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ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Edition A Version 1
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NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

14 December 2015

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Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5

Allied Joint Doctrine for The Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction

Edition A Version 1

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS BY NATIONS

CHAPTER	RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

NATION	DETAIL OF RESERVATION
BEL	Belgium is bound by legal provisions other than the Geneva Conventions only.
CAN	a. Canada does not consider Security and Reconstruction to be its own, unique campaign theme or operational level design. Military forces deploy in relation to a threat (or else some other organisation better suited would be deployed) and thus the campaign and supporting doctrine should be developed in relation to that threat. As admitted in the text of this publication, much of the content overlaps with other doctrines and in fact, spans from the strategic to the tactical. All the material is valuable but belongs in other manuals at the correct level. b. Following from the incongruency that is inherent in this publication, Canada does not view humanitarian assistance as a form of Stability and Reconstruction, as humanitarian assistance is a short term engagement that does not seek to create the enduring stability that is the focus of this publication. c. In accordance with the Concise Oxford Dictionary, Canada believes that capacity and capability are synonymous terms and, thus, the distinction made in various parts of this publication is a distinction without a true difference.
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PREFACE

0001. Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.4.5 *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction* is intended primarily for use by NATO-led forces. The doctrine can also be used as a reference by other military or civilian actors. It is based on the guidance provided in PO(2010)0140-Final, *Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction,* 14 Oct 2010.

0002. AJP-3.4.5 is intended for use primarily by joint force commanders (JFCs) and staff at the operational level. It describes the fundamental aspects of military support to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) and provides guidance on the conduct of joint operations. The level of joint participation may vary and is likely to include non-military staff, experts, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

0003. S&R is normally civilian-led and takes place during or after a crisis in unstable states. Therefore, S&R should be undertaken by actors and organizations with relevant expertise, mandate, and competence required to foster stability. Consequently, the primary military contribution usually focuses on establishing a safe and secure environment for the host nation (HN) authorities, population, and other actors to facilitate S&R efforts and lay the foundation for long-term stability.

0004. NATO-led forces may be required to contribute to a wide range of S&R activities. However, these activities should be coordinated with the activities of other actors involved in the overall S&R effort consistent with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan.[1] The long-term goal is to create conditions which the local population regards as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions include an ordinary level of violence; functioning government, economic, and societal institutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behaviour. Therefore, S&R focuses on identifying and mitigating the root sources of instability and building the capacity of the HN institutions.

0005. Within the Allied joint doctrine architecture, AJP-3.4.5 is categorized as a thematic publication as part of the AJP-3.4 series. Although S&R is categorized as crisis response, it can also be conducted as a result of an Article 5 operation, major combat operations, or concurrently in support of another crisis response. Other publications within the 3.4 series include:

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[1] PO(2011)0045, *Updated List of Tasks for the Implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit Decisions on the Comprehensive Approach*, 07 Mar 2011

      a. AJP-3.4.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support*.

      b. AJP-3.4.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations*.

      c. AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

      d. AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*.

CHAPTER 1 – OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS

Section I – Introduction to Stabilization and Reconstruction

0101. Stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) attempts to mitigate complex problems in unstable states during and after crises. S&R should be part of a comprehensive and integrated international response. S&R activities run the spectrum from providing security to fostering justice and facilitating livelihoods. Whenever possible, these activities should be led by the host nation (HN). The goal is to maintain, foster, or restore stability to provide the foundation for long-term peace. S&R activities should be, and normally are, civilian led and ideally implemented by legitimate local authorities. However, when civilian actors or local governments cannot operate because of an insecure environment, the JFC may be tasked to provide security to facilitate the activities of other actors. Additionally, there may be situations where military support, other than security, will be necessary. When civilian actors are unable or unwilling to provide support, the military may be tasked to temporarily assume the operational lead for other S&R activities.

0102. Stabilization is an approach used to mitigate crisis, promote legitimate political authority, and set the conditions for long-term stability by using comprehensive civilian and military actions to reduce violence, re-establish security, and end social, economic, and political turmoil. Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding physical infrastructure and re-establishing governmental or societal institutions which were damaged during the crisis. These activities should be focused on mitigating the sources of instability which fostered the crisis in the first place, and should help establish the foundation for long-term stability. Therefore, progress concerning both S&R may often go hand in hand and the two processes are interwoven. For example, a safe and secure environment (SASE) provided by a military presence facilitates the work of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which enables reconstruction and other activities to proceed. These activities in turn contribute to long-term stability.

0103. Initially the military might be the only organization capable of operating within an area due to the nature of the environment. In a non-permissive environment, the military may be required to temporarily assume initial responsibility for leading the international response to S&R activities that would normally be undertaken by civilian organizations. In such instances these activities must be planned and coordinated in conjunction with other actors. This will assist in ensuring that military activities do not undermine and are complementary to longer-term goals. Concurrently, the military must work to quickly set the conditions to allow the appropriate civilian organizations to focus on their core roles. In addition, and consistent with international law, NATO might take the lead in some S&R activities

or fill in programming gaps if the HN or international community lacks the necessary capability or capacity. S&R activities conducted by NATO-led forces should only be temporary until conditions allow them to transition to national or international authorities.

0104. Military activity can sometimes have negative effects on civilian activities. Therefore, planning and conduct of military S&R support to other agencies should attempt to complement their efforts. The hand-over process between the military and civilian agencies must be defined from the outset. As the security environment improves, the military involvement and support should decrease commensurately.

0105. In accordance with the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, it is important to establish unity of purpose with the HN and other members of the international community; in particular, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). While reaching consensus may be unattainable, the ramifications of not pursuing unity of purpose could prevent NATO from attaining its desired end-state.

0106. **Stabilization and Reconstruction in the Context of Other Operations**. S&R provides an overarching concept for stabilizing unstable states. This is primarily achieved by addressing the sources of instability. Consequently, S&R activities may be components of other operations. In some cases S&R will overlap with activities of other operations, such as peace support and counterinsurgency (COIN).

   a. **Peace Support**. Peace support is defined as the efforts conducted impartially to restore or maintain peace. Peace support efforts can include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The military contribution to peace support reflects an approach where NATO forces operate with no designated opponent. Impartiality is the fundamental difference separating peace support from other types of operational-level themes. Peace support may sit within the framework of S&R where NATO does not intend to take sides in the conflict, but has an interest in resolving the crisis. Consequently, there are many overlaps between S&R and peace support. For more on peace support, see AJP-3.4.1, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support*.

   b. **Humanitarian Assistance**. Because unstable states are more prone to humanitarian disasters, supporting humanitarian assistance (HA) efforts is one of the areas of focus for S&R. HA is defined by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee as "aid provided to a crisis-affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. HA must be provided in accordance with the basic principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence." For more

details, see AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance.*

c.   **Counterinsurgency.** COIN is a comprehensive civilian and military effort made to defeat an insurgency and to address core grievances. There are many overlaps between COIN and S&R, but they can also be conducted separately. Both approaches include strengthening the ability of the HN to provide the elements of a stable state while fostering legitimacy. This publication complements AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, by describing the elements of a stable state and supports the JFC in assessing and countering drivers of instability.

d.   **Major Combat Operations**. Major combat operations usually involve conventional force-on-force combat of varying scale, frequency, and intensity between opposing states' armed forces. They tend to be characterized by a series of major engagements with intense combat activity and large scale manoeuvre by complex multi-faceted forces. When S&R is conducted as a result of major combat operations, the transition from neutralizing an opponent to conducting military support to S&R is a critical period. S&R activities following major combat operations need to be planned using an integrated approach in order to understand the relationships between elites, states, and populations. The mix of actors, and their respective motivations, is also likely to be complex and constantly changing. Conventional opponents, even once defeated, may re-appear or be reinforced by irregular actors. They must be countered often at the same time that legitimate HN governance and authority are being re-established in order to address the underlying causes of instability.

0107. **The Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction**. The military can play a crucial role in S&R because they possess unique capabilities and capacities. PO(2010)0140-Final, *Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO's Involvement in Stabilisation and Reconstruction*, outlines NATO's involvement in S&R. It provides the basis for further work by NATO staffs and military authorities to improve NATO's contribution to S&R as part of the international community's efforts and NATO's contribution to a civil-military approach. Depending on the sources of instability, military support to S&R may include:

a.   Establishing a SASE and freedom of movement.

b.   Helping to restore public security.

c.   Helping to restore basic services and infrastructure.

d.   Supporting humanitarian assistance.

e.   Helping to establish the conditions for meeting longer term governance requirements.

There are other military tasks and activities conducted as part of S&R which are discussed in other publications. AJP-3. *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* and AJP-3.2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations* describe the four categories of tasks that can be conducted during all operations (offensive, defensive, stability and enabling). Allied tactical publication (ATP)-3.2.1.1 provides a detailed explanation and guidance on the subordinate tactical stability activities and tasks that could support operational-level S&R efforts.[2] Another valuable reference for S&R is the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) *Military Contribution to Stabilisation Operations (Stabilisation Handbook)* Version 1.0, November 30, 2009.[3] This publication addresses the tasks normally performed by military forces to support stabilization when a HN is unable to provide the basic needs of its citizens. It describes the tasks that will be accomplished by military forces when undertaking a wide range of activities to help set the conditions or framework for facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establishing political, legal, social and economic institutions; and setting the environment for transitioning responsibility to legitimate civil authority operating under the rule of law.

0108.   A key aspect of S&R is security sector reform (SSR). SSR involves reforming security institutions so that they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security. SSR is focused on establishing the conditions for meeting longer term governance and development; however, it also contributes to establishing a SASE and restoring public security. Pivotal to NATO's contribution to SSR are security force assistance (SFA); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and stability policing (SP).[4] SSR is explained in detail in Annex B.

Section II - Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction

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[2] ATP-3.2.1.1, discusses stability tasks in four major stability activity areas which align with the areas from the political guidance in PO(2010)0140. Security and control = establish a safe and secure environment; support to security sector reform = help to restore public security; initial restoration of services = help to restore basic utilities and infrastructure; and interim governance tasks = help establish conditions for meeting longer-term governance .

[3] The MIC provides a joint, multinational forum for identifying and addressing interoperability issues across the contemporary operating environment to enable more effective coalition operations. Member nations include Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[4] Although SFA and SP can be conducted when an SSR is not in place, they usually constitute the bulk of the military contribution to the reformation of the security sector. For more on SP see AJP-3.22, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing*. Also for more on SFA and SP see MCM-0034-2014.

0109. **Principles**. The characteristics, principles, and operational considerations of Allied joint and multinational operations are introduced in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine;* the principles and considerations are discussed in detail in AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.* All of them apply to military support to S&R; however, some such as the characteristic legitimacy, and operational considerations credibility, transparency, and consent have a more prevalent role. Therefore, they must be carefully considered by the JFC during the planning and execution of S&R.

0110. **The Principles of Stabilization and Reconstruction**.

    a.   **Primacy of Politics**. Political aims dictate the desired outcome and drive the planning and conduct of operations. The purpose of NATO participation in S&R is the attainment of the desired NATO end state. This should be at the forefront of the commander's planning, implementation, and assessment efforts and may require adaptation when political aims change. To be successful, S&R activities should support the achievement of a political settlement between the HN government, competing elites and the wider population.

    b.   **Focus on the Population**. The needs of the population, whose expectations will vary from one situation to another, must be met to promote human security and encourage support for the political settlement.

    c.   **Understand Context**. In most cases, the knowledge of the terrain, people, social structures and historical background is not sufficient. There is a need to clearly understanding the sources of instability, who benefits from them, the resiliencies which can help mitigate them, and relationships between the different groups. Regional issues and interests should also be considered.

    d.   **Foster Host Nation Governance and Capacity**. HN ownership of and responsibility for S&R requires the development of sufficient governance, authority and indigenous capability. All NATO actions should aim to foster HN authority and capacity in order to underpin enduring stability.

    e.   **Window of Opportunity / Manage Efforts Over Time**. Since deadlines usually work against external actors during S&R, NATO-led forces must both maintain their ability to act or respond in an emergency and work towards long-term objectives. It is important to take advantage of the initial response period when they are viewed favourably to identify and meet the requirements of the area. It is also essential to quickly and continuously adapt and provide lasting security to key areas, while being able to carry out emergency actions in response to unexpected threats or opportunities.

0111. **Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.**[5] In addition to the principles discussed above, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed common principles for engagement in fragile states (see Figure 1-1 below). These provide a set of guidelines for actors involved in development, peacebuilding, state-building, and security in fragile and conflict-affected states. They were established because fragile states require different responses compared to other states. The goal is to foster constructive engagement between national and international stakeholders in unstable countries. They are designed to support existing dialogue and coordination processes, not to generate new ones. The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reformers build effective, legitimate, and resilient state institutions, capable of engaging productively with their people to foster stability and promote sustained development.

Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations	
• Take context as the starting point	• Focus on State-building as the central objective
• Ensure all activities do no harm	• Prioritize prevention
• Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies	• Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
• Recognize the links between political, security, and development objectives	• Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors
• Act fast … but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance.	• Avoid creating pockets of exclusion

**Figure 1.1 - The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations**

Section III - The Stable State

0112. **Elements of a Stable State**. It is important to examine the functionalities and norms that underpin a stable state, because it is the breakdown in these elements and the linkages between them that generate instability.[6] Figure 1-2 depicts the core elements of a stable state: human security, economic and infrastructure

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[5] The OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations were formally endorsed by ministers and heads of agencies at the Development Assistance Committee's High Level Forum on 3-4 April 2007. They can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dacfragilestates/

[6] The annual *Fragile State Index*, published by The Fund for Peace, provides an overview of every states vulnerability to failure.

development, and governance and rule of law.[7] While these elements can each be analyzed individually, they should be viewed as interdependent rather than separate. The stability of a state depends upon the manner in which the elements interact and are mutually supporting. These three main elements, underpinned by societal relationships, form the interdependent building blocks that make up a stable state. A stable state is supported by a political settlement which, if effective, will facilitate mutually beneficial interactions.

Figure 1.2 – Elements of a Stable State

0113. **The Importance of the Political Settlement**. The extent to which a state functions in a stable fashion is determined by the nature of the political settlement and the degree to which competing elites and the populace they represent have access to the political process. Political settlements are the expression of a common understanding, usually forged between elites, about how power (economic, coercive and political) and resources are organized and shared between competing groups. Settlements are constantly changing and being renegotiated so that over time they may develop from narrow, exclusionary 'bargains' between powerbrokers, to include more members of society. Empirically, settlements which have been inclusive and incorporated members of the losing side(s) and their security apparatus have tended to endure. A weak or collapsing political settlement is often a symptom that

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[7] This illustration is one of several different models; it is necessary to set a basis for understanding the context of the military activities described in this AJP.

an underlying source of instability has not been mitigated. For example, if a previously marginalized group was not given the government positions promised to them, they have an incentive to undermine the settlement. Therefore, S&R should also support political settlements and facilitate their implementation.

0114. **Security**. States which lack the capability or will to protect their own population from violence, harm, intimidation, and reprisals equitably and without violating human rights will probably be unstable. A lack of rudimentary security provided by the state allows opportunists or adversaries to gain support through providing security in place of the authorities. Therefore, providing security is a crucial component of stability.

0115. **Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Equitable economic institutions, access to fair and reliable financial services, widely accessible income generating opportunities, administrative transparency, inclusive stewardship of natural resources and a developed supporting physical infrastructure all help to foster stability.

