



**From** JERUSALEM  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 10:32:00  
**Subject** MEPP: PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS  
**Summary** [REDACTED]

MEPP: PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS: ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

[REDACTED]  
DETAIL

2. Palestinian pollsters, the head of the Election Commission, our diplomatic colleagues, and various branches of Israeli intelligence all predicted that Hamas would win around 55-60 seats in the PLC. [REDACTED]

(Full results are available at [http://www.elections.ps/pdf/result\\_seat\\_distribution\\_EN.pdf](http://www.elections.ps/pdf/result_seat_distribution_EN.pdf))

3. We knew that Hamas would do well - pre-election polls giving Hamas 35-40% of the vote represented an all-time high for Hamas support. And we knew the reasons Hamas would do well - dissatisfaction with Fatah because of corruption and lawlessness, and on the other hand appreciation of Hamas' welfare activities and reputation for probity. [REDACTED]

4. The results from the national list part of the election (Hamas 30 seats, Fatah 27 seats) show that Hamas managed to up their level of support to around 45%. This slight increase can probably be attributed to Hamas high level of organisation on the day, the commitment of their core supporters, and perhaps a reluctance on the part of some of those polled to say that they intended to vote Hamas. But the key question is how Hamas managed to turn this share of the vote almost two thirds of the seats (76 out of 132, but with 4 additional Hamas-affiliated independents)? [REDACTED]

5. Each of the 16 electoral districts had a number of seats available, won in a straightforward "first past the post system". In each district, Hamas put up the same number of candidates as there were seats, whereas Fatah had an excess of candidates - both official and unofficial. In the last few days of the campaign the Fatah leadership persuaded some of the unofficial Fatah candidates to step down, but their names remained on the ballot, along with those of other unofficial Fatah candidates who insisted on running. On election day, the Fatah candidates between them must in many cases have picked up as many votes as the Hamas candidates, but shared between too many names (we will analyse this as soon as the figures are available from the Central Elections Commission). Where Fatah was organised and had the right number of credible candidates, it did well - but this only really applied to Rafah and Qalqiliya. Everywhere else, Hamas cleaned up.

6. At the district level, Fatah won only 16 of the 66 seats on offer. Five of these were seats reserved for Christians, won on a very low share of the vote (Hamas even managed to win the sixth seat reserved for a Christian, in Gaza City). Looking at the other 11 Fatah candidates returned from the districts reveals a similar pattern - those who won seats were either locally popular members of the "young guard" (as in Rafah, Jenin and Qalqiliya) - or they organised

their own campaigns and spent significant sums of money (Erekat in Jericho and Dahlan in Khan Younis). Even this did not always work - in Hebron, Hamas won all 9 seats, with Presidential security adviser Jbril Rajoub losing out to his brother, Hamas candidate Nayef Rajoub, despite reportedly spending a small fortune. Where Fatah had been expected to perform much better - Jerusalem, Ramallah and Nablus, for example, the main problems appear to have been complacency and having far too many Fatah candidates. **[REDACTED]**

7. With hindsight, Fatah could of course have tried to implement a different electoral system and one that benefited them more - such as a 100% party list system. **[REDACTED]** The local Electoral Reform Support Group took the position that it was not for donors to specify what type of electoral system the PA chose, provided that it was democratic and fair.

8. The shock at the results among ordinary Palestinians and the leaderships of Fatah and Hamas bears this out. **[REDACTED]**

#### REGIONAL IMPACT

9. It does not necessarily follow that elections elsewhere in the Arab world would lead to the same results as in Palestine - the election of violent and extremist Islamic parties **[REDACTED]** The analysis above shows how local factors, including even the type of electoral system used, played the major role in determining the results. Palestinians wanted to register their demand for clean government and an end to security chaos.

**[REDACTED]** Palestinians, as much as the international community, are not sure what will happen next, and they are apprehensive.

