



Ministry  
of Defence

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HP14 4UE

Our Ref: FOI2017/07456

21 August 2017

Dear [REDACTED],

Thank you for your email of 21 July 2017 requesting the following information:

*Please provide copies of all Defence Air Safety Occurrence Reports filed by air traffic control personnel at RAF Spadeadam in the period 1st January 2014 to 31st December 2016.*

*Please note that a response in electronic spreadsheet form, containing the Report ID, Incident Type, Date of Occurrence, Brief Title, Description, and Perceived Severity, is acceptable.*

I am treating your correspondence as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA).

I am writing to confirm that MOD holds some information on the subject you have requested. However, some of the information you requested falls within the scope of the following exemptions, Section 40 and Section 43 (2) of the FOI Act.

Section 40 is an absolute exemption and an assessment of the public interest for and against disclosure is not required under the terms of the Act.

Section 43 (2) is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice the commercial interests of any person (including the public authority holding it). This exemption is a qualified exemption and, as such, it has been necessary to decide whether, in all the circumstances of the case, the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosure. The balance of the public interest test concluded that while there is clear public interest in the transparency of this information, withholding some of it enables the MOD to have the ability to engage with commercial partners in confidence enabling good commercial outcomes.

Please find attached a redacted copy of the information you requested.

If you have any queries regarding the content of this letter, please contact this office in the first instance

If you wish to complain about the handling of your request, or the content of this response, you can request an independent internal review by contacting the Information Rights Compliance team, Ground Floor, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, SW1A 2HB (e-mail CIO-FOI-IR@mod.uk). Please note that any request for an internal review should be made within 40 working days of the date of this response.

If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may raise your complaint directly to the Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. Please note that the Information Commissioner will not normally investigate your case until the MOD internal review process has been completed. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at: Information Commissioner's Office, Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF. Further details of the role and powers of the Information Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website at <https://ico.org.uk/>.

Yours sincerely



Air Command Secretariat

## Annex A

Report ID	Incident Type	Date of Occ	Brief Title	Description	Perceived Severity
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\11258	Incident	19/10/2016	Loss of RAF Spadeadam ATM VHF Frequency 128x725MHz	At 0800Z, as the Duty Air Traffic Controller in Charge (ATCO IC), I was informed by the RAF Spadeadam Engineering Co-ordination section that the ATM VHF frequency 128x725 authority to radiate had expired and that as a consequence, until such time as the authority is re-instated, no more transmissions are to be made on this frequency. This VHF frequency is the only VHF frequency at Spadeadam ATC's availability and as such is vital in the safe and expeditious transit of both Military and Civil air systems. Whilst some mitigation can be instituted with the majority of civil general air traffic (GAT) there are periods when civil air systems have to, as a matter of urgency (Air Ambulances etc) transit the airspace of D510/D510A. By not having this function available to us severely hampers these events to the point of elevating the risk to life to not only injured parties in the process of being attended to but also the intermix of military and civilian air systems operating within the confines of D510/D510A where co-ordination between the two events now becomes a labour intensive and possibly restrictive process to ensure that safety is not compromised. Temporary procedures are being put in place and NOTAM action executed to attempt to minimise any safety issues until such time as this issue can be rectified.	A - High
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\11170	Incident	17/10/2016	Failure of RDS 1600 Console	During a Joint Warrior COMAO this afternoon, I was the safety controller monitoring the COMAO under the control of Boulmer CRC. At 1445z the left hand RDS 1600 (RVU 1) failed, & Nav Comms were called to investigate the problem. At 1450z the RVU was declared serviceable again.	A - High
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\11105	Incident	14/10/2016	Failure of Mascot Minicomms System	At 1100z Leeming Ground rang me with a prenote on Stakki 31 Flt, as I took the prenote I lent over to pick up the flight strip which was the other side of my Mascot panel & the comms went dead. After removing and refitting the headset plug, the comms came back but kept fading in & out. Navcomms were called, supervisor informed & the console declared unserviceable UFN. This was not ideal as 5 SWAF Gripen were due onto the range as part of JW & this automatically negated the use of a support controller. Thus increasing the controllers workload. The console was declared serviceable again at 1130z.	A - High
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\10959	Incident	11/10/2016	Possible EG D510A Airspace Infringement	I was the ATCO on console that witnessed the possible range infringement, at the time of the incident Lizard 52 (LD 52) was under my control & inbound to the range from RAF Leeming. Initially LD 52 was in the block 9000-15000 whilst transiting to operate within the range, with approximately 15 miles to run to the range boundary I noticed a primary only contact departing the Carlisle ATZ to the north which then dropped off of the radar. LD 52 then asked permission to conduct a met check in the local area working from the surface to 15,000'. LD 52 was cleared into the new altitude block & warned of his terrain clearance responsibilities, shortly after this a primary only contact appeared inside the south western range boundary tracking south east slowly. I cross checked this contact against my second radar display which had the Greymare Hill MSSR selected on it & after a few more radar sweeps a 0036 mode 3a code appeared with 005- on the associated mode C. I estimate that both the primary and secondary radar contacts were 0.5NM inside the range boundary. Traffic information was passed to LD 52 who had already started to turn north & the contact was seen to exit the range continuing on the same track. I contacted Carlisle air operations to gain some identification of the aircraft, as Carlisle ATC was unavailable due to the controller being on a break. The helicopter was identified to me as a Jetranger (GBXNS), callign Pipeline 81 which is operated by Helicentre Aviation. I tried to contact the AS on VHF but there was no answer, I also checked with Newcastle ATC & they were not working the AS. I rang the company to inform them that this DASOR was being raised, & the chief pilot checked the AS GPS track. He informed me that the AS had transited just outside of the range boundary, but he will re-check & after speaking to the pilot send me a comment to add to this DASOR to support any recommendations from the report.	A - High
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\10961	Incident	11/10/2016	Mascot Minicomms Instructor Comms Failure	Whilst screening SATCO this morning, I noticed that whenever a landline button was selected on the Mascot Minicomms panel, the radio frequencies would immediately blank out & the instructor could not hear any aircraft transmissions. I checked this with SATCO to see if he was having the same problem, which he wasn't so we concluded that it was purely a fault with the instructors comms. As I could potentially miss critical flight safety information whilst my U/T conducted a radar handover, we immediately contacted Navcomms to diagnose & fix the fault, once the AS had departed & a suitable window of opportunity was available. At the time of the incident we had 3 AS within Spadeadam's AoR conducting 2 separate tasks, Fabric 31 conducting training at Brunton with an SA6, & Lizard 37 Flt conducting CAS training within EG D510/510A. The AS were on 2 separate ATC frequencies with a third CAS frequency being monitored, again increasing the risk of the instructor missing critical information should a landline call have to be made. Due to the ATM workload a second controller was already in position conducting the support role on the spare ATM console, for the remainder of the sortie all landline calls were done by the support controller to ensure the instructor did not miss any transmissions. For the remainder of the day, ATM only had one serviceable Mascot Minicomms panel as Navcomms continue to diagnose the fault.	A - High
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\10882	Incident	10/10/2016	Failure of RDS 1600 Console	Whilst conducting opening up checks this morning, I immediately noticed that the left hand RDS 1600 console was unserviceable. Navcomms were informed & the unserviceability annotated in the ATM log book. The console was declared serviceable at 1100z.	B - Medium
asorSpadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\10778	Incident	06/10/2016	Failure of Mascot Minicomms	At 1312z Jackal 21 Flt were observed leaving the range to the north at low level, no radio call had been received (believed due to terrain) so I was trying to re-establish comms with them on 282x050 to confirm their intentions as they were co-ordinated against civil traffic above their altitude block. Nothing was heard, so I called D&D to ask them to go out on guard. As I started speaking to D&D support, the line went dead & Mascot Minicomms failed, Navcomms were called out to investigate. Both the [REDACTED] extensions were red & my console had to be reset. Whilst this was happening, D&D were contacted on a separate landline to pass the message about Jackal 21 Flt, as were Carlisle who were about to freecall a Helimed AS routing to the south of the range. Mascot Minicomms was restored at 1318z.	A - High