0116. **Governance and Rule of Law**. A stable state has a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful resolution of internal disputes. Long term stability only occurs when a population views the government as broadly legitimate. The rule of law is fundamental to legitimate governance, and may be institutionalized in varying forms dependent upon the social, cultural and political characteristics of the particular society. Legitimacy is ultimately defined by the local population rather than by any externally imposed criteria.

0117. **Societal Relationships**. Human security, economic and infrastructure development, and governance and rule of law encompass the substantive functionalities and competencies of the state. However, the context is also determined by the societal relationships that underpin them and are interwoven within these elements. Relationships and culture shape the nature of the political settlement and determine how the main actors interact. In a stable state, the social, cultural, and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the manner in which state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population.

Section IV - Instability Dynamics

0118. **The Downward Spiral to Instability**. Figure 1-3 illustrates how degradation in any one of these areas may lead to erosion of the others. For example poor governance, economic hardship, and insecurity simultaneously stimulate and exacerbate conflict. This may cause a collapse in the political settlement that

regulates key societal and state relationships. Despite huge contextual variations, this often fosters a downward spiral of state fragility. This can be characterized by decline or disintegration at the junction where security, economic development, governance and the rule of law meet, leading to the unravelling of the political settlement. Negative external influences, such as a breakdown in regional security, lack of free trade, or regional economic contagion, can also play a role in instability in any of these areas.

Breakdown in Security
- Widespread Organised Crime
- Failure of HN Security Institutions
- Rise of malign actors
- Risk of state failure

Economic Collapse
- Destruction of infrastructure
- Rise of black market and inability of government to collect revenue
- Rising unemployment and dependence on aid
- Increased potential for humanitarian crises
- Vulnerability to shock

Security

Political Settlement

Economic & Infrastructure Development

Governance & Rule of Law

Failure of State Institutions
- Loss of Government monopoly on legitimate use of violence
- Endemic corruption in formal and informal governance
- Arbitrary application of justice

Societal Relationships

Societal Disintegration
- Rise in tension between groups (ethnic, tribal, religious)
- Horizontal inequality

Figure 1.3 – The Instability Spiral

0119. **The Stages of Instability**. The following simplified framework is provided to help understand stages of instability in fragile states. The distinction between stages is rarely clear and there is often overlap between categories. However, understanding what stage a state is in and identifying the sources of instability which put it there are important, because all activities must be appropriate to both the stage and the corresponding sources of instability. The desired goal is to move the state toward stability, despite the ongoing presence of destabilizing factors that may continue to foster instability. The more unstable the state, the more likely that military action will be required to provide security. However, if NATO-led forces don't know the root

sources of instability, they will not be effective in mitigating it. For example, if a police force is corrupt or predatory, working with it to improve its capability may only foster more instability as it improves their ability to extract resources from the population. The descriptions provided below attempt to highlight some of the key indicators that may be present in each stage.

a. **Vulnerable**. States unwilling or unable to provide security and basic services to a significant portion of the population. These states are characterized by limited state capacity or legitimacy which would leave citizens vulnerable to internal and external shocks and conflict. They may also be facing challenge or opposition from internal or external sources.

b. **Failing**. States with a declining ability to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation and sources of instability, a failing state may be moving either towards vulnerability or failure.

c. **State Failure**. States which have ineffective and illegitimate governments, limited control over their territory, lack a monopoly on the use of force, cannot provide adequate public services, have widespread corruption and criminality, are in sharp economic decline, and have large involuntary population movements.

d. **Post-Crisis**. States in the process of implementing a political settlement and addressing the sources of instability which fostered the crisis or conflict. This phase is usually characterized by limited government legitimacy, improving levels of security, damaged infrastructure, limited provision of basic services, and demands for justice.

e. **Recovering**. States moving toward normality but with some unresolved sources of instability. These states are increasingly able to protect and govern their populations. A key consideration is whether the population considers the level of security and governance to be acceptable, normal, and legitimate.

Section V - Contributing to a Comprehensive Approach by the International Community[8]

0121. S&R usually requires active involvement from diverse actors with widely disparate experiences, resources, mandates, and capabilities. Because of their unique capabilities and capacity, military forces will often contribute to S&R. However, military action must be part of a comprehensive approach by the international

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[8] For more on a comprehensive approach, see AJP-01 and AJP-3.

community. Where NATO is involved, this requires the coordination of NATO's military contributions with non-NATO military forces and civilian organizations.

0122. Because S&R is primarily a civilian-lead process, many of the key actors are not under NATO's military command and control. They cannot be compelled by military forces to work within a coalition construct, nor do they have any incentive to do so. Therefore, military forces planning for and conducting S&R must seek to build strong relationships through cooperation, collaboration, and coordination with the various organizations and agencies involved. While establishing agreement among these different actors can be difficult to achieve, proactive engagement by NATO with international actors prior to a crisis can contribute to a broadly shared vision or unity of purpose. Planning S&R activities within a comprehensive approach means identifying sources of instability, establishing commonly desired outcomes and attempting to harmonize the roles of relevant actors. This requires an extensive information exchange with non-military actors starting at the earliest possible stage.

0123. The role of military forces should be carefully considered and clearly understood by those planning military operations. Because S&R is primarily the responsibility of non-military actors, the military contribution will generally enable or support other groups' end-states. Leadership, cohesion, and coherence are required to ensure NATO-led forces communicate and act in concert with other actors. Therefore, a comprehensive approach requires effective civil-military interaction (CMI)[9] through an adequate civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)[10] capability.

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[9] Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). As defined in MC 0411/2, CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises.
[10] Civil-Military Cooperation. The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organizations and agencies (AAP-6). For more on CIMIC, see AJP-3.19, Civil-Military Cooperation.

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CHAPTER 2 - THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

Section I - Introduction

0201. This chapter describes the main areas of S&R and provides examples of activities in each area. It outlines tasks that NATO military forces may conduct in support of S&R when the North Atlantic Council (NAC) has assigned specific tasks to the JFC. The intent is to improve NATO military support to other actors involved in S&R.

0202. S&R activities often take place in states with damaged or inadequate infrastructure and support services. This places greater demand on the JFC as logistics will often be both a major planning factor and a limitation on the JFC's freedom of action. Issues such as over-flight clearance, basing, access to port facilities and supply of basic materiel, will require considerable cross government and IO effort to resolve and may further be complicated by HN factors.

Section II- Establish a Safe and Secure Environment and Freedom of Movement

0203. **Introduction**.

    a. In a SASE, the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of persistent or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by a local norm of public order[11], physical security, territorial security, a state monopoly on violence and protection of civilians. A SASE allows other S&R activities to proceed.

    b. Establishing a SASE for the local population is the key to obtaining their support for the overall S&R effort. Such an environment enables civilian agencies and organizations whose efforts will be vital to ensure long-term success and stability. When the local population is informed and has confidence in the security provided, they are more likely to cooperate. Military forces need this cooperation to assist with controlling crime and subversive behaviour, defeat insurgents, and limit the effects of adversary actions. If required, military units may be given duties normally performed by the police immediately following the crisis. Military forces such as military police (including gendarmerie-type forces) and specifically trained and equipped infantry units (for crowd control) are available to the JFC to support

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[11] Public order is the set of norms derived from rules posed by constitution, national law, common law, tradition and values in order to safeguard fundamental society values. Public order is established when all social interaction occur in accordance with that particular set of local norms.

safety and public order through augmentation of indigenous security forces. They can also provide a temporary police capability in the absence of indigenous police. However, where possible these tasks should be performed jointly with local security forces, and transferred to them as soon as they are capable of assuming duties on their own. Although SSR is primarily used to establish the conditions for long-term governance this may also contribute to establishing a SASE during the initial stages. Further detail on SSR is included at Annex B.

0204. **Essential Elements**

    a.   **State monopoly for the legitimate use of force** is established when major illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, demobilized, and, where possible, reintegrated into society. If necessary, the local security forces have been vetted, retrained, and operate lawfully.

    b.   **Public order** is established when criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to levels in accordance with local norms.

    c.   **Physical Security** is established when political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population do not fear for their physical safety; dislocated civilians[12] can return home without fear of violence; women and children are protected; and key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected.

    d.   **Territorial Security**. Territorial security is established when the country is protected from invasion and its borders are secure from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and the illicit trafficking of goods and people.

    e.   **Freedom of movement** occurs when people, goods, and information can move freely throughout the country and across borders.

0205. **Military Contribution**. The key priority for the military is to provide security for the local populace and civilian organizations in order to facilitate S&R activities. The long-term goal is to foster stability by enabling an inclusive political process and increasing government legitimacy. Depending on the sources of instability, NATO-led forces may conduct a myriad of tasks to help achieve a SASE. Security activities are intended to reduce civil disorder and violence from uncontrolled groups. Other goals are to enforce ceasefires and facilitate peace agreements to

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[12] Dislocated civilians include internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as evacuees, migrants, stateless persons, etc. For more on dislocated civilians, see AJP-3.4.3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*.

ensure long-term security. A secure situation is normally required prior to starting the reconstruction of a country or region after a crisis.

a.   **A Safe and Secure Environment**. Establishing and maintaining a SASE requires a significant military effort since it may involve the execution of multiple tactical tasks throughout the entire area of operations. Simultaneously, the military force must be prepared to react rapidly to counter any threat to stability. Thus, offensive and defensive activities must be planned and, when necessary, combined with stabilization activities. In general terms, security and control activities are resource heavy and are likely to be the main military effort in S&R. A SASE is achieved and maintained through:

   (1)   **Deterrence**. NATO-led forces seek to prevent adversaries from acting against the HN government. This is done by adopting the appropriate posture and reacting to events with determination to show them that the cost of their action will be higher than the potential benefit.

   (2)   **Control**. NATO-led forces seek to gain awareness of the situation and anticipate the evolution of events, so they can respond to any threat to security. Control involves securing borders, lines of communication (LOCs), key points, population and towns, as well as occupying key areas and facilities. This requires a proactive approach with dynamic planning and implementation.

   (3)   **Response**. If deterrence proves to be ineffective and area control does not prevent or counter aggression, the military forces, along with the HN's security forces, must be capable of providing an effective, rapid, and balanced reaction to the aggression that will counter or neutralize the adversary.

b.   **Freedom of Movement**. One of the first priorities of NATO-led forces should be to establish the security conditions that will enable the entry and unimpeded movement of and communications for HN, NATO, and other actors in the area of responsibility. Freedom of movement allows them to perform activities in support of the economic, political and social development that is necessary to promote enduring stability (SSR, DDR and other non-military efforts, etc.). In a non-permissive environment, military escorts may also provide freedom of movement.

c.   **Protection of Civilians[13]**. The protection of civilians from physical violence is vital and should be a strategic priority for S&R, or any military operation conducted among civilian populations. NATO-led forces are expected, and in many cases mandated, to protect the population from the effects of armed conflict. A failure to meet this requirement may jeopardize the credibility and legitimacy of the operation and therefore undermine other objectives. Civilians and international workers, refugee camps, and other facilities for dislocated civilians may be attractive targets for adversaries, particularly in areas of historic ethnic or cultural conflict. Security forces may be requested to assist with the protection of such facilities, while also enabling access by NGOs, IOs, and other actors.

Section III - Help Restore Public Security

0206. **Introduction**.

a.   Public security includes the establishment of law and order, the rule of law and a basic legal infrastructure. A stable state has a justice system that promulgates just laws, provides equal access to the judicial system, holds all people accountable, protects human rights, ensures safety and security, and is perceived as fair and impartial. All individuals, institutions, and the state are accountable to the law.

b.   Legitimate mechanisms for civil dispute resolution and criminal justice are essential to a stable society. Without access to conflict resolution mechanisms and redress against real or perceived injustices, instability can occur. The rule of law in the HN should normally be based on the existing legal framework. A weak criminal justice system fosters instability by allowing crime as well as political, ethnic, sexual and domestic violence to flourish. However, the existing legal framework could itself be a source of instability if it is unjust and repressive and a cause of grievances among the population.

c.   **Traditional, Customary, or Informal Justice**. These are the broad range of ways that some communities resolve their disputes using non-governmental mechanisms. In many parts of the world, traditional and informal justice

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[13] For the purposes of protection of civilians, any person not part of security forces or armed groups (including criminal groups who are armed) is regarded as a civilian. In situations of international armed conflict or occupation, a civilian is any person who does not belong to the armed forces of a party to conflict or to (armed) militias and who has not spontaneously taken up arms to resist a force invading a non-occupied territory (see Article 43 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Ref. J) and Article 4A of Geneva Convention III). In situations of non-international armed conflicts, it may be considered that all persons who are not members of State armed forces or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict are civilians.

systems play an important role in adjudicating disputes and providing social order. They can function in parallel with formal justice systems or compete with them. In many cases, they can contribute to stability by providing legitimate dispute resolution or reconciliation mechanisms. However, sometimes these systems may be inconsistent with internationally recognized human rights standards or, themselves, may cause conflict.

0207. **Essential Elements**

    a.   **Legal Framework**. Adapted as necessary to the local norms, the legal framework should be consistent with international human rights standards; legally certain; drafted with procedural transparency; equitable, and applicable to all groups in society.

    b.   **Law Enforcement**. Public security is facilitated by laws that are enforced equitably, and occurs when the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected.

    c.   **Justice System**. Access to justice exists when people are able to seek and obtain a remedy for grievances through formal or informal institutions of justice that generally conform with international human rights standards. Another key element is the equal and effective application of the law, procedural fairness, and transparency.

    d.   **Accountability**. Accountability occurs when the population and public officials are held legally accountable for their actions. The judiciary should be independent and free from political influence. For more details, see paragraph B022.

0208. **Military Contribution**

    a.   A key aspect of public security and long-term stability may be the reformation of the various elements of a nation's security sector. The military may have a key role in reforming and restoring the nation's military capabilities, but could also support other aspects of SSR.

    b.   SSR requires a comprehensive approach with other government and international agencies dealing with judiciary and police forces. SSR will seek to address two broad areas: the quality of institutions dealing with security and the capacity and professionalism of personnel in those sectors. Military forces (particularly military police and gendarmerie-type forces) may have a key role in facilitating the process.

c.   The selection and appointment of reliable people from the local population in positions of trust and responsibility are the first steps, and can involve the participation of a military unit. However, the ultimate responsibility lies with the government. The next stage, once individual kit and equipment have been made available, is to start instruction and training for recruited personnel. The ultimate aim is to hand over the execution of, and responsibility for, public order and security to the local authorities.

d.   **Legal Advisor Review of Rule of Law Programmes**. Rule of law activities must be governed by the applicable laws. An advisor authorized to give legal advice to JFCs should ensure compliance with UN or other international mandates governing the intervention, applicable provisions of national laws of intervening forces, international law, and host country law.

e.   A more detailed description of SSR and how it contributes to the restoration of public security is provided in Annex B.

