



EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: Mr P Brittain
Respondent: Nottingham City Homes Ltd
Heard at: Nottingham
On: Monday 23 October 2017
Before: Employment Judge Moore
Members: Mrs J Young
Mr C Tansley

Representation

Claimant: Mr Benson, Representative
Respondent: Ms N Owen, Counsel

JUDGMENT ON REMEDY

1. The Respondent shall pay the Claimant damages to compensate him for his pecuniary losses as follows:
 - a) For past loss of earnings from date of dismissal to date of the remedy hearing the sum of £23716.17. The Respondent shall pay to the Claimant interest on the past loss of earnings to the sum of £1505.00.
 - b) For future loss from date of remedy hearing until 23 March 2018 the sum of £6549.80 (credit being given for state benefits).
 - c) The compensation for pecuniary losses in excess of £30,000 is £265.97. This shall be grossed up to £332.46.
2. The Respondent shall pay compensation to the Claimant for injury to feelings in the sum of £12,000 and interest upon the award for injury to feelings from 23 March 2016 to the date of the remedy hearing in the sum of 1522.87.

REASONS

Background

1. Judgment on liability was given orally at the hearing on 4 May 2017. Written reasons were provided on 7 September 2017. The remedy hearing was listed at the Nottingham employment tribunal on 23 October 2017 and a further day in chambers on 6 November 2017. The tribunal heard evidence from the Claimant and the Claimant's wife. There was a further bundle of documents prepared for the remedy hearing.

2. The previous findings in relation to liability are set out in the liability judgment written reasons provided on 7 September 2017.
3. The Claimant was dismissed on 23 March 2016. He received 12 weeks' pay in lieu of notice amounting to £3,466.68. Since the Claimant's dismissal, he has not received anything in respect of his tier 3 pension as he had been advised not to accept that pension pending the outcome of the litigation. He has received 75 weeks state benefits in the sum of £109.36 per week up to the date of the remedy hearing.
4. Pension trustees are currently reviewing the Claimant's position in respect of his pension and we were informed by the parties that it is likely the Claimant will receive 18 months' backdated tier 3 pension contributions and at the same time a review after 18 months of receipt of the tier 3 pension; there could be a number of different outcomes.
5. The Claimant may continue to receive a tier 3 pension for a further 18 months (as the total period of a tier 3 pension is 3 years) or if the review concludes that his health has deteriorated or his circumstances have changed, he may be moved to a tier 1 or tier 2 pension. For these reasons we are not deciding the pension loss now and that head of loss is adjourned. A separate Case Management Order sets out directions in respect of how this will be dealt with.

Findings of fact

6. Following the Claimant's dismissal in March 2016, we accepted the evidence of the Claimant and his wife that the dismissal and failure of the Claimant's appeal exacerbated his depression, which was a pre-existing condition connected to his diagnosis of cancer and some life events in relation to his daughter being unwell.
7. It was not possible to attribute a percentage or apportion how much the depression related to the discriminatory dismissal. We find that the discriminatory dismissal of the Claimant by the Respondent significantly exacerbated his depression at a time when he had shown signs of the depression improving.
8. The reasons we find this are as follows. We accepted the Claimant's evidence that the dismissal and failure of appeal made him feel useless and unwanted. He still suffers from feeling useless as a result of having no proper job and being dependent on his wife and experiences anxiety when meeting new people. The way the Respondent has treated the Claimant has also made him mistrustful of others and their motives. The Claimant has good days and bad days. On the good days he is positive and feels well enough to look for other jobs but on bad days, he feels that no one will want to employ him.
9. Following the Claimant's unsuccessful appeal, he collapsed and required further investigations of a heart monitor. The Claimant received the all clear in respect of these investigations in August 2016.
10. Towards the end of August 2016/beginning of September 2016, the Claimant made the first application for alternative work since his dismissal after seeing a company on LinkedIn was looking for a project manager. He had some conversations with the company and was invited to a

meeting on 4 October 2016. It was agreed that the role would be too much for the Claimant's health conditions as it involved a lot of travelling of long distances and site working. The company suggested another role which was office based and which was a go between for two companies involving fire installations and maintenance. The Claimant was asked what salary he would accept and he advised he was looking for £28,000. Following this conversation, he did not hear back in relation to this job.

