



Ministry
of Defence

Army Secretariat
Army Headquarters
IDL 24 Blenheim Building
Marlborough Lines
Andover
Hampshire, SP11 8HJ
United Kingdom

Ref: FOI2017/06065/79008

E-mail: ArmySec-Group@mod.uk

Website: www.army.mod.uk

[REDACTED]

E-mail address:

[REDACTED]

18 July 2017

Dear [REDACTED],

Thank you for your email of 23 June in which you requested the following information:

"On reflection, the third request could be satisfied through the provision of copies of the current versions of the single services' personnel strategy'. If they exist and are releasable, that should satisfy the 3rd question, particularly if you were also to include relevant (to the analysis of demographics) any supporting research or papers referenced in the strategy documents. In the interests of further narrowing the search for Q3, Army only."

This was a clarification of your request dated 21 June in which you also requested the following information:

- "1. Manning and Recruiting in the Lean Years of the Nineties report. I believe this report was known colloquially as MARILYN. I believe that the report concerned the Army, but cannot be sure and it may have covered all three services.*
- 2. The presentation used by the Adjutant General (General Granville-Chapman) around 2000-2001 to set out his vision for the Army Personnel Strategy. The unique identifying attribute of this presentation was a futuring model using 4 quadrants, describing 4 possible 'workforce' futures."*

I am treating your correspondence as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Following a search of our recorded information, I have established that some of the information you requested is not held by the Ministry of Defence.

Attached is a copy of the MARILYN report as requested. With regard to the presentation by General Granville-Chapman, having undertaken initial searches, I should advise that under section 12(2) of the Act, I am unable to confirm if the Ministry of Defence holds the information requested. Section 12(2) relates to historical documents that would be held in general files in MOD archive and would be impossible to find, or we would expect to have been destroyed under policies in place at the time. It would, therefore, be an unfair burden and a disproportionate effort on the Department to find them.

Moving to your clarified request, I have been unable to locate any documents that the Army has produced within the scope of your request. Under section 16 – Advice and Assistance, I have been advised that a Personnel Strategy document will be published later this year. Although it is intended to be published internally, you could submit a further request and its release under the FOIA will be considered. I am afraid I do not have a definite date for its publication at this time.

If you are not satisfied with this response or you wish to complain about any aspect of the handling of your request, then you should contact me in the first instance. If informal resolution is not possible and you are still dissatisfied then you may apply for an independent internal review by contacting the Information Rights Compliance team, Ground Floor, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, SW1A 2HB (e-mail CIO-FOI-IR@mod.uk). Please note that any request for an internal review must be made within 40 working days of the date on which the attempt to reach informal resolution has come to an end.

If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may take your complaint to the Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. Please note that the Information Commissioner will not investigate your case until the MOD internal review process has been completed. Further details of the role and powers of the Information Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website, <https://ico.org.uk>.

Yours sincerely,


Disclosure and Litigation Leader

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE~~



THE

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Andrew G.' or similar, written over the word 'REPORT'.

REPORT

(FULL REPORT, FOR INTERNAL MOD DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

A Report on Manning & Recruiting in the
Lean Years of the Nineties by AG

~~MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

LOOSE MINUTE

D/DM(A)/12/114 M1(A)


24 Nov 88

See Distribution

THE MARILYN REPORT : DISTRIBUTION OF THE FULL REPORT

References :

- A. ECAB/M(88)12 dated 27 Oct 88.
 - B. D/2nd PUS/272/1/1253/88 dated 18 Nov 88.
 - C. D/Min(AF)/AH/6/2 dated 21 Nov 88.
1. ECAB approved The MARILYN Report at its meeting on 21 Oct 88, subject to the adjustments detailed at Reference A. Those adjustments have been incorporated in the report which I am now circulating to internal MOD addressees.
 2. Distribution of the abridged version of the report outside the MOD will not take place until authorised by Ministers, as discussed at References B and C.
 3. I have written separately to HQ UKLF, HQ BAOR and the other commands informing them of the delay in the report's distribution and asking that further suggestions as to how we can combat the Demographic Trough are forwarded to the MOD for consideration. Any ideas that recipients of this letter may have would also be welcomed and I would ask that they are presented to M1(A) in the first instance.
 4. You may be aware that a PPO paper on the Demographic Trough has been prepared. It is about to be issued for comment at 2-star level and will be put to PPOC on 18 Jan 89.
 5. I will also shortly be issuing an action plan, stating what progress has been achieved in implementing the Management Measures and giving details as to how the Further Measures and the Longer Term Possibilities are to be staffed, together with a timetable.
 6. Finally may I emphasise that the enclosed version of The MARILYN Report is RESTRICTED and MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE. It is not to be released to, or discussed with, anyone outside the MOD.



DM(A)

~~MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE~~
Covering RESTRICTED

Distribution :

PS/2nd PUS
MA/DCDS(Prog&Pers)
PS/DUS(PL)
D Pers
AUS(PL)
Sec/2SL
DNMP
DNR
PSO/AMP
DPM Pol&Plans(RAF)
DDPM(FP)(RAF)
D of R(RAF)
R of R(RAF)
Head of RP(Manpower)
Head of PL(SPP)
Head of Stats(M)
EA
MA/CGS
MA/ACGS
Head of GS Sec
DMO
DCIS(A)
DGTA&Org
DASD
DARC
DGT&D(A)
ACDS OR(Land)
DD(Army)
DAT/IPAT
D Army Plans
Head of RP(Army)
Einc(A)
D Mil Svy
SOinc(A)
DSAS
DPR(A)
AB Sec
Head of HB(A)
MA/MS
MA/AG
DGAMR
DAR
D Sy(A)
DGPS(A)
CG
DGAMS
D of DDS(A)
D of DNS(A)
PM(Army)
PinC(A)
DAVRS
DAEd

DALS
DWRAC
AUS(A)
Head of AG Sec 1
Head of AG Sec 2
MA/QMG
DGLP(A)
D Log Ops(A)
D Engr Svcs(A)
D Def PCS
DAPL
AUS(Q)
DAQ
DGTM
DGOS
DGEME
DACC
MA/MGO
VMGO
AUS(Ord)

Spare : 100

Further copies
available from MIA

~~RESTRICTED~~

FOREWORD BY THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

1. You will all be aware of the Demographic Trough which confronts the UK and other Western Nations. Without doubt the Army will face major manpower difficulties in recruiting and retaining personnel over the next decade and unless we take firm action now there will be very serious undermanning. Indeed, shortages are already beginning to be felt.

2. The MARILYN Report addresses the problems caused by the Demographic Trough, and by the increased competition for manpower, as far as they affect manning and recruiting. The Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB) has considered the full Report and believes that the situation should be brought to the attention of commanders at all levels. There is a great deal that we can achieve ourselves in helping to overcome the problem and it is these aspects which I wish to emphasise in this Foreword.

3. Recruiting and retention are the two main pillars which support our manpower levels. Publicity has a significant effect on recruiting so every effort must be made to avoid the adverse publicity, such as that recently from bullying, which is so damaging. More positively, everyone must be made fully aware of his or her potential to influence recruiting by personally seeking and encouraging suitable candidates. As far as retention is concerned, there are three aspects that I would like to underline: these are job satisfaction, the level of our commitments and the conditions under which we serve. Clearly the MCD must lead on policy, as it does with recruiting, but all commanders have a vital part to play in seeking job satisfaction for those under them, in monitoring the level of commitments and in ensuring the best possible conditions of service in the wider sense. I look to the chain of command to pick up this challenge.

4. Most of the counter-measures for keeping up to strength in officers are the concern of individual MCD(A) Directorates; and many are already in hand. If some appear minor in themselves it stresses the point that it is 'the ones and twos' who we currently lose that must be retained in future. On the soldier side, ways of increasing the Junior Entry and of reducing recruit wastage are being addressed by the ITO Study. The Study into the Long Term Role of Women in the Army may identify a number of additional posts which can be filled by women. We have been able to be selective in our choice of recruits in the past but this will no longer be the case. Proper manpower husbandry therefore holds the key to the future.

5. The TA will be similarly affected by the Demographic Trough. Active encouragement of former regular officers and soldiers to enlist in the TA, and of TA officers and soldiers to serve with the Regular Army, will underline the One Army concept.

1
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

PARAGRAPH 1150

6. This edition of the Report has been abridged and I should explain why. It is because the full Report was a working document which contained a mass of detail, including costings, that was required by MCD Staffs. By removing it this version of the Report is quicker to read whilst still containing sufficient detail to underline the depth of the study and the intended action.

7. Finally, I should not wish to leave the impression that this will all cost nothing. It will not; some measures, particularly the enhancements to the publicity budget, will be expensive. However, by retaining those who we have already trained we will at least minimise the effect on other parts of the Defence Budget.

AG

11
~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED

D/DM(A)/12/114 MI(A)

~~MANAGEMENT IN CONFLICT~~

November 1988

THE MARILYN REPORT

(Full Report)(1)

CONTENTS

| <u>Chapter</u> | <u>Subject</u> | <u>Page</u> |
|----------------|------------------------------------|-------------|
| - | Foreword by AG | i |
| - | Contents List | iii |
| - | Distribution | iv |
| <hr/> | | |
| 1 | Introduction | 1 |
| 2 | The Lean Years | 9 |
| 3 | Publicity and Retention | 18 |
| 4 | The Officer Counter-Measures | 27 |
| 5 | The Soldier Counter-Measures | 39 |
| 6 | The Territorial and Reserve Armies | 59 |
| 7 | Longer Term Possibilities | 72 |
| 8 | Implementation and Cost | 76 |
| 9 | Conclusions | 82 |
| 10 | Recommendations | 86 |

Note :

(1) This version incorporates the adjustments directed by ECAB as per ECAB/M(88/12 dated 27 Oct 88.

~~RESTRICTED~~
RESTRICTED
THE MARILYN REPORT

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR THE FINAL REPORT

[For distribution down to unit level. Additional copies available from MI(A)]

External : (Abridged Version)

| | | |
|----------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| HQ UKLF (600) | SO/AMP | MA/QMG |
| HQ NI (30) | DFM Pol&Plans (RAF) | DGLP(A) |
| HQ BACR (600) | DDFM(FP)(RAF) | D Log Ops(A) |
| HQ Berlin (British Sector) (10) | D of R(RAF) | D Engr Svcs(A) |
| FMHQ Gibraltar (3) | R of R(RAF) | D Def PCS |
| HQ LF Cyprus (5) | Head of RP(Manpower) | DAPL |
| HQ BF Hong Kong (5) | Head of PL(SSP) | AUS(Q) |
| HQ BFFI (2) | Head of Stats(M) (5) | DAQ |
| DRAC (3) | EA | DGTM |
| DRA (3) | MA/CGS | DCOS |
| D Inf (3) | MA/ACGS | DGEVE |
| DAAC (3) | Head of GS Sec | DACC |
| D INT CORPS (3) | DVO | MA/MCO |
| RCDS (25) | DCIS(A) | VMCO |
| JSDC (25) | DGTA&Org | AUS(Ord) |
| NDC (25) | DASD | |
| JDSO (50) | DARC | |
| RAAS (25) | DGT&D(A) | |
| Staff College (50) | ACDS OR(Land) | |
| RACS (50) | DD(Army) | |
| OsIC All MROs | DAT/IPAT | Spare (200/100) |
| TDRS Camberley | D Army Plans | |
| DOAE (5) | Head of RP(A) | |
| APRE (5) | EinC(A) | |
| RHQ The Household Cavalry | D Mil Svy | |
| RHQ The Guards Division | SOinC(A) | |
| HQ The Scottish Division | DSF | |
| HQ The Queen's Division | DPR(A) | |
| HQ The King's Division | AB Sec | |
| HQ The Prince of Wales' Division | Head of HB(A) | |
| HQ The Light Division | MA/MS | |
| HQ Brigade of Gurkhas | MA/AG | |
| RHQ Parachute Regiment | DGAVR | |
| UKMR SHAPE (10) | DM(A) | |
| BDLS Washington (10) | DAR | |
| BDLS Canberris | LOBG | |

Internal : (Full Report)

| | | |
|----------------|-------------------------|--|
| PS/Min(AF) | CG | |
| PS/US of S(AF) | DGAMS | |
| PSO/CDS | D of DDS(A) | |
| PS/2nd PUS | D of DNS(A) | |
| MA/DCDS(P&P) | FM(Army) | |
| PS/EUS(PL) | PinC(A) | |
| D Pers | DAVRS | |
| SO/2SL | DAEd | |
| DMP | DALS | |
| DNR | DWRAC | |
| | AUS(A) | |
| | TOTAL : | |
| | Abridged Version (2000) | |
| | Full Report (200) | |

~~RESTRICTED~~

MANNING AND RECRUITING THE ARMY IN THE LEAN YEARS OF THE NINETIES

(THE MARILYN REPORT)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

PREAMBLE

1. In common with the other NATO nations the United Kingdom faces a decline in the number of young people within the overall population. By the year 2003 there will have been a reduction of about 20% of those aged between 15 and 29, compared to 1987. It is from this population that the Army recruits its officers and soldiers. Added to this the economic outlook has brightened and unemployment is falling, so the competition for resources will be even more fierce. This Report is about Manning and Recruiting in the Lean Years of the Nineties (MARILYN).

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

2. Between 1963, when the last National Servicemen left, and 1982 the Army's trained strength was cut from 180,000 to 151,000 in line with reduced commitments, while over the same period the population of 15 to 29 year olds rose steadily. The only time during those years when there were serious recruiting problems was between 1977 and 1980 and this was directly due to poor rates of pay. A more detailed historical analysis and comparison with the present situation is at Annex A. In 1980 the manning position was rectified by a substantial pay rise and recruiting was subsequently assisted by the Falklands War in 1982. Since then the total number of 15 to 19 year olds has been falling rapidly, but other factors have served to maintain the supply of good quality volunteers, particularly the high levels of youth unemployment.

3. Although unemployment is still high in some areas of the UK the youth element is falling very rapidly and an increasing proportion of school leavers are joining the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) as a route to jobs, so the Army faces much greater competition for recruits who, until very recently, were coming forward in plentiful numbers. Having become accustomed to selecting soldiers from high quality applicants the Army's procedures, equipment and training have developed accordingly and a new and serious situation faces the Regular Army and the TA.

4. The shortage of young people is known as the Demographic Trough, and its effects will continue to be felt beyond the turn of the century. Unless we create an awareness of the problem across the whole of the Army (including the Territorial Army and the Reserves), and start to take strong remedial action now, serious undermanning will result. Although responsibility for manning and

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

recruiting policy rests with the Ministry of Defence, this is not a problem that can be solved by policy alone. Recruiting and retention are of such importance that commanders at all levels right down to lance-corporal must be made aware of the problem and play their part in recruiting and retaining as many quality officers and soldiers as possible. Without a corporate effort, making full use of the strengths of the Regimental system, the 1990s will indeed be the Lean Years for the Army.

BACKGROUND

5. The MARILYN Report is essentially about the supply of manpower to meet the demand for manpower. It is important, however, to set the Report into perspective by considering some of the issues involved with manpower in general.

6. The Cost of Manpower. Expenditure on manpower has recently been increasing: indeed since 1985/86, when £1.824Bn was spent on the Army's 'A' area votes, it has risen by 14.4 % to £2.086Bn in 1987/88. Unfortunately the Defence Budget has not been increased proportionally and it follows that any increase in the manpower votes has to be compensated for by a reduction elsewhere in the equipment, training and quartering programmes. A reduction in the proportion of the Army's expenditure spent on manpower is therefore clearly highly desirable. Reducing wastage is vital and the least painful way

~~RESTRICTED~~

of saving on manpower expenditure ; but the most rapid and substantial economies come from employing less men.

7. Reducing the Manpower Requirement. The logical way of reducing the requirement for manpower is either to reduce commitments or to alter the ways in which the Army fulfils those commitments. The latter might take place by changing unit organisations or the manning mix (regular, TA, reservist, civilian and contractor) or by reducing the officer to soldier manning ratios, or the man to equipment ratio. Although strictly outside the scope of the Report it is nevertheless important that these issues are borne in mind since they are factors in formulating counter-measures to the Demographic Trough.

8. Manpower Strategy.

a. Unit Organisations. As manpower becomes more difficult to recruit it is important that unit organisations and establishments are reviewed and the priorities within those establishments, for most effectively fulfilling our commitments, analysed. If, for example, the Infantry are faced with being unable to recruit 5,000 men, it must be decided whether the shortfalls should be borne by reducing battalions, or by under-implementing all parts of each establishment, or by changing the establishment itself. This is a matter for General Staff review and decision.

b. Manpower as a Resource. As the budgetary regime develops manpower is being recognised as a resource. There is, however, a tendency to consider the optimum manning mix purely in economic terms and to ignore availability.

~~RESTRICTED~~

This has led, as an example, to the recent widespread misemployment of soldiers because of the inability of the Civil Service to recruit civilians. Our demographic problems are unlikely to be more than marginally eased by varying the mix of manpower as the regular forces, the TA, the Civil Service and civilian contractors will all face the same recruiting problems in the years ahead. If commitments are to be met we must meet them from whichever type of manpower is available regardless of whether it is the cheapest, provided that the manpower we employ is operationally effective and cost-effective.

c. Equipment. The design of equipment must minimise the numbers and quality of manpower required for operation and support, along the lines of the US Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) programme(1). Although positive MANPRINT measures initiated now would not be effective until the end of the 1990s (because of the long gestation period for equipment), they could make a significant contribution towards reducing manpower requirements in the longer term, but equipment development costs will be higher. There must also be an awareness on the part of the equipment programmers of the likely effect of the Demographic Trough on their plans.

Note :

(1) The US MANPRINT programme aims to ensure that future equipment is compatible with its operators, rather than vice versa.

~~RESTRICTED~~

AIM

9. The aim of the Report is to assess the likely effect of the Demographic Trough on Army manning and recruiting in the 1990s and to recommend counter-measures.

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

10. The Report presents the problem, considers some measures to overcome the Lean Years, suggests the mechanism by which the counter-measures might be implemented, how their effectiveness will be monitored by the Standing Committee on Army Manpower Forecasts (SCAMF), guided by a Steering Group, and gives details of the bid for initial funding to be made against LTC 89. The supporting evidence has been circulated on a limited distribution and includes detailed arguments and statistics resulting from the work done in preparation for the Report.