## Annex A

aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\10726	Incident	30/09/2016	Approach To Incorrect HLS	I was the duty controller on console working an A109 rotary air system inbound to the Range with a VIP on board for a visit to RAF Spadeadam. The programme, and the flight strip indicated that the AS was landing at R7 HLS. I asked the pilot at the Range boundary to report final for R7. When he reported final, I instructed him to land at his discretion on R7 and passed the surface wind. At this point the SATCO (who was watching from outside the building); entered the room and asked if the AS was landing at R7, as it looked as if it was making an approach to the MGR HLS (which is located a few miles away from R7). As I operate from an enclosed control room and was not visual with the AS, I asked the pilot to confirm he was landing at R7. He asked me to stand by, and then told me negative, & that he was landing at site 4 as pre-arranged. I didn't question this, as I may not have been aware of any pre-arranged agreement; or attempt to prevent the AS from landing as I was aware that the pilot was in a crucial stage of the approach. I merely asked other personnel in the room to get the message to the Stn Cdr asap, who was located at R7 awaiting the VIP's arrival.	B - Medium
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\10404	Incident	28/09/2016	Mascot Mini Comms Failure	During the running of Ex Cobra Warrior I observed the Mascot Mini Comms System failure. Nav Comms were contacted and reset the system, which brought it back online.	A - High
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\9381	Incident	31/08/2016	Failure of MIEAMS System	The MIEAMS system became unresponsive (egg timer) at approximately 0900Z, thereby halting the receipt of NOTAMS. I asked NAV COMMS personnel to take a look at the modem after rebooting the system several times myself to no avail. They could not bring the system back up, so I rang the help desk to ask if any updates had been implemented which would prevent the system restarting. I asked NATS to fax the backup NOTAMS to the Eng Co-Ord Fax, as agreed. I then rang the iHub for assistance. One of their personnel was already in the Berry Hill building and was asked to have a look. By the time he had looked at the equipment, it came back on again so we left the situation. The system then failed again and I requested the backup fax NOTAM from NATS. I rang the iHub again and was told the situation would be referred to [REDACTED] who then rang and informed me he would drive up to Berry Hill to have a look. When he checked the modem, the lights were on and the system responded. I cancelled the requested NOTAM fax backup after another hour just to make sure the system remained serviceable.	C - Low
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\8743	Incident	10/08/2016	Complete loss of Mascot Minicomms	I am an FOA in the Ops Room at Berry Hill. At 0915Z, I noted that the Mascot Minicomms system was not working. I checked the radio frequencies and telephone lines and confirmed that all of the Mascot Minicomms terminals were non-functional. I attempted to contact the Nav Comms Engineers unsuccessfully, then verbally reported the situation to the Air Traffic Controllers. The DATCO then reported the situation to [REDACTED] SHQ via the back-up telephones. The Nav Comms Engineers then returned to Berry Hill and restored serviceability to the Mascot Minicomms system at 0925Z.	C - Low
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\8678	Incident	09/08/2016	Distress and Diversion Line U/S	At 1030z, I tried to contact the Distress & Diversion (D & D) cell using the direct line on Mascot Minicomms. This was to assist in contacting a pair of Tomado GR4 aircraft (Jackal 11 FR) that had just departed the range. The direct line was dead so I had to use the DFTN number instead; D & D range me back using their direct line, which came through to our admin line number [REDACTED] instead of the D & D direct line. This fault has been logged with the Aquila help desk in order to notify Navcomms & the sunset tasking tool has also been used to bring this fault to C4Is attention.	A - High
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\16\8038	Incident	21/07/2016	Greymare SSR failure	At 1200Z today, it was observed that SSR contacts showing on the Greymare SSR Radar were sporadically dropping out to a point where only two or three radar contacts were being displayed. For the next thirty minutes SSR data was periodically showing/not showing to the point that the Radar became unusable for ATM Ops. Aquila/NAVCOMMS were advised of the issue and an investigation carried out to ascertain the fault. A possible fault was identified and suitable replacement parts ordered as a priority. Due to the ability to crosscheck the Great Dun Fell radar with set calibration markers it was decided that there was no requirement to lapse the autonomous status of the Spadeadam ATM. Until such time as the fault is rectified the Greymare SSR Radar has been deemed unserviceable.	A - High
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\7773	Hazard/Observation	15/07/2016	Berry Hill Watchman Failure	At 0940z, a USAF C-130 from 67 SOS callsign Strix 07 had been identified & placed under a Traffic Service (TS) below terrain safe level. At 0941z the PSR lead was seen to disappear, & Strix 07s TS was reduced to working SSR alone. The Aquila service desk was called & a maintenance request submitted. The Aquila service desk then contacted Nav Comms who are co-located within the Berry Hill Operations building, & they diagnosed the fault. The Berry Hill PSR was declared serviceable at 0957z.	A - High
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\7788	Incident	15/07/2016	Complete loss of Mascot Minicomms	At 1228z I was working a pair of A10s call sign Boar 23 FR; I had just taken a handover of a pair of F15s call sign Hoss 31 FR who were still inside CAS (P18). Approximately 5 seconds after I had finished the phone call, the Mascot minicomms system failed. All frequencies & landlines were unselectable, and I was unable to transmit or receive anything. As Hoss 31 FR were still inside CAS & not yet on my frequency, the Swanwick Mil North East planner was called immediately from another independent landline. I requested that Swanwick Mil retain Hoss 31 FR & ask the lead pilot to contact Boar 23 FR & get them to contact Swanwick Mil for a service. After this, the Aquila services number was called to register a maintenance request. This call took 2 minutes & they then contacted our nav comms section, who are co-located within the Berry hill operations building with us. Nav comms rectified the fault & the equipment was declared serviceable at 1235z.	A - High
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\7646	Incident	13/07/2016	EG D508 Infringement	Boar 1 FR free called me south east of EG D512 (Otterburn range), requesting permission to enter EG D510 (Spadeadam) range for a recon FR. The aircraft were issued a mode 3a (1741) & their altitude on the Tyne RPS 29.82° The type of service was also requested. Boar 1 read back the RPS, told me the pair was at 2,000' and requested a Traffic Service (TS). The aircraft were identified, placed under a TS and informed that they were responsible for their own terrain clearance. I immediately passed traffic information to them about EG D508 which was in their 12 o'clock at 2 miles; I told them that it was active up to 4,100' AMSL and to remain clear. Boar 1 answered, asking if I said it was in his 12 o'clock. By the time this transmission had ended the aircraft had already penetrated the danger area. I informed them of this and told them to maintain their course as this was the most expeditious course of action to exit the danger area. The USAF liaison officer was informed immediately and he liaised directly with the Squadron to ensure it doesn't happen again during the exercise.	B - Medium

## Annex A

ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1617134	Incident	29/08/2016	Removal of UHF Comms	This morning I received a call by OC ISF that we had lost all our ATC UHF frequency clearances, and we were to cease using them wis. He had checked the frequency allocation spreadsheet (PSA) and after calling direct to the Spectrum cell at RAF Leeming it was made evident that they have removed our frequency clearances from the JSA database and in turn the NATO equivalent (SMIR). This meant that RAF Spadeadam had no UHF capability fn.	A - High
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1615814	Hazard/Observation	23/05/2016	Ammunition found on R7 HLS	I was conducting the daily inspection of the R7 Helicopter Landing Site (HLS), on entering the HLS via the western most access ramp I discovered several empty 5.56mm blank casings between the access ramp and the first landing spot. A thorough FOD Plod was conducted on foot, & between 75 -100 empty 5.56mm blank casings were found. As well as numerous 5.56mm chain links & 2 live 5.56mm blank rounds. As the HLS is made of brick paving forming a zig zag pattern, the ammunition was quite hard to spot as at least 50% of it was lying on the lines.	B - Medium
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\1615248	Hazard/Observation	09/05/2016	Greymare SSR	Despite an initial successful Calibration Flight of the Greymare SSR, it was noted post flight that there was an issue with the Radar's 'cone of Silence'. Initial thoughts were that the calibration aircraft had an unserviceability with on board equipment, however, further flight calibrations of other Unit's radars confirmed that the calibration aircraft was fully serviceable. It was therefore deemed that the issue was with the Greymare SSR, but whatever the problem was could not be identified and therefore an 8nm radius (from the SSR overhead) restriction was put in place until such time as the fault could be identified. The matter has been passed onto Raytheon for further investigation.	B - Medium
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1614783	Hazard/Observation	27/04/2016	Loss of NATS Radar Feed	At 1335z the NATS radar feed disappeared from my RVU and all landlines to Swanwick started ringing, after cross checking with another display it was evident that the NATS radar feed was down. Nav Comms were informed immediately and all external agencies contacted law the RAF Spadeadam ATMOB. The Swanwick Supervisor confirmed that the GDF radar was fully serviceable at their end.	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1614588	Incident	26/04/2016	Loss of NATS Radar Feed	At 1245z the NATS radar feed disappeared from my RVU, after cross checking with another display it was evident that the NATS radar feed was down. Nav Comms were informed immediately and all external agencies contacted law the RAF Spadeadam ATMOB.	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1613764	Incident	06/04/2016	D510 Range Infringement	At 0920z the Carlisle controller called me to pass traffic information on a GA flight transiting to the south of D510. At that time the aircraft was west of Carlisle Airport at 1,500', tracking east towards Haltwhistle and Hexham and I could not see it on radar. I had a pair of HH-60 on R7 dropping off pax prior to an EW sortie, so I told the Carlisle controller that I had nothing to effect the GA aircrafts transit to the south as they would be staying within the confines of the range. At 0930z a 4677 squawk (Carlisle conspicuity code) was seen to enter the range boundary from the south west, I immediately contacted Carlisle ATC and informed them of the aircrafts position. The pilot was instructed to leave the range by Carlisle ATC, and the aircraft was seen to turn southbound to clear the range. As the aircraft was leaving the range, its squawk was seen to change to a Newcastle squawk. I measured the aircrafts distance from the range boundary using the RVU range/bearing tool and this was 2 miles inside the southern range boundary, within the confines of the DNV-GL warning circle displayed on the RVU. I spoke to Carlisle again once the aircraft was seen to clear the range, the Carlisle controller believes that this may have been a mis-interpretation by the pilot as he told him that Spadeadam had nothing to effect. Throughout this infringement, both HH-60 callign Jolly 11/12 were safe on R7 conducting there pax drop off.	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\1612860	Hazard/Observation	11/03/2016	Landline unserviceability	Upon reporting for the start of my shift I began to carry out standard opening up checks, which includes Radar and communication functionality checks. Upon checking the direct landline to Newcastle ATC Approach, it was discovered that the direct line was not working. NAVCOMMS were advised of the unserviceability and began an investigation. This landline is one of several required to safely operate air systems in the Spadeadam AoR and is used frequently to co-ordinate multiple air systems during their transit/range operations.	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\1612676	Incident	07/03/2016	MIL EAMS Equipment Unserviceable	A job had been raised to seat the MIL EAMS satellite receiver onto a concrete handstanding, rather than being secured by sandbags. The intent was to move the satellite a few feet to the inside, to enable digging of foundations for the concrete standing. The satellite was moved and the signal was lost. [REDACTED] informed the FOA that an engineer would need to be called to re-site the satellite in order to regain the signal, instead of the half hour or so it would have been to put back the satellite in its original place. The engineer will probably take up to the end of the week to attend once the concrete has set and the satellite placed back in position.  This has impacts on the receipt of NOTAMs for ATC safety; as well as receipt of regional QNH information, the broadcast of Spadeadams weather and the proposal of NOTAMs. A backup system of linking NOTAMs to our fax machine has failed, and as NOTAMs have failed to be received using the Ops Room fax machine. The Eng Co-ord fax was set up to receive faxes, but this also has problems. We are currently awaiting the latest suggestion from Swanwick helpdesk.	A - High
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Other\1612948	Accident	07/03/2016	SAB Vehicle vehicle stuck in ditch	Vehicle moved under escort through Spadeadam Forest tracks to meet the requirements of the above Ex. SA 8 vehicle rt hand wheel caught soft ground and left road into a ditch, the driver was uninjured. Vehicle was recovered following day by outside approved contractors and station Landmark personnel without damage. Vehicle underwent cleaning after photographs were taken. Both mechanical and electronic inspections were undertaken and no faults were found. Only superficial scratches were present as a result of the vehicle leaving the road.	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\1612438	Hazard/Observation	02/03/2016	NATS ORRD AND LANDLINE FAILURE	Upon reporting for the start of my shift, I was informed via the NAVCOMMS Supervisor that the NATS Great Dun Fell Radar feed was U/S. Upon checking the ATC Consoles as part of the morning checks, all direct landlines to external agencies (NATS, Swanwick etc) were also U/S. The loss of the NATS ORRD affects the provision of Spadeadam's Autonomous Radar status. As a result the duty FOA has been informed to notify any FJ's which book onto the range that there will be restrictions on the ATS that can be provided. Additionally, the DATCO has been informed to notify Swanwick (Mil) that they may need to control Range traffic transiting in the UAS/CAS.	B - Medium