11. Before the Claimant had started employment with the Respondent, he had previously been made redundant aged 55 and was on job seeker's allowance for 6 months. During that period, he applied for 127 jobs and went for 5 interviews and was 55 years old at the time. Following his unsuccessful application for the LinkedIn role, the Claimant took the view that he had no realistic chance of finding other employment. He took this view based on his previous experience when looking for work at the age of 55, his current age of 61 and his health problems including his depression and the likelihood he would need to ask any new employer for reasonable adjustments.
12. The Claimant decided to start wood turning and purchased a lathe and other equipment in between September 2016 and November 2016 at the cost of £1,000. The Claimant has made a number of items through wood turning which he has sold to friends and family. He accepted this was more of a hobby than an attempt to start a business. The Claimant has made a loss when taking into account the equipment.
13. In December 2016 the Claimant agreed to go on a sailing trip with a friend on a training boat but withdrew from the trip as he was still anxious about meeting new people.
14. The Claimant did not make any further applications for jobs until after the employment tribunal hearing in May 2017. The Claimant explained that his focus was on 2 tribunal hearings, one that took place in February (which was a preliminary matter) and the substantive hearing in May 2017. After succeeding in his claim in May 2017, he felt positive enough about the future to start looking for other employment.
15. The only up to date medical evidence before the Tribunal was a letter from the Lymphedema Dept dated 29 June 2017 and a letter from the Claimant's GP dated 30 May 2017. The lymphedema clinic confirmed the Claimant's lymphedema had reduced from 6.4% in December 2015 to 2% in April 2017. The GP letter in summary stated that the Claimant had continued to take Fluoxetine for depression since February 2016. He had not been seen for low mood until May 2017 and reported that he felt his mood had improved because of the Fluoxetine but was still affected because of his inability to work. By this the Claimant meant his inability to secure another job.
16. In terms of the other health issues of the Claimant, he remains cancer free. His lymphedema is well under control and since December 2016 the swelling has stayed at around 1% to 2%. The Claimant is more physically active and is able to drive short distances and climb ladders, although he is not able to get into confined spaces and requires regular stops when driving to stretch his legs.
17. In relation to the depression, the Claimant had been doing quite well in

respect of the depression since the outcome of the liability hearing in May 2017. However, he remains on anti-depressants and sometimes still gets angry and upset for no obvious reason.

18. The Tribunal heard evidence from Mrs Brittain. We accepted her evidence in full and found her to be a credible witness. Mrs Brittain believed the Claimant would have been fit to return to work at the time of his appeal in May 2016 and would have benefitted from the stimulus of interacting with people and having a purpose after the shock of having cancer and the stress that followed. She describes how the Claimant's spirits lifted after the outcome of the Tribunal in May 2017 but over a slow period of time probably from mid July 2017 he developed a slow burn anger and obsession. On the issue of looking for work Mrs Brittain described the Claimant as sometimes enthusiastic and applies but at other times particularly recently he is more pessimistic and feels there is no point as no one would employ him.
19. When the Claimant learned of the Respondent's intention to appeal the liability judgment, this exacerbated his depression and the Claimant has what he described reached crisis point on 4 October 2017 where he broke down and sobbed. The Claimant has had an increase in medication from 20 mgs to 40 mgs a day and has been referred to a Let's Talk Wellbeing Services who have in turn recommended him for CBT, which has not yet commenced. Let's Talk have assessed his depression and anxiety as severe.

Mitigation

20. The Claimant has applied for the following roles:
 - a) On 1 August 2017, the Claimant applied for the role of electrical estimator with Pearce Electrical UK Ltd.
 - b) On 31 August 2017, the Claimant applied for the role of fire safety manager with Metropolitan Housing.
 - c) On 19 July 2017, he made an application for electrical estimator with Grosvenor Maxwell.
 - d) On 11 August 2017, he made an application for electrical estimator with Approach Personnel Ltd.
 - e) On 18 August 2017, he applied for a position of fire and security project manager with an agency Highgrove Recruitment Group Ltd.
21. The Claimant was not invited for an interview for any of those roles and apart from an acknowledgement thanking him for applying, he has not received any response to the job applications.
22. Under the relevant Local Government Pension Scheme, the Claimant's retirement age was 66. If the Claimant had retired before then, he would not have received a full pension nor would he receive a state pension until his 66th birthday. The Claimant's evidence was that he would have stayed working with the Respondent until he was 66.
23. The Respondent adduced evidence that the Claimant had failed to mitigate his loss and we were referred to a number of job vacancies that the Respondent say the Claimant could have applied for. Our findings on each of those are as follows.
 - a) Senior Electrical Technician at De Montfort University. We find this was

not suitable due to physical nature of the role. Some elements would have been suitable management side but also required to lead or undertake advanced or complex electrical installations.