Section IV- Help Restore Basic Services and Infrastructure

0209. **Introduction**. The operation of basic services and infrastructure, based on local norms, are integral to S&R efforts. They facilitate stability by improving government legitimacy, enabling the return of dislocated civilians, and fostering a return to normality, thereby gaining popular support. A lack of access to basic services and infrastructure that are essential for daily living can lead to instability.

a.   Ideally, the restoration of essential services will fall to agencies other than the military. The military should normally not take more than a supporting role. In the early stages, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves and other agencies can conduct these activities. In specific cases, the military may wish, or need, to conduct some of these tasks, particularly at the tactical level, in order to gain and maintain support from the local population. However, such actions must be carefully considered in coordination with the other S&R actors and should be strictly limited in scale and duration to prevent the population from becoming dependent on military support.

b.   Restoring infrastructure and public utilities is an essential element of reconstruction. Additionally, it can make an important contribution to gaining the support of the local population. Cooperation with the civilian authorities through CIMIC is important, including the identification, control and co-ordination of potential quick impact projects (QIPs). The civilian authorities often have a good understanding of what QIPs are required and should be involved from the outset. QIPs can provide limited support to consent winning activity (particularly at the tactical level) however significant care is

required to ensure they are linked and coordinated with the higher operational intent to avoid inadvertently causing harm.

c. The provision of services and the establishment of a SASE are heavily interdependent. On the one hand, security is needed to enable the provision of services; conversely, visible progress on reconstruction is necessary to help sustain enduring security.

0210. **Essential Elements.**

a. Stability considerations should consider essential services and infrastructure priorities, including the identification of critical infrastructure.

b. The preservation of critical infrastructure is important to gaining the confidence and support of the population. Efforts to preserve infrastructure during conflict are important to support rapid post-conflict recovery.

c. Assessments must be done to determine if the lack of service(s) is fostering instability, and if so, take rapid action to counteract the service failure. Restoration of services supports life-saving activities and essential services for a limited period. Life-saving activities are those actions that within a short time span mitigate or avert direct loss of life, physical harm or threats to a population or major part thereof.[14] Essential services are those that satisfy basic human needs and provide the necessary infrastructure for initial recovery and future development. They include sewage, water, electricity, refuse, medical and security.

0211. **Military Contribution**

a. **Responsibility of the Military Force**. The restoration of services is primarily a civilian responsibility and this encompasses legal, financial and infrastructure issues. In emergencies, high threat situations, or remote areas, military forces may be the only assets available to initiate the restoration of essential services, and set the conditions for other agencies to resume their responsibilities. In such instances, military units should undertake such tasks with the clear intention of transferring them to local, regional and national (governmental) organizations and institutions as soon as possible.

b. Military capabilities that may contribute to the initial restoration of services include:

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[14] CERF LIFE-SAVING CRITERIA AND SECTORAL ACTIVITIES; Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), 2007

(1)   Military Engineering.[15] The support provided by military engineering for the restoration of services will be limited. It may include: assessment of damage and engineering repair, water storage and purification; well drilling, restoration and repair of utilities; camp construction for deployed forces and displaced civilians; airport/port/railway/road maintenance and repair; generator power; construction of landing strips and civil facilities; debris clearance; and explosive ordnance disposal.

(2)   Medical. NATO-led forces can temporarily provide medical support until the local medical facilities are restored. Medical support may range from local medical care to health inspection through prevention (vaccination) campaigns.

(3)   Other Logistics. Various additional support tasks may be provided including: water and fuel distribution; support to airports and seaports; transportation and the provision of building supplies.

(4)   Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence. This support could include detection, identification and monitoring, CBRN information management, physical protection, hazard management, and medical countermeasures.[16]

(5)   Communication. Support includes communication and media outreach to assist partners and the HN with informing the population and international audiences to help alleviate concerns and rumours while promoting support and public cooperation with the mission.

c.   As the security situation improves and non-military agencies capable of assuming and expanding restoration activities arrive, military forces should transition to a supporting role. As the situation continues to improve, the demand for military resources and security will decline and other agencies and departments will assume most, if not all, restoration responsibilities. Even when other agencies and departments assume responsibilities, they may not always have sufficient resources and personnel. Therefore, the military may be required to provide support until sufficient personnel and resources are imported or developed domestically.

Section V- Support Humanitarian Assistance [17]

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[15] For more information on military engineering, see AJP-3.12, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering*
[16] For more information on CBRN Defence, see AJP-3.8, *Allied Joint Doctrine for CBRN Defence*
[17] For more information on HA, see AJP-3.4.3

0212. The extent of the assistance that can be provided by NATO is guided by the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – "Oslo Guidelines"*, and the *Civil Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies.* Military involvement in HA should be limited to emergency situations, as a last resort, and be conducted in accordance with the humanitarian principles.[18] When implemented, military activity should primarily enable humanitarian actors through infrastructure support, or if this is not sufficient, by indirect assistance. Only in extreme cases should NATO-led forces provide direct assistance.

0213. The efficiency and effectiveness with which NATO-led forces can deliver HA can have the unintended consequence of decreasing the population's confidence in the HN's ability to provide basic care. Over reliance on NATO HA may delay and undermine the reconstitution of existing medical and other basic infrastructure. To mitigate these possibilities, primary consideration should be given to supporting and supplementing existing infrastructure while promoting the HN as the lead.

0214. Typical supporting roles include providing military airlift support of disaster victims; making available, preparing, and transporting humanitarian and relief supplies; transferring on-hand military stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies; conducting limited humanitarian demining assistance activities; conducting consequence management; and supporting media and public communication to build understanding and public cooperation.

Section VI - Help Establish Conditions for Meeting Longer-Term Governance Requirements

0215. **Introduction**

   a.   A stable state has a legitimate government with the capability and capacity to govern, manage state resources, which benefit all of society, and allow the population to share, access, and compete for power through non-violent political processes.

   b.   Without legitimate governance, spoilers may fill this vacuum and their quest to gain power can further destabilize the state and foster violence.

   c.   While SSR contributes to establishing SASE and restoring public security, its primary purpose is to establish the conditions for legitimate governance. See Annex B for more on SSR.

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[18] In accordance with *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*. endorsed in Stockholm, 17 June 2003, the humanitarian principles are humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.

0216. **Essential Elements**

a.   Effective, enduring and legitimate governance can only be established by the HN. NATO activities to support governance must encourage HN ownership of these processes and be aligned with international norms.

b.   The local population must be encouraged to take the lead in building their own government. NATO-led forces should facilitate the inclusion of all societal groups in governance activities.

c.   Developing governance requires improvements throughout the polity. Given limited resources, identification and prioritization of the sources of instability should narrow the focus of S&R governance activities.

d.   Establishing legitimate HN government generally occurs in graduated, but not necessarily sequential, stages. Initially, a SASE should be established. Other activities, which support civil society, include supporting independent media; communicating to build public trust; training professional administrators; reorganizing and training security forces; and holding elections.

e.   Since a goal of S&R is to return the control of the territory to a legitimate government, activities should be implemented in such a way as to empower legitimate government agencies. Not all local governing bodies are legitimate and therefore care must be taken not to empower illegitimate groups.

0217. **Military Contribution**

a.   In the early stages, the military may have to fill the void until the security situation improves. For example, this may require the military to support elections and any transitional administration. Such activities will facilitate a return to normality and foster support from the local population.

b.   Military expertise may be sought to support various governance activities. This type of S&R activity is difficult to categorize and will depend on the situation and requirements. In the early stages, the military may be the only agency capable of assuming such responsibilities to assist in planning and management and to provide communications and leadership. Planning and conduct of governance related tasks should be done in conjunction with non-military agencies that have expertise in these areas.

c.   It is essential to develop and implement a viable administrative capability so that spoilers, such as criminals and extremist groups, are prevented from

establishing their own shadow government in opposition to legitimate government institutions.

d.   Governance activities support the delivery of basic public services by local authorities while also helping to develop an effective, local public management capacity. Governance activities at the local level set the conditions for national-level projects and the subsequent transition to civil authority.

e.   Governance involves a unique set of public management tasks and competencies that do not normally reside within a conventional military organization. They require blending interagency capabilities through integrated civil-military planning, supported by effective societal information. The introduction of competent civilian agencies to assume governance tasks should be done as early as possible.

f.   The use of existing government institutions may produce quicker results than building new ones from scratch. In order to provide an initial degree of governance, there may be a requirement to permit some elements that were previously regarded as undesirable to remain in post (under close supervision) until they can be replaced by suitable alternatives.

g.   There are no fixed rules for this type of activity, however, when a commander has to act as a civil authority, the following framework should be considered:

   (1)   Communication. Establish a dialogue with key community figures through key leader engagement to increase awareness and manage local expectations. Assist with developing HN communication with the population through media and public engagements to build public trust and cooperation.

   (2)   Identify and Prioritize Local Requirements. Establish committees of local representatives to advocate and prioritize the needs of the civil population.

   (3)   Provide Administration and Essential Services. Meet the needs of the civilian population and encourage local ownership.

   (4)   Set Conditions for a Handover of Responsibility. Responsibility for governance should be handed over to the HN authorities, or an appropriate international civil organization, at the earliest practicable opportunity.

h.   Although civilian agencies and organizations guide the election process, military forces may be required to provide the support that enables broad participation by the local populace. This could include both security and logistic support.

CHAPTER 3 – PLANNING

Section I - Introduction

0301. Operations involving S&R activities are likely to involve a shifting balance between combat, security operations, and enduring peacekeeping. As the emphasis varies over time, NATO-led forces must modify their posture and approach. S&R activities must be incorporated into the planning process from the outset of an operation. As discussed in chapter 1, this should be accomplished through a comprehensive approach to planning for S&R. Whenever possible, national and local authorities should also be included in the planning process to promote not only legitimacy, but also HN and local ownership. The goal is to foster long-term stability by providing a framework for integrating the activities of various actors. NATO's crisis management system includes the Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) database, which is a list of national civilian specialists deployable for short, medium, and long term assignments. They are specialized in the political, stabilization and reconstruction, and media fields. Their role is to advise NATO forces on fulfilling their task in coordination with other international organizations.[19]

Section II – Comprehensive Understanding of the Operational Environment

0302. An essential part of planning S&R activities is the identification of sources of instability through a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment (OE). Because the factors that foster a stable state are diverse and complex, it is imperative that a stability assessment is conducted at the outset. Without identifying the sources of instability, activities will be ineffective, at best, and, at worse, may foster further instability and fuel a downward spiral that could ultimately lead to state failure. Instability is the result of the interaction of a variety of factors; therefore, it is important to have a holistic approach to stability assessments aided by subject matter experts in their respective fields rather than a narrowly focused sector view. To provide the information required to develop this broad situational understanding, entities separate from NATO (i.e. diplomatic missions, development organizations, the HN government, IOs, NGOs) should be invited at the earliest opportunity to contribute to the development of a comprehensive understanding of the OE.

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[19] PO(2011)0529 is a report by the Chairman of the Deputy Permanent Representatives Committee on the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action Plan and the Lisbon Summit decisions on the Comprehensive Approach. Efforts continue to refine the non-military expertise available to NATO and to enable its effective use. The COMPASS database currently contains 162 expert profiles from 10 Allies.

0303. To aid in understanding of the OE, a comprehensive preparation of the operational environment (CPOE)[20] is conducted by the staff. CPOE products enable a JFC and the staff to understand the complexity of the situation and help to frame the problem. The scope of analysis for S&R activities will focus on sources of instability and generally includes, but is not restricted to, the following areas[21]:

a. **Crisis Circumstances and Surroundings**

   (1) Circumstances. History of the conflict, geo-strategic position, physical environment (climate, geography, hydrography and oceanography), national and regional infrastructure.

   (2) Population and Culture. Populace (ethnicity, language, class, demography, distribution, health conditions), culture (religion, religious divides, fundamentalism, cultural divides, gender issues, distinctive cultures), political, economic and social issues (government, media, economy, medical factors, organized crime), legal issues (HN law, national and international law), and the information environment (Media, public engagements, influence).

   (3) Catalysts. Geographical, functional or socio-cultural aspects have, or may have the potential to act as catalysts for conflict: natural resources, borders and boundaries, critical infrastructure and LOC, and socially marginalized or excluded populations.

b. **Actors and Influences**

   (1) Those actively participating in a crisis, as well as those with the potential or inclination to do so.

   (2) Categorization of Actors. Belligerents, adversaries, other opposing actors, criminals making use of an unstable situation, neutrals, friendly.

   (3) Leading Actors. Key leaders (formal and informal leaders, power structure, power base), other leaders (power brokers, popular forces, private sector/business with associated trade unions, extra-territorial interests, IOs, governmental organizations, and NGOs), and other agencies.

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[20] The CPOE is a crisis-specific cross-headquarters process, led by the intelligence/knowledge staff, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. It covers the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) model areas and includes associated potential threats and risks, in support of planning and the conduct of a campaign or operation (COPDv2).
[21] These areas are from AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning*.

         (4)   Analysis of Actors. Actors, as described above, impact upon a situation to varying degrees depending upon their aims, motivation, positions, intentions, sub-culture, relationships, networks, capacity and critical vulnerabilities.

   c.   **Causes of Crises**. Understanding why states or other groups resort to the use of force is essential to the planning and conduct of operations.

         (1)   Elemental Causes. These include fears concerning personal security and survival, self-interest, ideology, and values.

         (2)   Structural Causes. Illegitimate government, formal/informal leaders, poor governance, lack of political participation, inequality and social exclusion, inequitable access to natural resources, and restricted freedom of religion or ideology.

         (3)   Immediate Causes. Uncontrolled security sector, weapons proliferation, human rights abuses, destabilizing role of neighbouring countries, role of diasporas.

         (4)   Triggers. Elections, arrest/assassination of key figure, military coup, environmental disaster, increased price/scarcity of basic commodities, economic crisis, and capital flight.

         (5)   Crisis-generated causes include material and emotional causes.

   d.   **Implications**. Interaction between the various components of, and actors involved in, a given situation may result in various outcomes from worst case to most likely to best case future outcomes. Each has different implications, different probabilities for occurrence, and different second-order effects. These implications may be defined in terms of current trends, shocks, risks, and opportunities.

0304.   These areas require continuous monitoring and analysis. The sources of instability identified during the CPOE will likely become the focus of military and civilian efforts. They will need to be included in operations assessments once S&R activities begin. Frameworks for identifying sources of instability when conducting both initial analysis and operations assessments can be found in Annex A.

Section III - Planning Considerations

0305.   **Consult with other international actors and relevant national authorities.** These consultations should identify which S&R activities other actors will perform,

which activities NATO should undertake to support and complement other actors, and which S&R activities NATO may need to temporarily fulfil. Whatever the gap, NATO should encourage civilian actors to assume those roles as soon as possible. Effective civilian and military coordination is required to ensure short-term actions do not undermine longer-term stability goals.

0306. **Utilize intelligence capabilities to develop a CPOE**. To achieve a CPOE, NATO utilizes the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) model. The use of the PMESII model ensures that intelligence staff can meet the intelligence requirements of the decision-makers, planners and operators.[22] For some environments, there might be other elements of relevance such as health and legal. Intelligence professionals may need assistance from specialists in some PMESII areas (e.g. the political advisor, engineers and civil military cooperation) to support their analysis. They may also need to contact supporting commands, and non-military and non-governmental organizations. This collaborative process is necessary for intelligence to be successful in most NATO missions, but particularly for S&R efforts.[23]

0307. **Regional engagement can be critical if not taken in the right consideration**. Engagement among the HN and neighbouring countries in common international initiatives can foster regional stabilization and successful S&R. Neighbouring countries play a major role in the HN's S&R process. Regional interests, issues, and unresolved conflicts can continue to influence and affect the HN throughout an S&R mission. The HN may be at risk from its neighbours' domestic instabilities or foreign policies. The flow of refugees and arms trafficking from neighbouring countries can seriously hamper the S&R process.