11. MARILYN considers the Regular, Territorial and Reserve elements of the Army, but more work will be necessary to cover the TA and the Reserves fully. It examines the wider use of women, but a detailed forecast of the effect of the Demographic Trough on the number of female officers and servicewomen has not been included because, although the young female population will also decline, our female recruiting extraction rate is a very small proportion of the overall population. The Report does not consider the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) although it will also be affected.

~~RESTRICTED~~

12. Related Studies.

a. The Individual Training Organisation (ITO) Study. The MARILYN Report makes a number of recommendations which involve the training organisation, especially concerning wastage rates and the Junior Army, so it is essential that the ITO Study takes cognizance of the points being made despite its remit to make financial savings. The supply of manpower is highly relevant to the ITO Study, not only in terms of the number of recruits that are likely to enter the training organisation but also in the numbers of officers and NCOs that can be allocated to it.

b. The Long Term Role of Women in the Army Study. The Study into the Long Term Role of Women in the Army is also likely to play a significant part in countering the effects of the Demographic Trough since its recommendations are most likely to involve the wider employment and deployment of women. Again, it is most important that the study team take fully into account the recommendations of this Report.

METHOD

13. The counter-measures have been divided into "Management Measures", "Further Measures" and "Longer Term Possibilities". The Management Measures can be introduced quickly and at little cost, and are in some cases already in hand. Implementation of the Further Measures will depend on the completion of detailed staffing and in the main on separately endorsed funding, while the

~~RESTRICTED~~

Longer Term Possibilities are intended for further consideration and implementation if all else fails. As a precursor to the examination of the counter-measures, the need for an increase to DAR's publicity budget and the necessity to introduce measures to improve retention are discussed in Chapter 3 ; both will require substantial funding. The cost of enhancing DAR's budget forms the bulk of the MARILYN bid against LTC 89. The cost of introducing the Officer Commital Bonus has been bid for separately against LTC 89.

~~RESTRICTED~~

RESTRICTED

~~RESTRICTED~~


CHAPTER 2

THE LEAN YEARS

GENERAL

14. It has been known for some time that the number of young people in the UK population would decline towards the end of the century, although the overall population is set to grow from the current 57 million to approximately 60 million by the year 2025. The decline in the number of 15 to 29 year olds is however projected to be marked, as Graph 1 illustrates :

Graph 1




RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

~~MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE~~

15. During the 1980s the number of young people reached an unprecedented high point. Current forecasts are that their number will not return to such a level for the foreseeable future, although there will be a partial recovery towards 2015, followed by a further down-turn towards 2030. Graph 2 shows a projection until the year 2055 :


Graph 2



THE OFFICER POOL

16. Officers are generally recruited from the better-qualified group of young people (those with 1 or more A levels) and enter the Army mostly between the ages of 20 and 24. The Demographic Trough is projected to affect this age group later than the soldier group and the low point does not occur until 1999, as Graph 3 illustrates :

Graph 3



RESTRICTED

17. Some 50% of officer recruits into Sandhurst are now graduates, the demand for whom is unlikely to diminish in an increasingly technical Army. The proportion of young men entering higher education in Great Britain is set to rise from 15% now to 19% in 2000, with the consequence that the effect of the Demographic Trough on graduate output will be limited to a fall of about 10% by the year 2000. However the demand for graduates in Industry and Commerce as a whole is expected to increase. Of the remaining 50% of officer recruits the majority have 1 or more A-levels. By 1995 the number of males in this group will have reduced by about 20% and competition for their services will have increased considerably.

18. A recent survey(1) of the reaction of a number of large employers to the Demographic Trough has highlighted their concerns about the expected future shortfall in the supply of graduates and school-leavers. Most of the employers interviewed expect difficulties in recruiting the numbers of school-leavers they require if they do not respond to the Trough, and there is already firm evidence of companies offering attractive financial packages in order to recruit graduates. The effect on the Army is likely to be considerably increased competition for the services of potential officers.


Note:

(1) "Employer's Response to the Decline in School Leavers into the 1990s" (IMS Report No 52).

THE SOLDIER POOL

19. Between the 1982 high point and the 1994 low point a fall of about 30% is projected in the number of those aged 15 to 19, from which 82.5% of soldiers are recruited. The Demographic Trough is therefore affecting the soldier pool today, as Graph 4 illustrates :


Graph 4



20. Historically the North of the country has produced more recruits than the South, as illustrated in Chart 1 :


Chart 1

(Recruit Extraction Rates by UK District/Region)



but as Graph 5 demonstrates the Trough may hit the Northern population hardest, a fact which is likely to exacerbate recruiting difficulties :

Graph 5



21. The proportion of school leavers in the 1990s who are of ethnic minority origin is likely to increase significantly. By 1991 approximately 5.4% of the UK population will be defined as non-white, with the proportion of the "South Asian" group (comprising those of Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin) having increased over that of the West Indian group. The implications of non-whites assuming a higher proportion of the future working population and the fact that they live in well-defined labour markets, essentially in the large cities, deserve further attention.

~~RESTRICTED~~

22. Soldiers are, as a rule, recruited from the less well-qualified group of school leavers (those with less than 5 O-levels). The decline in the size of this group will be exacerbated by increased educational attainment, which will tend to raise the proportion of young people who it is planned will enter higher education up to the year 2000. So the effect, which to some extent ameliorates officer recruiting difficulties, works against recruitment to the ranks. In addition, the shortage of better-qualified school-leavers will tend to increase competition for the services of the less well-qualified group.

23. Currently some 60% of school leavers enter the labour market through the Youth Training Scheme (YTS). The numbers are expected to rise to 72% in 1990/91 as YTS becomes increasingly accepted as the normal method of entry into jobs. From September 1988 those 16 and 17 year olds who are not on the YTS, at school or in employment will lose their entitlement to Income Support (formerly known as Supplementary Benefit) and this should increase the attraction of a Junior Entry which starts straight after school, pays well and holds out the prospect of a full career.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

24. The Defence Manpower Statistics Division has produced a statistical model of the possible effect of the Demographic Trough on the number of officers and soldiers likely to be recruited over the next 10 years. The model is based on the number of young people in the population at any one time and historical extraction rates. It does not take account of a number of factors such as the decrease in the number of the less well-qualified and regional variations. This

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

makes projections beyond 1998 of increasingly limited value. Graphs illustrating the outcome of this analysis are shown on pages 27 and 39.

25. Without taking the effect of any counter-measures into account it is forecast that the Army will be about 20,000 below MPT by the year 1998(1).

26. It should be noted that even at the end of the century trained strength is forecast as continuing to fall steeply in spite of the fact that the population group concerned has started to recover. In effect a soldier "black hole"(2) will come into being. The low point will probably not be reached until the early years of the 21st Century, with full strength not being achieved until some considerable time later.

Notes :

(1) Such a deficit would reduce the strength of the Infantry from 50 battalions to the equivalent of 35 battalions and the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps from 19 Regiments to the equivalent of 13 (in terms of manned tanks). Strength reductions in the supporting Arms and Services would lead to a similar degradation of operational capability.

(2) A strength deficit which causes gaps in the career structure.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

CHAPTER 3

PUBLICITY AND RETENTION

27. Before considering the detailed counter-measures which we recommend mention must be made of the wider issues which influence people to join the Army and a particular Regiment, and subsequently to stay in or leave. Successful publicity and good retention will form the essential defences of our efforts to stem the demographic tide.

GENERAL PUBLICITY

28. Although there is a general lack of public knowledge about all the Services, recent market research for DPR(RAF)(1) revealed that the public believes it knows most about the Army. However, many of its views are inaccurate, outdated and negative. The Army could have a very attractive image, but at present it is tarnished by bullying and some adverse impressions from Northern Ireland and the after-effects of the Falklands War. From within, the Army has been perceived for a number of years as a contracting profession threatened with a series of reviews, a reducing role and decreasing resources. This fuels Premature Voluntary Retirement (PVR) and deters the better quality potential officers and soldiers from joining. The introduction of an Army Presentation Team would be one way of improving the image to those in positions

Note :

(1) Alan Hedges Ltd : "Image of the RAF" November 1987.

~~RESTRICTED~~

of influence(1).

29. Research into attitudes to careers reveals how few people regard the Army as being a useful career (a 1988 MORI careers survey showed that only 8% of undergraduates are even fairly interested in an Army career). The youngest national serviceman is now 47 years old and the public has scant knowledge of the Army apart from that gained from TV, films and the papers. The Army must counter this ignorance and establish that it has a key role to play in the affairs of the nation and demonstrate the good career opportunities that it offers.

30. The Army's image depends to a great extent on how Defence affairs are managed and presented at the highest levels, in particular by the Government and in Parliament. Equally it is vital that whenever it is exposed to the public the Army is seen to be maintaining the highest professional standards and every effort must continue to be made to avoid incidents which give rise to poor PR. The Army can sometimes positively mould the image that the public receives by judicious use of PR but it is not an easy resource to control. It must be regarded as a bonus, to be exploited whenever favourable and counteracted when it is adverse. However good PR is essential to healthy recruiting and it would appear that DPR(A) is too understaffed to take on more positive PR since their efforts have to be concentrated more or less exclusively on the defensive.

Note :

(1) The RN and RAF both have established presentation teams. An Army team will conduct trial presentations from Summer 1989.

RECRUITING PUBLICITY

31. When the Army's image and standing in society are high, recruiting is easier and the need for publicity reduces. The converse is also true and underlines the importance of good publicity. Publicity is a long term exercise ; its aim is to influence awareness of Army careers and to promote the Army's image through our most controllable resource. It must be targetted not only at the existing pool of potential applicants, but also at those who have yet to enter the pool. That task must begin today with those who will be of recruiting age in the mid-1990s. The effects of recent cuts in DAR's publicity budget are now starting to be felt, while at the same time competition from civilian recruitment advertising is increasing. In 1981 our civilian competitors spent £121M, in 1986 they spent £300M. Recruiting publicity consists of 2 parts : advertising to create awareness of and interest in the Army, and marketing through more direct publicity methods like display teams, presentations and Keeping the Army in the Public Eye (KAPE) displays ; all aimed at exploiting that awareness and converting it into applicants. These two activities are mutually supporting and the more variety used the better the effect.

32. It is difficult to quantify the effect of publicity in terms of producing actual recruits without a Management Information System (MIS), but the amount of interest which advertising creates, measured in telephone calls and coupons, is directly related to how much is spent. In 1986/87 the RN officer advertising budget was cut by 30% ; inquiries fell by 25% and applications for commissions dropped by 32%. Similarly in 1986/87 an increase in the regular soldier advertising budget from £607K to £920K brought an increase in advertising-attributed enquiries from 13,593 to 15,820.

33. DAR's Publicity Budget. Whilst recruiting has been buoyant DAR's publicity budget has declined in cash and real terms. The amount spent on regular soldier advertising has reduced to £768K per annum. Without increased funding DAR will not be able to fulfill his responsibilities properly. Advertising is never cheaper tomorrow because of the exponential rise in media prices, which since 1980 has been 77.3%. Even if the publicity budget does keep pace with the retail price index, by 1994 it will have further declined to 52% of its 1987 value because the cost of advertising is rising more steeply. The cheapest time to increase our publicity and improve our image is now. Any delay will increase costs for a proportionally lesser effect.

34. The Publicity Strategy. Given the necessary funding DAR's publicity strategy would be put on a new footing. The overall plan, led by a TV campaign, would be based on the 'One Army' concept, putting over the advantages of being in the Army either full or part-time. Press and marketing efforts would be directed at exploiting the TV image and at encouraging volunteers. The advertising and marketing campaigns are complimentary and form a coherent recruiting strategy. The National Employers Liaison Committee (NELC) "Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign" will of course continue in parallel with the new publicity strategy.

35. Assessment of Effectiveness. DAR's recruiting requirement is laid down by SCAMF. However he does not currently have the ability to forecast accurately the return on investing in the different elements of advertising

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

and marketing, and therefore any assessment of the effectiveness of his publicity strategy can only be subjective. Until DAR has an MIS with which he can track applicants through the application and enlistment process he will not be able to demonstrate with any accuracy how effectively the publicity funds are being spent. (An analysis of DAR's requirement for enquiries from advertising and marketing is at Appendix 1 to Annex B).

36. Extra Funding Requirement. Based on the evidence of previous campaigns, the advice of the advertising agencies and of the Central Office of Information it is estimated that an extra £51.740M on advertising and marketing are needed over the LTC period to produce the number of enquiries which are required to sustain the recruiting effort. It is however acknowledged that in the present financial climate resources of this order of magnitude are unlikely to be released at the first attempt. We have therefore placed the publicity enhancements into 3 priorities. A summary of the enhancements, with their individual costs, is at Annex B. The Priority 1 bid amounts to some £3M per annum and the Priority 2 bid totals £1.6M per annum, for the PES years. The Priority 3 bid is for £260K until FY 91/92, followed by £5.3M thereafter. For LTC funding purposes the Priority 1 and 2 bids have been limited to the PES years, allowing an appraisal of the effectiveness of the increased publicity expenditure to take place before further funding is committed. Funding of these enhancements for the remainder of the LTC is included in the Priority 3 bid.

~~RESTRICTED~~

37. Conclusion. Although it will be possible to add to the total number of recruits by implementing individual counter-measures, an essential prerequisite is to improve the Army's publicity. It cannot be achieved without extra money and it is vital that we pre-empt the recruiting crisis and use funds when they are most cost-effective.

RETENTION

38. The successful retention of trained officers and soldiers has always been one of the Army's major personnel management objectives. Some wastage is both necessary and inevitable, but current levels are too high and must be reduced if the Army is to weather the Demographic Trough. A wide range of factors influence retention, but commitments, job satisfaction and conditions of service hold the key.

a. Commitments. Inadequate manpower to meet commitments inevitably results in overstretch. Since 1981 the Army's MPT has fallen by some 7,000 posts without any appreciable reduction in commitments. This Report assumes that the current plans for commitments will remain unaltered for the foreseeable future and, if this continues to be the case, the present serious degree of overstretch is bound to increase as the available manpower reduces. If retention is to improve overstretch must be markedly curtailed ; this can only now be done by political decisions.

~~RESTRICTED~~

b. Job Satisfaction. The need for officers and soldiers at all levels to feel they are doing a thoroughly worthwhile job to high professional standards comes through strongly as fundamental to retention, as does pride in their unit, in all our studies and market research. In the UK as a whole some 6 million people change their jobs each year ; take-up of second careers will inevitably increase and will only be limited by ensuring job satisfaction. Job satisfaction cannot be achieved if each year Training Datum Levels are reduced, exercises curtailed, new equipments postponed, spares reduced and living conditions allowed to worsen.

c. Conditions of Service. The importance of conditions of service in achieving good retention is clearly fundamental. The need to improve retention has been stressed, but any deterioration in conditions of service simply makes matters worse. On the other hand carefully targetted improvements could pay dividends in retention terms. The findings of the Continuous Attitude Survey and the PVR Survey continue to show how important a factor perceptions of inadequate conditions of service are in the decision to leave the Army. Regrettably as our competitors continually invest in improving conditions our own 3 year major Review of Allowances has been conducted on a no-cost basis and some incoming Government legislation has the potential of worsening conditions of service.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

39. The counter-measures examined include a number intended to improve retention, such as the introduction of committal bonuses, the award of civilian qualifications and the possible introduction of specialist pay. Detailed staffing of most of these measures has yet to take place, but the introduction of a committal bonus for officers has been supported by the Executive Committee of the Army Board (ECAB)(1) and submitted to PPOs for approval by AFPRB. A bid for funding has also been submitted for approval as part of the LTC process. The seriousness or otherwise with which the critical retention of officers and the Demographic Trough is viewed by the Central Policy Staffs of the MOD will be demonstrated to the Army by the outcome of this measure in negotiations over LTC 89.

SUMMARY

40. It is vital that the Army steps up its recruiting effort and establishes a coherent publicity strategy before it becomes inordinately difficult and expensive to do so. To that end a bid for £5.024M per annum should be submitted as part of the LTC process for the PES years only, allowing the effectiveness of the expenditure to be monitored before continuation funding is sought.

41. Similarly efforts to improve retention are fundamental and once the staffing process is complete a very high priority will be placed on obtaining

Note :

(1) ECAB/M(88)6 dated 13 Jun 88.

~~RESTRICTED~~

funds for the appropriate counter-measures. The measure concerning committal bonuses for officers has already been staffed and an LTC bid for £2.4M per annum from FY 89/90 has been submitted.

42. Failure to fund these measures will undermine the credibility of the MOD's intention to combat and overcome the effects of the Demographic Trough, will add fuel to the current perception that the Services are a declining profession and is therefore likely to exacerbate both PVR and the daunting problems of recruiting in the years ahead.

~~RESTRICTED~~


CHAPTER 4

THE OFFICER COUNTER-MEASURES

GENERAL

43. The effect on officer strength of the Demographic Trough is reflected in the statistical forecast shown in Graph 6. Line 1 shows the forecast MPT and Line 2 is the forecast strength resulting from the 10% drop in graduates and 20% drop in non-graduates because of demography. Line 3 shows the effect of a further 10% drop in graduate intake which may result from the increased competition for graduates which has been widely publicised :

Graph 6



44. Line 2 of the graph assumes that DAR will continue to attract sufficient graduates to compete for bursaries and cadetships and that the population will continue to have the same proportion of suitable individuals capable of passing RCB. There is no guarantee however that although more young people will have

better educational qualifications they will necessarily have the right qualities to become officers. Line 2 also ignores the competition for graduates from Commerce and Industry which is forecast by the CBI and postulated recently in a number of articles in the national press. This shortage of graduates is underlined by the Training Commission, which stated on 14 July 1988 that "by 1998 the graduate shortage will reach crisis proportions"(1). Particular shortfalls are anticipated for technical and engineering graduates, so specific targetting of these graduates by DAR's recruiting campaign will need to take place.