**[REDACTED]**



**From** JERUSALEM  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 11:24:00  
**Subject** MEPP: PALESTINIAN ELECTION: IMPLICATIONS  
**Summary** Both Fatah and Hamas stunned by the election results. Fatah will have to consider now how to be a party of opposition. Hamas will have to consider how they want to run a government. **[REDACTED]**

MEPP: PALESTINIAN ELECTION: IMPLICATIONS

#### SUMMARY

1. Both Fatah and Hamas stunned by the election results. Fatah will have to consider now how to be a party of opposition. Hamas will have to consider how they want to run a government. **[REDACTED]**

#### DETAIL

2. The results of the election are still sinking in. Fatah people we have spoken to are in shock and despair. **[REDACTED]**

3. Hamas too appear to be in shock. They expected to be a strong opposition in the PLC, in a position to pick and chose a few ministries but needle Fatah for the continuing failures of the PA. But the strength of their victory means that they will now be expected to form a government of some sort. At this stage, they appear to have three options:

- Form a government of national unity with Fatah and the other groupings that won seats. But it is not clear that Fatah would want to participate in such a government. **[REDACTED]**
- Form an Islamist government. This would have limited popularity. It would appeal to Hamas' core constituency. But much of the vote for Hamas was a protest vote against Fatah. It would also isolate the PA in the international community. It is likely that Hamas themselves want to avoid this.
- Set up a technocratic front government. Hamas are reportedly already musing about offering the Prime Ministership to Salaam Fayyad. Other capable independent politicians with links to Hamas (including former economy minister Mazen Sinnokrot, Ziad Abu Amr from Gaza and former deputy speaker Hassan Khreisheh) might find places in such a government. It could, under the Basic Law, contain non-PLC members, as long as the PM is in the PLC.

#### **[REDACTED]**

5. A Hamas-led government of any form will face two pressing problems - money and security. International budgetary support for the PA has been withheld because of fiscal indiscipline relating in particular to excessive salary payments. The Arabs have not filled the gap. There is no budget for this financial year (Jan-Dec), and no finance minister. Even when one is appointed, he/she will face the challenge of reducing salaries (basically, sacking

thousands of PA personnel) before donors will reconsider support. [REDACTED]

6. Security will be the other difficult issue. The PA currently has some 58,000 people on the payroll of its bloated security forces. 95% of those seem to have voted for Fatah. .

[REDACTED] Any Hamas control of the critical Interior Ministry will bring tensions. Preventive Security (PS) and Palestinian General Intelligence (PGI) - two of the better resourced and motivated forces - will fiercely resist any attempts at Hamas control of their activities. Equally Fatah is unlikely to want to retain ministerial control of the MoI if that means simply carrying out Hamas orders. No one knows at this stage how these tensions will play out: but there is a real risk of violence. Hamas will also have to decide what to do with its armed wing (the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades (IQB), who have, in the past, confronted PA security forces). They will not be willing or able to disarm them in the short term. But it is not easy to see how they could be integrated into the PA security forces, or maintain any role outside the PA security forces. [REDACTED]

7. In the longer term, the Palestinians will have to decide what to do on negotiations. Hamas have, for now, ruled out negotiations with Israel and have re-iterated their position of non-recognition of Israel. But formally, it is the PLO that has the mandate to negotiate with Israel, not the PA. [REDACTED]

8. The Hamas victory also raises urgent questions about our and EU activities in Palestine. A lot will depend on how a new government is formed, and how it then operates. We shall then need to consider how if at all we can engage with a Hamas administration and what exactly we need to see from them in terms of polices and behaviour. The immediate issues will be:

- EU BAM: [REDACTED]The crossing is run by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and PS (both, until now, Fatah strongholds). Continued Israeli co-operation with the Palestinians will, of course, be crucial: [REDACTED]Hamas have so far said that they want EU BAM to continue to operate.
- EU COPPS is negotiating letters of agreement with the Israeli government for the massive expansion of EU COPPS (up to 33 EU police officers [REDACTED]GOF/GCPP. We are re-assessing all our project work. For now, we intend to continue supporting projects with civil society [REDACTED]