0308. **Develop metrics for assessment**. When feasible, develop and monitor metrics and benchmarks in coordination with other relevant actors in the OE to assess effectiveness of activities in stabilizing the area. By closely monitoring changing conditions in the area of operations and in coordination with other actors, NATO-led forces will be able to plan and prepare for the transfer of responsibility to appropriate authorities.

0309. **Take into account cultural and gender related aspects**. This requires a thorough understanding of the local culture. Mission mandates should specifically address gender issues, earmark resources for gender work, and establish accountability and monitoring mechanisms. See Annex E for further details on the role of women in peace and security.

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[22] The CPOE development process should also integrate the commander's critical information requirements so that intelligence collection meets the commander's needs.
[23] For more information on NATO intelligence doctrine, see AJP-2, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-Intelligence and Security*, and AJP-2.1, *Intelligence Procedures*.

0310. **Focus on root sources**. Identification and prioritization of root sources of instability will facilitate a common understanding of the environment within which S&R is conducted. A stable state may be the overarching objective of S&R, but the JFC must be careful to avoid focusing too heavily on strengthening government as a panacea for stabilizing the state. Although capacity building at the national level is important, societal strength and stability is ultimately rooted at the community level.

0311. **Strategic, operational, and tactical levels are inter-related**. Because of the inherently tight interrelationships between the strategic, operational and tactical levels during S&R, commanders should not only be concerned with events at their respective level, but must also understand how their actions contribute to the operational and strategic end states. Strategic commanders, JFCs, and staffs should be informed by relevant actions at the tactical level from those units that encounter the local population and local security forces in order to gain situational awareness and develop operational insights.

0312. **Strategic Communications**.[24] The early implementation of a strategic communications (StratCom) framework is essential in establishing acceptance of the NATO-led force and bolstering HN governmental institutions. Properly focused and coordinated information activities can play a crucial part in supporting the credibility and legitimacy of both NATO and the HN, which in turn provide the foundations for stability.

0313. **Logistics.** Planning must include the necessary logistic support to facilitate long-term and sustainable activities. However, the logistic footprint can be minimized by outsourcing certain services locally. Outsourcing also has the advantage of encouraging acceptance of the military effort and helping to stimulate the local economy.

Section IV - Transitions

0314. Successful S&R efforts require extensive planning and coordination to ensure a successful transition. Poorly timed and ill-conceived transitions will generally foster and perpetuate instability.

0315. NATO should transition responsibilities to appropriate civilian agencies of the international community as soon as practical, and to the HN when the HN has the

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[24] PO(2009)0141, NATO Strategic Communications policy, defines StratCom as "the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.

capability and capacity to maintain security, provide essential services, and execute the normal functions of governance. Different regions or institutions may be ready to transition at different times. This dynamic should be incorporated into an overall transition plan to facilitate successful, conditions-based transitions.

0316. The criteria for successful transition should be coordinated between military and civilian organizations, the HN authorities, and the local population. The transition plan should be based on a realistic, accurate and shared understanding of the capabilities, responsibilities, and resources of all participants.

Section V - Training, Education, and Exercises

0317. In addition to individual NATO member nation training requirements, pre-deployment training should enhance regional, political, cultural, and economic awareness, and facilitate coordination and understanding between civil and military personnel. NATO personnel should also be trained on how to support civilian efforts. This training should include instruction and practical exercises in identifying and mitigating sources of instability. Whenever possible, IOs, NGOs, and other relevant governmental and civilian actors should be invited to participate in education and training exercises to improve coordination in the planning and execution of S&R efforts.

ANNEX A - OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

Section I - Assessment

A001. **Introduction**. The *NATO Operations Assessment Handbook* (NOAH) [25] states "assessment is the process that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that support decision making." Assessment should be conducted regularly to review progress and adjust plans as required. Because of the numerous actors and agencies, with different priorities and time lines, assessment in S&R can be challenging. These challenges can be mitigated by ensuring assessment is incorporated into the planning process from the outset and is not treated as a stand-alone activity. Assessment provides an important input to the knowledge development process, which builds upon and maintains a holistic understanding of the situation and OE. Significant resources are required, such as data collection and analysts, to provide timely and useful advice to support decision-making.

A002. **Key Factors**

    a.   An assessment framework should be nested with the overall plan. This means there is a comprehensive and enduring methodology, which can be applied consistently from the strategic to the tactical level. A comprehensive assessment framework includes:

        (1)   Realistic coalition objectives.

        (2)   Milestones to assess short-term progress against long-term goals.

        (3)   Stability so there are not wholesale changes to assessment-particularly during changes in command-as this precludes the ability to conduct accurate trend analysis.

        (4)   Ensuring the assessment process is incorporated into the planning process.

        (5)   Baseline indicators to measure the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability.

        (6)   Local perceptions.

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[25] For more details on the principles, procedures, and techniques of NATO operations assessment, see *NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH)*, dated 15 December 2012.

b.   While every operation is unique and thus there cannot be a "standard assessment", this annex provides general principles and frameworks to support assessment.

A003. **Assessment Principles**. Assessments require a consistent and enduring approach. Key principles include:

a.   **Objectives Led**. The assessment should be derived from the operation or campaign objectives (end-state). Otherwise, it will be irrelevant.

b.   **Useable**. Assessment is not an end in itself; therefore, the analysis it produces must be useable. In other words, it must measure stability and enable decision-making.

c.   **Achievable**. Assessment must be designed so it can be easily executed. The easier the method, the more consistent and reliable the analysis.

d.   **Valid**. Assessments must ensure both the data and analysis are accurate. Qualitative and quantitative data should both be used as appropriate.

A004. **Comprehensive Approach**. Assessment design and implementation should support a comprehensive approach, using military and civilian staff, including people from organizations that have the best understanding of the OE.

A005. **Assessment Challenges**. All too often, an activity is assessed rather than the results of the activity. The assumption is that a completed activity will achieve the intended result. Good assessment must correctly distinguish between performance and effect. There are numerous challenges to effective assessment. They include:

a.   A complex and changing OE.

b.   Multiple actors with different priorities and timeframes.

c.   A short-term focus caused by frequent rotations of JFCs, headquarters, and formations.

d.   Focus on measures of performance (output) versus measures of effectiveness (impact).

e.   Tendency to act before identifying and understanding the sources of instability.

f.   Staff structures and process which are focused on "threats" rather than sources of instability.

g.   Progress is often non-linear.

Section II – Planning and Assessment Tools

A006. There are numerous tools to support assessments. However, most of them are sector specific (health, justice, governance, etc.) and do not take a holistic approach to identifying sources of instability. An assessment framework, which provides a more holistic approach, is the District Stability Framework.

A007. **The District Stability Framework.**[26] The District Stability Framework (DSF), used successfully in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, South Sudan and elsewhere, is an analytical, planning, and programming tool specifically created to guide and support S&R. The DSF helps military and civilian personnel 1) identify sources of Instability (SOIs), 2) design programmes and activities to mitigate them, 3) and measure their effect in fostering stability. In contrast with other frameworks, the DSF is a holistic analytical, programming, and assessment tool. It reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on "understanding" and integrating the local population's perspectives into planning and assessment. The four step DSF process is nested within the AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-level Planning* and the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive* (COPD) joint planning process. To maximize its effectiveness, relevant actors and organizations in the area should be involved in the entire process, participating through an inclusive stability working group.

a.   **Situational Awareness**. DSF uses the following four "lenses" to achieve a population-centric and stability-oriented understanding of the local environment:

(1)   **Operating Environment**. The OE generally refers to the physical or tangible characteristics of the area. DSF uses the PMESII and areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) frameworks to gather this information. However, unlike a typical PMESII/ASCOPE product, the DSF does not simply generate a list of facts about the operating environment. Crucially it notes the relevance of those factors to the local population and the S&R mission. For example, users should not simply note there is a local government; they should note it is dominated by one tribal group that undermines the legitimacy and support for the government among other tribes.

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[26] For more information on DSF, refer to http://www.usaid.gov

(2) **Cultural Environment**. The cultural information should identify the major groups, what they care about (and potentially fight over) how they normally regulate society and solve disputes, the traditional authorities, disruptions to traditional mechanisms/authorities, and how "spoilers" and "stabilizers" can or do take advantage of these factors.

(3) **Local Perceptions**. To be effective, S&R activities must be based on a deep understanding of local conditions, local grievances, and local norms, not outsider assumptions. This understanding can be gained through various mechanisms, including population surveys, focus groups, key leader engagements, input from local NGOs, etc. Note that assessments, which rely solely or heavily on perception-based surveys, can be unreliable.

(4) **Stability/Instability Dynamics**. The DSF also identifies potential instability and stability factors in the local environment. Factors of instability include grievances of the local population (taken from various local perceptions data sources); events that create a window of vulnerability in which stability may be undermined; and key actors who are fomenting instability. On the other side of the equation are factors of stability: resiliencies in the society (institutions and mechanisms that help the society function peacefully); events that present a window of opportunity to enhance stability; and key actors (individuals) who are helping to promote stability. Noteworthy, events are neutral as they can reinforce either stability or instability depending on who exploits them and how they play out.

b. **Analysis.** After gaining situational awareness, the DSF analyzes the gathered information and identifies potential sources of instability, causes, desired objective(s), and the impact indicators that will measure progress in addressing each SOI.

(1) The four situational awareness lenses typically result in a long list of factors that *could* be driving instability. The primary purpose of analysis is to narrow this list down to a much smaller number of issues that are actually SOIs. To begin narrowing down the list, DSF starts by grouping together issues that are closely related or logically connected in a symptom-cause relationship. For example, the problems of poor border control, police corruption, and violent crime might all be grouped together under the heading of "physical insecurity." If insecurity is an SOI, the DSF process will break these issues apart again later to address them in detail.

(2)   Next, each problem or group of related problems is entered into the SOI Analysis Matrix (Figure A.1) and vetted against the three instability criteria.

(a)   Is there a decrease in support for the government or legitimate governance institutions? The notion of legitimate governance institutions refers to non-governmental entities that help the society regulate itself, such as a village elder or tribal council. This criterion can often be considered in two parts – first whether locals are upset about the issue and if so whether their expectations and displeasure are specifically directed toward the government/local leaders.

(b)   Is there an increase in support for malign actors? This usually occurs when malign actors are either directly addressing the problem (e.g. providing security to a community that the police never visit), or successfully leveraging the issue in their propaganda (e.g. "If we were in charge, we would reform and expand the police").

(c)   Is this issue undermining the normal functioning of society? The emphasis is on local norms, which are usually based on what community members have personally experienced. For example, if a community never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity can hardly be undermining the normal functioning of their society.

Potential Sources of Instability	Instability Criteria			SOI?	Prioritization
	Does this issue decrease support for the Govt / legit governance? Explain.	Does this issue increase support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? Explain.	Does the issue meet 2 of the 3 Instability criteria?	Is the SOI a Priority Grievance for the local populace?
Justice / Conflict Resolution (incl. Land Disputes)	Yes. Formal & traditional mechanisms seen as ineffective	Yes. Taliban increase their reputation by solving disputes.	Yes. Traditionally solved by shuras, now a source of violence	Yes	Yes (#1)
Barakzai dominate government	Yes. Undermines Noorzai support, increases resentment	No. Taliban not taking advantage	No. Barakzai have dominated for several decades	No	No
Lack of healthcare	Probably. Provincial gov't healthcare excludes Nawa	No. Taliban does not provide healthcare	No. Nawa has never had healthcare	No	Yes (#3)
Poor road infrastructure	No. Governor is actually working to build a new road	No. Taliban are not building roads	No. Road network has always been rudimentary at best	No	No
Civilian gov't corruption	No. Corruption complaints directed solely at police	No. No evidence that Taliban exploits this issue	No. Locals not concerned; apparently within normal bounds	No	No
Insecurity (incl. police & CivCas)	Yes. CivCas, insecurity police ineffectiveness reflect poorly on Govt	No. Taliban are also blamed for CivCas, not providing security either	Yes. Insecurity & police problems exceed local norms	Yes	Yes (#2)
Lack of Education (incl. radical mullahs)	No. Despite limitations, people are grateful for education improvements	Yes. Taliban use this to promote radical madrassas in Pakistan	No. Despite low levels, education has actually improved since 2001	No	Yes (#4)

Figure A.1 - SOI Analysis Matrix - Example

(3)   The final step on the SOI Analysis Matrix is to prioritize the identified SOIs using local perceptions. NATO-led forces should first focus on SOIs that are a priority grievance of the local population. Otherwise, locals may perceive stabilization efforts as focused on issues that do not really matter to them.

c.   **Design**. In the next step, NATO-led forces design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. This process starts by brainstorming potential activities that address each of the systemic causes of the SOI. These ideas are then screened and refined using the three stability criteria. Proposed activities that meet the stability criteria should then be refined using the eight design principles:

(1)   Can be sustained by the local government or society.

(2)   Maximizes local involvement to create local ownership.

(3)   Minimizes the trade-offs between short-term positive effects and any potentially negative long-term impacts (i.e. unintended consequences).

(4)   Leverages or supports the programs of other government agencies, inter-governmental organizations, NGOs, and the HN government.

(5)   Is appropriate to the local political and cultural context.

(6)   Strengthens governmental accountability and transparency.

(7)   Leverages and builds upon existing societal resiliencies (identified in situational awareness).

(8)   Includes the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change.

NATO-led forces should then screen each proposed activity against available resources – time, money, personnel, and expertise. The final step in the design process is the prioritization and synchronization of activities. They should be prioritized based on their anticipated impact on the SOI (i.e. those activities that make the most difference should be implemented first). They should also be synchronized with other actors' activities. Consideration should also be made toward pursuing a few activities, which may achieve short-term, quick, visible results to establish momentum for the longer-term S&R effort.

d.   **Monitoring and Evaluation**. The final DSF step takes place during and after the implementation of S&R activities. Monitoring and evaluation is conducted on three levels: output, impact, and overall stability.

(1)   Output indicators (also called measures of performance) simply track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, "Is the activity progressing?" and in the long run "Is the activity complete?" Examples might include the number of miles of road paved, or number of police trained. Output indicators are monitored *during* the implementation of an activity until it is completed.

(2)   Impact indicators (also called measures of effectiveness) measure an activity's impact. Examples might be decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). They are generally evaluated *after* an activity is completed.

(3)   Overall stability is the third level of S&R assessment. Rather than measuring the impact of individual activities, it takes into account the impact of all the activities conducted over a longer period, as well as the influence of external factors. It asks "is stability increasing or decreasing?" Key to measuring overall stability is identifying good indicators, creating a baseline, and then tracking the indicators at regular intervals, starting as early as possible. The best overall stability indicators reflect local perceptions of stability, NOT perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question "what will local people do or say differently if they believe the environment is getting more stable?" Examples include:

(a)   District government recognition – reflects trust and confidence (e.g. locals take their problems to the district government for resolution).

(b)   Local-on-local violence – a direct measure of insecurity.

(c)   Population freedom of movement – reflects security conditions.

(d)   Local perceptions of their government – direct measure of the public's stated confidence in the government's competence, transparency, and relevance.