- b) Electrical supervisor / Project Manager. This role required covering work all over the UK and also specified requiring a “hands on” approach to problem solving and getting the job done. We find this was not suitable as the driving was too much and also accept Claimant’s evidence this would have been a physical role.
- c) Project Manager Phoenix Property Solutions – experience in construction industry and travel described as essential. For these reasons we find it would not have been suitable. The Claimant did not have experience in the construction industry.
- d) Technical Officer - Ashfield District Council. The Claimant’s evidence was that it was an unsuitable role as it involved a lengthy drive and required ONC or HNC qualifications. We find this was a potentially suitable role with adjustments. The drive from the Claimant’s home to Sutton in Ashfield is approximately 16 miles and whilst the qualifications are specified the advert also states that equivalent proven experience within a building construction environment was an acceptable alternative to those qualifications.
- e) Building Services Engineer – Loughborough. The Claimant’s evidence was that it was not suitable due to supervising works by contractors and travelling. The job advert does not specify the need to travel other than the commute to Loughborough. We find this was a potentially suitable role.
- f) Electrical Supervisor – Sleaford. We find this would not have been suitable due to the distance and difficulty of the commute from the Claimant’s home to Sleaford and his limitations in respect of driving.
- g) Contracts Officer – Newark. The Claimant objected to this on the basis he would have needed highways work experience. We find this was not a suitable role due to the main responsibility for arranging sub-contractors for the delivery of highway maintenance and construction which is a very different field to electrical engineering.
- h) Technical Co-Ordinator – Strata Construction. This role involved provision of architectural and engineering design which we find was not suitable as the Claimant did not have any experience or qualifications in these areas.
- i) Electrical Supervisor – Derby. This role requires hands on installation work and travel around the country. For these reasons we find this was not suitable.
- j) Electrical Contracts Manager advertised through Synergy Personnel Services. The Claimant’s evidence was that this was a re-advertised position he had applied for and heard nothing however there was no evidence of his application. We find this was a potentially suitable role with adjustments.
- k) Electrical Supervisor – Ashby de la Zouch. We find this was not a suitable role as it required supervising electrical installations into vehicles and this was not an area the Claimant was experienced in.

- l) Electrical Project Manager – Grantham. This role would have been suitable but for the commute involved.
- m) Electrician – Wifinity. We find this was not a suitable role due to the physical nature of the role.
- n) Principal Engineer – Amoria Bond. We find this role was not suitable as it required someone with electrical controls background from the automotive defence or highways industry which was not the Claimant's field.
- o) Electrical Estimator – Nottinghamshire. We find this was potentially suitable although we were unable to reach a firm conclusion as the location was not specified other than "Nottinghamshire".
- p) Electrician – Eaton Electrical Ltd. Hands on electrician role not suitable due to physical nature and need to undertake actual installations.
- q) Mechanical Contracts role. We accept the Claimant's evidence that he was not qualified for such a role. He was not challenged on his evidence.
- r) Electrical Contracts Manager – Leicester based. Not suitable as involved managing UK wide projects due to amount of travel.
- s) Technical Officer – Chesterfield. We find this was not suitable as the role was building works than electrical works.
- t) Technical Officer – Fire Safety. The Claimant had not seen this role advertised – it was a suitable role similar to his previous job subject to adjustments to the requirement to work in confined spaces and work at heights and up ladders.

24. The Tribunal heard evidence about 21 roles advertised between June and October 2017. Of these we found there were four potentially suitable roles the Claimant may have been able to do having regard to his experience, qualifications and health restrictions subject to reasonable adjustments. Adding these to the five roles the Claimant has applied for during the same period this totals nine roles potentially suitable. We find the job market in the Claimant's sphere to be relatively buoyant.