9. There is no need for the moment to go beyond the statements we and others have made about the Hamas victory and the possibility of a relationship. With the exception of immediate financial support for the PA (which I have already suggested should be a task for the Arab states), there is far too much still to be decided by the Palestinians before we are called on to make our own decisions. But we should at least start thinking about what sort of policy and behavioural menu we need to see from Hamas over the coming weeks and months - and what the timing needs to be [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



**From** PARIS  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 11:23:00  
**Subject** NOSEC: PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS: FURTHER FRENCH REACTIONS  
**Summary** 1. Shock and concern in press. But the editorials also identify silver lining: power could moderate Hamas; and peace negotiations, while now a more distant prospect, cannot succeed without them. [REDACTED]

FROM PARIS

NO 10 FOR QUARREY

PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS: FURTHER FRENCH REACTIONS

SUMMARY

1. Shock and concern in press. But the editorials also identify silver linings: power could moderate Hamas; and peace negotiations, while now a more distant prospect, cannot succeed without them. [REDACTED]

DETAIL

2. Further to my e-gram 1712/06, the French press on 27 January continues to lead on the Hamas victory. Editorials agree that the result, while a shock for everyone, is as much a tribute to Palestinian democracy as a threat to the peace process. La Croix (centrist daily) sets the tone by calling it a "black day" for the peace process. Le Parisien (centrist daily) sees moderate Arab governments as worried that the movement might spread, with delight in Tehran.

3. But Le Monde (left-leaning daily) stresses that the peace process is not necessarily dead - withdrawal from the West Bank was a unilateral Israeli decision, and they have long refused to talk to president Abbas, so why does it matter who's in charge? Israel could just retreat behind its wall and leave the Palestinians with a country defined by vague borders. Hamas' leadership is still rather opaque, and might be more pragmatic when confronted with the realities of power. Hamas know that to get international financial aid, they have to renounce violence and acknowledge the existence of Israel.

4. Le Figaro (right-leaning daily) agrees. But its editorial says it will take time before Hamas can be steered towards a peaceful path. The leadership will first have to prove that they can govern Palestine. Power can have a moderating

effect, especially if Hamas co-habit with Abbas. There would never have been real peace without Hamas at the table.

5. There is of course some US-bashing - Le Figaro says the result shows Bush that democracy is not enough to fight terrorism or promote western values in the Middle East. But there is little analysis of a US response that was more restrained than Paris would have expected. The French press shares the sense of the European dilemma, but there is not a strong current of opinion either for or against continuing budget support. The weekend press will grapple with this question.

6. The Quai are sticking to their public line that we must take decisions on the basis of the positions adopted by the Palestinian government that emerges, but that we can only work with those who have renounced terrorism and accepted Israel[REDACTED]The scale of the victory surprised everyone, even the doom-mongers, but encourages Paris that EU Ministers are more likely to take a realistic stance at the GAERC on contacts with Hamas, albeit under clear conditions. We are reporting separately on the position Douste-Blazy is likely to take.

COMMENT  
[REDACTED]



**From** WASHINGTON  
**Date Created** 26/01/2006 23:27:00  
**Subject** NOSEC: Subject: MEPP: Palestinian elections: Initial US views  
**Summary** 1. The Administration: welcomes the "fair" electoral process; repeats its red lines on Hamas; tries to bolster Abbas; is concerned (along with Israel) about the PA's financial predicament; wonders if a caretaker government headed by Abbas could be a way to receive funds; hopes that Fatah will not join any national unity government.

## Detail

2. We spoke **[REDACTED]** for initial reactions to the Palestinian election results. Bush and Rice also made statements.

## Hamas

3. We noted that in our pre-election public statements the UK and US had made clear that we would not deal with terrorists; the onus was now clearly on Hamas. **[REDACTED]** agreed that we were on the same page. **[REDACTED]** said a clear Hamas majority was a better result than any hung parliament; Hamas were now on the spot. **[REDACTED]**

## Fatah

4. Discussing Fatah's poor showing at the polls, **[REDACTED]** said that the US had reports of major recriminations within the party. It looked as though they would stay out of a coalition government, believing that their best chance was to re-group as a loyal opposition. **[REDACTED]**

## Israel

5. **[REDACTED]** State was focussing on how Hamas' victory might impact on Israeli elections. Much would depend on how aggressive Hamas chose to be, although **[REDACTED]** noted that the group had not repeated its commitment to violence, or denial of Israel, in its immediate post-election statements.