(4)   Stability indicators should be established early, as they will serve as a baseline against which to measure progress. Although no single indicator can perfectly measure the concept of stability, the general trend in a "basket" of good indicators can be a useful way of identifying whether overall stability conditions are improving. Applying a 'weighting' to criterion can introduce bias that may skew an overall score and be inaccurate; therefore, weighting is generally best avoided.

A009. **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments**[27]. The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments provides a list of stability and reconstruction related goals, indicators, and measures. After identifying sources of instability, these factors can be used to help identify programming objectives. They can also be used to develop a baseline against which to measure overall S&R mission progress.

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[27] For more information on measuring progress in conflict environments, refer to http://www.usip.org

ANNEX B - SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

B001. **Introduction**

a. Second only to providing security, the major NATO-led force role in S&R efforts, in the broader context of cooperative security initiatives, may be to help reform the HN security sector and build partner capacity to make it an enabler of long-term stability. Security sector reform (SSR) involves reforming security institutions so that, under the control of a legitimate authority, they can play an effective and accountable role in providing internal and external security. It encompasses HN defence ministry reform; training and development; education; and support for the enhancement of judicial and law enforcement institutions. The security sector comprises both military and civilian individuals and institutions responsible for the safety and security of the HN and the population at the national and local levels. This includes state security providers, governmental security management and oversight bodies, civil society, and can include non-state providers of justice and security.

b. Development assistance benefits from being part of a comprehensive approach in which it is fully coordinated with security-related assistance, as development is at risk without basic security. With that understanding, NATO, along with like-minded bilateral and multilateral donors, has begun to develop a more comprehensive approach to SSR by better integrating defence and other security-related programmes with development, and diplomatic tools and resources to assist partner governments to provide effective, legitimate, and accountable security for their citizens. SSR refers to a comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to improve the way a HN provides safety, security, and justice. Through SSR, NATO may be tasked to assist the HN to respond appropriately to threats within and outside its borders. SSR programmes require integrated activities in many sectors, including defence, justice (to include law enforcement, border forces, the courts, and corrections), intelligence, governance (to include civil society, civilian oversight, and financial management), and DDR. SSR is a holistic concept that includes all of these various disciplines and covers many different sectors. To be successful, it must be treated as such.

B002. SSR is the restoration or the transformation of a country's security institutions which includes all actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated effectively, legitimately and accountably in a manner that is more consistent with sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes

to a well-functioning security framework.[28]

B003. **Support the Development of a Host Nation Strategic Plan for Security Sector Reform**. The military contribution to an SSR programme should be incorporated within an overall HN strategic reform plan, which should be developed by the HN with support from all the stakeholders, including the intervention force where applicable, IOs, and NGOs. SSR has an explicitly political objective to ensure that security is provided in a manner consistent with internationally accepted norms, human rights principles and the rule of law. Security can be provided and governed by state and non-state institutions in many ways and ultimately is driven by a country's balance of power. Therefore, SSR is best approached as a comprehensive governance issue and not simply as a technical and military activity. All SSR programmes must be coordinated during assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases.

Figure B.1 - Elements of SSR

B004. **Security Sector Components**. The activities of military forces are generally focused on reforming the HN military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, wide-ranging effort to reform the entire security sector, which is composed of individuals and institutions that provide safety, security and justice for the people of a state. Figure B.1 illustrates the elements within the security sector,

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[28] Working definition extracted from MC 0578, *MC Concept for Military Support to Defence Reform*, 23 February 2009.

which includes the core security actors and related organizations. Execution of comprehensive SSR unites the following elements of the security sector.

    a.   Security actors to include military forces, law enforcement services, constabulary or gendarme forces, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian), coast guards, border guards, customs authorities, and reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, militias).

    b.   Management and oversight bodies such as the executive and national security advisory bodies, legislative and legislative selected committees, ministries of defence, internal and foreign affairs, customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget officers, financial audit and planning units), and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).

    c.   Justice and the rule of law elements like the judiciary and justice ministries, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, and customary and traditional justice systems.

    d.   Non-state security forces including liberation armies, guerrilla armies, private security companies, and political party militias.

B005. Responsibility for implementing the non-military elements of SSR will normally reside with the appropriate civilian agencies and civil law enforcement organizations, either the HN, intervening external stakeholders, or a combination of both. The military role consists of assisting and facilitating the operations of these agencies. In some instances, where HN civilian agencies are not functioning or external civilian partners are not present, military forces, especially military police including gendarmerie-type forces,[29] may take on a limited role in SSR implementation for non-military areas.

B006. **Objectives**

    a.   There are four primary objectives when conducting SSR:

        (1)   Increase the capacity for effective governance, oversight, and accountability in the security sector.

        (2)   Improve delivery of security and justice.

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[29] Gendarmerie like police forces; e.g. Italian Carabinieri; French Gendarmerie; Spanish Guardia Civil.

        (3)   Assist local leadership to develop an ownership of the reform process.

        (4)   Support the development of sustainable security and justice delivery.

    b.   In order to achieve these objectives, an SSR programme must develop a legal and/or constitutional framework that provides for the legitimate and accountable use of force that is in accordance with universally accepted human rights norms and standards. It must also institutionalize a system of governance and management that provides mechanisms for oversight of security and intelligence provided by security institutions. Both of these should include mechanisms for interaction among the security actors, detailing their respective constitutional and legal roles and responsibilities, as well as how they are to cooperate and coordinate their actions.

B007. **Sustainability**. From the outset, SSR programmes should support the HN's national structures that will manage the implementation of SSR, since national ownership and leadership are essential for effective security sector development. The design of these programmes must focus on the organizational structures and management processes within security sector organizations. Merely training and equipping judges, prosecutors, soldiers, and law enforcement officers would be ineffective and unsustainable. Managerial systems and planning capacities need to be developed and supported in coordination with training and equipping programmes at the various levels of government - national, provincial, and local - and need to correspond closely to local capabilities. They must also be integrated with governance reform programmes.

B008. **Support Host Nation Ownership to Foster Transparency and Strengthen Legitimacy**. The principles, policies, laws, and structures that form SSR programmes must respect the HN's history, culture, legal framework, and institutions. The needs, priorities, and circumstances driving SSR programmes will differ substantially from one country to the next. Accounting for the basic security concerns of the HN population is essential for attaining legitimacy and is essential to the success of SSR programmes. To ensure the sustainability of reforms, assistance should be designed to meet the needs of the HN population and to support HN security sector actors, processes, and priorities. To accomplish this, SSR programmes should be developed to serve long-term goals. They should strengthen HN security forces' legitimacy and authority. Military law and a code of conduct should be developed to define the binding rules and regulations for military forces, and similar legal frameworks are needed for the other security services. Programme design should include a robust communications component to foster awareness of reform efforts among HN officials and the population, neighbouring countries, the donor community, and other actors with a potential stake in programme outcomes.

B009. **Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights**. Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights, and legitimacy must be included in security force development. Security forces must carry out their core functions in accordance with these principles. This is particularly important in countries where the legacy of abuse by security personnel may have eroded public confidence in the sector overall. SSR programmes should include accountability and oversight mechanisms to prevent abuses of power and corruption and to build public confidence. They must incorporate an explicit focus on security sector governance. Strengthening the overall legal, policy, and budgetary frameworks should be an important component of the SSR agenda.

B010. **Link Security and Justice**. SSR should ensure that all security forces operate within domestic and international law and support comprehensive efforts to enforce and promote the rule of law. Law enforcement forces in particular should operate as an integral part of the justice system and directly support other parts of the justice sector, including the courts and corrections institutions. Assistance to law enforcement and other state security providers should be complemented with other efforts to strengthen justice institutions. This will assist in avoiding unintended consequences and ensure that security forces operate according to the law. For example, if police reform is undertaken without efforts to strengthen other parts of the justice system, an increase in arrests without the necessary means to adjudicate cases, defend, incarcerate, or rehabilitate suspected offenders can lead to a failure of the justice system as a whole.

B011. **Public Trust and Confidence**. In supporting the reconstruction of the institutions of a failed state, commanders must engender trust and confidence between the local population and the security forces. As SSR proceeds, these security forces carry a progressively greater burden in ensuring public safety. Frequently, they do so in an environment characterized by crime and violence, particularly in areas recovering from violent, predatory forces. Recovery requires a community-based response that uses the unique capabilities of the security forces and police. Operating in accordance with the laws of the HN, the success of these forces will motivate them and help to gain the trust and confidence of the local population. Furthermore, increased public confidence engenders greater desire among the people to support the efforts of the security forces.

B012. **Leadership Capacity Building**. Challenges associated with developing capable, legitimate, and accountable security forces require capable leadership in the host-nation security sector at all levels. To establish the conditions for long-term success, SSR may help the HN identify and begin training and advising security force leaders as early as possible. Such efforts must avoid undermining host-nation legitimacy while recognizing that assistance, advice, and education may be

needed. Programmes focused on developing senior leaders may prove helpful. Advisors, trainers, mentors, monitors and liaison staff should be carefully selected to deal with the frustration in working with possible immature security forces. Tour length of advisors should be long enough for relationships to be forged and a deep understanding of how best to develop the indigenous forces to emerge.

B013. **Host-Nation Dependency**. During reform, the risk of building a culture of dependency is mitigated by adopting a training process. This process sequentially provides training and equipment to security forces, a dedicated advising capability, and an advisory presence. After initial training efforts, this reform helps host-nation security forces progress toward the transition of security responsibility. A robust transition plan supports the gradual and coherent easing of host-nation dependency, typically in the form of increased responsibility and accountability. Depending on the security environment, NATO-led forces and external actors in SSR may need to protect new HN security forces from many direct and immediate threats during their development. While this requirement usually applies only during initial training, security forces remain at risk throughout their development during SSR; these threats may contribute to problems with discipline, dependability, and desertion. In extreme circumstances, protecting host-nation security forces may necessitate training outside the physical boundaries of the state.

B014. **Balance Operational Support with Institutional Reform to Ensure Coherent Delivery and Unity of Effort**. Sufficient incentives, processes, resources, and structures must be put in place so that reforms, resources, and capacities are sustained after assistance ends. An equal emphasis must be placed on the financing, management, monitoring, deployment, and support of the security forces and institutions that international agencies are reforming. Training and materiel assistance must be coordinated with efforts to develop HN infrastructure, personnel and administrative support systems, logistical and planning procedures, and an adequate and sustainable resource base. Given the high levels of interdependency within the security sector, coherent delivery of SSR will require dedicated SSR command, control, and cooperation arrangements that are integrated with both military and civilian command structures of any intervening elements. In a hostile environment where civilian agencies are unable to operate freely or otherwise request support, a single military headquarters that coordinates local SSR activities for the reform of the HN military forces and possibly some police functions may, out of necessity, be given broader responsibility to help generate development across the whole sector. This should not be a permanent arrangement. The following coordination areas may be the most important and of special significance in post-intervention and hostile environment areas.

a. Ensuring that non-military activity like police training, which may be conducted by civilian organizations, private military companies (PMCs),

private security companies (PSCs) provided by contributing nations, is coordinated through the military headquarters dealing locally with SSR.

b.   Ensuring that the military headquarters dealing locally with SSR synchronizes its activities with adjacent and higher headquarters also dealing with SSR. Any disparity between these activities may affect the success of the transition back to the HN.

c.   Delivering coherence between the activities of various partners, agencies, and donors, when lead-agency or -nation responsibilities for aspects of SSR are allocated without an overall coordinating body.

B015. **Host Nation Capacity.** Developing capacity in the security sector is a complex challenge. Capacity development refers to the ability of Alliance forces to train and advise HN individuals and institutions to develop security strategies, set priorities, solve problems, and achieve results with the resources available. It is a broader concept than the training and technical assistance approaches that are usually employed to address capacity shortfalls. Capacity development requires a comprehensive approach from all participating agencies in coordination with IOs, such as the United Nations, and NGOs, which addresses capacity gaps tailored to the OE. Strengthening capacity in partner governments to develop, manage, and implement SSR should be a central aspect of all reform programmes. Capacity needs are present throughout the security sector, and not just within state institutions. In the past, capacity development programmes have failed because wider governance issues (e.g. systematic corruption) were not properly addressed. For this reason, a thorough assessment must be done to inform the SSR planning process.

B016. In addition to the capability to conduct operations, military capacity building must include the administrative support and development of a functioning HN defence ministry and chain of command. A coherent SSR programme directed at defence forces should focus on the provision of training and advisory teams, simultaneous delivery of equipment and infrastructure, operational support through provision of fires and logistic support and delivering financial and managerial support for the security forces.

B017. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the security sector is a critical element of any SSR programme. Oversight and control mechanisms and processes assure that the various elements of the security sector are accountable to elected and politically appointed civilian leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches. Civilian oversight bodies are those institutions authorized by the state to manage and oversee the activities and governance of security forces and agencies. They can be formal or informal and may include (but are not limited to) the executive branch and ministries, civilian review boards and compliance

commissions, and local government structures. Accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defence/security budget planning and programme implementation. Capacity building in these critical areas of governance should be a central element of SSR in which the military may only have a limited supporting role or expertise.

B018. A clear understanding of the relationship and responsibilities between Alliance and HN forces is critical to the successful transition of authority. Advisors and trainers provide the essential link between both HN and Alliance forces and have a significant role within the transition process. Headquarters elements on the ground should have a dedicated staff branch dealing with SSR that maintain a close link with any superior headquarters.

B019. **Host Nation Defence**. Military forces are developed primarily to counter external threats to the HN. The design of these forces develops from the analysis of those threats and the specific capabilities required countering them. Providing humanitarian assistance and countering certain types of internal military threats can also be a necessary capability. Defence reform should be structured by the constraints of relevant HN executive and legislative branch directives, legislation and policy documents. HN national security strategies, policies, acts and budgets are examples of documents that should inform the design and implementation of defence reform and SSR programmes as a whole. Assisting the HN to construct them, if they are absent or outdated, becomes an essential feature of the reform process.

B020. **Rule of Law**. The HN justice system may encompass an array of formal and informal institutions and actors. These institutions can include the ministry of justice, law enforcement, law schools and bar associations, and legal advocacy organizations. The legal framework includes the constitution, laws, rules, and regulations. Peace agreements may also constitute part of the legal framework in post-conflict countries. HN executive branch directives and relevant legislation should play a central role in the formulation and implementation of SSR initiatives and programmes. These can include national security strategies, policies, acts, or national criminal justice codes. Also important are HN structures charged with specific responsibilities for elements of SSR, such as governance reform agencies, national reconciliation commissions, and national DDR bodies. SSR planners must avoid imposing their concepts of law, justice, and security on the HN. The HN's systems and values are central to its development of justice system reform.

B021. **Legal System**. An effective legal and judicial system is vital to the rule of law. The lack of clear, widely accepted and enforceable laws, and easy access to justice, are significant barriers to sustainable national and economic development. Consequently, legal and judicial reform has traditionally formed an important part

of SSR, with the focus on national laws, the court system and judges. A formal justice system may be complemented by the informal customary or traditional justice systems that are unique to particular areas, cultures, or regions. Sometimes referred to as "non-state justice systems," traditional justice systems frequently provide important alternatives to formal, codified systems and provide greater access to justice to remote or underserved populations. Conversely, non-state systems may not adhere to international law. At the very least, SSR planners should gain a thorough knowledge of any alternative systems that may be operating in a particular HN and how they will fit into the overall SSR programme.

