



MOD-83-0000138-A

Witness Name: Jason Michael Williams

Statement No.: 1

Exhibits: None

Dated:

**In the matter of an investigation into the death of
Mr Hassan Said**

**WITNESS STATEMENT OF
JASON WILLIAMS**

I, Jason Michael Williams, will say as follows:-

1. I am making this statement for the purposes of the investigation into the death of Mr Hassan Said.
2. I was commissioned from Sandhurst in 1991, served as a Troop Leader within the 1st Royal Tank Regiment for 3½ years, then moved on to be the Reconnaissance Troop Leader with the 1st Royal Tank Regiment until about 1996. I then became a Squadron 2IC serving in Cyprus in 1997. I then completed a year long 'technical' course becoming Ops Officer for about 6 months with the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Regiment. I then assumed the position as Adjutant of the Joint NBC Regiment and then went to Sandhurst as an instructor before moving to the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment. There I assumed the role of the Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Officer working out of Battle Group HQ during Operation TELIC 1 in a war-fighting role. I then assumed the role of G5 Civil Military Cooperation Officer. That Operation started from Kuwait before moving over the border into Iraq. We came back from Operation TELIC 1, went on Post Operational

Tour Leave, then went back to Germany and formed up Badger Squadron on the 16th June 2003. On the 30th June 2003, the Advance Party including myself deployed to Iraq to start a handover. The main body of the Squadron deployed to Iraq and joined us about 10 days later.

3. In August 2003 I was Badger Squadron Leader with the 2nd Royal Tank Regiment based in Fallingbostal. At the time of the incident involving Mr Said, Badger Squadron was under the command of 1 KINGS Battle Group our Area of Operations was north of Basra including Ad Dayr, Ash Shafi and up to the Battle Group boundary with the Danish Battle Group. Within that area we had Ash Shafi and Ad Dayr Police Stations with a smaller team of troops from Badger Squadron and two members of the Royal Military Police, who were there to train and assist with the rebuilding of the Iraqi Police. Also within the area, there was a Troop location called the 'Hacienda'. Half an hour south of there was a location called the 'Riverside' which is where the Squadron Headquarters element was consisting of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), the Squadron Quartermaster Sergeant and the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME). This was next to one of the biggest power stations in Southern Iraq that we were providing front gate security for. The two members of the Royal Military Police at Ad Dayr Police Station also conducted regular visits in conjunction with our patrols to Ash Shafi Police Station (unmanned by Coalition Forces) to assist the police there. My unit base at Ad Dayr were basically left there to service Ash Shafi Police Station when the patrols went out there. It was one of these patrols that had gone out from the 'Hacienda' via Ad Dayr Police Station, picked up S008 RMP and were then on Route 6 heading north up to Ash Shafi Police Station when the incident then happened or where it began.
4. I did not witness the incident nor was I present at the scene. I make this statement on the basis of what I was told by Lt J M Halloran (Pl Comd) and S008 RMP. Lt Halloran told me the chain of events that he had witnessed on arriving at Riverside after the incident. Also S008 RMP briefly explained his account, but did not give any exact details as he said he was unable to until RMP(SIB) had arrived at Riverside. When I made my first statement on 2nd August 2003 I had not been able to speak to S009 to ascertain his account of what happened.

5. The account that I can give of this incident is based on the account given to me later that day by Lt Halloran. Lt Halloran and his patrol were escorting S008 RMP from Ad Dayr Police Station to Ash Shafi Police Station to carry out his daily checks of the Police Station. They were travelling north along Route 6 approx 2 kms north of Ad Dayr when the patrol noticed seven unknown males pushing a cart with what appeared to be mines inside. The patrol stopped and debussed. At this stage four of the men ran off, but the patrol managed to detain three of them. On investigating the cart there was a quantity of what appeared to be 12.7 and 14.7 mm rounds. During arresting and detaining the men, one of them got to his feet and ran off. S008 and S009 gave chase. Both were shouting for the man to stop. At this point S009 made his rifle ready and fired a warning shot into the air. The man ignored this and continued to run around the corner of a side street, disappearing from the sight of the rest of the patrol for what seemed to be more than 40 seconds. Lt Halloran then ordered Cpl Gardner to get them back so they could deal with the two detained men.
6. There was then a struggle/incident within a nearby house during which the Iraqi male was shot by S009 S008 then returned to where Lt Halloran was and said the man had been shot. Lt Halloran told S008 to wait at the Land Rover with the detainees and went to investigate. On turning down the street he saw Cpl Gardner at one entrance to a house and S009 at the other entrance. On looking inside he saw a man lying on the floor in a pool of blood. At this stage a crowd of approximately 40-50 had started to gather. Lt Halloran sent Cpl Gardner to fetch the Land Rover where upon it arrived at the house. The casualty was loaded onboard and taken to Ad Dayr Hospital. The patrol then went to Ad Dayr Police Station where the two detainees were put into a cell. At this point S008 cautioned S009 He then phoned 150 Pro Coy and explained the chain of events. They came to the 'Riverside'.
7. I would have been made aware of the incident by the Operations Room (Ops Rm) that was next to my room that was a joint office and bedroom shared by myself and the 2IC in the 'Riverside'. There was always a 'Watch Keeper' and a Radio Operator present and a member of the G2 Intelligence Cell there during working hours. The Ops Rm was informed of the incident by radio via the 'Hacienda'. The Ops Rm then informed me of the incident. I think I was informed in the early evening around 1800 hours but I only say that because I have read a patrol program since. Once notified, I then tried to ascertain exactly what had happened to then enable me to give advice and guidance to

those 'on the ground' as to future actions to take. It became clear that someone had been shot and needed to be extracted and taken to the Hospital. This of course was not a planned Operation but was just a routine patrol so the guys would have just dealt with the situation that unfolded at the time. I would initially be concerned for the guys on the ground and consider the need for a QRF deployment. I gathered that they had 'mounted up' and left the scene with all the patrol with them so they were no longer in any immediate danger.