45. In order to illustrate the effect of recruiting fewer graduates Graph 6, Line 3, shows what the officer strength would be if the graduate intake was further reduced by 10%. SCAMF will monitor intakes extremely carefully and must trigger the introduction of corrective action quickly if the situation so demands. Despite this reasonably healthy prognosis it must be remembered that full officer recruiting has not been achieved during the past 10 years, so it is prudent to plan now on introducing measures which will reinforce the purely statistical forecast.

MANAGEMENT MEASURES(2)

46. Many of the Management Measures are in-hand already, which accounts for

Notes :

(1) The Times, Tuesday 5th April 1988.

(2) The Management and Further Measures are summarised in Annexes C and D and cross-referenced to Chapters 4 and 5.

RESTRICTED

the current relatively healthy numerical situation, while others need to be introduced as soon as possible. Implementing most of these proposals will not involve additional costs. The sum effect should be in the order of 100 extra trained officers each year.

a. More Inter-Corps Transfers. Officers who are unhappy or discontented in their current employment and those who have decided to PVR should be actively encouraged to transfer to another more suitable Arm or Service.

b. Commonwealth Transfers. A policy of encouraging transfers to the British Army from other Commonwealth armies should be adopted, subject to adequate quality control and the ability to transfer pensionable service.

c. Commission More Warrant Officers (WOs). 21% of the strength of the officer corps now consists of late entry (LE) officers. The extent to which the rate of LE commissioning can be increased is therefore limited, but Arms and Service Directors should keep their policy under review. Greater extraction from the Sgt's Mess could adversely affect the quality of the remaining SNCOs and WOs.

d. Encourage Re-Instatement. Currently some 30 officers rejoin the Army each year. More officers could be re-instated by MS contacting those who have recently left the Army and encouraging them to rejoin. Particular emphasis should be placed on the re-instatement of specialist officers, allowing them, if they wished, to re-join for only a limited period of service. There is also some scope for the re-instatement of female officers who left the Army to have children.

RESTRICTED

~~SECRET IN CONFERENCE~~

e. Continuance Beyond Retirement Age. Officers of the rank of Brigadier and below are normally required to retire at age 55. Each year an additional 25 officers could continue in service filling posts which are proving difficult to man or would otherwise fall vacant. This policy is being implemented by DM(A) in conjunction with MS. In addition consideration will be given to allowing some of the few captains not promoted major to retain their commissions after the 16 year point and to filling Retired Officer posts currently manned by serving officers with re-employed officers.

f. Increased "Risk" Entrants. 50% of all Regular Commissions Board (RCB) passes are now 'risk' passes, yet Rowallan Company at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) is often under-utilised by as much as 50%. RCB must allow more Rowallan risk passes, particularly as the Standard Military Course (SMC) has recently been increased in length. Use of this spare RMAS capacity could result in some 20 more trained officers each year.

g. Reduce Potential Officer Wastage. Each year some 60 to 70 successful RCB candidates fail to attend their RMAS course. This wastage must be reduced through post-RCB monitoring by DAR and by the Arms and Service recruiting representatives.

h. Use of TA Officers. The scheme by which selected TA officers are offered Short Service Volunteer Commissions (SSVC) in the Regular Army for up to 2 years allows for 60 officers to be employed at any one time. Less than 50% of all places are currently taken up, yet the scheme offers distinct advantages to the TA (despite the fact that it too faces

~~RESTRICTED~~

demographic problems) and Arms and Service Directors must ensure that it is fully utilised. However the extent to which TA officers, including those on SSVC, should be encouraged to transfer to the Regular Army is being studied by DARC and DM(A).

i. Improved CCF/ACF Recruiting. 38% of regular officers were in the CCF and a number were in the ACF. Greater involvement by units and the recruiting staff in CCFs and ACFs would foster recruiting and should be encouraged by the Chain of Command. The recent Hulme Report(1) emphasised the importance of the CCF and ACF. Its recommendations should be considered urgently.

j. Improved Application Processing. The present system for processing applications for RCB and pre-RCB is cumbersome and time-consuming. DAR must make every effort to streamline the system to ensure that once a potential officer makes his initial enquiry the Army presents a friendly face and stays continuously in touch thereafter.

k. Recruit Older Officers. The employment market is more mobile now than it has been in the past so there could be scope for recruiting older individuals direct from the civilian market. In particular, specialists might be attracted to the Army providing the terms of service were suitably attractive in respect of seniority and employment. This may require the introduction of a specialist commission and it will certainly

Note :

(1) D/DARC/27/34/11 dated 10 Dec 86.

require changes to terms of service. DCAMR will pursue this with MS, DCIS(A) and DGPS(A).

l. More Exchange Postings. Sending officers on exchange postings increases the career satisfaction of those selected and enhances the environment into which the overseas officer is placed, both of which could lead to increased retention. 20 additional exchange postings should be instituted at a cost of £160K per annum.

m. Increase Capacity of Potential Officers Development Course (PODC). PODC is run at the Army School of Education and prepares serving soldiers and NCOs for RCB. 50% of those who attend pass RCB. The course is over-subscribed and should be expanded to take 71 students each year. This would require the establishment of one additional RAEC instructor at £30K per annum.

n. Re-Value Scholarships and Bursaries. The current values of the Army's school scholarships and university bursaries are not competitive. To ensure that all the places presently available are filled by the right quality of potential officer the amounts on offer must be increased. This requirement is being addressed by all 3 Services ; the cost for the Army would be £197K per annum.

THE LONG TERM ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE ARMY STUDY

47. The wider employment of female officers is an important area of consideration for increasing the number of officers, but because of the Study

~~RESTRICTED~~

into the Long Term Role of Women in the Army this has not been covered under Management Measures. There is considerable potential for recruiting more female officers, but changes will be necessary in the deployment rules before this can become an effective counter-measure. Nevertheless the study team have been briefed on the problems arising from the Demographic Trough. From the MARILYN viewpoint the team should be looking towards the employment of 200 additional female officers by 1994.

FURTHER MEASURES

48. There are a number of further areas where detailed study is either in hand now or is necessary in order that SCAMF can recommend rapid action should the forecasts be found to be optimistic.

a. Committal Bonus. A committal bonus aimed at encouraging service to age 37 (an officer's first pension point) has been supported by ECAB. The intention is to attack the current wastage of officers at the senior captain/junior major levels and to encourage more conversion from SSC to regular commissions. The proposal is currently with PFOs prior to being put to AFPRB in late 1988.

b. Specialist Pay. The requirement for IT specialists has recently been reviewed and one of the recommendations made was that specialist pay needs to be introduced if IT specialists are to be retained. The proposal should be staffed further by DM(A) and DCIS(A) and widened to include officers with engineering degrees.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

c. Expansion of Welbeck College. The expansion of Welbeck College is being examined with the view to producing 30 additional Welbexians each year. This is in keeping with the increasing complexity of military equipment and the emphasis on a 'Technical Army'. RMAS should have a closer relationship with Welbeck as Welbexians would benefit from receiving some preparatory training which should reduce their failure rate at RMAS.

d. Time Bars. In the Navy some officers are required to serve for a minimum period of 2½ years from their date of promotion. The introduction of time bars on promotion for all ranks in the Army will be given further study by DM(A). Consideration should also be given, by the Army Retirements Board, to making greater use of the existing 12 month rule governing notice to PVR.

e. Links with Industry. Current discussions with the CBI indicate that a scheme could be set up whereby officers who are committed to leaving the Army would be counselled towards employment in Industry. Furthermore firms might be prepared to guarantee places to young officers who complete a 1 year SSLC followed by 3 years in the TA. DGAVR should bring these discussions to fruition in conjunction with MS and DARC.

f. A Military Degree. The British Army is one of the few major armies which fails to provide a military degree. A considerable amount of in-service study (RMAS, JDSC, Staff College, JSDC, HCSC, RCDS) goes unrecognised by any civilian award and this could form the basis of a military degree. A qualification of this sort would be a most valuable recruiting attraction and a retention incentive. DGT&D(A) has this in hand.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

g. Lesser Civilian Qualifications. Recruiting for the non-technical Arms and Services suffers from the current inability to offer potential officers the expectation of being awarded any civilian qualifications in recognition of the skills he will have learnt and employed. DAT and DAEd are currently studying the possibilities.

h. Centralised Potential Officer (PO) Courses. PO courses are currently run under the auspices of individual Arms and Service Directors. They are designed to prepare POs for RCB. Centrally-run courses would ensure that all POs were given the greatest opportunity of gaining a commission and that those not considered suitable by, or for whom a vacancy did not exist in, one particular capbadge could easily be re-allocated. This is to be pursued by DGAMR with CTAD.

i. Centralised Pre-RCB Briefings. A centralised pre-RCB briefing would reduce the losses caused by borderline candidates being rejected (and thereby discouraged) by individual Regiments and Corps, who would fare better under the closer scrutiny afforded by RCB. It would allow a standardised briefing to be given and permit ready transfer between sponsor capbadges. Although this proposal is unpopular Regimentally it merits further study by DGAMR.

j. Increase Number of Schools Liaison Officers (SLOs). A proposal to increase the number of SLOs is currently being studied by DAR. Improved penetration and coverage of schools is considered achievable given more staff.

~~RESTRICTED~~

k. Increased Number of Bursaries and Cadetships. Once the values of scholarships and bursaries have been restored to competitive levels an assessment will be made by DAR as to whether application rates would justify increased numbers of bursaries and cadetships being offered.

l. The Military Schools. Despite recent consideration of their closure on cost grounds the Duke of Yorks Royal Military School (DYRMS) and Queen Victoria's School (QVS) for boys offer valuable potential for the recruiting of officers, particularly to the less technical capbadges. ECAB, in considering the future of these schools, stressed that more attention should be given to their recruiting potential(1). In this respect it is considered that their sixth forms might be expanded and qualitatively improved to offer equivalent opportunities in the Arts and non-technical Sciences to Welbeck. AUS(A) should now undertake a detailed study in consultation with the Commissioners of both schools.

m. Expansion of the Royal Military College of Science (RMCS). Civilian students attending RMCS become involved in a quasi-military environment and mix academically and socially with the military students. A number decide actually to join the Army while the rest take the impression of the Army gained at RMCS away with them. Use of RMCS to take more civilian students could have distinct recruiting benefits and should be studied by DGT&D(A).

Note :

(1) ECAB/P(88)20.

~~RESTRICTED~~

n. University Officer Training Corps (UOTC). The Review of the UOTC(1) is considering the role of the UOTCs and their recruiting potential. Many officers have been UOTC members and the potential for additional recruiting is excellent given adequate resources and support from the Regular Army.

OFFICER SUMMARY

49. The Army has not met its officer recruiting targets for some time and the problem is compounded by high PVR, particularly amongst younger officers. Applications for Welbeck College places and for Army Scholarships are already well down, indicating the beginning of the effects of the Demographic Trough on the younger age group. Temporary expedients to fill gaps such as re-instatements, continuance and re-employment of officers, together with new initiatives such as committal bonuses, are already being used or are under consideration.

50. It is anticipated that the officer recruiting problem will not be as severe as that for soldiers in the short and medium term, but greater competition for graduates and from Industry leaves no room for complacency. The major problem will appear towards the end of the century when the officer strength could decline significantly. At this stage it is impossible to forecast accurately the extent of the deficiency, but we must be prepared to take positive counter-action.

Note :

(1) Sponsored by DGT&Org, due to report in September 1988.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

51. The prospects of containing the problem in the short to medium term are reasonable provided more is spent on officer advertising, bursaries and scholarships. In the medium to long term active steps must be taken to employ more female officers to compensate for the projected shortage of male officers. In addition it would be prudent to try to provide a cushion against the Lean Years by building up manning surpluses now in those cap-badges where this can be achieved.

~~RESTRICTED~~


CHAPTER 5

THE SOLDIER COUNTER-MEASURES

GENERAL

52. The statistical model shows that the Army faces the alarming prospect of significant recruiting shortfalls for soldiers in the years ahead. Graph 7 shows the likely effect on trained soldier strength if no action is taken :

Graph 7(1)



Note :

(1) Data for 1.4.88 actual, remaining figures rounded to nearest 1000. Based on Summer SCAMF 1988.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED & CONFIDENTIAL~~

53. The Army requires some 20,000 soldier recruits each year, but it is forecast that by 1994 present extraction rates will bring in only about 13,000 recruits. The effect is already being felt : the 1987/88 recruit target was not met and achievement so far this year indicates a shortfall at the end of the year in the order of 2,000 recruits.

INITIAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES

54. Manning. More emphasis on, and increased use of, current manning practices is proposed and the following measures could together provide a gain of some 200 to 300 UKTAM each year :

- a. Additional Special 'S' Type Engagements. An increase in the numbers of men serving on Special 'S' Type engagements is considered to be possible if the scheme is more widely publicised and authorisation procedures are speeded up.
- b. Increased Inter-Corps Transfers. Encouragement and better counselling of those contemplating leaving the Army should persuade some of those currently lost to serve on in some other employment.
- c. Increased Re-enlistment. A sustained campaign to follow up reservists and encourage re-enlistment would increase the current number of re-enlistments.

d. Increased Use of the Long Service List (LSL). It is possible that more posts can be identified which could be filled by soldiers on the LSL. A review will be undertaken by DM(A) but the numbers involved are likely to be small.

e. Increased Use of Career Continuance. The Review of Army Terms of Service in 1987 resulted in a policy of increased career continuance. Changing the 22 year Notice Engagement to 25 years has been studied in the Army Terms of Service Review 1988. It became clear that disadvantages in the 1990s outweighed more tentative advantages in the 2000s. The Adjutant General therefore directed that, rather than change the engagement, extensions beyond 22 years should by 1990 become normal for any satisfactory and employable soldier who applies.


55. Recruiting. Some of the recruiting Management Measures are already being introduced by DAR. It is recommended that the remaining measures should be implemented as soon as possible :

a. Physical Development Course (PDC). Passing the Entrance Fitness Test (EFT) is no longer mandatory and will only be one factor in selection. Adult and Young Soldier (A&YS) applicants who are suitable in all other respects have from August 1988 attended a two week PDC at the Army Personnel Selection Centre (APSC) to bring them up to the required standard. Funding for the PDC will be required from 1991 when APSC is scheduled to close.

are only attached from units, and can be withdrawn at short notice. Without them many ACIOs would have to close or operate on a restricted basis. DAR has written to Arms and Service Directors seeking additional Specials. A further source of temporary Special Recruiters is the ITO, as the shortage of recruits may well result in spare capacity at training depots.

56. Effect of The Initial Management Measures. We have incorporated the effects estimated for each of the quantifiable Initial Management Measures in the statistical model and illustrated the effect on trained strength in Graph 8. It shows a deficit against MPT of some 14,000 remaining in 1998 :

Graph 8



- b. Satisfied Soldiers. DAR is enlarging the scope of the Satisfied Soldiers Scheme by making more use of trained soldiers who have recently completed their Phase 2 or Junior training. These soldiers still have strong ties with their home communities and are able to relate their recent experience of training to their contemporaries.
- c. Improve Calibre and Training of Recruiting Staff. Ensuring that recruiting staff are of the highest calibre, and the introduction of improved training for them, will further ensure that the image and salesmanship at the 'point of sale' are of the highest quality. Many recruiters are good calibre, however the most suitable NCOs must be made available ; their impact could increase enlistments by up to 1% for both A&YS and Juniors.
- d. Improve Selection Techniques. Selection tests are designed to ensure that applicants are capable of completing training for the employment concerned. Current tests are not perfect and the Army Personnel Research Establishment (APRE) is completing a study of improved tests. These should reduce the numbers entering training who are unsuited and therefore reduce wastage in training. It should also help reduce the number of otherwise suitable applicants who are found ineligible under current tests. It is estimated that the overall effect will be to reduce wastage in training by 1%, however these new tests will not become available before 1990.
- e. Additional Special Recruiters. DAR is heavily reliant on the 155 Special Recruiters based in Army Careers Information Offices (ACIOs). They

REDUCING WASTAGE

57. The initial Management Measures will only go a small part of the way towards solving the problem. Reducing wastage is the sole means of avoiding or delaying the need for costly Further Measures, unless a reduction of recruit quality or undermanning is to be accepted :

a. Reduction of Recruit Quality.

(1) Currently only 1 in every 4 applicants for the Army becomes a trained soldier ; the remainder withdraw at the ACIO (40%), are rejected (27%), or waste-out in recruit training (8%). One obvious option is to reduce the quality of recruit and thereby increase their quantity but this would lead to longer training times and substantially increased costs.

(2) The Army Entrance Test (AET) measures the quality of potential recruits while Arms and Service Directors set the selection standards they require. At present nearly all applicants are up to the standard required by the Infantry, so the reduction of AET standards would not increase the number of Infantry recruits, which is where the greatest shortfall will lie. With the advent of Warrior and a new range of weapons, the Director of Infantry has in fact made a case for increasing the quality of his recruits.

(3) Reducing recruit standards would only be effective if shortages lay in the higher ability employments, which is not the case today nor what we currently foresee. Arms and Service Directors should however keep recruit standards under review throughout the Lean Years to ensure that those demanded are the minimum necessary for the effective performance of their Career Employment Groups(1).

(4) It is concluded that there is at present no general requirement to lower recruit standards because the effect of doing so will not assist the Infantry and because the Army must have recruits capable of meeting the high professional standards we require.

b. Undermanning. Undermanning has a compound effect of aggravating overstretch and turbulence, and increasing wastage, thereby causing further undermanning. Unless the Army's commitments can be substantially reduced there is not considered to be any scope for a policy of deliberate undermanning to carry the shortfalls in recruiting.

58. The reduction of recruit and trained soldier wastage will have a major impact. A number of specific measures are considered elsewhere in this chapter, but the bulk of such a reduction must be achieved by a concerted management effort down the chain of command to the lowest level. To assist this process

Note :

(1) Faced with recruiting difficulties DRAC has recently reduced his recruit standards, but not below the perceived minimum requirement.

two precepts must be observed :

a. Cost-Consciousness. There must be appreciation of the cost of wastage : for instance a recruit on arrival at his depot has already cost £1250. As he leaves the depot as a trained soldier he has cost £7250. By the time he reaches the rank of sergeant after 12 years he has cost some £170,000 in training and support costs alone.

b. Objectives. Objectives have been introduced into training and are an essential element of the budgetary regime. There is no reason why objectives should not be introduced into retention in view of its importance. Retention is a matter both of high level management (such as the setting of terms and conditions of service) and of low-level man-management. Objectives therefore need to be expressed in ways relevant to these levels, with clear direction and interest down the chain of command.