## Public statements

6. In its public statements the Administration has welcomed the conduct of the polls as "peaceful and free of violence, and by all accounts, fair". Rice noted that Abbas had been elected on a platform of peace. There was a constitutional process that would be followed and asked all parties "to respect this process so that it can unfold in an atmosphere of calm and security". But the US position on Hamas had not changed; "you cannot have one foot in politics and the other in terror". When asked if the US was cautioning President Abbas not to resign, Bush noted that the US "message to him was, we would hope he would stay in office

and work to move the process forward.” Full texts at:  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060126.html> and  
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59870.htm>

#### Comment

7. This has been a test of the Administration's approach to its freedom and democracy agenda. **[REDACTED]**It will be important to keep the Quartet united in its approach to the new government if we are to handle the challenges we now face. Next week's meeting of Principals will be timely.

**[REDACTED]**





**From** UKREP BRUSSELS  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 17:15:00  
**Subject** NOSEC: PSC, 27 JANUARY: EUSR [REDACTED] ON THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS  
**Summary** [REDACTED] briefs on Palestinian elections, stressing the uncertainty ahead and the need to remain firm on conditions for engaging with a Hamas dominated government. Broad agreement that the EU should proceed cautiously, avoid premature decisions and remain united. The Commission focus on the consequences of cutting off EU funding but say they are still considering their options.. [REDACTED]

#### SUMMARY

1. [REDACTED] briefs on Palestinian elections, stressing the uncertainty ahead and the need to remain firm on conditions for engaging with a Hamas dominated government. Broad agreement that the EU should proceed cautiously, avoid premature decisions and remain united. The Commission focus on the consequences of cutting off EU funding but say they are still considering their options. [REDACTED]

#### DETAIL

2. On 27 January [REDACTED] briefed the PSC on the Palestinian elections. He said:

- There was now huge pressure on Abu Mazen. It could take as long as five weeks to form a government. During this period he would have the challenge of maintaining order in the Palestinian Territories.
- But there was pressure on Hamas too. They instinctively wanted to work with other Palestinian groups. But it was unclear whether they would find partners. They would need some time to define their strategy.
- It was difficult to predict next steps. One possible outcome may be a division of labour with Abu Mazen continuing to negotiate with the Israelis (as head of the PLO) whilst Hamas focused on domestic issues - in particular health and education.
- There was both a political and financial crisis (the PA was bankrupt). If salaries were not paid the security situation could deteriorate rapidly. In particular it would be very difficult to keep Fatah elements under control.

The EU would have to think carefully about its whole range of engagement with the PA. It was not just the money (although this was complex enough). [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said the EU should continue to stress that we would not engage with a future PA government unless it renounced violence, recognised Israel and entered into negotiations.

3. The Commission [REDACTED] briefed on implications for EU financial assistance. He stressed the Commission was still considering the options, but hinted that their approach would be not/not to cut funding to the PA unless absolutely necessary. He noted that:

- One million people in the Palestinian Territories relied - directly and indirectly - on EU funding. To withdraw it would have dramatic consequences and could lead to violence.
- The EU was under no obligations to align its position on financial support with that of the US and Israel. The EU had not done so in the past.
- The wider region was watching the EU response to these elections. If we seemed, by our actions, to be rejecting the results then our claims to promoting democracy would be undermined.

4. **[REDACTED]** also noted that Israel would need to decide whether to pass tax revenues to a PA dominated by Hamas. This decision would have a greater impact than any decision on EU funds.

5. In the discussion that followed there was broad consensus on the need to proceed cautiously. EU partners had to co-ordinate their approach carefully - both internally and with the Quartet. For the time being we should stress our conditions for engaging with any future PA - a renunciation of violence and recognition of the State of Israel. This would put the ball in Hamas' court.

