



MOD-83-0000061-A

29 SEP 2014

PROOF OF EVIDENCE OF EX-S006

This statement (consisting of 18 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Date the 25/09/14 day of 2014

Signed: S006

1. My service number was
2. My date of birth is
3. I was born in
4. I was educated at where I successfully completed 9 GCSEs. I then went to where I completed an apprenticeship in plastering which lasted for 2 years.
5. I joined the British Army in January 2000.
6. Phase 1 training consisted of a 12 week course at Lichfield. On successful completion of this element I undertook Phase 2 training, an 18 week course at Catterick.

Signed: S006

7. Having successfully passed out of Phase 2 training I was posted to RAF Brize Norton Parachute Jumping School for a 4 week course. During the course I completed 9 solo jumps together with numerous other assessments. I completed the course satisfactorily and I was then awarded my wings, allowing me to become a member of the Parachute Regiment.
8. I had always wanted to join the Parachute Regiment due to their history and the demanding roles that the regiment undertaken. I wanted to be a member of an elite regiment within the British Army and from my first day of basic training I was determined to join them.
9. On completing the parachute training course in late 2000 I was posted to 3 Parachute Regiment (3 Para), based in Colchester which, as I arrived, became part of 16 Air Assault Brigade. This was a relatively new concept whereby rather than having 3 Para working separately from other airborne units, we merged together to form a brigade. We undertook numerous Brigade level exercises and specialist units were all attached to the Brigade based in Colchester.
10. Lots of my friends from training were also posted to 3 Para, as the battalion was short of soldiers at the time.
11. We completed lots of exercises at Brigade level as we had to quickly learn to operate effectively together. I recall that these exercises took place on Salisbury Plain, in the Brecon Beacons, and numerous other locations both within the United Kingdom and abroad.
12. I recall that in 2001 we were away from Colchester for the vast majority of the year undertaking various exercises, the locations or the timings of which I cannot remember. When we were not away we were largely on leave that we had accrued due to the high intensity of our training programme.

Signed :

S006


AR/NDJR/97606/2

13. I think that in 2002 the battalion started to undertake lots of training for an upcoming deployment to Northern Ireland. This training took place mostly at Lydd Camp in Kent, which is a small camp with a large training area, or back in Colchester. I recall spending a large amount of time in Lydd prior to deployment to Northern Ireland but I cannot recall the dates we were there due to the long period of time that has elapsed.
14. I can confirm that I completed 2 tours of Northern Ireland with 3 Para. I was a Private Soldier during both of these tours.
15. During my first tour of Northern Ireland we were based in Bessbrook Mill. The locals as well as my fellow soldiers often referred to the surrounding area as "bandit country" due the perception that the area was controlled largely by the IRA and not by the authorities.
16. I was part of C Company 3 Para and I think the tour lasted for a couple of months. I cannot recall the dates of the tour due to the long period of time that has elapsed
17. During this tour of Northern Ireland we were undertaking lots of vehicle check points (VCPs). We patrolled mainly on foot but we were wearing full body armour and helmets, not berets. Our weapons were slung to the front. I believe we were issued with 30 rounds of ammunition each.
18. We communicated with each other through the use of personal radios. These radios worked well in Northern Ireland and certainly much better than they did in Iraq. Each section commander would have a larger radio called a 351, which he could use to communicate over greater distances and report any incidents back to the chain of command who were not out on patrol with us.

S006

Signed :

AR/NDJR/97606/2

19. During this tour we were working mainly at Platoon level but we were not at full strength. I think we only had about 20 personnel rather than the 30 you should have for a full strength Platoon.

20. I think the Platoon Commander was S010 [REDACTED] but I cannot be entirely sure due to the time that elapsed since the tour.