## Annex A

aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\2083	Incident	23/02/2016	Loss of Landline Comms at RAF Spadeadam	This morning the following equipment failed to work when conducting the ATM morning checks - 6 series telephone lines when dialling out to a full telephone number, 7 series telephone numbers both dialling out and receiving, and intermittent serviceability when calling GPTN on the 6 series. All other direct dial numbers to adjacent ATC units were fully serviceable for outgoing and incoming calls. The issue with 7 series numbers on camp was highlighted the previous day and subject to BT work. Reporting of the issue has been made via the Sth ISF using email. Operational ATS support can still be provided however no messages can be received via Sqns direct to traffic working Spadeadam.	B - Medium
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\2094	Incident	23/02/2016	Comms failure to Swanwick (Mil)	I was controlling a pair of GR4s(Vampire 21F) conducting EW Operations in D510/510A. On completion of their task the pilot requested FL190 RTB via the TILNI RVC. I was unable to achieve 2 way landlines communications to Swanwick (Mil) to hand the aircraft over. After 3 failed attempts, and having used various methods to establish a connection on the landlines, I gave up and instructed the aircraft to carry out a left hand orbit clear of CAS, and to freecall Swanwick (Mil) on the ICF.	C - Low
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\1144	Hazard/Observation	02/02/2016	Interrupted sleep within the Combined Mess	During the evening of 1 Feb 16 and into the early hours of 2 Feb 16, I had a full evening of interrupted sleep caused in part due to the inclement weather outside (Storm Henry) and a faulty tannoy system outside my room in the combined mess. Having gone to bed at 2230, strong winds outside the building caused me to remain awake. Whilst the storm winds have been excessive (reported to have gusted upto 80mph in the local AoR), the vents in the window and some recent repair work have only increased the whistling heard reverberating through the windows. A similar experience with the windows had occurred on the evenings of 30 Jan and 31 Jan however this had not restricted some sleep. At approx 0300, the tannoy began to make an excessive squelching noise much akin to someone blowing through it. This continued on and off until aprox 0500 with the most significant occurrence at aprox 0350hrs. Again there had been a fault with the tannoy which had been repaired following previous occurrences. I am concerned that a continuation of interrupted sleep for any length of time would have potential flight safety consequences for the 3 ATM personnel whom live within the combined mess. Coupled with this any other personnel not involved in Flight Safety tasks but employed in driving duties or operating machinery may also be equally fatigued.  I reported the issue to OC Ops on reporting to duty at 0800 and the mess manager at 0820. The other ATCO on shift has also reported a similar issue and will raise a seperate DASOR.	C - Low
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\16\1149	Hazard/Observation	02/02/2016	Continuously noisy living environment	A culmination of poor window fixings, ventilation fans within the bathroom and an unserviceable Tannoy system has led to a continuous level of noise that has risen to a degree that sleep is continually disrupted. The inclement weather, which includes high wind speeds has exacerbated the situation to an unacceptable level. The resultant lack of sleep is having a direct and detrimental effect on the operational day. This includes a lack of motivation, drowsiness and a degraded ability to focus on the requirements of the day. Being an Air Traffic Controller elevates this state to a level where Flight Safety could be compromised. With 75% of Spadeadam ATC living within the aforementioned constraints, these continual interruptions to the natural sleeping pattern can only have a detrimental effect on both individual capability and the output of the Unit as a whole. The Tannoy system began this morning emanating a level of noise (due to a known fault which was seemingly repaired earlier) at approximately 0300 Hrs this morning and continued for some 2-3 hours. The level of noise precluded the chance of any sleep. The matter was reported to the Mess manager on arrival at work this morning. The windows of a number of living-in personnel were recently changed because of issues with poor fixings/ventilation. The newer windows have not improved the situation, if anything they are worse. A constant howling (despite the window being fully closed) can be heard all night( the high winds again making the situation worse). The recipient cold wind blowing through these poor fixings further adds to the discomfort of the night.  2 Feb 16 - PMC informed and reported to OC BSS.	A - High
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Chinook\15\12065	Hazard/Observation	25/11/2015	Communications Failure	At 1300Hrs, whilst controlling a single CH47 Chinook (conducting EW Ops), Spadeadam Ops room suffered a complete failure of communications (landlines and air comms). Communications were re-established relatively quickly with the CH47 through the use of a Havequick radio located within the Operations room for just such an occasion. NAVCOMMS was advised of the Comms failure and were quick to respond. Within the following five minutes communications were restored. The initial NAVCOMM assessment indicated a mascot failure. At the time of the failure essential work was being carried out removing obsolete Cosser radios from the Radio room by Aquilla technicians, however, it is not thought that their work had any relevance to the communications failure. Fortunately, due to the nature of the air operation that was in progress coupled with the ability to use Havequick, the communications failure did not have a significant impact on operations.	C - Low
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\15\11881	Hazard/Observation	19/11/2015	UHF Multi-Channel (M/C) partial failure.	Noted during morning checks that the UHF M/C Tx was not transmitting on RAF Spadeadam Primary frequency (282.050MHz). Checked secondary and tertiary frequencies on M/C and found to be serviceable. Job Card No. 0358191115 raised and work in progress.	C - Low
aso\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\15\11883	Hazard/Observation	18/11/2015	Loss of Microwave Link from Deadwater Fell	Loss of Microwave Link from Deadwater Fell (DWF), resulting in remote AGA Comms from DWF being unavailable thereby decreasing comms range to the north. Babcocks have been tasked with assisting with the fault. Job Card No. 1775181115.	C - Low

Annex A

ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\11732	Hazard/Observation	17/11/2015	Impact on RAF Spadeadam Air Traffic output through sickness of Flight Operations Assistant	<p>Due to the "calling-in-sick" of the Flight Operations Assistant (FOA), exacerbated by the other FOA post being gapped, RAF Spadeadam has not been able to provide a full Air Traffic service to range users on 17 Nov - this scenario will continue until such times as the FOA returns to work. This event impacted on ability of RAF Spadeadam to offer a full ATM service to Ex TUSKAN TACTICAL TRAINER, a CH47 deployment operating out of RAF Leeming and using the Range EW training facilities. By way of mitigation RAF Spadeadam contacted the CH47 DDH to set the conditions to continue training:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The range is treated as DA with RAF Spadeadam ATM providing a BS listening watch and not an radar ATS.</li> <li>2. EGD510 remains active to provide segregated airspace for users carrying out EW trg and manoeuvres.</li> <li>3. Ac operate VFR autonomous and are responsible for safe operations within the confines of the airspace.</li> <li>4. RAF Spadeadam would ensure that during Ex TTT training series (range VULs) they are the sole users of EGD510.</li> <li>5. RAF Spadeadam would advise the DDH chain if the weather forecast/deteriorated to a point where it starts to compromise CH47 VFR ops.</li> </ol> <p>These conditions were accepted as reasonable mitigation and authority was granted by the DDH to continue training.</p> <p>While it is acknowledged the important role that the FOA plays in supporting the Range Air Trafficers, it is difficult to understand: how the absence of this post means only a BS listening watch can only be offered by the present SQEP ATM personnel; why the SQEP ATM personnel are no able to perform the FOA duties. The necessity for OJT in posts is understood, however, in a Sqn with five Ops Spt personnel (one ATC, one Ft Ops, three TG9 seniors), it is ludicrous that non of them are deemed SQEP to stand-in and perform the basic FOA functions under such circumstance.</p>	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\11030	Hazard/Observation	27/10/2015	Loss of Moskit Capability	<p>I contacted GES this afternoon, regarding the use of our MOSKIT this week. I was informed that the MOSKIT was unavailable, and the Movers based at RAF Leeming were due in on Thursday to prep the MOSKIT for flight. I briefed SATCO and she asked me to investigate further as the MOSKIT is one of our mitigations for the use of R7 as a HLS. GES were contacted via email by Air Command requesting the MOSKIT, in order for it to be deployed to RAF Akrotiri next week. I asked how this had come about, as I believed the MOSKIT belonged to RAF Spadeadam for use on R7? The answer I received from GES was that RAF Spadeadam is not scaled for a MOSKIT and a business case would have had to have been submitted for it to be kept here. He believed that there may not be a business case in place and Air Command may have seen the GSE listed as just being stored here at Spadeadam. GES will dig further into this matter to see if we are scaled correctly for the MOSKIT.</p>	C - Low
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\10944	Hazard/Observation	23/10/2015	Mouse Infestation of Berry Hill Operations Room	<p>Berry Hill Operations has an annual rodent problem which is in desperate need of attention. As it gets colder, mice from the surrounding area make there way into the operations room through the floor. A pest control contract used to be in place, floors were lifted &amp; all traps under the floor were routinely checked as well as all holes filled to prevent rodent ingress.</p> <p>In the last 4 weeks at least 12 mice have been found in the traps above ground in the Ops room, more dead mice have been found in void spaces between rooms by Nav Comms as well as fresh holes adjacent to essential wiring for ATM equipment &amp; mice droppings have been found on top of desks &amp; consoles immediately adjacent to keyboards etc.</p> <p>The routine that we have had to adopt to combat this infestation is:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Daily check of the traps above ground, any that have been set off are placed outside.</li> <li>2. Landmarc employee contacted to empty &amp; re-bait the traps with peanut butter.</li> </ol> <p>When the mouse droppings were discovered, I raised a response job with Landmarc (5 Oct ref 36186) to have a pest control company come in &amp; seal all holes &amp; remove all signs of vermin from the area.</p> <p>More &amp; more mice are being found in the traps &amp; just this evening a mouse set off a trap whilst the room was occupied, proving that they are not deterred by our presence. This was a trap immediately adjacent to the radar consoles, there is a gap in the floor to allow essential ATM wiring to pass through &amp; this is probably one of there points of entry.</p> <p>Landmarc are still waiting on a purchase order to be approved, allowing for one months worth of pest control to be conducted. With the quantity of mice being found, &amp; the areas they are being found in. There is a definite flight safety hazard as the ATM equipment could soon be quite easily damaged; a more pertinent issue is the Health &amp; Safety aspects due to evidence of the mice being found above floor level on top of desks. As winter draws closer &amp; the temperatures plummet, more mice will make there way in towards Berry Hill Operations. This problem needs to be eradicated immediately before a member of staff becomes ill, or ATM equipment is declared unserviceable leading to costly &amp; long term unserviceability.</p>	B - Medium
ason\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\10673	Hazard/Observation	19/10/2015	FOD on Berryhill HLS	<p>As part of the weekly SATCO inspection of BH HLS, a 2M of overbanding was found detached from two central concrete slabs. These pieces were removed and the surface declared U/S until a full inspection and rectification work is complete.</p>	B - Medium

