



MOD-83-0000368-A

FOLIO NUMBER  
4  
INTSUM0159  
11APR07

2 <sup>ND</sup> BN THE RIFLES G2 BASRA CITY SOUTH BG BASRA PALACE BFPO 657 Blue 964 3148		
DTG:	111200APR07	
INFO CUT OFF:	111200APR07	
PERIOD:	FROM 101200APR07	TO 111200APR07

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.** (SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI)

**IDF BP**  
**OP AREZZO**  
**SR SAF ON PJCC**

**SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS / EVENTS.** (SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI)

1. **IDF BP.**

2. **OP AREZZO.** Whilst inserting into the target area, at 101436DAPR07 a CHINDIT Coy C/S was contacted by six rounds SAF as they passed the southern edge of AL QUIBLA while transiting Route 6 en route to Red 2 IVO GR 690 712. The rounds were heard hitting the side of one of the Warriors, but no FP was identified and no rounds returned. The C/S continued on task.

A Coy Rifles cleared Red 2 and the Force Res C/S pushed into AL QUIBLA and transited through AL QUIBLA to establish their blocks on the Reds. A Coy inserted to strike their target location (Alpha 1-GR QU 69221 73584) at Orange 2 at 1456 while Chindit C/S struck their objective just north of Orange 1 (ALPHA 103 GR QU 68370 71955) and was completed by 1503. B Coy moved past Chindit Coy and struck their objectives at 1502 (ALPHA 53-GR QU 6900 72870, ALPHA 54 and 55-GR QU 6902 7290). Nothing of significance was found in A Coy or Chindit Coy's Alphas, but in A53, B Coy found the building had been left in a rush, food for lunch had been left on the table or tipped on the floor. They removed some exploitable evidence which included paperwork on Pythagoras's theory relating to the firing of rockets and details of how to achieve 'direct hits' on the enemy and an arms recognition pamphlet which has 'needed' or 'search' jotted next to a number of items that include missile types, lightly armoured vehicles and Mortar Illium rounds. **BC G2 COMMENT:** IDF teams in the area near to the SHIA FLATS and AL QUIBLA usually fire at an effective range of 7-7.5km. Recently, however, they have been reducing the range and IDF teams have had successes from new FPs that are also at a closer range. This may be as a result of the application of mathematics to the firing of some of the IDF teams who would then be capable of achieving accurate hits from new FPs without the need to adjust their fire. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**

Once static on ALPHA 1 A COY C/S noticed combat indicators of an imminent attack: the streets soon cleared of people and adults were seen moving children off the streets at 1521. The market places near Orange 2 began to pack up and a number of dickers were seen- of note were two motorcycles that passed A Coy on their way into B Coy's area that had 7 UKMs on them who were

Modf

006

Ser N<sup>o</sup>

321

whitlockh



**SECRET - REL MCFI**

carrying bags. CHINDIT Coy also noticed cars dicking them and a man in a grey top and wearing a Shemagh on a motorbike who was later seen firing an RPG. B Coy reported seeing a black LINCOLN saloon circle them up to four times. **BC G2 COMMENT:** AIF attempt to locate MNF C/S before engaging them they seem to establish exactly where all c/s are to avoid being surprised by depth c/s. The motorcycles seemed extremely suspicious; either they were carrying weapons in bags, could be provided with weapons in AL QUIBLA (as seen on previous contacts) or, less likely, were in a hurry on their way back from the shops. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**

While B Coy were searching their houses they came under a number of bursts SAF from FPs situated to the East of their positions. Rounds were returned but were not followed up to avoid being sucked into a fight in the tight streets of HAYY AL SHUHDA. Instead, once the task was complete, B Company moved off to the West into the area of HAY AL MUHANDISN. At 1605 the extraction began.