59. Recruit Wastage.

a. Objectives. In the last 2 years recruit wastage rates have varied from 7% at one depot to 58% at another and between 8% and 29% at the same depot but at different times. From observation of the variations between depots and of past records it is considered that a reduction in recruit wastage by 5%, from the current overall level of 28%, is achievable. The Army target should be a reduction to 25%. As an objective at platoon/company level this reduction in recruit wastage means saving one recruit in 20.

~~RESTRICTED~~

b. Remedial Training. Recruit wastage is the product of many variable factors such as the style of command of the training unit, the ratio of instructors to recruits, the medical screening of the recruit, his overall fitness, conditions of service, the extent of support from the recruit's family, his background and, in particular, his acceptance of the need for discipline and a sense of duty. It is only by continual adjustment and monitoring of all the factors that wastage can be kept to the minimum. However it is considered that a great deal more effort should be put into the area of remedial training. Recruits who are physically weak, injured or need additional training should be grouped into remedial courses at each depot. As recruit numbers decrease it should be possible to run such courses using the staff and resources thereby released.

c. Common Military Syllabus (Recruits) (CMS(R)) Review. CTAD has recently ordered that a review of the content and length of CMS(R) be carried out. This review is underway and a report, including a recommended revised CMS(R), will be published this year. The pace of life during Phase I training is one of the subjects being considered by the review, and it is accepted that some recruits find Phase I training too hectic in comparison with civilian life. Therefore 8, 9 and 10 week long options for CMS(R) are being examined, and of these the 10 week option is the one most likely to be adopted. Such a change should help to reduce recruit wastage.

~~RESTRICTED~~

60. Trained Soldier Wastage. Currently the Army loses 12% of its trained strength each year. It is both necessary and achievable to reduce this outflow by 1%. As an objective at unit level this means avoiding the loss of 2 men per company or equivalent per year. Officers and NCOs should compare the quality of the man being saved not with the quality of his peers but with the quality of those available as replacements. In the late 1970s and early 1980s PVR rates varied considerably, from 2% to nearly 5%. Unit PVR rates have been widely used to monitor manning levels especially by formation HQs. More recently however PVR appears to have stabilised around an Army average of 2.5% and, in the absence of major de-stabilizing factors such as loss of pay comparability, may stay in this area. Currently the problem is increasingly "drifting" (staying past the manning option points without commitment to the next option point), followed by run out at a year's notice. Monitoring of rates and leadership action should in future focus on drifting and run out as much as on PVR, and APRE must continue its studies into retention determinants.

ADDITIONAL MANAGEMENT MEASURES

61. We have identified a number of additional Management Measures, as follows :

- a. Increased Employment of Women. The potential for additional dual posts is limited under the present deployment rules. The rules, and the role of women in the Army, are being looked at by the Long Term Role of Women in the Army Study. Should a change of deployment rules emerge it

RESTRICTED

should be possible to identify a number of additional dual-posts. It is considered that a minimum target of 1000 such posts is realistic.

b. Committal Bonuses. The relative value of committal pay in relation to the rest of the pay package has declined since it was introduced in 1972. APRE research indicates that the money might be better spent as a lump-sum committal bonus. Such a scheme should be considered by DGPS(A) ; the effects are not presently quantifiable but, being a rearrangement of existing payments, would be at no net cost. This measure can be expected to encourage retention but will need PFO and AFFRB approval.

c. Civilian Qualifications. Broadening the range of military qualifications which are recognised by civil institutes as reflecting an NCO's experience, responsibility and management skills would enhance the attractiveness of an Army career. An NCO would then be more secure in the feeling that he was employable in competition with others at the conclusion of his service, and recruiting is also likely to benefit. DAEd should pursue this with the City & Guilds and other professional bodies.

d. Transfers from Dependent Territories and Commonwealth Countries. Members of units such as the Hong Kong Military Service Corps and the Gibraltar Regiment could provide a source of transfers into the British Army, particularly from Hong Kong as 1997 approaches. Such men have become closely identified with the British military and could be assimilated easily into a number of Corps of the British Army. There are however considerable difficulties over rights of entry and residence on

discharge, particularly for the dependants of such personnel, which will need resolution. However a flexible approach to such transfers, and transfers from other Commonwealth armies, would provide a valuable contribution to trained strength. AUS(A) should be invited to sound out the FCO and other interested Government Departments on the way forward.

e. PVR Delays. Use of the Protected Employment Scheme has shown that enforced delay of PVR by 6 months can achieve temporary alleviation of undermanning. The use of this measure must be carefully weighed against the possible detrimental effect on morale, and should only be applied in extremis ; it is however already in force in a few deficiency employments.

f. Increased PVR Costs. Current PVR costs are related to committal pay and are consequently low, offering little disincentive to soldiers contemplating leaving the Army. The raising of PVR costs to a deterrent level could reduce wastage and should be examined by APRE.

RESTRUCTURING THE JUNIOR ARMY

62. The need for the Junior Army in the light of the Demographic Trough is fundamental. While some Juniors might otherwise have entered as A&YS, there is no doubt that most would have found alternative careers. Without the Junior Entry we would leave the field for good quality young men completely open to our competitors. Improving employment prospects and the Government's YTS policy serve to increase this possibility. Unless we can offer employment to a young man on leaving school, we are going to miss out on a large slice of the target population.

63. Recent LTC measures have been proposed which affect the structure and conditions of service in the Junior Army. Measures seeking to abolish Junior Soldiers and Junior Leaders go against the principle of maximising the Junior entry, while those affecting Junior pay reduce DAR's ability to recruit them. These measures were valid when they were originally proposed under favourable recruiting conditions, but the recruiting climate has deteriorated since. At the very least the status quo should be maintained and any LTC measure likely adversely to affect the Junior Army should now be firmly deleted.

64. Furthermore, where the length of Phase 1 and 2 training for any particular employment approaches or exceeds 1 year, then it makes sense to have a Junior intake. This allows more recruits to come direct from school and become trained soldiers after their 17th birthday.

65. Junior recruiting is at present impaired in 2 respects : the distribution of intake dates throughout the year does not match school leaving dates, and the minimum age of 16.5 for Junior Soldiers results in their diversion to other careers as many cannot join direct from school. These restrictions were introduced as a result of the Groom Report, which at the time made valuable savings because the resulting reduction in the size of the Junior intake was offset by A&YS recruiting. This is no longer the case and therefore the Junior entry should be increased and intake dates re-scheduled to coincide with the end of the new GCSE examination which 85% to 90% of school children sit in May and June, subsequently leaving school in the Summer. It is important that the ITO Study's review of the Junior Army should consider these recruiting factors as well as the economic use of training resources. In the light of their study :

~~RESTRICTED~~

- a. Intake dates will need to be rescheduled.
- b. Junior Soldiers should be able to join direct from school. This requires a minimum age of 15 years 11 months and training being extended to either a one year course or, providing suitable continuation training, to age 17 and entry into adult service.
- c. All employments with Phase 1 and 2 training time approaching or exceeding one year should have a Junior entry.

66. Implementation of these changes would have considerable implications for the ITO. Uneven intakes could lead to uneven loading of training facilities and variable use of accommodation. Wastage would lead to redundant accommodation without there being succeeding intakes to make use of it. Unit programming would become inefficient ; education staff, range space and battle camps would be wanted in great numbers but only for specific limited periods. All this might however be overcome if Adults and Juniors were trained at the same establishment. This flexibility would allow the more efficient use of resources and may be the price the Army must necessarily pay if it is to maximise the Junior intake. Specific safeguards would however be necessary to guard against bullying and other abuses at such mixed establishments.

67. DAR estimates that such a review would increase Junior enlistments by up to 14%. Other measures which will increase the number of Juniors are the removal of the Entrance Fitness Test and increasing the number of Army Schools Liaison Officers (ASLOs). These may yield about a 14% increase ; the combined

effect, allowing for the inter-action of the measures, is estimated as a 26% increase. Based on a projected maximum recruit achievement of 6100, this would indicate that the annual Junior intake after restructuring would lie between 7000 and 9000 per year.

FURTHER MEASURES

68. The final group of soldier counter-measures which we have identified are those which should be introduced subject to the satisfactory conclusion of detailed staffing and the provision of separate funding.

a. Form BAOR Recruiting Staff. The British community in BAOR has the potential to produce many more recruits beyond those presently obtained. A permanent presence would also allow improved careers advice in schools and attendance at shows and events. It is considered that an Army Careers Officer supported by 2 LSL recruiters should be established at a cost of £70K per annum.

b. Information Technology (IT) Specialist Pay. Pay of IT specialist employments in the RAFC and RACC has recently been subject to the threat of down-banding and currently a Joint Service paper is being staffed with the RAF as the lead Service. The aim is to retain present pay bands on the basis of civilian pay comparisons and the importance to the Services of these skills. Should this fail specialist pay will be sought. The cost, including that for a new Royal Signals IT employment group, is estimated to be £212K per annum.

c. Implementation of the Corkran Study Recommendations. The Corkran Study examined the current organisation and operation of recruiting and display team activities with a view to making recommendations, where necessary, for rationalisation and improvements. The Study Report(1) is currently being staffed. In particular, the Study examined the use, control and deployment of Mobile Display Teams (MDTs), Regimental Information Teams (RITs) and KAPE events. It recommended better coordination of MDTs, the tasking of RITs to partially fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Army Youth Teams (AYTs), the formation of Schools Presentation Teams at District level and improved liaison between the Recruiting Organisation and the cadet forces to which 35% of recruits have belonged. The provision of additional resources to introduce AYTs or their equivalent into the deprived Inner Cities would allow the Army to penetrate areas which are presently difficult to reach. It could also result in an increase of recruits from the ethnic minorities. (The use of AYTs, or similar, in inner city areas has political implications, see Chapter 7).

d. Re-Introduce Preliminary Training. There remains a small but significant proportion of applicants whose educational attainment prevents their acceptance as recruits. It is estimated that at least 500 such applicants, who are otherwise suitable, are rejected each year. The re-introduction of preliminary education would allow these applicants to be brought up to standard via remedial training. This concept could be

Note :

(1) D/DAR/39/41/1/1 dated 30 June 1988.

extended to provide character training and physical development for those recruits assessed in selection as high training risks. In essence it would provide a form of Rowallan Company for soldiers.

e. Increased Administrative Support to CsRLS. Implementation of the counter-measures will increase the workload on the staff of District Commanders Recruiting and Liaison Staff (CsRLS) who are already stretched. Subject to further study some or all Districts would require an additional RO3 at a capitation rate of £14.8K per annum.

f. Resettlement Training. Enhanced resettlement training for those of the non-technical trades who leave after 9 and 12 year's service, but who do not hold any civilian qualifications, would provide an increased feeling of security for the future and thereby improve the retention of 3 and 6 year men. The effect of resettlement counselling for 3 year men and those in the technical trades should also be studied by DAEd with a view to persuading them to continue in service.

g. Increase Retention Incentives. If the combination of measures already proposed proves insufficient to recruit and retain sufficient manpower to maintain the Army at full strength, then greater financial incentives to retention will be required. These incentives will have to be competitive with the civil labour market and will require considerably increased spending on pay and allowances and pay differentials as incentives for long term commitment.

h. The Canadian Model. The Canadian Forces have encountered, and apparently successfully overcome, problems recruiting into the combat arms. Applicants for technical employments who fail to reach high entrance test standards, but are otherwise satisfactory, are offered deferred places on the appropriate technical course subject to completion of a 3 year tour in a combat arm. Significant numbers elect to stay with their foster arm while those who do take up the re-training option have a very high pass rate.

i. US Initiatives. The US Army employs a number of recruiting initiatives, some of which are worthy of consideration in the UK. Examples are the granting of pay increments to serving soldiers who enlist friends, allowing groups of up to 5 friends to train and serve together, allowing choice of Theatre for initial posting of individually posted personnel, granting cash incentives to encourage enlistment into deficiency trades and allowing schools to administer the Army Entrance Test as part of their career counselling.

j. Increase Number of ASLOs. The key to the successful recruiting of Juniors lies with the operation of ASLOs within schools. They provide careers information to both staff and pupils and give personal guidance on methods of entry. Their operations also exert considerable influence on potential adult recruits. At present there are 31 ASLOs each covering 180 schools. Improved coverage is essential and will only be achieved by bringing the number of schools for which each is responsible down below 100. An additional 31 ASLOs are required at a cost of £741K per annum.

k. Commonwealth Recruiting. Any major effort to recruit from the Commonwealth would require the agreement of the Government concerned and would be complicated by the UK's immigration rules, in particular those affecting rights of residence. The fact that this measure would face these and other difficulties should not however preclude its consideration especially when the rewards could be substantial.

SOLDIER SUMMARY

69. The dominant factor is wastage. A major reduction could go a long way to solving the problem of the Lean Years. However it is a dynamic situation which will be subject to fluctuations as a result of other factors, including the improvements brought about as a result of MARILYN itself.

70. It is therefore important that counter-measures proceed on all the 3 available fronts : reduction of wastage and the improvement of adult and Junior recruiting. In addition it is considered that manning surpluses should be built up in those capbadges where it could be achieved to act as a cushion against shortfalls in other areas.

71. A range of measures has been identified which we judge may make it possible to maintain manning to MPT during the Lean Years. However we are not confident of achieving this ; it is quite possible that the Further Measures will not suffice to overcome the problem. Undermanning can set in at short notice as we have seen in the current SCAMF where a surplus last year is now forecast to change to a deficit of about 2000 by 1 April 89. It will be

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM~~

necessary therefore to establish a mechanism whereby the effectiveness of the MARILYN measures can be monitored and direction given if necessary on the detailed study of the Longer Term Possibilities. It is proposed that a Steering Group involving Head of GS Sec, DMO, DASD, D Army Plans, Head of RP(Army), DASC, Head of AG Sec 2 and DM(A) should give guidance to SCAMF.

~~RESTRICTED~~

CHAPTER 6


THE TERRITORIAL AND RESERVE ARMIES

THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

72. The Territorial Army (TA) is an integral part of the Army, supplying over 91,000 male and female soldiers, 39% of the overall ORBAT. The Demographic Trough will affect the TA as well as the Regular Army and therefore DARC has been involved throughout the study. Not only will the target population for TA recruiting reduce in size, but other social changes such as increased productivity from a smaller workforce are starting to have an effect and are highly significant for the TA.

73. The effects of the Stats TA forecast are summarised at Graph 9. However, although there is no reason to doubt the probability of a downward trend unless firm counter-measures are taken, DARC considers that as the forecast is based on only 75% of the TA intake age group (17 to 24 years), it may therefore be regarded as a worst case scenario.

Graph 9



74. The effect of reducing wastage by 5% is represented by the middle line on the graph and would result in an overall reduction in male strength of only 1000 between 1989 and 1998. In order to minimise this reduction or do better it will be necessary to implement retention measures now and action is already in hand ; for instance a bounty enhancement has recently been announced. Historically, the bounty has always had a beneficial effect on TA recruiting and retention and the increased weighting of the 2nd and 3rd year bounties is expected to produce even better results than in the past.

75. The Cadet Forces. The cadet forces play an important role in motivating young men to join the TA. At least 10% of all TA recruits are former members of the cadet forces. Examination of wastage statistics shows that they are less liable to leave during the recruit training stage and tend to remain in

~~RESTRICTED~~

the Army for longer than direct entrants from civil life. At a time of difficult recruiting it is essential that cadet forces should be encouraged and supported. Furthermore, because cadets form such an important element of the regular and TA intake, serious consideration should be given to devoting additional resources especially to combat pressures from other youth organisations.

76. Recruitment & Public Relations. The study into TA recruitment and wastage by the Grandfield Rork Collins Report concluded that it was essential for TA recruitment and PR to be closely coordinated so that PR was supportive of recruiting. This added further weight to the recommendations of the Shapland Report which had reached similar conclusions a few years earlier. In consequence the TA PR and Recruiting Group was established to monitor the effects of recruiting campaigns, formulate policy for recruiting expenditure and plan complimentary PR action. A pool of TA Public Information Officers (PIOs) has been established, partly to meet the Army's wartime PR needs and in peace to promote the TA image in the local and national media. Coordination of policy for recruiting campaigns can only be beneficial. Similarly, recruiting efforts by Regular Army Schools Liaison Officers and Recruiting Teams should cover both the Regular Army and the TA if full use and value is to be obtained for the costs expended.

77. Compeing for Manpower. Although both the Regular Army and TA compete for officers and soldiers from the same pool, the problems faced are not identical. Whereas the Regular Army is seeking entrants who wish to make a full time commitment to the Army, the TA seeks to attract suitable young men who have

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

already entered a non-military career. The TA is therefore competing for the free time and some working time, of young men who are seeking to establish themselves in their civilian careers. Not only does this involve the employer losing his junior executives for short periods but also means that TA officers and soldiers surrender some of their leisure and family time in addition to carrying out their full time employment. Any reduction in the size of the recruiting pool will therefore mean that civilian employers will themselves face shortfalls, thereby reducing their willingness to release their depleted staff for TA training activities. This could be exacerbated by the reluctance of employers with greatly slimmed-down, individually highly-productive workforces, to lose employees for any period to the TA.

78. Recruiting Measures.

a. In addition to the measures outlined for the Regular Army, a major effort must be made to convince the employer that far from losing his staff to the TA he is gaining employees whose knowledge, technical, managerial and executive skills have all been enhanced through membership of the TA. Territorial Army and Volunteer Reserve Association (TAVRA) local employer liaison committees have preached this message for a long time and on a local basis it has been supported by unit initiatives such as running weekend leadership exercises for major local employers. Feedback from the firms concerned has been very promising, but on its own this is not enough. The Government recognised this problem and in 1986 established an independent advisory body, the National Employer Liaison Committee (NELC). Examination will be required to establish the need for a permanent, dedicated staff for an NELC Secretariat.

