

PROGRAMME EVALUATION  
SUPPORT TO ACCOUNTABLE  
SECURITY & JUSTICE IN THE  
OPT  
EVALUATION REPORT

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FINAL REPORT

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Evaluation Report are entirely those of the independent Evaluation Team.

## About this Report

This Evaluation Report was commissioned by the DFID Palestinian Programme as the second stage in an end of programme evaluation of Support to Accountable Security and Justice in the OPT.

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## Table of Contents

About this Report .....	i
List of Tables .....	i
List of Diagrams and Figures .....	i
Executive summary .....	ii
List of Abbreviations .....	xv
1. Introduction: description of evaluation .....	16
1.1 Terms of Reference .....	16
1.2 A two-phased approach .....	17
1.3 The evaluation team .....	17
1.4 Structure of report and methodology .....	18
1.5 Adherence to ethical standards .....	21
1.6 Limitations .....	21

1.7 Lessons from evaluation process .....	21
2. Problem statement .....	22
2.1 Nature and scale of women’s exposure to violence in the OPT .....	22
2.2 Baseline evidence concerning the prevalence of VAWG and women & girls access to S&J services .....	23
2.3 Summary of needs identified with recommended actions and strategies (2010 scoping study) .....	26
3. Key evaluation findings .....	27
3.1 Relevance .....	27
3.2 Effectiveness.....	31
3.3 Efficiency .....	40
3.4 Impact.....	41
3.5 Coherence .....	45
3.6 Coordination.....	46
3.7 Sustainability .....	47
4. Learning & recommendations .....	49
4.1 Relevance .....	49
4.2 Effectiveness .....	50
4.2 Efficiency .....	53
4.3 Impact.....	53
4.3 Coherence .....	54
4.4 Coordination.....	54
4.5 Sustainability .....	54
Bibliography .....	i

## List of Tables

Table 1: Share of women experiencing different forms of violence at least once in their lives .....	25
Table 2: Recommendations and Strategies: Scoping Study (2010) .....	27
Table 3: Basic features of sample FJPU's visited by team .....	31

## List of Diagrams and Figures

Diagram 1: FJPU Site Visits .....	20
Diagram 2: Continuum of Exposure to Violence throughout women's life cycle in OPT .....	23
Diagram 3: Multi-sectoral nature of the CRC women inmates' intervention .....	35
Diagram 4: PBA VAW Training .....	38
Diagram 5: Programme implementation arrangements .....	41
Diagram 6: Number of Police Stations and Cases Registered at FPU's in 2013, West Bank .....	43
Figure 1: Programme Theory of Change (ToC) .....	21
Figure 2: Share of women exposed to IPV July 2010 –June 2011 .....	24
Figure 3: Number of total cases registered in FPU's between 2012-2014 .....	44
Figure 4: Number of comparable cases registered in FPU's between 2012-2014 .....	44
Figure 5: Satisfaction levels of women with services dependant on whether they had contact with S&J services during the last 12 months preceding the survey, 2012 .....	45

# Executive summary

## Terms of Reference

This report presents the findings of an independent end of programme evaluation of the DFID funded “Support to Accountable Security and Justice in the OPT” programme (2011-2015) implemented by UN Women (UNW) from March 2011 to end March 2015.<sup>1</sup> Thereafter it is anticipated that the programme, or parts of it, will be fully integrated into the Joint UNDP/-UNW Programme (“Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OPT: Justice and Security for the Palestinian People”), which started in 2014. This aims to develop and maintain conditions for a viable Palestinian state, based on the rule of law and principles of gender equality.<sup>2</sup> It is important to underline that the current evaluation is an evaluation of a specific programme and not of UNW as an institution which is implementing a number of programmes in Palestine.

Within the geographic scope of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the evaluation focuses on the support provided to Palestinian National Authority (PNA) efforts to tackle Violence against Women (VAW) and to enhance women and girls’ access to Security and Justice (S&J) in four main areas:

- a) Providing the police, prosecution and judiciary with the right skills, tools and resources to effectively handle cases and refer them on to the courts.
- b) Funding the refurbishment of facilities to accommodate Family Protection Units (FPUs) at three police stations in the West Bank in order to improve access to services.
- c) The improvement of data on cases and handling of violence against women in the West Bank; and
- d) The provision of support to Correction and Rehabilitation (CRC) personnel to ensure that women inmates are treated according to international human rights standards.<sup>3</sup>

The evaluation comprised a desk based **Inception Phase** which included a review of the programme documentation and literature; the design of the evaluation framework and methodology for data collection and analysis.<sup>4</sup> Two weeks field research in the West Bank was undertaken for the **in-depth full evaluation** followed by analysis of the data and information collected and report writing. The Final Evaluation Report reflects the very full feedback received from DFID and UNW. The two stages of the evaluation were undertaken by a three-person team of consultants.

## Structure of report

**Section 1** of the report outlines the evaluation approach and methodology and describes the fieldwork process, including minor modifications that were made to the data collection process and limitations; **Section 2** provides an overview of the nature and scale of women’s exposure to violence and their need and demand for S&J services. **Section 3** presents the evaluation findings grouped under the OECD/DAC criteria. **Section 4** provides some key learning and targeted recommendations.

## Methodology

The evaluation adopted a theory based approach<sup>5</sup> to evaluate the contributions which the programme has made to enhancing women and girls’ access to S&J services in the West Bank that are more responsive and accountable to their needs. A mixed methods approach enabled quantitative and qualitative data, both secondary and primary, to be collected and analysed so that findings could be systematically cross checked and *triangulated*. Site visits were made to 5 of the 11 of the specialist Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) Family and Juvenile Protection Units (FJPUs) and extensive discussions were held with the FJPU Central Administration in Ramallah. In addition, Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Roundtable Conversations were conducted with Palestinian implementing partners and individuals who have received support under the programme, as well as with a wide range of state and non-state actors, civil society organisations (CSOs), and International Development Actors (IDA).

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<sup>1</sup> UNW name this programme: “Support for Delivery of Security and Justice Services for Women” or for short: “Women Access to Justice” programme. However, the title used in this evaluation is that used by the client, i.e. DFID.

<sup>2</sup> UNW and UNDP (2014) - Two of seven priority outcomes of the Joint Programme are particularly relevant to UNW: Outcome 4: Gender responsiveness of justice, security and legislative actors strengthened; and Outcome 5: Women’s and girls’ access to justice and security improved by ensuring accountable service provision to prevent, protect and respond to violence, and by addressing their broader legal need.

<sup>3</sup> DFID (2014a) p: 1.

<sup>4</sup> Final Inception Report (dated 08-01-2015)

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. White. H. (2009).

## Adherence to ethical standards

At all times, the Evaluation Team have kept in mind the sensitive cultural, contextual and political issues relating to reform of the S&J sector in the West Bank. Care has also been taken to ensure that the evaluation approach and process were appropriate to sensitivities surrounding the focal topic of VAWG. Strong emphasis has been given to international standards and ethics governing evaluations involving vulnerable populations.

## Limitations

The main limitation of the evaluation is that it does not contain more direct evidence about the views and perspectives of the programme's direct beneficiaries (i.e. women and girls reporting on violence). However, in terms of the relative youth of the programme this does not negatively impact since it is too early to assess precisely how increased VAW specialisation among S&J service providers has translated into improved outcomes for clients or potential clients.

## Lessons from evaluation process

From its experience of conducting this evaluation, the Evaluation Team identified a number of key 'lessons' about ways to plan and manage future evaluations. These included the importance of a field visit during the Inception Phase, the importance in a fast changing situation in the West Bank of allowing time both to build trust and arrange logistical and other matters, and the need for clearly defined information flows.

## Problem statement

A Scoping Study conducted for DFID in 2010<sup>6</sup> pointed to VAW in the OPT as being a product of the impact of the Israeli military occupation, and the prevalence of some Palestinian traditions that militate against women's rights, which are strongly manifested in parallel legal systems, including those operated under religious law. The latter are exemplified in the response to domestic violence and 'honour killings' as a 'family matter'; and the immunity of perpetrators from prosecution. Women are continuously exposed to violence during their life cycle.

Surveys, undertaken by the PCBS and UNDP, confirm that spousal and other family violence is prevalent in all its forms in the West Bank and takes the form of Domestic Violence/Intimate Partner Violence. There is high incidence of VAW with most of it perpetrated within the (extended) family. VAW in the West Bank is not only confined to private spaces; in its most obvious public/political dimension, women are also subject to violence and harassment at the Israeli occupation checkpoints, by illegal settlers, through proximity to the separation barrier/Wall and/or Area C under Israeli control, and by public service providers. Some women also report that they resort to using violence against their husbands, in the absence of other alternatives to settle interpersonal disputes and stress.

A tradition of silence around VAW that is prevalent in many Arab States, has been fairly effectively challenged by the established Palestinian women's movement (especially the women's National Coalition). However, the malfunctioning and lack of accountability of state institutions means that it is still possible for VAW to be dismissed as a private matter; and, as elsewhere, the most common strategy adopted by victims of violence is to remain silent and not to inform anybody about what has happened. Few turn to specialised institutions, and even fewer to S&J services. A dominant societal culture of shame, the patriarchal nature of society; lack of physical access to institutions that can help (exacerbated by the inability to move freely inside the West Bank); the predominance of sharia and Christian family courts; and pressure from family and the community in cases of VAW make it difficult for women to seek solutions for their plight. Inadequate, outdated, sectarian<sup>7</sup> and contradictory laws,<sup>8</sup> lack of protection services, and low confidence in S&J institutions further hamper opportunities for women to seek redress. As a result, most violence cases are not reported and never enter the justice system, or, if they do, receive inadequate redress. What distinguishes Palestine from other countries is the difficulty of movement due to violent conflict and military checkpoints in addition to more predictable patriarchal familial controls, and the inability of the state to evolve legislation since parliament does not sit.

In terms of women and girls' access to S&J services in the West Bank, women are generally less likely to access justice, than men, particularly outside the religious courts, fewer women than men know how to take a case to court, and an

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<sup>6</sup> Jennings, M. (2010)

<sup>7</sup> There are about a dozen religiously-inflected family laws in place depending on the Christian sect adhered to, and the sharia laws. See: UNDP (2012)

<sup>8</sup> In the West Bank the sharia courts follow outmoded Jordanian law of 1976 as the PNA has not enacted its own laws yet.

exceedingly limited number of judges and other legal personnel have capacities to advance principles of gender equality or referencing jurisprudence that might assist them in passing judgements that challenge the status quo. When women are in contact with the law, a negligible number of them had the support of a lawyer. Many people think that court cases take too long, which is one of the reasons documented for avoiding formal justice and depending instead on the swifter legal remedies offered by religious courts. In addition, analysis of the data shows that satisfaction with S&J institutions is “inversely related” to legal literacy.

Furthermore, whereas people are often satisfied with technical performance (e.g. number of judges, qualifications of lawyers), they are not as satisfied with the integrity of civil courts (independence, honesty, fairness) – importantly, women are comparatively more satisfied with the integrity and responsiveness of religious court processes. Furthermore, unlike for other services, the satisfaction level in 2011 seemed to be lower among women who had contact with S&J institutions. In general, NGOs’ legal aid services were the most trusted, particularly by women. Most S&J institutions were acutely understaffed and under-resourced, and women were underrepresented “across the board” with the sharia prosecution employing the largest share of women and the police services employing by far the smallest share.

There is a marked lack of data concerning case processing times; oversight; number and types of criminal offences reported, investigated, closed by the police; number of arrests; use of force; number and causes of case attrition between police and prosecutors office; and number of cases referred to the PBA by the courts. In addition reliable data is scarce on charges against and the detention of juveniles; the proportion of ‘non-convicted’ detainees and the length of their hold. Although they represent a small proportion of individuals arrested and held in detention, women in detention lack adequate, equal access to facilities, including opportunities for education and learning, vocational skills development, time and facilities to exercise, care for infants, access to social workers and counsellors, as well as medical services (e.g. psychiatrists); and women awaiting trial lack access to places of safety/shelters and adequate legal counsel.

## **Key evaluation findings**

### **1) Relevance**

The programme design reflects the above-mentioned needs. It envisaged that DFID funding would buy training to equip Palestinian policing services, prosecutors and judges with the specialist skills to provide better services to women victims of violence, those awaiting trial and women inmates; increase women’s access to effective services by refurbishing facilities for three new FPU; leverage funding to address VAW from relevant Ministry budgets; and improve monitoring and action by equipping specialist units in police stations and hospitals to record cases and monitor referrals. This would also strengthen the evidence base for results monitoring and public communication. Specific interventions were designed to advance tackling VAW at the structural level by challenging the culture of silence that surrounds it and addressing questions of immunity from prosecution by perpetrators.

Excluded from the design of the programme under evaluation were interventions to support the revision of legislation and development of law to address VAW.

Primary Target Group/s of the programme have been on the institutional supply side; and within this category primarily those that are specifically tasked or mandated with responsibility for focusing on women and girls. These include: Public Prosecutors in the AGO; the High Judicial Council (HJC); the Independent Commission of Human Rights (ICHR); Palestinian Civil Police (PCP); and CRC Department; and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) and Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). On the demand side, important stakeholders are non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and a range of Women’s Rights Organisations, which provide support and services to VAW survivors and those at risk, and represent their interests. However, these have been much less directly targeted by the programme over the course of its relatively short life span.

Programme Target Groups have been supported in different ways, including institutional strengthening through, for example, the creation of specialist units and the development of guidelines and procedures; and through the design and delivery of specialist training. The needs and expectations of the Target Groups have influenced the use of different approaches or intervention types. Direct beneficiaries (i.e. the women and girls who have survived violence and/or those who are at most risk of it) encompass women inmates in the CRC, and female clients of the FJPU, the VAW specialist Public Prosecutors and PBA lawyers. For all accounts and purposes it is the needs and expectations of this sizeable group that feature most prominently in the programme interventions.



In order to ensure continuing relevance to the needs and expectations of the different Target Groups, a number of specific needs assessments have been undertaken thereby allowing specific programme interventions and activities to be fine-tuned or adjusted. Most recently, the programme has responded to the need to respond to the killing of women who had already reported VAW to the police or other services through the multi-sectoral Serious Case Review (SCR) mechanism led by MoWA and coordinated through a National Technical Committee.

The programme has fully integrated human rights and is conflict sensitive; indeed it is premised on international human rights standards, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which has now been helpfully strengthened through the addition of General Recommendation 30 (2013)<sup>9</sup> dealing with women living in situations of protracted conflict and political uncertainty. Human rights experts have contributed to the development of materials and the design and delivery of training and sensitisation sessions. Both in its design and execution, the programme has been sensitive to the diverse local cultures existing across the West Bank in which S&J service providers are themselves rooted. In terms of gender responsiveness the programme design and implementation have aimed to: a) ensure enhanced awareness of the gender, and other social and political inequalities and discrimination that motivate and drive VAWG; and b) to ensure that the S&J institutions supported are responsive and accountable to women and girls' needs. However, neither in design nor implementation has it specifically sought to integrate male engagement approaches or work with men and boys. Nor has it explicitly addressed the needs of men who are subject to sexual or domestic violence.

## 2) Effectiveness

**The programme has contributed to the development of VAW specialist police services for women victims of violence at three levels.**

- 1) **Provision of basic furnishing and equipment to support establishment of the FPU throughout the West Bank:** The existence of FPU/FJPU at Governorate level across the West Bank and East Jerusalem represents a significant achievement. Together with other stakeholders the programme has contributed not only to the material needs of the Units but the process of putting in place specialist police services for VAW survivors and those at risk.
- 2) **Institutional strengthening through support for the development of a normative framework (including a Strategy, SOPs, and other regulations and guidance) for the FPUs:** That the FPU normative framework was endorsed by the Chief of the PCP as national policy in January 2014 is another key achievement to which the programme has contributed. The participatory and inclusive approach used by the UNW experts is widely regarded as having been exemplary.

From the perspective of the FJPUs, there has been clear movement towards the desired outcome of an S&J system which is more accountable and responsive to women and girls in the West Bank. However, a number challenges remain including:

- a) The need to clarify at the frontline of service provision the precise roles and responsibilities of the different actors (FJPU officers, CID officers, Governors, Social Workers, and health professionals);
  - b) The need to reduce the number and length of the forms which FJPU officers are expected to use, adjust these to their typical case load types and ensure that the SOPs are being correctly applied;
  - c) Further work to ensure robust FJPU decision-making about which VAW cases are amenable to reconciliation and solution at Unit level and which must be referred on to formal S&J or other service providers, including the role and appropriateness of mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution; and
  - d) Evidence based research into and actions (including public education and community sensitisation) to address what are reported to be high rates of VAW complaint withdrawal.
- 3) **The design and delivery of training to build the individual capacities of FPU officers and/or to sensitise them to the content and importance of the FPU SOPs:** Following on from early training of FPU officers, and following introduction of the normative framework, the programme has conducted a number of sessions to sensitise FPU officers to the SOPs. Officers have found this useful, but form driven. They emphasise the importance of providing more space for cross learning and experience exchange rooted in practice. Relatively little formal training has been delivered yet although a comprehensive Training Manual has been designed with the intention that this will be delivered centrally through the Jericho Police Training Academy.

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<sup>9</sup> United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2013)

In addition to contributing significant support to the development and strengthening of VAW responsive, accountable police institutions, the programme has aimed to strengthen the VAW capacities of other key S&J providers.

**1) VAW Specialist Public Prosecutors in the AGO's office:** Ongoing advocacy for the creation of a Gender Unit combined with the direct involvement of Public Prosecutors in drafting the FPU SOPs enabled the programme to create buy in from the AGO for the creation of a Gender Unit made up of VAW specialist Public Prosecutors. As a result of a UNW designed and delivered "orientation process" 15 Public Prosecutors were officially assigned to deal with VAW cases across the West Bank and are now in the process of developing their own specific Guidelines and Procedures.

It is too early to judge whether or not: a) designated VAW specialists manage VAW cases more satisfactorily as there is not yet statistical data with which to compare prosecution rates across VAW specialist and non-specialist prosecutors; b) women are less likely to withdraw their cases from the formal justice system if these are managed by VAW specialist Public Prosecutors. It will be important to monitor this going forward.

**2) VAW specialist PBA lawyers:** The programme has contributed to developing the skills and capacities of lawyers to provide advice and representation to female clients who are living with violence or its consequences. Twenty PBA lawyers were selected under the programme to participate in a three-month VAW specialised training programme. Those consulted are mostly very satisfied with the duration of the training, its substantive content, and with the VAW legal skills it enabled them to acquire. They are less satisfied with the quality of the training. Importantly, the programme is seen to have made a positive contribution to raising the profile of VAW within the PBA as an institution and inculcating in its lawyers a VAW centred approach. In terms of whether or not VAW clients are more likely to seek the legal advice and representation they need from VAW trained lawyers, a key contextual factor is clearly the need for legal services provided without charge to the client. At present there is no state funded legal aid system in the West Bank.

**3) The Judiciary and VAW specialisation:** Although it is seen to be critically important, to date the contribution the programme has made to supporting the growth of specialisation within the judiciary has been limited. Little progress has been made on the creation of special courts dedicated to hearing VAW cases or to mainstreaming VAW through specialist training, although a Training Manual was developed.

Going forward it will be imperative to assess how best the UNW programme can engage with the HJC and the judges who fall under its purview in order to ensure that VAW is fully integrated or mainstreamed.

**Improved outcomes for clients:** It is early days yet to assess how the relatively recent introduction of the FPU SOPS and the sensitisation of officers to them are translating into improved individual FPU officer performance and better outcomes for clients. Over time the findings of the regular monitoring visits conducted by the central FJPU administration combined with a robust performance management system should allow this to be assessed systematically and at regular intervals. Enthusiasm exists at FJPU leadership level for exploring how to obtain client feedback as a mechanism for learning and improving service quality. In terms of increasing the access of vulnerable women to legal advice and representation, considerable achievements have been won by definition of a meagre baseline which shows that very few, if any VAW survivors were able to access any legal services at all in the West Bank. Therefore, the creation of VAW trained lawyers' means that a greater number of VAW clients are able to access legal advice and legal representation than they did previously; and that this will be appropriate, effective and responsive.

Broader evaluation findings suggest a need to look at whether or not the sex of S&J service providers is (or is not) a significant factor influencing the choices women victims of violence make about whether or not to access S&J services in the West Bank in the first place, and then to pursue the criminal prosecution process or withdraw their complaints from the formal justice system.

The programme has contributed to the **generation of robust evidence on the access to S&J of women and girls in the West Bank** through the innovative vehicle of the Justice Observatory housed by the ICHR. The Observatory undertakes two strands of monitoring work: a) tracking the trajectory/pathway of individual VAW cases through the S&J system; and b) monitoring the performance of S&J service provider institutions. Data collection by the Observatory monitors is on-going, but the data base system is still at data entry stage and has not yet been analysed. This means that the use of data and information collected by the Observatory for policy influencing to increase women and girls access to S&J (outcome) remains limited.

### 3) Efficiency

In responsive fashion a number of changes to programme plans have been made. In terms of planned support to the FJUs, for example, the programme moved quickly from activities designed to meet the units' material needs to an emphasis on the development of a normative framework to promote the accountability and responsiveness of these young institutions to their clients. It also adjusted priorities somewhat to ensure support for the SCR Mechanism in order to ensure that women who do seek help for the violence they are subjected to are adequately protected and that robust decisions are made by service providers concerning the referral of vulnerable women. Less positively the programme has experienced some implementation delays and time-lags between activities. Whilst some of these have been largely unavoidable, communication to partners and project staff of their reasons has not always been clear. On-going M&E, stronger contingency planning and continued flexibility would reduce negative fall-out.

The way in which resources (particularly human resources) have been utilised and combined for the achievement of programme results has been complex. For various reasons the Implementing Agency has taken on an increasingly proactive or direct programme implementation role over the programme's short life-span. At the same time it has faced a number of challenges, such as the turnover of experienced staff and programme staff shortages. Programme management arrangements have differed across programme components with some being less heavy than others in terms of day to day administration.

