

RESTRICTED
FM KAMPALA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 125
OF 260555Z APRIL 94

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UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1471 : RWANDA

SUMMARY

1. PROSPECTS FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN RWANDA BETWEEN RPF AND RGF.

DETAIL

2. THE FOLLOWING GLEANINGS FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE HERE ARE OFFERED WITH MORE THAN USUAL DIFFIDENCE.
3. WE GATHER THAT ALTHOUGH RUDASINGWA (RPF) DID GO TO ARUSHA (MY TELNO 123) UNDER PRESSURE FROM MUSEVENI, HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE. THE LOCAL PRESS REPORT HIM AS STATING THAT HE HAD ONLY GONE TO BRIEF THE OAU.
4. IT HAS ALSO BEEN REPORTED LOCALLY THAT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT SEND A DELEGATION TO ARUSHA ON 23 APRIL. IN FACT, THE RWANDAN EMBASSY HERE STATE THAT THEIR AMBASSADOR (KANYARUSHOKE) AND THEIR MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR DID GO TO ARUSHA. THEY CLAIM THE REMAINDER OF THEIR DELEGATION ASSEMBLED IN GOMA TO AWAIT TRANSPORT (PROMISED BY UNAMIR) WHICH DID NOT MATERIALISE.
5. IN ANY CASE, NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT GET UNDERWAY IN ARUSHA.
6. THE AMERICANS MEANWHILE HAVE AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT MOBUTO IS CONTINUING HIS QUOTE MEDIATION UNQUOTE EFFORT.
7. THE RPF'S INTENTION OF DECLARING A UNILATERAL CEASE-FIRE HAS BEEN WELL PUBLICISED. ACCORDING TO THE RWANDAN EMBASSY, THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) WOULD RESPOND IN KIND TO A STRAIGHT FORWARD CEASE-FIRE: THE AMERICANS IN DAR ES SALAAM HAVE HEARD AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON RADIO RWANDA THAT THE RGF WILL INDEED IMPLEMENT A

CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN MILITARY COMBATANTS TONIGHT. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE RGF WOULD SWALLOW ALL THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO THE RPF'S UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF A CEASE-FIRE: THE CLEAR IMPLICATION OF THEIR REPORTED RADIO ANNOUNCEMENT IS THAT THE RGF WILL NOT BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR KILLINGS BY QUOTE CIVILIANS UNQUOTE. THE RWANDAN EMBASSY HAVE ALSO SAID THAT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT WILL NOT AGREE TO PLACE KIGALI AIRPORT UNDER JOINT RPF/RGF CONTROL, AS THE RPF HAVE PROPOSED. THE AIRPORT IS CLOSE TO THE RGFS BIGGEST BARRACKS IN RWANDA.

8. A VISITING BELGIAN DIPLOMAT HAS MEANWHILE REPORTED THAT THREE QUARTERS OF KIGALI NOW APPEARS TO BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE RPF. UNOMUR REPORT THAT UNAMIR'S STRENGTH HAS NOW BEEN REDUCED TO 430.


COMMENT

9. THE CHANCES OF A CEASE-FIRE BEING CALLED BY BOTH SIDES TONIGHT ARE SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN EVEN. BUT SINCE THE TERMS OF THE CEASE FIRE HAVE NOT EVEN BEEN NEGOTIATED, LET ALONE AGREED, THE CHANCES OF A CONTINUATION OF THE MASSACRES AND A RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY FORCES ARE HIGH.

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FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 291300Z FCO
TELNO 128
OF 291211Z APRIL 94.



(102)

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNOS 1537 AND 1538 : RWANDA/BURUNDI

