Annual Review - Summary Sheet

PROGRAMME TITLE: Peru/Colombia Serious and Organised Crime (SOC)			
Country/Region:	Peru/Colombia		
HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)	National Crime Agency (NCA), Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Crown Prosecution Service		
Total Budget:	ODA: £2.3m	Non-ODA:	
Start Date: Apr 2015		End Date: March 2020	

Outputs	Score (per output component.
1. Law Enforcement- Specialist cadres of police trained in priority areas of intervention, trusted relationships formed with key units and individuals and specific recommendations delivered to police authorities offering sustainable solutions to weaknesses in policies and working practices.	A
2. Law Enforcement Prosecutor relations- Trusted relationships formed with key individuals and specific recommendations delivered in priority areas to respective institutional authorities to improve sustainably policies and practices that promote police-prosecution joint working against organised crime	B+
3. Prosecutor Criminal Justice Advisors- Trusted relationships formed with key individuals and specific recommendations delivered to respective institutional authorities to improve sustainably policies and practices that make the prosecution service and judiciary more effective in the fight against organised crime.	B+
4. Corruption- Cadre of internal affairs officers in Peru trained in anti-corruption techniques and recommendations delivered to criminal justice authorities in both Peru and Colombia to improve policies and procedures for tackling corruption.	A
5. Independent report produced that makes recommendations on how to join up actions against organised crime in Peru and Colombia and UK organises a series of interventions that bring together Peruvian and Colombia counterparts to share information and best practice.	A

Outcome: Strong cooperation with Colombia and an enhanced partnership with Peru, resulting in increased regional stability and a reduced serious and organised crime threat to the UK, particularly in the field of narcotics.	
Outcome Score: A	Risk: Medium

Summary of Programme Performance

Year	15/16	16/17						
Programme Score	A/B	A						
Risk Rating	Medium	Medium						

What support is the UK providing?

The CSSF Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) programme is providing support to discrete areas across the criminal justice systems in order to assist Peru and Colombia make sustainable progress in tackling serious organised crime. In turn, this will reduce the threat to the UK emanating from these countries. The work complements that concurrently undertaken by other UK Government departments in the region. In addition, the UK provides strategic advice to the Colombian government in the fight against organised crime, in order to support the government as it seeks to implement the peace process.

Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last review

Colombia
1. Since the last review there has been a shift in focus within the Colombian element of the CSSF SOC programme to a more strategic approach in some aspects of delivery. This evolved during and prior to the Colombian state visit to the UK. The change in focus was designed to improve the Colombian cross institutional collaboration mechanisms required to effectively tackle serious organised crime.

2. The focus of the programme in Colombia is now more heavily weighted towards bringing together the police and prosecution at the strategic level, combined with the practical targeting of criminal financial networks. The latter is designed as a more effective means of attacking the higher levels of organised criminal groups. In addition, assistance has been provided on intelligence collection methods and procedures as well enhancing the use of forensic science.

3. Relations with the relevant stakeholders within the judiciary have been developed although more work needs to be done to translate this to practical assistance if an end to end criminal justice approach is to be achieved as cases often fail when they come before a judge.

Peru
4. Programming in some work streams has also shifted positively towards a more strategic approach which is much needed in Peru, a country that has tended to be better at practical implementation than strategic reform. The clearest example of improvement is the NCA approach to tackling corruption and the assistance provided to the Delivery Unit in this respect. It is a positive move away from the consideration of developing an existing anti-corruption unit that was not fit for purpose.

5. The Criminal Justice Advisor (CJA) has also complemented these efforts with technical and strategic assistance being delivered to the prosecution agency (Fiscalia). Assistance in large scale corruption and money laundering cases, including those with a UK connection is a welcome development as is the development of an Office of Strategic Analysis in the Fiscalia with specialists enabling more effective analysis of organised crime groups operating in Peru.

Summary of recommendations for the next year

Colombia
1. The Colombian government remains stronger on strategy than on implementation so efforts to address strategic reform need to be accompanied by quick wins and pilot projects if they are to be translated into practical effect.

2. There still needs to be an increased focus on achieving an end to end criminal justice approach in areas of targeted intervention (financial investigations, corruption, use of DNA evidence) if longer term reform rather than just disruption is to be achieved. This must include leveraging the improved relations with the Judiciary and seeing reforms at the investigative stage produce results in court.

3. International donor co-ordination also needs to be considered going forward. The UK may be best placed to provide strategic advice and certain technical interventions but some of the latter may work best if delivered in the context of wider institutional reform programmes run by larger donors.

Peru
4. The results framework should be amended to reflect work being delivered and provide clearer guidance of what success looks like and how it can be measured.

5. The ability of the tactical interventions to deliver longer term reform, particularly in relation to forensic development, should be reassessed.

6. Within the Justice Sector, the CJA has a very good understanding of developmental strategy but this needs to be reflected in programme documentation and a written theory of change in order to ensure continued progress for the remainder of the programming cycle.