#### **4) Impact**

In terms of the extent to which and how the programme has contributed (or not) to ensuring that women and girls in the West Bank access PA provided S&J services (i.e. the desired impact), it is still early days yet to judge.

According to the available data there are now a significant number of cases registered by the FJUs with some variation across Governorates. And the number of women and girls reporting VAW to them has increased. There is also evidence from on-going Public Perception Surveys conducted by UNDP of increased confidence in the formal justice system as a whole as symbolised by public perceptions of the courts.

Across the West Bank in 2013 the FJUs in the Governorates of Nablus, Hebron and Jenin had the most registered cases. Bearing in mind differences in population size, it is important to stress that the figures concerning FJU registered cases do not necessarily mean that there are more *incidents* of VAWG in some Governorates than others. Rather they offer evidence that there is more reporting to FJUs and possibly greater recording of cases in some Governorates than in others. Excluding Jerusalem FJU, which was only recently established and has data only since 2014, the total number of cases registered has increased over 2011-2014 for almost all FJUs.

At the other end of the formal justice system, in terms of women's access to the courts, some changes are also apparent between the Public Perceptions Surveys of 2011 to 2012. Although these are very small, if reasons given for using courts are considered, it seems as if S&J institutions significantly improved their services and image between the two surveys. The 2012 public perception survey shows that levels of satisfaction with S&J services regarding VAW cases were higher amongst women who had been in contact with S&J services than those who had not been. This is an indication of an improvement in services as compared to the previous survey, where women in contact with legal systems were less satisfied.

The above suggests that the programme has contributed to efforts to enhance women and girls' access to PA/state provided S&J services in the West Bank. The precise level of the contributions made cannot be easily apportioned given that other actors (PNA institutions, other International Development Agencies (IDAs), and CSOs) have also played important roles. In particular it must be recognised that a range of CSOs and WROs provide information about the referral system, the relevant law and legal processes; assist with alternative dispute resolution; provide advice on legal issues; and refer cases through the national referral system. With respect to criminal cases, CSOs (according to FJU officers interviewed) assist at police stations, prisons and courts by providing victims and, indeed, defendants with information about their rights and the operation of formal procedures. They are facilitating the tracing of sureties for bail; the tracing of parents and guardians of juveniles; and notifying witnesses of upcoming trial dates.

In the absence of data tracing cases through the S&J system it is not possible to assess whether or not the trajectory of VAW cases through the justice system is becoming smoother and/or faster. However, a key factor influencing the speed with which VAW cases travel through the formal justice system is the complex and often contradictory system of laws existing in the West Bank and women's differential access to them depending not only on religion and other family status, but also their legal standing and proximity to the defining features of the military occupation – checkpoints, the separation barrier, and illegal settlements.

#### **5) Coherence**

Overall and at the macro strategic level the programme appears to have been responsive to the local context. This can be seen in the support provided to the multi-sectoral SCR mechanism which has become a national priority; and in the priority the programme is giving to support the harmonisation of systems and procedures as well as training for the merged FPU and Juvenile Units.

A significant evaluation finding is the depth and breadth of the sense of ownership in the programme displayed by senior PA decision-makers, i.e. high-level political buy-in has definitely improved. This is particularly strongly evidenced at FJPU leadership levels (central administration and Governorate) where strategic leadership is being provided to build the capacity of the FJPUs and extend the specialist services they provide to vulnerable women and children.

## 6) Coordination

Linked closely to coherence is the OECD/DAC principle of coordination. Elsewhere in this report examples have been cited of where UNW programme personnel have worked with other actors engaged in related programming. These include other IDA's and of course the PA target institutions. The development of the FPU normative framework involved not simply working closely with the PCP, but extended to engaging other stakeholders across the S&J sector. More recently, work on the SCR Mechanism has demonstrated programme commitment to driving forward the desired multi-sectoral coordination and response.

Going forward, the programme would benefit enormously from increased coordination, cross-sharing of learning and information with actors on the demand side of the S&J system, including CSOs, WROs and traditional justice providers, and indeed with other IDAs especially within the UN family.

## 7) Sustainability

The long term **sustainability of specialist, VAWG centred police services** is potentially constrained by: a) growing securitisation rather than service delivery to tackle social ills, which exacerbates the continuing lack of financial resources and physical infrastructure and increases the risk of increasing dependence on IDA support; b) the need to maintain the momentum and fully realise the benefits contributed to date in light of the merger of the FPU and Juvenile Units; and c) the need to ensure that non-FJPU police officers do not become deskilled in terms of their capacities to manage VAW clients who might not have access to a specialist Unit. More broadly, in light of the preference for traditional, non-formal justice mechanisms over the formal criminal justice system, the societal drive for reconciliatory justice and the sheer difficulty of accessing all but the most local services, it is imperative that the programme, moving forward, considers how best to work with non-formal justice providers especially those not near urban centres. Included here are both existing traditional justice providers and third sector providers of legal aid and ADR services. In addition, legal reform and harmonisation is absolutely essential not only for the continuation of efforts to increase women and girls access to justice, but also in order to improve the quality and basic minimum standards of S&J services.

For longer term sustainability alternative models to training and sensitisation, such as Trainer of Trainer (ToT) programmes, learning exchanges between & across S&J professionals, which could include study visits to Jordan where significant gains have been made in VAWG prevention and response in recent years, were suggested in order to build capacity. Specifically, lawyers emphasised the need for the PBA to develop a Continuing Professional Education (CPE) programme. In addition, the relative costs and benefits in terms of effectiveness and impact, as well as sustainability of a targeted approach which focuses on VAWG specialisation vis a vis a mainstreaming approach to integrate VAWG across the S&J sector (formal and traditional) warrants consideration.

## Learning & recommendations

### 1) Relevance

Any programme design that addresses women's access to S&J needs to be contextually-specific and contextually relevant, especially given the marked cultural diversity within Palestinian society and the unpredictable and worsening conditions imposed by the Israeli military occupation. No ready-made formula exists as to how to empower women and girls to assert their rights and act as agents of sustainable social change. However, it is important to consider: a) best entry points to empower women to use the legal system to advance their rights; b) forums where women's core concerns are dealt with; c) opportunities and contextual obstacles for system reform through legal empowerment;

and d) how best to challenge deeply entrenched gender stereotypes, vested interests in the status quo, and power inequities.

The evidence from this evaluation highlights some key areas of learning from which the Evaluation Team makes some practical recommendations.

### 1) Male engagement and working with men and boys

A key **learning point** is that interventions to engage men and boys in tackling VAWG have not been integrated into the programme under evaluation, from design through implementation. This is significant because male engagement can: a) play an important role in changing the ideas, values and beliefs which underpin and serve to perpetuate VAWG; b) influence the decisions and choices VAWG survivors make about whether or not to access S&J services by reporting the violence they have been subject to and pursuing the prosecution of its perpetrators; c) influence the behaviour and decision-making of men who are engaged in the provision of S&J services and affect the ways in which they manage clients and VAWG case files; and d) in a situation of ongoing conflict, enable men and boys to reflect on the ways in which public violence can become internalised, and distort interpersonal dynamics.

It is **recommended** that the access to S&J for women and girls components of any future programme integrate strategies to ensure male engagement and new approaches to working with men and boys to address VAWG. In particular, it is recommended that the Implementing Agencies of the future programme investigate further (through evidence based research) approaches that have been used within the S&J sector in other countries (especially within MENA) with reported success. Examples include using male engagement methodologies for training police officers as well as working with male Traditional, Tribal (and other Opinion, in particular religious, Leaders) at central and decentralised levels to enable them to serve as role models or change agents in tackling VAWG. Excellent examples of such work exist in Jordan and Lebanon through work being done with religious leaders within the MENA region by ABAAD (Resource Centre for Gender equality) in Lebanon;<sup>10</sup> and (Arab Women's Organisation of Jordan) AWO<sup>11</sup> in Jordan. These strategies have been implemented in communities comparable enough to the OPT to have real value as comparisons. Work with community Opinion Leaders will be particularly important in addressing complaint withdrawal and in efforts to define more precisely in practice which VAWG cases are amenable to ADR and which must go to criminal prosecution.

### 2) Public legal education and awareness raising

From a **learning** perspective, the contribution the programme has made to the national media campaign to address VAWG and women and girls' access to S&J services would benefit from closer scrutiny and review. Given the emphasis given to legal empowerment under the UNDP/UNW Joint Programme, it will be particularly important to consider how legal education on women's rights and entitlements can be fully integrated or mainstreamed into this Legal empowerment initiative.

It is **recommended** that the specific learning about what worked well and less well in the media campaign under the current programme is captured and carefully reflected on with the women's National Coalition so that it can feed into any future campaigns on legal rights and the access of women and girls to S&J services.

## 2) Effectiveness

### 1) Taking forward the concept and practice of merged FJPU

**Learning:** There are a number of real challenges associated with the merger of the FPU and Juvenile Units, but this process represents an opportunity to build on learning from what has worked well and less well in developing a normative framework and related capacity development and awareness raising interventions for the FPU. Such learning can be applied to the process of harmonising and developing a unified normative framework, including FJPU standard operating procedures (SOPs). In order to minimise the risks of losing the momentum created, a priority will be to ensure that the process of harmonising systems and procedures is a rapid, albeit consultative and participatory, one. This will mean deciding who should be involved and how at each stage of the process. For example, maximum participation by the FJPU officers at Governorate level will be required in order to harmonise the content and possibly

<sup>10</sup> See: [http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our\\_work\\_sub&s=policy\\_development&w=36](http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our_work_sub&s=policy_development&w=36) (accessed February 2015)

<sup>11</sup> See: <http://english.arabwomenorg.org/> (accessed February 2015)

the format, and to review a final draft of any document generated, but is possibly less necessary for the actual drafting process itself which could be undertaken by a smaller technical group.

The following **recommendations** are made:

- a) When undertaking revisions to the FPU normative framework so as to include SOPs for juveniles and children in conflict with the law,<sup>12</sup> the associated forms should be reviewed and prioritised so as to relate more closely to “typical” caseloads of the different FJPU at Governorate level.
- b) The review and development of harmonised procedures should be achieved through a vehicle such as Roundtable Conversations convened by the FJPU Central Administration with the FJPU officers themselves so that they can exchange learning from the frontline; discuss where revisions and guidance are most needed; and decide on how and by whom the revisions should be made and the necessary accompanying guidance developed. The process of harmonisation should not require the same level of external expert input as was necessary for to develop the innovative first round of FPU procedures.
- c) The FJPU SOPs should be reproduced and printed in a form which allows them to be more easily and regularly amended and updated by the PCP. For example, they could take the form of a simple policy document (numbered, dated and stamped by the PCP) with related guidance provided in a loose leaf folder which can be modified as necessary.
- d) Future training or sensitisation should clarify in practical ways the roles and responsibilities of different actors at both the frontline of service delivery and leadership levels. In particular, the precise roles and responsibilities of the FJPUs and their relationships with other initiatives, police departments and the Governors’ office which are not yet clear in practice need to be addressed head on.
- e) New approaches to facilitate cross learning and exchange between senior FJPU officers at central and Governorate levels on a regular basis should be given more prominence in the next phase of the programme. In addition, approaches to building capacities and capabilities which centre on cross-learning and experience sharing have much to offer. For example, funding could be provided for quarterly Roundtable Conversations convened by the FJPU Central Administration to enable FJPU officers to exchange learning, expertise and experience and discuss amongst themselves what is working well and less well in practice. This would also provide a much needed space for officers under pressure to breathe more freely.

## 2) Police SOPs training

**Learning:** A comprehensive SOPs training programme has been designed but has not yet been implemented.

It is **strongly recommended** that once the training package has been modified to reflect the FJPU merger, the training is delivered through the Jericho Police Training Academy as an integral part of its police training curriculum. All new police officers joining the force should receive basic training in the FJPU SOPs; and new and existing officers in the FJPUs should participate in a more comprehensive programme. It is essential for all officers to receive an introduction since they may at any time be placed within an FJPU or be in a position where a VAWG case is reported to them in post at a station without an FJPU. It is further **recommended** that an introduction to the SOPs forms part of a routine PCP induction programme for ALL officers.

## 3) Compliance, sanctions and rewards

**Learning:** The FJPU Central Administration is exploring how best to ensure compliance with the SOPs through regular monitoring visits to the Units; and the use of appropriate sanctions and rewards to ensure high quality performance by officers. Assured funding for these visits is a priority.

It is **recommended** that the development of internal staff performance monitoring systems and process is supported (through funds and other modalities as requested by the Central Administration) with a linked system of sanctions and rewards for individual officer performance. This should build on existing examples of good practice displayed at Unit level and mechanisms to monitor their effect on individual officer performance and morale should be incorporated into the broader monitoring system.

## 4) Monitoring how learning can feed into improved practice

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<sup>12</sup> Here the needs of children who have been arrested by the Israeli’s largely for political reasons will need to be considered since these differ from the needs of children who have broken the law.

**Learning:** As yet there is no system in place to monitor how investments in training, sensitisation and other learning (including, particularly, FJPU officers, VAW specialised Public Prosecutors, VAW specialised lawyers) translate into the improved performance of professionals in the S&J sector defined in terms of better case outcomes for clients.

It is **recommended** that such a monitoring system is built into and onto existing processes such as the monitoring visits conducted by the central FJPU administration to the individual Units; and the developing staff performance management systems within the public service and elsewhere (e.g. PBA). Support for such processes might be direct or delivered through partnership working with other agencies supporting, for example civil service reform processes. Such an initiative is likely to involve some policy-influencing and inter-agency communication which will need to be planned and budgeted for in terms of funds and human resource inputs.

#### 5) Reconciliation, ADR and prosecution

**Learning:** FJPU officers' decision-making concerning precisely where the line MUST be drawn between cases that may be amenable to reconciliation and ADR at Unit level and those which must be sent for prosecution is not clearly understood.

It is **strongly recommended** that this issue is explored further as a priority through capturing learning from the FJPU officers about the issues they face in their local contexts, including challenges and achievements. In addition, and following on from this, the whole issue of how to effectively engage Tribal/Religious and other Opinion Leaders in any ADR or Unit level reconciliation warrants serious attention.

#### 6) Complaint withdrawal

**Learning:** A significant (but not counted) number of clients who have reported to the FJPU withdraw their complaints from the formal justice system for a range of reasons that have not been fully explored.

It is **recommended** that moving forward a review is commissioned to assess precisely what factors influence women's decision to withdraw their complaints at different stages in the criminal justice process. Good practice examples are found in the work being done with religious leaders within the MENA region by ABAAD (Resource Centre for Gender equality) in Lebanon;<sup>13</sup> and (Arab Women's Organisation of Jordan) AWO<sup>14</sup> in Jordan.

#### 7) Client feedback on S&J services received

**Learning:** enthusiasm exists within the Central FJPU Administration to explore further best systems for encouraging, collecting and monitoring feed-back from FJPU clients.

It is **recommended** that the Central FJPU Administration is supported to introduce a "pilot" client feed-back initiative. Such support should include the identification and sharing of good practice examples from other countries, such as the Victims Charter developed by the Lebanese Police; and associated systems for obtaining feedback from victims of crime. In developing client feed-back mechanisms, it is further **recommended** that the approach centres on the benefits of client feedback for learning and hence improved service planning and performance. As such it should be clearly distinguished from a formal "complaints" system and emphasise the opening up of opportunities for clients to raise any "concerns" they have with the services they have received or are receiving from the Service Provider and to share what they have found most useful or positive in the knowledge that they do so in full confidentiality and anonymity.

#### 8) Support to women inmates of CRCs

**Learning:** The CRC programme component of work to support women inmates is complex in terms of the multiple needs it has attempted to address in a highly sensitive operating environment. There are two main recommendations here:

First, support to women inmates should focus more explicitly on: a) securing high quality legal advice and representation for those who choose this option; b) working with the CRCD to ensure the access of legal professionals and ICHR Observatory monitors to women inmates; and c) developing reintegration strategies for ex-offenders, which is especially important given the small size of the population in the OPT, tight-knit communities and high levels of

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<sup>13</sup> See: [http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our\\_work\\_sub&s=policy\\_development&w=36](http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our_work_sub&s=policy_development&w=36) (accessed February 2015)

<sup>14</sup> See: <http://english.arabwomenorg.org/> (accessed February 2015)



interpersonal surveillance and social control, and the stigma (or worse, in terms of retribution) attached to women who come into contact with the law.

Second, further capacity development strengthening should be provided to the IHCR Observatory Monitors. This need not necessarily only comprise training and individual skills development but might include, for example, learning exchanges or secondments or mentoring visits to similar Justice Observatories (with a focus on women and girls or a broader access to S&J mandate) within MENA and possibly further afield. The aim would be to enable the Observatory Monitors to undertake direct policy influencing work based on their findings and/or to produce/ package their findings in such a way that other policy-influencers and advocates can use them.

### 9) Strengthening the capacities of Public Prosecutors working on VAWG cases

**Learning:** A solid foundation has been built through the assignment and orientation of Specialist Public Prosecutors in the AGO to work on VAWG cases.

Moving forward it is **recommended** that an internal (AGO) system is developed to enable the Gender Unit to: a) monitor the performance of the newly specialised team; b) assess their on-going needs for learning and capacity strengthening; and c) keep under review how they are managing cases.

### 10) Approaches to capacity development with S&J actors

**Learning:** To date the programme has focused on the design and delivery of formal training and sensitisation sessions comprising short workshops.

Moving forward it is **recommended** that:

First, the approach to capacity development is broadened to include greater emphasis on: a) self-directed learning supported by skilled facilitators; b) possible Training of Trainers (ToT) pilots (for example with the PBA who have specifically recommended this approach); c) learning and experience exchanges through Roundtable Conversations and Learning Forums/ Communities of Practice of already skilled and practiced S&J professionals; d) carefully structured exchanges/ mentoring with professional counterparts elsewhere within the OPT, MENA and possibly further afield; e) exploration of opportunities for e-learning (although this idea is new and does not appear to have much support from the Key Informants the Evaluation Team discussed this with); f) the design and delivery of a professional PCP coaching and mentoring system.

Second, to the extent possible the design and delivery of any capacity development initiatives should be a locally owned and adopt a participatory process centering on the use of local resources of knowledge, experience and skills, some of which have been built by interventions supported by this programme (see **Annex N**).

Third, all capacity development initiatives must be subject to rigorous M&E so that learning and evidence can be captured about what works well and less well with particular groups of S&J professionals - it is unlikely that a "one suit fits all" approach will be the most effective. Particular attention needs to be given to: a) explaining any selection processes to applicants clearly; b) providing feedback on applications to all candidates who put themselves forward for training or other forms of capacity development; and c) ensuring that participants complete evaluation forms either at regular intervals, in an on-going process, or at the end point of an event/ programme; and that the findings of these evaluator inputs are anonymously summarised and Annexed to reports of training and other events together with full lists of participants.

### 3) Efficiency

**Learning:** There has been a mismatch between the size, and possibly levels of seniority, of the UNW staff body and the enormity of the challenges it has had to confront. Added to this has been the weight imposed by the level of direct programme implementation it has undertaken.

It is **recommended** that in going forward emphasis is placed on identifying local Implementing Partners and where necessary providing support to strengthen their institutional and other capacities to assume full management responsibility for any project staff. This would obviate, for example, the need to directly employ Project Coordinators for each programme component thereby reducing day to day administrative and management burdens.



**Learning:** The operating context in the West Bank is volatile and fluid as evidenced for example in the recently merged FJPU. This suggests need to reduce the emphasis that has been placed on the production and publication of high quality documents and reports.

It is **recommended** that the idea of “living documents” that are more amenable to frequent revision and updating are seriously considered in future. For example, the SOPs could be produced in the shape of a policy document which is updated at specified, regular intervals by the responsible PCP management board. They could then be reproduced in print form for inclusion in a “Toolkit” comprising key materials for the specialist Units. Again examples from the Lebanese police warrant further investigation possibly through a two-way exchange visit of officers with the FJPU.

#### 4) Impact

**Learning:** The existence of a **robust legal framework is an essential tool for advancing women’s rights and their access to justice**. It is an essential building block towards meaningful access to justice for VAWG survivors and provides a basis that dictates S&J service provider actions. Legal uncertainty creates a myriad of additional challenges. It. When a society is governed by the rule of law, with an accessible and just legal system, women can thrive, contribute to the system and improve it for future generations. The rule of law requires that laws are free from bias and discrimination and are consistent with international human rights norms and standards and are contextually relevant. As such, a robust and effective legal system based on the rule of law and derived from evolving jurisprudence is central to assisting women to become equal partners in decision-making and development. Just as a strong legal system can protect and open up opportunities for women, a justice system that is inaccessible or that contains discriminatory rules or practices can significantly impede the advancement of women’s rights and development of the family, community and society. UNDP has highlighted the danger of women being left vulnerable to becoming victims of criminal acts, such as fraud, theft, sexual or economic exploitation, violence, torture or murder, if they are not empowered to benefit from the full protection of the law.<sup>15</sup>

It is **recommended** that the PNA is encouraged and supported to recommence the process of unifying and harmonising legislation, to enact a penal code that would apply to all parts of the OPT. One Key Informant suggested that if the current, revised Jordanian code were simply adopted by the PNA this would represent a step forward. Debates concerning the relative costs and benefits of revising the penal code or introducing new, specific legislation to combat VAWG deserve further consideration, dialogue, discussion and debate. Examples from other countries need to be considered, first within MENA but also further afield since it is hard to find a model that has worked demonstrably well on all fronts.

#### 5) Coherence

**Learning:** Overall and at the macro strategic level the programme has been responsive to the local context and significant changes in this as illustrated most recently in interventions to drive the SCR Mechanism forward and to support harmonisation of the FJPU normative framework.

It is **recommended** that robust knowledge management and M&E systems are put in place to capture evidence to capture learning and demonstrate what has worked well and what has worked less well, especially in multi-sectoral interventions such as the SCR Mechanism.