SUMMARY

1. SRSG EXPECTED IN KAMPALA THIS WEEKEND. IMPORTANT TO RETAIN MUSEVENI'S CONTRIBUTION TO MEDIATION.

DETAIL

2. I UNDERSTAND FROM UNOMUR THAT BOOH BOOH IS EXPECTED IN KAMPALA IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. HE WILL NO DOUBT DISCUSS WITH MUSEVENI WHAT CONTRIBUTION UGANDA CAN MAKE TO HELP TACKLE THE SITUATION IN RWANDA (AND BURUNDI).
3. REGIONAL INITIATIVES ARE CURRENTLY IN DISARRAY. MOBUTU IS RUNNING HIS OWN SHOW AS QUOTE FACILITATOR UNQUOTE, BUT IT IS ESSENTIALLY A SPOILING GAME: HE HAS SO FAR GIVEN THE RGF AN ALIBI FOR FAILING TO TURN UP AT ARUSHA AND THE RPF FOR FAILING TO NEGOTIATE AT ARUSHA. MOBUTU IS PERCEIVED AT LEAST IN UGANDAS FAVOURING AND ARMING THE RGF, AND AS HAVING THE CAPACITY TO DO HARM, BUT LITTLE TO DO GOOD. MWINYI MUST REMAIN A CENTRAL MEDIATING FIGURE, BOTH AS THE CUSTODIAN OF ARUSHA AND AS THE OUTSIDER CONSIDERED LEAST COMMITTED TO EITHER PARTY. BUT HE LACKS THE CLOUT TO DO THE JOB ON HIS OWN. IT IS ESSENTIAL, THEREFORE, THAT MUSEVENI REMAINS ACTIVE IN THE MEDIATION EFFORT IN SUPPORT OF MWINYI: HE REMAINS THE REGIONAL LEADER MOST LIKELY TO INFLUENCE THE RPF AND TO IMPRESS THE RGF.
4. MY TELELETTER TO MCLENNAN (NOT TO ALL) OF 29 APRIL DESCRIBES MUSEVENI'S FURY AT BEING ACCUSED OF IN EFFECT MASTERMINDING THE RPF'S OPERATIONS, AND HIS REFUSAL (NOW WITHDRAWN) TO HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER TO DO WITH MEDIATION.

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FM KAMPALA
TO IMMEDIATE FCO
TELNO 94
OF 071241Z APRIL 94

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O DIST?

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1232 : ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENTS OF RWANDA
AND BURUNDI

SUMMARY

1. AFTERMATH OF THE AIRCRASH AT KIGALI ON 6 APRIL. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARUSHA PROCESS.

DETAIL

2. THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE AVAILABLE HERE ABOUT THE PRECISE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CRASH. THE RWANDAN AMBASSADOR MAINTAINS THAT THE CRASH WAS IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED BY FIRING. HE IS SCEPTICAL OF THE RPF'S DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY, IF THE AIRCRAFT WAS INDEED SHOT DOWN, BUT ACCEPTS THAT THAT EXPLANATION IS ONLY THE MOST OBVIOUS OF A RANGE OF PLAUSIBLE THEORIES.
3. ACCORDING TO KANYARUSHOKE, THE VICTIMS OF THE CRASH INCLUDED, BESIDES THE TWO PRESIDENTS, THE RWANDAN CHIEF OF STAFF, HABYARIMANA'S PRIVATE SECRETARY (ALSO HIS BROTHER IN LAW), HIS POLITICAL ADVISER, DOCTOR AND ADC. THE BARUNDI MINISTERS ACCOMPANYING THEIR PRESIDENT WERE THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND A JUNIOR MINISTER FOR SECURITY. THESE DETAILS ARE, HOWEVER, UNCONFIRMED: IT IS STILL NOT SURE HERE WHETHER THE BODIES HAVE BEEN RECOVERED OR INVESTIGATIONS HAVE GOT UNDERWAY.
4. THE SITUATION IN KIGALI MEANTIME APPEARS TO BE CALM. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO OUR HONORARY CONSUL. HE AND KANYARUSHOKE BOTH SPEAK OF THERE HAVING BEEN SOME PROLONGED PERIODS OF SHOOTING. BUT KANYARUSHOKE BELIEVES THIS WAS THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD REACTING HYSTERICALLY AND FIRING WILDLY IN THE AIR, RATHER THAN TO KILL.

5. THERE IS A DANGEROUS POWER VACUUM IN KIGALI: THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERIOR ARE STILL IN DAR ES SALAAM, AND THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE IS ALSO ABROAD (IN CAMEROON). THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE IS ISSUING REPEATED CALLS TO PEOPLE TO SAY INDOORS.

6. THE AMBASSADOR HAD SPOKEN TO MUSEVENI. THE LATTER HAD REPORTED IN POSITIVE TERMS ABOUT YESTERDAY'S TALKS IN DAR ES SALAAM AND SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY OTHERS TO WORK ON THE RPF TO HELP CLEAR THE WAY FOR THE SWEARING IN OF THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY.