At 1543 A Coy 2 Rifles began to come under a number of single round SAF attacks, again from the East of Orange 2 (GR QU 6926 7348). During this initial contact an IPS officer who was manning a PVCP at Orange 2 between the FPs and the A Coy C/S was hit in the neck by AIF fire. The IPS vehicle at the VCP was also hit a number of times. This was the first contact against A Coy. The IPS officer fell to the first or second rounds of the burst. It is believed that the rounds were actually aimed at the WR that was static a few metres behind his position. A Coy Rifles and a co-located Recce/Sniper roof team identified a number of FPs and began to engage. AIF gunmen continued to attack the A Coy C/S for at least 20 minutes from this point, and A Coy claim approximately 5 hits from near the junction. The AIF were firing primarily from roof tops and a wall to the east of the football pitch at Orange 2. A sniper claimed a hit against a gunman who was approaching the MNF position from the east and A10B who were to the north of the main A Coy positions also claimed 2 hits from FPs on the eastern side of the MSR (GR QU 694 737). The majority of the gunmen seen to the east and north east of Orange 2 were seen crossing the road from HAYY AL SHUHDA into HAY AL QAD. During the contact a black saloon car was seen travelling down from the north having already been engaged by SAF. It came to a stop to the north of Orange 2 and 1 UKM ran off. Another UKM who had clearly been hit also climbed out and ran off leaving a possible third UKM in the vehicle. It is uncertain who had engaged this vehicle. Neither A Coy nor the snipers engaged this vehicle, it is believed that it may have been engaged from the north by Force Reserve c/s at Orange 4. At least 2 contacts came from dark vehicles as they drove across the interface between HAYY AL SHUHDA and HAYY AL QAD- one of these was successfully engaged. **BC G2 COMMENT:** It is surprising that the AIF fired upon the police VCP, the IPS themselves were clearly as surprised as the MNF C/S nearby. It is likely that this was an error on the part of the AIF and inaccurate firing. Attacks from moving vehicles have been seen in AL QUIBLA before, but are rare in the rest of the BC AO. Of note in this contact was that the AIF did not appear to choose new FPs, but continued to return to the same FPs despite possible casualties and accurate returning fire. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**

B Coy 2 Rifles were engaged from the NW as soon as they crossed into HAYY AL MUHANDISN. They believe that this was an MG or HMG. They returned rounds in the direction of the FP and the enemy weapon system (which was not clearly identified) fell silent and was not heard again during the contact. One C/S then proceeded to the northern area of HAY MUHANDISN and was contacted from a static white Saloon car at 1535. They assaulted the FP and found 2 UKMs in a ditch by the car who were then detained. They also passed two bodies who are assessed to be ENHITs. Simultaneously they came under contact from the north and south. The black LINCOLN had been spotted firing at another B Coy C/S and came to a stop to the south so the C/S assaulted, coming under contact again from a house with an RPG. The C/S followed up into the building but nothing of significance was found. The two detainees were later flown to the COB and identified as wanted SCU members and then interned. **BC G2 COMMENT:** A heavy machine gun weapon has been repeatedly reported by C/S involved in contacts in the AL QUIBLA area. In the past it has changed fire position a number of times indicating that it could be vehicle mounted. During the last contact in AL QUIBLA on 29 March it was fired was from a similar



position in HAYY AL MUHANDSIN, indicating that it may be stored in the area. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**

The remainder of B Coy 2 Rifles was engaged in a significant contact with a large number of AIF in the area who had taken up FPs on the roof tops in two blocks in the East of HAY AL MUHANDISN. The C/S manoeuvred around the FPs, having effectively surrounded them, and claimed 15 ENHITS before the extraction began. **BC G2 COMMENT:** It is uncertain where these gunmen came from. Current G2 assessments indicate that most AIF within AL QUIBLA live within the HAYY AL SHUHDA area, whenever there is a large contact they seem to be reinforced from the AL HYANNIAH. However on this occasion the ingress routes from the HYANNIAH had been blocked off. Either they were infiltrating through the blocks or had looped round from HAYY AL SHUHDA or there are in fact a heavier concentration of AIF within AL MUHANDISN than previously thought. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**

Chindit Coy, having extracted from their strike area, came under contact at 1623 from a number of FPs to the SW of Orange 1 (GR QU 6822 7180). At least 2 RPGs were fired and a number of SAF contacts. The FPs were all located within approximately 20m area, from round walls and behind a number of parked cars. 30mm, Chaingun and top cover returned rounds. At 1700 another C/S down on the southernmost tip of AL QUIBLA was also engaged by SAF and 5 RPGs and returned 2 30mm along with SAF and a UGL. During these contacts CHINDIT Coy claimed two ENHITS. **BC G2 COMMENT:** It is again noteworthy that the AIF did not attempt to significantly change their FPs during these contacts. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**

As the FORCE RES C/S were extracting past the CHINDIT C/S at 1627 they were engaged and hit by an RPG at GR QU 684 721. B COY extracted to Red 3 where they again came under contact from FPs to the east of their positions. CHINDIT Coy returned rounds at a car and 1<sup>st</sup> floor FP near Red 2 as they moved through as well, after Force RES C/S were engage by another RPG. A Coy used smoke to aid in their extraction and moved down to the area of HAMDANN JUNCTION without incident excepting a twisted track that was eventually cut away and left in the area. The rest of the 2 RIFLES C/S followed and the FORCE RES C/S extracted back to their location.