**Learning:** One of the most significant findings of the evaluation is the depth and breadth of the sense of ownership in the programme displayed by senior decision-makers, particularly within the PCP. This demonstrates its alignment with PNA development priorities towards more responsive and accountable police services for victims of VAW.

It is **recommended** that finding effective ways of engaging with the HJC and judiciary to ensure women and girl’s access to the courts and the speedy trajectory of cases through the prosecution process is a priority for future programming. An option to consider might be support for the development of victim friendly court services and special measures to protect vulnerable witnesses.

**Learning:** In Palestinian society, informal (including religious) justice systems tend to substitute the statutory justice system, especially in Family law in certain situations, and areas. While the informal justice mechanism has an important function to fill, particularly in civil and family law-related cases, linkages between in the programme have

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<sup>15</sup> United Nations Development Programme (2005)

been identified as weak which increases the risk of VAWG crimes and other crimes with women as their primary victims, all of which are inadequately addressed.

It is **recommended** that future programme design addresses the importance of the informal justice system including a strategy for how to incorporate it into programme activities.

## 6) Coordination

**Learning:** UNW programme staff have worked with other actors, including other IDA's, and of course the PNA target institutions, engaged in related programming on the supply side of the S&J system. The comparative lack of attention given to coordination with actors on the demand side within this programme is starkly apparent.

It is **strongly recommended** that avenues for enhanced coordination and cross sharing of learning and information with CSOs, especially WROs, are seriously explored within the UNW/ UNDP Joint Programme itself, such as through the legal empowerment interventions. Within the UN family it is also imperative that UNW and UNICEF coordination is strengthened so that interventions towards increasing access to accountable and responsive S&J services fully encompass both women and girls.

**Learning:** In the OPT culture exerts an influence that can be as strong as or stronger than the rule-of-law. It is imperative therefore that the programme moving forward finds modalities for working with traditional, non-formal justice providers, strengthening decades-long efforts of the women's National Coalition and human rights organisations, as well as working with PNA institutions in the S&J sector.

It is **recommended** that the programme develops appropriate monitoring tools to identify precisely what opportunities to effect transformational change exist in the diverse local contexts within the Governorates. Opportunities should be explored within the formal and traditional justice system; and may involve targeting procedural or substantive aspects. Ultimately, the programme should aim to become more pragmatic, realistic and reflective of the local context especially in the rural areas, Area C and other deeply controlled areas near the separation barrier or illegal settlements, and in areas that are recognised as having a deeply conservative culture.

## 7) Sustainability

**Learning:** Any programme to promote the access of vulnerable women and girls to responsive and accountable S&J services and affect long lasting transformational change is likely to be more durable if it achieves an appropriate balance between support to state institutions and non-state actors, including CSOs and private institutions such as universities. In addition, a key message of this evaluation is that by empowering women to claim their rights, women are better equipped to bring about change in their communities. When such initiatives are pursued in conjunction with legal and institutional reforms, progress will be faster and more sustainable.

The recommendations outlined above are made with a view to ensuring longer term sustainability of the gains made by building on the evidence from this evaluation of what has worked well and what has worked less well. The **core recommendation** of the team is that increased investment is needed in: a) the development of robust knowledge management and M&E systems in order to capture and evidence achievements made; and b) communications so that the evidenced achievements can both be used for policy influencing and to promote shared learning with other actors across the S&J system (state- non-state, formal and informal).

## List of Abbreviations

Attorney General's Office	AGO
Arab Women's Organisation	AWO
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces	DCAF
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	CEDAW
Correction and Rehabilitation Centre	CRC
Continuing Professional Education	CPE
Civil Society Organisation	CSO
Criminal Investigations Department	CID
Department for International Development	DFID
European Union	EU
EU Common Security and Defence Policy	EU CSDP
EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support	EUPOL COPPS
Family and Juvenile Protection Unit	FPJU
Family Protection Unit	FPU
Gender-Based Violence	GBV
Higher Judicial Council	HJC
Independent Commission for Human Rights	ICHR
International Development Actors	IDA
International Monetary Fund	IMF
Jerusalem Legal Aid Centre	JLAC
Juvenile Protection Unit	JPU
Key Informant Interview	KII
Middle east and North Africa	MENA
Middle East Peace Process	MEPP
Ministry of Interior	MoI
Ministry of Justice	MoJ
Ministry of Social Affairs	MoSA
Ministry of Women's Affairs	MoWA
Monitoring and Evaluation	M&E
Most Significant Change approach	MSC
National Development Plan	NDP
Netherlands Representative Office	NRO
Non-Governmental Organisation	NGO
Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation	NORAD
Occupied Palestinian Territories	OPT
Palestinian National Authority	PNA
Palestinian Bar Association	PBA
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics	PCBS
Palestinian Civil Police	PCP
Palestinian Legislative Council	PLC
Security and Justice	S&J
SAWA NGO	SAWA
Social Development Direct	SDD
Serious Case Review	SCR
Swedish International Development Cooperation	SIDA
Standard Operating Procedures	SOPs
Terms of Reference	TOR
Theory of Change	ToC
United Nations	UN
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner	OHCR
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality & the Empowerment of Women	UNW
United Nations Development Programme	UNDP
Violence against Women	VAW
Violence against Women and Girls	VAWG
West Bank	WB
World Health Organisation	WHO
Women for Life	WFL
Women's Rights Organisation	WRO

# 1. Introduction: description of evaluation

## 1.1 Terms of Reference

This report presents the findings of an end of programme evaluation of the DFID funded “Support to Accountable Security and Justice in the OPT” programme (2011-2015) implemented by UN Women (UNW).<sup>16</sup> The evaluation Terms of Reference (ToR) identify the primary objective of the evaluation as being to assess whether or not the DFID programme has helped to improve women’s access to justice and security, and combat Violence against Women (VAW). The current evaluation is in addition, to draw lessons for the design and delivery of upcoming DFID programmes in the OPT (see TOR at **Annex A**).

The TOR defines the evaluation focus in terms of support provided to Palestinian National Authority (PNA) efforts to tackle VAW and enhance women and girls’ access to Security and Justice (S&J) in four main areas:

- e) Providing the police, prosecution and judiciary with the right skills, tools and resources to effectively handle cases and refer them on to the courts.
- f) Funding the refurbishment of facilities to accommodate Family Protection Units (FPUs) at three police stations in the West Bank in order to improve access to services.
- g) The improvement of data on cases and handling of violence against women in the West Bank; and
- h) The provision of support to prison personnel<sup>17</sup> to ensure that women inmates are treated according to international human rights standards.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to a number of specific questions grouped under the OECD/DAC criteria, the ToR specify five key areas as being of primary concern to DFID:

1. The contribution the programme has made to the prevention of VAW in the OPT;
2. The contribution the programme has made to meeting the needs and problems identified in the design phase;
3. The efficient delivery of quality outputs and outcomes against original and subsequently modified plans;
4. The attainment of development results for the targeted populations in order to improve women’s access to S&J services; and
5. Evidence about which approaches towards the delivery of accountable S&J services for women work best and the reasons for this.

The Implementing Agency -UNW- has emphasised from the start of the evaluation process that the programme being evaluated does not have a prevention focus as such, although it recognises that improving the justice chain influences the level of reoffending.<sup>19</sup> Hence the evaluation focuses on questions 2) - 5) above. The evaluation is also to identify lessons learned and make recommendations, pointing to good practice as well as areas for improvement. Recommendations are to be specific and clear as to the actors to whom they are directed. The Evaluation Matrix, developed by the team during the Inception Stage, includes the key evaluation questions and is found at **Annex B**.

The geographic scope of the evaluation is the OPT, including the West Bank and East Jerusalem.<sup>20</sup> It does not encompass Gaza. The timeframe covered is from the period of conceptualisation and design by DFID, as detailed in the Project Memorandum (DFID 2010), to the moment when the evaluation is taking place and the Final Evaluation Report is disseminated. Programme implementation by UNW started in March 2011 and the second “no cost extension” period ends on March 31 2015. It is important to underline that the current evaluation is an evaluation of a specific programme and not of UNW as an institution which is implementing a number of programmes in Palestine.

The evaluation was not conceived as being a joint evaluation, but the TOR state that target groups, partners and beneficiaries are aware of and content with the evaluation purpose. Strong stakeholder engagement in the evaluation has been actively sought and steps have been taken to encourage full involvement through the adoption of participatory and transparent methodologies, tools and processes. Partners, beneficiaries and stakeholders have been interviewed and consulted through Key informant Interviews (KII) and Roundtable Conversations in order to gather and assess different perceptions, experiences and views.

<sup>16</sup> UNW name this programme: “Support for Delivery of Security and Justice Services for Women” or for short: “Women Access to Justice” programme. However, the title used in this evaluation is that used by the client, i.e. DFID.

<sup>17</sup> Prisons are known as Correction and Rehabilitation Centres (CRC).

<sup>18</sup> DFID (2014a:) p1

<sup>19</sup> UNW supports a number of other projects which specifically focus on the prevention of VAW, but these fall outside the scope of the current evaluation.

<sup>20</sup> East Jerusalem was not specifically targeted by the programme, but the last FJPU to be established is located here and the research culminating in the UNW (2014), Access Denied Report also covers East Jerusalem.

## 1.2 A two-phased approach

The evaluation comprised two distinct stages:

**Stage 1: Inception Phase** was entirely desk-based and included:

- a) Development of a proposed Draft Programme Theory of Change (ToC) with underlying assumptions (**Annex C**);
- b) Design of an evaluation framework, including the evaluation questions (above mentioned Evaluation Matrix at **Annex B**) and methodology for data collection and analysis;
- c) Outline of how the evaluation work would be distributed across the team;
- d) An Activity Chart for the Stage 2: In-depth Full Evaluation;
- e) Outline of the proposed fieldwork approach, including key agencies and stakeholders to interview and documents to be obtained;
- f) A proposed dissemination strategy;
- g) Outline of the risks inherent in the proposed approach and risk mitigation strategies; and
- h) A contents outline for the Stage 2 Evaluation Report.

During the Inception Phase, the Evaluation Team worked with a designated UNW officer to collect relevant documentation and data and plan the itinerary for the field research phase of the evaluation (January 2015). A sizeable volume of reports and literature was collected (see updated, Full Bibliography). Since an explicit output of the Inception Stage was the systematic collection of quantitative, statistical data, stock was taken of data generated by the programme and through other sources, including the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)<sup>21</sup> and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).<sup>22</sup> A Draft Inception Report was submitted to DFID and UNW (dated 10-12-2014) and comments and feedback received were incorporated into the Final Inception Report (dated 08-01-2015).

**Please note: the Final Inception Report contains the Annexes referred to above.**

**Stage 2: In-depth full evaluation** included:

- a) Preparations for the field research;
- b) Implementation of the field research in the West Bank (Monday 11-02-2015 to Friday 23-02-2015 inclusive);
- c) Follow up interviews and continuing collection of programme documentation;
- d) Analysis of the data and information collected; and
- e) Report drafting.

A **Draft Evaluation Report** (18-02-2015) was submitted to DFID and shared with UNW with time built in to allow opportunity for them to discuss, feedback and comment on this. The **Final Evaluation Report** reflects the very full feedback received and contains a stand-alone Executive Summary, which is translated into Arabic to ensure wide dissemination of the evaluation findings within the OPT and the Arab speaking region as well as further afield.

## 1.3 The evaluation team

The two stages of the evaluation have been undertaken by a three-person team of consultants. The team comprised an experienced Team Leader with a strong background in programme and policy work to tackle VAWG and develop more responsive S&J systems; an international quantitative evaluation expert with solid experience in the use of mixed methods evaluation approaches and substantive statistical expertise; and a National Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) Expert with wide ranging regional evaluation experience and in-depth understanding of the local context and situation of VAWG. Quality Assurance has been provided by Lydia Stone (SDD) and this, the Final Evaluation Report, has been independently peer reviewed by Vanessa Farr.

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<sup>21</sup> The PCBS has collected data to generate representative statistics concerning violence in the OPT in 2011 (The survey was financially and technically supported by the MDG project "Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment" through UNDP/ PAPP, UNICEF and UNFPA); and has undertaken a number of other surveys relevant to the evaluation.

<sup>22</sup> This includes two UNDP surveys: the "Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions" and "A Review of Palestinian Security and Justice Sector Data". The former is carried out every two years and data for the latter is collected on an annual basis. In addition, UNDP shared with the team a copy of a UNDP evaluation looking at the extent to which legal aid services and training has met the expectations of beneficiaries, and the impact of these services on their wellbeing. See: UNDP/PAPP, Supporting the Rule of Law and Access to Justice in the Palestinian Territory. Evaluating the UNDP-funded Training Activities from the Perspective of the Final Beneficiaries.

The evaluation was commissioned by DFID as the donor of the programme. All evaluation activities were delivered independently by the Evaluation Team, including logistical and administrative aspects of setting up Key Informant Interviews and Roundtable Conversations, transportation and local travel, facilitation, documentation, translation during the field research and report writing phases, and communications.

## 1.4 Structure of report and methodology

### 1.4.1 Structure of the report

This section 1 of the report outlines the evaluation approach and methodology and describes the fieldwork process, including minor modifications that were made to the data collection process and limitations.

Section 2 provides an overview of the nature and scale of women's exposure to violence (particularly at baseline, i.e. at the start of the programme); and their need and demand for S&J services, including public perceptions of and satisfaction with S&J services. It summarises the key needs identified in the 2010 scoping study commissioned by DFID<sup>23</sup> and its recommendations.

Section 3 presents specific findings concerning the programme's achievements grouped under the OECD/DAC criteria. Evidence and findings to confirm (or not) the assumptions underlying the programme ToC are analysed.

Section 4 provides some key learning and targeted recommendations.

### 1.4.2 Practical note on use of terms

The concepts of Violence against Women (VAW) and Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) are used interchangeably unless one or other is used in explicit reference to a document or programme component. The programme has increasingly sought to address the needs of girls as well as women who have experienced violence. Similarly, the term Family and Juvenile Protection Unit (FJPU) is used except where programme interventions have focused solely on the Family Protection Unit (FPU) as the specialist police Units were named prior to their merger with the Juvenile Units in 2014. The evaluation uses the name of the programme used by DFID- the client of this evaluation. It also refers to the Logframes supplied by the client namely: original Logframe 2010 and revised current Logframe September 2014.<sup>24</sup> These are summarised at **Annex D**.

### 1.4.3 Evaluation approach and methodology

As outlined in the Inception Report, the evaluation has used a theory based approach<sup>25</sup> which is premised on an explicit theory of how the programme caused or contributed to the observed results and outcomes rather than an experimental or a quasi-experimental design. This is for a number of reasons:

- a) The volatile security and conflict affected context in which the programme is being implemented presents significant challenges for the identification of and access to identical comparison and intervention sites.<sup>26</sup>
- b) There is a lack of (baseline) statistical data.<sup>27</sup> Although the team has managed to collect more statistical data than it anticipated at the evaluation design stage, attributing any changes to the component on support to PA efforts to tackle VAWG is difficult with the data available.
- c) The existence of other programmes and programme components aimed at improving the Palestinian population's access to S&J<sup>28</sup> constrains direct attribution of impacts or effects to the DFID support, and strongly suggest the alternative analysis of contribution.

A theory based approach is valuable in helping to ascertain not only whether the programme has achieved the intended and expected results but, more specifically, how it is doing this.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Jennings (2010)

<sup>24</sup> A number of other revisions have been made to the Logframe by UNW during the programme's life span.

<sup>25</sup> Coryn et al (2011) p201

<sup>26</sup> DFID (2012) p14

<sup>27</sup> In her scoping study, Jennings (2010) found no systematic compilation of statistics within the police, judiciary, or religious courts that could help quantify access to S&J services by women. In 2011, UNDP (2013) found a complete lack of data with which to either paint a clear picture of performance, functioning or working between the Palestinian MoJ, Civil Police, office of the AG/ Public Prosecution, HJC, Shari'a Courts, Military Courts, PB, or to generate key statistics and inform policies.

<sup>28</sup> For example, UNDP/PAPPs Rule of Law and Access to Justice Programme has delivered training on a wide range of areas (E.g. legal skills, children's rights, labour rights, international law, legislative drafting and gender and law); and numerous services for the prevention and protection of women victims and survivors of VAWG are established in the OPT.




#### 1.4.4 Data collection

Adopting a mixed methods approach, the Evaluation Team gathered both quantitative and qualitative data from a broad set of stakeholders and from a mix of primary and secondary sources. In addition to the surveys published by the PCBS, the UNDP public perceptions and institutions surveys supplied additional quantitative data to the team. This is analysed together with the FJPU Administration statistics on registered case numbers and types for the years 2012 – 2014; and information on numbers, case type and location of callers from SAWA – a Palestinian NGO which runs a telephone helpline/ hotline. Qualitative data and evidence have been derived from a review of the available documentation and primary data collected during the field research.

The mixed methods approach has enabled findings to be cross checked and *triangulated*. A List of Key Agencies Consulted is found at **Annex E**. In order to respect the confidentiality of key informants and Roundtable Participants no individual names or personal identifiers are specified in the presentation of the evidence. Where this relates to a minority view and/or has not been triangulated this is explicitly highlighted in the narrative.

**Site visits to FJPUs:** In full cooperation with the central FJPU Administration, the Evaluation Team made site visits to 5 of the 11 decentralised FJPUs as detailed on the map below as well as having extensive discussions with the FJPU central administration in Ramallah.

**Diagram 1: FJPU Site Visits**



In three of the five FJPUs the KII was conducted with the Unit Director and in two Units with the Deputy Director, two women and three men. In only one of the FJPUs were fellow officers invited by the Director to participate in the interview/ discussion.

**Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)** were conducted with a wide range of additional stakeholders, including key PA officials and decision-makers, representatives of International Development Agencies (IDA) - both multi-lateral and bi-lateral, and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and activists. The KII took the form of semi-structured Interviews to

<sup>29</sup> Theory-based approaches are increasingly being used in development settings, including by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) and the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). See e.g. White. H. (2009).

explore the evaluation questions. **Roundtable Conversations** were convened with the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) VAW specialist lawyers; the VAW specialist Public Prosecutors in the Attorney General's Office (AGO); the Independent Human Rights Commission (ICHR) Observatory monitors; the Social Workers supporting women inmates of Correction and Rehabilitation Centres (CRCs) (sub-contracted by the Palestinian Counselling Centre-PCC); senior members of the Palestinian Central Statistics Bureau; the NGO Sawa hotline team; and with the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUPOL COPPs). This was seen to be a better use of time and resources; enabled real discussion of issues that participants regarded as being important; and allowed professionals to discuss and share learning about specific programme results and broader contributions in an informal and relaxed atmosphere. Roundtable Conversations were convened with UNW and DFID at the start of the Fieldwork Phase and de-briefing meetings were held with both agencies at the end of the field research.<sup>30</sup>

Through participatory review, exploration and assessment, the above interviews and conversations helped to build local ownership of the evaluation process and ensured that it met OECD-DAC quality standards for evaluations and Security Sector Reform.<sup>31</sup>

#### 1.4.5 Data analysis & Programme Theory of Change (ToC)

In line with the theory based approach adopted for this evaluation, the analytical process has been built around the programme's Theory of Change (ToC) and its underlying assumptions about how change takes place.<sup>32</sup> The programme's achievements at output, outcome and impact levels are evaluated against the ToC and its underlying assumptions. As shown below (and detailed at **Annex C**) the ToC demonstrates the links between the programme outputs/ results, outcomes and impact.

The overarching programme ToC as revised following the Roundtable Conversation with UNW at the start of the field research is as follows:

Interventions to build institutional (structures, mechanisms, systems and processes); individual capacities (knowledge and skills); and evidence to address VAWG will contribute to the improved access of women and girls to PA provided security and justice services in the West Bank that are responsive to their needs. Ultimately/ indirectly this will contribute to a model of PA state building in the West Bank that delivers core and expected state functions to combat VAWG with accountability.

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
<sup>30</sup> Most of the above mentioned KIIs and Roundtable Conversations were convened during the two week period when all three members of the Evaluation Team were in-country. This allowed priority to be given to national and local stakeholders who enjoy less ready access to international telephone and Skype facilities; and in a majority of cases opted to converse in Arabic thereby necessitating on-the-spot translation. Following on from this, KIIs were conducted by Skype or telephone with additional representatives of IDAs.

<sup>31</sup> See: [http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/dac\\_criteria](http://betterevaluation.org/evaluation-options/dac_criteria) (accessed November 2014).

<sup>32</sup> Assumptions may be things which are taken for granted or accepted as true, or are pure suppositions (Stein and Valters, 2012). They are usually distinguishable from "facts" which are supported by evidence, although factual assumptions can also be included within a ToC.



**Figure 1: Programme Theory of Change (ToC)**



Despite the revisions made to the ToC itself, the assumptions drafted during the Inception are judged by the Evaluation Team to hold even if, as one would expect in the case of such a young programme, it is not possible yet to evaluate all of them.

Using the programme TOC the evaluation findings (in section 3 below) present evidence to demonstrate whether, how and why the programme has been a significant factor (or not) in helping to bring about or trigger change together with contextual factors that influence the contribution claim.<sup>33</sup> Critical incident timelines (see **Annex F**) were developed from the programme documentation to provide a chronology of key programme events and have been used to support the analysis of linkages, bottlenecks and other influences. By gathering evidence from various sources to test the programme theory, a credible ‘performance story’ is built.<sup>34</sup>

### 1.5 Adherence to ethical standards

At all times, the Evaluation Team have kept in mind the sensitive cultural, contextual and political issues relating to reform of the S&J sector in the West Bank. Care has also been taken to ensure that the evaluation approach and process were appropriate to sensitivities surrounding the focal topic of VAWG. Strong emphasis has been given to international standards and ethics governing evaluations involving vulnerable populations. The evaluation was conducted in line with DFID’s Ethics and Principles for Evaluation (see **Annex A**) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) Guidelines on the conduct of ethical research into VAWG.<sup>35</sup>

### 1.6 Limitations

The main limitation of this evaluation is that it does not contain more direct evidence about the views and perspectives of the programme’s direct beneficiaries (i.e. women and girls experiencing violence). This is primarily a symptom of the heavily supply side driven nature of the programme and the fact that it does not therefore engage with CSOs and Women’s Rights Organisations (WROs) at community level. However, in terms of the relative youth of the programme this does not negatively impact on the evaluation since it is too early to assess factors concerning the translation of, for example, increased VAW specialisation among S&J service providers into improved outcomes for clients or potential clients.