B022. Any transitional justice scheme is likely to be part of a wider reconciliation process and handling of unresolved justice concerns from past or ongoing conflicts, including war crimes. In such cases, special venues and processes for conflict-related justice and reconciliation may be necessary. Such processes sometimes are incorporated in the comprehensive peace agreements that form the foundation of conflict transformation. Issues to be addressed in the initial development of a legal and judicial system include:

    a.   Fair and impartial laws and effective enforcement mechanisms.

    b.   Independent, impartial and competent courts and judges.

    c.   Accountability and transparency in the judicial system.

    d.   Timely access to justice.

    e.   Transparent cooperation between state and traditional institutions.

    f.   An integrated approach with other components of the criminal justice system including police and prison/penal reform bodies.

B023. The justice system consists of a number of interrelated steps: arrest, detention, prosecution, adjudication, corrections, and parole or rehabilitation. As discussed earlier, functionality requires that all actors work together as a system. Law enforcement reform that outpaces the rest of the justice sector may result in more arrests with inadequate detention facilities and no means of adjudication.

B024. **Law Enforcement**. Law enforcement (especially police) forces supporting an effective and accountable justice system are central to an efficient security sector. Military forces could be initially involved in developing the justice and the law enforcement agencies, with the view of facilitating the training of their personnel. As such, NATO military police and gendarmerie-type forces should be involved at the onset of mission planning. In this context, SP assets can have a key role

focusing on police capacity building. Gendarmerie-type forces possess full police jurisdiction in their nations with all the skills required to cover the full spectrum of needs in local police force strengthening. Although military forces initially may be involved in re-developing the justice and law enforcement systems, this task should be assumed by other agencies as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Their expertise ensures an appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement sectors. Police services are the cornerstone of any justice system and a necessary component of a functioning society. Ultimately, a police reform effort aims to build a professional police force that earns the trust and confidence of the local population while strengthening the legitimacy of the HN government.

B025. **Corrections System**. The justice system as a whole contributes to a secure, just, peaceful and safe society through the use of appropriate and reasonable sanctions. As part of the justice system, corrections contributes to the protection of society by actively encouraging offenders to take advantage of opportunities that will assist them in becoming law-abiding citizens, while exercising only the degree of control necessary to provide for the safety of society. In the context of failing and failed states, overcrowded and poorly managed prisons are often characterized by abuse and torture and often present major health risks to the whole community. In these cases, specific SSR action is needed to reform and develop corrections systems quickly, often placing immediate demands on military participation. Corrections reform is necessary to support developments in police and justice systems and needs to be reformed simultaneously. Military police including gendarmerie-type forces could be called to take part in the related activities, on a case-by-case basis. Issues that should be considered in the initial development of a corrections system are:

    a.   Ensuring respect for the human rights of detainees.

    b.   Reducing pre-trial detention.

    c.   Improving health and social services in prisons.

    d.   Increasing civilian and Alliance oversight of prisons.

    e.   Promoting rehabilitation and reintegration.

    f.   Developing an integrated approach with the judicial system.

B026. **Border Security**. The control of border areas by state-sanctioned border forces will be necessary to prevent any movement of irregular activists into a failed state.

Border forces are often involved in detecting and preventing crime in border areas, including illegal trafficking and entry. These forces can include border guards, coast guard, and immigration and customs personnel. In many states, ineffective border management systems frustrate efforts to detect and prevent organized crime and other irregular activity. Border forces can also be associated with corruption, which reduces state revenues, erodes confidence and discourages trade and economic activity. Issues to be considered in the initial development of a border control force are:

a. Facilitating the efficient and regulated movement of people and goods, thereby achieving an appropriate balance between security, commerce, and social normalization.

b. Building capacity to detect and combat illicit trafficking, organized crime, terrorism and other factors leading to insecurity.

c. Strengthening revenue generating capacity, promoting integrity and tackling corruption[30].

d. Establishing a border guard under central government control.

e. Harmonizing border control and customs regulations regionally and enhancing cross-border cooperation.

f. Establishing cross-border protocols with adjoining states.

B027. **Non-State Security Forces**. Local militias, neighbourhood watches, and tribal forces are a frequent response when the state is unable to provide effective security to local communities and may be significant employers within local communities. SSR programmes must acknowledge the presence of these non-state actors and determine how best to deal with them. Indeed, intervening forces may quickly achieve a measure of local legitimacy by partnering with local non-state security actors in such situations. Local militias and other non-state security forces are less legitimate and functional at the district and provincial levels, though their activities may undermine state authority at those levels due to the disconnects between local actors and the district and provincial government bodies that are charged with formal responsibility for public safety. Because non-state security actors lack accountability mechanisms and oversight systems, over time they tend to become major abusers of human rights and predators in their own and other communities. The DDR of non-state security forces is essential to

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[30] Promoting integrity and tackling corruption already are the key elements of NATO's Building Integrity (BI) Initiative. BI is mainly conducted by civilian actors and does not only apply to border areas. To achieve unity of effort, the JFC should coordinate respective activities with other actors engaged in BI.

reforming a HN's security sector. Where bearing weapons is a socially accepted feature of adulthood, disarmament will be problematic at best. Disarmament processes may require a nuanced approach that differentiates between personal weapons and heavy or crew-served weapons. The perception that former combatants are receiving benefits that are not broadly available to civilians may generate resentment, if not open hostility, among those civilians.

B028. **Private Military and Security Forces**. The private security industry comprises those individuals and institutions that provide security for people and property under contract and for profit. The activities of an uncontrolled or poorly regulated private security industry can present unique governance problems and act as an obstacle to SSR programmes directed at both military and law enforcement forces. Increased security provision by non-state actors is prevalent in all regions of the world. SSR planners therefore must consider the potentially serious implications of the private security industry in the HN, as well as the effects of limited regulation and accountability of a market, which continues to grow in both size and importance. There are many types of organizations that compose the private security industry, including:

    a.   Non-lethal service providers that conduct mine clearance, logistics and supply and risk consulting.

    b.   PSCs that protect industrial and commercial sites, humanitarian aid missions, embassies, VIPs, and conduct surveillance and investigation, and risk assessment and analysis.

    c.   PMCs that support military training, military intelligence, and offensive combat.

B029. SSR planners need to develop a comprehensive system providing effective regulation and oversight of the private security industry. Untrained staff with questionable backgrounds may use force in an illegitimate way. More importantly to an effective SSR programme, the introduction of armed PSCs/PMCs weakens the state's monopoly over the use of force and, where unregulated, hinders rather than helps law enforcement. A comprehensive licensing system, clearly defining the type of services that PSCs/PMCs may be allowed to provide, and providing for the revocation of licenses, counters those tendencies.

B030. **Intelligence and Security Services**. Intelligence and security services are normally located within central government, typically reporting directly to senior decision-makers. They should provide warnings and insights about threats and trends, which affect the security and economic well-being of a state and allow decision makers to shape policy. Intelligence services can make a significant contribution to the process of building a nationally owned and led vision of security

through the provision of tactical or strategic intelligence assessments on the range of threats faced by the state. Domestic and foreign intelligence activities increasingly overlap, particularly in the realm of activities such as counter-terrorism, which can encompass threats to domestic targets, overseas embassies, armed forces or commercial interests in foreign countries.

B031. In addition to assisting the overall SSR process, intelligence services themselves frequently require reform. Intelligence services of the state may have been involved in human rights abuses or colluded in the rule of a corrupt or tyrannical regime. Thus, there may be a requirement to reform the intelligence services and structures of a state as a part of the comprehensive SSR programme.

B032. In principle there are four types of intelligence services that may be present in a HN:

    a.   Intelligence on foreign or external threats.

    b.   Intelligence on threats to internal security.

    c.   Intelligence-led advice on policy and decision-making.

    d.   Military intelligence.

B033. In reforming and training intelligence organizations, as with the rule of law, the military is not the ideal lead, though military intelligence personnel may need to be factored into the development of the HN military capacity. Traditionally, civilian intelligence agencies have taken the lead in building intelligence capacity in countries where reconstruction efforts are ongoing. It is no less important to maintain effective and transparent civilian and political oversight of these efforts and ensure that they are effective, accountable, and integrated into broader security sector and government development goals than it is in other aspects of the SSR programme.

Figure B.2 - Capabilities and Activities that Support SSR

B034. Promoting security through cooperation remains a core task of NATO. Figure B.2 illustrates several cooperative capabilities and activities (specifically SFA, SP, and DDR) that can also support SSR efforts; they are described in the following paragraphs.

B035. **Security Force Assistance**. A key element of defence reform is security force assistance (SFA), which is an activity to develop or directly support the development of the sustainable capability and capacity of indigenous military security forces and their associated institutions.[31]

    a.   SFA forms part of the military's contribution to a wider comprehensive post-crisis security transition. That is to say, a progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities from a foreign body to the government of the HN that is not dependent on a significant operational foreign military contribution. While SFA activities may have utility within other operational contexts, the focus of the NATO concept and doctrine will be on its application in post crisis management and security transition.

    b.   SFA is used to develop an accountable, self-sustaining, capable and credible security force, or parts thereof, which is able to meet the security challenges faced by its nation. It must be understood that cooperation with other military and civilian actors is essential in gaining the resources and political agreements necessary for a successful SFA programme.

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[31] For more information on Security Force Assistance, see AJP-3.16, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance* and MCM-0034-2014, *NATO Security Force Assistance Concept.*

B036. **Stability Policing**. While SFA activity is developed to address the need to train and develop indigenous military security forces, the need to address local police forces is filled by SP activity in circumstances that preclude relevant national or international organizations from immediately undertaking that responsibility. SP is a set of police related activities intended to strengthen or temporarily substitute indigenous police in order to contribute to the restoration and/or upholding of the public order and security, rule of law, and the protection of human rights.

   a.   SP activities are conducted with the aim of establishing a SASE, restoring public security, and establishing the conditions for meeting longer-term needs with respect to governance and development, in particular through SSR. This can include (re)establishing law and order and reinforcing the rule of law.

   b.   SP should be conducted by specialized assets, which are police trained and equipped. SP assets are specialized in the field of maintaining public order, public safety and law enforcement. This may be accomplished by the replacement or reinforcing of indigenous police forces.[32]

   c.   The natural providers of resources devoted to SP activities are military police inclusive of gendarmerie-type forces when operating in a non-permissive environment. Due to the police and military nature of these forces, they share the general mind-set and operational procedures of the military force they are part of and can easily be integrated in the military missions. Other actors who may be involved in SP include combat and support component of coalition forces. Military police forces are not the only forces who can conduct these tasks. Most of these tasks can also be conducted by conventional forces in the initial stage, but should transition to military police forces as soon as possible. During the transition, there may be a combination of conventional and military police forces in doing these tasks.

B037. **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration**

   a.   Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants, belligerents, and the local population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

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[32] Under the police perspective, SP is conducted under two main mission types; the replacement or the reinforcing of indigenous police forces. Replacement is essential when the indigenous police or a recognized government are non-existent. Reinforcing is required when the indigenous police are existing and reliable but their effectiveness is limited.

Ideally, disarmament is a voluntary process carried out as part of a broader peace process. Disarmament functions best with high levels of trust between those being disarmed and the forces overseeing disarmament. Some groups may hesitate to offer trust and cooperation or even refuse to participate in disarmament efforts. In these circumstances, disarmament may occur in two stages: a voluntary disarmament process followed by more coercive measures. The latter will address individuals or small groups refusing to participate voluntarily. In this second stage, disarmament of combatant factions can become a contentious and potentially very destabilizing step of DDR. Military forces should manage disarmament carefully to avoid renewed violence.

b.   Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defence-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. Within the context of DDR, demobilization involves the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The second stage of DDR, demobilization, includes identifying and gathering former combatants for processing and discharge orientation. This extends from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas, or barracks). In many societies, women and children are active participants in violent conflict. During demobilization, separate facilities are necessary for adults and children. Additionally, child soldiers require specific services including health, education, food, assistance with livelihood development, and reintegration into communities. SSR programmes must adequately address demobilization to avoid re-emerging violence from combatant groups or organized criminals.

c.   Reintegration is the process through which elements of the damaged society receive amnesty, re-enter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local population. These elements include former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians. Reintegration is a recovery process focused on the social and economic areas of the local community; it complements other community-based programmes that create job training, employment, and general economic recovery. It includes programmes to teach marketable skills to demobilized armed forces and groups, belligerents, and dislocated civilians; and relocation assistance to support their resettlement in civilian communities. Reintegration also addresses the willingness of local groups to accept former belligerents into their communities; amnesty and reconciliation are key aspects of successful reintegration programmes. Reintegration cannot be separated from justice and reconciliation

programmes that are part of the broader reform process. Successful reintegration programmes are typically long term and costly, requiring the participation of multiple external and host-nation SSR actors. Only through successful reintegration can a nation avoid renewed violence and instability. Reintegration inherently includes reinsertion. However, the repatriation and resettlement of personnel associated with belligerent groups involve broader political and diplomatic issues. These issues extend beyond the role of joint forces but are integral to the reintegration process:

(1) Reinsertion is the immediate assistance offered to former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians prior to the long-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is intended to provide for the basic needs of individuals and their families; this assistance includes food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, and employment. While reintegration represents enduring social and economic development, reinsertion is short-term assistance programmes intended to alleviate immediate needs.

(2) Repatriation is the return of individuals to their country of citizenship.

(3) Resettlement is the relocation of refugees to another country, which is neither the country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has fled. Resettlement to another country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement. It is based on a number of criteria, including legal and physical protection needs, local integration opportunities, medical needs, family reunification needs, and protection against violence and torture.

B038. Military forces are likely to be involved following an intervention, leading to the eventual transition of security responsibilities to the HN. A role military forces may play in an intervention is the DDR of armed elements of a conflict. DDR usually forms part of a peace agreement and is conducted within the wider post-conflict recovery process. DDR seeks to increase the stability of the post-conflict security environment by ensuring that combatants, and their weapons, are taken out of the conflict and provided with at least a minimal transition package so that they can return to their civilian life and forego returning to arms. The complex DDR process has dimensions that include culture, politics, security, humanity, and socioeconomics.

B039. While the process is focused on the ex-combatants, the wider community will also feel the benefits of a successful DDR programme that enhances security and is a clear sign of progress to peace. However, communities will require assistance to successfully absorb such ex-combatants. If combatants are disarmed too quickly then this may create a security vacuum, if they are detained for too long in

encampments this may create unrest. Without a fully funded re-integration programme, militia leaders may simply re-form their groups for criminal purposes, creating a new security problem. Gender, child-soldier, and ethnic and minority issues should also be considered in the design of DDR programmes. Beyond the immediate goal of reducing the number of weapons and combatants, DDR should be coordinated with SSR to appropriately scope the armed forces to the security requirements of the HN. Typically, a DDR programme transitions from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration.

B040. Effective DDR planning relies on the analysis of possible DDR beneficiaries, power dynamics, and local society as well as the nature of the conflict and ongoing peace processes. External and host-nation military forces and police working together in a peace support role may facilitate DDR. Former combatants must develop confidence in DDR and the organizations charged with implementing it. To build this confidence, the DDR programme focuses on restoring the society, the government, and the economy at all levels. This leads to the HN taking responsibility for DDR processes. Some former combatants will be incorporated into the armed forces, while others may not.