6. There were, however, some suggestions of divergence on how to deal with Hamas in the long term **[REDACTED]** **[REDACTED]** was notably tough in his response. Hamas was still very much a terrorist organisation. It had been rearming throughout the election campaign.

**[REDACTED]**

7. The Presidency noted that the PSC would return to the MEPP GAERC Conclusions at 0800 (Brussels time) on Monday to update them in light of the Hamas majority. (We have passed the Presidency additional language based on UK lines).

#### COMMENT

8. GAERC discussion is likely primarily to focus on Hamas' victory and the implications for EU financial assistance. **[REDACTED]**  
**[REDACTED]**



**From** PARIS  
**Date Created** 26/01/2006 17:14:00  
**Subject** NOSEC: PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS: INITIAL FRENCH REACTIONS  
**Summary** 1. Cautious French public reaction  
[REDACTED]

## FROM PARIS

NO 10 FOR QUARREY

PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS: INITIAL FRENCH REACTIONS

### SUMMARY

1. Cautious French public reaction, [REDACTED]

### DETAIL

2. The Quai are delaying a formal statement until definitive results are in. Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy praised the conduct of the elections and the rate of participation as proof of the "democratic maturity" of the Palestinian people. On the potential role for Hamas, the Quai are saying that the French will not comment until after the GAERC/Quartet meetings on 30 January. [REDACTED]

3. There is dense press coverage, mainly reportage on similar lines to the UK press. In advance of the results this morning (26 January), Le Figaro (right-leaning daily) called the potential Hamas majority a "catastrophic scenario", but joined other newspapers in concluding that, on balance, Hamas participation in elections was nevertheless an opportunity. Le Monde this afternoon, after the unofficial results, assesses Hamas success as down to its domestic rather than anti-Israel agenda, and sees the rising levels of Hamas support as a sanction for Fatah failure. It foresees a lengthy freeze on links between Israel and the PA, and explores the major dilemma now facing the international community over Hamas-handling.

4. We discussed prospects with [REDACTED], and have co-ordinated public lines with the Quai. Their analysis of the election day itself reflects our own (Jerusalem 16663/06). The day itself went better than hoped, with the

Palestinians once again a role model for the region. But the Quai remain concerned about the implications for Abbas. They agree we need to hold our nerve, and delay public comments on dealing with Hamas until the situation is clearer and EU Ministers have met on 31 January. **[REDACTED]**

5. **[REDACTED]**

**[REDACTED]**



**From** SOSFA PO  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 16:36:00  
**Subject** MEPP: THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH THE ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER, 27 JANUARY:Id=2642167  
**Summary** FROM PRIVATE SECRETARY

#### SUMMARY

1. The Foreign Secretary and Livni agree on the need to send a clear message that Hamas cannot continue as both a terrorist organisation and a political party. **[REDACTED]**

#### DETAIL

2. The Foreign Secretary (on his way from Athens to Davos) spoke to the new Israeli Foreign Minister, Tzipi Livni, on 27 January. The Foreign Secretary began by congratulating Livni on her appointment. **[REDACTED]**
3. The Foreign Secretary said he had made his position clear in public. We respected the outcome of the elections and the democratic wish of the Palestinian people. But it was clear that we could not accept a political party in power that was still also a terrorist organisation. We had to put the onus on Hamas now to respect the norms of democracy and the will of the Palestinian people, who through the act of voting made clear their desire for a peaceful, democratic solution to their problems.
4. Livni said she agreed with the Foreign Secretary that the core message must be that democracy and terror were incompatible. **[REDACTED]** Hamas sought legitimacy, its isolation from the international community was very important. We had to continue to send out a very firm message reiterating the conditions that Hamas would need to meet before it could be seen as legitimate. The international community did not need to talk about accepting the outcome of the elections.
5. The Foreign Secretary explained why for the credibility of our policy of democratisation in the Middle East we had to declare that we accepted the results. But we had made this statement now and did not need to repeat it. We would make very clear that Hamas must accept the responsibilities of leadership or bear the consequences if it failed to do so **[REDACTED]** The next few days would be crucial which is why the messages the international community sent out would be so important. The Foreign Secretary agreed. EU Foreign Ministers would discuss the matter on Monday and this would be followed by the Quartet meeting. He said

he would call Livni before the GAERC to follow up his discussions in Davos.  
**[REDACTED]**

**From****SEC****Date Created****27/01/2006 16:40:00****Subject****COMEM COMEP - NOUVELLE DONNE POLITIQUE APRES LES etc****Summary**

1. In connection with the forthcoming all-source assessment on Nouvelle donne politique apres les Elections Palestiniennes, to be produced by the EU Joint Situation Centre, The Council Secretariat invites information contributions from Member States on the topics detailed below.