### 1.7 Lessons from evaluation process

Lessons drawn from the process of implementing the evaluation point to the value of an evaluation team with diverse expertise and clear definitions of roles and responsibilities rather than an individual consultant having been

<sup>33</sup> Stern et al (2012) p27

<sup>34</sup> Stern et al (2014) p25

<sup>35</sup> WHO (2001)

commissioned. From its experience of conducting this evaluation, the Evaluation Team identified a number of key 'lessons' about ways to plan and manage future evaluations.

- a) **An Inception phase is imperative: We have learned** that compromising on field inception activities hinders the potential of evaluation effectiveness!
- b) **Ownership is a major factor in evaluation and learning: We have learned** that having gaps in perspectives and responsibility influences the implementation of the evaluation and the quality of its process. Also, that the evaluation team was highly dependent on a single staff member without clear accountability increases the challenge of time constraints.
- c) **The flow and quality of information influences the evaluation quality and pace: We have learned** that prior to starting evaluation activities the line of accountability, responsiveness and responsibility for information provision by more senior staff must be established.
- d) **In country logistical support enhances effectiveness: We have learned** that in the challenging operating environment of the OPT the team would benefit from more logistical support in-country.
- e) **Mobility in conflict zones is high risk and resources consuming: We have learned** that when operating in complex conflict zones, hiring a reliable and consistent means of transport can increase evaluation efficiency.
- f) **Translation is a consideration: We have learned** that in future, the field research evaluation budget should contain provision for an experienced translator who has a solid grasp of the sector and issues as well as of Arabic-English translation.
- g) **Permissions must be prepared well ahead of time: We have learned** that in the future, it should be part of the project-holders' mandate to "open doors" and facilitate the entry of the evaluation team to all sites and offices. The evaluators are external and were in-country for only a short time which meant that it had to build trust with local partners and stakeholders very fast in order to gain access to conduct the field research.
- h) **Advance time-planning of the closing of the valuation helps to overcome time constraints: We have learned** that in future the dates should be double checked and once they are agreed the necessary time must be planned in what are, by definition always, busy schedules.
- i) **In view of the above: We have learned** that a significantly larger number of evaluator days was required, especially for the field research but also for regular meetings and discussions with the Implementing Agency team/ counterpart at intervals during the field research process.

## 2. Problem statement

### 2.1 Nature and scale of women's exposure to violence in the OPT

The Scoping Study conducted for DFID in 2010<sup>36</sup> points to VAW in the OPT as being a product of the impact of the Israeli military occupation, which both exposes Palestinians to daily violence and normalises interpersonal violence, as well as militating against coherent and responsive governance mechanisms including access to and delivery of justice. These problems are further exacerbated by the prevalence of some traditions that militate against women's rights. The latter are exemplified in the treatment of domestic violence and 'honour killings' as a 'family matter'; and the immunity of perpetrators from prosecution, including and because of the predominance of religious/sectarian justice mechanisms in determining family matters. Women's continuous exposure to violence during their life cycle is depicted in the report as summarised in the Diagram below.

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<sup>36</sup> Jennings (2010)

**Diagram 2: Continuum of Exposure to Violence throughout women’s life cycle in the OPT<sup>37</sup>**

Palestinian Authority/others in society	Violence related to Occupation	Community	Family
<p>Failure of the state to protect women’s rights:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Complicated &amp; different civil law applied in West Bank, Gaza &amp; East Jerusalem.</li> <li>• Civil law that discriminates against women e.g. ‘honour killings’ not categorized as murder &amp; perpetrators receive a reduced punishment.</li> <li>• Religious law which often sanctions &amp; reinforces unequal gender relations.</li> <li>• Marriage by rapist to his victim results in dropping criminal prosecution.</li> <li>• Weak law enforcement agents &amp; mechanisms</li> <li>• Lack of facilities &amp; education for prevention &amp; treatment of women exposed to violence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deprivation of land &amp; confiscation of homes, lack of access to basic needs &amp; public utilities resulting in increased workload.</li> <li>• Violence during Cast Lead resulting in widowhood, disablement, &amp; death &amp; disablement of family members.</li> <li>• Restrictions on mobility &amp; intimidation &amp; harassment at check points.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exposed to sexual and verbal harassment &amp; intimidation.</li> <li>• Acceptance of femicide while impunity prevails.</li> <li>• Social control wanting early marriage.</li> <li>• Abandonment /death of raped women/ girls or in cases of pregnancy outside marriage.</li> <li>• The children of abused women may experience low birth weight, malnutrition, behavioral problems &amp; higher mortality rates.</li> <li>• Trafficking by others.</li> <li>• Increased violence against children.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk of physical, psychological &amp; sexual abuse.</li> <li>• Risk of incest.</li> <li>• Early /forced marriage.</li> <li>• Femicide/ ‘honour killings’.</li> <li>• Divorce with loss of rights.</li> <li>• Pressure to forego inheritance rights on widowhood.</li> <li>• Differentiated access basic needs (food, education, and health).</li> </ul>

Source: Scoping Study on Violence against Women in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (2010)

## 2.2 Baseline evidence concerning the prevalence of VAWG and women & girls access to S&J services

In the effort to establish a baseline of the situation prevailing in the West Bank at the start of the programme the key findings of a number of surveys are presented below. Of particular relevance to the evaluation are two surveys undertaken by the PCBS. The first of these, namely: “Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society” (2012) provides information about different types of violence experienced by the Palestinian population, with differentiation between violence against women, youth, children, elderly and male spouses; and “Women and Men in Palestine” (2013). Important also are two surveys undertaken by UNDP. First, the “Findings of UNDP Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions” (2012) was intended as a baseline survey to track the impact of UNDP’s Rule of Law and Access to Justice Programme. Data was collected in 2011 from 6,710 households. The respondents were interviewed about their engagement with and trust in S&J institutions. Second, the UNDP “Survey for a Review of Palestinian justice and security sector data 2011”. The first round of data was collected over May-December 2012 in Gaza and the West Bank. However, data collection in Gaza could not be completed, so the report focuses on the West Bank only. The survey gathered information about the number of police stations and other offices (depending on institution), number of staff/personnel by gender, professional category, employment status, qualification, geographical disaggregation, monthly hits on the MoJ website,<sup>38</sup> number of complaints, number of services, and core functions of the Palestinian Ministry of Justice, Civil Police, Attorney-General’s Office/Public Prosecution, High Judicial Council, Sharia Courts, Military Courts, Bar Association.

### 2.2.1 Prevalence of VAW in the West Bank


In terms of the exposure to violence of women and girls living in the West Bank, the 2012 PCBS survey found the following:

<sup>37</sup> DFID (2010) p 15.

<sup>38</sup> See: [www.moj.pna.ps](http://www.moj.pna.ps) (accessed November 2014)

a) **Spousal violence is prevalent in all its forms:** in the West Bank, 29.9 % of women interviewed had experienced violence by their spouses at least once in their life time; 48.8 % of the women reported psychological, 17.4 % physical, 10.1 % sexual, 44.8 % social, and 41.5 % economical violence during the last 12 months preceding the survey (July 2010 – June 2011), as shown in Figure 1. Another 2.4 %, 8.7 %, and 15.9 % of ever-married women report to have experienced sexual, physical and psychological abuse by someone else than their husband, respectively. The largest share of the perpetrators came from within the family.

**Figure 2: Share of women exposed to IPV July 2010 –June 2011**



b) However, it is important to note that **VAW in the West Bank is not only confined to private spaces**. For example, 4.1% of ever-married women aged 18-64 reported to have been psychologically, physically or sexually abused/harassed at the Israeli occupation checkpoints or by illegal settlers,<sup>39</sup> and 4% had experienced psychological violence by public service providers.

c) **Women also resort to domestic violence:** 17.1% of women overall and 13.3 % in the West Bank said that they had used violence against their husbands in the 12 months preceding the survey.

The 2013 PCBS survey confirms that **married and previously married women are subjected to all forms of violence in Palestine**. The percentage of those affected in the West Bank was 29.5%, which means that one in every three married/previously married such women has been a victim of at least one form of violence, and 17.8% have been subject to physical abuse (as shown in the **Table** below).<sup>40</sup> Women in the 18-44 year age group, i.e. of reproductive age, were found to suffer more violence than the over 45 age group.

**Table 1: Share of women experiencing different forms of violence at least once in their lives**

Area	Psychological violence	Physical violence	Sexual violence	Social violence	Economic violence	Experienced actual violence
In WB	48.8	17.4	10.2	44.8	41.6	29.9
In Gaza	76.4	34.8	14.9	78.9	88.3	51.0
In Palestine	58.6	23.5	11.8	54.8	55.1	37.0

Source: PCBS Women and Men in Palestine 2013

### 2.2.2 Culture of silence militates against reporting VAW

**VAW is mostly seen as a private matter and the most common strategy adopted by victims of violence is to remain silent** and not to inform anybody about what has happened. The 2012 PCBS survey, revealed that one-third of women

<sup>39</sup> This is a large and growing source of violence for all Palestinians, but women seem to be being particularly targeted by it.

<sup>40</sup> The percentage is as high as 51% in the Gaza Strip; this means that one in every two married/previously married women has been a victim of at least one form of violence.

experiencing violence either remain silent or seek help only from family. Few turn to specialised institutions, and even fewer to S&J services.<sup>41</sup> Only 0.7% of women exposed to violence by their husbands sought advice from a women's institution or centre. Similarly, the 2013 survey found that 65.3% of female victims of violence adopted a strategy of remaining silent, due to their lack of faith in alternatives and lack of awareness of any means available to them to stop the violence or to leave a violent relationship.

However, according to data maintained by the national NGO Sawa,<sup>42</sup> **almost 2,000 individuals living in the West Bank called the Helpline in 2011** with problems related to commercial exploitation of children and women, family problems, and violence and abuse. Almost 80 % of commercial exploitation cases concern boys (27 out of 29 cases of child labour). The majority of family problems relate to parent-child relationships and relationships with other relatives. 60 % of these calls were made by girls and women. Finally, violence and abuse is reported to 71.7 % by women and girls. These cases involve abuse, neglect, rape within and outside the family, attempted rape, sexual abuse within the family, indecent assault and other violent acts (see Table 1 at **Annex G**).

The declining socio-economic wellbeing of Palestinians, especially men, as a result of the military occupation combines with a dominant societal culture of shame, while the patriarchal nature of society and pressure from family and the community in cases of VAW make it difficult for women to seek solutions for their plight. Inadequate and incoherent laws, lack of protection services, isolation worsened by severe constraints on the movement of those who might otherwise seek help and low confidence in S&J institutions further hamper opportunities for women to seek redress. As a result, most violence cases are not reported and never enter the justice system.<sup>43</sup>

### 2.2.3 Access to S&J services

With respect to indicators of access to S&J services for women, the 2012 UNDP survey found that **women were generally less likely to access justice than men**. Although women's rights are reportedly more often violated in civil cases, 24% fewer women were found to be party to civil cases than men.

**Access to legal assistance was considered a challenge by most of the UNDP surveyed households**. Up to 90.8% of all respondents did not have access to a lawyer, 57.2 % reported that they could not afford to easily pay for one, and 56 % doubted they would get free legal assistance if needed. UNDP (2012) reported that 41% fewer women than men know how to take a case to court, and when women were in contact with the law, only 1.2 % of them had the support of a lawyer (as contrasted with 3.9% of men).

### 2.2.4 Satisfaction with S&J services

Regarding indicators of **satisfaction with S&J services**, overall the data suggests that the vast majority of Palestinian households consider the rule of law institutions, lawyers and CSOs supporting their work to be legitimate and pivotal, and use them if needed. However, half of the households think that court cases take too long, which is one of the reasons documented for avoiding formal justice. In addition, analysis of the data shows that satisfaction with S&J institutions is "inversely related" to legal literacy.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, whereas respondents were found to be satisfied with technical performance (e.g. number of judges, qualifications of lawyers), they were **not as satisfied with the integrity of civil courts** (independence, honesty, fairness) – importantly, 18.6% were more satisfied with the integrity and speed of religious court processes.

With respect to VAW, respondents were also asked how they judged civil and Sharia courts to deal with corresponding cases. **Figure 1 at Annex H** shows that differences in opinion concerning civil and Sharia courts dealing with VAW cases are not very different. 36.68 % and 33.58 % of women express their dissatisfaction with civil and Sharia courts, respectively. Furthermore, unlike for other services the satisfaction level seemed to be lower among women who had contact with S&J institutions. **Figure 2** also at **Annex H** shows this relationship. Regarding gender differences, women were on average 11% less satisfied with S&J institutions (performance institution and personnel) and fewer women believed that they would be 'treated equally by the courts'. In general, NGOs' legal aid services were the most trusted,

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<sup>41</sup> Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics: Palestine - Violence Survey in the Palestinian Society, 2011, PSE-PCBS-VS-2011-V1.0 Press release by WCLAC on the International woman's Day. <http://www.wclac.org/atemplate.php?id=340>

<sup>42</sup> Sawa is an NGO, based in Ramallah -with a second centre in East Jerusalem. It runs a Helpline offering advice, psychological counselling and contact details concerning community, and other service providers, including the police.

<sup>43</sup> UN Women research (of 2013 press coverage) on Palestinian women's access to justice in the West Bank revealed that justice service providers lack professional knowledge and expertise in dealing with female survivors of violence.

<sup>44</sup> UNDP (2012) p.7

particularly by women (the NGOs' services were scored 3.2 vs. 3.03 by men on average, out of 5 possible score points).

### 2.2.5 S&J institutions: staffing and gender profile

Overall, the UNDP review of S&J sector data found that **most of the institutions were acutely understaffed and that women were underrepresented "across the board"** with the notable exception of the sharia prosecution (five out of the seven prosecutors here were women) and the MOJ's legal and administrative positions (although women in forensic medicine were sparse which is particularly important for VAWG survivors).<sup>45</sup> In 2011, on average women comprised only 8.7 % percent of police officers, public prosecutors, and support personnel working in the prosecutor's office, lawyers, and judges in different civil courts. The Table at **Annex I** gives an overview on these numbers disaggregated by governorates (where possible). By far the smallest share of female staff was found in the police services, with as few as 1.6 % of women police officers in Qalqilya.

### 2.2.6 Data gaps

The above mentioned UNDP survey also identified significant data gaps, including, for example, lack of data concerning case processing times; oversight data (e.g. information regarding complaints against judges); number and types of criminal offences reported, investigated, closed by the police; number of arrests; use of force; number and causes of case attrition between police and prosecutors office; and number of cases referred to the PBA by the courts. Of particular concern to the investigators was the **lack of reliable data on charges against and the detention of juveniles**; the proportion of 'non-convicted' detainees and the length of their hold. Out of 7,232 individuals arrested and held in detention, 216 were women. The survey suggests that not all of these had adequate, equal access to all facilities, including family visits, opportunities for education and learning, vocational skills development, time and facilities to exercise, access to social workers and counsellors, as well as medical services (including e.g. psychiatrists).

## 2.3 Summary of needs identified with recommended actions and strategies (2010 scoping study)

The 2010 DFID Scoping Study identified the following **key needs**:

- a) Further legislative development and reform to address the existing framework of laws which militate against the realisation of women's rights (more detail of the current framework of laws is found at **Annex J**);
- b) The designation of specialist staff to all police stations, including those with specialist FJUs (then five), to deal with VAW cases together with "the standardisation of written protocols and guidelines in order to improve quality and consistency of service, and to form the basis for a data system";
- c) Greater efforts to coordinate and harmonise training to address VAW, especially with the police, and monitor its impact;
- d) The development of a criminal database on VAW to fill information gaps to: inform policy, structure protection services according to need, and estimate the level of prosecution;
- e) Increased monitoring of VAW as a human rights issue and assessment of progress being made in challenging impunity.

In addition a number of specific **recommendations** were made concerning the design of a programme to address the above needs; and a number of different **strategies** were suggested to enable DFID to integrate tackling VAW into its existing and planned portfolio of work. These are detailed below.

**Table 2: Recommendations and Strategies: Scoping Study (2010)**

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DFID PROGRAMME DESIGN
<p>DFID should:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Support to the MoI to develop a strategy on VAW with key stakeholders in order to fulfil its protection mandate, support implementation on the national strategy to combat VAW and strengthen coordination for effectiveness;</li> <li>b) Strengthen the FPU in line with the Bethlehem model;</li> <li>c) Harmonise training on how to combat VAW through support to the Jericho Police Training Centre and specialist training for FPU officers together with the development of written police protocols and guidelines;</li> <li>d) Develop a data system to capture VAW crime statistics (from when a case is reported through investigation and prosecution) to inform policy making and needs based service development;</li> <li>e) Support the ICHR to integrate VAW monitoring into its work.</li> </ol>

<sup>45</sup>For example, only 27 out of 178 sitting judges in the Palestinian High Judicial Council and 397 out of 2,084 lawyers registered at the Palestinian Bar Association in the West Bank are women.



## STRATEGIES TO INTEGRATE TACKLING VAW INTO DFIDS PORTFOLIO

These included the following:

- a) Mainstreaming combatting VAW into existing work with the MoI so that it becomes institutionalised within the security sector strategy and integral to the police training curriculum, FPU development and the development of a multi-sectoral data system;
- b) Support VAW monitoring through the ICHR;
- c) Promote coordination to combat VAW across all S&J institutions;
- d) Support the strengthening of CSOs working to address VAW in Gaza- interestingly no mention is made of CSOs in the West Bank.

The extent to which and how these recommendations and strategies were reflected in the programme design are assessed in the section below looking at “relevance”.

### 3. Key evaluation findings

#### 3.1 Relevance

Here the question of the programme’s relevance to addressing the needs of the target group is examined, including how the needs and expectations of the target group have been addressed and the extent to which and how conflict and human rights based, culturally sensitive and gender responsive approaches have been integrated into its interventions. Programme relevance is considered from design through implementation.

##### 3.1.1 Programme design: interventions to address identified needs and expectations

The programme design is detailed in the DFID Project Memorandum (December 2010) and reflects the above-mentioned needs identified, and the recommended actions and strategies proposed to address them by the 2010 Scoping Study.<sup>46</sup> At inception, the **overall goal** or expected impact of the “Support to Accountable Security and Justice in the OPT” programme was that “Palestinian Authority (PA) state building in the West Bank delivers core and expected state functions with accountability” as evidenced by the percentage (%) of the public in the West Bank who are at least satisfied with S&J services. Its sole **outcome** was to ensure that: the criminal justice sector is more accountable and responsive to the public in the West Bank. The three-year programme was designed to support Palestinian state building, address vulnerability and human rights, and indirectly contribute to the prospects for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was formed of two components, the second of which falls outside the scope of this evaluation:

- i) Improving the access to security and justice institutions for women; and
- ii) Strengthening the accountability of the security services at the level of the PA Ministry of Interior (MOI).

This evaluation focuses on the first component, which has been implemented by UN Women (UNW).<sup>47</sup> The **total programme budget** was £3million over 3 years (2011-2014).<sup>48</sup> DFID has granted a “no-cost extension” of £500,000 to UNW up to 31<sup>st</sup> March 2015 in order to consolidate gains made and to enable transition to the Joint UNDP/ UNW Programme (“Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OPT: Justice and Security for the Palestinian People”), which started in 2014. This aims to develop and maintain conditions for a viable Palestinian state, based on the rule of law and principles of gender equality.<sup>49</sup>

The programme design envisaged that DFID funding would buy training to equip Palestinian security services, provide prosecutors and judges with the specialist skills to provide better services to women victims of violence and women inmates; increase women’s access to effective services by refurbishing facilities for three new FPUs; leverage funding to address VAW from relevant Ministry budgets; and improve monitoring and action by equipping specialist units in police stations to record cases and monitor referrals. This would also strengthen the evidence base for results monitoring and public communication.<sup>50</sup> Specific interventions were designed to advance tackling it at the structural

<sup>46</sup> Section 4.2, DFID 2010

<sup>47</sup> Implementation of the second component has been delayed.

<sup>48</sup> It is anticipated that total actual UNW programme spend will be somewhere between £2million and £2.2million.

<sup>49</sup> UNW and UNDP (2014) Strengthening the Rule of Law in the OPT: Justice and Security for the Palestinian People:

1 May 2014 - 30 April 2017, United Nations Development Programme, Assistance for the Palestinian People. Two of seven priority outcomes of the Joint Programme are particularly relevant to UNW: Outcome 4: Gender responsiveness of justice, security and legislative actors strengthened; and Outcome 5: Women’s and girls’ access to justice and security improved by ensuring accountable service provision to prevent, protect and respond to violence, and by addressing their broader legal need.

<sup>50</sup> Section 2.3.1

level by challenging the culture of silence that surrounds VAW and addressing questions of immunity from prosecution for perpetrators. This was designed to go some way towards promoting the cultural and attitudinal changes that are needed to make significant progress on addressing VAW.<sup>51</sup>

Although the Project Memorandum points to the 2010 Scoping Report finding that “transformative progress ...required wholesale revision of current legislation”, neither the results chain nor the results framework elaborated in the Project Memorandum mention this.<sup>52</sup> In consequence interventions towards the development of new law (the Domestic Violence Bill and the Family Bill for example) and reform of existing law (reform of the Jordanian Penal Code 1960) have not formed part of the support provided under the programme being evaluated. At the same time, key informants point to work which both DFID and the Implementing Agency, UNW, are engaged in to strengthen the infrastructure of laws to address VAWG. The linkages between the current programme and initiatives within other programmes towards law development do not, however, form part of the evaluation. The pivotal significance of the existing inadequate, outdated, sectarian<sup>53</sup> and contradictory laws<sup>54</sup> in influencing women and girls access to justice in the West Bank cannot be ignored.