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1519967	Hazard/Observation	29/09/2015	Berryhill PSR Fault resulting in release to Navcomms	The Berry Hill Primary Radar has been spoking and providing spurious returns, this was reported to NAVCOMMS and on Mon 28 Sep at 1443 it was released to NAVCOMMS for investigation. During the morning checks today it was reported by NAVCOMMS that they would need to keep the BH offline for investigation. This will result in Spadeadam operating SSR only until the issue is rectified - ac booked onto the range today include 31Sqn, 41 Sqn and 1 Sqn.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1519838	Hazard/Observation	24/09/2015	510 Range infringement by KNIFE63F	Whilst controlling Ex Cobra Warrior traffic on the range, Newcastle Radar prenoted KNIFE63/64 inbound the range from the North of New Class D. Newcastle were passed the Ex Sqks and Spadeadam frequencies 282x050 and 308x775. The ac were observed to track westbound towards LFA13 and EGD510, no Tx were received from KNIFE on any Spadeadam Frequencies. I made a blind Tx on all Spadeadam Frequencies including UHF requesting they checked in. I also requested they squawked ident when at approx 10miles to run from the range boundary. Given that they were indicating less than 1000ft, it is possible they were out of RT coverage. A blind Tx was made to enter the range at their discretion and a BS applied. Further Tx were made when they entered the range and when they proceeded to the pre planned sites within the range for drop off/collection of PAX. The ac were observed to vacate the range inbound Carlisle at 2103.  KNIFE had previously operated in the range at 1938 to 1952 with two way RT with Spadeadam however it had been weak.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1519706	Hazard/Observation	22/09/2015	Concerns about Skyray RT delivery on ATC Frequency	I was the safety controller for a U/T ATCO undergoing a working endorsement check in the presence of ATM STANEVAL. The ATCO was controlling routine EWTF traffic with a Support ATCO in position. Whilst working a FGR4 (Typhoon) the voice callsign 'Skyray' was conducting routine EW liaison as per ACAWEWROs on the Spadeadam ATC Frequency. It was evident that the RT delivery of 'Skyray' was illegible thus increasing the workload for the aircrew and the need for Tx to be repeated. In my opinion ineffective RT delivery not caused by Eqpt issues resulted in extended transmissions on the ATC frequency which was being used for the provision of both an ATS and EW liaison. This issue has been raised previously and I believe that there is an increased likelihood of an Air Safety incident. The SOPs pertaining to the use of RT by 'Skyray' should be reviewed.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1519740	Hazard/Observation	22/09/2015	RAF Spadeadam Cobra Warrior Airspace Infringement	I was the Air Traffic Controller under examination from ATM STANEVAL at the time of the incident, ATC was manned for exercise Cobra Warrior with the anticipation of aircraft checking in & requesting permission to enter the danger area. At the time of the incident I was working one exercise aircraft callsign Guardian, a DA-42 simulating a Shadow at 8000ft. Guardian was requested by white force to come up on the exercise mission frequency 262x750 to speak to all other units taking part. Guardian was pushed to our VHF ATC frequency 128x725 to free up his UHF box which was then set to 262x750. ATC also decided to monitor this frequency for increased SA. At approximately 2020z, Lifter 61 (CH-47), and Knife 63 Ft (2 x V-22) were seen on radar closing from the south at low level. No call to Spadeadam was made on any published Spadeadam frequency by Lifter 61 who could be heard on 262x750. Lifter 61 was seen to enter the DA inbound to his landing site along with Knife 63 Ft. A blind call to Lifter 61 was made on 262x750 granting him access to the range which was acknowledged, Knife 63 Ft were also given a blind call granting clearance but at no time were they heard to respond. The Spadeadam UHF frequencies were listed on the exercise coord card. This was the only interaction with exercise traffic requesting permission to enter the DA, both Lifter 61 and Knife 63 Ft were seen to enter the DA again later in the exercise to conduct a PAX pickup with no request for permission to enter heard from either callsign.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15110047	Hazard/Observation	21/09/2015	Communication with DNV GL	The week commencing 21 Sept 15, RAF Spadeadam was due to open as follows:  Monday - 0800z-1600z Tuesday - 1430z-2230z Wednesday - 1430z-2230z Thursday - 1430z-2230z Friday - 0930z-1500z  On Monday, the Range Controller (RC) informed ATC that the range opening times for Wednesday would be amended to 0930z-1730z to reflect the cancellation of night flying. Later that afternoon the Flight Operations Assistant (FOA) received a NOTAM from DNV GL, this published that they would be conducting explosive trials from 0800z until 1430z Tuesday to Thursday. I brought this to the attention of the RC & the reply I received was "I have nothing to do with that as its NOTAM s****." I tried to expand on this, with regards to DNV GL's awareness of our opening times & the reply I got was, "I have nothing to do with them, they get our opening times from the weekly brief."  I feel that the answers I received are both un-helpful & unprofessional; I took the NOTAM back to the FOA & asked if she would kindly contact DNV GL on this occasion only, as I am fully aware that it is not within her TORs to conduct range planning/ de-confliction. The FOA informed me that she had spoken to DNV GL & also the Fire Section who had also not been informed of the change in timings.  I believe that the potential Flight Safety risk for not liaising with DNV GL is severe; if an explosive test had been conducted & an aircraft was in the vicinity, this could have led to a major Station incident.	B - Medium



Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\6697	Hazard/Observation	19/08/2015	Spadeadam Range Controller Assurance	<p>Nothing untoward as yet has happened so this In Form is to raise a concern that I have had for a number of weeks.</p> <p>On my return from annual leave on 4 Aug 2015, I was instructed to start my Range Controller (RC) Training. This had been discussed prior to my leaving but was not supposed to start until Sep 15, where I was going to be the 'Guinea Pig' for the new RC Trg package.</p> <p>To date I have been training for nearly 2 weeks, I have been on console at least twice each day. I have received no training reports, no real feedback on my performances and no areas to improve on other than voice procedure. There are no TO' or EO's that I have seen and no reading list. My Instructor, a C2 grade Civil Servant, has been in the job for less than 4 months and 'qualified' for even less than that.</p> <p>There is no certification or assurance with the course. I feel that if, and hopefully when, I am 'qualified' I may be held accountable for my actions for something that I may not have been taught due to the lack of and assured Trg package.</p> <p>I feel that something needs to be done in this respect ASAP. A period of no fly/range closer is drastically needed to enable the qualified RC's to produce a DSAT compliant Trg package, which is certificated and assured by a higher authority.</p> <p>It has got to the stage where I am no longer comfortable continuing with my RC training.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\6699	Hazard/Observation	19/08/2015	Ops Squadron Fatigue	<p>Nothing untoward as yet has happened so this In Form is to raise a concern that I have had for a number of months.</p> <p>I feel that TDF, indeed Ops Sqn, are being over utilised. TDF alone are currently being tasked with non TDF related jobs such as Wind Farms and Stats. Additionally, we are trying to arrange SSS Trg to comply with DIO and SASC regulations and requirements, further we are trying to produce a DSAT compliant Trg package law STAR audit findings. All this is on top of our normal tasking which in the past 6 months have markedly increased. This is still on top of Stn duties such as Duty Airman, SDO, Op Tempera, Mess Moves, Stn Visits, Church Services, Family Fun Days and Air Cadets.</p> <p>TDF currently have 2 personnel OOA, that is 20% of our manpower but we are still expected to fulfil just as many if not more tasks as before.</p> <p>If the work load does not slow down in the near future I feel that I will have personnel going sick or, more importantly, making mistakes. With the roles that TDF play both on and off range, these mistakes could lead to a serious accident or worse.</p> <p>If a period of no fly/range closer could be negotiated to enable us to catch up I feel this would be the first step in the right direction. Also if the range opening could be published to reflect a closure over lunchtime and period of closer for Stn PT on a Tuesday and Thursday morning, I feel we would benefit dramatically.</p> <p>If TDF could be increased by at least 1 JNCO (FTRS RAF Reg with 'M' Qualification) and 1 TG12 SAC I feel this would help the situation.</p> <p>I appreciate the work hard, play hard way of working but I feel that, Ex Orange Stag apart, it is all work verging on over work for some personnel within TDF and Ops Sqn.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Other\15\7047	Hazard/Observation	09/07/2015	Civilian use of explosives when range closed	<p>I was phoned by DNV-GL who wished to conduct a detonation of an explosive charge within their agreed test site. I explained that as the range was shut there was nobody available to clear the airspace and that no authorisation could be given. I understand that the detonation did not take place.</p>	D - Negligible
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\6592	Hazard/Observation	26/06/2015	Dentally Unfit for Controlling Duties	<p>RAF Spadeadam operates with remote unit status, as such all ATC medicals are carried out at RAF Boulmer, and all dental inspections are conducted at Albermarle Barracks. As both checks were due in and around the same time, the medical centre at Spadeadam booked me into Boulmer for both checks to be done on the same day, and I arranged for my dental records to be sent from Albermarle to Boulmer. When I arrived at Boulmer I was informed that I hadn't been booked in for a dental appointment, and that none were available for the remainder of the day. As a result I went out of date the following day and no appointments were available until Thursday 16th July. RA 3203 states that controllers should ensure they are dentally fit prior to controlling duties, guidance was sought as to whether I could still control, or be declared non-effective. ATM STANEVAL were consulted, but they were unsure, as the phrase contained in RA 3203 was open to interpretation. Further guidance was sought from MAA, their advice was that it was pointless to staff an MAA waiver for 2 weeks until my appointment on the 16th, that said, if I was out-of-date on dental fitness then SATCO should take a view that if they deem me fit to control I could be granted permission to control until then. I was reinstated having had 2 days of being declared ineffective. RAF Spadeadam ATM consists of a SATCO and 3 controllers, we are already operating at 75% manning, so my absence reduced this to 50% and meant that several restrictions had to be placed on the operational output.</p> <p>The following day, RAF Boulmer Dental Centre emailed to apologise, stating it was due to an administrative error that they had lost my original booking.</p>	C - Low