COMMENT

7. RWANDA IS IN A VERY DANGEROUS CONDITION: THE SOLE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTION - THE PRESIDENCY - IS NOW VACANT. IT IS EVEN MORE URGENT TO MOVE TOWARDS THE SWEARING IN OF TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY AND GOVERNMENT. ACCEPTANCE BY ALL PARTIES OF AN INTERIM PRESIDENT SHOULD BE THE PRECURSOR OF THAT. THE ARUSHA PROVISIONS - WHICH CANNOT YET BE IMPLEMENTED, OF COURSE - PROVIDE FOR THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO TAKE OVER THE PRESIDENCY ON AN INTERIM BASIS IN THE EVENT OF THE INCAPACITY OF THE PRESIDENT. THEREAFTER, THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY - IN PRACTICE THE MRND - WOULD HAVE TO OFFER TWO CANDIDATES, ONE OF WHOM WOULD BE ELECTED BY THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY AND THE GOVERNMENT VOTING TOGETHER. THE FORMER CONSTITUTION ALSO PROVIDES FOR THE SPEAKER OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY TO BECOME INTERIM PRESIDENT FOR THREE MONTHS. THERE IS SUCH A SPEAKER IN BEING. HE IS DOCTOR SINDIKUBWABO, WHO WAS ENGAGED IN POLITICS FROM SOON AFTER INDEPENDENCE UNTIL 1973, BUT THEN DROPPED OUT UNTIL HIS COME-BACK IN 1989. HE BELONGS TO THE MRND, AND COMES FROM BUTARE IN THE SOUTH OF THE COUNTRY. HE HAS NO REAL POWER BASE AND IS A RATHER INSUBSTANTIAL FIGURE. BUT THOSE CHARACTERISTICS MIGHT TURN OUT TO MAKE HIM ATTRACTIVE AS A STOP-GAP PRESIDENT.

8. [REDACTED]

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FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 092300Z FCO
TELNO 98
OF 092131Z APRIL 94

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YOUR TELNO 38 AND UKMIS NEW YORK 1284: RWANDA

SUMMARY

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

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FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 201200Z FCO
TELNO 119
OF 201048Z APRIL 94

18 APR 1994

TOP COPY
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(144)
UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1410 : RWANDA

Pr Study

SUMMARY

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4.

INTERESTED REGIONAL STATES TO SEE STABILITY RESTORED TO RWANDA. THE TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WOULD ALL HAVE A DIRECT STAKE IN THE FUTURE STABILITY OF RWANDA, AND WOULD CARRY MORE CLOUT WITH THE INTERNAL PARTIES.

5. MUSEVENI SAID HIS PROPOSED REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WAS DESIGNED TO KEEP NOT TO MAKE PEACE, TO FACILITATE DIALOGUE, TO HELP THE PARTIES FORM A BROAD-BASED INTERIM GOVERNMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS, AND TO HELP THAT GOVERNMENT DISARM THEIR OWN PEOPLE. MUSEVENI ALSO DECLARED HIS SUPPORT FOR AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ASSASSINATIONS PRECEDING HABYARIMANA'S DEATH AND THE MASSACRES WHICH HAD FOLLOWED IT.

COMMENT

6. I TOLD MUSEVENI THAT SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF UNAMIR MIGHT WELL BE MADE THIS EVENING. THE FORCE COULD NOT BEGIN TO FULFIL ITS MANDATE BEFORE THERE WAS A CEASE-FIRE, WHILE THE SECURITY OF ITS PERSONNEL WAS SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY CONTINUED FIGHTING. WE WERE REALLY AT THE TWELFTH HOUR IN TERMS OF GETTING THE PARTIES TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE.

7. [REDACTED] ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS TO SEE AN EFFORT MADE TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL SOLUTION, REVIVING THE ARUSHA PROCESS. HE IS HIMSELF QUITE CLEAR THAT ALL THE ORIGINAL PARTIES AND FACTIONS SHOULD REMAIN INVOLVED, EVEN IF SOME INDIVIDUAL LEADERS WERE NO LONGER QUOTE AVAILABLE UNQUOTE.

