## Recommendation(s) Status: Explosion inside an underframe equipment case at Guildford, 7 July 2017

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

## **Key to Recommendation Status**

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eted.	nplemented: All actions t
ay that was not identified by the RAIB during	nplemented by alternative the investig
agreed and is in the process of being	<b>nplementation ongoing:</b> Work to del delivered.
as provided a response that does not to properly consider and address a	
appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to provide this.	
no implementation action to be taken.	on-implementation: Regulation
ody or authority.	ther Public Body or uthority The recommendation
ublic body on the status of the	waiting response:  Awaiting initial recommend
	waiting response: Awaiting ini

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

1 07/07/2017

05/2018

Explosion inside an underframe equipment case at Guildford

Status: Awaiting response

The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the risk of a future capacitor failure on UK rolling stock traction systems leading to an explosion and possible harm to the travelling public and staff.

UK train operating companies in co-operation with the suppliers of their rolling stock (Rolling Stock Leasing Companies or Contracting Entities) should:

a) review the design of the electric traction systems in their current fleets and check that there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent an explosion capable of causing harm in the event of a failure of a capacitor(s); and

b) address any shortcomings identified in (a).

(paragraphs 123b and 123e).

30 April 2018