8. Being satisfied about their safety my next concern was to report it up to Battle Group HQ so that they could report to Brigade HQ who in turn would report to Divisional HQ. This is the chain of command as to who would need to know about a shooting incident like this. I only informed Battle Group HQ that there had been an incident. I then needed to get more definite details so that I could more accurately 'brief-up' Lt Col Griffin. I did this by way of a typed report dated the 2nd August 2003 containing four paragraphs. I signed this report at the time I handed it to Lt Col Griffin that night. I still retain a copy of this report which I gave to Detective Sergeant Nelhams of the Serious Crime Directorate, Metropolitan Police at 12.45 pm on Tuesday the 13th July 2004 at Hohne Camp in Germany. I signed an exhibit label 2789487Z and produce this document as exhibit JMW/1. DS Nelhams countersigned the exhibit label in my presence. This report was based on Lt Halloran's account and a very brief account from S008. I believe the patrol arrived at the 'Riverside' about 2000 hours where I spoke to S008 and Lt Halloran separately from each other. I then went to Battle Group HQ where I typed up the report JMW/1. I do not know where the other members of the patrol were and I did not speak to either of them. I certainly did not speak to Tpr Williams initially and I did not know who did. I believe I spoke to Lt Halloran first and he gave me an account as per my exhibit JMW/1. S008 told me that he could not give a detailed account and that he had to wait for the SIB to arrive. The SIB is the Special Investigation Branch who is part of the Royal Military Police (RMP) of which S008 is a member. As a member of the RMP S008 obviously thought that that was the correct procedure and he did not want to speak to anybody else. That is my interpretation of why he would not speak to me. I did tell him that he had to tell me something so that I could 'brief-up' CO 1 KINGS. He gave me a very brief account but that is all. I cannot remember what S008's demeanour was like at the time I spoke to him. It was clear to me that things were 'going to run', statements

would be taken and so I did not want to push him any further, make him feel victimised or interfere with any future process. I had the rest of the Squadron to run as well. S008 did not tell me any more than was on my report. I wrote my report and conclusion looking at the situation from a young twenty year old's point of view in his position at that time. When I typed the report Lt Col Griffin was on a patrol. I think I spoke to him at some point but I cannot remember what was said. He would have read my report and if he wanted any more he could have spoken to the individuals himself. The only reason I made the report was because they had come to me first and I had to get an account to give to the CO. The report went straight to Lt Col Griffin and no one else. S008 and S009 later got down to Battle Group HQ to make their statements but I do not know whether they travelled separately or together. S008 was in an office used by the RMP and members of G2 cell. S009 went into the Ops Officer's office where he sat and wrote his statement. I would just pop in and out to make sure he was ok. I did not give him any advice on how to write his statement.

9. S009 wrote two statements. The first was very general. This he signed but I added his name, rank and Service Number in block writing under his signature, as he had not done this. This statement was then handed in to the Battle Group 2IC or CO who then said that they required it to be more detailed. S009 then wrote a more detailed second statement regarding the events within the house where the incident took place. I did not help him to write this second statement in any way either. I am pretty sure that S008 later returned to Ad Dayr Police Station and S009 returned to the 'Hacienda'. SIB turned up approximately twenty-four hours later regarding seizing of clothing and weapons. After this we moved S009 down to the 'Riverside' so that he had some 'moral' support. This was a 'Duty of Care' move on our part. There were more staff there as well, which enabled us to be more flexible with his duties. Also if anyone wanted to interview him or have him make a statement then they would have to go through his Commanding Officers and we could be there for him. Lt Col Griffin wrote a 'Serious Incident Report'. The purpose of this report, which I believe should be completed within 24 hours, is for the CO to recommend whether or not the matter should go further as far as any investigation is concerned. This recommendation was written on the back of this Serious Incident Report and the recommendation was that there was not a case to answer. This was his view. I saw that recommendation the next day. I do not think at any stage we assumed it was the end of

it and although that was the recommendation of Lt Col Griffin, it could still be investigated by the SIB. I don't think this report was typed up that night by Lt Col Griffin so I don't think the decision was made then. I think, ultimately, the decision would rest with the Brigade Commander or a 'legal' officer. I was not involved with any cautioning or removal of weapons from S009 by S008. This was done by S008 and those issues were dealt with by Captain Nick Ridgway of my unit. I was not present during any of this but I knew S009 weapon was later returned to him and he resumed normal duties. I was not personally involved in telling anyone that night that this matter would go no further or that it was not a Police matter. I was at Battle Group HQ probably from about 2000/2030 hours until half past midnight doing all this stuff. I do not know for sure who asked S008 and S009 to provide their written statements. It definitely was not me. When I spoke to Lt Col Griffin he did not specifically discuss with me any aspects regarding whether it was in the 'Rules of Engagement' or not or what action would be taken next. I do not know what happened to the two remaining Iraqi prisoners. I believe the cart and ammunition was left at the side of the road and later disappeared.

10. I would just like to explain the background, setting and tension within the area. For example, on Lt Col Griffin's Serious Incident Report, it mentions that the Police Station had come under fire two days before. The whole situation out there wasn't just a 'walk in the park'. Tension was high and it was an area that was frequently inflicted with bloody 'tribal' feuds. People were 'ready' for things to happen all the time. S009 would have had three weeks working in that environment having to make such decisions.

Statement of Truth

I believe the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed ...

Dated05/02/15.....