8. SO FAR AS I CAN TELL, MUSEVENI HAS RECEIVED NO SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR AN AFRICAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE TO TAKE THE PLACE OF UNAMIR. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ORGANISING SUCH A FORCE ARE FORMIDABLE. A MAJOR DISADVANTAGE WOULD NO DOUBT BE THE NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENT UNAMIR TO STAY IN POSITION UNTIL A SUCCESSOR FORCE COULD BE PUT IN PLACE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF A CEASE-FIRE COULD BE AGREED WITHIN THE NEXT 24 HOURS, AND IF THE PARTIES ACCEPTED PEACE-KEEPERS FROM THE NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, UNAMIR'S POSITION WOULD BECOME LESS DANGEROUS.

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FM KAMPALA
TO DESKBY 231100Z FCO
TELNO 123
OF 230931Z APRIL 94

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FOR AD(E)

MY TELNO 122 : RWANDA : PRESIDENT MUSEVENI'S INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

1. RPF TO ANNOUNCE A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE. EARLY PROGRESS AT ARUSHA UNLIKELY.

DETAIL

2. PRESIDENT MUSEVENI CONVENED HIS DIPLOMATIC GROUP TO HEAR THE RPF'S AND RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S REPLIES TO HIS INITIATIVE. THE GROUP WAS JOINED BY AGARD DIDI (DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER) AND MUHWEZI (EXTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATION), WHO WILL BE REPRESENT MUSEVENI AT ARUSHA.

3. THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO COMMUNICATE A FORMAL REPLY TO THEIR CHARGE. THE LATTER DID NOT ANTICIPATE OBJECTION FROM THEM. THE RPF RESPONDED BY CIRCULATING A STATE WHICH IS TO BE BROADCAST SHORTLY, ANNOUNCING A UNILATERAL CEAS FROM MIDNIGHT LOCAL (2100 GMT) ON MONDAY, 25 APRIL. THE STATEMENT CONTAINS SOME ELEMENTS OF MUSEVENI'S ORIGINAL PROPOSALS, BUT IS ONE-SIDED AND TENDENTIOUS, AND MAKES CONTINUED OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE CONDITIONAL ON THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES (RGF) IN EFFECT ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR, AND SUPPRESSING VIOLENCE IN THEIR AREAS. IT DEMANDS A SWIFT ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO IDENTIFY AND PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR RECENT ATROCITIES, AND FOR HABYARIMANA'S DEATH. THE RPF CALL UPON THE FACILITATOR AND REGIONAL HEADS OF STATE TO CONVENE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE RPA AND THE RGF ON MODIFICATIONS TO AND MODALITIES OF

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IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA AGREEMENT.

4. THE RWANDAN CHARGE REACTED MILDLY TO THIS. MUSEVENI GENERALLY WELCOMED THE CEASEFIRE BUT LECTURED RUDASINGWA (RPF) ON THE FOLLY OF TAKING PRE-EMPTIVE POSITIONS ON MATTERS WHICH WILL BE THE SUBJECTS OF NEGOTIATION.

5. RUDASINGWA REPORTED A LATE ATTEMPT BY MOBUTU TO MEDIATE YESTERDAY. THE RPF HAD NOT RESPONDED TO HIS INVITATION. THEY DID NOT WANT TO 'DIVIDE THE REGION' BY RESPONDING TO SOME MEDIATORS AND NOT OTHERS AND FELT THEY WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED NOT TO ATTEND THE ARUSHA MEETING, EITHER. MUSEVENI [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] INSTRUCTED HIS OWN TEAM TO GIVE RUDASINGWA A FLIGHT ON THEIR PLANE TO ARUSHA. BUT RUDASINGWA MAINTAINED HE WOULD HAVE NO MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE ANY MATTERS IN THE RPF STATEMENT.

COMMENT

6. THE RPF'S STATEMENT WAS GENERALLY WELCOMED AS A STEP FORWARD. HOWEVER, THEIR TACTICS SEEM DESIGNED TO KEEP PLENTY OF OPTIONS OPEN. GIVEN RUDASINGWA'S LACK OF AUTHORITY, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT MALECELA WILL BE ABLE TO PUSH MATTERS AHEAD VERY FAR AT THIS WEEKEND'S ARUSHA MEETING. THE RPF'S EXPLICIT EXCLUSION OF DEALINGS WITH THE INTERIM RWANDAN GOVERNMENT, AS OPPOSED TO THE RGF, WILL MAKE PROGRESS OVER THE ARUSHA ACCORDS VERY DIFFICULT. PROVIDING THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ARE NOT PROVOKED, THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THE CEASEFIRE WILL BE OBSERVED AS FROM MONDAY NIGHT.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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FM KAMPALA
TO TELELETTER FCO
TELELETTER FILE REF : NFR
OF 290718Z APRIL 94