21. Prior to the Platoon deploying on patrol we would normally be briefed by either the Platoon Sgt or the Platoon Commander. These briefs included details of where we were going, what we should be looking out for and confirmation of what tasks we needed to complete during the patrol. If we were going to undertake VCPs we would be informed as to the location and any specific targets that we were trying to stop. I was not involved in the decision making processes or the planning of such patrols as I was only a private soldier. This role was undertaken by my chain of command based upon any intelligence they had obtained.

22. The process of completing a VCP in Northern Ireland was that one section of the Platoon would be tasked with in flagging the suspect vehicle down using hand signals and trying to get them to stop. If the vehicle failed to stop the second section would deploy a device known as a stinger on the road to puncture the vehicle's tyres. The stinger was long spiked device similar to that used by the British Police that could be laid across the road to it to quickly deflate tyres. A third section would be located further down the road to ensure that the vehicle could be stopped, if the stringer had failed, so they could apprehend anyone who tried to flee.

23. If the vehicle failed to stop for the first section they would then provide a cut off to ensure that the vehicle was not able to turn round and go back upon itself. These VCPs were carried out at Platoon level so involved all 3 sections of the Platoon working closely together and communicating with each other over the radios. The procedure therefore involved all 20 troops, and it would have been 30 if the Platoon had been at full strength.

S006 [REDACTED]

Signed : ..

AR/NDJR/97606/2

24. There were no military vehicles involved in these stops as we would largely patrol on foot.
25. The vast majority of vehicles would stop without any issues when flagged down by the first section. However I would estimate that on approximately 10 occasions a car failed to do so. I cannot recall any further details as to when, where or what the outcome of these failed stops were due to the large amount of time that has elapsed.
26. I do not recall any warning shots being fired by anyone within the Platoon. I think we were briefed that if any shots were fired the paperwork would be very long and onerous so people were very cautious to avoid opening fire if at all possible.
27. We were briefed that we were mainly searching for drugs rather than weapons in these vehicles. It was my understanding that the paramilitaries were heavily involved in the supply of illegal drugs hence our role was to try and disrupt their supply chains. I think that on a number of occasions we did recover illicit drugs from vehicles but I can't remember any further details due to the time that has elapsed.
28. The VCP procedure was taught to us by instructors at camp in Colchester and also reinforced during our exercises at Lydd. The Platoon became very efficient in undertaking VCPs and we completed them on numerous occasions. I do not recall ever completing any VCPs at Section level and do not recall being given any training as to how to undertake such stops with so few men.
29. I recall that the instructors at Lydd assessed our ability to carry out all the roles required in Northern Ireland prior to our deployment. If we failed any of the drills then we would be sent for re-training. I recall that we passed every time.

S006

Signed :

AR/NDJR/97606/2

30. I think we went to Lydd approximately 10 times and I felt well prepared for a deployment to Northern Ireland. We had been fully briefed on what our role was, the rules of engagement, and the effective way to carry out VCPs. We were well trained and knew what to expect when we arrived in Northern Ireland.

31. During the Bessbrook tour I recall an incident whereby a helicopter crashed causing multiple fatalities and injuries. We were tasked with securing a cordon around the crash site so that no paramilitaries or civilians could seize access the site or interfere with any equipment on the helicopters. We also had to ensure that the bodies of those who had died on board could be safely recovered and any evidence as to what had happened to the helicopter be preserved.

32. Other than completing VCPs our main role was to complete routine patrols on foot. We would deploy as a Platoon, rather than at Section level, presumably so we had increased protection from the threat of ambushes.

33. I do not recall S010 or whoever the Platoon Comamader was coming on to the ground to patrol with us very often. The Officers would often oversee what we doing from the control room. I think our Platoon Sergeant at the time was Sgt Jarvie who would always come on patrol with us.

34. My second tour of Northern Ireland was to Belfast. I cannot recall when we deployed or for how long due to the amount of time that has elapsed.

35. We were given lots of training before this tour and I deployed with C Company. I think that the reason for our deployment was that it was marching season and we were tasked with trying to prevent sectarian violence. There was a tense atmosphere in Northern Ireland and our role was a peace keeping one. We had training on how to prevent and control large scale public disorder prior to deployment.