### 3.1.2 Target Group needs and expectations identified and addressed

A range of institutions and organisations are defined by the programme as comprising the “Target Group”. These are listed in the Box below together with a summary of how they have been targeted during programme implementation.

PA INSTITUTION	PROGRAMME SUPPORT
Attorney General 's Office (AGO)	Support to creation of VAW specialised cadre of Public Prosecutors in the AGO Gender Unit; and development of VAW specialised Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
High Judicial Council (HJC)	Early efforts to support the provision of judicial services specialised in VAW.
Independent Commission of Human Rights (ICHR)	Home for the Justice Observatory on women's access to justice.
Ministry of Interior (MoI)- especially Palestinian Civil Police (PCP); and Department responsible for CRCs	Institutional strengthening and individual capacity development support to the specialist FPU's which form part of the PCP; and provision of multi-sectoral services to women CRC inmates.
Ministry of Justice (MoJ)	Little direct working with this Line Ministry under the programme.
Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)	Liaison concerning protection services and links to S&J services: UNW Social Workers providing services and support to women CRC inmates. Recent partnership working with MoSA as Vice Chair of the Serious Case Review (SCR) Technical Committee.
Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA)	As above: support to work on the SCR mechanism under the umbrella of National Committee to Combat VAW.
Palestinian Bar Association (PBA)	Specialized VAW training to lawyers and other support to VAW specialist lawyers, including provision of legal aid for women.
Palestinian Counselling Centre (PCC)	Assumed management of independent CRC Social Workers from WFL NGO.
SAWA	Designed and delivered early police/ FPU training.

It is clear from the above that the primary Target Group/s of the programme have been on the institutional supply side and within this category primarily those that are specifically tasked or mandated with the responsibility of targeting women and girls. On the demand side, important stakeholders are non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and a range of women's organisations, which provide support and services to the survivors of VAW and represent their interests. However, these have been less directly targeted.

Programme Target Groups have been supported by the programme in different ways. On the one hand institutional strengthening through, for example, the creation of specialist units and the development of guidelines and procedures has been provided. On the other hand, some specialist training has been designed and delivered. There is primary evidence from the field research that the different approaches or intervention sets have been influenced at least in part by the needs and expectations of the partner Target Groups.

<sup>51</sup> Section 3.5.2

<sup>52</sup> Section 2.1.7

<sup>53</sup> There are about a dozen religiously-inflected family laws in place depending on the Christian sect adhered to, and the sharia laws. See: UNDP (2012)

<sup>54</sup> In the West Bank the sharia courts follow outmoded Jordanian law of 1976 as the PNA has not enacted its own laws yet.



The evaluation TOR include **direct beneficiaries** in the list of the programme's Target Groups (i.e. the women and girls<sup>55</sup> who have survived violence and/ or those who are at most risk of it) encompassing Palestinian female inmates in the CRC, and female clients of the FPU, the VAW specialist Public Prosecutors and PBA lawyers. For all accounts and purposes it is the needs and expectations of this sizeable group that feature most prominently in the programme interventions.

### **Needs assessments**

In the early years of programme implementation and in order to ensure continuing relevance to the needs and expectations of the different Target Groups, a number of specific needs assessments were undertaken<sup>56</sup> thereby allowing specific programme interventions and activities to be fine-tuned or adjusted. For example, concerning the establishment and institutional development of the FPUs, at the very start of the programme's implementation in March 2011, scoping assessment visits were undertaken to the seven FPUs in existence at that time<sup>57</sup> to assess their tangible needs. Gaps highlighted, included basic equipment, infrastructure, and staffing – with significant variation across FPUs. In September of the same year an FPU training needs assessment was undertaken and a Training Needs Analysis' Report was produced (April 2012).<sup>58</sup> Programme reports also point to a Capacity Development Strategy and Programme having been developed in year 1 of implementation for judges in consultation with the HJC.<sup>59</sup>

Programme support for the Serious Case Review (SCR) Mechanism provides a more recent example of relevant needs being identified and addressed and is well aligned with the UNW/UNDP Joint Programme. This initiative, which falls under the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA), developed in response to the individual case of a woman in Bethlehem as described below.

### **Origin and Development of the Serious Case Review Mechanism**

Nancy suffered from domestic violence by her husband. In her attempts to seek protection by the police, she was sent to Mehwar Shelter for a few months and her children were put up for fostering by the MoSA. She decided to withdraw her case and go back to her husband, and following a chain of incidents Nancy was eventually killed by him in public in the middle of the market in Bethlehem. This provided a case study that is widely recognised as reflecting the failure by S&J service providers across the board to manage cases of this type. Not only was nobody able to protect Nancy, but after she was killed no one took the initiative to identify the lessons learnt from this case. Recognising the need to address this situation, UNW contracted an international expert and introduced the idea of introducing a SCR Mechanism through the formation of a national committee, to discuss and promote ideas and mechanisms of how things could be done differently next time. The National Technical Committee on VAW is chaired by MoWA, who employed a legal advisor and a coordinator, and the Committee was endorsed by the Minister of the MoWA. This in itself as an achievement attributed to the initiative taken by UNW.

In early March 2015 a multi-stakeholder Committee meeting was convened including representatives from the MoJ, MoH, MoWA, ICHR, Mehwar, Mosa, WCLAC and Aman counseling center in Hebron.

A decision was taken to study and review the femicide case of Marga from Samouah, a small village near Hebron. In 2012, the 29 year old Marga was killed by her family and buried in the garden because she ran away from the abuse of her 80 year old husband. This represents another case of where the system failed to protect. However, a court case was established and Marga's juvenile brother was arrested, and confessed to committing the crime on behalf of the family. As is not unusual Marga thus received justice, but it is not unlikely that older men in the family made the under-age brother confess to the crime because the sentence would be lighter for him on account of his age. This is an issue which WROs are aware of and working on.

Since the introduction of the SCR Mechanism 23 cases of femicide have been recorded as having taken place in the West Bank<sup>60</sup> making the comparatively new programme initiative to address the protection needs of acutely vulnerable beneficiaries extremely important and timely.

<sup>55</sup> Primary focus has been placed on women and Violence against Women (VAW).

<sup>56</sup> These are detailed in the UNW Annual Reports.

<sup>57</sup> Bethlehem, Hebron, Ramallah, Tubas, Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem

<sup>58</sup> However, SAWA training on VAW to 24 FPU staff took place in September 2011 before the Training Needs Assessment Report was published in April 2012.

<sup>59</sup> DFID (July 2012)

<sup>60</sup> Judge Ahmad Al Ashqar (2014) Murder of Women in Palestine under the pretext of Honour:n Legislation and Jurisprudence Analytical Study, Executive Summary, April 2014, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Occupied Palestinian territories. See:

[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/Executive\\_summary\\_study\\_called\\_honour\\_killings\\_Palestine.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/Executive_summary_study_called_honour_killings_Palestine.pdf) (accessed February 2015)

[http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/Executive\\_summary\\_study\\_called\\_honour\\_killings\\_Palestine.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/Executive_summary_study_called_honour_killings_Palestine.pdf)

### 3.1.3 Integration of human rights, culturally sensitive and gender responsive approaches

**Integration of human rights:** It is clear from the programme documentation and triangulated by the findings of KII and Roundtable Conversations conducted during the field research for this evaluation that VAWG is conceptualised and addressed as a **human rights** issue. Indeed the whole programme is premised on international human rights standards, in particular the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which has now been helpfully strengthened through the addition of General Recommendation 30 (2013)<sup>61</sup> dealing with women living in situations of protracted conflict and political uncertainty. Key informants also pointed to the significance of the visit made to the West Bank in 2013 by the Special Rapporteur of the CEDAW Committee which included discussions with the Prime Minister and contributed to the 2013 General recommendation. International and local human rights experts have been relied upon extensively in the development of materials and the design and delivery of training and sensitisation sessions under the programme.

**Cultural sensitivity:** The evidence suggests that the programme, both in its design and execution, has been sensitive to the diverse local cultures existing across the West Bank. Examples of the importance of culture were highlighted by Key Informants. As described by one: “When a woman enters the justice system she may face divorce from her husband and be banished by her family. It is a real dilemma as to whether one goes with the justice system or with the dominant culture”. The FJPU leadership emphasise the drive for social change in order ultimately to tackle VAWG by working towards increasing the number of cases that are reported and prosecuted. However, the Evaluation team were asked not to forget that police officers are part of the local cultures in which they are rooted and for them it is an “on-going emotional and moral dilemma to go through change – the ‘new way’ versus the knowing what will happen to a woman if she reports to the FJPU and follows the case through”.

The programme has taken the cultural context on board in particular through support to the SCR Mechanism described above which is designed to address negative consequences, including death, for women and girls who opt to report and prosecute those who have perpetrated violence against them.

**Gender responsive approaches:** In terms of gender responsiveness the programme design and implementation have aimed to: a) ensure enhanced awareness of the gender inequalities and gender discrimination that motivate and drive VAWG; and b) to ensure that the S&J institutions supported are responsive and accountable to women and girls’ needs. However, the narrowness of the focus within this programme on women and increasingly also on girls, is marked. It has not explicitly attended to working with men and boys or to the use of behavioural change models to increase male engagement in initiatives to tackle VAWG. UNW emphasise that this type of outreach was not part of the original programme design; and that taken as a whole the UNW programme in the West Bank delivers interventions with this focus that are aligned to the Access to Justice (A2J) initiatives. However, these are not reflected in the programme under evaluation and arguably could have featured more prominently. Other significant modifications have been made to the original 2010 programme design and results chain.

From the design phase through implementation, the programme has not explicitly addressed the less frequent incidence of violence perpetrated against men and boys either by other males or by women, although this access to S&J provision is articulated to a certain extent in the FPU mandate. The Units cater for all victims of violence regardless of their gender, age or other aspects of identity and UNW’s VAW prevention work under other programmes includes working with men and boys. However, given the PCBS 2012 survey finding that “17.1% of women overall and 13.3 % in the West Bank said that they had used violence against their husbands in the 12 months preceding the survey”<sup>62</sup> these issues would have benefitted from more further integration into the S&J programme.

In terms of interventions to change social norms and beliefs surrounding VAWG, the programme contributed to a nation-wide media campaign<sup>63</sup> which aimed to garner public commitment to combatting domestic violence, VAW, and violence against children and to enhance the principle of equality of access to S&J services.<sup>64</sup> This important intervention appears to have been a “one-off” exercise for reasons to do with both UNW staff constraints and prioritisation.

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<sup>61</sup> United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (2013)

<sup>62</sup> PCBS 2011

<sup>63</sup> For example, UNW: a) contracted a media company to develop media tools (November 2011); and b) developed a media strategy which was approved by the Project Field Committee (PFC) in the first quarter of 2012.

<sup>64</sup> Between September 2012 and February 2013 it is reported that 8 public service announcements were produced and broadcasted on local television and radio stations. The initiative involved high ranking PA officials, including key Ministers from the S&J sector.

### 3.2 Effectiveness

The analysis below evaluates programme effectiveness primarily from the perspective of the four outputs detailed in the Programme ToC. It examines the extent to which the programme has contributed to the achievement of these expected results and outcomes; what has worked well and less well and some possible reasons for this; some of the major factors influencing the programme’s contribution to the achievement or non-achievement of the results and outcomes.

#### 3.2.1 Programme contribution to development of specialist police services for VAWG survivors and those at risk (ToC Output 1)

As well as conducting extensive discussions with the FJPU leadership at Central Administration level the Evaluation Team made site visits to 5 FJPUs located at Governorate level. The essential features of these are summarised in the table below.

**Table 3: Basic features of sample FJPUs visited by team**

FPU	Date established	Number of Staff	Female Staff	Most frequent cases	Number of daily cases
Bethlehem	2008	6	1	1. Wife beating 2. Attempted suicide 3. Runaways	3
Nablus	2009	10	5	1. Domestic Violence 2. Runaways 3. Threats against life	2
Hebron	2009	12	1	1. Domestic Violence 2. Cash transfer 3. Sexual harassment	4
Jericho	2011	3	1	1. Physical Domestic Violence 2. Family disputes 3. Runaways	7 – 8 per month
Ramallah	2010	11	3	1. Physical Domestic Violence 2. Runaways 3. Attempted suicide	1 – 2

Source: key Informant interviews with FJPU Directors/ Deputy Directors, January 2015

The above Table illustrated the differences in the typology of cases and hence about the different pressures in the individual Governorates. It also points to the continuing low number of women staff in the FJPUs.

The programme has contributed to the development of VAW specialist police services for women victims of violence (ToC Output 1) at three levels:

- a) Provision of basic furnishing and equipment to support establishment of the FJPUs throughout the West Bank;
- b) Institutional strengthening through support for the development of a normative framework (including a Strategy, SOPs, and other regulations and guidance) for the FJPUs; and
- c) The design (e.g. training manuals) and delivery of a limited amount of training to build the individual capacities of FJPU officers and/ or to sensitise them to the content and importance of the FJPU SOPs.

#### 1) Contribution to establishment of FJPUs in the West Bank

The fact that the number of FJPUs increased over the life span of the programme is not contested. Even if the original 2010 Logframe baseline was wrong (i.e. there were already seven FJPUs in existence at programme start), their number has increased to 11 over the life span of the programme, one to serve each of the 11 Governorates in the West Bank (starting with Bethlehem in 2011 and ending with the last unit to be established in an East Jerusalem suburb). Each of these units covers approximately 5-11 other police stations/ posts. In addition there is the central FJPU administration office based at the Ramallah police Head Quarters. Tangible contributions have been made through the provision of basic furnishing and equipment, the inventory of which is now held with the central FJPU administration. Other International Development Actors have also funded basic FJPU infrastructure. For example, the EU has supported the installation, in a number of FJPUs, of interview rooms specifically designed to allow the unit head to observe and monitor interviews as they are being conducted.

The existence of FPU/ FJPU at Governorate level across the West Bank and East Jerusalem represents a significant achievement which the programme has contributed to in terms of putting in place specialist police services for VAWG survivors and those at risk of VAWG.

## 2) Contribution to the FPU normative framework

That the FPU normative framework was endorsed by the Chief of the PCP as national policy in January 2014 is another key achievement to which the programme has made significant contributions at both output and outcome levels of the program (ToC).

In particular, interviews with a range of Key Informants across the S&J sector suggest that the experts contracted by UNW played a central role in the process of developing the framework. The **approach** used for this process is viewed by a number of Key Informants as having been exemplary in terms of the participatory and inclusive methods used by the UNW experts. UNW has been a key player, working in partnership with a number of IDAs, in contributing to the development of the normative framework. The results must be attributed not only to the hard work and effort which the FPU leadership and officers invested in the process but also to the members of the Project Field Committee made up of UNW, EUPOL COPPS and the PCP,<sup>65</sup> and the three Working Groups established in early 2013 to oversee: a) drafting of the normative framework; b) development of the training programme and materials; and c) address human resource issues.

**FPU SOPs:** The evaluation evidence suggests that whilst the FPU SOPs have helped to clarify the mandate and role of the FPUs (assumption 6), some work remains to be done to ensure that this is clearly understood not only by Family and Juvenile officers but also by PCP officers and other actors in the S&J sector. At present there is a considerable diversity of roles and relationships. Senior FJPU officers report that much of the investigative work on their cases is in practice undertaken by the PCP Criminal Investigations Department (CID). For example, one unit informed the team that due to the shortage of personnel all juvenile cases are currently being managed by the CID. Another summed up the situation in the sample of FJPUs visited by saying: "There are differences in the case types which the individual FJPUs take on or refer to the CID. There is supposed to be a unified system and definition. In theory this exists but in practice the situation is very resource bound. For example out of hours we call on the CID". Whereas the former example may relate primarily to the recent merger of the FPU and Juvenile Units most examples shared with the team suggest that the precise roles and responsibilities of the FJPUs, other police departments and indeed, in some cases, the Governors' office, are not yet always clear in practice which is something that needs to be addressed going forward.

**Form driven process:** At the level of the individual FJPUs there is recognition of the importance of observing new procedures but some clear frustration concerning the practicalities of doing this. Particular frustrations are expressed by FJPU managers across the board about the length and number of forms and their relevance to the typical daily case types they manage. One senior officer said: "The forms being used are too long. One form is 10 pages. The forms are repetitive and need to be adjusted. It is not enough to develop a manual and distribute forms- we find ourselves stuffed with papers that cannot fit in the filing cabinets". Another was of the personal opinion that: "The (SOPs) forms are very western oriented, the culture is different, western society is individually based: two people make a family, the challenges are different. Here, we are very family based". The FJPU Central Administration informed the Evaluation Team that steps are being taken to address these, and other, concerns raised about the forms and to ensure that the SOPs are being correctly used. It is worth emphasising that any failure to understand the centrality of the (extended) family in Palestinian society is likely to simply drive women back time and again to the religious courts regardless of how patriarchal they may be.

**Compliance: sanctions and rewards:** It is very early days yet to consider the extent to which the systems and processes, which have been established to improve service quality and accountability to VAW survivors/clients, are being complied with (assumption 4). However, observations based on the evidence collected for the evaluation can be made at two levels. At the senior leadership level within the FJPUs there are positive signs that the whole issue of compliance with the FPU SOPs is regarded with utmost seriousness. During monitoring visits to the units, for example, "We check to see if the officers are using the forms. If there are deficiencies we make time bound recommendations and when we revisit the unit and find that these have not been implemented we apply sanctions for non-compliance". It is recognised that within the FJPU system financial rewards for good performance are not appropriate, so a number of other practices are used to reward this. These include: sending out a letter of gratitude; giving an individual preference when it comes to participation in a workshop; increasing the visibility of the individual and emphasising the importance of the contribution that s/he has made. Sanctions include a letter of reprimand, moving the individual

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<sup>65</sup> The life span of the PFC is unclear- created July 2011.

out of the unit, re-training and capacity building. The most severe sanctions rest with the PCP Human Resources Department and can involve demotion or loss of FJPU title and seniority which may be cumulative.

**Reconciliation or prosecution:** The transmission belt between the FPU SOPs, improvements in FJPU officer performance and better client outcomes appears to be operating in some unexpected ways. Certainly, the Evaluation Team found that a characteristic of the FJPU officers consulted in the main is a victim or client centred approach. However, officers concern with the “best interests” of the victim/ client can mean that they do not always follow the procedures as they are instructed to do. Particular problems and, indeed complexities, were found to exist in terms of FJPU decision-making about which VAW cases are amenable to reconciliation and solution at unit level and which must be referred on to formal S&J or other service providers (assumption 9). In general it appears that it is only the very “serious” cases which are sent up for prosecution. The view that: “Rape falls into a totally different category – there is no judgement to be made here. The case MUST go for prosecution” was not an isolated one and is triangulated by findings from KII’s with IDA’s and other key stakeholders.

**Alternative dispute resolution (ADR):** A key finding of the evaluation is that FJPU officers often find themselves having to balance between formal and informal justice. In many cases, they expressed a tendency to lean on traditional justice mechanisms because these are rooted much more deeply in the culture. Also, as one senior FJPU officer underlined: “this is a family PROTECTION Unit and not family FRAGMENTING Unit”. Wherever the possibility exists for informal resolution, the FJPU appear to give this primacy. The predominance of men in the police system makes it harder for them to understand just how biased towards men the informal systems are. Examples are cited by Key Informants of situations where community leaders have supported the FJPU. For instance, in Hebron, the community chief/leader plays an active role in the resolution of familial conflicts by coming to the FJPU office. As a front line strategy, chiefs/leaders focus on the mediation of disputes instead of prosecution or litigation. This approach is recognised as being essential to maintaining peaceful coexistence among disputing family members who often reside under one roof.

**Complaint withdrawal:** In many cases, the FJPU officers interviewed report that it is the victim or client who decides to withdraw a complaint of domestic violence. Here, contextual factors such as a woman’s economic status and their awareness of their legal rights are said to play a role. As one FJPU officer described: “Women are more aware of their rights. The trend is that those that are economically empowered continue with their case and don’t withdraw. Economic empowerment is the most significant factor”. Community and family influence and pressure is also reported to be a significant factor influencing complaint withdrawal. This signifies the need for broader-reaching community awareness-raising, which the FJPU currently undertake on a relatively limited scale.

### 3) FPU training and sensitisation

In addition to the important exposure to new ways of working and international standards for the management of VAWG response services which the programme has provided through the development of the normative framework, the following training and sensitisation has been delivered specifically to FPU officers.

- **September 2011:** Training was provided (through the MDG Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Joint Programme) to the 24 members of staff<sup>66</sup> then employed by the FPU on VAW, sexual abuse, PTSD, and how to receive survivors of violence. The training was designed and delivered by the national helpline NGO SAWA.<sup>67</sup>
- **November 2011:** Follow-up training for 20 FPU officers<sup>68</sup> on how to work with sex offenders.
- **June 2013:** After initial endorsement of the FPU SOPs, sensitisation sessions were held with approximately 30 FPU officers.
- **March 2014:** A second round of sensitisation sessions were convened at the Jericho Police Academy Training Centre.<sup>69</sup>

In practice relatively little formal training has been delivered under the programme. That which FJPU officers have participated in is reported to be useful but “form-driven” as are the SOPs themselves (as discussed above). Moreover, all the FJPU officers interviewed emphasised that considerable experience and expertise exists within the FJPU themselves. Indeed, the central administration leadership point out that the selection and recruitment of senior level personnel ensures that officers of the highest possible calibre are in place. An **approach** to building capacities and capabilities centred on cross-learning and experience sharing would appear to have much to offer in the future.

<sup>66</sup> Training participants included nine senior ranking officials (2 women and 7 men).

<sup>67</sup> SAWA report that they were “dropped” by UNW as a training provider with no explanation for this communicated to them.

<sup>68</sup> Training participants comprised 7 women and 13 men. It is not clear who delivered this training.

<sup>69</sup> The UNW Report of the SOPs training dated April 2014 has 12 Annexed forms but no Annexed List of Participants.

