

FM KAMPALA  
TO DESKBY 120930Z FCO  
TELNO 7

SUMMARY

1. SITREP AS AT 120630.

- (A) KIGALI WAS RELATIVELY CALM.
- (B) THE RPF FORCES FROM THE NORTH WERE STILL ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY, BUT HAD NOT ENTERED KIGALI PROPER.
- (C) NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED FOR A CEASE FIRE, BUT WITH NO RESULT SO FAR.
- (D) THE EVACUATION OF UN CIVILIANS HAD CONTINUED YESTERDAY AND WOULD CONTINUE TODAY. A HANDFUL OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL HAD CROSSED INTO UGANDA FROM NORTHERN RWANDA.
- (E) THERE HAD BEEN NO OTHER ENTRIES FROM RWANDA: THE UGANDANS ARE STILL NOT ALLOWING REFUGEES IN FROM RWANDA, AND THE NRA HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY HAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO PREVENT THEIR ENTRY.
- (F) THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, THERE SHOULD BE NO PROBLEM IF ANY STRAY EXPATRIATES TURN UP AT THE BORDER SEEKING TO ENTER UGANDA. UNOMUR WOULD LOOK OUT FOR THEM AND GIVE ASSISTANCE.
- (G) UN FOOD CONVOYS ARE STILL STUCK ON THE UGANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER.

(H) THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN MOVEMENTS FROM UGANDA TO RWANDA, APART FROM THE OCCASIONAL SMALL VEHICLE.

(I) THE NRA AND RPF CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE ON THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES OF THE BORDER.

3. WE NOW HAVE NO DIRECT MEANS OF CHECKING WHETHER ALL BRITONS WHO WISH TO BE EVACUATED HAVE LEFT, FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE HONORARY CONSUL AND THE CLOSURE OF THE BELGIAN EMBASSY. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET US KNOW, AS INFORMATION REACHES YOU, WHO HAS BEEN EVACUATED.

COMMENT

4. THE RPF SEEM TO BE BUILDING UP THEIR STRENGTH IN ORDER EITHER TO MOVE QUICKLY AND POWERFULLY AGAINST THE RGF IN KIGALI OR TO ESTABLISH A VERY STRONG POSITION FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE IN THE EVENT OF A CEASE-FIRE.

5. THESE SITREPS ARE VERY INDIRECT AND NECESSARILY OUT OF DATE: DO YOU FIND THEM USEFUL?

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FM KAMPALA  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 145  
OF 110612Z MAY 94

INFO PRIORITY ODA, BDDEA, NAIROBI, DAR ES SALAAM, UKMIS NEW YORK  
INFO PRIORITY BRUSSELS, UKMIS GENEVA  
INFO ROUTINE ROME, KINSHASA, WASHINGTON, ADDIS ABABA, OTTAWA  
INFO ROUTINE SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR

*Reply sent  
to UKMIS  
pa  
14/5*

MY TELNO 144 : RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. UNOMUR ARE STILL NOT GRANTED ACCESS TO MONITOR THE WHOLE BORDER BETWEEN UGANDA AND RWANDA.

DETAIL

2. DESPITE PROMISES THAT AN ANSWER WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN BY NOW,

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ UNOMUR HAVE STILL NOT BEEN GIVEN AGREEMENT TO EXTEND THEIR MONITORING OPERATIONS TO THE EASTERN EXTREMITY OF THE UGANDA/RWANDAN BORDER. THEIR INABILITY TO DO SO WILL HEIGHTEN SUSPICION THAT THE UGANDANS ARE INVOLVED IN SOME LARGE SCALE RESUPPLY. THE VISITORS FROM THE NGOS (MY FIRST TUR) WHO VISITED THE RPF HELD AREA OF RWANDA LAST WEEK WERE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF THE RPF'S REFUSAL TO LET THEM ENTER THE BORDER AREA SOUTH OF KAKITUMBA (WHICH IS THE ENTRY POINT FOR A MAJOR TRUNK ROUTE FROM UGANDA, NOW IN RPF HANDS). THE RPF ALLEGED THAT THERE WERE BANDITS AND LAND MINES IN THE AREA CONCERNED.