Signed

S006

AR/NDJR/97606/2

36. I recall that during one of the parades there was serious incident when a large group of individuals managed to break through our extended line formation. We were trying to keep two groups of people apart. For a short period of time some of this mob managed to grab hold of one of the young private soldiers who was the operator of the baton gun and in effect take him prisoner. We managed to recover him relatively quickly from the mob but whilst doing so, some of them managed to enter our snatch Landover vehicles and causing extensive damage.

37. We were subjected to very vicious assaults by numerous unknown individuals, yet showed great restraint in not fighting back and peace keeping to the best of our abilities. We only ever used minimal force to defend ourselves and I do not recall that anyone fired any shots during these riots.

38. During the tour of Belfast we did not undertake many VCPs as it is far more difficult to do them in a built up area and that was not our primary role. I believe the tour lasted a couple of months but I cannot be sure.

39. The rules of engagement in Northern Ireland were fully briefed to us by a number of people including the Platoon Sergeant. Before both tours started we were given extensive training and we were informed of the Yellow Card Rules, which I believe was governed by the Terrorism Act of 2000.

40. We were physically given a Yellow Card which had 7 rules of engagement on it. It was a standing order that we were to have the card on us at all times.

41. I cannot recall the exact wording of the rules printed on the card due to the time that has elapsed since I have last seen the document. However I think the contents were largely common sense. I believe the rules stated that if you were shot at you could shoot back,

Signed :

S006

AR/NDJR/97606/2

however if the person shooting at you stopped, disengaged or retreated, you were to stop shooting immediately.

42. I also believe that all soldiers had to pass a written test to confirm our understanding of the rules of engagement. I recall that I passed the test otherwise I would not have been deployed to Northern Ireland.

43. During the tours we were very busy so I do not think that we had any refresher sessions or briefs on the rules of engagement.

44. I was confident that I and all the other members of the C Company were fully aware of the rules of engagement during our tours of Northern Ireland.

45. In total I think I spent about 4 months in Northern Ireland and trained for the role for about 1½ years.

Training for Iraq

46. We did not receive any specific training for our deployment to Iraq whilst based in the UK at all.

47. My recollection is that at Christmas 2002 we had a call from someone in the Battalion saying that we were going on exercise in Brecon in January 2003. I cannot recall who this call was from.

48. I was meant to be starting a physical training instructors course in Pirbright in January 2003 but due to this exercise my place on the course was cancelled.

S006

Signe

AR/NDJR/97606/2

49. In January 2003 3 Para deployed on exercise to the Brecon Beacons. I think the exercise consisted of a 10 day live firing exercise package on the ranges and the training area. The live firing exercise involved incremental increases in the complexity of the manoeuvres, we started firing in pairs and then proceeded all the way up to Company level scenarios.
50. At no point were we told for certain that we were going to Iraq but there was lots of speculation within the Battalion. Whilst in Brecon we were given anthrax injections so everyone then thought that we were going to be deployed, although I do not recall anyone formally confirming it to us.
51. The emphasis in Brecon was very much on the fact that we were preparing for a fighting role and not a peace keeping role, two fundamentally different things.
52. We had prepared for and undertaken a peace keeping role in Northern Ireland for the last 3 years so this was very much a change of direction for the Battalion.
53. Following the conclusion of these exercises in Brecon we returned to Colchester, packed up our kit and we were then flew from RAF Brize Norton to Kuwait on a date I cannot recall.
54. I think we may have arrived in Kuwait late February 2003 and I believe we were stationed in No. 5 Camp. I do not recall any other Regiments or Battalions being within 5 Camp, it was solely for 3 Para.
55. We were stationed in Kuwait for a couple of weeks, during which time we did extensive military exercises, acclimatisation to the heat and lots of physical training to ensure our fitness levels were as high as they possibly could be. We were all preparing for war. I took this training very seriously indeed but it was not as well organised as it could have been due to the rushed

S006

Signed

AR/NDJR/97606/2

deployment to Kuwait. We spent large amounts of time training as a Platoon to ensure that our own battle drills were up to scratch.