As at 111200 24 ENHITS were claimed. 6,000 7.62mm were fired, 3500 5.56mm and 29 UGLs. The two detainees were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

**BC G2 COMMENT:** The majority of the AIF behavior in this operation seems to fit within their normal pattern. Apart from the brief contact during the insertion, the main activity started 30 mins later, after extensive dicking. AIF were seen obviously moving about on motorcycles and using cars and only then did they attack static C/S. The majority of movement seemed to be coming from HAY AL SHUDA and heading into other areas which would reinforce previous assessments that this was where AIF militia had a stronghold. There however seemed to be a sizeable AIF force gathered against B Coy in HAYY AL MUHANDSIN. The call of [REDACTED] (see para 4) which implies that reinforcements did not arrive until after MNF left and the block on the Reds ( that should have deterred most infiltration) suggests that there is a larger and more active AIF grouping operating within HAYY AL MUHANDSIN than previously thought.

This was one of the few times where atmospherics obviously alerted the C/S to the imminent contact. In past contacts in AL QUIBLA gunmen have opened up on MNF without any regard for civilians in the vicinity. This would indicate that the AIF presence was sufficiently obvious to warn the locals, or that the AIF were local and thus able to warn their friends and family.

The AIF behaviour once the contacts started also raises a number of points. It would appear that they attacked almost all of the C/S in AL QUIBLA with small groups rather than trying to mass and engage one outnumbered target. They also failed to show the maneuver that has previously been witnessed in AL QUIBLA- C/S described the incident as being at times like a turkey shoot, with



**SECRET - REL MCFI**

gunmen popping up in the same places repeatedly and thus making themselves easy targets. Gunmen were clearly moving towards contact areas and using vehicles as platforms to carry out attacks, but there was no concerted attempt to outflank static MNF C/S.

A question remains as to what effect this will have had upon the AIF and more importantly the local population. Whilst some people merely looked glum, there were no negative gestures from the locals as MNF entered; some were waving and showing approval. Likewise on the extraction, whilst the streets were emptier, there were no negative gestures. As one c/s moved through Red 3 a man on the corner applauded. However this is merely anecdotal and BC BG will have to await phone calls with local contacts to assess the true reaction on the ground. It is unlikely that the AIF will see this as a victory, the reaction to the Op HOWSON extraction on 12 April should be a key indicator as to the effect on AL QUIBLA AIF groupings. It may have dampened the enthusiasm of the lower ranks to attack MNF. **BC G2 COMMENT ENDS.**



3. **SR SAF ON PJCC.** At 101607DAPR07, Sangar 1 (GR QU 7055 8055) at the PJCC was contacted by SRSAF. Firing point was not identified. No rounds were returned. There were no reports of any MNF casualties or damage.

**INFORMATION.** (SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI)

4. **KEY LEADER PHONE CALL.** The CO's interpreter was phoned by [REDACTED] who has conducted KLE with BC BG. He informed the interpreter that someone had spoken to JAM in the HYANNIAH and requested support for the ongoing contact in Al QUIBLA. The JAM were going to muster on the western road of the HYANNIAH and would then proceed to the edge near the JAMEAT and then south into AL QUIBLA via Red 6. The CO's interpreter was phoned as the last C/S left AL QUIBLA and so no further action was taken.



**SECRET - REL MCFI**

5. **LECS REQUEST TO LEAVE EARLY.** The U.S. at BP reported that they had noticed that their LECs often went home early on days when BP was attacked with IDF in the early afternoon. As their LECs had just asked to leave early, they informed the Ops room that there could be an attack this afternoon.

Lt Mat Burbeck  
BCS G2  
(Blue) 964 3108  
(Red) 964 3143