3. I EXPRESSED TODAY TO THE PERMANENT SECRETARY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE MY CONCERN ABOUT THE UGANDANS' DELAY IN EXTENDING COOPERATION TO UNOMUR OVER THIS SECTOR OF THE FRONTIER.

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2/3/94

FM KAMPALA  
TO TELELETTER FCO  
TELELETTER FILE REF : 014/1  
OF 011213Z MARCH 94

AND TO TELELETTER UKIMS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, BRUSSELS,  
AND TO TELELETTER NAIROBI, BDDEA NAIROBI

FROM EDWARD CLAY

FOR [REDACTED], AD(E)

COPIED TO [REDACTED] UND  
[REDACTED], RAD  
CHANCERIES UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, BRUSSELS,  
NAIROBI, BDDEA NAIROBI. ([REDACTED])

KAMPALA TELNO 55 : RWANDA

1. I HOPE YOU MIGHT FIND HELPFUL SOME GENERAL IMPRESSIONS, TO FILL OUT THE SPARSE PICTURE IN MY TUR. AT ALL EVENTS, BECAUSE WE KNOW SO LITTLE ABOUT RWANDA, I THOUGHT I WOULD RECORD THESE IMPRESSIONS FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES AND HOPE THEY MAY BE OF INTEREST TO OTHERS.

2. I WENT TO KIGALI BY ROAD, [REDACTED] AND MY CP TEAM. IT WAS VALUABLE TO DO THE JOURNEY. IT BROUGHT HOME JUST HOW MUCH SOUTH WEST UGANDA AND RWANDA ARE GEOGRAPHICALLY AND ETHNICALLY THE SAME. THE FEAR OF A TUTSI REGION EMBRACING NORTH RWANDA AND SOUTH-WEST UGANDA TOGETHER IS UNDERSTANDABLE. IT IS, OR OUGHT TO BE, A BEAUTIFUL PART OF THE WORLD. HIGH, HILLY, WITH STEEP VALLEYS AND TOUCHES OF SWITZERLAND OR SCOTLAND. THE OMINOUS THING IS THAT THESE STEEP HILLS ARE CULTIVATED IN TERRACES RIGHT UP TO AND OVER THE TOP, AND DEFORESTATION HAS OBVIOUSLY BEEN SERIOUS. BOTH KABALE DISTRICT (THE PART OF UGANDA ADJOINING RWANDA) AND RWANDA ITSELF ARE DESPERATELY OVER-POPULATED.

3. DRIVING INTO RWANDA IS AN EERIE EXPERIENCE. WE WERE CONVOYED BY UNOMUR TO THE BORDER SOUTH OF KABALE, AND BY UNAMIR FROM THE RWANDAN BORDER POST ONWARDS. NO-ONE LOOKED AT OUR PASSPORTS AT ANY POINT DURING OUR VISIT. THE FIRST RWANDANS WE SAW WERE A HANDFUL OF SOLDIERS OF THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF). FOR THE FIRST 10

[REDACTED]

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OR 15 KILOMETRES OF RWANDA, THE COUNTRY WAS DESERTED. CROPS AND TEA ESTATES HAD GONE WILD, AND HARDLY ANYBODY WAS AROUND - NOT EVEN THE RPF. WE THEN PASSED THROUGH A SERIES OF GOVERNMENT CHECKPOINTS, WITH SOLDIERS WHO LOOKED A PRETTY RAG, TAG AND BOBTAIL COLLECTION. DEPRESSED, NERVOUS AND UNSURE WHAT THEY WERE DOING - AND CONSEQUENTLY RATHER ALARMING. THE AREA CONTROLLED BY THE RPF, WHICH ADJOINS UGANDA, HAS BEEN PRETTY WELL EMPTIED OF PEOPLE. THERE ARE STORIES OF REFUGEES BEGINNING TO COME BACK FROM ACROSS THE BORDER IN UGANDA INTO THE NORTHERN PART OF RWANDA, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO VERIFY THIS. NEVERTHELESS, THE PHENOMENON CAUSED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT CONCERN.