56. During these exercises in Kuwait we were given a White Card, which was a new rules of engagement card. Due to the time that has passed, I cannot recall any of the detail or what was on the card, but I think it was very different from the Yellow Card. I can remember a lot of the card focussed upon what to do when troops were surrendering.

57. I do not recall a lawyer speaking to us about these new rules of engagement. I think we were briefed by the Platoon Sergeant and the Platoon Commander.

58. We did not receive any specific Iraq training, and the last war that any members of 3 Para had been involved in was the Falklands war. It appeared to me that no-one was sure what was going to happen when we crossed the border and were trying to get organised. It appeared to me that there was no firm plan as to exactly what was going to happen once war was declared.

59. The main part of the training in Kuwait was on the use of nuclear, biological and chemical warfare suits (NBC). I, of course had been trained in the proper use of NBC equipment from very early on in my military career. Everyone took the NBC training very seriously indeed because of the threat from scud missiles and its importance was stressed to us. It should be noted that walking in NBC gear was very difficult, visibility is reduced, it is very hot and it is a very uncomfortable experience. I can recall when we crossed the border we were in full NBC equipment.

60. Both prior to war being declared and during the war we were not focusing at all on peace keeping or vehicle stops. Our sole objective was to end the war as quickly as possible, suffering minimal casualties. I was under the impression that we should do whatever was

Signed

S006

AR/NDJR/97606/2

required to achieve these aims, as long as our actions were not inconsistent with international law.

61. Approximately twenty four hours before we crossed the border air strikes commenced on Iraqi military infrastructure.

62. On crossing the border our first objective was to secure the oil fields in Ramallah. The Platoon was mounted on Pinz-Gauer and Wimmicks. In addition we were also supported by 4 tonne trucks which had our rations and supplies in the back. Every time we harboured up to get some rest, members of the platoon who were not on sentry duty, would pull a net over the truck and sleep under it.

63. When we first deployed I believe that S001 was Section Commander, LCpl Sexton second in command, S004, S003, S005 and myself were the private soldiers. The Company managed to secure the oil fields without much resistance and we saw very little enemy action.

64. Our main role was to take lots of prisoners. I do not recall firing any shots in anger during my entire tour of Iraq.

65. 3 Para were involved in an attack on an oil refinery where the fire support Platoon deployed Milans into a bunker which was then seized but we were not directly involved as we were the reserve Platoon in case things went wrong.

66. I was the Mini-mi gunner, and I had been trained on this weapon prior to our deployment. There was only one other Mini-mi gunner within the Platoon and that was Private Jordieson.

S006

Signed

AR/NDJR/97606/2

67. The Mini-mi is an American weapon system that is cap of firing more rounds than the SA80 but is more manoeuvrable then General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) as it weights less. I believe S005 was the GPMG gunner within our section.

68. It took us a few days to secure the oil fields and we were then sent to a village very close to the Iran border. The Platoon was stationed in a Police Station in a place I believe was called Al U'Zayra.

69. I do not recall ever being told that the war was over.

70. We moved into the police station, and I cannot recall where the other Platoons were stationed.

71. When we first arrived a combat engineer came with us and he supervised the building of very basic toilets, which involved us digging a hole in the ground. He also advised how to best secure the police station by constructing protection over our firing positions to stop us being injured by indirect fire when we were on guard. I recall we had a sentry position on the roof and a number of private soldiers were deployed on the main gate to guard it.

72. I cannot recall ever being briefed that the rules of engagement had changed. I cannot recall being issued with a Yellow Card that we had in Northern Ireland nor surrendering my White Card.

73. There were still soldiers getting killed even after the war had officially ended so I never saw our role as a solely peace keeping one. I was 22 years old and in my first war situation. I was always on my guard and keeping an eye out for trouble.