The Law

25. Section 124 (6) EQA 2010 provides 'the amount of compensation that may be awarded...corresponds to the amount which could be awarded by the county court....under section 119.'

26. In summary, Section 119 EQA 2010 provides that the county court has the power to grant any remedy which could be granted by the High Court in proceedings in tort as well as damages for injury to feelings. The Tribunal therefore awards compensation to put the Claimant back into the position he would have been but for the discriminatory act(s).

Pecuniary Loss

27. The Claimant is seeking career long loss. We must consider the chances of a non discriminatory dismissal at in any event; the *Polkey* principle

applies to discriminatory dismissals **Chagger v Abbey National plc** [2010] ICR 297CA.

28. We were referred by the Respondent to the case of **Newsome v Sunderland City Council** EAT/36/02. In this case the EAT set out how the Tribunal should approach the assessment of future loss by reference to principles approved in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in **Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police (No 2)** [2003] IRLR 103. In summary these principles are that the Tribunal must approach the compensation for future loss of earnings by assessing the chances, if the Claimant had not been discriminated against and dismissed, of remaining employed until retirement age. It is not an issue of primary fact. The question requires a forecast to be made about the future course of events and has to be answered on the basis of the best assessment that can be made on the relevant material available to the court.
29. The Respondent's submissions also referred to the case of **Wardle v Credit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank** [2011] EWCA Civ 545. This case sets out important guidance in assessing future compensation loss. The Court of Appeal stressed that career loss cases will be rare. The usual approach, assessing the loss up to the point where the employee would be likely to obtain an equivalent job, does fairly assess the loss in cases (and they are likely to be the vast majority) where it is at least possible to conclude that the employee will in time find such a job. In the normal case, if a tribunal assesses that the employee is likely to get an equivalent job by a specific date, that will encompass the possibility that he might be lucky and secure the job earlier, in which case he will receive more in compensation than his actual loss, or he might be unlucky and find the job later than predicted, in which case he will receive less than his actual loss. The tribunal's best estimate ought in principle to provide the appropriate compensation. The various outcomes are factored into the conclusion. In practice, the speculative nature of the exercise means that the tribunal's prediction will rarely be accurate. But it is the best solution which the law, seeking finality at the point where the court awards compensation, can provide.

Non pecuniary loss - Injury to feelings

30. Awards for injury to feelings are compensatory and are not designed to punish the Respondent. They should be just to both parties fully compensating the Claimant only for proven unlawful discrimination.
31. Awards should command public respect and should not be so low as to dismiss the underlying policies behind discrimination legislation nor too high to have the same effect. The award should reflect the range of awards in personal injury cases. This is not a case where psychiatric injury is claimed. The effect of the unlawful discrimination on the Claimant and the duration and nature of the discrimination are relevant to assessing the extent of the injury to feelings.
32. When considering the level of compensation in discrimination cases we should consider the guidance in **Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police** and the revised bands in **Da'Bell v NSPCC** [2010] IRLR 19 EAT. Further in **De Souza v Vinci Construction (UK) Ltd** [2017] EWCA Civ 879 the Court of Appeal held that for claims falling for consideration after 1 April 2013 these amounts should be subject to an

uplift of 10% to reflect the general approach to increases in similar kinds of damages awarded in personal injury cases laid down in **Simmons v Castle** [2012] EWCA Civ 1039 and 1288.

33. The latest Presidential Guidance (for claims presented before 11 September 2017) sets out at para. 11 a formula by reference to the RPI All Items Index for the month and year closest to the date of presentation of the claim to uprate for the effects of inflation since 2010, with the **Simmons v Castle** uplift of 10% then to be applied.

Conclusions

34. The Claimant made the following submissions regarding the percentage chance that he would have ceased employment for reasons other than the discriminatory dismissal before the date of his retirement. The Claimant submitted there was a 0% chance he would have left the Respondent's employment before retirement. The Claimant submitted he was fit to work and pointed to there being no recurrence of the cancer for nearly three years. His lymphedema was under control and with reasonable adjustments there was no other reason his health might have resulted in his leaving employment.

35. The Respondent submitted that the reality of the Claimant's health and ability to work should be considered in light of new evidence that was not available at the liability hearing. The only new medical evidence that was available was a letter dated 29 June 2017 regarding his lymphedema and the GP letter dated 30 May 2017. We agree that neither of these reports were helpful in providing a prognosis of the Claimant's current ability to work in respect of his mental health but the letter dated 29 June 2017 did assist in relation to the Claimant's condition of Lymphedema as it confirmed that this had reduced to 2%.