#### REFUGEES

4. MEANWHILE, THOSE WHO USED TO RESIDE IN THE AREA HAVE FLED SOUTHWARDS. ON THE ROAD NORTH OF KIGALI THERE IS A WRETCHED LOOKING REFUGEE CAMP CLIMBING UP THE HILLSIDES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD. IN THE RAINS, THAT WILL BE A MISERABLE AND DISEASE-RIDDEN PLACE. OF COURSE, A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THE RWANDANS IS WHERE ON EARTH THE REFUGEES NOW OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY WOULD GO, IF THEY WERE TO RETURN HERE. THOSE APPREHENSIONS ARE REASONABLE ENOUGH, ESPECIALLY AS THE ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBERS INVOLVED RANGE FROM 500,000 (RWANDAN GOVERNMENT) TO TWO MILLION (RPF). THERE ARE ALSO LARGE NUMBERS OF FOREIGN REFUGEES IN RWANDA, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOUTH ADJOINING BURUNDI. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR [REDACTED] TAKES THE VIEW THAT THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES SHOULD SAY THAT THOSE REFUGEES WHO WANT TO STAY THERE RATHER THAN RETURN TO RWANDA CAN STAY. I BELIEVE THAT THIS RUNS CONTRARY TO THE LONG-STANDING CONSENSUS ON REFUGEES, WHICH IS THAT CONDITIONS SHOULD BE CREATED IN WHICH THEY CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. BUT IT DOES RECOGNISE THE REALITY THAT A SUPERHUMAN EFFORT WOULD BE NEEDED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH ALL THOSE RWANDANS NOW OUTSIDE RWANDA'S BORDERS COULD RETURN, FIND LAND TO LIVE ON, AND COHABIT PEACEFULLY.

#### KIGALI

5. KIGALI ITSELF IS AN ODD PLACE. IT LOOKS PRETTY GOOD, COMPARED TO THE BEATEN-UP APPEARANCE OF KAMPALA. IT SPORTS SOME NICE AMENITIES, ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY USED BY EXPATRIATES (IN A WAY WHICH THE PARALLEL AMENITIES IN UGANDA ARE NOT). CONSIDERING THAT THE COUNTRY IS BROKE AND ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FABRIC ROTTEN, THE

APPEARANCE IS VERY MISLEADING. IT IS THE CASE, I BELIEVE, THAT THE EXPATRIATES HAVE NOT BEEN THE TARGETS OF ATTACKS IN ANY OF RWANDA'S TROUBLES. THEY DO, HOWEVER, NEED TO TAKE CARE WHEN TENSION IS HIGH, AT LEAST TO AVOID BEING CAUGHT IN THE CROSSFIRE, PARTICULARLY AT NIGHT. THERE ARE, INCIDENTALLY, AROUND 1,500 BELGIANS, 600 FRENCH, 300 EACH AMERICANS AND GERMANS, AND FEWER THAN 100 BRITISH.

6. I THINK WE MUST RELY ON OUR HONORARY CONSUL IN GIVING CONSULAR ADVICE. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EC MISSIONS COORDINATE REASONABLY CLOSELY, IF INFORMALLY. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO GET FIRM CONFIRMATION THAT THE BELGIANS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR EVACUATING OUR CITIZENS, IF IT CAME TO THAT. MEANWHILE, I DOUBT WHETHER, EXCEPT IN THE MOST EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS WISE TO GO BEYOND ADVISING OUR CITIZENS TO STAY CLOSE TO HOME IN TROUBLED TIMES, NOT TO TRAVEL ALONE, NEVER TO TRAVEL AFTER DARK, AND TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH FELLOW-MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY. OUR COMMUNITY ARE FAIRLY WELL DUG IN, AND THOSE WHO ARE OUTSIDE KIGALI IN PARTICULAR ARE LIKELY TO BE WELL KNOWN TO THE RWANDANS AMONGST WHOM THEY LIVE: THAT PROBABLY GIVES THEM SECURITY RATHER THAN OTHERWISE. WHAT WE MAY NEED TO WATCH FOR IS THE RATHER INSOUCIANT ATTITUDE OF THE BELGIANS (WHO ARE RELUCTANT FOR POLITICAL REASONS TO PULL OUT PRECIPITATELY), AND THE MORE ALARMIST INSTINCTS OF THE UN AGENCIES, WHO TEND TO THINK OF EVACUATION BEFORE MOST OTHERS.

7. THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF OUR VISIT WAS VERY TENSE AND FULL OF APPREHENSIONS. TRAVELLING AROUND KIGALI, AS NEWCOMERS IGNORANT OF ITS TOPOGRAPHY, WAS A NIGHTMARE: SINCE THERE WERE NO SHOPS OPEN, WE COULD NEITHER CASH MONEY TO BUY PETROL, NOR EVEN FIND A DECENT MAP. SO I WAS DEPENDENT ON PHOTOCOPIES OF THE RELEVANT PAGE OF QUOTES THE LONELY PLANET UNQUOTES GUIDE TO EAST AFRICA. THERE WERE MANY ROAD BLOCKS IN TOWN, AND LOTS OF SOLDIERS WHO WERE USUALLY UNSURE, UNHELPFUL, AND OFTEN TRUCULENT. TRYING TO MAKE A PROGRAMME - EVEN WITH THE HELP OF THE ADMIRABLE M. VIGNERON (WHO HAS NO OBLIGATION TO HELP US) - WAS A NIGHTMARE. APPOINTMENTS, IF MADE, KEPT GETTING CHANGED. MY CREDENTIALS WERE SUDDENLY ARRANGED FOR THURSDAY MORNING BUT, MINUTES BEFORE WE WERE TO LEAVE THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, WERE ABRUPTLY DEFERRED. IT WAS ONLY MY INSISTENCE THAT I COULD NOT POSSIBLY STAY UNTIL SATURDAY THAT LED THEM TO RECONSTITUTE THE CEREMONY ON FRIDAY.

8. IN THREE DAYS, SIX IMPORTANT EVENTS TOOK PLACE :

- (A) THE ASSASSINATION OF THE MINISTER OF WORKS, AND NATIONAL SECRETARY OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PSD), FELIC IEN

- GATABAZI. HE WAS A SOUTHERNER, KNOWN TO BE PLAYING A KEY ROLE IN ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES:
- (B) THE ASSASSINATION THE FOLLOWING DAY OF MARTIN BUCYANA, PRESIDENT OF THE COALITION POUR LA DEFENSE DE LA REPUBLIQUE (CDR) - AN EXTREMIST HUTU MOVEMENT:
  - (C) THE CONVENING FOR 10 AM ON 23 FEBRUARY OF THE MEETING AT THE PARLIAMENT TO SWEAR-IN NEW DEPUTIES: THIS WAS CANCELLED JUST AS IT WAS DUE TO START:
  - (D) THE RE-CONVENING OF THAT MEETING FOR 2PM THE SAME DAY. I WENT TO THIS ON SPEC, AND IT GAVE ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET VIRTUALLY ALL THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS, AND A NUMBER OF OTHER PERSONALITIES, INCLUDING THE BENCH OF BISHOPS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THE MEETING WAS BOYCOTTED BY THE RPF AND NO SWEARING-IN OCCURRED. HABYARIMANA MADE A SPEECH WHICH SEEMED TO ME UNIMPRESSIVE AND LIKELY TO BE HYPOCRITICAL, IN WHICH HE DEPLORED THE DEATH OF THE LATE MINISTER, STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF COMPROMISE, AND APPEALED TO ALL RWANDANS, REGARDLESS OF TRIBE OR REGION, TO SEEK UNITY AND RECONCILIATION. THIS WAS THE FIFTH ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO SWEAR IN THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY:
  - (E) THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 23 FEBRUARY ATTACKING HABYARIMANA, ACCUSING HIM OF COMPLICITY IN THE ASSASSINATION OF THE LATE MINISTER, AND OF THE AMBUSH OF A UN CONVOY ESCORTING RPF DEPUTIES ON 22 FEBRUARY. THE STATEMENT AMOUNTED TO A DECLARATION OF WAR, AND REAFFIRMED THE RPF'S REFUSAL TO ATTEND THE CEREMONY OF SWEARING IN CALLED FOR 23 FEBRUARY:
  - (F) THE FUNERAL OF GATABAZI ON 24 FEBRUARY WENT OFF PEACEFULLY, TO THE HUGE RELIEF OF THE UN AND OTHERS. IT DEMONSTRATED THE SURPRISING CAPACITY OF THE RWANDANS, EVEN IN A PROFOUND POLITICAL CRISIS, TO UNDERTAKE A MAJOR EVENT SUCCESSFULLY, TO CONDUCT IT WITH ORDER, GOOD ORGANISATION, AND DIGNITY, AND TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF ALL THOSE PRESENT AT THE FUNERAL ITSELF (IN THE SOUTH OF RWANDA) AND OVER THE 22 HOUR LONG JOURNEY BACK TO KIGALI. IT WAS, INCIDENTALLY, NOTICEABLE THAT THE RPF ELEMENT IN THAT CONVOY WAS WARMLY APPLAUDED BY THE CROWD ALONG THE ROAD.