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RWANDA : MUSEVENI'S INITIATIVE

1. THERE WAS A CURIOUS POSTSCRIPT TO MUSEVENI'S EFFORTS TO HELP MWINYI OF TANZANIA TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE AND TO GET THE RPF AND THE RGF TO START TALKING ABOUT HOW TO REVIVE THE ARUSHA PROCESS.
2. MUSEVENI'S GROUP OF DIPLOMATS - THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, THE TANZANIAN, RWANDAN AND US CHARGES, AND I, BUT NOT THE RPF - WERE SUMMONED AT SHORT NOTICE ON 28 APRIL TO SEE MUSEVENI. HE FLOORED US BY SAYING THAT HE HAD CALLED US TOGETHER SO THAT HE COULD QUOTE HAND IN MY RESIGNATION UNQUOTE FROM HIS ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE OVER RWANDA. HE WAS PROVOKED TO THIS BY REPORTED STATEMENTS CARRIED BY THE BBC FROM A RWANDAN MINISTER IN NAIROBI ASSERTING THAT MUSEVENI WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RPF, IN CHARGE OF THEIR CAMPAIGNING, AND HAD INDEED MORE OR LESS LAUNCHED THEIR INVASION OF RWANDA IN 1990. MUSEVENI WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH, WITH HUMOUR BUT WITH INCREASING PASSION, ABOUT THE WAY HE HAD BEEN TRADUCED, AND HIS ROLE MISUNDERSTOOD. HE REALLY HAD OTHER THINGS TO DO, AND WOULD NOT ONLY GIVE UP HIS OWN ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE, BUT WOULD NOT ATTEND MEDIATION MEETINGS.
3. [REDACTED] BUT THERE IS NO DOUBTING MUSEVENI'S INDIGNATION AT THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO THE RWANDAN MINISTER. IT IS, OF COURSE, A LINE PEDDLED BY THE FRENCH AND, FROM TIME TO TIME, OTHERS. HE WENT OVER THE GROUND OF THE RPF'S INVASION OF RWANDA IN 1990. HE REITERATED HIS FAMILIAR ARGUMENT THAT THIS WAS NOT THE SOURCE NOR THE CAUSE OF

THE PRESENT PROBLEM IN RWANDA. THAT WENT BACK MANY GENERATIONS. WHY SHOULD RWANDA HOLD HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RWANDAN SITUATION: THEY SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT WAS THEIR GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD EXCLUDED THEIR OWN PEOPLE FROM THEIR OWN COUNTRY, FORCING THEM TO LIVE AS REFUGEES IN UGANDA. WERE THEY SUGGESTING THAT THE HOST COUNTRY (UGANDA) SHOULD ALSO ACT AS THEIR PRISONER, AND PREVENT THE REFUGEES FROM TRYING TO RETURN HOME? HE CONTRASTED THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH WITH HIS OWN IN RESPECT OF AMIN'S FELLOW-TRIBESMEN IN THE WEST NILE DISTRICT: HE HAD MADE SURE THAT THEY RETURNED TO UGANDA FROM THEIR REFUGE IN SUDAN, AND HAD THUS ROBBERED THE SUDANESE OF A RECRUITING BASE FOR PEOPLE THEY COULD INFILTRATE INTO UGANDA. SOON, HE WOULD FIND THAT HE WAS BEING ACCUSED, AND UGANDA WAS BEING ACCUSED, OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR INSTABILITY THE FACT WAS THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT RWANDESE IN THE DIASPORA TO SUSTAIN A REBELLION AGAINST THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT WITH EASE, WITHOUT ANY HELP FROM UGANDA AT ALL. HE DIGRESSED AT LENGTH ON HIS OWN EXPERIENCE OF CONDUCTING A CIVIL WAR IN UGANDA.

4. THE HAPLESS RWANDA CHARGE LOOKED PRETTY SICK AS THIS TIRADE WENT ON. HE DESCRIBED HIS MINISTER'S REMARKS AS QUOTE VERY UNFORTUNATE UNQUOTE, AND CLAIMED THAT HE HAD EXPRESSED HIMSELF BADLY. HE PROTESTED THAT THE MINISTER HAD NOT INTENDED TO CONVEY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S REJECTION OF MUSEVENI'S MEDIATION.