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1516414	Hazard/Observation	25/06/2015	The challenge of delivering ATM output with 50% manpower	<p>Since Jul 14 ATM manpower supporting operational output at RAF Spadeadam EWTF has been a significant issue for the Unit. RAF Spadeadam is established for four controllers and two flight operation assistants to provide an ATS law its Autonomous Radar Status. The Unit has carried a gapped FTRS controller post from 1 Nov 14 and a gapped FCA post from the 1 Dec 14, with the manpower norm routinely being 50% gusting 75%. These issues have been formally articulated to the HoE and ATM FHQ with mitigations put into place to manage them. These mitigations have included seeking CMLO support, exemption from SDO duties, imposing controller leave bans during periods of increased aerial activity, and restrictions to range opening hours. As the Unit moves towards its heightened summer tempo, the intensity of traffic will increase but with no forecast change in ATM manpower. It is my opinion that the ATM team will struggle to meet its requirements to provide an ATS during current published range hours for the duration of this period. ATM manpower is further stretched given its requirements to appropriately staff the safety management areas law the BM SMM. These manpower issues leave little resilience in the system.</p> <p>Moreover, as the Stn continues to operate with an ever decreasing number of SQEP personnel, the roles of SFSO and SEMSCO have fallen to the SATCO. These posts are integral for the Stn being able to deliver an assured and regulated ASMP which in turn strives towards a safe operating environment for air operations at Spadeadam EWTF. As a DH Facing organisation it is incumbent upon me to demonstrate an open reporting culture and formally articulate my concerns to the DH Community especially when they pertain to Air Safety.</p> <p>It would be my recommendation that RAF Spadeadam formally down declares its opening hours during this period.</p>	A - High
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Wildcat\1516401	Incident	12/06/2015	Grass Fire	<p>I was the Duty Range Controller at the time of the incident. Callsign Vagabond was practising flare deployment over Wiley Sike AWR on a north to south track whilst withing the impact area for flares he jettisoned his remaining flares before departing the range and returning to the FARP at Otterburn. After he had completed the jettison smoke was observed Via Security Camera and ground observers coming from the area of the jettison followed shortly after by flames. The station Fire section were deployed at the main quadrant of Wiley Sike range they immediately responded to the smoke and flames and made their way to R8 the nearest hard standing to the incident. At this time in consultation with [REDACTED] a tannoy was made to alert the station of the fire and request all available personnel make their way to R8 to assist the station fire service if required. I also recieved a call from the duty site manager of DNVGL stating that he was sending his fire team and spare personnel to assist At this point [REDACTED] made the decision to contact the civilian fire service and ask for assistance which arrived in ever increasing numbers I remained within Range Control to act as a point of contact with both our fire service and any outside agencies. I was requested to try to maintain a visual track of the fire and to inform the station fire service if flames were seen cresting the hill to the west of Range Control i also contacted DNVGL for their assistance in monitoring the fires progress.</p> <p>At one stage i was asked if it would be possible for one of the civilian fire marshals be taken aloft in the wildcat helicopter holding at the helipad to asses the extent of the fire this request was declined but the suggestion was made that DNVGL have a UAV which has the ability to transmits pictures back to a base station. Further to this i received a call from the station fire officer on the ground relaying a message from the Station Commander requesting the wildcat helicopter take photographs of the area on his departure which he agreed to.</p> <p>At approximately 1645z i was informed by the station fire officer that the fire was out and damping duties were being carried out and the incident was terminated.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Wildcat\1515865	Hazard/Observation	11/06/2015	Destroyed Communications Fibre Optic Cable	<p>The Wiley Sike AWR primary quadrant caravan has fixed telephone communications to both DFTS and a direct line to Operation Room. This safety means of communication is delivered through fibre optic cable which is surface layed outside of the caravan to a Fibre cabinet situated outside. It is surface laid over concrete and is protected only by temporary rubber cable protectors. On activation of the range today, one of the setting up procedures is to confirm communications, and we could not achieve this. Further examination i found that the fibre cable had been destroyed by cattle by either chewing or by trampling with hooves. The fencing around the primary quadrant is no longer suitable to keep stray cattle from getting in to the compound, nor is the surface laying of the fibre cable an acceptable situation.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\1514833	Hazard/Observation	08/05/2015	Incursion of R7 Helicopter Refueling and Rearming Facility (HRRF) by RNLAf Ground Units	<p>Whilst controlling AWC trials assets (C130) on the range and an LFA transit ac (Pipeline), the Duty Range Controller (RC) notified me that a number of vehicles (6 Trucks with ISO containers, crane, 4 ton truck) had entered onto the R7 HRRF landing surface. This was observed on the Spadeadam CCTV. I ascertained that the other rostered ATCO, not in the Ops Room at the time, had not given them permission or delivered a face to face ATC brief. The other ATCO was sent out in Rover 1 to liaise with the personnel. Upon return I was informed that the Ground personnel were in support of TAC UK a RNLAf Exercise which was a pre notified Ex due to commence its Flying Serials on Mon 11 May for two weeks. They informed my ATCO that they were given permission from Spadeadam Engineering Support Sq (ESS) WO to utilise the surface for the duration of the Ex. OC Ops was informed of the incident via landline.</p> <p>Whilst R7 HRRF is a PPR surface and we had no RW assets booked to utilise the facility, there was no dialogue between the RNLAf and ATC or WO ESS and ATC about access rights to ether the R7 HRRF landing or refueling surfaces. Should ac have been scheduled to utilisie the surface they would have been precluded use of it.</p> <p>The R7 HRRF surface has now been handed over to the RNLAf for the Ex with a brief scheduled for Mon 11 May.</p>	C - Low

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\4020	Hazard/Observation	23/04/2015	NATS ORRD AND LANDLINE FAILURE	Upon reporting for the start of my shift, I was informed via the NAVCOMMS Supervisor that the NATS Lowther Radar Feed was U/S. It was ascertained that there was also no NATS GDF Radar Feed available. Upon checking the ATC consoles as part of the morning checks, all direct dial landlines to external agencies (NATS, Swanwick etc) were also U/S. The loss of the NATS ORRD effects the provision of Spadeadam's Autonomous Radar Status. As a result the Duty FOA has been informed to notify any FJ which book onto the range that there will be restrictions on the ATS that can be provided. Additionally, the DATCO has been informed to notify Swanwick Mill that they may need to control JW traffic transiting in the UAS/CAS.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\4027	Hazard/Observation	23/04/2015	Notification by external agency of a loose door latch clip on RNLAFC130 operating at Spadeadam	At approx 0945 the Defence Photographer [REDACTED] notified me (via telephone) that he had photographed a RNLAFC130 operating at Spadeadam the previous day with a loose port door latch. A follow up email including the photographs was requested which was promptly received at 0953. These details were forwarded to RNLAFC336 Sqn Operations via email and to Sqn Exec personnel at 0959 with a request made via the FOA to contact them on landline. The ATCO IC was then informed. An email was received back from [REDACTED] 336 Sqn RNLAFC at 1031 thanking us for the notification and that they would be conducting an investigation. Update provided to Sqn Execs and ATCO IC, details added to the ATC watch log.	A - High
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Tomado\15\3908	Hazard/Observation	20/04/2015	Breach of SSS Saftey Zone	At the start of all Smokey SAM Simulator(SSS) operations it is SOP to clear a 500m ground safety bubble around the launch site. At the start of SSS operations my SSS opo and i Requested that all DNV GL personel working inside the R8 area would leave so we could proceed with SSS operation, they agreed and packed up their equipment. during the 1st Run against a Tomado GR4 we realise that DNV GL had left the gate open after leaving. I cancelled the first run as i could not confirm if it was left open for more people leaving. i checked the area 300m away and concluded they left and just left the gate open. We proceeded with the mission against the GR4 and then took a mission against a Hawk. After the mission and after the debuild of the SSS launcher we realised that the DNV GL workers had come back on to the site with out permission from the LSS. they had ignored a Warning sign 1000m from the launch site blocking the access road, and ignored another sign and the saftey gate (500m from lauch site) which stated that the range was active and had flashing lights.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Tomado\15\4376	Hazard/Observation	20/04/2015	SSS SAFTEY ZONE INFRINGEMENT	On Smokey Sam Simulator ops it is SOP to clear a 500m ground safety area around the launch site.  After clearing the R8 area of three DNV GL personnel,  I carried out two sorties against a Tomado GR4 and a Hawk.  When cleared to bring the launch site out of action by the RC the team noticed that they had come back on to the site without permission from myself. Ignoring 2 warning signs at 1000m and 500m from the launch site.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\3739	Incident	16/04/2015	Range Fire due to Flare release	I was controlling a NAF C130(BISON21) conducting EWT operations on the range. At the end of the sortie the pilot called complete and informed me that he could see a ground fire, and had the co-ordinates for me. I copied the information, and the Range Controller used the CCTV to search for the fire. It became apparent that the C130 had dispatched flares which had set fire to the dry ground between Berry Hill Operations and the DNV GL site. This area is out with Wiley Sike, the only flare activity area within D510. The fire quickly spread on the dry ground and most Station personnel had to assist with fire fighting operations. This resulted in the range being closed and the cancellation of pre-booked Ex Joint Warrior sorties which were due to take place after the C130.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\3090	Incident	25/03/2015	Total Equipment Comms Failure	I was working a Danish C130 aircraft within the confines of D510 in very good weather conditions. The aircraft had been on frequency some 20 - 25 minutes without any problems. At approximately 1515 all the Mascot mini comms panels throughout the Ops room lost power. At the time of the incident an ADATS team were working in and out of the radio room monitoring the Spadeadam frequencies. The landlines and frequencies were all locked so I tried to use the Havquick radio to inform the C130 about the comms issues. Whatever caused the comms failure was also blocking out the frequencies with a high pitched squeal. This left no communication with the aircraft so I contacted D&D via landline and asked them to relay a message to the C130 regarding the issues. The equipment comms issue was resolved at 1524 and the sortie continued without further incident.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\2984	Hazard/Observation	23/03/2015	Failure of Berry Hill PSSR	I was controlling a C130J inbound to Spadeadam Range when the Berry Hill PSR failed. I informed NAVCOMMS and they investigated the fault but it couldn't be resolved. I reduced the service provided to the ac in accordance with SOPs, as this is the only PSR feed available at RAF Spadeadam. Weather conditions were fine. The PSR failure didn't have an adverse affect on the Ac's operations and the pilot elected to remain on the range and continue with the sortie.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\1919	Hazard/Observation	25/02/2015	EGD510 Airspace Infringement by Civil Ac inbound Carlisle	Whilst controlling a Typhoon on the range, I was notified by Carlisle of an ac proceeding inbound to Carlisle RW 25 Direct Arrival. A handover of a second Typhoon from the North was conducted when I observed a Sqk 4877(Code callsigned C) inside the range by approx 1nm west bound appearing to follow the published procedure. The Spt Controller liaised with Carlisle ATC and obtained the callsign of the ac AAD925A. This had no direct impact on the Typhoons working the range.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\1921	Hazard/Observation	25/02/2015	Infringement of EG510 by civil ac inbound Carlisle	Whilst controlling 2 Hawks and a 1 GR4 on the range conducting CAS sorties, the Spt Controller took a call from Carlisle stating an ac was inbound RW25 Direct Approach and that 2 x Seakings were outbound Carlisle for EW work on the range. When the Seakings came onto frequency, TI was passed on the traffic inbound Carlisle. As the Carlisle ac conducted its inbound turn the primary contact was observed approx 2 miles inside the range. The Spt Controller was advised to speak to Carlisle.	B - Medium