9. AS I SAID IN MY TUR, IT SEEMS IMPROBABLE THAT PRECISE RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE ASCRIBED FOR ANY OF THE ACTS OF TERRORISM. IT IS SUCH A LOOKING-GLASS PLACE THAT IT IS PLAUSIBLE TO SEE ANYBODY'S HAND IN ALMOST ANY EVENT. THE GOOD THAT MIGHT CONCEIVABLY EMERGE FROM THESE EVENTS IS TO INSTIL SUCH FEAR AS TO MAKE THE POLITICIANS DOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS TO SEEK A COMPROMISE. BUT TO THINK THAT WOULD BE A TRIUMPH OF HOPE OVER EXPECTATION. AS THE PRESIDENT PUT IT IN HIS REMARKS TO THE ABORTIVE SESSION IN THE PARLIAMENT ON 23 FEBRUARY, THE FAILURE OF THAT MEETING MEANT GOING BACK TO SQUARE ONE AND REVERTING TO THE SITUATION AS AT 5 JANUARY (FOLLOWING HIS OWN INSTALLATION AS TRANSITIONAL PRESIDENT).

SIGNED.....EDWARD CLAY

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FM KAMPALA  
TO TELELETTER FCO  
TELELETTER FILE REF : 014/4  
OF 011213Z MARCH 94  
AND TO TELELETTER UKIMS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, BRUSSELS,  
AND TO TELELETTER NAIROBI, BDDEA NAIROBI

FROM EDWARD CLAY

FOR [REDACTED] AD(E)

COPIED TO [REDACTED] UND  
[REDACTED] RAD  
CHANCERIES UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, BRUSSELS,  
NAIROBI, BDDEA NAIROBI ([REDACTED])

ARUSHA

10. ALL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN RWANDA, AND MOST RWANDANS, SAY THAT THE ARUSHA ACCORD IS THE ONLY WAY FOR THE COUNTRY OUT OF ITS PRESENT DEADLOCK. THE CURRENT PROBLEM IS THAT HABYARIMANA HAS BEEN INSTALLED AS A TRANSITIONAL PRESIDENT, AND IS THUS THE ONLY INSTITUTION OF THE ARUSHA PROCESS PROPERLY IN PLACE. BEFORE PROGRESS IN OTHER AREAS CAN BE MADE, THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT (THE BBTG) BOTH NEED TO BE SWORN-IN. THE TROUBLE IS, THAT WHILE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES PROTEST THAT THEY ARE COMMITTED TO THE ARUSHA PROCESS, ALL OF THEM ARE CLAIMING MORE THAN THE ARUSHA AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR. AT THE TIME OF ARUSHA, THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BETWEEN, ON THE ONE HAND, THE RPF, AND ON THE OTHER, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF ALL THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES, AND WERE SIGNED UNDER PRESSURE ON THE MILITARY FRONT FROM THE RPF. THEREAFTER, SOME OF THE OTHER PARTIES BEGAN TO DESERT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS PARTY. IN ORDER TO INHIBIT THE EVAPORATION OF HIS SUPPORT AMONG THE OTHER PARTIES, THE PRESIDENT HAS MANOEUVRED TO DIVIDE THEM, AND TO WOO THE SUPPORT OF FACTIONS WITHIN THEM. TO DO THIS, HE EXPLOITED THE PERCEPTION OF THE RPF AS A TUTSI PARTY, AND ALSO EXPLOITED THE LONG-STANDING RIFT BETWEEN RWANDESE FROM THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY. MEANTIME, THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL), WHICH HAD BEEN FOUNDED TO PREACH RECONCILIATION BETWEEN HUTU AND TUTSI, IN FACT BECAME PREDOMINANTLY A VEHICLE FOR THE TUTSI. THAT PARTY HAS NOW SPLIT ALONG ETHNIC LINES, AND ONE OF THE INTRACTABLE ELEMENTS OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL IMPASSE IS DISAGREEMENT OVER HOW

THE TWO FACTIONS WITHIN THE PARTY SHOULD SHARE THE PARTY'S QUOTA OF (ELEVEN) SEATS IN THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY. THE SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY IS BEING EXPLOITED BY HABYARIMANA, WHILE THE PRESIDENT OF THE PARTY (A HUTU, MINISTER OF COMMERCE AND BELIEVED TO BE HIS OWN LATE WIFE'S MURDERER) IS BEHAVING WITH DUPLICITY. THE TANZANIANS HAVE BEEN TRYING TO HOLD BACK THE TUTSI WING OF THE PARTY FROM PUSHING THEIR AMBITIONS TOO HARD.

11. THE PRESIDENT, IN MEDDLING IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE PL, AND IN THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS BETWEEN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT (MDR), HAS BEEN EXCEEDING HIS POWERS, AND BEHAVING QUITE CONTRARY TO THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. LIKewise, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN ACTING ILLEGALLY IN SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE ALLOCATION OF MINISTERIAL SEATS. HE IS GIVEN NO POWER UNDER ARUSHA OVER THE APPOINTMENT OF MINISTERS, WHICH IS A RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

12. IT IS HARD TO ACCEPT THE VIEW OF MARTENS (HARVEY'S TELELETTER TO SHAND OF 21 FEBRUARY), THAT HABYARIMANA IS GENUINELY SEEKING PROGRESS. MOST OF THE KNOWLEDGEABLE OBSERVERS I SPOKE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT IS RELUCTANT TO SHARE POWER: THAT HE, ALONG WITH THE OTHER PARTY LEADERS, DESIRE EITHER TO SECURE A POSITION THAT GIVES THEM AND THEIR ALLIES CONTROL OF THE ASSEMBLY, OR, AT WORST, GIVES THEM A BLOCKING MINORITY: FURTHER, THAT HABYARIMANA IS ANYWAY UNDER STRONG PRESSURE FROM THE PLACEMEN WHO DEPEND UPON HIM NOT TO LOSE CONTROL OF THE ASSEMBLY, FOR FEAR THAT THEY WILL LOSE THEIR OFFICES, AND THAT HE AND SOME OF THEM COULD FACE IMPEACHMENT OR TRIAL FOR CRIMES COMMITTED WHILE THEY HAVE BEEN IN OFFICE. THE UNSG'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE (BOOH BOOH) WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT 80% OF THE CURRENT OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS WERE DUE TO HABYARIMANA. THE BELGIAN VIEW IS THAT HABYARIMANA'S STRATEGY IS TO DELAY AND PREVARICATE IN THE HOPE THAT ULTIMATELY HE WILL BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION BY ATTRACTING THE SUPPORT OF FACTIONS IN PARTIES WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE OPPOSED TO HIM.

13. ALL THIS IS AGAINST A BACKGROUND OF INTRIGUE, LYING AND DECEPTION WHICH MAKES ORDINARY DEALINGS WITH THE RWANDANS PECULIARLY DIFFICULT.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S LEVERAGE OVER RWANDA OUGHT TO BE

OVERWHELMING. BUT IT CONTINUES TO PROVE INEFFECTIVE. THAT IS NO DOUBT A TRIBUTE TO THE INTRACTABLE CHARACTER OF THE PROBLEM, AND THE COMPLEX NATURE OF RWANDA'S POLITICAL LEADERS. SOME OF THE FACTORS AT WORK ARE:

(A) IN A NEGATIVE SENSE, THE EXAMPLE OF BURUNDI HAS HELPED THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAS BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT HIMSELF BOTH AS A MODERATE IN ETHNIC MATTERS (AS INDEED HE WAS, TO BE FAIR). BUT IT HAS ALSO HELPED HIM TO ATTRACT THE SUPPORT OF THOSE WHO WOULD ARGUE THAT, IF YOU GIVE THE TUTSI AN INCH, THEY WILL TAKE A MILE, AND CANNOT BE TRUSTED IN RWANDA. IMPROVEMENT IN BURUNDI SHOULD WEAKEN THIS FACTOR:

(B)


(C)

(D) DURING HIS VISIT TO KIGALI LAST WEEK, BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CLAES WARNED THE RWANDANS OF THE DANGER THAT THEY WOULD ALIENATE THOSE WHOSE ECONOMIC SUPPORT THE COUNTRY DESPERATELY NEEDED:


(E) THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES BY THE RPF WOULD BE A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THE RPF - WHO HAD A LONG MEETING WITH THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON 25 FEBRUARY (AND ARE SEEING HIM AGAIN ON 1 MARCH) - DID NOT THREATEN TO RESTART THE WAR, BUT THEY ARE IN A STRONG POSITION: THEY ARE DUG IN, BY AGREEMENT, AROUND THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING, AND HAVE COME TO REALISE JUST WHAT A STRONG STRATEGIC POSITION THIS GIVES THEM. IN ADDITION, THEY HAVE, ACCORDING TO THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENCE, BETWEEN 13-15,000 MEN UNDER ARMS. BY COMMON CONSENT, THEY ARE MORE EFFECTIVE SOLDIERS THAN THE RWANDAN ARMY, THOUGH MUCH LESS THAN HALF THE SIZE OF THAT ARMY (TO WHICH MUST BE ADDED 19,000 GENDARMES). [REDACTED] PUT IT BEST WHEN HE

SAID THAT RWANDA IS AN EASY COUNTRY TO TAKE, BUT VERY HARD TO KEEP. SO WHILE THE RPF COULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT - AND WOULD CERTAINLY ACT IF THERE WERE TO BE A MILITARY COUP BY THE RWANDAN ARMY - IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY COULD CONTROL THE COUNTRY. INDEED THE RPF'S BEST BET IS TO RELY ON THE ARUSHA ACCORDS: THESE GIVE THEM MUCH MORE THAN THEIR PROBABLE SUPPORT IN THE COUNTRY WOULD JUSTIFY:

(F)



15.



16. [REDACTED]

17. UNAMIR AND BOOH BOOH ARE FRUSTRATED. THEY CAN ONLY BE TRULY EFFECTIVE IF THE RWANDANS THEMSELVES REACH THE POLITICAL COMPROMISES WHICH ONLY THEY CAN MAKE. BOOH BOOH IS REASSURING AND CALM. UNAMIR SEEM TO BE DOING A GOOD JOB. GENERAL DALLAIRE EXUDES ENERGY AND COMMONSENSE. THE TROOPS SEEM IN GOOD HEART: WE VISITED THE GHANIAN BATTALION'S HEADQUARTERS, AND THEIR ESCORTING ENGINEER COMPANY OF BANGLADESHI TROOPS, ON OUR WAY BACK TO UGANDA. BUT IT WILL BE VERY UNFORTUNATE IF THE UN CONTINUES TO BE SEEN TO BE POWERLESS.

SIGNED... EDWARD CLAY

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY  
05 MAY 1994

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RESTRICTED  
FM KAMPALA  
TO IMMEDIATE FCO  
TELNO 135  
OF 050600Z MAY 94

INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK, DAR ES SALAAM, PARIS, BRUSSELS  
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INFO IMMEDIATE NAIROBI, UKMIS GENEVA, OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS  
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1593 AND WASHINGTON TELNO 1095 TO FCO :  
RWANDA

1. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ALLEGATION OF MASSIVE TROOP MOVEMENTS FROM UGANDA TO RWANDA (PARAGRAPH 6 OF FIRST TUR) IS ALMOST ENTIRELY A FABRICATION. WE HEARD A SIMILAR STORY IN MID-APRIL ORIGINATING FROM A GROUP OF DANISH BAPTIST MISSIONARIES WHO HAD BEEN EVACUATED FROM RWANDA. THEY ALLEGED THAT 10,000 UGANDAN TROOPS HAD GONE TO HELP THE RPF. THE DANISH PRESS TOOK UP THE STORY ON 17 APRIL, URGING THEIR GOVERNMENT TO SUSPEND AID TO UGANDA. THE DANISH MFA CONSULTED EU CAPITALS AND DISMISSED THE ALLEGATION AS GROUNDLESS.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

COMMENT

4. THESE STORIES ARE PERSISTANT. THE EVIDENCE IS ANECDOTAL AND RELATES TO SMALL NUMBERS : IT IS HIGHLY UNRELIABLE. UGANDAN ARMY REINFORCEMENTS ON THE SCALE SUGGESTED IN PARAS 2 AND 3 ARE NOT

FEASIBLE. UNOMUR HAVE NO (NO) EVIDENCE OF ANY SUCH MOVEMENTS.

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 INFO IMMEDIATE DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, NAIROBI, PARIS  
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UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 2513 AND 2514:  
 SUBJECT: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. French ask us to encourage RPF to accept cease fire.

DETAIL

2. The Minister at the French Embassy telephoned Goodenough late on 14 July to ask whether we could encourage the RPF to soften their conditions for a ceasefire. Narik said that similar approaches were being made to the Americans and Belgians. In taking note, Goodenough pointed out that we had no direct dialogue with the RPF.

COMMENT

3. Since the start of the present crisis we have of course consistently urged all sides to halt the fighting. In any contacts which you or other recipients may have with representatives of the Rwandan factions, you should reiterate our support for the position of the Security Council as restated in UKMIS New York's second TUR.

4. We are telegraphing separately to posts most closely concerned details of our response to the latest refugee influx into Zaire.

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PART ONE OF TWO

SUBJECT: RWANDA: FRENCH INITIATIVE  
PARIS TELNO 763 AND UKMIS GENEVA TELNO 416

SUMMARY

1. Local French briefing based on latest reports from Goma/Bukavu show French gaining acceptance in principle and on the ground of the humanitarian protection zone concept. Reinforced appeal for humanitarian support to meet the desperate crisis facing displaced people in Western Rwanda.
2. Improvement in political climate between France and the RPF here continues.
3. Two hundred Ghanaian troops transited Entebbe on 6 July en route to strengthen a UNAMIR in Rwanda.

DETAIL

4. French Ambassador briefed his EU colleagues on 6 July on the progress of the French action on the ground in Rwanda, based on up-to-date reports from the French military command in Eastern Zaire.

MILITARY

5. Both the French and the RPF top leadership were playing down the incident in which the RPF had fired on a French humanitarian convoy near Butare.
6. The French were confining their operations to the area south of



Kibuye. Government forces were concentrated around Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Thus, Rwanda was effectively divided into 3 parts. The French operations were being severely hampered by congestion at Goma, where airport facilities were grossly overloaded (Colonel Peter Gillham, ODA Logistics Expert on loan to the UNHCR, confirmed these problems when I saw him on 6 July). The French operations into Rwanda were being conducted from Bukavu.

7. The Rwandan government troops were largely turning against the French. They were requesting arms and reacting badly to the French refusal to oblige. The French concept of their humanitarian zone was that the Rwandan government forces would not be allowed to conduct operations within it, nor would any armed forces or militias be permitted. The disarming of militias had already started.

#### HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

8. The flight of people westward following the fall of Gitarama and Butare to the RPF had created a situation of grave distress for around 270,000 people. A similar situation existed around Kibuye, in the north of the French humanitarian zone. The French had identified 37 refugee camps south of the Kibuye-Gitarama access, and 22 north of it, comprising 850,000 displaced. They estimated that the RPF zone contained 1.5 million people (compared to the 2 million estimated by Rudasingwa, in his talk with Lady Chalker - your telno 88). There were 3.7 million in the western zone (ie the two zones controlled respectively by the interim government, north of the Gitarama-Kibuye access, and the French-controlled zone south of it. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs assessed the situation as worse than those they had encountered in Somalia, Eritrea and Yugoslavia: the humanitarian crisis was "unprecedented". Help was needed over feeding, clothing and medical care. The French had installed military hospitals in Cyangugu and Bukavu: the Ambassador repeated several times his government's strong appeal to all NGOs and humanitarian agencies to give help.

9. In the Gikongoro district, around 450,000 original inhabitants had been joined by around 350,000 displaced persons. Two hundred thousand more were thought to be on their way from the Butare area. Caritas, CRS, and the ICRC were active. The French had identified 2 camps, each of 60,000 displaced people. In one, there were 20 deaths a day from epidemics.

10. The French had found mass graves, especially in the Kibuye area. There were signs of recent massacres.

11. NGOs prepared to operate from eastern Zaire into western Rwanda should contact the French humanitarian relief coordinator in Goma. He is Gerard Larome: telephone (satellite): 19 871 682080225.

12. Of the agencies so far active, ICRC have been fastest off the mark and are the most effective. World Food Programme are also working, but no-one else.

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