

## Annual Review - Summary Sheet

<b>PROGRAMME TITLE: Niger Delta Stability Programme</b>		
<b>Country/Region:</b>	Nigeria	
<b>HMG Partners (LEAD in bold)</b>	Department for International Development (DFID), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence (MOD)	
<b>Total Budget:</b>	ODA: £1.25 million	Non-ODA: £0.15 million
<b>Start Date:</b> April 2016	<b>End Date:</b> March 2019	
<b>Outputs</b>		<b>Score</b>
1. Heightened level of understanding of Delta issues within the UK government and selected partners		A
2. Enhanced state/community early warning and early response mechanisms		B
3. Influence of gangs addressed (in targeted areas) and response to oil spills better managed		A +
4. Greater awareness of gender-based violence and enhanced tackling of gender-based violence		A
<b>Outcome:</b> The UK government has greater level of access and influence to promote sound policies and strategies to Nigerian stakeholders. Improved collaboration and accountability among Nigerian government, security services and civil society, leads to reduced levels of violence		
<b>Outcome Score: A</b>		<b>Risk: Medium</b>

### Summary of Programme Performance

Year	<b>16/17</b>							
Programme Score	<b>A</b>							
Risk Rating	<b>Medium</b>							

### What support is the UK providing?

The UK provided £1.25 million to the Niger Delta Stability Programme in 2016/17 (and an additional £0.15m on maritime security implemented by the MOD) with the aim of addressing conflict and security issues. The majority of this was in support of the DFID-funded Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP). This complementary CSSF funding enabled an expansion of NSRP's work in the three target Delta region states of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. NSRP implemented outputs two to four of the Delta Stability Programme. Output one of the programme was implemented by the Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) and focused on providing conflict and political economy analysis to the political section in the British High Commission to inform their engagement with Nigerian stakeholders.

At the beginning of 2017, "blue water" maritime security training for the Nigerian Navy was brought into the programme. This work was not focused on the Delta and the funding arrangement was just an interim measure (a separate maritime security programme will be established for 17/18). This means there is no reference to maritime security training in the Delta Security programme document and therefore no indicators in the results framework to judge progress against.

### Summary of progress and lessons learnt/actions taken since last review

The programme takes a multi-faceted approach to addressing conflict and security issues in the Delta region with good use of conflict and political economy analysis. There are demonstrable results and some significant achievements. The output results indicators have all been met and exceeded. Progress at outcome level has not been tracked which makes assessing overall performance difficult.

On balance, progress has been easier at the community level than at the state level. This highlights a challenge about the scale of impact which is linked to the difficulty which the programme has faced in securing government ownership. This challenge may in part be because the programme has tended to support the development of parallel, potentially duplicative structures. Key lessons identified by the annual review included:

- The programme was not internally coherent with no link between the Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) research and Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) activity on ground. Adding the maritime security work was not a clear fit.
- If a programme outcome is to increase UK access and influence, then consideration should be given as to how to assess this. Counting the number of reports produced is an output-level indicator at best, and arguably an input-level one.
- Work on demobilisation requires an economic reintegration component to be fully effective.
- Delays in contracting can impact on programme performance and, with short timeframes for CSSF programmes, this is a critical issue.
- The closure of NSRP leaves a big gap in the UK's programme portfolio on conflict issues which remain a priority to address in the Delta. The primary focus of the 2017-19 Niger Delta Stability Programme is on economic issues.

### **Summary of recommendations for the next year**

- A monitoring system should be developed to assess the extent to which Nigerian government policy and initiatives are influenced by CSSF programmes.
- The 2017-19 Nigeria Stability Programme should learn the lesson of this programme and not be over-ambitious in the breadth of interventions. SDN need to avoid the same pitfall of NSRP, especially given their comparative lack of experience in on-the-ground implementation.
- There should be a clear transition plan between NSRP and SDN with consideration as to how some areas of priorities (e.g. work on gangs) could be taken forward.
- SDN should develop a sustainability strategy for the programme from the outset and ensure this is reflected in all areas of work.
- If the work on a new Federal Government Peace and Security Plan for the Delta region progresses well then consideration should be given as to whether this provides an entry point for a strategic engagement on demobilisation and reintegration of militants and gangs.
- DFID's engagement on conflict and security issues in Nigeria as a whole, and in the Delta, should be sustained through the CSSF when management responsibility for the Niger Delta programme passes to the FCO.
- The CSSF team should enhance their financial management oversight of SDN, including visiting their office to conduct spot checks.