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\2985	Hazard/Observation	25/02/2015	Berry Hill UPS Issues - Serviceability Issues	<p>raised an AEMS highlighting the issues wrt the UPS at Berry Hill (BH), this was forwarded to the SEMSCO and elevated to a DASOR. The AEMS content is cut and paste from AEMS SPD/AEMS/2015/06:</p> <p>Following our discussion last week I raised the outstanding UPS fault as a risk to flight safety.</p> <p>This is due to the fact that our Air Traffic Controllers could be in the middle of controlling low flying aircraft with a mains supply that has no back up automatically if power fails. The supporting communications channels and computers would fail as we do not currently have UPS and our generators would not auto start.</p> <p>Ironically this morning the power failed, luckily this was before our flying programme started, and could have led to something significantly more serious than the inconvenience we experienced waiting for your staff to start the generator. I must add that this was undertaken in a swift and professional manner.</p> <p>I am requesting that pressure be applied to speed up the final stage of this repair in order for our Air Traffic Controllers to operate with the confidence that the generators would automatically start, as designed, in the event of mains failure.</p>	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\15\1813	Hazard/Observation	23/02/2015	Failure of ATM Equipment following UPS power swap to mains	<p>The Unit had suffered an issue with it mains power and UPS overnight; as a possible result the NATS ORRD (Lowther) was declared U/S on arrival to work. All issues were rectified by 0912. However, NAVCOMMS identified a need to transfer from UPS back to Mains power. The ATCO IC and RC selected a suitable period in the FLYPRO to facilitate this. NAVCOMMS notified Ops personnel that the decision was taken to not conduct the transfer. At approx 1240 a pair of F15s (MAD 51) were then prenoted inbound from Swanwick Mil to conduct EW training. As the controller I advised Swanwick to let the ac know that their may be issues with the Spadeadam radars and to expect a possible hold in the overhead with Swanwick. NAVCOMMS reported to the Ops Room to advise that all equipment could now be switched on - the ATC equipment remained offline. The BH PSR U/S, GM MSSR U/S and NATS ORRD U/S - reported to NAVCOMMS. The BH and NATS ORRD were then reported S at aprox 1250. However, with the GM still U/S and SPICCS offline the ac were refused an ATS at Spadeadam due to the question over the integrity of the eqpt. An offer was made to the ac to work Swanwick for an ATS both via landline to Swanwick and frequency to MAD 51, the ac elected to route into the LL system</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Typhoon\15\1145	Hazard/Observation	03/02/2015	Loss of NATS (GDF) radar feed, and interruption of land lines.	<p>I was receiving a handover from London Mil North when the telephone line went dead and the GDF radar feed failed. All the civil sector direct lines started ringing, and as they were answered one by one it became apparent that they had also failed. The radar feed was down from 1149-1152Z. Comms were re-established with London Mil North and I had to delay the handover as I was unable to take the ac through CAS without the GDF radar. I was informed by Lon Mil North that their GDF radar had been F/S throughout the downtime at Spadeadam.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Typhoon\15\1148	Hazard/Observation	03/02/2015	Loss of NATS (GDF) radar feed, and interruption of landlines.	<p>I was controlling a pair of Typhoons on the range when the GDF radar feed dropped out, and landlines started ringing to all the civil sectors and Lon Mil North. I limited the height block of the Typhoons to keep them clear of CAS and when the landlines were selected the connections were dead. The ac called complete and ready to RTB, I stopped their climb to keep them out of UAS and handed them over to Swanwick Mil. The radar feed and landlines were down from 1231-1234Z.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\13200	Hazard/Observation	09/12/2014	Loss of DWF Watchman Feed	<p>The DWF Watchman feed dropped out whilst I was the DATCO controlling two ac (LEE34 Hawk and GONZO DA42) whom were conducting JFACTSU CAS sorties SFC to 5000ft RPS. GONZO was predominately operating within the confines of EGD510/510A and LEE 34 was operating in and out of EGD510/510A to the South of the airspace. I was using the Beryhill Watchman and NATS ORRD on the main console (RVU1) and DWF Watchman and GM MSSR on RVU 3. The ATS was already reduced due to the ac operating levels. The ATCO IC was on support controller and observed the incident, and she reported it to the NAVCOMMS Supervisor.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\12584	Incident	24/11/2014	Failure of the Meteorological Monitoring System (MMS)	<p>On arrival at Berry Hill the MMS system was showing no data and - after re starting the PC - had not transmitted any weather data to the Met Office after 1850 on Saturday 22nd November.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\12154	Hazard/Observation	13/11/2014	Loss of NATS (GDF) radar feed, and interruption of land lines.	<p>Whilst controlling a DA20 on the range, the GDF radar feed dropped out from 1051Z-1053Z. At the same time the direct lines to Lon Mil North, Carlisle, Newcastle, and all civil sectors starting ringing. I cleared all the landlines one by one but the Lon Mil North remained U/S. I liaised with Swanwick(Mil) London East Sup whom reported no issues with the GDF. The GDF radar feed, and all landlines apart from Lon Mil North returned to service at 1053Z.</p>	C - Low

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\12075	Hazard/Observation	12/11/2014	Loss of all comms	<p>I was controlling a C130 (DAF3020) on the range (EGD510/510A) at 500ft to 6000ft under TS in variable wx. It was operating on the Spadeadam UHF ICF conducting EW work with the Range Controller (C/S SKYRAY). The Range Controller reported a tone in his headset and was unable to Tx to the ac. This did not immediately impact on the ATC consoles but was evident on the EWTC consoles. It was then observed on the DATCO and SpT ATCO console approx 30 secs later. I was able to receive a Readability 1 Tx from the C130 on Mains UHF ICF Frequency and a blind Tx was made to the ac to advise of comms failure. The standby Radios and Pax sets were also affected. The ac was advised to climb to FL65 the notified MSFL and to squawk ident. This was observed and the ac was then advised to freecall Newcastle Radar on their ICF. The entire MASCOTT comms panel then failed and no frequencies or landlines worked. The on duty FOA was advised to utilise the stand alone phone to contact Newcastle and to check if the ac was on their Frequency. The MASCOTT panel conducted an unaided reset. I was then able to liaise with Newcastle on the landline to ascertain the C130 was enroute EGQS.</p> <p>This failure had direct impact on the ATS provided and the potential safety of this visiting ac. The entire system failure provided no resilience.</p>	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\11654	Hazard/Observation	31/10/2014	Range infringement	<p>I was the DATCO working an American C130 within the confines of D510 operating surface to altitude 2000 feet. at approximately 0920 I observed a SSR return (squawk 1730) within D510 tracking south east. A helicopter callsign GUHGB had been operating within D510 on occasions throughout the week in the vicinity of the observation of the SSR code. I tried to call the aircraft on VHF and also asked D&amp;D to make a call on guard frequency but no reply was received. I also tried to contact the company by telephone but there was no answer. The nearest the 2 aircraft got in relation to one another was 6nm and an indicated 500 feet separation.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\11585	Hazard/Observation	29/10/2014	Loss of Communications	<p>I was the DATCO at RAF Spadeadam working to rotary aircraft within D510 rotary had just landed within the range boundary working UHF and the other rotary was operating VHF within the confines of D510. At 1322 all frequencies stopped working including UHF/VHF packsets. The duty engineers were called and the full use of frequencies restored at 1325.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\10756	Hazard/Observation	08/10/2014	Loss of NATS (GDF) radar feed and external direct telephone lines.	<p>Whilst controlling a pair of Hawks(GONZO) on the range, the GDF radar feed dropped out from 1233Z to 1235Z. I had to place GONZO under a BS as they were operating in and around the only PSR I had available. The GDF is a NATS radar feed which grants Spadeadam Autonomous Radar Status so this also had a knock on effect to traffic which had been pre-noted to the Unit. I couldn't take a pair of Typhoons(JEDI) through Controlled Airspace to the North, and I was unable to control in the UAS with Typhoons(PSYCHO) carrying out SPACES in the St Abbs area. The loss of direct landlines meant that I didn't receive a handover from Swanwick Mil(North) on JEDI, and this could potentially have had a more serious outcome as they free called me 3 miles North of the range and descending to FL100, whilst I had GONZO in the block Stc-10,000' (987hPa) within the range. All ac were separated and at no stage was there any serious risk of losing height separation. The issue was reported to our engineers, and following their investigation was available again to use at 1316Z.</p>	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\9046	Incident	22/08/2014	Infringement of GZZLE into D510 Spadeadam	<p>An aircraft squawking 7000 was south of Spadeadam Range tracking north slowly. At the time there was a single helicopter operating in the range from surface to 1500' - 'Powerline64' on the Tyne pressure of 1002 receiving a BS from me. At the point in which the ac was 3 minutes south of the range I began to dial D&amp;D in order for them to go out on guard frequency and tell the ac to avoid the range. As I was dialling the newcastle line rang. I picked up and Newcastle informed me that the aircraft in question had just freecalled them and asked if the range was currently active. Newcastle confirmed that the message they passed was that the range was active and the aircraft was instructed to avoid. After watching the aircraft's profile, I could see him alter course to the east (as a result of Newcastle's information passed). At this point he was around 1 mile south of the range, paralleling the boundary. He then altered back onto a northerly heading and entered the range at 550152N 0021997W (roughly 3 miles west of the eastern range boarder). I took down the details of the time, coordinates and altitude of the ac. It was revealed that the callsign is GZZLE and was a Gazelle rotary. The indicated Mode C was 023- putting the aircraft at around 2000ft if he was using the Tyne RPS. The Powerline64 helicopter was to the west of the Gazelle by around 4 miles and I was content that there was no risk of collision between the two ac.</p>	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\8683	Hazard/Observation	12/08/2014	DWF Failed Flight Check	<p>A Flight Check of the Deadwater Fell radar was carried out on the 12 Aug 14. The Flight Check was unsuccessful and the DWF radar has been declared U/S which severely reduces the radar coverage to the north of Spadeadam range at low level. This leaves RAF Spadeadam with only one serviceable PSR and one MSSR which could have a knock on effect should there be any problems with the Berry Hill Watchman radar leaving Spadeadam to work SSR alone.</p>	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\8412	Hazard/Observation	05/08/2014	Loss of NATS (GDF) radar feed	<p>Whilst controlling a low level RW asset on the range, the GDF radar feed dropped out from 1040Z to 1043Z. This is the second time in the last month in which this has happened, the last occasion for four minutes on the 14 Jul 14 which affected external units including ScACC. I liaised with the Swanwick LNOR Sup whom reported no issues with the GDF.</p> <p>As the NATS radar feed grants Spadeadam Autonomous Radar Status, this would impact operations in the UAS. As there were no ac operating in the UAS, this had no direct effect on operations.</p>	C - Low