FJPU officers interviewed who have participated in training are not able to say under which programme the training was provided. EUPOL COPPs is mentioned most frequently as a provider of police training to FJPU officers.

**Translation of learning into improved practice:** The precise impact the training FJPU officers on the regulations, minimum standard guidelines and SOPs or sensitising them to these has had on improved officer performance is unclear. This is not to say that the sensitisation process is not essential, indeed it is obligatory given official endorsement of the normative framework by the PCP. Rather, it is early days yet to assess how the relatively recent introduction of the FPU SOPs and the sensitisation of officers to them have translated into improved individual FPU officer performance and better outcomes for clients. Over time the findings of the regular monitoring visits conducted by the central FJPU administration combined with a robust performance management system should allow this to be assessed systematically and at regular intervals.


**Better outcomes for clients:** Translating improved FJPU officer performance into better outcomes for clients (assumption 8) is an issue that requires further investigation. Thus far, little thought has been given by the FJPU leadership to the question of client feedback on services received. However, there is recognition of this as being important moving forward. For example, the idea of a suggestion box is one that will be considered as part of a strategy to obtain client feedback that can be used as evidence to highlight areas where improvements are needed. This will help to ascertain the importance of factors such as better resourcing (skills, facilities and equipment) in contributing or not to levels of client satisfaction with FJPU services (assumption 16).

**Police training on SOPs:** In addition, UNW undertook an FPU Training Needs Assessment in the second quarter of 2011, which was published as a Training Needs Analysis Report in April 2012. From this a full training package and SOPs Training Manual were developed. The training programme has not yet been implemented.

### 3.2.2 Programme contribution to multi-sectoral support targeted at female inmates of CRC (ToC Output 2)

The programme has clearly contributed to continuing multi-sectoral (social, economic, legal, psycho-social) support (as depicted in the Diagram below) targeting the female inmates CRC. These women represent one of the most disadvantaged populations in the West Bank from both the perspective of access to S&J services and vulnerability to or experience of VAW. They also face stigma and poor quality of reintegration on their release from detention.

**Diagram 3: Multi-sectoral nature of the CRC women inmates' intervention**



Source: Programme Evaluation PowerPoint: Field work debrief, January 2015



Relations between the programme and the CRC Department (CRCD) or the MoI under which it falls have not been easy. Despite this the programme has managed to negotiate access to women inmates in the CRCs and to make basic services available to these women for the first time ever. Having conducted a number of assessment visits to ascertain inmates' interest in various rehabilitation activities, in December 2011 access was granted through a formal agreement<sup>70</sup> which established regular visits to the CRCs by various (sport, yoga, and gardening) project trainers.<sup>71</sup> In addition, access was granted for regular visits by the VAW specialist PBA lawyers to provide much needed legal advice and representation to women inmates.<sup>72</sup> In early 2012 UNW sub-contracted Women for Life (WFL) NGO in Salfeet to hire 3 Social Workers, including a Project Coordinator responsible for reporting to UNW through the local women's organisation. Subsequently this responsibility was taken over by the Palestinian Counselling Centre (PCC) up to June 2014 when the programme component came to an end.

The CRC programme component of work to support women inmates is complex in terms of the multiple needs it is attempting to address in a highly sensitive operating environment. The goal is to meet the minimum standards of treatment for this target group, including access to justice through legal support and accompaniment for those women who cannot access their basic legal rights because they are unable to afford a lawyer, do not enjoy visits from their children or relations with their families. In addition, the programme has sought to ensure social and psychological support through Social Workers under MoSA as well as through those sub-contracted through the PCC.

**Some perceptions of women inmates:** CRC women inmates in the CRC visited by the Evaluation Team expressed mixed, but largely positive views about the benefits of the legal advice and representation they had received or would like to receive. Others shared the CRCD's frustration and disappointment with the income-generating projects delivered, in particular the ratio between the amount of work the women have done and the income they received after two years, pointing out that this was not justly proportional.<sup>73</sup> And, some scepticism was expressed by both the CRCD management and the women themselves about the contextual relevance of yoga classes.

#### Feedback from women CRC inmates

- 1) **Inmate one:** does not want the gardening project, or the yoga or a lawyer.
- 2) **Inmate two:** has been involved in the gardening project for 3 years and got 260 Shekels out of it in the end. She stated that this was not very rewarding as it was a job. The sport could be more diversified, e.g. walking. She wants education and to improve her skills to generate income.
- 3) **Inmate three:** said that the lawyer was very good and helped in court, and that she wants it to continue as she does not have money to pay a lawyer on her own. In order to generate income she would welcome learning some hand-based skills.
- 4) **Inmate four:** liked the legal aid part of the programme.
- 5) **Inmate five:** suggests embroidery, jewellery making or knitting classes.
- 6) **Inmate six:** did not want to say anything at all.
- 7) **Inmate seven:** came late to the meeting because she had a family visit and there was not time for her to share her views.

Although UNW has significant experience in addressing issues concerning the reintegration of women into their communities and society following time spent in shelters, strategies to ensure the reintegration of women CRC inmates following their release have been limited largely to skills development for income generation.

### 3.2.3 Programme contribution to strengthening the capacities of justice sector providers to manage VAWG cases (ToC Output 3)

In addition to contributing significant support to the development and strengthening of VAW responsive, accountable police institutions, the programme has aimed to strengthen the VAW capacities of: a) Public Prosecutors in the AGO's office; b) lawyer members of the PBA; c) the judiciary; and more recently the multi-sectoral Serious Case Review (SCR) Mechanism.

#### 1) VAW specialist Public Prosecutors

<sup>70</sup> DFID 2012

<sup>71</sup> This enabled a number of training workshops to be held aimed at developing women's vocational skills, facilitating recreational pursuits and supporting them to develop income-generating activities.

<sup>72</sup> UNW 2012

<sup>73</sup> Women inmates and the CRC leadership unanimously agreed that the gardening project had not worked because the income it had generated was miniscule.

In terms of the programme's contribution to strengthening the capacities of Public Prosecutors to manage VAW cases more effectively, the programme approach has centred on support for the creation of a VAW specialist pool of Public Prosecutors within the AGO. It is important to highlight the fact that the AGO decision to create such a resource was a result of ongoing advocacy by UNW to create a Gender Unit, and the direct involvement of Public Prosecutors in drafting the FPU SOPs. Both these programme interventions contributed significantly to recognition by the AGO of the need for specialisation.

The selection of Public Prosecutors to be up-skilled in VAW was conducted through the administration of a questionnaire designed by a UNW expert. This "orientation process" was intentionally rich and long and UNW believes that it constitutes a best practice which in the West Bank was "exported" from the shelters to the AGO Public Prosecutors.<sup>74</sup> The process aims to assess the motivation, mind-sets, and cultural background of professionals working on VAW, while helping to select those who will be able to acquire the necessary skills and knowledge to work on these cases. The process also serves as sensitisation and training. In a meeting with AGO in September 2014, the adoption of this process was cited as one of the most innovative and successful contributions made by UNW.

As a result of the above "orientation process" 15 Public Prosecutors were officially assigned to deal with VAW cases across the West Bank. Following their assignment, the team has participated in different sensitisation sessions and two multi-stakeholder meetings (February and March 2014) to analyse how to strengthen other stakeholders' working relations, referrals and collaborative work with the Public Prosecution.

**Public Prosecutor SOPs:** The Public Prosecutors who participated in the Roundtable Conversation for this evaluation report that, having been invited by UNW to support the drafting and review of the FPU SOPs, they are now in the process of developing their own specific Guidelines and Procedures. Supported in this process by a locally contracted and exceptionally highly regarded UNW expert, the team felt that "we were going forward". However, in summer 2014 the consultants' contract with UNW ended after which s/he continued on a voluntary basis in the effort to complete the work and that the initiative "is not moving forwards now which presents an obstacle". Public Prosecutor participants in the Roundtable Conversation believed as one said that "UNW is the most significant partner in the domestic violence field. The specialisation within the Public Prosecution of domestic violence started through support from UNW". However, they pointed out that "UNW support came primarily in the initial phase through the selection and identification of the specialists". More recently, other IDAs (including, EUPOL COPPS) and CSOs are reported to have provided more support, including training, although new funding arrangements are said to be in the process of being negotiated.

**Improved outcomes for clients:** In terms of the assumptions underlying the programme ToC, there is no evidence with which to determine whether or not VAW cases that are referred to the Public Prosecutors will be managed more satisfactorily by designated VAW specialists (assumption 10). This is in part because the creation of the specialist resource is at an earlier stage of development and there is as yet no statistical data with which to compare prosecution rates across VAW specialist and non-specialist prosecutors.

**Withdrawal of cases from prosecution:** Similarly, the assumption that VAW survivors are less likely to withdraw their cases from the formal justice system if these are managed by Public Prosecutors who have received specialist VAW training (assumption 17) can neither be validated nor discarded on the basis of the available evidence. This is primarily because the development of the VAW specialist Public Prosecutors is still in its infancy. However, broader evaluation findings suggest a need to look at whether or not the sex of S&J service providers is (or is not) a significant factor influencing the choices women victims of violence make about whether or not to withdraw their complaints from the formal justice system. Evidence from elsewhere suggests that this is an important factor.<sup>75</sup>

## 2) The Judiciary and VAW specialisation

Although it is seen to be critically important, the contribution the programme has made to date in terms of the development of a more VAWG specialist judiciary has been limited. A partnership agreement with the **Higher Judicial Council (HJC)** was signed during the first year of implementation, but relations with the Council have not been easy. The start appears to have been positive with a meeting of Italian VAW specialised judges and six Palestinian judges;<sup>76</sup> and the development of a training framework in the first and second quarters of 2011. Thereafter relations with the HJC deteriorated for a number of reasons related to differences in approach and perceptions of need. Concerning the **underlying ToC assumption** that the High Judicial Council (HJC) favours the development of specialist VAW capacity

<sup>74</sup> The process is explained/ codified in detail in a UNW publication "Guidelines for recruiting anti-violence centres personnel".

<sup>75</sup> UN Women's global "In Pursuit of Justice" report provides evidence that this is the case.

<sup>76</sup> The Palestinian judges are reported to have formed part of the "core HJC project group" but it is not clear what this was.



among judges and mainstreaming gender into the existing system, over and above the creation of special courts dedicated to hearing VAW cases (assumption 12) needs to be revised.


### 3) PBA VAW specialist lawyers

At the same time (2011) as UNW signed a partnership agreement with the HJC a similar agreement was made with the Palestinian Bar Association (PBA) whereby the programme would support capacity development for VAW specialist legal advice and representation. In the second quarter of 2011 a UNW PBA Project Coordinator was recruited and four lawyers were selected from a pool of twenty to provide legal advice and representation to fourteen CRC women inmates. With the support of a number of UNW legal consultants, tools and forms were developed to facilitate case monitoring. In early 2013 a two-day orientation workshop was organised by the PBA in order to select twenty PBA lawyers to participate in training on how to apply human rights standards and CEDAW principles within legal aid.<sup>77</sup> Following on, with a time lag, the twenty lawyers from the previously selected group participated in a three-month specialised training programme.

The PBA Roundtable participants report that the **selection of trainees** was a lengthy process. UNW convened a preparatory meeting with fifty PBA lawyers facilitated by four legal (local) experts. Plenary sessions dealt with four sectoral areas (criminal law; international; civil law; women’s law) and then training needs were identified against these by topic. The four experts developed selection criteria and then sent a form to the participants asking them to complete and return it to them. The forms were marked (1-10) and then sent back to the candidates. On the basis of this, participants for the training programme were selected. No feedback was given to the PBA applicants on the outcome of the selection process (whether successful or not).

**Assessment of training:** In order to make a rapid assessment of how useful they had found the training provided under the UNW programme, the VAW Specialist Lawyers at the Roundtable Conversation were asked to rank from 1-10 (with 1 being very poor and 10 being excellent) their views. The Diagram below shows that they were most satisfied with the duration of the training. They were mostly very satisfied with the substantive content of the training and with the VAW legal skills they acquired through it. They were less satisfied with the quality of the training that was delivered.

**Diagram 4: PBA VAW Training**



Source: VAW Specialist PBA Lawyers: Roundtable Conversation, Jerusalem January 2015

With some recommendations for how to approach things differently next time, the Roundtable Participants were positive about the training received as can be seen from their observations summarised in the Table below.

#### Contribution of VAW training to building the capacity of the PBA

- “It is extremely important to note that before UNW came to the PBA it had never addressed the VAW issue at all”.
- “UNW played a role in raising the self-awareness of PBA’s role and mandate in social change. Before it only collected members’ fees and supervised lawyers. Nowadays the image and prestige of the PBA is improving”.
- “We have learnt that when issues are addressed in the media to bring in VAW it influences public opinion”.
- “In terms of building the knowledge infrastructure within the PBA there was previously no single reference. Now we are able to produce brochures etc. which is sustainable”.
- “The UNW programme has helped to empower the role of the PBA as protector of the right to freedom in society”.

<sup>77</sup> The training was chaired by the Vice President of the CEDAW Committee during a 10 day visit to Palestine.

In terms of the underlying assumption that individual motivation exists to apply what had been learnt from training delivered and/or guidance received under the programme (**assumption 4**), PBA Roundtable participants pointed to the following when asked about the difference that their participation in training has made to the way they conduct their everyday work.

#### Key difference participation in UNW training has made

- Strengthened research capacity in law – *“provided courage to break down the barrier to accepting VAW cases (defendant and victim)”*;
- Experience on how to deal with VAW cases and provide clients with legal and psycho-social support – *“in many cases I find myself playing these two roles”*;
- Diversified tools to support victims of VAW – *“Before I was only thinking of law and courts. I learnt that there are many options and tools available and different stakeholders, including traditional law and mediation with CSOs. The victim must be at the centre”*;
- VAW has been promoted for discussion with lawyers and judges: *“I am encouraged to research more on the subject”*.

In addition:

- The *“diversifying stakeholders approach applies to VAW and other cases – ADR and mediation are alternative routes to justice”*;
- *“Previously I was very money driven and focused on building my career. Women’s cases are challenging in terms of fees since husbands usually pay. The training has changed my approach.”*
- *“Lawyers don’t like to take on VAW cases because they are usually complex”*;
- *“A major disincentive is the fees”*.<sup>78</sup>

**Improved outcomes for clients:** Concerning the two assumptions (assumptions 11 and 18) underlying the programme ToC in relation to VAW specialist legal advice and representation, the above findings in section 2 suggest that very few, if any VAW survivors are able to access any legal services at all in the West Bank. By definition of this meagre baseline therefore, the creation of VAW trained lawyers means that a greater number of VAW clients are likely to be able to access more appropriate, effective and responsive legal advice and legal representation than they did previously (assumption 11). A number of Key Informants emphasised the importance of encouraging women to take up civil actions for the award of compensation and damages for the violence they have suffered. Consideration is apparently being given by CSOs and lawyers to the use of “test cases” in this regard. In terms of whether or not VAWG survivors are more likely to seek the legal advice and representation they need from VAW trained lawyers (assumption 18) a key contextual factor is clearly the need for legal services provided without charge to the client. At present there is no state funded legal aid system in operation in the West Bank. This holds true not only for VAWG survivors but for any woman who needs legal assistance, such as advice in a divorce settlement, alimony, or child custody. Lack of access to legal services is exacerbated further by restrictions on movement since many legal specialists are based in East Jerusalem which West bank Identity Document (ID) holders cannot travel to.

#### 3.2.4 Programme contribution to the generation of robust evidence on women and girls access to S&J (ToC Output 4)

The main vehicle whereby the programme has contributed to the collection of key data and information on women and girls’ access to S&J has been through the creation of a UNW/ICHR Observatory. As described by one Key Informant, “the idea of the Observatory matched with ICHR priorities and enabled it to mainstream this work into the Commission’s programme. The idea was to incorporate information gathered into a data bank/ knowledge information system that could be a resource for researchers”.

The four Observatory Monitors (two women and two men) are independent lawyers who spend 70% of their time in the field and 30% of their time on documentation. The monitoring takes place in the three ICHR centres: north, south and central. Work is distributed between the four observers in a way that is sensitive to gender and locality. The ICHR has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with S&J Providers to allow the monitors monitoring access; and a pre-assessment form was developed in order to interview key service providers, including judges to assess their gender sensitivity.

#### Functions and Roles of the Justice Observatory

The role of the Observatory is to monitor the S&J chain: from the time a woman reports to an FPU to Public Prosecution to the

<sup>78</sup> NB citizens who cannot afford to pay a PBA lawyer can ask the court for small funds to cover their representation.

court hearing/s, with links to shelters and other protection support, including prisons, detention centres.

It undertakes two strands of monitoring work:

- a) Tracking the trajectory/ pathway of individual VAW cases through the S&J system; and
- b) Monitoring the performance of institutions providing S&J services.

In terms of **monitoring the trajectory of cases** through the justice system, a number of case files were supplied by the HJC including cases of sexual abuse; domestic violence, especially with physical violence; and women accused of serious crimes in order to assess the sensitivity of the S&J system to these women. The HJC data management system generated a sample of cases and provided basic data on the nature of the cases and dates of hearing etc. From the case files, thirty cases were chosen and ten cases were allocated to each of the three monitors by geographical area. The clients of the ten cases assigned to each monitor are accompanied to court. In order to track trajectory of cases the monitors check with the Public Prosecutors data base to see how many cases have been sent to court and how many are still in the AGO's office and why.

The **observation of S&J service provider institutions** covers: Courts, FJUs, Shelters, Public Prosecutors, and CRC. However, the Observatory monitors have experienced problems in terms of access to the CRCs from start of the project culminating in their being forbidden to visit women CRC inmates. At the start of each month the observers define the places to visit, how often and when. A combined monthly report is produced on both the cases being followed and the service providers being monitored.

Data collection by the Observatory monitors is on-going: monthly, six monthly reports and annual reports are produced. Although the hardware for the development of an electronic database was procured in late 2013, installation of the software has taken some time. Observatory Roundtable participants report that the data system is still at data entry stage and has not yet been analysed. Technical and other problems with the company developing the database and software were reported.

There is little evidence as yet to suggest that programme is attempting broader sweeping transformative change, to ensure that appropriate independent monitoring data on VAW collected across relevant sectors is being analysed and used to inform decision-making and policy change (assumption 18). ICHR Observatory monitors who participated in the Roundtable Conversation expressed frustration concerning the non-publication (as yet) of their reports. Succinctly expressed their perception is that: "our achievements are not always visible or defined because we observe the UNW policy not to publish our reports and recommendations even though this conflicts with ICHR policy". In particular, Roundtable participants pointed to UNW sensitivity to their use of legal terminology. Because the reports are published jointly under the name of UNW and ICHR, it is important that UNW is satisfied with the quality assurance process. Participants also emphasised that the Access Denied report relied heavily on the findings of unpublished Observatory reports. Sensibly they believe that the Observatory reports should be published independently by the ICHR because this would enable more effective policy advocacy. As one participant described: "We are able to advocate..... Our presence in court exerts pressure, for example, on judges but we cannot exert wider influence unless we publish our reports".

There is evidence to suggest that where change requires policy decisions to be made at a high level some PA officials, especially within the PCP, understand the programme. This must in part be a result of evidence based advocacy under the programme. In most cases the necessary support appears to be in place. It is only in respect to the CRC women inmates that some blocks to progress are apparent (assumption 21). The ToC assumption that data and information, including direct feedback from clients, concerning the living conditions of female CRC inmates is being used as an evidence base to advocate for and effect positive change on women's protection and rights issues (assumption 20) is evidenced to a certain extent in the policy influencing undertaken through the regular participation of UNW in the prisons coordination group chaired by EUPOL COPPs. This positions UNW to raise issues of concern relating to the situation of CRC women inmates and to update the group about current needs.

The assumption (assumption 21) that effective policy advocacy with decision-makers depends in large part on direct access to VAW clients, including women inmates in CRCs, is also valid in the sense that access by the Observatory monitors has been severely constrained (i.e. terminated). There is some limited evidence to suggest that the relevant authorities in the past have felt threatened by independent S&J service monitoring and feedback, but that this is diminishing. Allowing independent monitors' access to relevant clients groups, documentation and files is obviously critical not only to successful policy influencing but also to realise the institutional accountability and transparency to which PA institutions aspire. If and when they are employed directly by the ICHR, the Observatory monitors may be perceived to be more "independent". At the same time it will be important moving forward to review the roles of the Observatory given its location within a PA institution.

**Direct advocacy and policy-influencing work** has been undertaken under the programme by UNW with PCP and other key stakeholders in order to raise awareness about the existence of the FJUs and their role and function. This work does not feature strongly in the programme documentation possibly because it is not attached to any funding stream. Given the role and mandate of UNW, it is to be expected that it has been instrumental in helping to bring about this important gender-responsive development in West Bank state-building. However, a number of Key PA Informants pointed to the relative invisibility of UNW as compared to its UN sister agencies and other IDAs. UNW personnel say

that they have deliberately adopted a low profile owing to the acute vulnerability of their key primary beneficiary target groups. In the absence of efforts to engage CSO and WRO partners directly in policy influencing under the programme, this means that advocacy work has primarily been undertaken largely by the Implementing Agency itself and largely behind closed doors. Other than through its support of the Observatory which was not originally conceived of as a policy influencing entity, the programme has not directly supported (through funds or other means) organisations within civil society that are advocating for changes in policy and law.

### 3.3 Efficiency

This subsection of the report considers the extent to which the programme activities and outputs have been in line with plans or not and at changes or delays in programme implementation and the explanation for this. It also examines the extent to which resources (human, financial administrative, time) have been efficiently utilised to achieve the expected results.

In terms of the **alignment of programme activities and outputs to plans**, a number of changes to programme plans are reflected in revisions made to the programme Logframe (original 2010 version and revised September 2014 Logframes compared). This might indicate programme responsiveness to changes in the local context. However, it also suggests some weaknesses in Logframe design/ development as well as in the M&E systems used to capture changed plans.