**[REDACTED]**

**SUBJECT: COMEM/COMEP / NOUVELLE DONNE POLITIQUE APRES LES ELECTIONS PALESTINIENNES: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION INPUTS**

1. In connection with the forthcoming all-source assessment on Nouvelle donne politique apres les Elections Palestiniennes, to be produced by the EU Joint Situation Centre, The Council Secretariat invites information contributions from Member States on the topics detailed below.

2. Topic: Nouvelle donne politique apres les Elections Palestiniennes

Deadline for contributions: 07 fevrier 2006

Detail of Requirement:

- Rapport de force apres les elections, Bilan:

- Politique Interieure :

- . Etat de preparations des cadres du Hamas a l'exercice du pouvoir
- . Personnalites du Hamas pouvant occuper des postes ministeriels
- . Nature des relations entre la branche politique et la branche armee
- . Refonte de la chartre fondatrice du mouvement, adhesion a l'OLP
- . Avenir de la restructuration de l'appareil securitaire palestinien (services de securite et services de police)
- . Devenir des Brigades Ezzedine al Qassam (desarmement ?)
- . Nature des relations avec l'opposition (Fatah)
- . Avenir politique du president Mahmoud ABBAS
- . Attitude des autres mouvements radicaux : Jihad Islamique, Comites de Resistance Populaire

- Politique Etrangere :

- . Nature des relations avec la communauté internationale et l'Union Européenne
- . Reconnaissance de l'Etat d'Israël et des accords d'Oslo
- . Influence des puissances étrangères sur le nouveau gouvernement; Iran, Syrie...
- . Role et attitude des dirigeants du mouvement en exil à l'étranger

3. **[REDACTED]**

4. Unclassified material in electronic format may be submitted directly to <secretariat.cic@consilium.eu.int> with a header sheet indicating the assessment for which it is intended. Classified or documentary material should be forwarded by Representations directly to the SitCen (Kortenbergh 150).

**[REDACTED]**





**From** JERUSALEM  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 12:41:00  
**Subject** MEPP: HAMAS IN GOVERNMENT:Id=2636488  
**Summary** Hamas is structured to deliver social welfare for Palestinians, violence against Israelis and political campaigning. It is not designed to govern or negotiate a peace deal with Israel. It has a set of principles but, not expecting to win so handsomely, it does not have detailed plans to face the new challenges confronting it. Dealing with the Fatah-dominated security forces will be particularly testing.

1. Hamas has three branches: social welfare, violence and politics. The social welfare branch consists of a number of charities no longer formally affiliated with the movement, enabling them to operate within the law both inside Palestine and outside (for fund-raising purposes). The Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades (IDQ) are responsible for 'resistance' - [REDACTED]The third branch deals with political campaigning. The three branches are united by an overarching political leadership (the Political Bureau), itself advised by a wider Shura (consultative) Council. A key part of the leadership is based outside Palestine.
2. This structure has proven highly effective to date. And the organisation has generally been very disciplined. [REDACTED]Politically, Hamas has just demonstrated how well it can mobilise its supporters, contrasting [REDACTED]There has undoubtedly been a lively debate within the leadership on (for example) how to deal with Israel, but this has not prevented the maintenance of a broadly unified policy.
- 3[REDACTED]
4. Life in government will be made still more difficult for Hamas by the fact that important members of the leadership (including the Head of the Political Bureau, Khalid Mishaal) live abroad. This makes for difficulties in communication. And Mishaal and other exiled leaders will not necessarily understand the pressures and constraints faced by Hamas in running the PA[REDACTED]
5. There is no one dominant figure: the leadership is likely to operate in a collegiate fashion.
6. Hamas did not expect to win as handsomely as it did. [REDACTED]They will face huge and immediate challenges in two main areas: relations with Israel, and the handling of the PA security forces.
7. With regard to Israel, Hamas in government can be expected to try to maintain the conditional cease-fire [REDACTED]8. The PA security forces are dominated by members of Fatah. Individually, they have an interest in keeping their jobs. But Hamas will want some of these jobs for their own members. [REDACTED] There is likely to be considerable tension between the security forces and the new Hamas government.
9. In post-election statements, Hamas leaders have stressed national unity, and have sought to ease their looming difficulties in government by bringing other factions in. Appointing a largely technocratic government would be another way of making it easier to govern, both in terms of reducing the friction in dealings with others (Israel, the security forces and Western governments) and bringing in much-needed expertise. Hamas seems already to have taken some initial steps in this direction. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]



