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FROM J D BEVAN, CHANCERY

TO R D WILKINSON ESQ, EASTERN DEPARTMENT, FCO
TO CC CHANCERIES RIGA, TALLINN, VILNIUS, MOSCOW

SUBJECT: U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

## SUMMARY

1. State's Baltic experts concerned at continued Russian pressure: likely to grow after Chechnya. Latvians propose chequerboard enlargement of NATO to include Baltic republics: Talbott downplays this.

## DETAIL

2. My teleletter of 8 December. I had another round with State (Kunstadter, Head, Baltic Desk) on 18 January.

## Baltics Internal

3. The Baltic Governments remained neurotic about their OSCE missions. The Americans continued to stress that there was no stigma attached to an OSCE presence. The missions helped the Baltic Republics as a buffer and early warning system.

Corruption was another growing problem,

## Russia

There had been no let-up in Russian coercion against the

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- The Tartu Peace Treaty. The Estonians were willing to accept Stalin's 1944 borders with minor adjustments. Continued Russian unwillingess to recognise Tartu as the basis for Estonia's existence as a state would indicate severe long-term problems with the Russian attitude.
- Skrunda. The Russians were still refusing to implement the agreement. They had threatened as recently as November that their military doctrine allowed them to send troops into Latvia if there were incidents around Skrunda. They still had 800 personnel based there,

  There was no evidence they were preparing to move out.
- The Kaliningrad Transit Agreement.

  They still needed offstage support and encouragement from the West to go forward. The Russians were still seeking to use MFN leverage

NATO Enlargement

5. Latvian Foreign Minister Birkavs last week presented to Christopher a "chequerboard NATO integration plan". This seeks to include the Baltics in the eventual expansion of NATO

Immediate US aims were to strengthen the Balts' relationship with NATO through PFP and Baltbat.

6. Talbott admitted to Ms Neville-Jones yesterday that the Balts By all criteria

except one (erstwhile membership of the FSU) they should be at the head of the queue to join NATO. But they would not accede in the same timescale as the Visegrads.

UK Policy

- 7. Mindful of Kunstadter's earlier accusations that the UK was soft on the Russians over the Baltics, I rehearsed our own commitments and policy on the lines of FCO telno 45 to Tallinn. Kundstadter accepted that we had an impressive record and good talking points. But he continued to believe that Western governments were disposed to sell out Baltic rights under Russian pressure.
- 8. Eastern Dept please copy to

SIGNED J D BEVAN

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