~~RESTRICTED~~

b. The proposed Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign is an essential and complimentary factor to the TA national recruiting campaign. It is not, however, an alternative to the recruiting drives sponsored by DAR for the TA.

c. Other measures which are being studied include increased efforts to recruit ex-regulars, the introduction of 2 years obligatory TA service for all SSC officers on completion of their regular engagement, active recruitment from school leavers in the CCF and increased usage of TA PIOs to produce TA local boy stories and articles in professional journals. The TAVRA Interface Study report, which is still being staffed, recommends changes to improve local recruiting. These include the establishment of TA recruiting staffs (1 x Maj, 1 x WO and 2 x Sgts), PR staff for each TAVRA and better resources for handling ex-regulars and enquiries arising from the national recruiting campaigns. This late idea has not been costed.

d. Recruiting from UOTCs. The present success rate for recruiting from the UOTCs is not encouraging. The UOTC Study Team which is currently examining the functions and roles of the UOTCs has already noted this and is likely to recommend that UOTC COs should be tasked to make far greater efforts to recruit for both the Regular Army and the TA.

79. Retention Measures. In view of the high turnover of TA personnel it is also essential to introduce strong internal recruiting measures. Two schemes will be introduced in late 1988 to coincide with the start of the Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign :

a. A comprehensive aide-memoire detailing unit wastage counter-measures (based on a similar idea used in the Australian Reserve Army) has already been issued.

b. A continuous attitude survey to monitor and evaluate the relative importance of reasons for wastage is being discussed with APRE. The aim of this scheme would be to help concentrate counter-measures more effectively and monitor changing social attitudes towards the TA.

c. Efforts must be made to retain volunteers by encouraging them to remain through transfers to units with lower training commitments and obligations, (specialist units, pools, Home Service Force (HSF) or cadets).

80. Other Manning Measures.

a. Age Limitations. Action has already been taken to widen the ages for enlistment and commissioning, and discharge and retirement. The main changes have inevitably fallen on the specialist groups who are employable in tasks outside the Forward Combat Zone at older ages.

b. Officer Retention. The introduction of a TA Lt Col Special List has been examined and rejected. An alternative use for those who have completed command appointments and cannot be used for other tasks would be to rank-range home defence HQ and LO posts, providing flexibility if there is a shortfall of majors.

~~RESTRICTED~~

c. Specialist Career Structures. Specialist officers may have to be granted rank commensurate with their standing in their civilian profession.

d. TA Assistance to Regular Army. Rules for SSVC officers and the rules for the Special "S" type engagement for soldiers are being amended to allow greater flexibility in using TA personnel against Regular Army shortfalls. Consideration should also be given to the introduction of a limited call-out scheme of volunteer reservists to give assistance in MACE tasks. Not only would this assist the Regular Army by reducing overstretch, but it would also help the TA make a greater impact nationally.

81. The Continental TA. A pilot scheme was established in 1985 to find out whether or not additional TA units could be formed by recruiting expatriate personnel resident on the Continent. Five small units have been raised and 260 personnel recruited from ex-servicemen, service dependants, MCD employees resident in the area and other British nationals. The scheme has been enthusiastically supported by HQ BAOR and it is proposed to seek official agreement to expand the Continental TA to a strength of 1000. However, because manpower cover has had to be found from within the TA establishment ceiling, any expansion would have to be funded through a discrete programme of compensating reductions found over the next 3 years. In the event that the proposed expansion is considered to be unjustified, then there would appear to be no other option than to disband a highly successful innovation.

RESTRICTED

82. Terms and Conditions of Service.

a. Although counter-measures will concentrate on enhancing the TA public image and convincing the employer of the benefits he can gain from the TA, there is also a need to look at terms of service. The first flush of enthusiasm will soon wear off if a TA soldier finds he is losing money or material benefits as a result of his TA service, quite apart from the personal inconvenience which is often to the detriment of his family and social relationships. Many TA soldiers attending evening or weekend training forego overtime rates of pay, and as a result they are actually financially worse off than they would have been had they stayed at work. It is therefore essential that TA pay, bounties and allowances are fair.

b. A second area of concern is the penalty suffered by those who are in receipt of DHSS benefits. Receipt of TA pay and allowances has in the past debarred TA soldiers from being eligible for their full entitlements, but this may no longer be the case under the new Income Support benefit. DHSS have been persuaded to raise the earned income thresholds (which now include travel and subsistence allowances) for members of the tri-Service reserves but, until the benefit has been in force for several months, we are unable to judge whether these concessions are adequate. If they are not, re-negotiation of the rules will be necessary.

c. Further measures which may have to be considered to encourage enlistment and longer service include lower training obligations, reduction of overstretch, greater flexibility in individual training

~~RESTRICTED~~

commitments, the fostering of an esprit de corps specific to the TA, and actions to maintain TA perception of Government support.

d. Matters are already in hand to control the amount of training carried out over and above the minimum commitment and a revised lower training commitment has recently been introduced.

e. The current system of holding volunteers on the Unposted List requires review. Consideration should be given to the RNR/RMR List 2 system.

f. The TA 3 year engagement and the limitation of the engagement to not more than 4 years in Section 96 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980 (RFA 1980) is very unsatisfactory. The arguments in favour of the Regular Army Notice Engagement are equally applicable to the TA and action should be taken to revise RFA 1980 to permit an open engagement for Volunteer Reserve Forces as soon as possible.

g. Little has been done so far to create beneficial inducements specific to the TA. DGPS(A) has agreed to approach BUPA to extend the Regular Army's group membership concessions to the TA. However, other ideas in use by the United States and Australia have not yet been considered. These are :

(1) Reservist's Pension Scheme. Government legislation now allows a reservist to invest his earnings in a private pension scheme, but no

~~RESTRICTED~~

action has yet been taken to negotiate a group scheme offering particularly favourable terms. Reservists are not granted any concession over the 17.5% limitation placed on investment of income in private pension funds. Two other pension schemes which are worth further consideration and are in force in other NATO or Commonwealth Reserves are the provision of a terminal gratuity and/or a contributory pension scheme for long service volunteer reservists.

(2) Tax Relief. In Australia reservist earnings are free of tax. Such a proposal for the UK is not without precedent ; TA bounties are free of tax but the Individual Reinforcement Plan (IRP) bounty is not.

(3) Forces' Rail Cards. The case for extending the right to Forces' Rail Cards was rejected a few years ago. However, it is a possible group benefit and one which should be reconsidered.

83. Expenditure Cuts. TA ethos is extremely fragile and is easily damaged by measures seen by those without close involvement with the TA as sensible or cost-saving. Examples of this have been the proposed removal of No 2 dress (which was later overruled), reductions in works services and TAVRA funding, or delayed in-service dates for equipments and clothing. It is fully appreciated that the TA must suffer its share of cuts in defence expenditure, but this must not be allowed to happen in a fashion that causes the TA to believe that they are no longer important or that they no longer have Government support.


~~RESTRICTED~~

THE RESERVES

84. Individual reservists are former Regulars with a call-out liability. Currently 105,000 are available, but by the mid-1990s the total should increase to about 120,000 due to inherent growth in the system. Individual reservists are earmarked on mobilization mainly as war establishment reinforcements and battle casualty replacements. It is also planned to use them in formed units mainly for Home Defence in a KP-guarding role. They are therefore an important component of the mobilized Army.

85. The effect of the Demographic Trough on Regular Army manning levels will have a direct bearing on the availability of reservists. There will however be a time lag of approximately 6 years before a particular lean year in Regular Army recruiting is reflected in reservist availability. This to some extent will cushion the blow initially but, once the effects start to bite, numbers will decline. As the strength of the Army falls so too will the strength of the Reserves. Based on the MARILYN line (that is the strength forecast without taking account of counter-measures) we have forecast the likely effect of the Demographic Trough on the size of the Reserves. It is illustrated in Graph 10 :

Graph 10



86. Several measures designed to increase reservist availability are under consideration. These include amendments to reservist terms of service, improved effectiveness, reducing the number who are unavailable and the introduction of a TA reservist category. Any PR or image enhancement campaign for the Regular Army and the TA should also promote the importance of individual reservists. This will lead to increased status which in turn will contribute to greater awareness by the public and cooperation by employers.

~~RESTRICTED~~

SUMMARY

87. The population for TA recruiting is diminishing ; Industry and Commerce have reorganised to increase productivity from smaller workforces while undergoing an overall expansion, and public awareness and interest in the Armed Forces are diminishing. This, coupled with the concentration of Regular Forces into enclaves in the UK and the commitment of a large element to stations abroad, entails a growing separation between the Regular Army and society as a whole. This alienation is in part overcome by the wide dispersion of the TA and the LDFCs, CCFs and ACFs, each of which provide a link with the community through the network of 500 TA Centres and 1500 cadet huts.

88. It is impossible to quantify the value of this support although the tangible recruiting benefit is more easily established. The contribution of the Army Reserve of approximately 40% of the Order of Battle at under 5% of the total Army budget is more easily understood. Volunteers in the Reserve Forces have a very special ethos, they give up their free time and are dedicated in their support, but such support is fragile, and this fragility should be fully understood by resource programmers. Reductions in resources for Reserve Forces can have a disproportionate effect on this support, and on the commitment of the volunteers. Measures to improve recruiting, raise the public image of the TA, persuade employers of the benefits of TA membership, reduce wastage and improve group ethos must all be reviewed carefully and sympathetically if we are to maintain TA force levels at a time of increasing demographic difficulty.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

CHAPTER 7

LONGER TERM POSSIBILITIES

89. If the scale of the soldier shortfall has been correctly estimated, and if all reasonable counter-measures fail to overcome the shortfall, the Army must decide what further more radical measures should be taken to achieve full manning. It has not been possible to do more than examine a number of ideas and take advice as to whether or not they are considered to be practicable. The implementation of any of these measures will require political clearance.

90. A table summarising the additional measures is at Annex F. Particular attention is drawn to the following :

- a. Use of Gurkhas. Currently the future use of Gurkhas is only being considered as an enhancement to current manpower levels. Use of Gurkhas as a substitute for trained British soldiers in unit or sub-unit packages should also be considered, although there are constraints on their deployment and employment. They can be recruited given a year's notice.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

b. YTS. It is estimated that by 1991 some 72% of school leavers will go into YTS straight from school and the number will probably continue to rise thereafter. Those who have already thought about an Army career are likely to be recruited as Juniors, and will benefit from the attractive pay rates, but the predominant career move for those not going on to higher education and unable to find a job will be to employment via the YTS. The current Armed Services YTS scheme has not proved successful for the Army and any attempt to make it more attractive is likely to be detrimental to the Junior Army. The disincentive of the Junior Army is that it involves a long term commitment whereas a YTS scheme does not. If we cannot use a uniformed version of the YTS scheme to expose young men to Army life without commitment, then we should do so via the civilian element of YTS. This could be done by ensuring that vacancies are available within the Army Department which offer interesting work and a high level of exposure to the Army way of life. This would encourage YTS trainees to sign on and spread increased awareness of the Army amongst their peer groups.

c. Work Experience. Work Experience is provided when an employer takes on school children in their last year at school to introduce them to the employment environment. This has now become standard practice. The Army offers work experience on an ad hoc basis through local arrangements between training units and CsRLS. Courses typically last 5 days and are well received by those schoolchildren taking part. Most parents no longer have experience of National Service and as relatively few have seen

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~MANAGEMENT INFORMATION~~

regular service this would help rectify their children's misconceptions about modern Army life. A major centrally-coordinated Army Work Experience scheme, including both field and training units, would expose many more schoolchildren to Army life.

d. Young Offenders. There are currently tight constraints on the recruitment of young men and women with criminal records. These rules could be relaxed to allow suitable young offenders who wished to join the Armed Forces for a minimum of 3 years in lieu of a custodial sentence. There would need to be clear guidelines laid down as to what constituted suitability and there would be a limit placed on the total number of such volunteers accepted, so that the dilution should not be more than 1%.

e. Army Youth Teams. The re-formation of the Army Youth Teams is thought by many to be an essential method of putting the Army's recruiting message across to young people. In particular it is considered that the AYT's should primarily operate in the Inner Cities giving the Army access to areas which are otherwise difficult to target, especially the ethnic minorities. The teams would be expensive to establish and operate and the use of private sponsorship could be actively pursued.

f. Locally Engaged Units. It is for consideration that the current phasing out of MSO-type units should be reversed. Use could be made of locally engaged civilian units in BACR, overseas and in the less sensitive employment areas of the UK on security and CD duties.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

g. EEC Recruiting. The consequences of the 1992 'Open Market' on employment patterns and eligibility are not yet clear. It may be that as the unrestricted employment of EEC nationals becomes feasible there could be considerable recruiting potential in Europe and we should consider if and how this could be developed.

h. Permanent Cadres. The concept of establishing county-based Cadres has been examined in the past with a view to improving recruiting and retention and reducing manpower costs. Cadres run very much on the lines of the Ulster Defence Regiment (Permanent Cadre) could be established for employment in UKLF. The Cadres would require barracks (or where possible be based on TA Centres) and equipment but not quarters since the manpower would be locally recruited and permanently based in one area. The Cadres would have overseas training commitments and would be liable for operational tours but not for Arms Plot moves. Transfers between Arms Plot regiments and affiliated Cadre companies would be possible and could provide the additional stability some older officers and soldiers seek. An alternative to permanent Cadres for the Regular Army is to establish permanent Cadres for the TA.

~~RESTRICTED~~

CHAPTER 8

IMPLEMENTATION AND COST

INTRODUCTION

91. Outline details of the counter-measures are contained in Annexes B to E, as follows :

- a. Annex B. Enhancements to DAR's Budget.
- b. Annex C. Part 1 : No-Cost Management Measures.
Part 2 : Cost-Associated Management Measures.
- c. Annex D. Part 1 : Costed Further Measures.
Part 2 : As-Yet-Uncosted Further Measures.
- d. Annex E. TA Remedial Measures.

Where appropriate they are cross-referenced to the supporting evidence, include a forecast of the likely effect of each measure, the cost, when it should be implemented, who should take the lead and what priority is given to the provision of LTC funding.

92. Implementation of the no-cost Management Measures has already started and will proceed subject to ECAB's consideration. Implementation of the remaining measures requires ECAB's endorsement, the staffing of detailed submissions to

~~RESTRICTED~~

the MDD Committees and the provision of the appropriate LTC funding. (Consideration should be given to funding the MARILYN measures from the forecast underspend in AG's area to allow the necessary enhancements to be made in order to restore manning levels).

93. Bidding for LTC funds will commence with LTC 89, supported by the MARILYN Report itself. This first bid will be made up of 3 tranches. Tranche 1 will consist of the Priority 1 enhancements to DAR's publicity budget and those Management Measures which require funding from FY 89/90. Tranche 2 consists of the Priority 2 enhancements to DAR's publicity budget and those Further Measures which have been costed and for whose introduction it is considered vital that funds be made available now. Tranche 3 consists of the Priority 3 enhancements to DAR's publicity budget and those measures to which we have been able to attach an approximate cost and for which we therefore seek funds to be earmarked. ECAB will be asked to endorse all 3 tranches, but realistically we expect attention in LTC 89 to focus on Tranches 1 and 2. Of the remaining Further Measures some are likely to be of critical importance in combatting the Demographic Trough (such as making the most of our capacity to recruit Juniors). We are not yet able to cost them but they will now be studied in detail. Once their costs and details of their implementation become clear separate LTC bids will be made for the necessary funds.

DAR'S PUBLICITY BUDGET

94. The enhancements to DAR's publicity budget are the precursor to all the counter-measures. A detailed explanation of these proposed enhancements and their cost is at Annex B.

~~RESTRICTED~~

LTC TRANCHES

95. Those measures carrying a defined cost have been arranged for staffing purposes into 3 tranches according to the importance attached to the provision of LTC funds. These tranches are (in priority order) :

a. Tranche 1. This tranche consists of the Priority 1 elements of DAR's publicity enhancements, those which are the minimum required to step-up the Army's publicity campaign, funded for the PES years, and those Management Measures carrying a cost from FY 89/90.

| | FY 89/90 | 90/91 | 91/92 | 92/93 | 93/94 | 94/95 | 95/96 | 96/97 | 97/98 | 98/99 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <u>DAR's Priority 1 Publicity Budget Enhancements (1)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 3294 | 3294 | 3294 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Cost-Associated Management Measures (2)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 |
| <u>Total</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 3681 | 3681 | 3681 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 | 387 |

Notes :

- (1) See Annex B, p B-9.
- (2) See Annex C, Part 2, pp C-6/C-7, Serials 1 to 4.

RESTRICTED

b. Tranche 2. Tranche 2 consists of those elements of DAR's publicity enhancements which would enable a more balanced and forward-looking campaign to be established, funded for the PES years, and those costed Further Measures which we consider should be afforded high priority in the provision of funds.

| FY | 89/90 | 90/91 | 91/92 | 92/93 | 93/94 | 94/95 | 95/96 | 96/97 | 97/98 | 98/99 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <u>DAR's Priority 2 Publicity Budget Enhancements (1)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 1470 | 1470 | 1470 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Costed Further Measures (2) (3)</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 0 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 |
| <u>Total</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 1470 | 2793 | 2793 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 | 1323 |

Notes :

- (1) See Annex B, p B-9.
- (2) See Annex D, Part 1, pp D-1/D-2, Serials 3, 4, 5 and 7.
- (3) Does not include cost of Officer Commital Bonus, £2400K pa. (Annex D, Part 1, p D-1, Serial 1).

c. Tranche 3. Tranche 3 seeks provision for the Priority 3 elements of DAR's publicity enhancements (including the continuation of DAR's Priority 1 and 2 enhancements), the remaining cost-associated Management Measures and for the lower priority costed Further Measures.

| FY | 89/90 | 90/91 | 91/92 | 92/93 | 93/94 | 94/95 | 95/96 | 96/97 | 97/98 | 98/99 |
|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|

DAR's Priority 3 Publicity Budget Enhancements (1)

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| £K | 260 | 260 | 260 | 5024 | 5024 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 |
|----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

Remaining Cost-Associated Management Measure (2)

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| £K | 0 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 | 250 |
|----|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

Costed Further Measures (3) (4)

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| £K | 450 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 | 2278 |
|----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

Total

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| £K | 710 | 2788 | 2788 | 7552 | 7552 | 7852 | 7852 | 7852 | 7852 | 7852 |
|----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|

Notes :

(1) See Annex B, p B-10.