36. The Respondent further submitted that the most recent medical information prior to the GP letter of 30 May 2017 was the supplementary report of Dr Jackson dated 8 August 2016 following a consultation with the Claimant on 16 June 2016 which concluded Tier 3 ill health retirement was appropriate as there was "insufficient evidence of permanent incapacity with regard to all gainful employment". Therefore, as there was a medical opinion that he qualified for Tier 3 retirement there was no definitive medical opinion that the Claimant was fit to return in any capacity.

37. We do not accept this contention for the following reasons. It is important to note that Dr Jackson stated in the sentence before the sentence quoted in submissions the following:

"Following receipt of this report I would support the view that Mr Brittain is permanently unfit for his most recent occupation due to physical impairment relating to persistent Lymphedema."

38. Dr Jackson specifically links the Claimant being permanently unfit for his role due to physical impairment relating to persistent Lymphedema. He further states that there was insufficient evidence to conclude the Claimant was permanently incapacitated with regard to all gainful employment. The Lymphedema clinic letter confirmed that the Claimant's Lymphedema has decreased from 6.4% to 2% as of April 2017.

39. Further, there was other medical evidence prior to May 2017 from the Claimant's Consultant Clinical Oncologist Dr Lawson who had seen the Claimant on 15 June 2016 only a day before Dr Jackson. This was a more detailed report in respect of his overall health at that point in time as set out in paragraph 41 of the Judgment on liability.
40. Having regard to all of the medical evidence available to the court at the remedy hearing we remain of the view that but for the discrimination which exacerbated the Claimant's depression, he would have been well enough to return to work on a phased return between April and June 2016 (paragraph 42). We have to try and assess when the Claimant would have returned to work full time but for the discriminatory dismissal and this involves a degree of speculation. We are assisted (see our findings at paragraph 41 of the liability judgment) by the letter from the Claimant's oncologist Dr Lawson in July 2016. We find that but for the discriminatory dismissal the Claimant would have completed a phased return and been back full time from 5 August 2016. In particular we took into account this was the date when he received the all clear from the hospital regarding his heart monitor.
41. We accept that the Claimant would not, of his own volition left the employment of the Respondent before he reached retirement age of 66. The reason we make such a finding is that we have taken into account the Claimant's age, his health conditions and a diagnosis of cancer and the fact that prior to starting work for the Respondent, the Claimant had been made redundant at age 55 and had undertaken an extensive job search in order to get employment with the Respondent. We find there was zero chance that the Claimant would have given up the security of the role with the Respondent at his age and given his health conditions he would not have given up the security of being employed by a public sector employer to enter the job market.
42. However we do not go on to conclude that this means the Claimant would have stayed in employment until he was 66 years old. We must make an assessment of the chance of the Claimant remaining in service with the Council until 66. We have had to determine a hypothetical evaluation of the chance of the Claimant remaining in employment until 66 had the discriminatory dismissal not occurred. We have concluded this is not a case where the career loss is appropriate. We have taken into account the Claimant's various health issues along with the medical evidence and the Claimant's evidence. Although the Claimant has remained cancer free after three years he still has a number of health issues of Lymphedema and depression. There was no evidence or submissions before the Tribunal in respect of the % chance of the cancer returning now the Claimant has been cancer free for 3 years and we therefore have not taken this into account in reaching our conclusions.
43. It was not possible to apportion all of the depression to the discriminatory dismissal and given that the Claimant had suffered with depression prior to his dismissal it is possible he could have done so again in the future regardless of whether the dismissal had taken place. In other words but for the discriminatory dismissal there was a likelihood the Claimant could have had further periods of ill health and as a result been dismissed from his employment with the Respondent. Taking into account all of these factors we find that there was a 70% chance that but for the discriminatory

he would have remained employed with the Respondent until retirement at age 66.