B041. The military should not lead the planning and execution of the DDR programme. However, military forces should be integrated in the planning of DDR from its inception and may be involved more directly in the disarmament and demobilization stages. Military forces and police, whether from external sources or the HN, are fundamental to the broad success of the programme by providing security for DDR processes. Successful DDR programmes use many approaches designed for specific security environments. Each programme reflects the unique aspects of the situation, culture, and character of the state. International DDR approaches must also comply with "The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups", also known as The Paris Principles. The staff legal advisor is responsible for providing command guidance on any situations pertaining to child combatants.

B042. **Reconciliation**. Stability activities are often conducted in situations where there have been human rights abuses and social trauma to include the appropriation of lands and property. Reconciliation is led by the HN and supported by the international community. The tasks of promoting justice, psychological relief, and reconciliation are challenging and time consuming, but the goal of achieving reconciliation is key to establishing a sustainable peace. In the reconciliation process itself, the military commander normally has no tasks.

B043. Institutional capacities in relation to structures, personnel, equipment and resources to provide effective security, should be able to be maintained and sustained by the HN government.

B044. A critical issue is the relationship of the military and law enforcement in providing internal security to the state. In most post-conflict situations, appropriate distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions may have eroded or disappeared entirely. A fundamental task of defence reform may be to restore that distinction and to provide robust mechanisms to sustain their separation.

B045. **Transfer of Authority**. Transferring security responsibility from intervening to HN security forces should be done according to the tactical, operational, and strategic conditions identified during SSR planning. As forces establish suitable conditions, responsibility for security gradually transitions to the local, provincial, and national government. The transition of authority should include an evaluation process that confirms the performance and capabilities of each respective HN security force before authority is transferred. These capabilities can be gauged through exercises similar to those used to validate the readiness of Alliance forces for contingency operations. This prevents a premature transition of authority which can lead to a loss of confidence and cause the population to seek alternative means of security, damaging the overall SSR programme.

B046. Once Alliance and HN military forces have stabilized the security environment other participating agencies, organizations, and institutions can safely begin activities in the operational area. Military forces gradually transfer the responsibilities they have retained during combat operations to other participants in the SSR effort, either from one military force to another, or to civilian groups or agencies. Transitions allow the military force to focus their efforts on their primary tasks of securing the HN and building up HN security forces. The HN may wish to build up a broad and long-term relationship with the Alliance with the aim to develop a programme of cooperation. This will help the HN to take full responsibility of its own security. The programme may include specially tailored activities for HN participants and NATO or other Allied teams to provide expert advice on specific issues related to SSR.

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ANNEX C - LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

C001. This Annex summarizes some of the legal aspects that bear upon NATO military operations in support of S&R. No summary provided in this document can replace a consultation with the unit's supporting legal advisor.

C002. **The Law of Armed Conflict and Stabilization and Reconstruction**

    a.   NATO-led forces conducting S&R activities remain bound to comply with international law (including, where applicable, the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and international law regarding human rights) and their respective national laws and regulations.

        (1)   LOAC applies only in armed conflicts. It does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. In such circumstances, NAC approved operations are conducted under a specific legal framework, determined on a case-by-case basis. It is widely accepted to define armed conflicts as existing, whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.

        (2)   If an armed conflict is in existence in for example COIN operations, then offensive force may be considered, in accordance with NATO issued rules of engagement (ROE) for the operation, and enshrining the LOAC principles of military necessity, humanity, distinction/discrimination and proportionality.

    b.   The nature of S&R anticipates that it will be conducted in countries, regions, or areas that lack governmental structures capable of completing basic functions and providing services to the local population. Where the environment is not sufficiently permissive to allow civilian governments, agencies, or NGOs to provide adequate assistance to local populations, NATO-led forces may be required to conduct operations in those areas. The operation of NATO-led forces in these circumstances generates several legal issues that will be of concern to JFCs and troop-contributing nations (TCNs) at all echelons.

C003. **Non-International Armed Conflict**

a.   Although S&R activities can be carried out while the HN is involved in armed conflict with another state, they are generally focused on the need to preserve the HN's internal security. Most often, S&R is conducted in a country with an existing conflict between government forces and armed non-state actors. As such, the main body of LOAC dealing with international (inter-state) armed conflict does not apply to these conflicts. This might lead to a legal position that can be a source of confusion to JFCs and NATO-led forces.[33] It bears emphasis, however, that Article 3 common to all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is specifically intended to apply to non-international (including intra-state or "internal") armed conflicts. Where applicable, 1977 Additional Protocol II will be applied by TCNs that are a party to this treaty. It has not been ratified by all NATO nations.

b.   In accordance with Common Article 3, those taking an active part in the hostilities have no special status under international law. They are not, when captured, prisoners of war, but may be deprived of liberty for some time, depending on both the justification of their arrest and each TCN laws and international commitments in the field of military detention abroad. The relevant judicial authority may also prosecute them as criminals for bearing arms against the government and for other offenses. NATO-led forces should remember that such persons might be criminal suspects within the legal system of the HN. Therefore, NATO-led forces must carefully preserve weapons, witness statements, photographs, and other evidence collected at the scene. This evidence will be used by the HN legal system and thus promote the rule of law by holding persons accountable for their crimes.

c.   During all such military operations, JFCs and TCNs must be aware of Common Article 3 and the status of non-combatants under the laws of the HN. The importance of having awareness is heightened during S&R because the crux of the overall plan is to provide training and support to HN governments and security forces. The most effective means of maintaining legitimacy in S&R is to conduct the mission in a professional manner consistent with international legal standards.

d.   Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) establish the legal status of foreign military personnel in a HN. Criminal and civil jurisdiction, taxation, and claims for damages and injuries are some of the topics usually covered in SOFAs, which can be concluded in the form of diplomatic exchanges of letters or specific agreements. Memoranda of understanding, memoranda of agreement, and technical arrangements can support the legal

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[33] The parties to an internal armed conflict may agree to apply more than just Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II to a given situation.

framework mainly to address the detail of non-sovereignty issues. In the absence of an agreement or some other legally binding arrangement with the HN, NATO personnel may be subject to HN laws.

e.   The role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Common Article 3 situations as an impartial humanitarian organization is formally recognized in the Geneva Conventions. In non-international armed conflicts, the ICRC formally declares itself available for carrying out its Common Article 3 designated tasks. The ICRC's efforts in non-international armed conflicts include protecting the lives and dignity of victims of armed conflict and endeavouring to prevent suffering.

C004. **Detainee Operations**

a.   Detainee operations of civilians, in general, should not be undertaken unless they are well planned, coordinated with the HN, and directed by the highest authority. The detention of civilians in an S&R environment is a complex task. Detention is a highly politically and legally sensitive issue, and the manner in which detainee operations are carried out can have a negative impact on the civilian populace and could affect the success or failure of S&R. Although NATO-led forces may be involved in detainee operations, it generally remains a national responsibility.[34]

b.   A number of issues must be considered in respect of the issue of detention. One such issue is the legal basis for detention. This will be defined by the nature of the conflict and will inform all subsequent actions including when it is appropriate to detain civilians, how long detainees may be held, and the conditions upon which they may be released or transferred to appropriate judicial authority. All detainees must be humanely treated as set out in Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions. JFCs will specifically address the parameters for detainee operations within plans, orders, detention directives, and standing operating procedures all of which are to be incorporated into component and subordinate commands planning.

c.   **Standards for Detention and Internment**. Regardless of the precise legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in custody by NATO-led forces, they must receive humane treatment until properly released. They also must be provided the minimum protections articulated in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

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[34] NATO does not detain long-term, and while NATO ROE may authorise detention operations, the act of taking, processing, looking after and passing the detainee on to the relevant authority is always a national responsibility.

Specially trained, organized, and equipped military police units in adequately designed and resourced facilities should accomplish prolonged detention. Such detention must follow the detailed standards contained in applicable law and policy. The interrogation of detainees may only be conducted by qualified and certified personnel and must be in accordance with applicable law and policy.

d.   **Transfer of Detainees to the Host Nation**. Taking into account the international human rights commitments of the NATO nations, there are certain conditions under which NATO-led forces may not transfer the custody of detainees to the HN or any other foreign government. In particular, NATO-led forces retain custody if they have substantial grounds to believe that the detainees would be in danger in the custody of others. Such danger could include being subjected to torture or inhumane treatment.

(1)   Many NATO member states are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Since recent case law has indicated that the Convention can have extra-territorial effect, these nations are liable to challenge on the basis of their convention obligations; such litigation may ultimately result in the case being heard by the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In line with the fact that NATO member states have varying treaty obligations, detention is usually a national responsibility even within an Alliance operation with each TCN responsible for its own detainees and their ultimate release or transfer to appropriate judicial authority.

(2)   The two obvious areas of legal challenge within ECHR comprise Article 3, the prohibition from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment that encompasses issues surrounding transfer of detainees to a non-Article 3 compliant HN and Article 5 the right to liberty and security that encompasses the right not to be unlawfully detained.

e.   **The Role and Contributions of the International Committee of the Red Cross**. All instances of detention shall be documented with sufficient detail to enable the identification and onward tracking of all detainees.

(1)   Subject to essential security needs, mission requirements, and other legitimate, practical limitations, the ICRC must be permitted to visit detainees and provide them certain types of relief. Typically, the national governments will invite the ICRC to observe prisoners of war, civilian internee, or detainee conditions as soon as circumstances permit. The invitation to the ICRC for its

assistance is made by the national government and not by the military. Reporting of all ICRC contacts, inspections, or meetings through operational channels is accomplished in accordance with applicable guidance.

(2)   The responsible national or multinational legal advisor should serve as the escort and liaison with the ICRC. The legal advisor can quickly identify and resolve many LOAC issues before they become a problem for the JFC. The legal advisor can best serve as the JFC's skilled advocate in discussions with the ICRC concerning LOAC.

(3)   Both the JFC and the legal advisor should recognize that the ICRC, as an impartial humanitarian organization, is not a political adversary, eagerly watching for and reporting LOAC violations. Rather, it is capable of providing assistance in a variety of ways. In recent conflicts, the ICRC assisted in arranging for the transportation of the remains of dead enemy combatants and for repatriating prisoners of war and civilian detainees.

(4)   Involving the ICRC is a central issue when considering detainee issues. Because detention facilities, even during multinational operations, are usually administered by individual nations, the confidential reports provided by the ICRC tend to be directed to national governments.

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ANNEX D – CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION

D001. This Annex summarizes some of the key aspects of the coordination of military operations among engaged stakeholders including national government agencies; subnational governments; IOs, NGOs, and the private sector.[35]

D002. **General**

    a.   Interactions help to attain the desired end state by facilitating cooperation in areas of common interest or avoiding unintended negative consequences when working in the same space as other stakeholders.

    b.   Interactions can facilitate unity of effort, help achieve common objectives and provide for common understanding.

D003. **Unity of Purpose**

    a.   Achieving unity of purpose requires the application of a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and de-confliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. An inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders is often more appropriate than a military command and control (C2) focused approach. Taking an authoritative, military approach may be counterproductive to effective relationships, impede unity of purpose, and compromise mission accomplishment. Gaining unity of purpose is never settled and permanent; it takes constant effort to sustain relationships.

    b.   Military leaders should work with civilian stakeholders with skill, tact, and persistence.

D004. **Working Relationships and Practices**

    a.   **Range of Interactions**. Relationships between military and civilian agencies cannot be equated to military command authorities (e.g. operational control); therefore, they are defined by the types of interactions described below. There is no common agreement on these terms, and other stakeholders may use them interchangeably or with varying definitions. However, these descriptions are provided as

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[35] The guiding policy for CIMIC and CMI is MC 0411/2, *NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil Military Interaction (CMI)*, 28 Mar 14.

a baseline for common understanding.

(1)   **Coordination** can be described as the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved and bring their contributions together to form a coherent and efficient whole. It implies formal structures, relationships, and processes. . Although there is no equivalent command relationship between military forces and civilian agencies and organizations, clearly defined relationships may foster harmony and reduce friction among the participants. Civilian agencies tend to operate via coordination and communication structures, rather than C2 structures. NGOs do not operate within military, governmental, or IO hierarchies. However, military forces and NGOs often occupy the same operational space and there is an increased risk of confusion if that space is in a hostile or uncertain environment.

(2)   **Cooperation** can be described as the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other agencies does not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.

(3)   **Collaboration** can be described as a process where organizations work together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus. Be aware that some attribute a negative meaning to the term collaboration as if referring to those who betray others by willingly assisting an enemy of one's country, especially an occupying force. The most common technique for promoting this collaboration is the identification or formation of centres, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, working groups, and planning teams and other enduring or temporary cross-functional staff organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. They facilitate planning by the staff, decision making by the JFC, and execution by the headquarters. They mostly fall under the principal oversight of the NATO-led force staff directorates. This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JFC in mission execution. Inclusion of participating civilian agency and organization representatives in the various cross-functional staff organizations enhances collaboration. JFCs should consider selective integration of participating civilian agencies into day-to-day operations.

(4)   **Consultation** can be described as seeking the opinion or advice of other organizations, which may include discussion, conferring, and

deliberation.

(5) **De-confliction** can be described as the elimination of undesirable overlap among entities, especially where two or more entities perform the same function or occupy the same physical space.

b. **The Value of Personal Relationships**. Interpersonal communication skills that emphasize consultation, persuasion, compromise, and consensus contribute to obtaining unity of effort in a military-civilian effort. Successful JFCs and staff build personal relationships to inspire trust and confidence. The challenges of gaining consensus and creating synergy among the engaged stakeholders and multinational partners are greater, as there are no clear authorities directing the relationship. JFCs and their staffs can mitigate this risk by developing personal relationships, using liaison elements, and making conscious decisions on the degree of reliance on those stakeholders for critical tasks. Personal relationships are essential. Inspiring trust and confidence is a conscious act that does not just happen- it must be planned, actively built through words and actions, and continually reinforced. Development of strong personal relationships and the requisite trust and confidence that the engaged stakeholders will respond when their help is needed to accomplish requested tasks are key.

D005. **Civil-Military Interaction**. The following are considerations when interacting with the HN, IOs, and other civilian actors:

a. **Cultural Awareness**. Understanding and being sensitive to local customs, mores, culture and ways of life is crucial for mission success. In a politically sensitive environment, a violation of a local law or custom can create a highly unfavourable news event and seriously undermine the mission.

b. **Common Goals**. Establishing, maintaining and/or strengthening civil-military relationships are critical to mission success. Although entities operating in a joint operations area may have different interests, the identification of common goals will facilitate cooperation.

c. **Shared Responsibility**. The ethos, structure, and standard operating procedures working practices of civilian entities working with NATO-led forces are extremely diverse. Identification of common goals helps avoid misunderstandings and defines respective roles and responsibilities.

d. **Consent**. Every effort should be made to secure and retain the cooperation of civilian organizations in the OE. The loss of consent can occur quickly for trivial reasons. Therefore, commanders must be prepared to spend time and energy to preserve it.

e. **Transparency**. Successful civil-military interactions requires the mutual trust and confidence of all those involved. Therefore, whenever possible, military interactions with civilian entities should be transparent. Although there will inevitably be confusion or tension between military and civilian actors, transparency helps instil trust, increases confidence, and encourages mutual understanding.

f. **Communication**. Effective communication with civil entities is vital for successful S&R activities. Because they often have different goals than NATO, civilian organizations will pursue their own priorities. Some may even take the view that cooperation with the military and accomplishing their mission are mutually exclusive. The key to minimizing these difficulties is to maintain open and constant communication.

g. **Do No Harm**. Civilian actors will seek to ensure civil-military interactions follow a "do no harm" principle. This means they will not contribute to or further conflict and not harm or endanger the recipients of humanitarian assistance.