S006

Signed

AR/NDJR/97606/2

74. I did not trust the locals. They had a very different way of life to us. I felt that the women were treated very badly by the men. For example, some of the local farmers would make the women do all the hard work whilst they would sit down and chat.

75. I remember one incident when I was guarding the police station with other members of the Platoon and a local male and female walked passed the main gate. One of the other lads, I cant remember who, said hello to them and the female looked over and acknowledged his greeting. She nodded her head and the male then instantly punched her in the face causing her to fall to the floor. I found this violence very uncomfortable to witness and not intervening, but we were told not to get involved.

76. As far as I was concerned we were not trying to win hearts and minds at this point as we were still wearing helmets, not berets, and our weapons were to the front and not rear slung. We were therefore always carrying our weapons in such a way that we could open fire very quickly if required to do so.

77. I did however try and help the local children on a number of occasions, by providing them with food, as many of them appeared to be malnourished. I provided them with food from my ration packs but did not give any supplies to the adults.

78. I do not recall speaking to the adults as I felt that they could just not be trusted. There were other members of the section who were more comfortable in communicating with the local population.

79. On an almost daily basis the locals would attend the police station with various injuries and bullet wounds that had presumably been caused by other Iraqi's. Our medic would do all he could to help but we would often have to send them away to hospital. We did not have a doctor

S006

Signed

AR/NDJR/97606/2

stationed at the police station and we had relatively small amounts of spare medical equipment.

80. I recall that on one occasion a truck arrived at our base with a badly injured civilian in the back. The driver asked us for help and he assisted our medic in carrying the injured person into our compound. The driver left his truck in front of our gates causing an obvious security risk. S001 and I were tasked with moving the vehicle to a safer location. When I got in the vehicle it was covered in blood and there were also dead bodies in the back. I came into contact with blood from the local population both on this occasion and various other times throughout the tour.

81. I recall another incident when a large group of locals approached the front gate of our compound in an aggressive manner. There were lots of them and we were heavily outnumbered. We were ordered to try and disperse them due to the serious security threat that they were causing. We started by shouting at them to retreat, but that did not work so we had to physically push them back. I cannot recall the exact date of this incident. I am unable to provide any further specific details of such events.

82. Our daily routine was meant to be 8 hours rest, 8 hours patrol and 8 hours guard, but because there was always something to do so we rarely got the 8 hour rest period. I would estimate we got approximately 4 hours sleep on average during a 24 hour time period. I was very tired as were most of the rest of the platoon as our job was very stressful and demanding. We felt constantly threatened which added to our inability to relax or switch off.

83. The accommodation within the compound was very basic. The toilets were long drop latrines and it was often too hot to sleep properly. I slept mainly outside in a central courtyard during

S006

Signed :

AR/NDJR/97606/2

our occupation of the police station. The reason for this was that it was too hot to sleep inside as there was no air conditioning or breeze.

84. I recall that on one occasions I went with S010 to meet the village elder. The atmosphere was very tense and after a short discussion, via an interpreter, the place erupted. Locals started screaming at us and pulled their weapons out. There were some 20-30 locals in the room and just me and S010. I recall that I had to make my weapon ready and we then left very quickly. I think that this was the last time that we had a meeting with the village elder.

85. I believe the Platoon had the use of 1 Wimmick and 1 Pinz-Gauer and hence the vehicles were out on patrol most of the time. We would occasionally patrol on foot but we always preferred to have the vehicles with us.

86. When out on patrol we would see lots of begging children. The adults did not appear to want to approach us and would rarely try to communicate with us. They would mainly just stare at us and I would describe it as a hostile atmosphere.

87. During our time at the police station I do not believe that we were ever briefed as to what our final objective was, but I was under the impression that we were showing a presence in the area to reassure the locals that someone was protecting them. I understood that the crime rates were very high and since the fall of Saddam Hussain, there was no effective police force as all the former police officers were members of his ruling party.