(2) See Annex C, Part 2, p C-7, Serial 5.

(3) See Annex D, Part 1, pp D-1/D-2/D-3, Serials 2, 6, 8 and 9.

(4) In addition there will be the capital cost of obtaining a suitable barracks for the re-introduction of Soldier Preliminary Training.

THE AS-YET-UNCOSTED MEASURES

96. There will be costs associated with the remaining Further Measures, some of them significant. Clearly until the further studies are completed it is not possible to bid for LTC resources, but this does not mean that we do not attach a high priority to the introduction of these measures ; some, such as the restructuring of the Junior Army, are likely to be vital in our efforts to combat the Demographic Trough and, if we could, we would want to implement them now.

THE TA MEASURES

97. The resource implications and timetable of the TA Remedial Measures (see Annex E) remain to be clarified. Many of the Regular Army measures will however assist the TA, particularly the enhanced publicity budget which will be used to put across a "One Army" message.

THE LONGER TERM POSSIBILITIES

98. ECAB has directed that a number of the Longer Term Possibilities are now to be studied so that if practicable they could be considered for implementation at some future date.

~~RESTRICTED~~

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

99. The UK faces a serious decline in the number of young people, known as the Demographic Trough, which will be at its worst during the 1990s. Unless the Army increases its awareness of the problem and starts to take remedial action as soon as possible serious undermanning will result. The whole Army at all levels of command, particularly at Regimental level, has a part to play in the recruiting and retention of officers and soldiers. (Paragraphs 1 to 4).

100. There is a pressing need for an overall manpower strategy, treating manpower as a resource in its own right, integrating the use of military, civilian, TA, reservist and contractor manpower. Commitments must be met from whichever type of manpower is available, provided that it is operationally effective and cost-effective. The demand for manpower must be measured against the availability of supply and a UK MANPRINT programme instituted. (Paragraph 8).

101. Two important studies are being undertaken in parallel with APRILYN : The ITO Study and The Long Term Role of Women in the Army Study. It is vital that both these studies take full cognizance of the Report and seek to bring into effect those counter-measures which pertain to their field. (Paragraph 12).

102. Without taking the effect of any counter-measures into account it is forecast that the Army's strength could be about 20,000 below MPT by the year

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

1998, with strength still falling. (Paragraphs 25 and 26).

103. Efforts to recruit officers and soldiers in the face of the Demographic Trough will meet with little success unless the Army mounts and maintains an effective publicity campaign. To do this £51.74M is required over the LTC period in addition to DAR's current budget. (Paragraphs 31 to 37).

104. Successful retention is also essential. Job satisfaction and conditions of service play a vital part in retention as does the current level of commitments. A reduction in commitments would reduce the level of overstretch and could reduce the manning requirement. (Paragraph 38).

105. The introduction of a committal bonus for officers has been supported by ECAB and submitted to PPOs for approval by AFPRB. Provision of the necessary LTC funds for this would significantly improve the retention of younger officers and demonstrate the seriousness with which the MCD views the Demographic Trough. (Paragraph 39).

106. There is a good chance of maintaining the numerical strength of the officer corps to within about 200 to 400 of the MFT. Towards the end of the decade however officer strength could decline significantly. (Paragraph 43).

107. The scale of the problem on the soldier side is far greater. By 1994 we will on current achievement levels only be able to recruit 13,000 recruits against a requirement of 20,000. Whole Army strength has already fallen below MFT and will continue to reduce unless effective counter-measures are rapidly

~~RESTRICTED~~

introduced. (Paragraphs 52 and 53).

108. The Report identifies a number of Management Measures whose sum effect will only partially relieve the difficulties. These are starting to be implemented now. Undermanning is not advocated nor are any general measures to reduce recruit quality (provided Arms and Service Directors ensure that the standards required for their employments are the minimum necessary). The only soldier measure which will have a major impact is a marked reduction of recruit and trained soldier wastage Army-wide. (Paragraphs 57 to 60 and Annex C).

109. The Report identifies a number of Further Measures the introduction of which will depend on staffing separate papers, most importantly :

- a. The wider employment of WRAC.
- b. The deletion of LTC proposals adversely affecting the nature and pay of basic trainees and cuts in the Junior Army.
- c. The re-structuring of the Junior Army to ensure the recruitment of the maximum possible number of Juniors. (Paragraphs 62 to 67 and Annex D).

110. These measures may make it possible to maintain manning to MPT during the Lean Years, but there is considerable uncertainty. A Steering Group should be set up to monitor the results of the counter-measures and to direct the staffing of the more radical measures if the situation worsens. (Paragraphs 49 to 51 and 69 to 71).

111. The Territorial Army (TA) faces the same problem as the Regular Army and many of the Regular Army counter-measures will have an effect on the TA. A summary of the TA remedial measures is at Annex E. (Paragraphs 72 to 83).

112. The strength of the Reserves will fall in line with any reduction in Regular Army strength. (Paragraphs 84 to 86).

113. A number of more radical Longer Term Possibilities have been identified, some of which are to be examined in depth against the possibility that the Further Measures will not be sufficient. These measures are summarised at Annex F and are only ideas at this stage requiring considerably more study. ECAB's direction on which to pursue is sought. They will need political clearance before they could be introduced. (Paragraphs 89 to 91).

114. Implementation of the Management Measures has already commenced and will proceed subject to ECAB endorsement. Funds are required for certain Management Measures and for the Further Measures. In addition funds to meet the cost of implementing the enhanced DAR publicity campaign will be required. The remaining Further Measures remain uncostered, but include some critical counter-measures such as maximising the Junior Entry. (Paragraphs 92 to 94).

115. The costed measures have been grouped into 3 tranches in priority order and a bid for funding from FY 89/90 will be submitted as part of the LTC process. Funding of the publicity budget enhancements has only been requested for the 3 PES years to allow the effectiveness of the expenditure to be reviewed. (Paragraphs 95 and 96).

~~RESTRICTED~~

CHAPTER 10

RECOMMENDATIONS

116. It is recommended that :

- a. A bid for LTC funding, according to the tranches detailed in Chapter 8, should be put forward as an enhancement in LTC 89.
- b. The Management Measures are introduced at once, subject to provision of the necessary funds.
- c. The Further Measures are pursued, subject to the completion of detailed staffing and the provision of LTC funding.
- d. ECAB should note the Longer Term Possibilities and give guidance on which the staff should pursue.
- e. SCAMF should be the mechanism whereby the effectiveness of the counter-measures is monitored, the earlier or later implementation of the Further Measures is triggered, and the necessity to introduce the Longer Term Possibilities is reviewed, subject to the direction of a Steering Group.
- f. The MARILYN Report should be given a wide circulation within the Army.

~~RESTRICTED~~

Annexes:

- A. The Historical Perspective.
 - B. The Pre-requisite : Enhancements to DAR's Budget.
 - C. Part 1 : No-Cost Management Measures.
Part 2 : Cost-Associated Management Measures(1).
 - D. Part 1 : Costed Further Measures(1).
Part 2 : As-Yet-Uncosted Further Measures.
 - E. TA Remedial Measures.
 - F. Longer Term Possibilities.
-

Note :

(1) This annex includes cross-references to the supporting evidence for the Report. This is to allow those involved in the detailed LTC staffing of these measures to examine the full justification for the expenditure.

RESTRICTED

ANNEX A TO
THE MARILYN REPORT

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

(The Soldier Pool)

1. Introduction. Demography is one of many factors affecting recruiting, albeit a major one. Other factors in play are the state of the economy, attitudes in society, expectations within the target market, educational patterns, pay, resources for advertising and changes in training patterns. Any comparative analysis with previous experience is only valid if the analysis gives due weight to these other factors in addition to demography.

2. The 1970s. The situation in the 1970s was that :

a. Demography. The population of 15 to 19 year olds grew steadily towards the peak in 1982. The numbers, however, were larger than those forecast for at any time in the 1990s.

b. Economy. Compared to the 1980s the 1970s saw little economic growth or improvement in living standards. Two sharp rises in the male unemployment level, from 0.5M to 0.7M in 1971/72 and from 0.5M to 0.9M in 1975/76, raised the relative attraction of Army careers and improved the recruiting climate.

~~RESTRICTED~~

c. Attitudes in Society. Attitudes to Army careers were healthy. Expectations within our target market were not so high. Parents and opinion-formers would still have seen National Service. Northern Ireland maintained a high profile in the press and gave the Army prominence.

d. Educational Patterns. A high proportion of 16 year olds elected to leave school and not embark on further education. Technology did not demand the skills sought today. As an employer of largely unskilled labour the Army was attractive. This was reflected by the ease in which Infantry soldiers were recruited and the difficulties experienced in attracting technicians.

e. Pay. Service pay levels were gradually eroded until restored by the Government at the end of the decade. This made the Army less attractive to both potential applicants and serving soldiers.

f. Resources for Advertising. Resources available for advertising for Army careers were significantly greater in real terms. This is best illustrated by the fact that TV advertising for the Regular Army was common in the 1970s but ceased in 1982.

g. Training. The Junior Army had no fixed target and effectively accepted all suitable applicants, mainly in autumn intakes. The A&YS entry similarly had no formal targets. Training time was longer.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

h. Selection Methods. Selection was conducted on the basis of post-enlistment selection. This meant that a recruit was first enlisted and then allocated to a capbadge depending on his ability level and the needs of the Army. This yielded an application to enlistment ratio of 45%. However it denied an important element of choice for the recruit.

3. Manning in the 1970s. The overall effect was to achieve quantity at the expense of quality. Even so the Army was undermanned, typically by 6% to 7%. The effects of lower quality was accommodated by longer training time and the less sophisticated equipments in service. The effect of undermanning was cushioned by a larger MPT (on average 151,000) and by larger establishments, which had a degree of surplus 'fat'.

4. The 1980s.

a. Demography. The population of 15 to 19 year olds peaked in 1982. This peak was considerably larger than previous peaks in the demographic cycle. The early 1980s has therefore seen unusually high numbers available in the target market.

b. Economy. The recession at the start of the decade was marked by a rapid rise in unemployment. The ending of the recession did not at first ameliorate the problem but since mid-1986 the growth of the UK economy has led to a rapid decline in unemployment. Concurrently the economy grew significantly with large rises in pay and living standards. 1982 saw the

~~RESTRICTED~~

introduction of YTS, providing a major alternative start in life for school leavers. In contrast to the 1970s many different opportunities have been created within the economy and with it more choice of employment for the Army's target market.

c. Attitudes in Society. The Falklands crisis led to a high in the attitudes of society to the Services. Since then the dilution of Service experience within society and greater expectations and aspirations amongst the young has led to a diminution in the attraction of Army careers.

d. Educational Patterns. The 1980s has seen an increase in the numbers of 16 year olds staying on for further education. This reflects the fact that they perceive the need to prepare themselves better for life. New technologies have created greater demands for skills. This is reflected by market research which shows that potential applicants for the Army seeking a trade or skill outnumber those that wish to join simply to soldier. Today technicians are easier to recruit while the shortfalls lie in the Infantry.

e. Pay. The 1980s has seen the Army maintaining relative pay comparability with the civilian sector. This has been achieved by pay taking an increasing share of the Army budget. It is questionable whether the trend can continue or not.

f. Resources for Advertising. Resources for advertising have continued to fall in real terms. Conversely commercial recruitment has increased significantly over the same period.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

g. Training. The Groom Report made wide changes to the ITO. The major impact was on the Junior Army in imposing a ceiling on numbers, redistributing intake dates (causing a mismatch with school leaving dates) and creating the 6 month Junior Soldier course.

h. Selection Methods. Pre-enlistment selection was introduced in 1980. Recruits are now allocated to capbadge prior to enlistment. In addition a call forward system for selection was introduced, later supported using ADP (Project March). This system allows only the highest quality applicants to be called forward for each employment. The system has resulted in a fall in the enlistment ratio to 30%. However it ensures that the applicant knows his capbadge on enlistment and produces high quality recruits.

5. Manning in the 1980s. During the 1980s to date we have seen full manning and a period of surplus manning due to substantial reductions in MPT (to 136,000). These surpluses have now disappeared while at the same time establishments have been cut to the bone. In addition allowances for non-effective strength have been reduced to well below our requirements. We have now reached undermanning in lean units ; the current overstretch is a manifestation of this situation. The increased quality of recruits has become the accepted norm and has allowed units to do more with the same manpower. Buoyant recruiting minimised the impact of wastage and, until now, new recruits could easily be found as replacements.

~~RESTRICTED~~

6. Summary. There are few direct parallels between the late 1970s, which was the last period of Army undermanning and poor recruiting, and the problems now foreseen for the 1990s which are already beginning to bite. The 1970s problems occurred at a time of rising unemployment when the total number of 16 to 19 year olds was increasing and a high proportion of them entered the job market early. At that time the introduction of pay comparability gave substantial rises to the Armed forces, and together with good advertising and supportive public attitudes, better pay quickly rectified the problem. No such simple answer exists today as there are rapidly falling numbers of school leavers, most of whom are heading for YTS and many others are going on to higher education. Thus, a starvation of young men and women faces the Army at a time when establishments are very tight giving no fat or flexibility. Reductions in the recruiting budget have made things worse. The consequent overstretch and loss of morale in these circumstances is likely to add to the manning shortfall by creating increased outflow of trained soldiers. This last point is the one which most closely links the recent situation with the late 1970s.

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

ANNEX B TO
THE MARILYN REPORT

ENHANCEMENTS TO DAR'S PUBLICITY BUDGET

GENERAL

1. The framework for the stepped-up campaign is based on professional assessment by DAR and advice from the Central Office of Information.
2. DAR does not currently have any statistical support to assess the effectiveness of any single part of his advertising and marketing strategy. In order to 'track' applicants through the application and enlistment process he requires a Management Information System (MIS). Only when this is available will DAR be able to assess the return on recruiting investment.
3. The estimated responses to the proposed increase to DAR's budget are based on the 1985 TA campaign, the nearest example to a multi-media campaign. Advertising and marketing are mutually supporting activities; it is not possible to determine the responses to each in isolation.
4. The campaign is aimed at a target area which is shrinking rapidly as a result of demography. We have been warned that competition for resources will be fierce. This makes it impossible to be certain of the outcome of advertising and marketing and suggests other measures will also be necessary to

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~RESTRICTED~~

combat the Lean Years. Nevertheless the aim must be to extract sufficient from those available and it would be foolish to set out to under-achieve and thereby increase the size of the problem we face.

5. Over-achievement and under-achievement can be monitored by DAR and by SCMF. Over-achievement can clearly be adjusted by turning down expenditure, however it must be realised that there are long lead times in recruiting and it will take 2 years to see the effect of the extra spending. The publicity tap cannot be turned on and off, but the flow can be reduced or increased. Expenditure now will buy a 'voice' in the media when it is most required ; delaying expenditure will result in having to pay more for less and is likely to be too late.

6. A table showing the impact of enhanced advertising and marketing is at Appendix 1. This is based on the best data currently available.

7. The assessment of advertising and marketing effect is based on the implementation of all the publicity enhancements. However, recognising the constraints on increases to expenditure we have divided the enhancements into 3 priorities in line with the approach adopted in Chapter 8 (Implementation and Cost).

8. Funding of all 3 priorities is likely to be necessary to achieve the required number of enquiries, however the minimum required to step-up the publicity campaign initially is represented by the Priority 1 enhancements, while funding of the Priority 2 enhancements in addition would establish a more

~~RESTRICTED~~

balanced and forward-looking campaign. It is not possible to separate the enhancements to any greater degree. Those placed within each priority are inter-dependent and inter-related.

ADVERTISING

9. The current budget of £3.658M for national advertising produces some 60,000 enquiries (approx £61 per enquiry), based on :

| | | |
|----|--------------|----------------|
| a. | TV (TA only) | £0.650M |
| b. | Press | <u>£3.008M</u> |
| | | £3.658M |

10. The proposed budget increase for advertising is estimated to yield in itself about 50,000 additional enquiries, making a total of 110,000. This will result in a significant increase in enlistments and will allow recruit shortfalls to be effectively addressed in conjunction with other counter-measures. The enhancements are as follows :

| Ser | Item | Pri | Cost (pa) | Comment |
|-----|----------|-----|--------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| 1. | Research | 1 | £190K | All publicity is founded on market research to ensure that it effectively communicates the desired message to the target audience. The bid is to fund research into the new advertising strategy (£60K) and to examine the most cost-effective organisation for recruiting (£100K) and the design and image of our ACIOs and marketing initiatives (£30K). |

{See Part 2, Section F, para 16}

RESTRICTED

2. Local Advertising 1 £132K The 10 CsRLS presently share £77K for local advertising. Once the special circumstances of Scotland and NI are catered for, it amounts to £3-5K each. This is insufficient to achieve adequate publicity on local radio and in the local press. This element cannot substitute for national advertising, but is an essential complement to it, covering the media where job vacancies appear locally.

[See Part 2, Section F, para 28]

3. TV Advertising 1 £2200K Today's young people are stimulated predominantly visually and TV is their primary source of information. We have not advertised the Regular Army on TV since 1981. This enhancement will allow one new commercial to be made at a cost of £200K. The remaining £2000K will buy about 3 weeks coverage of the 18 to 25 age group, giving a 75% probability of them seeing the commercial at least 4 times. Resumption of TV advertising could bring in as much as 60% of the enquiries we require.

[See Part 2, Section F, paras 24 to 26]

4a. Press Advertising 1 £382K It is essential to support a TV campaign with press advertising. £150K is required to restore recent reductions to our officer-related activity in support of scholarships and graduates in the daily B/W press. £232K is required to enhance our soldier-related colour advertising from 2 to 3 periods per year, giving 90% cover and 6-7 opportunities to see (OTS).

4b. 2 £100K Pri 2 bid is to expand B/W daily press coverage and for Welbeck advertising.