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\7837	Incident	22/07/2014	Range Infringement by civil aircraft	I was the DATCO on Tues 22 Jul 14. At approximately 1110Z I was informed by Carlisle controller that there was a C182 callsign GBEKO inbound from the south for a NDB approach. I informed Carlisle that I had traffic in the range a rotary operating surface to 3000ft Tyne 1020 & a single Hawk operating 4000 - 10000ft Tyne 1020. Carlisle controller said he would inform the aircraft & tell him to remain to the south of the range. At approximately 1120Z I passed traffic information to the Hawk with regards to the ac inbound to Carlisle but the aircraft continued northbound flying 2nm into the range. I then gave the Hawk further traffic information informing him that the aircraft was indicating 2000ft below. The RW traffic was much further away and no threat to the aircraft penetrating the range. I immediately contacted Carlisle ATC informing them that the aircraft had penetrated the range and asked them to vacate the range immediately. The aircraft was observed turning left to vacate the range.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\6175	Hazard/Observation	16/08/2014	Loss of ATC Communication Lines - Meridio Switch U/S	The FOA I/C reported that the Spadeadam 6 series operational telephone lines in Berry Hill were unusable. NAVCOMMS were informed. The fallback 7 series lines continued to function as did the external direct dial landlines. Swanwick (MI) prenoted an ac (REBEL 84) inbound to Spadeadam at aprox 1330 and they were offered the 7 series number as a back up incase there were any issues with the direct line. REBEL84 then freecalled Spadeadam just clearing CAS (P18) advising that Swanwick (MI) were unable to contact us on the landlines. The lack of communication between each Unit could potentially contribute to a FS issue.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\Hercules\14\5831	Hazard/Observation	06/08/2014	Smokey SAM Simulator event	During a routine Electronic Warfare Threat Training Facility Sortie, TALON 71, a USAF C130, requested the use of Smokey SAM Simulator rockets to practice the response to a SAM launch. The Rockets are designed to mimic real surface to air missiles, and are launched by means of a battery powered igniter box connected to a 4 missile launch rack placed 100m from the Operator. Engagements are controlled on the ground by a single Launch Safety Supervisor (LSS) assisted by a Launch Safety Operator (LSO). The safety distance for ground and air participants is 2000' (600m) in all directions. The aircraft location is plotted by means of a discrete Mode 3 IFF squawk allocated on entry to the Facility. Squawks are plotted using feeds from 2 x Secondary Surveillance Radars, one at Greymare Hill and the other at Deadwater Fell. Aircraft tracks are fed into a central server and a filtered synthetic display is produced which the Duty Range Controller uses to follow the progress of aircraft missions. The location of the launch site is plotted, often by GPS or accurate map recoce, and inputted to the controlling programme software and added to the display. Data on the azimuth, elevation and slant range is also displayed on a separate smaller screen with Bearing Range and altitude referenced to the plotted launcher position.  In supervising individual engagements, I indicate the Bearing, Range and Altitude to the target to the LSS via mobile phone (ground radio comms are often difficult or unworkable), using the filtered air display in the Ops room. When I judge that an engagement is required I order "Launch when safe" and if the LSS judges that the aircraft is outside of safety limits, a rocket is fired. On the last engagement, as the RC, I delayed the "launch when safe" call as I judged that the aircraft was not close enough for a representative missile shot to be taken. I recall that, according to the display, the aircraft was flying abeam the site at 1.5 km. The LSS queried it and I replied that I judged the aircraft to be far enough away for the launch to be delayed. The LSS was correct in asserting that it was the LSS's call whether to launch or not although I countered that I thought that the aircraft was a safe distance away. On studying the marked locations logged in the display system computer, it was evident that the location of the launcher was incorrect by approximately 600m. I informed the LSS's Ft Cdr that I would review the issue of the incorrectly logged position and rectify it immediately. I also acknowledge that the LSS does have the final say on whether to launch or not, hence my habitual use of the phrase of "launch when safe".	D - Negligible
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\5633	Hazard/Observation	03/06/2014	RESTRICTING AC OPERATIONS TO OUTSIDE CAS and UAS	Due to a significant reduction in manpower Spadeadam ATC operated on the afternoon of 3 Jun with a sole ATCO. As that ATCO I elected in consultation with the CoC to restrict ac operations to Class G only, thus refusing ac permission to operate under Spadeadams control in the UAS or CAS. The afternoon was forecast for trial RW assets operating the range (EGD510) with the possibility of three formations of Ex Anderoid Preference fastjet transits prosecuting possible targets in the area. A four ship of FGR4s contacted the ICF whilst in the D323 complex for a transit and run through our AoR. They were advised to work Swanwick(MI) for initial transit as they were outside the Spadeadam AoR and to expect handover to Spadeadam once clear of the TILNI Radar Corridor. On contacting Spadeadam they had split into two separate formations each requesting permission to operate within the LAS and UAS with a transit across CAS (L602) this was refused due to a sole controller on position. The ac were advised of this restriction on frequency. Despite operating in the Class G, traffic information was required to be passed to adjacent civil agencies on two occasions given their proximity to CAS.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\5495	Hazard/Observation	02/06/2014	Air quality/temperature in the ops room	There is no fresh air in the ops room. The atmosphere becomes muggy and unbearable. The fresh air supply was blocked off due to the installation of an Argonite Fire Suppression System (confirmed by the Air Conditioning Engineer). The only quick and easy method of improving the air quality when needed is to open the fire exit door. This has been made impossible by the replacement of the push bar opening system with a locked break-glass bolt. The previous verbal agreement was that we were able, when the air quality deteriorated, to ask the Fire Section to unlock the fire exit door. We have now been told that they are unwilling to do this in case - to quote - we break the door. The air quality is exacerbated during times in the ops room when it is fully manned - ie when both FOAs are operationally required in the ops room. Fans simply move stale air around. The temperature can go from too hot to very cold within minutes without there being any manual intervention of the controls. The temperature can vary from one side of the ops room to the other where the ATC side are in shirt sleeves and the FOA side wear three layers of clothing. This has been an ongoing situation since the installation of the Argonite System. This is my primary work place. After a period of time the atmosphere brings on drowsiness and headaches, amongst other symptoms. When I am on leave I do not suffer from a sore throat or runny nose which I do in the ops room.	A - High