The summary programme timelines (at above mentioned **Annex F**) suggest that there have been a number of **delays in programme implementation or time lags between the implementation of different activities towards particular outputs** and this is robustly triangulated by primary evidence collected during the fieldwork. The delays and time lags are explained by a number of factors including: the time heavy nature of participatory approaches used (e.g. in developing the FPU normative framework); the different reporting requirements of the various agencies and institutions involved; staff turnover and shortages within UNW; and lengthy processes of negotiation over “no cost extensions”. As a result, whilst some time lags and delays have been largely unavoidable, and are not always by definition bad, the Evaluation Team found that the communication to partners and project staff of their reasons has been lacking. In addition, in some cases closer, on-going M&E and stronger contingency planning would have reduced the negative fall-out that the time lags and delays have inevitably created among the stakeholder community.


#### 3.3.1 Utilisation & combination of resources for achievement of results

A number of Key Informants pointed to the expertise, knowledge and skills of the UNW programme Management Team, and particular individuals within this. UNW believe that the decision to rely on in-house capacity has ensured contributions of technical assistance for enhanced programme efficiency by the management team.

Nevertheless, Key Informants and the programme reports evidence that over the programme’s life-span UNW has taken on an increasingly proactive and direct programme implementation role in respect to a number of the outputs, including the Justice Observatory. At the same time UNW report that they have faced a number of human resource issues over the life span of the programme, in particular, the turnover of experienced staff and to an overall shortage of programme staff. Taken together these two factors have meant that: a) programme management arrangements have been complex; and b) heavy reliance has been placed on the input of international and local consultants to ensure a number of specific deliverables (including, for example, the development of the FPU normative framework and the design and delivery of training and sensitisation for different S&J service providers).

The range of different programme implementation arrangements is depicted in the Diagram below.

**Diagram 5: Programme implementation arrangements**



For each of three major programme strands (Justice Observatory, PBA VAW specialist lawyers, and the CRC female inmates) UNW has employed a Project Coordinator. In addition, the three observatory monitors are directly contracted and paid by UNW; the CRC Social Workers and Trainers have been sub-contracted through the WLF and then the PCC; and the VAW specialist lawyers are contracted by the PBA. In considering which of the above models has worked well and least well, the Evaluation Team found the sense of ownership and buy in to the programme was strongest among the PBA lawyers and weakest in the case of the CRC Social Workers. However, this difference may reflect the institutional capacity of the local partner as well as their level of engagement in the programme.

From the perspective of financial efficiency, the more direct the relationship of project staff is with the Implementing Agency, the heavier the day to day management and administration inevitably must be.

### 3.4 Impact

In terms of the extent to which and how the programme has contributed (or not) to ensuring that women and girls in the West Bank access PA provided S&J services (i.e. the desired impact), it is still early days yet to judge. However, to the extent possible the analysis below considers the programmes contribution to movements towards this.

The over-riding aim of the criminal justice system in any country is to ensure those found guilty of perpetrating criminal offences, including VAWG, are prosecuted and punished. Challenging impunity is seen to have a demonstration effect in that it acts as a deterrent to other members of the society. A first step in the formal justice chain is the reporting of an offence to the police and the end point of the criminal justice continuum is the conviction or acquittal of the alleged perpetrator. The practice of VAWG survivors seeking compensation for the violence they have been subject to through the civil courts is not well established in the West Bank, but is one that is being explored through “test cases” by the VAWG specialist PBA lawyers.

#### 1) Reporting VAWG


According to the available data there are now a significant number of cases registered by the FJPU with some variation across Governorates. And the number of women and girls reporting VAW to them has increased. There is also evidence of increased confidence in the formal justice system as a whole as symbolised by public perceptions of the courts.

The map, **Diagram 4** below, portrays the number of cases registered with FJPU in 2013 across the West Bank. As can be seen, Nablus, Hebron, Jenin are the Governorates with most registered cases in 2013. This corresponds roughly to the distribution and number of calls made to the telephone helpline run by SAWA. Most phone calls concerning commercial exploitation, problems with family relationships, and violence and abuse in 2013 were received from

callers in Hebron, Ramallah and Al Beirah, and Jenin, with Nablus being fourth. Bearing in mind differences in population size, it is important to stress that the figures concerning FJPU registered cases do not necessarily mean that there are more *incidents* of VAWG in some Governorates than others. Rather they evidence that there is more reporting of incidents to FJPU in some Governorates than in others. The variation in numbers might also be a result of the capacity the different FJPU teams have to document cases. Some were found to be more verbally orientated than others.

The perception survey does not distinguish the FJPU from the police in general. Hence, it is not possible to ascertain if women and girls are more likely or not to report VAWG to an FJPU than to a police station. In addition, it is important to emphasise that it is not possible to ascertain the number of VAWG reports that were made to police stations before the establishment of FJPU in the absence of broader crime statistics which show the numbers of VAWG cases reported to the police and registered under criminal offences which are defined as VAW (see FPU SOPs).

**Diagram 6: Number of Police Stations and Cases Registered at FJPU in 2013, West Bank**






Data sources: FPU Statistics – General Police Directorate. Number of police stations – UNDP Institutions Survey 2014. Please note, that no FPU statistics for Jerusalem are available before 2014.<sup>79</sup>


### Statistical trends in reporting to the FPJU

The graphs below show the trends of total numbers of reported cases for each FPU between 2012 and 2014 (with the exception of Jerusalem FJPU which was only recently established and has data only since 2014).

**Figure 3: Number of total cases registered in FPUs between 2012-2014**



**Figure 4: Number of comparable cases registered in FPUs between 2012-2014**



As illustrated by the above graphs, the total number of cases registered increases over time for almost all FJPU. This holds true when comparing the total number of registered cases in the FJPU (regardless of case types), or only case types that are recorded in all years.<sup>80</sup> Of course, there are different ways of explaining these increases in numbers: a) increase in incident numbers, b) increase in awareness by the population, c) increase in trust levels by the population, d) increased capacity of FJPU to take on and register cases, or e) a combination of these factors. As such, these data

<sup>79</sup> Map source: Relief web at: [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B27EA20E099D8E9F8525704A006DE879-ocha\\_REF\\_westbank\\_opt220705.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/B27EA20E099D8E9F8525704A006DE879-ocha_REF_westbank_opt220705.pdf)

<sup>80</sup> The second option avoids an increase in numbers by adding cases that might not have been handled in earlier years.

does not provide 'evidence' for increased trust levels in formal S&J institutions as a reason for increased reporting levels. However, they could be an indication that qualitative assessments and narratives about increased trust might not be wrong.

## 2) Perceptions concerning "going to court"

At the other end of the formal justice system, in the courts, some changes are also apparent. In 2011, 66.1% and 65.5 % of all women and men interviewed for the Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions Survey indicated they would "go to the courts to solve a dispute". The share amongst individuals that had used S&J institutions in the 12 months preceding the survey was 68.6 % amongst women and 61 % amongst men. In 2012,<sup>81</sup> the share of women and men who had contact with S&J institutions and indicated that they would "go to courts or formal justice if they had conflicts or disputes in the future" was 69.4 % and 65.4 %, respectively. This increase is very small and might be related to the different wording of the question. However, looking at reasons given for using courts, it seems as if S&J institutions did manage to significantly improve their services and image during the time between the two surveys.

Reasons stated by respondents who said they **would use** courts in 2011 and 2012 show that women and men who had contact with the justice system in 2012 much more often agreed that they saw the formal court as a place where they could get justice, as an institution that can prevent violence, and as an institution that is more just and legitimate than women and men perceived in 2011. This is depicted in Figures 1 and 2 at **Annex K**. However, women (and men) are still suspicious of courts. In 2012, 45.7 % of men and 28.8 % of women who stated that they **would not use** the courts or formal justice system said they do not trust the courts, and 30 % of men and 17.8 % of women thought the whole formal justice sector was corrupt. This is an increase from 2011, when 28.3 % of men and 17.8 % of women who would not want to use the courts or formal justice system stated a lack of trust, and 13.3 and 8.4 % judged the whole formal justice sector to be corrupt. Again, this might be at least partially down to question wording. Yet, other explanations are also possible. For example, people are very wary of the system and only change their opinions if they have good experiences. But extremely suspicious people or those very opposed to the system might not use it and can thus not have a good experience, thus making a polarisation of opinions possible. As Graph 3 also at **Annex K** shows, however, comparing trust levels between women who had and had not contact to the S&J system in both 2011 and 2012 does not show any large differences. Thus, it is possible that factors other than the performance of S&J institutions have affected the overall trust given to them. This seems rather likely, given that satisfaction levels have slightly increased between the two surveys, particularly with respect to VAW cases (see Figure 5 below).

## 3) Women's satisfaction with S&J services


The public perception survey 2012 shows that levels of satisfaction with S&J services regarding VAW cases were higher amongst women that had been in contact with S&J services than those that had not – clearly an indication of an improvement in services as compared to the previous survey, where women in contact with legal systems were less satisfied. On a scale from 1 – 4, the average satisfaction level in 2011 was 2.48 and increased to 2.58 in 2012 (see Figure 5 below).

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<sup>81</sup> The second round of the public perceptions survey took place in 2012. 8,705 men and women were interviewed for this survey in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza together. In the West Bank, for which all data is shown, 2,480 men and 2,495 women responded.



**Figure 5: Satisfaction levels of women with services dependant on whether they had contact with S&J services during the last 12 months preceding the survey, 2012**



Source: UNDP Public Perceptions of Palestinian Justice and Security Institutions Survey data 2012.

Note: Satisfaction Levels range from 1 = extremely unsatisfied to 4 = extremely satisfied, shown numbers are averages over all women respondents in 2011 in the West Bank

In the absence of data tracing cases through the S&J system it is not possible to assess the underlying ToC assumption that by addressing the capacity gaps of local level frontline S&J providers the trajectory of VAW cases through the justice system is becoming smoother and/or faster (assumption 3). However, the Observatory monitors have some pretty clear ideas about what key factors influence the pathway of a VAWG case or client through the S&J system as they identified during the Roundtable Conversation (see summary at **Annex L**). Additional primary data from the field research suggests that a key factor influencing the speed with which VAW cases travel through the formal justice system is the complex and outdated system of laws existing in the West Bank.

It is clear from the above that the programme has contributed to efforts to enhance women and girls access to PA/state provided S&J services in the West Bank. The precise level of the contributions made cannot be apportioned given that other actors (PA institutions, IDAs, and CSOs) have also played important roles. In particular it must be recognised that a range of CSOs and WRO provide information about the referral system, the relevant law and legal processes; assist with alternative dispute resolution; provide advice on legal issues; and refer cases through the national referral system. With respect to criminal cases, CSOs (according to FJPU officers interviewed) assist at police stations, prisons and courts by providing victims and, indeed, defendants with information about their rights and the operation of formal procedures. They are facilitating the tracing of sureties for bail; the tracing of parents and guardians of juveniles; and notifying witnesses of upcoming trial dates.

### 3.5 Coherence

The section of the report briefly looks at the extent to which and how the programme is: a) responsive to the local context; b) aligned with PA development priorities; and c) has considered and built relationships with other relevant programmes.

#### 3.5.1 Responsiveness of the programme to the local context

Overall and at the macro strategic level the programme has been responsive to the local context and significant changes in this. Two examples are of particular relevance.

- 1) Most recently, the programme has responded to the perceived PA priority of ensuring the protection of women and girl victims of serious VAWG offences and those at risk of being targeted following, for example, their access to and report of VAWG to the police. A key function of the SCR Mechanism is to help combat and prevent “femicide” as well as to facilitate case monitoring and lesson learning. It has been fully supported by UNW and its process of development is described by one Key Informant as being “a major output for the S&J programme in which the UNW consultant played a major role”. Hosted by a Technical Committee under the MoWA National Committee for Combatting VAW, the SCR Mechanism was approved in late 2013. Given the upwards trend in the killing of women (known as “honour killings” or “femicide”) over 2011-2013 this intervention is a timely

intervention that illustrates programme responsiveness to evidence about the local context.<sup>82</sup> With support from the programme, at the time of writing, MoWA is undertaking a review of the performance of all relevant bodies and agencies regarding individual cases of “Femicide” and is compiling a summary of lessons learnt including recommendations for future actions. The report is expected to be completed at the end of March 2015. Together with the Technical Committee, an intervention plan will be developed based on the review results and will include capacity building, training, interagency co-ordination. Responsibility for monitoring the SCR Mechanism lies with the MoWA SCR Technical Committee. Although the SCR mechanism is described as “a major achievement which places Palestine at the forefront of the Arab world” it must be considered as work in progress since it has not been in operation long enough to trigger marked change.

- 2) Second, as mentioned elsewhere in the report, over the course of 2014 the PCP took the major decision to merge the FPU with the Juvenile Units to become the FJPU. The merger included the marriage of all resources (office premises and furniture, vehicles, computer equipment etc.), personnel and most importantly the merger of the two sets of case-loads and the two sets of clients. The revised Logframe (September 2014) specifies that the programme will respond to this merger during the last months of the DFID funding through support to the harmonisation process now underway. This process will include the amendment of systems and procedures to mainstream juvenile and children’s issues into the FPU normative framework and include unifying the training provided to all FJPU personnel.

The evaluation team was informed that the Juvenile Unit has already drafted SOPs to guide police work with children in conflict with the law. However, these have yet to be integrated into or harmonised with the already endorsed FPU SOPs. Multi-agency discussions are reported to have taken place between the FJPU central administration leadership and various IDAs, including UNW, UNDP and UNICEF. The experience that UNW has gained through working with others, in particular EUPOL COPPs, on the development of the FPU SOPs will be invaluable in the development of the integrated normative framework, particularly if cognisance is taken of the key learning gained from this.

Responding to the merger is an excellent example of the programme’s capacity and the willingness of UNW as Implementing Agency to adapt and respond positively to a major change in the local operating environment.

### **3.5.2 Alignment of the programme with PNA development priorities**

One of the most significant findings of the evaluation is the depth and breadth of the sense of ownership in the programme displayed by senior decision-makers, particularly within the PCP. Other institutions such as the AGO Gender Unit and PBA have also clearly bought into improving the access of vulnerable women and girls to S&J services through increasing VAW specialisation. The sense of PNA ownership is most strongly evidenced at senior levels of the FJPU central administration; and FJPU Directors and Deputy Directors at the frontline of service provision are committed to making the normative framework work. It is also apparent that the FJPU Central Administration is providing committed strategic leadership within the force to build the capacity of the FJPUs and extend the specialist services they provide to vulnerable women and children.

In addition, it is reported that UNW has made important contributions to legal reform, national policy development, and institutional strengthening to tackle VAWG within its overall portfolio largely in partnership with MoWA. However, it must be noted that some positive examples cited by Key Informants<sup>83</sup> fall outside the direct ambit of the programme under evaluation. This underlines the importance of viewing the current evaluation as being an evaluation of a specific programme and not of UNW as an institution which is implementing a number of separate, albeit related programmes or interventions.

### **3.6 Coordination**

Linked closely to the OECD/DAC principle of coherence is the principle of coordination. Elsewhere in this report examples have been cited of where UNW programme personnel have worked with other actors engaged in related programming. These include other IDA’s, in particular UNDP and EUPOL COPS, and of course the PA target institutions. The development of the FPU normative framework involved not simply working closely with the PCP but,

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<sup>82</sup> The PCBS survey: Women and Men in Palestine, Issues and Statistics, 2013, p 151 found that approximately 25 women were killed between early 2013 and September 2013 under the pretext of maintaining family honour. Statistics produced by the Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling (WCLAC) show that 4 women were killed in 2011, while the number of recorded killings increased to 13 women in 2012 and doubled to 27 in 2013.

<sup>83</sup> The revision of the criminal penal code and drafting of amendments to focus on VAW; and the creation of Technical Committees under MoWA are examples.

as illustrated above, extended to engaging other stakeholders across the S&J sector. More recently, work on the SCR Mechanism has demonstrated the commitment of UNW to driving multi- sectoral coordination.

There are three areas that warrant further attention going forward:

First, a striking feature of the programme is the comparative lack of attention it has given to coordination with actors on the demand side of the S&J system and has become increasingly supply driven over its short life span. Initially, for example, it relied on CSO partners to design and deliver activities such as training. A number of CSO activist and academic Key Informants point to the trend over time of UNW moving away from partnership styles of working with civil society towards increasing assumption of direct programme implementation. Regardless of the reasons for this, there is a critical need for more coordination and cross sharing of learning and information with CSOs, especially WROs.

Second, enhanced coordination between the Police and MoSA social workers, and indeed health professionals who play an essential role not only in the conduct of forensic medical examinations necessary for prosecution but in assuring the health of VAW victims, would strengthen the FJPU contribution to services that are accountable and responsive to the needs of vulnerable women and girls. However, presently there are serious shortages of Social Workers and an even greater lack of Probation Officers to manage cases involving children in conflict with the law. Although it is recognised that support to the MoSA or MOH may not be central priorities for an S&J programme, it is important to ensure coordination and coherence as illustrated by the developing SCR Mechanism.

Third, given the merger of specialist FPU police services with juvenile services, it is essential that coordination and partnership working between UNW and UNICEF is strengthened. Each agency has a huge amount of accumulated institutional and programme learning and information to share. However, such sharing calls for increased investment in knowledge management and M&E systems which are designed to capture evidence to demonstrate what has worked well and what has worked less well in terms of the achievement of PNA provided S&J services that are truly accountable and responsive to vulnerable women and girls living with violence across the West Bank.

### 3.7 Sustainability

The extent to which and how the observed changes are likely to endure post programme are assessed in this section of the report. In particular, the factors that need to be in place for the benefits to be sustained are assessed.

1) The long term sustainability of **specialist, VAWG centred police services** is potentially constrained by four factors.

First, is the continuing lack of financial resources and physical infrastructure which is reported by Key Informants at FJPU Central Administration and Governorate levels. There is some evidence to suggest that this is being driven in part by the “model” of FJPU facilities demonstrated at the Jericho Police Training Academy that falls far short of the facilities most FJPUs enjoy on the ground. In addition, there is a sense among some FJPU officers of being set up to fail because implementation of the SOPs, for example, demands a confidential interview room for clients and the Unit simply does not have the physical space to allow this.

As emphasised above, a range of IDAs are already supporting these institutions with investments in infrastructure, institutional strengthening and capacity development. Plans are underway to provide additional support such as investment in the development of a FJPU data base and to enhance the development of multi-sectoral services towards a “one stop shop” model. However, there is a risk of growing dependence on international aid to sustain the services.

Second, a key imperative moving forward will be to ensure that the benefits contributed by the programme to developing specialist police units is maintained since the Units must now also meet the needs of children in conflict with the law and child victims of violence.

Third, current policy dictates that if a VAWG case is reported to a police station/ post with no FJPU, it MUST be referred to an FJPU. For example, if a woman reports to a police station in a remote area and wants to file a domestic violence case she is advised to go to the nearest FJPU or if the case is serious she will be accompanied by a police woman with a police vehicle to that FJPU. In police stations/ posts without a FJPU, officers are not permitted to open a case file or register the case. The risk is that potential clients/ beneficiaries will simply slip through the net because they are unable or unwilling, except in extreme cases, to in effect report VAWG twice. A mechanism is needed to keep track of women and girls who are referred on to an FJPU by the police. In order to ensure that specialist services are able to meet needs it will be important to consider how best to mainstream VAWG across the PCP.

Fourth, the sustainability of VAWG specialised police units will be influenced by any further deterioration in the overall security situation, increased restrictions to freedom of movements, and violence perpetrated by Israeli settlers. The growth in the militarisation of police services to meet the worsening tensions of occupation would severely undermine the achievements that have been made to date.

- 2) **Sustainability of continued focus on supply side institutions:** As emphasised above, the programme has to date been highly supply driven. This does not necessarily mean that either DFID's or UNW's portfolios of support are such. Indeed both institutions are known to support other programmes of work that are demand driven and involve working with CSOs and other non-state partners. Key questions here are: a) to what extent are these different portfolio elements joined up and harmonised with each other? And perhaps more significantly b) to what extent is the apparent lack of balance in the focus on supply and demand a product of the way in which programmes are divided between different funding agencies or Implementing Partners? These questions warrant further scrutiny in the transition to an access to S&J programme for women and girls under the umbrella of the UNDP/ UNW Joint Programme.

CSOs are currently playing key roles in the provision of support and other services to VAW survivors and those at risk, through institutions such as shelters as well as hotlines/ helplines; training; and more. A number of these CSOs are highly VAWG specialised and together with more technical legal experts have important contributions to make. In addition, they have critically important day-to-day, frontline contact with direct beneficiaries.

- 3) **Sustainability of focus on PA state S&J institutions and services:** In light of the preference communities show for traditional, non-formal justice mechanisms over the formal criminal justice system and the societal drive for reconciliatory justice, it is imperative that the programme moving forward considers how best to work with non-formal justice providers. Included here are both existing traditional justice providers and third sector providers of legal aid and ADR services.
- 4) **Sustainability of political will and legal framework:** Thus far the PNA has shown promising signs that it recognises the critical importance of combating VAWG and increasing women and girls access to S&J services. However, this commitment will be judged on whether the draft Family Bill and the draft Domestic Violence Bill are passed, how quickly legal aid institutions are established, and the amount of state resources provided for legal aid that women and girls can access. This, and other new legislation represents an attempt by the PNA and civil society to link top-down approaches to access to S&J with a bottom up focus on women and girls' needs. It is critical not only for the continuation of efforts to increase access to justice, but also in order to improve the quality and basic minimum standards of S&J services. A key driver militating against women and girls reporting incidents of sexual and domestic violence, in addition to social stigma, lack of legal rights awareness and family pressure, is the fact that reporting often results in divorce or abandonment of the woman and this means that she loses her rights over her children.
- 5) **Sustainability of capacity development centred on training and sensitisation:** A significant number of Key Informants within the PNA S&J sector pointed to the heavy reliance which exists currently on IDA funds and experts for the design and delivery of training. One said "we are 100% dependent on IDAs for training". Another emphasised that "local experts/ judges/ academics will only share their knowledge if they are paid by a donor". Yet another was of the opinion that "the principle is deficient and immoral- we depend on buying knowledge and are fully dependent on international aid". For longer term sustainability alternative models such as Trainer of Trainer (ToT) programmes were suggested in order to build local capacity. More specifically, lawyers emphasised the need for a more comprehensive approach to capacity building targeting lawyers, including importantly the development of a Continuing Professional Education (CPE) programme by the PBA.
- 6) **Sustainability of existing programme management and implementation arrangements:** Currently the programme relies heavily on UNW contracted Project staff to implement activities. In the medium to longer term, it will be important to consider more sustainable arrangements.
- 7) **Sustainability of a targeted approach mainstreaming or targeted approach:** The 2010 scoping study advocated a two-pronged approach to VAW specialisation within the police. On the one hand, it envisaged increasing VAW specialisation across the PCP (mainstreaming or integrating VAW specialisation); and on the other hand, the provision of specialist VAW training to FPU officers (targeted support for VAW specialisation). To date the approach adopted by the programme has been to target support to the establishment of a West Bank wide network of FPU/ FJPUs. This approach is not necessarily misplaced. However, it is recommended going forward that its relative costs and benefits are closely monitored; and that the options for increased mainstreaming or

integration are explored. The evidence from this evaluation concerning the turnover of FJPU personnel is contradictory and warrants further scrutiny since it will be an important factor to consider when reviewing mainstreaming versus targeted approaches and the relative future emphasis given to institutional strengthening versus individual training or capacity development.

Similarly, at the explicit request of the AGO the programme has supported the development of specialist VAW capacities among a carefully selected group of Public Prosecutors rather than opting for a broader based mainstreaming approach of working with all Public Prosecutors to increase their basic understanding of VAW case management. The benefits of this approach in terms of case outcomes for clients demand careful monitoring. In the case of the judiciary there has been a clear change in programme approach from an emphasis on the creation of “Special Courts” or court sessions to hear VAW cases to one designed to enhance the gender responsiveness and understanding of VAW by individual Judges. Again questions of weighting and balance warrant “outing” in dialogue with senior level decision-makers within the HJC and individual members of the judiciary.

## 4. Learning & recommendations

### 4.1 Relevance

Any programme design that addresses women’s access to S&J needs to be contextually-specific and contextually relevant, especially given the marked cultural diversity within Palestinian society and the unpredictable and worsening conditions imposed by the Israeli military occupation. No ready-made formula exists as to how to empower women and girls to assert their rights and act as agents of sustainable social change. However, it is important to consider: a) best entry points to empower women to use the legal system to advance their rights; b) forums where women’s core concerns are dealt with; c) opportunities and contextual obstacles for system reform through legal empowerment; and d) how best to challenge deeply entrenched gender stereotypes, vested interests in the status quo, and power inequities.

The evidence from this evaluation highlights some key areas of learning from which the Evaluation Team makes some practical recommendations.

#### 1) Male engagement and working with men and boys

A key **learning point** is that interventions to engage men and boys in tackling VAWG have not been integrated into the programme under evaluation, from design through implementation. This is significant because male engagement can: a) play an important role in changing the ideas, values and beliefs which underpin and serve to perpetuate VAWG; b) influence the decisions and choices VAWG survivors make about whether or not to access S&J services by reporting the violence they have been subject to and pursuing the prosecution of its perpetrators; c) influence the behaviour and decision-making of men who are engaged in the provision of S&J services and affect the ways in which they manage clients and VAWG case files; and d) in a situation of ongoing conflict, enable men and boys to reflect on the ways in which public violence can become internalised, and distort interpersonal dynamics.

It is **recommended** that the access to S&J for women and girls components of any future programme integrate strategies to ensure male engagement and new approaches to working with men and boys to address VAWG. In particular, it is recommended that the Implementing Agencies of the future programme investigate further (through evidence based research) approaches that have been used within the S&J sector in other countries (especially within MENA) with reported success. Examples include using male engagement methodologies for training police officers as well as working with male Traditional, Tribal (and other Opinion, in particular religious, Leaders) at central and decentralised levels to enable them to serve as role models or change agents in tackling VAWG. Excellent examples of such work exist in Jordan and Lebanon through work being done with religious leaders within the MENA region by ABAAD (Resource Centre for Gender equality) in Lebanon;<sup>84</sup> and (Arab Women’s Organisation of Jordan) AWO<sup>85</sup> in Jordan. These strategies have been implemented in communities comparable enough to the OPT to have real value as comparisons. Work with community Opinion Leaders will be particularly important in addressing complaint withdrawal and in efforts to define more precisely in practice which VAWG cases are amenable to ADR and which must go to criminal prosecution.

#### 2) Public legal education and awareness raising

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<sup>84</sup> See: [http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our\\_work\\_sub&s=policy\\_development&w=36](http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our_work_sub&s=policy_development&w=36) (accessed February 2015)

<sup>85</sup> See: <http://english.arabwomenorg.org/> (accessed February 2015)

From a **learning** perspective, the contribution the programme has made to the national media campaign to address VAWG and women and girls' access to S&J services would benefit from closer scrutiny and review. Given the emphasis given to legal empowerment under the UNDP/UNW Joint Programme, it will be particularly important to consider how legal education on women's rights and entitlements can be fully integrated or mainstreamed into this Legal empowerment initiative.

It is **recommended** that the specific learning about what worked well and less well in the media campaign under the current programme is captured and carefully reflected on with the women's National Coalition so that it can feed into any future campaigns on legal rights and the access of women and girls to S&J services.

## 4.2 Effectiveness

### 1) Taking forward the concept and practice of merged FJPU

**Learning:** There are a number of real challenges associated with the merger of the FPU and Juvenile Units, but this process represents an opportunity to build on learning from what has worked well and less well in developing a normative framework and related capacity development and awareness raising interventions for the FPU. Such learning can be applied to the process of harmonising and developing a unified normative framework, including FJPU standard operating procedures (SOPs). In order to minimise the risks of losing the momentum created, a priority will be to ensure that the process of harmonising systems and procedures is a rapid, albeit consultative and participatory, one. This will mean deciding who should be involved and how at each stage of the process. For example, maximum participation by the FJPU officers at Governorate level will be required in order to harmonise the content and possibly the format, and to review a final draft of any document generated, but is possibly less necessary for the actual drafting process itself which could be undertaken by a smaller technical group.

The following **recommendations** are made:

- f) When undertaking revisions to the FPU normative framework so as to include SOPs for juveniles and children in conflict with the law,<sup>86</sup> the associated forms should be reviewed and prioritised so as to relate more closely to "typical" caseloads of the different FJPUs at Governorate level.
- g) The review and development of harmonised procedures should be achieved through a vehicle such as Roundtable Conversations convened by the FJPU Central Administration with the FJPU officers themselves so that they can exchange learning from the frontline; discuss where revisions and guidance are most needed; and decide on how and by whom the revisions should be made and the necessary accompanying guidance developed. The process of harmonisation should not require the same level of external expert input as was necessary for to develop the innovative first round of FPU procedures.
- h) The FJPU SOPs should be reproduced and printed in a form which allows them to be more easily and regularly amended and updated by the PCP. For example, they could take the form of a simple policy document (numbered, dated and stamped by the PCP) with related guidance provided in a loose leaf folder which can be modified as necessary.
- i) Future training or sensitisation should clarify in practical ways the roles and responsibilities of different actors at both the frontline of service delivery and leadership levels. In particular, the precise roles and responsibilities of the FJPUs and their relationships with other initiatives, police departments and the Governors' office which are not yet clear in practice need to be addressed head on.
- j) New approaches to facilitate cross learning and exchange between senior FJPU officers at central and Governorate levels on a regular basis should be given more prominence in the next phase of the programme. In addition, approaches to building capacities and capabilities which centre on cross-learning and experience sharing have much to offer. For example, funding could be provided for quarterly Roundtable Conversations convened by the FJPU Central Administration to enable FJPU officers to exchange learning, expertise and experience and discuss amongst themselves what is working well and less well in practice. This would also provide a much needed space for officers under pressure to breathe more freely.

### 2) Police SOPs training

**Learning:** A comprehensive SOPs training programme has been designed but has not yet been implemented.

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<sup>86</sup> Here the needs of children who have been arrested by the Israeli's largely for political reasons will need to be considered since these differ from the needs of children who have broken the law.



It is **strongly recommended** that once the training package has been modified to reflect the FJPU merger, the training is delivered through the Jericho Police Training Academy as an integral part of its police training curriculum. All new police officers joining the force should receive basic training in the FJPU SOPs; and new and existing officers in the FJPUs should participate in a more comprehensive programme. It is essential for all officers to receive an introduction since they may at any time be placed within an FJPU or be in a position where a VAWG case is reported to them in post at a station without an FJPU. It is further **recommended** that an introduction to the SOPs forms part of a routine PCP induction programme for ALL officers.

### 3) Compliance, sanctions and rewards

**Learning:** The FJPU Central Administration is exploring how best to ensure compliance with the SOPs through regular monitoring visits to the Units; and the use of appropriate sanctions and rewards to ensure high quality performance by officers. Assured funding for these visits is a priority.

It is **recommended** that the development of internal staff performance monitoring systems and process is supported (through funds and other modalities as requested by the Central Administration) with a linked system of sanctions and rewards for individual officer performance. This should build on existing examples of good practice displayed at Unit level and mechanisms to monitor their effect on individual officer performance and morale should be incorporated into the broader monitoring system.

### 4) Monitoring how learning can feed into improved practice

**Learning:** As yet there is no system in place to monitor how investments in training, sensitisation and other learning (including, particularly, FJPU officers, VAW specialised Public Prosecutors, VAW specialised lawyers) translate into the improved performance of professionals in the S&J sector defined in terms of better case outcomes for clients.

It is **recommended** that such a monitoring system is built into and onto existing processes such as the monitoring visits conducted by the central FJPU administration to the individual Units; and the developing staff performance management systems within the public service and elsewhere (e.g. PBA). Support for such processes might be direct or delivered through partnership working with other agencies supporting, for example civil service reform processes. Such an initiative is likely to involve some policy-influencing and inter-agency communication which will need to be planned and budgeted for in terms of funds and human resource inputs.

### 5) Reconciliation, ADR and prosecution

**Learning:** FJPU officers' decision-making concerning precisely where the line MUST be drawn between cases that may be amenable to reconciliation and ADR at Unit level and those which must be sent for prosecution is not clearly understood.

It is **strongly recommended** that this issue is explored further as a priority through capturing learning from the FJPU officers about the issues they face in their local contexts, including challenges and achievements. In addition, and following on from this, the whole issue of how to effectively engage Tribal/Religious and other Opinion Leaders in any ADR or Unit level reconciliation warrants serious attention.

### 6) Complaint withdrawal

**Learning:** A significant (but not counted) number of clients who have reported to the FJPU withdraw their complaints from the formal justice system for a range of reasons that have not been fully explored.

It is **recommended** that moving forward a review is commissioned to assess precisely what factors influence women's decision to withdraw their complaints at different stages in the criminal justice process. Good practice examples are found in the work being done with religious leaders within the MENA region by ABAAD (Resource Centre for Gender equality) in Lebanon;<sup>87</sup> and (Arab Women's Organisation of Jordan) AWO<sup>88</sup> in Jordan.

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<sup>87</sup> See: [http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our\\_work\\_sub&s=policy\\_development&w=36](http://www.abaadmena.org/index.php?p=our_work_sub&s=policy_development&w=36) (accessed February 2015)

<sup>88</sup> See: <http://english.arabwomenorg.org/> (accessed February 2015)



## 7) Client feedback on S&J services received

**Learning:** enthusiasm exists within the Central FJPU Administration to explore further best systems for encouraging, collecting and monitoring feed-back from FJPU clients.

It is **recommended** that the Central FJPU Administration is supported to introduce a “pilot” client feed-back initiative. Such support should include the identification and sharing of good practice examples from other countries, such as the Victims Charter developed by the Lebanese Police; and associated systems for obtaining feedback from victims of crime. In developing client feed-back mechanisms, it is further **recommended** that the approach centres on the benefits of client feedback for learning and hence improved service planning and performance. As such it should be clearly distinguished from a formal “complaints” system and emphasise the opening up of opportunities for clients to raise any “concerns” they have with the services they have received or are receiving from the Service Provider and to share what they have found most useful or positive in the knowledge that they do so in full confidentiality and anonymity.

## 8) Support to women inmates of CRCs

**Learning:** The CRC programme component of work to support women inmates is complex in terms of the multiple needs it has attempted to address in a highly sensitive operating environment. There are two main recommendations here:

First, support to women inmates should focus more explicitly on: a) securing high quality legal advice and representation for those who choose this option; b) working with the CRCD to ensure the access of legal professionals and ICHR Observatory monitors to women inmates; and c) developing reintegration strategies for ex-offenders, which is especially important given the small size of the population in the OPT, tight-knit communities and high levels of interpersonal surveillance and social control, and the stigma (or worse, in terms of retribution) attached to women who come into contact with the law.

Second, further capacity development strengthening should be provided to the ICHR Observatory monitors. This need not necessarily only comprise training and individual skills development but might include, for example, learning exchanges or secondments or mentoring visits to similar Justice Observatories (with a focus on women and girls or a broader access to S&J mandate) within MENA and possibly further afield. The aim would be to enable the Observatory Monitors to undertake direct policy influencing work based on their findings and/or to produce/ package their findings in such a way that other policy-influencers and advocates can use them.

## 9) Strengthening the capacities of Public Prosecutors working on VAWG cases

**Learning:** A solid foundation has been built through the assignment and orientation of Specialist Public Prosecutors in the AGO to work on VAW cases.

Moving forward it is **recommended** that an internal (AGO) system is developed to enable the Gender Unit to: a) monitor the performance of the newly specialised team; b) assess their on-going needs for learning and capacity strengthening; and c) keep under review how they are managing cases.

## 10) Approaches to capacity development with S&J actors

**Learning:** To date the programme has focused on the design and delivery of formal training and sensitisation sessions comprising short workshops.

Moving forward it is **recommended** that:

First, the approach to capacity development is broadened to include greater emphasis on: a) self-directed learning supported by skilled facilitators; b) possible Training of Trainers (ToT) pilots (for example with the PBA who have specifically recommended this approach); c) learning and experience exchanges through Roundtable Conversations and Learning Forums/ Communities of Practice of already skilled and practiced S&J professionals; d) carefully structured exchanges/ mentoring with professional counterparts elsewhere within the OPT, MENA and possibly further afield; e) exploration of opportunities for e-learning (although this idea is new and does not appear to have much support from the Key Informants the Evaluation Team discussed this with); f) the design and delivery of a professional PCP coaching and mentoring system.

Second, to the extent possible the design and delivery of any capacity development initiatives should be a locally owned and adopt a participatory process centering on the use of local resources of knowledge, experience and skills, some of which have been built by interventions supported by this programme (see **Annex N**).

Third, all capacity development initiatives must be subject to rigorous M&E so that learning and evidence can be captured about what works well and less well with particular groups of S&J professionals- it is unlikely that a “one suit fits all” approach will be the most effective. Particular attention needs to be given to: a) explaining any selection processes to applicants clearly; b) providing feedback on applications to all candidates who put themselves forward for training or other forms of capacity development; and c) ensuring that participants complete evaluation forms either at regular intervals, in an on-going process, or at the end point of an event/ programme; and that the findings of these evaluator inputs are anonymously summarised and Annexed to reports of training and other events together with full lists of participants.

## 4.2 Efficiency

**Learning:** There has been a mismatch between the size, and possibly levels of seniority, of the UNW staff body and the enormity of the challenges it has had to confront. Added to this has been the weight imposed by the level of direct programme implementation it has undertaken.

It is **recommended** that in going forward emphasis is placed on identifying local Implementing Partners and where necessary providing support to strengthen their institutional and other capacities to assume full management responsibility for any project staff. This would obviate, for example, the need to directly employ Project Coordinators for each programme component thereby reducing day to day administrative and management burdens.

**Learning:** The operating context in the West Bank is volatile and fluid as evidenced for example in the recently merged FJPU. This suggests need to reduce the emphasis that has been placed on the production and publication of high quality documents and reports.

It is **recommended** that the idea of “living documents” that are more amenable to frequent revision and updating are seriously considered in future. For example, the SOPs could be produced in the shape of a policy document which is updated at specified, regular intervals by the responsible PCP management board. They could then be reproduced in print form for inclusion in a “Toolkit” comprising key materials for the specialist Units. Again examples from the Lebanese police warrant further investigation possibly through a two-way exchange visit of officers with the FJPU.

## 4.3 Impact

**Learning:** The existence of a **robust legal framework is an essential tool for advancing women’s rights and their access to justice**. It is an essential building block towards meaningful access to justice for VAWG survivors and provides a basis that dictates S&J service provider actions. Legal uncertainty creates a myriad of additional challenges. It. When a society is governed by the rule of law, with an accessible and just legal system, women can thrive, contribute to the system and improve it for future generations. The rule of law requires that laws are free from bias and discrimination and are consistent with international human rights norms and standards and are contextually relevant. As such, a robust and effective legal system based on the rule of law and derived from evolving jurisprudence is central to assisting women to become equal partners in decision-making and development. Just as a strong legal system can protect and open up opportunities for women, a justice system that is inaccessible or that contains discriminatory rules or practices can significantly impede the advancement of women’s rights and development of the family, community and society. UNDP has highlighted the danger of women being left vulnerable to becoming victims of criminal acts, such as fraud, theft, sexual or economic exploitation, violence, torture or murder, if they are not empowered to benefit from the full protection of the law.<sup>89</sup>

It is **recommended** that the PNA is encouraged and supported to recommence the process of unifying and harmonising legislation, to enact a penal code that would apply to all parts of the OPT. One Key Informant suggested that if the current, revised Jordanian code were simply adopted by the PNA this would represent a step forward. Debates concerning the relative costs and benefits of revising the penal code or introducing new, specific legislation to combat VAWG deserve further consideration, dialogue, discussion and debate. Examples from other countries need to

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<sup>89</sup>United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Programming for Justice: Access for All - A Practitioner’s Guide to a Human Rights-Based Approach to Access to Justice (2005) 3 (writing in reference to ‘the poor and disadvantaged’ generally).

be considered, first within MENA but also further afield since it is hard to find a model that has worked demonstrably well on all fronts.

### 4.3 Coherence

**Learning:** Overall and at the macro strategic level the programme has been responsive to the local context and significant changes in this as illustrated most recently in interventions to drive the SCR Mechanism forward and to support harmonisation of the FJPU normative framework.

It is **recommended** that robust knowledge management and M&E systems are put in place to capture evidence to capture learning and demonstrate what has worked well and what has worked less well, especially in multi-sectoral interventions such as the SCR Mechanism.

**Learning:** One of the most significant findings of the evaluation is the depth and breadth of the sense of ownership in the programme displayed by senior decision-makers, particularly within the PCP. This demonstrates its alignment with PNA development priorities towards more responsive and accountable police services for victims of VAW.

It is **recommended** that finding effective ways of engaging with the HJC and judiciary to ensure women and girl's access to the courts and the speedy trajectory of cases through the prosecution process is a priority for future programming. An option to consider might be support for the development of victim friendly court services and special measures to protect vulnerable witnesses.

**Learning:** In Palestinian society, informal (including religious) justice systems tend to substitute the statutory justice system, especially in Family law in certain situations, and areas. While the informal justice mechanism has an important function to fill, particularly in civil and family law-related cases, linkages between in the programme have been identified as weak which increases the risk of VAWG crimes and other crimes with women as their primary victims, all of which are inadequately addressed.

It is **recommended** that future programme design addresses the importance of the informal justice system including a strategy for how to incorporate it into programme activities.

### 4.4 Coordination

**Learning:** UNW programme staff have worked with other actors, including other IDA's, and of course the PNA target institutions, engaged in related programming on the supply side of the S&J system. The comparative lack of attention given to coordination with actors on the demand side within this programme is starkly apparent.

It is **strongly recommended** that avenues for enhanced coordination and cross sharing of learning and information with CSOs, especially WROs, are seriously explored within the UNW/UNDP Joint Programme itself, such as through the legal empowerment interventions. Within the UN family it is also imperative that UNW and UNICEF coordination is strengthened so that interventions towards increasing access to accountable and responsive S&J services fully encompass both women and girls.

**Learning:** In the OPT culture exerts an influence that can be as strong as or stronger than the rule-of-law. It is imperative therefore that the programme moving forward finds modalities for working with traditional, non-formal justice providers, strengthening decades-long efforts of the women's National Coalition and human rights organisations, as well as working with PNA institutions in the S&J sector.

It is **recommended** that the programme develops appropriate monitoring tools to identify precisely what opportunities to effect transformational change exist in the diverse local contexts within the Governorates. Opportunities should be explored within the formal and traditional justice system; and may involve targeting procedural or substantive aspects. Ultimately, the programme should aim to become more pragmatic, realistic and reflective of the local context especially in the rural areas, Area C and other deeply controlled areas near the separation barrier or illegal settlements, and in areas that are recognised as having a deeply conservative culture.

### 4.5 Sustainability

**Learning:** Any programme to promote the access of vulnerable women and girls to responsive and accountable S&J services and affect long lasting transformational change is likely to be more durable if it achieves an appropriate balance between support to state institutions and non-state actors, including CSOs and private institutions such as

universities. In addition, a key message of this evaluation is that by empowering women to claim their rights, women are better equipped to bring about change in their communities. When such initiatives are pursued in conjunction with legal and institutional reforms, progress will be faster and more sustainable.

The recommendations outlined above are made with a view to ensuring longer term sustainability of the gains made by building on the evidence from this evaluation of what has worked well and what has worked less well. The **core recommendation** of the team is that increased investment is needed in: a) the development of robust knowledge management and M&E systems in order to capture and evidence achievements made; and b) communications so that the evidenced achievements can both be used for policy influencing and to promote shared learning with other actors across the S&J system (state- non-state, formal and informal).

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