[See Part 2, Section F, para 27]

~~RESTRICTED~~

- | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|---|-------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5. | Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign | 3 | £300K | The National Employers Liaison Committee Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign is due to end in 1994. The direct mail element aimed at employers should continue through the LTC period to sustain the benefits of the previous £10M already voted to NELC. [See Part 2, Section F, paras 22 and 32] |
| 6. | UDR | 3 | £20K | Recruiting the UDR is hardest outside Belfast. Better penetration of the rural population is necessary. [See Part 2, Section F, para 31d] |
-

MARKETING

12. Marketing is the effort directly exerted by the Recruiting and Liaison Staff UK-wide and DAR's more direct publicity methods. It encompasses the work of the Army Careers Officers and includes the activities listed below.

13. The current budget of £1.73M breaks down as follows :

- | | | | |
|----|-------------------------------|---------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| a. | Direct Marketing | £0.200M | Exploitation of advertising enquiries, direct mail to teachers and special categories (eg Musicians and Linguists). |
| b. | Brochures | £0.620M | |
| c. | Photography | £0.200M | For brochures and ACIO window displays. |
| d. | Exhibitions and Career fairs. | £0.221M | National exhibitions and local careers fairs. |

RESTRICTED

- e. Videos & Films £0.147M
- f. IT £0.020M The Times Network Service to schools.
- g. Displays & RITs £0.157M Display teams, open days & county shows.
- h. ACIO Support £0.170M Electronic window displays, computer information data-bases.

14. The proposed enhancements are as follows :

| Ser | Item | Pri | Cost (pa) | Comment |
|-----|------------------|-----|--------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |
| 1a. | Direct Marketing | 1 | £190K | Direct marketing involves putting all advertising enquiries through a computer database so that they can be followed up quickly by letter. It allows the tracking and analysis of responses. |
| 1b. | | 2 | £120K | The Pri 2 bid is to fund direct targetting of specific potential recruits, such as specialists. A club is also to be formed to keep under-age enquirers interested until the age of enlistment. [See Part 2, Section F, paras 36 to 39] |
| 2. | DAR MIS | 1 | £200K | Although direct marketing can provide information on the output of central advertising, there are over 200 other agencies involved in recruiting. DAR needs information from all these agencies about the quantity and quality of recruits being generated by their activities, to produce recruiting intelligence and thereby monitor the effectiveness of the publicity campaign. A system definition study is planned to take place before Apr 89 to allow the technology to be introduced during FY 89/90. [See Part 2, Section F, para 40] |

~~RESTRICTED~~

- 3a. Displays 2 £100K DAR's best assets are the soldiers who are put into the field each summer to meet the public in Mobile Display Teams, KAPE Teams, bands and formal arena displays (mounted, parachute, motorcycle). The Corkran study has suggested cost effective ways to increase them and their recruiting output. This expenditure is for stands and vehicles.
- 3b. 3 £100K The Pri 3 bid for full funding of the requirement.
[See Part 2, Section C, para 7 and Section F, para 41]
4. Exhibitions 2 £260K There are presently 2-3 national careers fairs each year and numerous local ones. Our recruiters already attend all that they are invited to, but with limited display resources. These are likely to become more important in a sellers market. Higher profile display materials will be needed. The RN and RAF currently spend £100K each on each major exhibition to the Army's £25K. Even as the lead service at this year's Royal Tournament, our budget was only £40K to the RAF's £100K. £100K is to fund displays at national exhibitions. £160K is to enhance displays provided by CsRLS at District Level.
[See Part 2, Section f, para 50]
5. Printing 2 £387K This will allow for the wider availability of brochures (£88K), and allow DAR to resume sponsorship of "Soldier" magazine and thereby more effectively direct and exploit its efforts (£150K). £49K is required to assist units in establishing and supporting RITs and MDTs ; £100K is required for promotional items for use at displays and exhibitions.
[See Part 2, Section F, paras 42 to 49]
6. Photography 2 £100K Additional photography to support the increase in the printing effort and for careers office window displays.
[See Part 2, Section F, para 51]

RESTRICTED

- 7a. Films 2 £203K Audio-visual technology has been a key recruiting tool for some years. DAR's film library is out of date and there is a 2-3 year waiting list for new films to be made. The enhancement will allow 1 more film to be made a year and an interactive video programme to be made. The RN are installing the latter throughout their display teams and CIOs. £150K is to fund the introduction of interactive video at selected public sites, £53K is to fund the production of one additional film each year.
- 7b. 3 £40K The Pri 3 bid is to fund the creation of a loan library and allow videos about Army careers to be loaned to individuals, clubs and teachers.
- [See Part 2, Section F, paras 52 to 56]
- 8a. ACIO Improvements 2 £200K The 175 ACIOs are in the recruiting frontline. The leasehold investment in them alone is £500K pa: the total running costs amount to several £M. If we wish to compete in the high street we must do so on an equal basis with other high street operators. Most retailers completely refurbish their outlets every 2 years. ACIOs must be made more welcoming. They should have a browsing 'no obligation' area at the front of the office, where the enquirers can help themselves to literature, watch video clips and settle in before they need approach a recruiter. ACIO staff must be given modern tools (computers, interactive videos and up-to-date literature) to do their job. Doing this enhances the Army's image as an employer, as well as making the recruiters more productive and efficient.
- 8b. 3 £60K The Pri 3 bid allows for full funding of the requirement.
- [See Part 2, Section F, paras 34 to 35]
9. Careers Information Technology 3 £40K DAR has had a toehold in careers IT since 1985. This is a rapidly

~~RESTRICTED~~

growing area, all the main graduate employment handbooks are available as computer databases. DAR needs to keep abreast of the field and to expand into teletext (eg Prestel).

[See Part 2 Section F, para 57]

COST

15. The per annum cost of the enhancements consists of the following :

a. Priority 1. (for PES years only).

(1) Advertising.

| | | |
|-----------------------|--------|-------------------|
| (a) Research | £ 190K | [See pB-3, Ser 1] |
| (b) Local Advertising | £ 132K | [See pB-4, Ser 2] |
| (c) TV Advertising | £2200K | [See pB-4, Ser 3] |
| (d) Press Advertising | £ 382K | [See pB-4, Ser 4] |
| (e) Sub Total : | £2904K | |

(2) Marketing.

| | | |
|----------------------|-------|--------------------|
| (a) Direct Marketing | £190K | [See pB-6, Ser 1a] |
| (b) DAR MIS | £200K | [See pB-6, Ser 2] |
| (c) Sub Total: | £390K | |

(3) Total Priority 1 : £3294K

b. Priority 2. (for PES years only).

(1) Advertising.

| | | |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|
| (a) Press Advertising | £100K | [See pB-4, Ser 4b] |
| (b) Sub Total : | £100K | |

(2) Marketing.

| | | |
|----------------------|--------|--------------------|
| (a) Direct Marketing | £120K | [See pB-6 Ser 1b] |
| (b) Displays | £100K | [See pB-7, Ser 3a] |
| (c) Exhibitions | £260K | [See pB-7, Ser 4] |
| (d) Printing | £387K | [See pB-7, Ser 5] |
| (e) Photography | £100K | [See pB-7, Ser 6] |
| (f) Films | £203K | [See pB-8, Ser 7a] |
| (g) ACIO Support | £200K | [See pB-8, Ser 8a] |
| (h) Sub Total : | £1370K | |

(3) Total Priority 2 : £1470K

RESTRICTED

c. Priority 3. (for full LTC period).

(1) FY 89/90 to FY 91/92. (Pri 3 Enhancements).

(a) Advertising.

(1) UDR £20K [See pB-5, Ser 6]

(b) Marketing.

(1) Displays £100K [See pB-7, Ser 3b]
(2) Films £40K [See pB-8, Ser 7b]
(3) IT £40K [See pB-8, Ser 9]
(4) ACIO Support £60K [See pB-8, Ser 8b]
(5) Sub Total : £240K

(c) Total : £260K

(2) FY 92/93 and 93/94.

(a) Continued funding of the Pri 1 and Pri 2 enhancements (£4764K).

(b) Continued funding of the Pri 3 enhancements (£260K).

(c) Total : £5024K

(3) FY 94/95 to FY 98/99.

(a) Continued funding of the Pri 1 and 2 enhancements (£4764K).

(b) Continued funding of the Pri 3 enhancements (£260K).

(c) Continued funding of the Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign (£300K).

[See pB-5, Ser 5]

(d) Total : £5324K

~~RESTRICTED~~

16. The resultant LTC profile is as follows :

| FY | 89/90 | 90/91 | 91/92 | 92/93 | 93/94 | 94/95 | 95/96 | 96/97 | 97/98 | 98/99 |
|-------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| <u>Priority 1</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 3164 | 3164 | 3164 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Priority 2</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 1600 | 1600 | 1600 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| <u>Priority 3</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 260 | 260 | 260 | 5024 | 5024 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 |
| <u>Total</u> | | | | | | | | | | |
| £K | 5024 | 5024 | 5024 | 5024 | 5024 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 | 5324 |

Appendix:

1. The Requirement for Advertising and Marketing Enquiries.

RESTRICTED

APPENDIX I TO
ANNEX B TO
THE MARTLYN REPORT

THE IMPACT OF INCREASED ADVERTISING AND MARKETING FUNDING

| Serial (a) | Item (b) | Remarks (c) |
|---------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1 | Recruit Target FY 88/89 : a. Regular Army: 22500 b. TA : 27500 50000 | Advertising and marketing will seek to influence all those interested in joining the Army. Impact is analysed on a One Army basis, the enhancements would fund an Army image campaign benefitting both Regular and TA recruiting. |
| 2. | Current Recruiting Situation : a. Regular Army shortfall forecast for end FY 88/89 is 2000. b. TA is currently 10000 below planned strength of 85000. | Larger shortfalls are predicted into the Lean Years. |
| 3. | DAR's current budget : a. Advertising : £3658K b. Marketing : £1735K | Marketing is required to support and exploit advertising. Ratio of around 2 to 1 is considered to be optimum required to obtain best value for money. |
| 4. | Current advertising generates 60000 enquiries per year. On average one enquiry in 13 converts to an enlistment. | Cost per enquiry is therefore : a. Advertising: £61 b. Marketing : £29 Total : £90 Enlistments generated : 4600 (or approx 10% of recruit target). Therefore cost per advertising-generated enlistment is £1170. |

RESTRICTED

5. Proposed annual enhancements to DAR's budget :
- a. Advertising : £3044K
 - b. Marketing : £1920K
- Includes Priority 1, 2 and 3 bids. Increase in relative proportion of marketing costs is to allow :
- a. Introduction of DAR Management Information System (MIS) : £200K
 - b. Exploitation of new technology, interactive video and IT : £190K

Agency and COI advice is that these are the minimum enhancements necessary to provide an effective and balanced TV based campaign.

-
6. Effect of advertising enhancement spend is to produce 50,000 more enquiries (at £61 each) leading to 3,800 more enlistments (at one in 13).
- The cost per response (£61) will be increased by competition, reduction in market size and effects of working at the margins. It will however be reduced by the economies of scale and benefits of being TV-based. Conversion rate to enlistment will be lower due to those attracted being of lower motivation. These effects will reduce enlistments gained to below 3,800. As cost per response will increase with time it will be more cost-effective to spend in the earlier years.

7. Conclusion :

- a. The enhancements will make a significant contribution to meeting forecast shortfalls. Other measures will be required to address remaining shortfalls.
 - b. Provision of funding in PES years and introduction of a DAR MIS will allow detailed analysis to support case for further funding in later LTC years.
- a. There will be additional benefit from the combined effect of enhanced publicity and other measures.
- b. Funding included as Priority 3 in non-PES years.

PART 1 : NO-COST MANAGEMENT MEASURES

| Ser | Measure | Lead By | Cross Reference to Page in Text and to Supporting Evidence (Section/Paragraph) | Remarks |
|-----|---------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |

OFFICERSManning

- | | | | | |
|----|----------------------------|----------|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | More Inter-Corps Transfers | MS | Page 29. G/Para 2. | Advice to officers who are unhappy in their current employment, or who have already decided to PVR, to transfer to another capbadge. |
| 2. | Commonwealth Transfers | MS/DAR | Page 29. G/Para 3. | Policy of positive encouragement of transfer to British Army from other Commonwealth armies. Necessity to transfer pensionable service. |
| 3. | Commission More WOs | MS | Page 29. G/Paras 8, 9 & 10. | In those capbadges where it is feasible. Since 21% of the officer corps is now LE it is generally considered that there is limited scope for further use of this measure without reducing the quality of SNCOs and WOs. |
| 4. | Encourage Re-Instatement | MS/DM(A) | Page 29. G/Paras 11, 14 & 15. | Each year some 30 officers, having left the Army, are re-instated. Subject to suitability, considered that an additional 10 officers could be re-instated each year. A number of female officers could be encouraged to return to the Army each year, particularly having had children. The re-instatement rules are currently under review. |

RESTRICTED

5. Continuance Beyond Retirement Age MS/DM(A) Page 30. G/Paras 12a, 12b and 12c. Officers below the rank of Brig are required to retire at age 55. It is considered that some 25 each year could continue in service either in RO posts or filling otherwise vacant posts. Officers who are not promoted Maj are required to retire at 16 year point. Some of them could serve on in selected posts for limited periods. Some 15 officers each year could be re-employed from civilian life for periods of up to 5 years, particularly to fill specialist posts.
6. More RCB Risk Passes DAR Page 30. G/Para 21. 50% of all RCB passes are now 'risk' passes, yet despite SVC being extended by 6 months Rowallan Coy at RMAS is still under-utilised (often by over 50%). Concept is that Rowallan Coy should take more risk passes. This measure could result in 20 more trained officers each year.
7. Reduce Potential (PO) Wastage DAR Page 30. G/Para 22. Each year some 60-70 successful RCB candidates fail to attend their RMAS course. Reduction of this wastage is essential.
8. Use of TA Officers MS/Arms & Svc Directors /DARC Page 30. G/Paras 26 & 27. SSVC officers are TA officers serving between 1 and 3 years in the Regular Army. Up to 60 SSVC officers can be accommodated at any one time. The Inf currently have 26, but the rest of the Army does not make full use of the scheme. Further use of the SSVC would impinge on TA who also face demographic problems. Subject to the limitations of TA manning more TA officers might be encouraged to transfer to the Regular Army, on basis that 30% of TA service would count as reckonable regular service.

Recruiting

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 9. | Better CCF/ACF Recruiting | DARC/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 31. D/Para 14. | 38% of Regular Army officers were in the CCF and a number were in the ACF. Greater involvement by units and the recruiting staff in local CCFs and ACFs would foster improved recruiting. |
| 10. | Improved Application Processing | DAR | Page 31. D/Para 6. | The present system for processing applications for RCB and pre-RCB is unwieldy and time-consuming. Every effort must be made to streamline the system and to ensure that the Army presents a friendly face to potential officers and stays continuously in touch after the first enquiry. |
| 11. | Recruit Older Officers | DCAMR MS DCIS(A) DGPS(A) | Page 31. D/Para 8. | There are a number of specialist posts which could be filled by older officers recruited from civilian life specifically to fill such posts. Changes in terms of service will be required. |

SOLDIERS

Manning

- | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 12. | Greater use of Special S Type Engagements | DM(A)/ DARC | Page 40. H/Para 2. | Currently an average of 120 Special S type soldiers (TA soldiers on 1 year engagements with Regular Army) are serving at any one time. This number could be increased to 400 per annum given wider publicity and streamlined authorisation procedures. Measure infringes on TA. |
| 13. | Increase Inter-Corps Transfers | Arms & Svc Directors /DAR | Page 40. H/Para 3. | It is considered that given sympathetic counselling, greater publicity and streamlined procedures some 200/300 additional trained soldiers could result each year from transfers by disillusioned recruits (incl those rejected by Para Regt and RM Cdo), from the other 2 Services and from RMAS and RCB failures. |

~~RESTRICTED~~

- | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14. | Encourage Re-Enlistments | DM(A) | Page 40. H/Para 4. | Some 200 reservists re-enlist each year. It is considered that renewed efforts would result in an additional 100 returns each year. |
| 15. | Facilitate Use of Long Service List (LSL) Soldiers | DM(A) | Page 41. H/Para 5. | Soldiers placed on the LSL may serve until age 55. There is thought to be scope for the identification of greater numbers of LSL posts across the Army. Increased use of LSL offers greater stability to both the individuals concerned and to employing officers. Up to 50 such posts are being sought. |
| 16. | Increased Continuance | DM(A) | Page 41. H/Para 5. | Soldiers are offered continuance in service for up to 5 years at a time after completion of 22 yrs svc. Phase 1 (to 1991) of the current scheme will result in an additional 600 soldiers staying with the colours. The scope for increases in Phase 2 (till 1994) is currently being assessed. |
| 17. | Reduce Recruit Wastage | CTAD/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 46. H/Para 9. | Current levels of recruit wastage are too high. A reduction in the whole Army average to 23% is required. It is vital that the ITO Study does not make recommendations which will prejudice this effort. |
| 18. | Reduce Trained Soldier Outflow | Commands/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 48. H/Para 10. | A reduction of 1% in the current rate of trained soldiers outflow would lead to a reduction in the annual recruit requirement of 1250. Every effort must be made to reduce outflow (incl wastage through PVR and runout). |
| 19. | Introduce Committal Bonuses | DCPS(A) | Page 49. H/Para 12. | APRE research indicates that the payment of a committal bonus is likely to improve retention. Current rates of committal pay are negligible and do not have the support of the AFPRB. A proposal to translate committal pay into a bonus at no net cost is currently being studied. |

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 20. | Award Civilian Qualifications | DAEd | Page 49. H/Para 13. | It is considered that the award of civilian qualifications for those in non-technical trades would act both as a retention and recruiting factor. Knowledge of subsequent employability could do much to influence soldiers to serve for longer and would assist their view of the Army as a caring and responsible employer. |
| 21. | Transfers from Commonwealth Countries | DM(A) | Page 49. H/Para 14. | Numbers of soldiers serving with local Hong Kong and Gibraltar units would readily transfer to the British Army. There is also scope for encouraging transfers from other Commonwealth armies. |
| 22. | PVR Delays | DM(A)/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 50. H/Para 61e. | Use of the Protected Scheme has shown that enforced delay of PVR by 6 months can achieve temporary alleviation of undermanning. The use of this measure must be carefully weighed against the possible detrimental effect on morale, and should only be applied in extremis; it is however already in force in a few deficiency employments. |
| 23. | Increased PVR Costs | DM(A)/ DGPS(A) | Page 50. H/Para 61f. | Current PVR costs are related to committal pay and are consequently low, offering little disincentive to soldiers contemplating leaving the Army. The raising of PVR costs to a deterrent level could reduce wastage and should be examined by AFRE. |

Recruiting

- | | | | | |
|-----|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 24. | Increase Use of Satisfied Soldiers | DAR/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 42. E/Para 12. | The use of recently trained "satisfied soldiers" is a most effective recruiting method. Their increased use is currently being staffed by DAR but its success will depend on the sympathetic response of Commanding Officers. |
|-----|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

RESTRICTED.

- | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 25. | Provide High Calibre Recruiting Staff & Introduce Salesmanship Training | DAR/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 42. E/Para 2. | It is essential that the quality of recruiting staff is the highest possible, that they are best suited to their role. Their image and presentation must be right. The Army School of Recruiting is introducing salesmanship training into their courses. |
| 26. | Improve Selection Techniques | DAR with APRE | Page 42. E/Para 13b. | The use and content of the Army Entrance Test (AET) and other selection techniques are currently under review. The intention is to refine them to achieve a 1% reduction in recruit wastage. |
| 27. | Additional Special Recruiters | DAR/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 42. E/Para 13. | DAR is seeking provision of additional Special Recruiters. These men are "lent" to DAR by units without any manpower compensation. DAR depends on them to augment the staff of ACIOs and thereby increase active recruiting. |
| 28. | Review AET Standards | DAR/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 45. E/Para 3a. | Separate to the study of the content of the AET the standards set by Arms & Svc Directors must be kept under review to ensure that they are commensurate with their needs. |

PART 2 : COST-ASSOCIATED MANAGEMENT MEASURES

| Ser | Measure | Estimated Effect (pa) | Cost (pa) | Implementation Date | Lead By | Funding Priority | Remarks/Cross Reference to Text and Supporting Evidence |
|-----|---------|-----------------------|-----------|---------------------|---------|------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) |

OFFICERS

Manning

/Section G

| | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------|-------------|-------|----------|----|---|--------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | More Exchange Postings (20 pa) | Reduced PVR | £160K | FY 89/90 | MS | 1 | £8K per officer for flights and LOA/Para 4. (Page 32). |
|----|--------------------------------|-------------|-------|----------|----|---|--------------------------------------------------------|

RESTRICTED

| | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|----|------|----------|-----|---|---------------------------------------------|
| 2. | Increased Use of Potential Officer Development Course (PODC) | 20 | £30K | FY 89/90 | DAR | 1 | 1 x RAEC officer at ASE /Para 6. (Page 32). |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|----|------|----------|-----|---|---------------------------------------------|

Recruiting

/Section D

| | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|---|-------|----------|-----|---|---------------------------------------|
| 3. | Re-value Scholarships |) | £43K | FY 89/90 | DAR | 1 | /Para 5a and b and Appendices 2 and 3 |
| 4. | Re-value Bursaries |) | £154K | FY 89/90 | DAR | 1 |) (Page 32). |

SOLDIERS

Recruiting

/Section E

| | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-----|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 5. | Modify Entrance Fitness Test and Introduce Physical Development Course (PODC) (1) | +7% A&YS +4% Juniors (increase in enlistments) | £250K | Aug 88 (from FY 90/91 onwards) | DAR | 3 | Funded until FY 90/91 from underspend arising from recruit shortfall. PODC located at Army Personnel Selection Centre /Para 14. (Page 41). |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|-----|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Note:

(1) DAR has already staffed this measure.

RESTRICTED

ANNEX D TO
THE MARILYN REPORT

PART 1 : COSTED FURTHER MEASURES

| Ser | Measure | Estimated Effect (pa) | Cost (pa) | Implementatio- Date | Lead By | Funding Priority | Remarks/Cross Reference to Text & Supporting Evidence |
|-----|---------|-----------------------|-----------|------------------------|---------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) | (f) | (g) | (h) |

OFFICERS

Manning

/Section G

| | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------------------------|---------|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | Introduce Committal Bonus | 30-50 | £2.4M | Currently being staffed | DGPS(A) | 1 (1) | Recommended by ECAB but still requires PRO and AFFRS approval /Para 20. (Page 33). |
| 2. | Introduce Specialist Pay | 10 | £280K | FY 90/91 | DCIS(A) | 3 | Await outcome of PASC/PRO paper /Paras 17 & 18. (Page 33). |
| 3. | Expand Welbeck College | 20 | £300K | FY 90/91 | Yes/DAR | 2 | £10K per boy, need to recruit additional 30 boys at Welbeck for 20 to be commissioned eventually /Para 23. (Page 34). |

Note :

(1) LTC Funding bid for separately.

RESTRICTED

SOLDIERS

Manning

/Section H

4. Introduce Specialist Pay NYK £212K FY 90/91 DCIS(A) 2

/Para 15.
(Page 53).

Recruiting

/Section E

5. Increase Number of ASLOs +10% Juniors (estimate very subjective) £690K FY 90/91 Yes/DAR 2 (Staff costs) £51K (vehicles)

Improved penetration of schools, releases ACIO staff to other A&YS recruiting. Staff may be provided before 90/91 but effect not felt until then /Para 2. (Page 56).

6. Implement Corkran Study Recommendations Not quantifiable £450K FY 89/90 Yes/DAR 3

DAR has a TMA to co-ordinate implementation of recommendations. Further task identified for RITs /Para 3. (Page 54).

a. Coordination of MDTs at DAR and CRLS level

b. Formation of District Schools Presentation Teams

7. Form BACR Recruiting Staff Up to 40 Juniors Up to 20 A&YS £70K FY 90/91 Yes/DAR 2

Tap additional potential from BACR/ Para 6. (Page 53).

RESTRICTED

- | | | | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------|----------|---------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8. | Re-Introduce +4% A&YS Preliminary Training | £1.4M | FY 90/91 | Yes/DAR | 3 | ting does not include capital cost of obtaining barracks. To bring sub-standard recruits up to required standard /Para 13c. (Page 54). |
| 9. | Increase Admin-istrative Support to CsRLS | Not quanti-fiable | Up to £148K | FY 90/91 | Yes/DAR | 3 Required to support additional workload imposed on CsRLS as a result of the introduction of measures /Para 16. (Page 55). |

PART 2 : AS-YET-UNCOSTED FURTHER MEASURES

| Ser | Measure | Lead By | Cross Reference to Page in Text and to Supporting Evidence (Section/Paragraph) | Remarks |
|-----|---------|---------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) | (e) |

OFFICERS

Manning

- | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. | More Female Officers | MS/DM(A) | Page 32. G/Para 13. | Deployment and employment rules currently under review. In view of the likely male officer shortage the WRAC Study should seek at least further 200 officer posts. |
| 2. | Introduce Specialist Commission | DM(A)/ DCIS(A) | Page 31. G/Paras 16 to 19. | A study is currently being undertaken into whether a commission should be introduced specifically for IT specialists. |
| 3. | Time Bars on Promotion | DM(A) | Page 34. G/Para 32. | Consideration is being given to the introduction of time bars on promotion as an aid to retention/PVR deterrent. Based on scheme being operated by Navy. ARB may have to make greater use of 12 month PVR rule. |

- | | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------|----------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 4. | Foster Links With Industry | DM(A) | Page 34. G/Para 25. | Current discussions with CBI are based on counselling officers who are committed to leaving the Army towards employment in Industry and on scheme where firms would guarantee places to young officers who complete a 1 year SSLC followed by 3 years in the TA. |
| 5. | Military Degree | DGT&D(A) | Page 34. G/Para 33 | The institution of a British military degree would aid recruiting and should persuade officers not to PVR early in search of qualifications. |
| 6. | Lesser Civilian Qualifications | DAT/DAEd | Page 35. D/Para 15. | Recruiting for non-technical Arms and Services suffers from an inability to offer any sort of qualification which a potential officer can be offered in recognition of the skills he will have learnt and employed. Detailed study of the possibilities currently in hand. |

Recruiting

- | | | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 7. | Centralised Potential Officer (PO) Course | DAR | Page 35. D/Para 11. | The benefits of decentralised PO courses are being reviewed. A centralised course could offer advantages in reducing wastage and standardising training content. |
| 8. | Centralised Pre-RCB Briefing | DAR | Page 35. D/Para 11. | A review of the advantages to be gained from centralised briefing is in hand. |
| 9. | Increase Size of Schools Liaison Officer (SLO) Organisation | DAR | Page 35. D/Para 3. | Currently subject to study. Improved penetration and coverage by SLOs is considered achievable given more staff. |
| 10. | Increase Number of Bursaries and Cadetships | DAR | Page 36. D/Para 5. | Once the value of bursaries and cadetships has been restored to competitive levels the number of applications may justify an increase to the number offered. |

~~RESTRICTED~~

- A -
- | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 11. | Expand Duke of Yorks Royal Military School and the Queen Victoria School Dunblane | DAR | Page 36. D/Para 17. | Both schools offer considerable recruiting potential and if expanded to include comprehensive 6th form facilities could result in take up for non-technical Arms and Svcs akin to Welbeck. |
| 12. | Expand RMCS | DAT | Page 36. D/Para 18. | An expansion of RMCS to increase the number of civilians enrolled could increase the number who decide to opt for a military career. |
| 13. | Better UOTC Recruiting | DAR/ Arms & Svc Directors | Page 37. D/Para 4. | A study is currently under way into the utility of UOTCs and their contribution to recruiting. Many officers have been UOTC members and the potential for additional recruiting is excellent, given adequate resources and support to UOTCs from the Regular Army. |

SOLDIERS

Manning

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------------|---------|------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14. | Increased Employment for Women | DM(A) | Page 48. H/Para 11. | Subject to Long Term Role of Women in the Army Study. At least 1000 posts should be identified for conversion to dual manning. |
| 15. | Increased Retention Incentives | DGPS(A) | Page 49. H/Para 15. | Conditions of service have a crucial role to play in retention. Specific incentives to retention are kept under review by PS10(A). |

Recruiting

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------|------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 16. | Review Junior Army to achieve : | CTAD | Page 50. E/Paras 5, 7 & 9. | Junior entry vital to Army and efforts to combat the Demographic Trough. Essential that despite remit to make savings ITO Study seeks to implement these recommendations. |
|-----|---------------------------------------|------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

a. Majority
of vacancies
in Summer/
Autumn

b. All Juniors able to enter at age 15 yrs 11 mths.

c. Flexibility in size of Junior Army.

d. Ensure that all employments with Phase 1 & 2 Training exceeding 12 months have a Junior entry.

- | | | | | |
|-----|--------------------------------|------|------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 17. | Enhanced Resettlement Training | DAEd | Page 55. H/Para 15. | For 9 and 12 year men. An aid to both retention and recruiting. Study will also consider what should be offered to the technical trades and whether 3 year men should be offered counselling. |
| 18. | Entry via Combat Arms | | Page 56. E/Para 18. | Based on the Canadian Forces LOPT programme. Lower quality entrants to technical employments required to first complete a 3 yr tour with combat arm but guaranteed a later place on the relevant technical course and transfer to the Service concerned. |
| 19. | US Initiatives | | Page 56. E/Para 19. | Examination of a range of recruiting initiatives employed by the US Army, such as "peer recruitment" and choice of Theatre on posting. |
| 20. | Commonwealth Recruiting | | Page 57. | There is considerable scope to recruit high quality soldiers from the commonwealth states. Preliminary examination of the issues will commence shortly. |
-

THE TA REMEDIAL MEASURES

| <u>Ser</u> | <u>Measure</u> | <u>Cross Reference To Paragraph in Text</u> | <u>Comment</u> |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (a) | (b) | (c) | (d) |
| <u>Cadets</u> | | | |
| 1. | Greater Assistance to ACF Contingents by TA sponsor Units | 75 | Recruitment of a 'Junior TA' has been rejected. Greater assistance to ACFs is the only means available through which we might gain greater interest in TA from cadets & ex-cadets. |
| <u>Recruiting and Retention</u> | | | |
| 2. | Regular Recruiting Assistance to TA | 76 | Proposed to make greater use of regular resources to assist TA recruiting. |
| 3. | NELC Secretariat | 78a | Examine need for establishment of NELC Sec in MCD. |
| 4. | Volunteer Reserve Forces Campaign | 78b | A 5 year campaign which has been allocated £2M a year expenditure. Campaign is designed to change attitudes of employers & general public towards the Reserve Forces. |
| 5. | Recruitment of Ex-Regulars | 78c | Rewrite of AGAI 44 placing responsibility on COs to brief regulars on the TA as an attractive alternative to service on RARO, LTR etc. Improve follow up of ex-regulars by TAVRAs and units. |
| 6. | Obligatory TA Service for All SSC Officers | 78c | Proposal not yet formally staffed. Initial reactions fear effects on SSC recruitment. |
| 7. | Active Recruitment from CCFs & Use of KAPE & RRTs | 78c | Need for DAR SLOs, recruiting teams etc to recruit both regulars and TA. |

~~RESTRICTED~~

| | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 8. | Establishment of TAVRA TA PR & Recruiting Staff | 78c | Recommendation of Interface Study Report (still being staffed, uncosted). |
| 9. | Active Recruitment from LUTCs | 78d | Greater efforts to be made to recruit Regular and TA officers from LUTCs. |
| 10. | Introduce Unit Retention Scheme | 79a | This is currently being staffed to Districts for comment. Reception to date has been favourable. The scheme consists of a guide to unit COs and key personnel on measures designed to improve TA unit retention. |
| 11. | Introduce Continuous Attitude Survey | 79b | This is being staffed with APRE. Our intention is to monitor the reasons for voluntary discharge and compare them with the attitudes of serving TA soldiers and deploy our resources accordingly. |
| 12. | Internal Transfers | 79c | Encourage potential leavers to consider transfer to unit, pool or cadets with lower commitments. |

Manning

| | | | |
|-----|-------------------------------------------|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 13. | Introduce TA Special List | 80b | This proposal has been rejected by the chain of command. However it has been suggested that TA M/D posts could be rank ranged (Maj/Lt Col) so that greater use would be made of the unposted list and manpower availability. |
| 14. | Introduce Specialist Career Structures | 80c | To be investigated. |
| 15. | Limited Call-Out for MACC | 80d | Assist regulars by reducing over- stretch and enhance TA image in public eye. |
| 16. | Expansion of Continental TA | 81 | There is considerable enthusiasm toward the idea among expatriates on the Continent. Extensions of recent pilot schemes could lead to the |

~~RESTRICTED~~

Continental TA assuming TTW roles currently assigned to UK-based units, reducing requirement for the latter.

Terms of Service

-
- | | | | |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 17. | Re-Negotiate Relationship of TA Pay to Unemployment and Social Security Benefit. | 82b | Under present DHSS rules pay for Saturday working is deducted from Unemployment Benefit, but not Sunday pay. All weekend pay is also deducted from Social Security benefit. Service with TA therefore offers little real financial reward to the unemployed or those drawing Social Security Benefit. |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-
- | | | | |
|-----|----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 18. | Lower Training Obligations | 82c | This proposal has been introduced for both independent and specialist units to cater for those with more than 3 years bounty earning service whose personal circumstances would otherwise cause to retire/resign. Extension of AMS (TA) lower training liability trial to all AMS (TA) units is currently being staffed. |
|-----|----------------------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-
- | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------|
| 19. | Revise Unposted List | 82e | Examine introduction of RNR/RNR List 2 as alternative option. |
|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------|
-
- | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 20. | TA Notice Engagement | 82f | Revise Reserve Forces Act 1980 to remove 4 year maximum engagement. |
|-----|----------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
-
- | | | | |
|-----|--------------------|--------|-------------------------|
| 21. | Examine TA Pension | 82g(1) | Costings not yet known. |
|-----|--------------------|--------|-------------------------|
-
- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 22. | Introduce Tax Relief on Reservists Earnings | 82g(2) | This would require a change to the Finance Acts and should be regarded as a long term project. |
|-----|---------------------------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-
- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 23. | Introduce TA Reservist Category | | Officers who leave the TA can volunteer to transfer to the RARC. Suggested that a similar option should be available for TA soldiers. |
|-----|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
-

~~RESTRICTED~~

ANNEX F TO
THE MARILYN REPORT

THE LONGER TERM POSSIBILITIES

| Ser | Measure | Remarks |
|-----|-------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| (b) | (b) | (c) |
| 1. | Use of Gurkhas | Currently only being considered as manning of MPT enhancement. Recommended use of Gurkhas to reduce MPT. |
| 2. | Channel part of YTS into Army | By 1994 over 81% of school leavers will probably go into YTS. The Army must offer YTS opportunities in competition with other employers. |
| 3. | Work Experience | All UK-based Army units should partake in the Work Experience scheme and introduce local schoolchildren to the Army environment. |
| 4. | Young Offenders | Relax rules to allow suitable young offenders to join the Army as volunteers subject to agreement of courts, in lieu of a custodial sentence. |
| 5. | Army Youth Teams | The re-formation of the AYT's for use in the Inner Cities would give the Army access to areas which are otherwise difficult to target. Consideration should be given to funding the teams through private sponsorship. |

~~RESTRICTED~~

M... ..

6. Locally Engaged Units Reverse current trend. Use MSO-type units to replace regular soldiers overseas and in UK, especially on security and GD duties.

 7. EEC Recruiting Uncertain effect of the 1992 Single Market legislation. May result in expansion of potential recruit market and movement into UK of Southern EEC nationals.

 8. Permanent Cadres Permanent Cadres run very much on similar lines to the LDR (PC) could be established as a way of improving recruiting and retention. These cadres would be county-based and although they would have training and operational commitments they would not be subject to Arms Plot moves. Permanent Cadres would require barracks (or be based on TA Centres) and equipment but not quarters as manpower would be locally recruited. An alternative to Permanent Cadres for the Regular Army is to consider a similar proposal for the TA.
-

~~RESTRICTED~~

~~MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~MANAGEMENT IN CONFIDENCE~~

~~RESTRICTED~~