## Annex A

asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\5343	Hazard/Observation	28/05/2014	Discrepancy between DNV-GL location data	I was notified earlier in the morning that there would be a possible controlled explosion from the DNV-GL site from 1315Z onwards upto approx 250m/821ft. From 1255Z I was controlling a C130 on the range from SFC to 3500ft AMSL. I was conscious the warning calls would shortly be received from DNV-GL seeking approval via local orders. I correlated the displayed information on the SRE screen to determine if it would be a factor for the C130 profiles at this point I noticed a discrepancy between the LAT/LONG and the range and bearing displayed. The controlled explosion did not take place and did not impact on the ac sortie. The UStanO was advised to confirm the correct details across all documentation.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\5303	Hazard/Observation	27/05/2014	Failure of Mii EAMS data link(satellite)	The Mii-EAMS terminal program froze while trying to transmit the ASP signal (due to the loss of the satellite link). This prevented the resetting of the system until the satellite link was re-established - approximately one hour - in which time we could not receive or send any signals (NOTAM's, RPS's and ASP's).	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\14\4939	Hazard/Observation	14/05/2014	Berryhill Watchman Calibration out of date	The equipment was due for annual Cal Flight on the 29 Apr 14, this was then delayed until the 15th May 14. E-mail from DES ADATS-Flight Checking requested the date change via SATCO and Eng Co-ord, stating "it will still be within it's 28 day servicing period from when 3rd line carry out the service and within periodicity.". This appears to have caused confusion as to the exact expiry date of the last Cal Flight, which was subsequently found to be 7 May 14. When the 15 May 14 Cal Fit was delayed it was only then brought to my attention that the equipment was due to rechecked by the 7 May 14, I immediately informed WO ATC and the equipment was withdrawn from use at approximately 1400 on the 14th May 14.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\3331	Hazard/Observation	01/04/2014	Non availability of landline phones	Following on from a power outage on the 31 Mar 14 the phonelines are still u/s (direct lines on the mascot system are unaffected). Air Traffic Control have no way of contacting Swanwick Mii to give/receive handovers as there is no direct line.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\14\3290	Hazard/Observation	31/03/2014	Total Power Loss	Arriving at Berry Hill to open up after the weekend, Berry Hill was found to be without power. On investigation, the backup generator was also not functioning. The only comms available were two '7' extension telephone lines located within the operations room. Power was restored around 1000L.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\14\3292	Incident	31/03/2014	Non availability of emergency telephone	On receipt of a fire alarm within the Berry Hill complex the usual evacuation procedure was followed and personnel vacated the building. A member of staff walked to the emergency telephone on the compound main gate to alert the emergency services via 222. Due to an earlier fault within Berry Hill resulting in the loss of '6' extension telephone lines the emergency telephone did not work and the call was unable to be placed. Despite a very poor coverage for mobile phones at Berry Hill, another member of staff managed to get hold of the main guardroom on their mobile telephone and the emergency services were called. The fire alarm was attended by the station fire service and it was found to be a false alarm.	A - High
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\14\3333	Hazard/Observation	31/03/2014	MAINS POWER FAILURE	At 0800 I was informed that the Berry Hill complex had no mains power and the standby generator had not taken over. It is likely that the complex had not any kind of power supply for over 48 hours, judging by CCTV recordings. As a result, we were unable to open at 0900L as we had no communications or radars. In addition, the power outage had caused the branch telephone exchange computer to fail so that we were unable to conduct normal business as we had been reduced to a handful of serviceable telephone extensions. Even after the restoration of AT Radars and some phone lines, we could not establish comms with outlying sites as the loss of the exchange meant normal links were down. Also emitter plinth supplies were not restored such that 2 major emitters were unavailable due to lack of electricity - a situation that took more time to resolve. The extended loss of electricity supply meant that the AN/MPQ T1 Missile Tracking Radar simulator, suffered abnormal condensation and moisture build up that, subsequently on power-up, caused a major short circuit in the HV supply causing a small fire. HV cables will have to be replaced and the radar is still out of action. Thirty six hours after the restoration of power supply, the branch exchange remains unserviceable.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\14\2779	Incident	17/03/2014	Total Power loss including back up	At 1100L Berry Hill Operations lost all power, the backup generator appeared to start up but backup power was not achieved. Mascot mini comms appeared unaffected but all radar was lost. Power was reinstated 40 mins later.	B - Medium
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\14\1088	Incident	03/02/2014	D510 Range Infringement	Whilst in the Ops room but away from console, I was called by ScATCC FIR, stating they had received a freecall from Police 51 an EC135 routing from EGNC (Carlise) to EGEA (Cutter, 4nm south of Aberdeen city), and that they believed he was within the confines of RAF Spadeadam EWTF (D510). Upon looking at the RVU the AC was indeed within the boundary of D510 squawking 0057 indicating around 2000' moving North. I informed ScATCC FIR that there was no traffic to affect the transit of the helicopter as nothing was inside the range at the time and that they should remain on FIR's frequency as he would shortly exit D510. I asked the FIR controller to pass on to Police 51, that each and every time range penetration was required the AC in question should call up on one of RAF Spadeadam's ICF's before entry. I then spoke with Carlise who had been working the helicopter prior to entering the range, the controller said no mention of transiting near D510 was mentioned by the aircrew of Police 51 and therefore never passed on our activity status.	C - Low
asor\Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD\No Aircraft\14\1252	Hazard/Observation	31/01/2014	Loss of Dii connectivity	At approximately 1400 on Friday 31st Jan, RAF Spadeadam ATC located within Berry Hill compound lost all DII/MOSS/Internet connectivity for the rest of the day. Despite the range being closed at the time, ATC had no access to any Flight Safety documentation which is now held online.	C - Low

## Annex A

ason/Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD/Other/14/2183	Incident	30/01/2014	Electric Shock during maintenance of SA-6 threat system.	<p>During the week of 27 – 31st Jan 2014 Babcock (4th line support contractors) were tasked to carry out work on one of the SA-6 (SPA-T) equipment's located in the GAFE Hangar B3, in preparation for a major trial "Ex WALLRIDER" to be held later on in the year. This visit also included delivery of operator training to the RAF technicians working on the SA-6 threat systems.</p> <p>The Babcock team consisted of 3 Babcock employees and [redacted] engineers from [redacted]. Four members of the [redacted] engineers possessed extensive in depth knowledge and experience on the equipment. Their mission was to test and fine tune the equipment to ensure optimum operational capabilities. This included any fault rectification that could be completed to restore the equipment back to an operational status.</p> <p>After completing equipment set up and tune over a 2 day period in the hangar the equipment was tested out on the range and used as a vehicle to deliver operator training. Unfortunately during the second day the equipment CW function failed and was returned to the GAFE hangar, B3.</p> <p>On the 30th Jan 2014, two [redacted] engineers were working on the CW transmitter in an attempt to rectify the problem. This activity was undertaken with the Babcock staff present in a management and a safety role. The line replaceable unit under investigation is located under the 'clamshell' of the TTR assembly at the top of the antenna rack. Scaffolding was placed around the equipment and the power was removed and isolated. One of the [redacted] engineers disconnected the connecting plug by using a screwdriver to prise apart the plug from the socket (This is not the normal procedure). Disconnection of the plug resulted in a spark between the plug terminals and socket; this is neither normal nor to be expected.</p> <p>A 'Brinkley' earthing stick was used to discharge the unit under investigation, as it has high voltage applied under normal operation. The lead had been securely attached between the equipment chassis and the pins of the now removed plug to dissipate the electrical charge that had been stored, rendering the unit safe to work on. It is to be noted that the only way to gain access to these pins involved disconnection and removal of the plug previously.</p> <p>The [redacted] engineer continued his investigation on the faulty unit for about 10 minutes when the back of his hand came into contact with the pins of the plug (previously been earthed) and received a discharged shock, the clues that he had suffered an electrical shock was a small spark visible at the contact point, a reflex reaction of the arm and a hushed exclamation of surprise/pain. The attendant Babcock staff who was working alongside and supervising him were qualified First Aiders and checked to see if he was alright.</p> <p>As a result of the event the engineer was a little shaken but suffered no visible injury and was prepared to carry on with his investigation of the fault. Before he could continue, the pins of the plug were again shorted to earth via the 'Brinkley' stick but this time the pins were wired together and the 'Brinkley' stick permanently attached throughout the investigation period. No other incidences occurred.</p> <p>The unit in question is known as a potential source of a shock hazard and precautions were carried out to ensure risks were kept to a minimum. However, this unit was faulty causing the internal components to charge and hold a voltage, which could not have been anticipated, resulting in the occurrence. This event was the first of its kind and a one off event. A revision of the safety precautions was undertaken to try to prevent any re-occurrence. (Submitted by Babcock's line manger with minor amendments to accurately identify location and purpose of task)</p> <p>Though this event had no major effects of the individual concerned, the potential for serious injury or possible death may have occurred.</p> <p>If this had been a service person then the outcome would probably have been the removal of the equipment from RAF Spadeadam's Electronic Warfare Range until such time as an investigation into what caused it was complete, and the service personnel</p> <p>Note:- As the task was under the control and management of a 4th line Contractor the incident only came to light to the GAFE management after being informed by the Station Health and Safety Adviser (SHSO). The SHSO is carrying out a follow up investigation with the assistance of Eng management.</p>	A - High
ason/Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD/No Aircraft/14/687	Hazard/Observation	15/01/2014	Firing of Smokey Sam Simulator (SSS) at Wilely Sike AWR RAF Spadeadam	<p>SSS have been fired at Wilely Sike primary quadrant for a number of years. I expressed concern as to the permissiveness of the road which runs immediately to the south of the surface danger area of the AWR. Sqn Cdr Spadeadam investigated and has received confirmation from Cumbria County Council that the road is public right of way. The restrictions placed by DOSG is a 500m safety exclusion zone around the launcher. The firing point is less than 100m from the public road. With consultation with the Range Controller we have suspended SSS operations from Wilely Sike primary quadrant until advise and direction is given.</p>	A - High
ason/Spadeadam - RAFATC - SPD/14/74	Incident	07/01/2014	Unauthorised landing on HLS	<p>I was the screen controller training an experienced area radar controller who had previously been an ATCO at RAF Spadeadam. We had taken on booked traffic flying in from Otterburn Range. The aircraft called to say that they were running late and wanted to fly through the range for a quick recce, an approach to Berryhill and then on to Carlisle airport for a refuel. This was acknowledged by the UT controller, who then issued the Tyne RPS of 980Hp, placed SHF740 under a BS and requested their altitude not above. SHF740 stated that they would be not above altitude 1500' for their transit. Seven minutes later we received a freecall from the next range booking callsign APOLLO. APOLLO was asked to be not below 2000' on the Tyne RPS of 980Hp. APOLLO then asked to be not below 1000' due to cloud. APOLLO was told to standby so that a deconfliction plan could be arranged with SHF740. SHF740 was asked to be not above 500' RPS to allow APOLLO to continue with their slot. SHF740 then reported that they were on the ground at the HLS at Berryhill and was looking to depart to Carlisle. At this point SHF740 was asked to hold as APOLLO was about to commence their first low level run against one of the emitters. SHF740 had landed at Berryhill without the required ATC clearance as stated in the HLS UK FLIP. The reason for this is to confirm that all threat emitters are on standby. On this occasion there was one emitter transmitting in the vicinity of Berryhill.</p>	B - Medium