**From** COPENHAGEN  
**Date Created** 26/01/2006 15:49:00  
**Subject** NOSEC: DENMARK: PRE-GAERC BRIEFING  
**Summary** 1. [REDACTED][REDACTED]rules out cutting Danish aid to Palestinians as a result of Hamas' election success. [REDACTED]

## SUMMARY

1.[REDACTED][REDACTED] rules out cutting Danish aid to Palestinians as a result of Hamas' election success. [REDACTED]

## DETAIL

2. The Danish MFA [REDACTED]gave a pre-GAERC briefing on 26 January. Following were the key points:

## GENERAL AFFAIRS

[REDACTED]

## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

### MEPP/Hamas election success

5. [REDACTED]noted the need for the EU to react to the PLC election results.  
[REDACTED]

6. Foreign Minister Møller is quoted on the news wires as saying "Now we must see whether, under the yoke of responsibility, they understand that they simply cannot run around and have militias and at the same time a peaceful solution. Hamas must drop the line that Israel must be destroyed and must go for negotiations with Israel in order to achieve a two-state solution which can solve the problem". He has rejected calls from the (anti-EU, anti-immigration) Danish Peoples' Party to stop Danish assistance to the Palestinians saying "one naturally shouldn't punish the Palestinian people for using their voting rights. We must, in one or other way, make sure that they don't suffer in this situation... our support doesn't go to the Party (Hamas) but to the Palestinian people. It can't help if we throw them into deeper economic chaos. That would only cause frustration and aggression and certainly would not create a will to make peace and a peaceful solution."

[REDACTED]





**From** BERLIN  
**Date Created** 27/01/2006 11:17:00  
**Subject** NOSEC: GERMANY: PRE-GAERC BRIEFING 26 JANUARY  
**Summary** [REDACTED] Merkel leaves for Israel and Palestine on Sunday so the Hamas election in particular will be exercising them.

## Summary

1 [REDACTED]Merkel leaves for Israel and Palestine on Sunday so the Hamas election in particular will be exercising them.

## Detail

2The Auswärtiges Amt [REDACTED] briefed EU Embassies yesterday evening ahead of next week's GAERC. Steinmeier will attend the Council. Main points as follows:

[REDACTED]  
MEPP

10. M-L expected Ministers to have a good political discussion of the PLC election results.

[REDACTED]



**From** SANA'A  
**Date Created** 26/01/2006 10:55:00  
**Subject** YEMEN/UK: VISIT BY DR KIM HOWELLS 23 - 25 JANUARY  
**Summary** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

- Israel/Palestine: al-Qirbi felt that Hamas might get as much as 30% of the vote in the Palestinian elections. Dr Howells said [REDACTED] Israel had to be tackled about issues such as the security barrier and allowing inspectors in to examine its nuclear programme.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

# eGram



# 1846/06

**From**

**WASHINGTON**

**Date Created**

**27/01/2006 22:28:00**

**[REDACTED]** At a press conference on 27 January, Bush was in relaxed, jocular form despite close questioning on Hamas and wire-tapping.

**[REDACTED]**