D006. **Information Sharing**

a. Effective information sharing is a critical enabler for success. Identify, acquire, and implement information sharing strategies, methods, and tools that support and enable the interaction process. Information sharing is making information available to participants (people, processes, or systems). Information sharing includes the cultural, managerial, and technical behaviours by which one participant leverages information held or created by another participant. Improving NATO's ability to share information helps to realize the power of information as a strategic asset. Benefits include, but are not limited to:

    (1) Achieving unity of effort across the mission and multinational operations.

    (2) Improving the speed and execution of decisions.

    (3) Achieving rapid adaptability across the mission and multinational operations.

    (4) Improving the ability to anticipate events and resource needs, providing an initial situational advantage, and setting the conditions for success.

b. The following are key focus areas for inter-organizational coordination to foster a comprehensive approach.

   (1) **Dialogue**. Continual dialogue with national leadership helps identify national objectives, the desired end state, risks, and feasible policy direction. Continue JFC and staff dialogue with national and international leaders, and then translate what they see, hear, and feel into solid, logical operational-level objectives. This takes much effort and never ends. National and international positions and objectives change. JFCs recognize this and should maintain a dialogue to ensure they remain nested within these national and international objectives.

   (2) **Analysis**. Recognize the complex, interconnected, and largely unpredictable nature of the environment and the need to work to better understand it and the problem. Be inclusive with our partners in gaining a common understanding of this environment, the associated often-hanging problem, and determination of necessary conditions or desired outcomes to achieve success. This analysis helps provide a common visualization and contributes to achieving unity of effort with our partners- it bridges the gap between all instruments of national and international power. Since the persons acting in an environment like this change frequently, it provides newcomers with the means for a better understanding of taken decisions and supports a seamless continuation of on-going processes. Therefore, the analysis should be properly documented.

   (3) **Actions**. Harmonize military actions with those of the stakeholders. Use mission type orders coupled with guidance and intent to empower decentralized military operations that are synergized with those of our partners. Establishing a command climate and organizational capability that facilitates inclusion is important.

c. The sharing of information is particularly critical because no single responding source (whether an NGO, IO, assisting country government, or host government) can be the source of all of the required data and information. Making critical information widely available to multiple responding civilian and military elements not only reduces duplication of effort, but also enhances coordination and collaboration and provides a common knowledge base so that critical information can be pooled, analyzed, compared, contrasted, validated, and reconciled. Civil-military collaboration networks need to be designed to dismantle traditional institutional stovepipes and facilitate the sharing of information among civilian and military organizations.

    d.   A collaborative information environment (CIE) facilitates information sharing. Constructing a CIE is not primarily a technology issue; effective, low-cost network equipment and data management systems exist today, and more are being developed. The least common denominator among them with respect to communication capability is the Internet. Rather, the challenges are largely social, institutional, cultural, and organizational. These impediments can limit and shape the willingness of civilian and military personnel and organizations to openly cooperate and share information and capabilities.

    e.   It is important to not compromise the position of the IOs and impartiality of the NGOs and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

D007. The role of military forces should be carefully considered and clearly understood by those designing and planning S&R, because it is primarily the responsibility of non-military actors; the military contribution enables or supports other groups' aims and objectives. Leadership, cohesion, and coherence are required to ensure NATO-led forces communicate and act in concert with non-NATO actors. Therefore, a comprehensive approach requires effective CIMIC. CIMIC serves as NATO's interface to the civil environment and facilitates coordination and cooperation with civil actors. However, increasingly complex and crowded S&R architecture will often require a much deeper level of understanding of the shared civil-military space than a single CIMIC cell can provide. Whatever the focus of the NATO operation (security, support to humanitarian assistance, longer-term stability), it is imperative to understand the larger architecture, where the military will be one of many actors, mostly civilian. NATO-led forces should liaise and cooperate with all organizations on the ground. They must understand the coordination and communication structures that will be established by the civilian organizations. Coordination is vital in emergencies. Good coordination strives for a needs-based, rather than capacity-driven, response. It aims to ensure a coherent and complementary approach, identifying ways to work together for better collective results; with less gaps and overlaps.

D008. A map of the international agencies and organizations present in S&R operations reveals a multitude of actors, with diverse, sometimes competing mandates. These agencies, often present in the hundreds, carry a variety of mandates, covering human rights, humanitarian assistance, long-term development, rule of law, justice, conflict resolution, governance etc. The main challenge for NATO commanders will be to identify the main civilian stakeholders to engage with, to understand the existing civ-

mil coordination structures, and to agree with civilians on military contribution where they can add most value. The system is dominated, in terms of operational presence and resource share, by a small group of global giants:

a.   Bilateral and multilateral donors (such as Department for International Development, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, United States Agency for International Development, Canadian International Development Agency, Japan International Cooperation Agency, European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, etc.)

b.   UN agencies (such as The Department of Peacekeeping Operations, World Food Programme, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Children's Fund, Food and Agriculture Organization, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, etc.)

c.   The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (International Committee of the Red Cross, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies)

d.   International and national NGOs and NGO networks with multiple mandates (such as World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam, Médecins Sans Frontières, Human Rights Watch, Care International, etc.)

D009. In the initial stages of conflict or post conflict emergency, with overwhelming humanitarian needs, the international coordination system will most likely be conducted in a cluster approach. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations (UN and NGOs) working in the main sectors of humanitarian action.[36] Clusters provide a clear point of contact for technical experts and are accountable for adequate assistance.   When NATO deploys their militaries to respond alongside the local and international humanitarian organizations, it is essential that they can operate in the same space without detriment to the civilian character of assistance. The extent of the assistance that can be provided by NATO is guided by several instruments, notably the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – "Oslo Guidelines", and the Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies. The UN humanitarian architecture, to include the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, humanitarian coordinators, UN Humanitarian

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[36] The objectives and activities of NGOs are guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.

Civil-Military Coordination, On-Site Operations Coordination Centres, clusters, and the cluster approach, is described in detail in AJP-3.4.3.

D010. Beyond the acute humanitarian phase, the UNSCR may decide to establish a UN integrated long-term stabilization mission. This concept describes design and implementation of complex UN operations and for linking different dimensions (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects) into a coherent support strategy. UN missions create partnerships between international political, military development, early recovery, human rights and other actors. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contribution to supporting countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in coherent and mutually supportive manner.

D011. A UN integrated mission is a multi-dimensional operation, led by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), supported by two deputies (DSRSG for Operations and Rule of Law and DSRSG for Humanitarian Coordination, Rehabilitation, Recovery and Reconstruction) and a Head of Military component. The UN integrated mission will incorporate humanitarian and development activities as above, but also activities related to security and justice, security sector reform reviews, border security control, prison reform, DDR, Small Arms and Light Weapons control, mine action, and other stabilization activities.

D012. Under the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union operates civilian and military missions worldwide. These missions conduct a variety of tasks from border management to local police training.

ANNEX E - The Role of Women in Peace and Security

E001. **Introduction**. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325[37] was adopted by the UN Security Council in Oct 2000. It is the first resolution to address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. The resolution stresses the importance of women's equal participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction. It calls on member states to ensure women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. In order to achieve this, the resolution urges all members to increase the participation of women on operations and identifies areas where a greater representation of women could advance an enduring peace. DDR and SSR are acknowledged as areas where the inclusion of women in the planning process and conduct of operations can contribute to establishing a lasting peace. The resolution identifies the need for mission mandates to specify gender issues and for special representatives to earmark resources for gender work, and to establish accountability and monitoring mechanisms. UNSCR 1325 can be summed up as:

   a.   The **participation** of women in efforts to prevent and resolve conflict.

   b.   The **protection** of the vulnerable, especially women and girls.

   c.   The **prevention** of sexual and gender-based violence.

E002. **Context**. Thriving economies and developing states are those where women fully participate in society, have access to education, and can participate in the labour force. Ignoring their influence and potential will impede progress towards peace. Sexual and other forms of gender-based violence in war have reached epidemic proportions. Rape and sexual violence in war is now recognized, codified and prosecuted as the most serious of international crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity and in certain circumstances the gravest crime of all – genocide. Rape, and other acts of sexual and gender based violence, routinely occur where women are working in isolation or vulnerable conditions. Therefore, gender issues should be integral to stabilization and reconstruction operations.

E003. **NATO Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Stabilization and Reconstruction**. NATO's support for UNSCR 1325 was affirmed in Bilateral-Strategic Command 40-1 and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council policy on "Implementing UNSCR 1325 on

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[37] UNSCR 1325, 31 Oct 2000 concerns the role of women in peace and security. UNSCR 1820, 19 Jun 2008 links sexual violence as a tactic of war and impedes the restoration of international peace and security. UNSCR 1960, 16 Dec 2010 reiterates the UN's condemnation of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.

Women, Peace and Security and Related Resolutions". At the political level, NATO will promote the implementation of UNSCR 1325 through its political and human rights dialogues with partner countries, particularly those affected by armed conflict, or in the post-conflict phase. NATO recognizes that the inclusion of military women in the planning process, and indigenous women's peace efforts at the local and national levels, are a valuable resource for conflict resolution and peace building.

E004. **Mainstreaming**. Gender mainstreaming is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all spheres so that women and men benefit equally, and inequality is not perpetuated. Implementing UNSCR 1325 is a crosscutting issue and should not be stove-piped. Although NATO headquarters have gender advisors, it is incumbent upon all staff to consider gender perspectives within planning assumptions across all branches.

E005. **Participation**. NATO should seek involvement of women at all formal decision-making levels in the prevention and resolution of conflict:

   a.   NATO-led forces are encouraged to ensure there is military female representation on decision-making boards and across branches in the sphere of peace and security. Their presence will provide alternative views and solutions to crises that often affect women more than men. The presence of female military staff provides an example of democratic equality and encouragement for indigenous women. Their position in DDR and SSR programmes will allow initiatives to be more inclusive and not solely focused on men. The subsequent inclusion of females in security institutions (e.g. the police) would be beneficial.

   b.   NATO-led forces are encouraged to include the participation of indigenous women in the reconciliation and post conflict reconstruction phases, and promote women in political decision-making and governmental bodies. It is widely accepted that women's peace efforts at the local and national levels are a valuable resource for conflict resolution and peace building. CIMIC and outreach programmes should include women's groups as part of key leader engagement.

E006. **Protection**. Specific attention should be paid to the security needs of both women and men. The S&R of a state offers a window of opportunity to review and re-draft constitutions and to create new systems of governance, including reform of both customary and formal judicial systems. An enduring, inclusive peace is more likely if:

   a.   Women's rights are advanced in compliance with International Law.

b.   If particular risks are identified (e.g. women collecting firewood being attacked), solutions are found such as the provision of firewood patrols by either NATO or local security forces.

E007. **Prevention**. To deter sexual and gender-based violence, specific attention should be paid to investments in the required infrastructure (e.g. forensic laboratories), and human resources needed for the reception of victims. By adopting a more interventionist approach, NATO-led forces will be able to reduce impunity for war crimes affecting women.

E008. **The Role of Women in Stabilization and Reconstruction**. NATO recognizes the links between the issues of peace, security, development and gender equality. Therefore, it is not enough to promote the participation and the protection of women during and in post conflict. S&R initiatives are also needed to ensure that these actions are supported by wider development considerations, such as the promotion of economic security and opportunities, and women's access to health services and education. This requires collaborative work with IOs and NGOs as well as the national government.

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LEXICON

PART I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AAP	Allied administrative publication
AJP	Allied joint publication
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
BI	building integrity
C2	command and control
CIE	collaborative information environment
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CMI	civil-military interaction
COIN	counterinsurgency
COPD	Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
CPOE	comprehensive preparation of the operational environment
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
DSF	district stability framework
DSRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EU	European Union
HA	humanitarian assistance
HN	host nation
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IO	international organization
JFC	joint force commander
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOC	line of communication
MC	Military Committee
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NGO	non-governmental organization
NOAH	NATO Operations Assessment Handbook

OE	operational environment
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMC	private military company
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information
PSC	private security company
QIP	quick impact project
ROE	rules of engagement
SASE	safe and secure environment
S&R	stabilization and reconstruction
SFA	security force assistance
SOFA	status of forces agreement
SOI	sources of instability
SP	security policing
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	security sector reform
STANAG	NATO standardization agreement
StratCom	strategic communications
TCN	troop-contributing nation
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

PART II – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Allied joint publication
An Allied publication containing doctrine applicable to NATO and NATO-led operations involving more than one service (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

assessment
The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems. Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

civil-military cooperation
The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

conflict prevention
A peace support operation employing complementary diplomatic, civil, and – when necessary – military means, to monitor and identify the causes of conflict, and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

counter-insurgency
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

host nation
A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

humanitarian aid
The resources needed to directly alleviate human suffering. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

internally displaced person
A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee his or her home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognized State border. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

international organization
An intergovernmental, regional or global organization governed by international law and established by a group of states, with international juridical personality given by international agreement, however characterized, creating enforceable rights and obligations for the purpose of fulfilling a given function and pursuing common aims. Note: Exceptionally, the International Committee of the Red Cross, although a non-governmental organization formed under the Swiss Civil Code, is mandated by the international community of states and is founded on international law, specifically the Geneva Conventions, has an international legal personality or status on its own, and enjoys some immunities and privileges for the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

law enforcement officer
Public sector employee or agent whose duties involve the enforcement of laws. Examples include police officers, corrections officers, customs officers, special agents, immigration officers, and court bailiffs.

military engineering
Engineer activity, undertaken regardless of component or service to shape the physical operational environment. (AJP-3.12)

non-governmental organization
A private, not for profit, voluntary organization with no governmental or intergovernmental affiliation, established for the purpose of fulfilling a range of activities in particular development-related projects or the promotion of a specific cause, and organized at local, national, regional or international level.
Notes:
1. A non-governmental organization does not necessarily have an official status or mandate for its existence or activities.
2. NATO may or may not support or cooperate with a given non-governmental organization. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

operation
A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose.
Note: 1. NATO operations are military.
2. NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

operational level

The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

refugee
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. [UN] (AAP-6)

security sector reform
A comprehensive set of programmes and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. (This term is a new term and definition and will be processed for NATO Agreed status)

strategic level
The level at which a nation or group of nations determines national or multinational security objectives and deploys national, including military, resources to achieve them. (NTMS-NATO Agreed)

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MC 0560/1   *MC Policy for Military Engineering*

MC 0578   *MC Concept for Military Support to Defence Reform,* 23 February 2009

MC 0133/4   *NATO's Operations Planning*

AAP-6   *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*

AAP-15   *NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications*

AJP-01   *Allied Joint Doctrine*

AJP-2   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counter-intelligence and Security*

AJP-2.1   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Procedures*

AJP-3   *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*

AJP-3.2   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*

AJP-3.4   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations*

AJP-3.4.1   *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Peace Support*

AJP-3.4.3   *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Humanitarian Assistance*

AJP-3.4.4   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency*

AJP-3.8   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence*
AJP-3.12   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Military Engineering*
AJP-3.19   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation*
AJP-5   *Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning*

ATP-3.2.1.1   *Guidance for the Conduct of Tactical Stability Activities and Tasks*

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