5. I SPOKE FIRST IN RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT, AND SAID:

- (A) WE SUPPORTED HIS EFFORTS AT MEDIATION AS A CONTRIBUTION TO MWINYI'S ROLE AS FACILITATOR:
- (B) WE WOULD MUCH REGRET HIS WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SCENE:
- (C) IT WOULD MEAN THAT MEDIATION WAS EFFECTIVELY LEFT IN THE HANDS OF PRESIDENT MWINYI, WHO WOULD BE GIVEN AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK:
- (D) UGANDA HAD, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD TOLD US, AN INTEREST IN, AND MUCH TO CONTRIBUTE TO A REGIONAL SOLUTION:
- (E) IT WAS THE CASE THAT UGANDA, HAVING BEEN A CAUSE OF INSTABILITY IN THE REGION, WAS NOW A BEACON OF STABILITY THREATENED BY THE DISORDERS IN NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES. BUT UGANDA'S SUCCESS CARRIED WITH IT RESPONSIBILITIES.

- (F) THE EU IN THEIR LATEST STATEMENT HAD EXPRESSLY SUPPORTED REGIONAL EFFORTS, WHICH THE WORLD REGARDED AS THE BEST REMAINING HOPE OF ACHIEVING PEACE IN RWANDA:
- (G) THE RWANDAN MINISTER'S REMARKS WERE CUTTING, BUT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND STATE WERE USED TO THAT. IN FACT, IF HE LOOKED AT THE SITUATION CALMLY, HE WOULD SEE THAT HIS INITIATIVE HAD IN FACT BEEN TREATED CAVALIERLY BY BOTH PARTIES: THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE A PROPER, FORMAL RESPONSE TO IT: AND THE RPF HAD COME BACK WITH A RATHER DIFFERENT DOCUMENT OF THEIR OWN. HE WAS QUITE RIGHT TO FEEL INDIGNANT: BUT, WITH OUR MORAL SUPPORT, WE HOPED HE WOULD REDOUBLE HIS EFFORTS WITH THESE TWO RECALCITRANT PARTIES, BOTH OF WHOM HAD TREATED HIS INTERVENTION WITH INSOLENCE.

6. THE FRENCH SPOKE IN MY SUPPORT, AND MADE THE ADDITIONAL POINT THAT MUSEVENI HIMSELF OFFERED THE BEST PROSPECT OF COMBINING THE DIVERGENT INITIATIVES OF MWINYI AND MOBUTU. THE US CHARGE, THE RWANDAN CHARGE AND, WITH PARTICULAR FORCE, THE TANZANIAN CHARGE, ALSO EXPRESSED THEIR HOPE THAT MUSEVENI WOULD NOT WITHDRAW FROM MEDIATION.

7. AFTER AN HOUR AND A HALF OR SO OF THIS, MUSEVENI SMILINGLY CONCEDED THAT HE SHOULD NOT BE OVER-SENSITIVE PERSONALLY TO INSULTS: BUT HE COULD NOT FORGIVE INSULTS AGAINST THE REPUTATION OF UGANDA. HE FURTHER ACCEPTED THAT HE SHOULD PERSEVERE: UGANDA WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO DO ITS SHARE, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE USED AS A PUNCHBAG OR A SCAPEGOAT. IN SHORT, HE RELENDED ON HIS RESIGNATION, WHICH HE SAID HE NOW REGARDED AS QUOTE SUSPENDED UNQUOTE. HE WOULD TRY TO INFLUENCE WITH LOGIC THOSE WHO LISTENED TO THE UGANDAN GOVERNMENT THE RPF.

COMMENT

8. THIS HAD ITS HUMOROUS MOMENTS. BUT HIS OPENING LINE WAS PRETTY DISMAYING, AND I AM GLAD THAT COLLECTIVELY WE MANAGED TO TURN HIM ROUND. NO DOUBT HE WAS PLAYING WITH UP THE PART OF THE INJURED INNOCENT IN FRONT OF THE RWANDAN AND THE FRENCH. THERE IS A GOOD MEASURE OF JUSTICE ON HIS SIDE, OF COURSE. EQUALLY, HOWEVER, TAKING UMBRAGE AT THE REMARKS OF THE RWANDAN MINISTER GAVE MUSEVENI CHANCE TO OPT OUT OF AN INITIATIVE WHICH HIS FRIENDS IN THE RPF WERE CLEARLY UNHAPPY ABOUT AND NEITHER SIDE WAS PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH. IT WAS NOT A VERY LOGICAL ACTION ON HIS PART: THE FACT WAS THAT BOTH SIDES HAD FAILED TO GIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO HIS INITIATIVE, AND THE RPF

IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN PRETTY DISOBLIGING. HE MAY HAVE BEEN GLAD OF AN EXCUSE TO DISENGAGE FROM AN INITIATIVE WHICH HAD FAILED, AND WHICH HAD BEEN FOULED BY MOBUTO'S OWN EFFORT.

SIGNED.....EDWARD CLAY

OEWS: 020/1
REC'D
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Mr. [unclear]
HP *S 1/4*

FM FCO
 TO TELELETTER KAMPALA
 TELELETTER NFR
 OF 081533Z APRIL 94
 AND TO TELELETTER BRUSSELS, PARIS

FROM D R MACLENNAN, ADE

TO MR EDWARD CLAY, CMG, BHC, KAMPALA
 TO CHANCERY, BRUSSELS, PARIS
 TO CC MR DRUMMOND, CSAD, ODA
 TO CC NAIROBI FOR BDDEA

A POLICY FOR RWANDA

18

1. In my teletype of 3 March I promised a considered response to your telno 55. Much of the following was drafted before the deaths of the Rwandan and Burundi presidents. I hope it will still be valid once the dust settles but we shall have to wait and see.
2. We have consulted Ministers who have endorsed the broad lines of paras 7-9 of your TUR. As you rightly point out, there is no sense in our being drawn into an area where our commercial and political interests are insubstantial. However, we cannot ignore the country entirely. Rwanda currently holds one of the three non-permanent African seats on the Security Council and we will need to maintain dialogue with them as best we can. Moreover the UNAMIR and UNOMUR operation cost us an estimated Pounds Sterling 2.17m in the 1993/94 financial year.
3. In effect this means we should also continue to give moral support to the US and those of our European partners who are active and represented in Kigali in their efforts to persuade all the parties to implement the Arusha Peace Accord. We also agree that we should use your access, particularly to Museveni, to encourage the Ugandans to disassociate themselves from the Rwandan Patriotic Front and to ask the Ugandans to continue to point out to the RPF, the benefits of the Arusha agreement (i.e. the approach we have asked you to take following the deaths of the Rwanda and Burundi presidents - FCO telno 38).

4. At the same time we agree that we might usefully remind the French and Belgians that we are in touch with the Ugandans in this sense. It was clear from a meeting between the Belgian Ambassador and Anthony Goodenough on 7 April that Belgium continues harbour deep suspicions about possible Ugandan assistance to the RPF. I am content to leave it to Paris and Brussels to decide when and how to pursue this on the basis of your further reporting.

5. On the Aid front, I fear we have been unable to meet all of your suggestions. In line with agreed policy to concentrate bilateral aid in countries where we maintain a resident presence, we had already taken steps to wind up our TC programme (one ELT project) before the outbreak of hostilities last year. Aid Framework provision for Rwanda (as for neighbouring Burundi) is therefore limited to Pounds Sterling 20,000 annually for a Heads of Mission Gift Scheme (HOMGS). We are also funding NGO projects through the Joint Funding Scheme (Pounds Sterling 187,000 in 1992/93) and provide humanitarian aid (about Pounds Sterling 800,000 over the last year) for displaced Rwandans. The latest estimate (which predates the present internal problems in Rwanda) of the UK share of multilateral aid to Rwanda is some Pounds Sterling 6 million annually.

6. In the ODA's view, we could not justify increasing the Aid Framework provision for Rwanda to renew ELT support. To do so would be inconsistent with our general policy, and could raise expectations of similar treatment for other countries (eg Burundi). It follows that we also could not make a bilateral contribution to demobilising Rwanda's armed forces though we might support a move by the EU or one of the other multilateral donors to do so.

7. Lady Chalker has, however, asked both NGO unit and Emergency Aid Dept in ODA whether we could do more on bilateral aid particularly through NGOs and to make a particular effort to look out for worthwhile projects in Rwanda. No doubt you will let us know if you spot any deserving causes that might fit the bill.

SIGNED D R MACLENNAN

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