Mitigation

44. That is not the end of the matter. Turning now to the issue of mitigation. The duty to mitigate loss continues into future loss.
45. The burden of proof for failure to mitigate loss rests with the Respondent. The Respondent's position is that there are three grounds on which the Claimant has failed to mitigate his loss.
 - a) Firstly, that the Claimant did not seek new employment for over a year following his dismissal.
 - b) Secondly that he has applied for an unreasonably low number of jobs and that his search for alternative employment should have widened outside of his electrical skills to retail and hospitality.
 - c) Thirdly that the Claimant's wood turning was not a reasonable step to take as it could never have been expected to attract the salary he had earned whilst with the Respondent.
46. Having regard to all the circumstances and the evidence of the Claimant and his wife regarding his mental health, we find that the Claimant has not failed to mitigate his loss as at the remedy hearing. We have taken into account his depression after the dismissal and how the discriminatory dismissal affected the Claimant and his ability to apply for other roles. The Claimant took such steps as were reasonable in the circumstances. When he began to actively apply for roles he reasonably has commenced a search within his sphere of experience and background.
47. There has not been a failure to mitigate by failing to widen his job search at this stage to retail and hospitality. The Claimant worked in these sectors many years ago and this is not an area in which he has qualifications or expertise. Further they are likely to be more physically demanding by the very nature of these industries.
48. In relation to the wood turning the Claimant accepted this was more of a hobby. It was reasonable for the Claimant to engage in hobbies and activities such as the sailing trip to try and improve his mental wellbeing.
49. The Claimant's reaction to the appeal of the liability decision should not be taken into account when assessing compensation as this is not attributable to the act of discrimination for which we found the Respondent liable. We must therefore try and assess when it would be reasonable to say the Claimant could find alternative employment setting aside his reaction to the appeal and how this affected his depression.
50. Having assessed the evidence regarding the job market in the Claimant's area of expertise and his physical and mental health prognosis we conclude that the Claimant should secure alternative employment within two years of his dismissal. The job market is buoyant with nine jobs in evidence as suitable for the Claimant to have applied for within a period between June and October 2017. We therefore award loss from the date of dismissal on 23 March 2016 to the date of the remedy hearing on 23

October 2016 of £436.85 @ 81 weeks which totals £35,384.85. The Recoupment Regulations do not apply and we have therefore deducted state benefits of £8202.00 from the pecuniary loss. We have also deducted notice pay of £3266.88. The total past loss therefore comes to £23,716.17.

51. There was no evidence before the Tribunal about whether the Claimant would have been paid in full during a phased return however the Respondent's counter schedule of loss agreed that the Claimant's loss from date of dismissal should be calculated at his net weekly loss with no mention of any deduction for a potential phased return. On this basis we award the net loss from date of dismissal with no deduction for the period we find he could have returned on a phased return basis.

Injury to feelings

52. The Respondent submits that an award in the lower band of Vento is appropriate as the dismissal was effectively a one off event. This is rejected by the Claimant who submits that there were a series of acts that led to the dismissal and these should also be taken into account when assessing injury to feelings.

53. We do not agree that the dismissal was a one off event. Our liability judgment made findings at the level of distress experienced at a meeting on 3 February 2016 (paragraph 29). The Claimant was given reassurances by Mr Edlin in a letter dated 10 March 2016 which were subsequently contradicted (paragraph 33). There was an outright rejection of the possibility of making reasonable adjustments to enable the Claimant to return to his role (paragraph 33). As well as the dismissal itself the Claimant found the appeal hearing very distressing and became very emotional (paragraph 38).

54. These were acts that had a profound and serious effect on the Claimant as well as the loss of his job and all that followed in terms of the effect on his mental health and confidence. We accept there was no finding of bad faith on the part of anyone at the Respondent.

55. Taking all of this into account it is the judgment of the Tribunal that the appropriate award for the Claimant's injury to feelings falls in the lower end of the middle Vento band and is the sum of £12,000.

56. The Respondent shall pay the Claimant interest on the award to injury to feelings from 3 February 2016 to the date of remedy hearing 23 October 2017. The Respondent shall also pay interest on past loss of earnings from the mid-point date (from the act of discrimination to the date of calculation). The relevant rate of interest is 8% from 29 July 2013; Employment Tribunal (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) regulations 1996.

57. The compensation in respect of pecuniary losses above £30,000 shall be grossed up based on a tax band of 20%.

Employment Judge Moore

Date: 3 January 2018

JUDGMENT SENT TO THE PARTIES ON

13/01/18

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FOR THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE