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MDHIAN 1681

FM KAMPALA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 224
OF 190607Z JULY 94
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, UKMIS NEW YORK
INFO PRIORITY DAR ES SALAAM, KINSHASA, NAIROBI
INFO ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, CAIRO, DAKAR, HARARE
INFO ROUTINE ISLAMABAD, OTTAWA, UKMIS GENEVA
INFO ROUTINE UKDEL NATO, OTHER EU POSTS
INFO ROUTINE SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS

per

SUBJECT: RWANDA
YOUR TELNO 97

445

UNP 062 / JG
19 JUL 1994

SUMMARY

1. Action on the French request to encourage the RPF to accept cease-fire.

DETAIL

2. In the absence from Kampala of all the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, I spoke, after consultation with my French colleague, to the Permanent Secretary (Katsigazi). I said I wanted to reinforce the representation already made by the French to ask the Ugandan government to use its influence with the RPF to implement an immediate and unconditional cease-fire. I acknowledged that it had been President Museveni's public position for several weeks to urge the RPF to call a cease-fire: since I had no direct contact with the RPF hierarchy, I hoped the Ugandans would themselves continue to press the RPF's top leadership in Rwanda to comply with the Security Council's call of 14 July.

3. Katsigazi undertook to pass on my message, and to inform his Ministers and the President.

4. He told me, incidentally, that the Ugandan Ambassador to Kigali had returned there for the swearing-in of the President-Designate on 18 July.

5. On a different point, the French Ambassador reports that members of the rump government have now left the French humanitarian zone for Zaire.

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA
TELNO 38
OF D71629Z APRIL 94

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Q DIST ?

(29)

YOUR TELNO 94: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENTS OF
RWANDA AND BURUNDI

pa. J.S. 81

SUMMARY

- 1. Agree you should speak to Museveni.

DETAIL

2. Given Museveni's participation in the talks in Dar es Salaam you might ask him to brief you on how he sees the situation following the Kigali air crash. This would give an opportunity to ask him to use whatever influence he may have to encourage the RPF to remain calm and co-operate in the establishment of the transitional institutions. You could point out that the RPF have an important opportunity to participate in power-sharing if they play their cards carefully and constructively. We agree that it should be possible to get these points across without suggesting that we hold Uganda in any way responsible for the RPF or events in Kigali. After all, Uganda has a vested interest in preventing any further deterioration in the situation which is likely to prompt a new influx of refugees.

3. Given the uncertainty surrounding the crash, we are for the moment avoiding attributing responsibility to any group. We are taking the following line in response to enquiries:-

- We very much regret this tragic event that comes at a time when leaders of the region have just met in Tanzania in a further effort to find a lasting solution for both Rwanda and Burundi.
- Hope this will not derail peace process, that calm will

prevail and that all parties will refrain from further acts of violence and continue to direct their efforts to resolving the inter-ethnic conflict.

FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 131530Z FCO
TELNO 109
OF 131340Z APRIL 94

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13/4

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1306 : RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. RPF MEET EU HEADS OF MISSION IN KAMPALA. RPF INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS IN RWANDA. RPF AIMS. ARUSHA PROCESS STILL RELEVANT.

DETAIL

- 2. THE RPF VICE-PRESIDENT, PATRICK MAZIMAKA, ASKED TO SEE ME THIS AFTERNOON. IN THE EVENT, BECAUSE HE HAD ALSO ASKED TO SEE THE GERMAN, WE INVITED HIM TO JOIN ALL EU HEADS OF MISSION AT OUR REGULAR MEETING TODAY.
- 3. MAZIMAKA IS THE SMOOTH AND PLAUSIBLE INTERNATIONAL FACE OF THE RPF. HE WAS IN KAMPALA FOR A DAY EN ROUTE FROM MULINDI (RPF HQ IN RWANDA) TO ADDIS ABABA AND DAR ES SALAAM. HE WAS ALSO GOING TO SEE MY US COLLEAGUE.
- 4. MAZIMAKA EXPRESSED THE RPF'S CONCERN TO HELP OVER ANY RESIDUAL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE EVACUATION OF EUROPEANS. (IN FACT, THE FRENCH WILL QUIT RWANDA ON 14 APRIL, LEAVING THE BELGIANS TO COMPLETE THEIR EVACUATION.)
- 5. HE DESCRIBED THE RPF'S REACTION TO THE ATROCITIES INITIATED BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ON THE MORNING AFTER THE 'ACCIDENT' TO HABYARIMANA'S AIRCRAFT, AND THE GUARD'S ATTACK ON THE RPF IN KIGALI. (HE BELIEVED THE REGIME HAD A LONG-LAID CONTINGENCY PLAN TO KILL THE OPPOSITION IF REALLY FORCED INTO A CORNER, BUT THEY HAD NOT EXPECTED THE DEGREE OF BRUTALITY EMPLOYED). THE SUBSEQUENT STATEMENT FROM THE INTERIM ADMINISTRATION APPEARING TO CONDONE THE MASSACRES HAD PROVOKED THE RPF TO MOVE REINFORCEMENTS TO KIGALI.
- 6. THERE HAD BEEN AN ATTEMPT TO TALK TO SOME ELEMENTS OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) LAST SATURDAY, BUT THE LINK HAD

BEEN INTERRUPTED. THE RPF HAD THEREFORE CONTINUED WITH THE DESPATCH OF 2,000 TROOPS TO KIGALI TO STOP THE KILLINGS BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. THESE HAD CONTINUED YESTERDAY: FIGHTING WAS INTENSE TODAY. THERE WERE LARGE NUMBERS OF DISPLACED AND WOUNDED PEOPLE NEEDING AID.

7. THE RPF'S FURTHER AIM WAS TO SIT DOWN WITH REMNANTS OF THE FORMER PARTNERS IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS TO DISCUSS HOW TO ACHIEVE A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT ACCEPTABLE TO THE POPULATION.

8. THEIR MAIN ANXIETY AT PRESENT WAS THAT THE ARMY WOULD FAN OUT FROM KIGALI AND EXTEND THEIR INDISCRIMINATE KILLING INTO THE PROVINCES: THE RPF COULD NOT HOPE QUICKLY TO EXTEND ITS PROTECTION TO THE RURAL POPULATION OF THE WHOLE COUNTRY, AND THEY FEARED FURTHER MASSACRES BEFORE THE ARMY COULD BE DEFEATED.

9. MAZIMAKA STATED THAT HE THOUGHT THE ARUSHA ACCORDS STILL OFFERED THE BEST BASIS FOR RESTORING ORDER IN RWANDA. IN ANSWER TO MY QUESTION OF HOW THE RPF COULD DISCUSS THE FUTURE WITH OTHER PARTIES WITHOUT INCLUDING THE MRND, HE SAID A KEY QUESTION WOULD BE THE DEGREE OF THE MRND'S COMPLICITY IN THE RGF'S MASSACRES. HE BELIEVED MOST MRND FIGURES HAD FLED. BUT THE ARUSHA PROCESS COULD BE PURSUED EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ONE OR OTHER OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES.

10. ASKED WHEN THE RPF WOULD CONSIDER ACCEPTING A CEASE-FIRE, MAZIMAKA REPLIED, NOT YET, AT LEAST ON A GENERALISED BASIS. AT PRESENT, IF INDIVIDUAL RGF UNITS WANTED TO AGREE A CEASE-FIRE, THE RPF WOULD DO SO ON A PIECEMEAL BASIS.

11. ON THE POSSIBILITY OF UNAMIR'S WITHDRAWAL, MAZIMAKA SAID UNAMIR SHOULD REMAIN AT LEAST UNTIL THE RPF AND THE REMNANTS OF THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAD SEEN WHAT HELP UNAMIR COULD GIVE THEM IN THE NEW SITUATION. IT WOULD NO, HOWEVER, BE NECESSARY TO ENHANCE UNAMIR'S CAPACITY TO INTERVENE: THE RPF COULD TAKE CARE OF THE CURRENT DISORDER, AND SHOULD BE LEFT TO DO SO. HE STRESSED THAT IN TRYING TO RE-ESTABLISH ORDER, THE RPF WERE NOT TAKING POWER.

12. MAZIMAKA DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT, EVEN IF THE RPF STOPPED THE MAYHEM CAUSED BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES, THERE MIGHT STILL REMAIN A PROBLEM OF ETHNIC MASSACRES CARRIED OUT BY CIVILIANS. HE MAINTAINED SIMPLY THAT RWANDANS HAD NEVER SPONTANEOUSLY SET OUT TO BUTCHER EACH OTHER, EXCEPT AT THE INSTIGATION OF THE AUTHORITIES.

COMMENT

13. MAZIMAKA GAVE AN ACCOMPLISHED PERFORMANCE. THE RPF IS ACQUIRING THE DEMEANOUR OF A GOVERNMENT IN WAITING, BEING PUSHED BY EVENTS TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITIES BEYOND ITS EXPECTATIONS. MUSEVENI WOULD NOT FAULT THIS APPROACH. THEIR CLAIM THAT ONLY THEY ARE IN A POSITION TO STOP THE MASSACRES IS PLAUSIBLE. THE MOST DANGEROUS MOMENT FOR THE RPF WILL INDEED ARISE IF THE RWANDAN POPULATION SET ABOUT EACH OTHER, PERHAPS PROVOKED BY THE ARMY AND/OR FEAR OF THE RPF AS A TUTSI FORCE, POSING A SECURITY PROBLEM BEYOND THEIR POWER TO SOLVE.

14. THE RPF SEEM TO SEE SOME VALUE IN UNAMIR, AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING. IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO CHANGE THE FORCE'S CHARACTER OR MANDATE UNTIL THE RPF HAVE ATTAINED THEIR MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND WE CAN SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT THE UN CAN DO TO ASSIST IN NORMALISING THE CONDITIONS OF LIFE, BRINGING RELIEF AND PERHAPS FACILITATING CONTACTS BETWEEN THE RPF AND THE OTHER PARTIES.

FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 130930Z FCO
TELNO
OF 130600Z APRIL 94

pa Rin

MY TELNO : RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. UNOMUR SITREP AS AT 130600Z.

DETAIL

2. UNOMUR CONFIRM THAT THE RPF REINFORCEMENTS ARE NOW IN THE CITY OF KIGALI AND CLEARING POCKETS OF RESISTANCE. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM SOME OF THEIR POSITIONS. THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ARE STILL HOLDING THEIR POSITIONS, HOWEVER, AND THE RPF'S MAIN AIM WILL BE TO ATTACK THESE.

3. UNOMUR ALSO CONFIRM THAT THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT HAS NOW FLED. THERE HAVE BEEN NO FURTHER UN CASUALTIES.

4. AS REGARDS THE UGANDA/RWANDA BORDER :

(A) NO EVIDENCE OF SIGNIFICANT UGANDAN SUPPORT TO THE RPF (NOR, SO FAR AS THEY CAN JUDGE, ACROSS THE UGANDA/ZAIRE BORDER EITHER).

(B) THE NRA CONTINUE TO BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO PREVENT REFUGEES ENTERING UGANDA.

(C) REPORTS IN THE LOCAL PRESS OF 12 APRIL OF SHELLS FIRED INTO UGANDA FROM RWANDA WERE WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT EXPLOSIONS OCCURRED OCCASIONALLY IN OLD MINEFIELDS ON THE UGANDAN SIDE, BUT NO SHELLS HAD LANDED IN UGANDA FROM OVER THE BORDER.

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(THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME)?

(B) WILL THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, WHO HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO STOP THE KILLINGS THEMSELVES, BE READY AND ABLE COOPERATE?


(C) HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE AND WHAT WOULD BE DONE WITH THE FINDINGS?

ON THE WHOLE, OFFERING AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION AT THIS STAGE SEEMS LIKELY TO PROVIDE AN EXCUSE FOR BOTH PARTIES TO EMBROIL THEMSELVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN DISPUTE ABOUT TERMS OF REFERENCE ETC INSTEAD OF STOPPING THE KILLINGS IN RWANDA.

CLAY

YYYY

FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 202230Z FCO
TELNO 120
OF 202113Z APRIL 94



MY TEL NO 119: RWANDA

82

SUMMARY

1. MUSEVENI PUSHES RPF HARD TO AGREE TO EARLY CEASEFIRE WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT AGREED AD REFERENDUM.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT MUSEVENI EVENTUALLY RECEIVED THE ENLARGED AD HOC GROUP AT 1700Z THIS EVENING. THE GROUP COMPRISED THE RPF GENERAL SECRETARY, RUDASINGWA, AND THE RWANDAN, US AND FRENCH AMBASSADORS, AND THE TANZANIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER AND ME. THE MEETING LASTED 2 1/4 HOURS.
3. MUSEVENI BEGAN BY RECAPPING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE TWO PREVIOUS MEETINGS, AND ELABORATED HIS IDEAS FOR REGIONAL COUNTRIES TO REPLACE THE PRESENT UNAMIR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS AS MONITORS UNDER UN COVER AND WITH UN FINANCING. HE STRESSED THAT HIS INITIATIVE WAS NOT DESIGNED TO CUT ACROSS MWINYI'S EFORTS, BUT TO BE COMPLEMENTARY TO THEM.
4. RUDASINGWA REPORTED THE RPF'S RESPONSE TO MUSEVENI'S REQUEST THAT THEY CONSIDER A CEASEFIRE. THIS WAS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE RPF WERE READY TO AGREE TO A CEASEFIRE SUBJECT TO THE SO-CALLED RWANDAN GOVERNMENT STOPPING THE KILLINGS, PUNISHING THOSE RESPONSIBLE AND ARRANGEMENTS TO STOP THEIR RECURRENCE.
5. MUSEVENI INVITED COMMENTS. NO-ONE APART FROM THE RPF, APPEARED TO HAVE INSTRUCTIONS. ALL WELCOMED THE RPF'S ACCEPTANCE OF ARUSHA AS THE BASIC FRAMEWORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THEIR INSISTENCE ON STOPPING THE MASSACRES AND PREVENTING A RECURRENCE AS A PRECONDITION OF A CEASEFIRE. THE US AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED AGREEMENT THAT IF, WITHIN A PERIOD OF A FEW DAYS (NOT MORE THAN THREE) THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAD MET THESE TWO CONDITIONS, THE RPF WOULD THEREUPON

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IMPLEMENT A CEASEFIRE.

6. I MADE FOUR POINTS:

(A) RWANDA WAS IN CHAOS AND CONDITIONAL AGREEMENTS MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT, EVEN IF (AS WAS NOT APPARENT) THERE WAS GOOD WILL. THE WORLD WAS SICKENED BY THE VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, FRUSTRATED THAT THE INTERNAL PARTIES DID NOT PERMIT UNAMIR TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE AND FEARFUL OF THE RISKS THE FORCE FACED.

(B) UNAMIR'S FUTURE WAS PROBABLY BEING DISCUSSED AS WE SPOKE.

(C) THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CEASEFIRE, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, WHICH WOULD ITSELF PROVIDE THE IMPETUS AND IMPOSE ON ALL PARTIES AN OBLIGATION TO STOP THE KILLINGS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF CONTROL.

(D) THE NEED TO COMMUNICATE WITH SCATTERED MILITARY UNITS SHOULD NOT DELAY ANNOUNCEMENT OF A CEASEFIRE: 48 HOURS WAS TOO LONG, 24 SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT.

MUSEVENI BACKED ME ON BOTH (C) AND (D). HE TOLD RUDASINGWA THE PROSPECTS OF GETTING A DECENT SETTLEMENT IN RWANDA WERE BETTER FROM THE RPF'S POINT OF VIEW THAN THEY HAD EVER BEEN. THE RPF SHOULD NOT RISK THEIR ADVANTAGE BY FLOUTING WORLD OPINION.

7. RUDASINGWA WAS VERY RELUCTANT TO CONSIDER A CEASEFIRE WITHOUT PRIOR EVIDENCE OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S WILL AND CAPACITY TO STOP THE MASSACRES. MUSEVENI PRESSED HIM VERY HARD INDEED TO SEEK FROM RPF HQ AT MULINDI ACCEPTANCE OF THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE:

- ANNOUNCEMENT ON TIMING TO BE AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES THAT A CEASEFIRE WOULD BE IN FORCE 24 HOURS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT:

- FROM THE START OF THE CEASEFIRE, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE 96 HOURS TO CONTROL THE VIOLENCE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF CONTROL:

- UNAMIR WOULD BE ASKED TO VERIFY WHETHER THE KILLINGS HAD IN FACT STOPPED:

- IF SO, BOTH SIDES WOULD BE COMMITTED TO GOING ON TO DISCUSS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS:

- A COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY WOULD BE ESTABLISHED INTO THE KILLINGS AND MASSACRES BEFORE AND AFTER HABYARIMANA'S DEATH, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS OWN DEATH.

8. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT THE DIPLOMATS WOULD MEET UNDER THE TANZANIAN'S CHAIRMANSHIP AT 210600Z TO DRAFT AN AGREED TEXT WHICH, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY MUSEVENI, RUDASINGWA COULD COMMEND TO RPF HQ AND KANYARUSHOKE TO HIS AUTHORITIES. THE OTHER DIPLOMATS WOULD COMMEND IT TO THEIR CAPITALS.

COMMENT

9. MUSEVENI WAS AT HIS BEST - CONSTRUCTIVE, PATIENT BUT READY TO USE HIS PRESTIGE AND CLOUT WITH THE RPF. HE PUBLICLY LECTURED RUDASINGWA ON THE NECESSITY OF NOT GETTING ACROSS INTERNATIONAL OPINION, WHICH WOULD ONLY DAMAGE HIS CAUSE. IT IS HELPFUL THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAW THIS PERFORMANCE AND INDEED PARTICIPATED IN THE INFORMAL CONSENSUS WE REACHED.

CLAY

FM FCO
TO IMMEDIATE KAMPALA
TELNO 44
OF 201631Z APRIL 94.

82
YOUR TELNO 119: RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. We should keep along side Museveni and encourage him to remain engaged with RPF. Regional peace keeping forces idea interesting but real problems likely on funding.

DETAIL

2. We welcome Museveni's continued efforts to encourage the RPF to accept a cease fire and agree you should keep along side him.

3. In principle we would welcome a greater regional involvement in peace keeping in Rwanda but it is difficult to see much prospect of progress on this until an effective cease-fire is in place. If Museveni is proposing a revamped UNAMIR with a higher regional content, this might be a starter in due course. However, if the aim is a force on the lines of the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism, there is no prospect of the UN agreeing to foot the bill. The UN will only fund operations which it mandates and directs (there have been similar pleas from the Russians for their peacekeeping costs in the FSU which have been rejected). The best that might be arranged is something similar to the operations in Liberia and Burundi where the OAU have provided forces and the UN Secretary-General has set up a trust fund and solicited voluntary contributions. However there is not much sign of donor enthusiasm for these arrangements. Our own ability to contribute would be severely circumscribed. Although we gave Pounds Sterling 1 million for humanitarian aid purposes to the UN trust fund for Liberia, we have no financial provision for peace-keeping operations other than those set up

by the UN Security Council.

4. There is the additional consideration that there could well be local objections to a substantial Ugandan involvement in any peace-keeping force. Museveni himself is regarded as being ethnically Tutsi by the Rwandans. This makes him well placed to act as an interlocutor with the RPF, but suspect to the Hutus (as well as France and Belgium).

FM KAMPALA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 121
OF 211112Z APRIL 94

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TOP COPY
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Per [Signature]
21/

MY TELNO 120 : RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. TEXT OF FINAL DRAFT OF A PROPOSAL FOR MUSEVENI TO PUT TO THE RPF AND THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT.

DETAIL

2. THE DRAFTING GROUP MET AS AGREED (PARAS 7 AND 8 OF NY TUR) AND AGREED TO PUT TO PRESIDENT MUSEVENI THE DRAFT TEXT IN PARA 4 BELOW. SUBJECT TO HIS APPROVAL OF THE TEXT, IT WILL BE FOR MUSEVENI TO INVITE THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF TO CONSIDER IT URGENTLY AND TO RESPOND TO IT. EITHER THE TANZANIAN (AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FACILITATOR) OR THE GROUP COLLECTIVELY WILL PUT THE DRAFT TO MUSEVENI, HOPEFULLY TODAY.

3. THE GROUP HAD A DIFFICULT TIME WITH RUDASINGWA (RPF) WHO ENTERED A NUMBER OF RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE DRAFT. KANYARUSHOKE (GOR) PERSONALLY ACCEPTED THE DRAFT TEXT. I REMINDED THE MEETING THAT:

- (A) THIS WAS PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S INITIATIVE AND IT WAS FOR HIM TO FINALISE AND TO DECIDE HOW TO DEPLOY THE DOCUMENT. HE HAD SIMPLY INVITED US TO DRAFT A SUMMARY OF HIS WINDING UP OF LAST NIGHT:
- (B) THE URGENT MATTER WAS TO GET A CEASE FIRE:
- (C) RUDASINGWA'S ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE DISCUSSION OF QUOTE LEGITIMACY UNQUOTE AND TO QUALIFY THE WORD QUOTE VIOLENCE UNQUOTE WOULD BE SEEN BY WORLD OPINION AS DISTRACTIONS FROM THE OVERWHELMING NEED TO STOP THE KILLINGS.

4. THIS IS THE FINAL DRAFT TEXT WHICH IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO MUSEVENI :

1. THE GOR AND RPF WILL MAKE SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENTS COMMITTING EACH SIDE TO ENTER INTO AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE THAT WOULD GO INTO FORCE 24 HOURS AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. (AT HOURS RWANDA TIME: ... TIME GMT).
2. FROM THE START OF THE CEASE-FIRE, BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE 96 HOURS TO CONTROL THE VIOLENCE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF CONTROL:
3. UNAMIR WOULD BE ASKED TO VERIFY BOTH THE CEASE-FIRE AND WHETHER THE KILLINGS HAD IN FACT STOPPED:
4. IF SO, BOTH SIDES WOULD BE COMMITTED TO MOVE TO IMMEDIATE DISCUSSION OF THE EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS:
5. AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO ENQUIRE INTO THE KILLINGS AND MASSACRES BEFORE AND AFTER THE LATE PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S DEATH, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS OWN DEATH.

CLAY

FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 211600Z FCO
TELNO 122
OF 211406Z APRIL 94
INFO DESKBY 211600Z UKMIS NEW YORK

25/4
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MY TELNO 121 : RWANDA : PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. MUSEVENI APPROVES WITH SLIGHT AMENDMENT THE DRAFT TEXT OF HIS PROPOSAL TO THE RPF AND THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT. BOTH PARTIES TO REPLY AT 230600Z.

DETAIL

2. AT A FURTHER MEETING WITH THE SAME GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVES AS LAST NIGHT'S GATHERING, (MY TELNO 120), PRESIDENT MUSEVENI WENT OVER THE DRAFT PROPOSAL THE GROUP HAD PREPARED FOR HIM (PARA 4 OF MY TUR). HE APPROVED IT, WITH THE FOLLOWING CHANGES :

- (A) IN PARA 1, REPLACE THE FIRST FOUR WORDS WITH QUOTE BOTH SIDES UNQUOTE.
- (B) IN PARA 3, INSERT A NEW SENTENCE AFTER STOPPED: QUOTE OAU AND REGIONAL COUNTRIES WOULD CONSIDER HOW THEY COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THIS: UNQUOTE.
- (C) DELETE THE FIRST TWO WORDS IN PARA 4 AND INSERT INSTEAD : QUOTE SUBJECT TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PARA 2 ABOVE, BOTH ... UNQUOTE.

3. RUDASINGWA (RPF) AND KANYARUSHOKE (RWANDAN AMBASSADOR) WERE TASKED TO PUT THE PROPOSAL TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AUTHORITIES, AND TO REPORT BACK WITH THEIR REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT MUSEVENI ON SATURDAY MORNING. THE REST OF US WERE ASKED TO ATTEND.

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4. IF BOTH SIDES ACCEPT MUSEVENI'S PROPOSAL, HE WILL THEN TELL PRESIDENT MWINYI BEFORE THE MEETING SCHEDULED TO START AT ARUSHA LATER THAT DAY. THE ANNOUNCEMENTS WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE CEASE-FIRE WOULD THEN FOLLOW. IF THE TWO SIDES DO NOT AGREE, DISCUSSION OF THE POINTS OF DIFFERENCE WILL HAVE TO PROCEED AT ARUSHA.

COMMENT

5. THE AMENDMENT TO PARA 3 CAUSED MUCH DISCUSSION: MUSEVENI WAS TEMPTED - IN DEFERENCE TO THE RPF'S LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN UNAMIR'S CAPACITY TO PERFORM THE VERIFICATION ROLE - TO AMEND PARA 3 IN A WAY WHICH WOULD HAVE PRE-EMPTED SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR.

6. I ARGUED THAT THE COURSE OF ACTION IN PARA 4 WAS FUZZY AND RISKED THE INITIATIVE LOSING IMPETUS: RUDASINGWA AND KANYARUSHOKE SHOULD BE PRESSED TO GET THEIR AUTHORITIES TO AGREE RAPIDLY TO AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CEASE-FIRE, EVEN IN ADVANCE OF ARUSHA. BUT I LOST THE POINT. I FEAR THAT THE INITIATIVE MAY GET BOGGED DOWN IN THE ARUSHA DISCUSSIONS AND THAT THE CEASE-FIRE MAY BE LONG DELAYED, IF IT IS ACHIEVABLE AT ALL.

CLAY