



MOD-83-0000371-A



## THREAT BRIEF OP ARREZO

### General

1. AL QUIBLA is a community that falls largely, although not completely under the control of AIF militias. Though intimidated by local AIF there have been signs of discord between the local tribes and the AIF in AL QUIBLA. After a series of MNF strike ops key AIF personalities within AL QUIBLA either moved or left. However recent reporting indicates that some key personalities may be returning. The AL QUIBLA AIF groupings are concentrated largely in the south eastern corner in the HAYY AL SHUHDHA area. They enjoy strong links with AIF groupings from within the AL HYANNIAH. IDF teams are formed from individuals from both areas. In addition all the decisive engagements between MNF and AIF have occurred when AIF have moved across from the AL HYANNIAH to mount co-ordinated SAF and RPG attacks on MNF patrols within AL QUIBLA.

### Targets

2. **ALPHA 1 (GR QU 69221 73584)**. Location to which AIF car drove following IDF attack against BP on 3 April 07. Prior to driving to this ALPHA dropped 2 pax and a quantity of weapons (subsequently recovered on Op PHOENIX 15). SHADOW tracked the vehicle to one of these three houses in the vicinity of Orange 2 in AL QUIBLA. Up to 15 UKMs were seen already in position outside the ALPHA. Whilst the car was static a further 20-30 UKMs arrived at the ALPHA. It is believed that the ALPHA acts as an AIF planning/ coordination cell. The ALPHA should be thoroughly searched and exploitable evidence removed. See Appendix 2.

3. ALPHA 53 GR QU 6900 72870. ALPHA 53 is believed to be the home of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It is believed that he has also been involved in attacks against MNF forces over a protracted period of time. [REDACTED] is closely associated with a host of known Bravos. He is suspected of holding the position of QM within a JAM Coy and involvement in IED attacks Three brothers live within the house: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. There is no description of [REDACTED] so it is imperative to establish as early as possible the identities of those within the house. It is unlikely that those detained will reveal to MNF their true identities- therefore it is key to find documentary evidence determining their true identities from within the ALPHAs. See Appendix 3.

4. ALPHA 54 and 55 GR QU 6902 7290. ALPHA 54 and 55 is [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. Due to the lack of reporting on this target, detention should only occur if credible evidence or quantities of munitions are found within the ALPHA. See Appendix 3.

1. 5. ALPHA 103 GR QU 68370 71955. ALPHA 103 is believed to be an AIF weapons cache and coordination centre. AIF were sighted by BWSD gathering at ALPHA 103 following an MNF strike op, Op SALVADOR. They appeared to remove weapons from the hide prior to attacking Force Reserve as they departed from the target area. Following the strike they returned to the ALPHA. It is unknown who the occupants of the house are, detention is only to be made in the event of a find of credible evidence or weapons. See Appendix 4.

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## AIF Locations

6. See Appendix 1 for known or suspected AIF locations within AL QUIBLA. The COM is in the HAYY AL SHUHDA district, however MNF should be aware of the University Complex GR QU 690 753 and the Hospital under construction at GR QU 685 745. SAF and SRSAF attacks have been mounted from both these locations against c/s static on the Reds.

7. IPS locations. The AL QUIBLA IPS station is at GR QU 6945 7315. IPS also man a VCP at Orange 2 and Red 1. FPS man the VCP at Red 2 covering access to the Government Road. All these IPS posts have been implicated in IED attacks against MNF. IPS activity at these posts should be monitored closely by MNF c/s. In addition IPS vehicles will be used to trigger MNF onto IEDs (TW 574 refers to an IPS KIA vehicle that tails MNF along the Reds). It is possible that AIF will try to move from AL HYANNIAH into AL QUIBLA in IPS vehicles.

## AIF Intent

8. AIF within AL QUIBLA are attempting to intimidate and control the whole area to ensure that AL QUIBLA, like AL HYANNIAH becomes an impregnable stronghold for them. Intimidating the local population and attacking MNF patrols within the area serves to raise their profile and prestige amongst the local population. However an engagement that results in serious casualties will be counter-productive; therefore they only decisively engage an enemy that they believe they can damage. Previous patrols in AL QUIBLA have demonstrated that whilst AIF will mount coordinated ambushes against BDG c/s, they are less willing to attack WRs. When faced by overwhelming force AIF within AL QUIBLA tend to keep a low profile and do not decisively engage.

## Threat

9. **IED.** The most pertinent threat to MNF on Op ARREZO is from IEDs. TW 574a refers to a BSWD sighting of IEDs being laid on the western side of the carriageway at GR QU 681 745. There was another hole seen on the east side of the carriageway at GR QU 678 743, that could also contain an IED. The threat of IEDs Red 1- Red 6 is primarily from pre-placed CWIEDs. To avoid discovery by VP checks these are not normally laid on junctions. As it is unlikely that dismounts will find these devices MNF should look for likely FPs, any pax hanging around to the east or west of the road should be deemed suspicious, especially on the northern side of the road between Red 1 and Red 2 and in the area of the Technical College on the northern side of the road at QU 660722. Within AL QUIBLA itself the most likely area for pre-laid devices is the Government Rd's interface with HAYY AL SHUHDA and at Orange 2, the central node within AL QUIBLA. When checking for IEDs dug in beneath roads CWs may be buried for up to 25m from the edge of the road. Dismounted c/s should bear this in mind when conducting VP and isolation checks. The main threat within AL QUIBLA comes from pop and drop IEDs laid on likely extraction routes. It is key that MNF observe or physically hold all extraction routes to combat this threat. Overwatch from Orange 2 and ISTAR assets will be key for this. The last IED in AL QUIBLA was an IED at GR QU 694 736 targeting the fourth WR in a packet of five as it was leaving the town. The device was on the eastern side of the carriageway.

10. **SRSAF.** The threat from SRSAF is high. Whilst it is unlikely that the AIF will mount a coordinated ambush due to the weight of MNF troops on the ground it is more likely that they will mount SRSAF contacts onto static c/s. The main area of threat from this are the static locations on the Red route. Once any VP checks have been conducted c/s should remount and scan the interfaces with AL HYANNIAH through optics. AIF should be expected to mount SRSAF within 30 minutes of c/s going static on the interface or within AL QUIBLA itself.

11. **SAF/RPG.** This attack is more likely to consist of a sporadic burst fired from a rooftop or alleyway within the more enclosed area of HAYY AL SHUHDA. These are most often fired once AFVs have driven past the FP and are aimed at the back of the vehicles. Once c/s based at BP



have left AL QUIBLA and are moving east along the Government Rd they are likely to receive sporadic SAF and RPGs from the interface with HAYY AL SHUHDA.

### **Most Likely COA**

12. AIF will be prevented from reinforcing AL QUIBLA from the HYANNIAH, therefore there will be no attempt to mount a coordinated attack against MNF within AL QUIBLA. After 30 minutes MNF should expect SRSAF contacts against static c/s on the Reds and sporadic SAF and RPGs on extraction from AL QUIBLA

### **Worst Case COA**

13. A pre-laid CWIED initiated between Red 1 and Red 3, the AL QUIBLA Government Rd Interface or Orange 2

### **Appendices:**

Appendix 1- AIF and IED Locations

Appendix 2- A Coy 2 RIFLES Target Pack

Appendix 3- B Coy 2 RIFLES Target Pack

Appendix 4- CHINDIT Coy 2 LANCS Target Pack