88. We sometimes had a briefing before going on patrol. During this briefing we would be told where we were going and what we would be going to do. These briefings were always verbal and not written down. There was no need to give us written orders as we were an experienced

Signed : S006

AR/NDJR/97606/2

section. All of the private soldiers within the section were ready for promotion to corporal and had been out of training for a number of years. We were not fresh recruits on our first deployment, although we had of course never been to war before.

89. I had been offered a promotion prior to my deployment. I had been told that I could do the 6 week cadre to gain me promotion to Lance Corporal but as I had already decided that I did not want to stay in the Army, and only wanted to serve for 6 years. I did not think there would be any point in me doing the course. I was of the opinion that someone who wanted to stay in the Army could have my place in order to accelerate their career.

90. I think we were all issued with personal radios but they did not work very well. It was much easier just to communicate by shouting at each other as we would try and maintain a distance from each other within the section where this was achievable. S001 did however have a large 351 radio in order to liaise with the Platoon Commander back at the police station if he needed to.

91. The patrol reports were nothing to do with me. I have never completed one and I do not recall S001 ever doing one. I do not recall ever asking S001 to record anything that I had seen on patrol in the report. I do not recall anything occurring whilst on patrol that needed to be formally reported.

92. The patrols could last up to 8 hours, but they were generally much shorter than that, at an average of a few of hours long.

93. The section that went on patrol was broken down into two separate fire teams – Charlie and Delta.

S006

Signed : .

AR/NDJR/97606/2

94. I think that Charlie Fire Team normally travelled in the Wimmick. The fire team consisted of myself, S001, S003 and a driver who was not part of the section.

95. I would normally provide top cover as I had the Mini-mi weapon. This involved me standing up in the vehicle and poking my head out the top of it to provide fire support if required.

96. I would however occasionally travel in the Pinz-Gauer where again, I would often provide top cover due to the weapon system I had been issued with. I cannot recall why I would change vehicles.

97. On a number of occasions we carried out VCPs – but these were very different from those we had done in Northern Ireland. The reason for this was because we were not undertaking VCPs at Platoon level, but at section level, so there were only 6 of us rather than 20-30 soldiers.

98. I recall being told that the reason for stopping vehicles was to try and stop arms smuggling, but the locals knew that even if we found weapons in the back of the vehicles we could not arrest them or seize weapons from them. Therefore I felt that our role was somewhat diminished. Additionally I think we were told that lots of local people were being stopped in their vehicles at checkpoints and robbed by local militias. We therefore had to patrol the roads to ensure that no checkpoints had been set up.

99. In general terms I recall to carry out VCPs the 2 vehicles were parked on the road. I normally stayed in the Wimmick as the top gunner. The Pinz-Gauer would be located anywhere up to 100 m away down the road, with S001 and S004 between the two vehicles so that they could speak to the drivers of the vehicles that needed to be stopped. They would flag the vehicle down.

S006

Signed

AR/NDJR/97606/2

100. I do not recall any vehicles that failed to stop. I do not recall us having to chase any civilian vehicles.

101. I do not recall any incidents where S001 or S004 had to use any violence to remove any individuals from their vehicles. I do not recall any incidents where any members of the section had to restrain any locals or fight with them. I do not recall seeing any members of the section hitting any locals with their helmets or their rifle butts.

102. I do not recall any members of the section firing their weapons or shooting any dogs.

103. I did not get involved in any physical altercation with any Iraqi locals during any of the patrols that I went on. During patrols I normally remained as top gunner in the Wimmick so would rarely get out of the vehicle.

104. I do not recall any incident occurring that I deemed needed reporting to the chain of command.

105. It has been over 11 years since I returned from Iraq and my memory has faded considerably. I have now got a totally different life where I work as a house renovator and I have a young family. I cannot recall anything further from my tour of Iraq.

106. I have seen the statements that have been given by the Iraqi civilians and I cannot recall any of the incidents that they make reference to.

Signed :

AR/NDJR/97606/2