



Peterhead CCS Project

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Executive Summary

The purpose of this document is to provide a description of the proposed allocation of risk and reward between Shell and each of the counterparties to Tier 1 Sub-Contracts (meaning a direct subcontract to PCCS Limited) and Tier 2 Sub-Contracts (meaning a sub-contract of the EPC Contractor) applicable to the Project Phase.

The proposed allocation of risk and reward described in this document reflects the negotiations with the Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) Contractors, SSE and Cansolv, and not executed Agreements.

This report describes:

- Pricing and payment structures. (Including Cost Reimbursement Model).
- Liabilities and Indemnities.
- Warranties.
- Insurance.
- Other key terms that directly impact the allocation of risk and reward for the PCCS project.

The summary will provide an insight into what future Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Developers may need to bear in terms of Project Risk as a function of the risk and reward envelope that the Supply Chain is willing to adopt at the current time.



1. Introduction

1.1. Project Introduction

The Peterhead CCS Project aims to capture around one million tonnes of CO₂ per annum, over a period of up to 15 years, from an existing combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) located at SSE's Peterhead Power Station in Aberdeenshire, Scotland. This would be the world's first commercial-scale demonstration of (post combustion) CO₂ capture, transport and offshore geological storage from a gas-fired power station.

As the Goldeneye gas-condensate field has ceased production, the production facility will be modified to allow the injection of dense phase CO₂ captured from the post-combustion gases of Peterhead Power Station into the depleted Goldeneye reservoir.

The CO₂ will be captured from the flue gas produced by one of the gas turbines at Peterhead Power Station (GT13) using amine-based technology provided by Cansolv (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shell). After capture the CO₂ will be routed to a compression facility, where it will be compressed, cooled and conditioned for water and oxygen removal to meet suitable transportation and storage specifications. The resulting dense phase CO₂ stream will be transported direct offshore to the wellhead platform via a new offshore pipeline which will tie in subsea to the existing Goldeneye pipeline.

Once at the platform the CO₂ will be injected into the Goldeneye CO₂ Store (a depleted hydrocarbon gas reservoir), more than 2 km under the seabed of the North Sea. The project layout is depicted in Figure 1-1 below:



Figure 1-1: Project Location



2. Content

This report is divided into 3 distinct sections;

- EPC Contracts;
- SSE Agreements; and
- Cansolv Agreements.

2.1. EPC Contracts

2.1.1. Tier 1: Shell’s own EPC Key-Subcontracts, Material Subcontracts, and other agreements

In general, Shell’s approach to apportionment of risk and liability is such that risks are allocated to the party best positioned to manage and control them. Shell considers that this provides clarity of risk ownership, and drives the right behaviour, with the aim of reducing the total cost of risk management and remediation. Such an approach is most likely to result in a Value for Money solution, and in Shell’s experience is generally accepted in the EPC Supply Chain.

Therefore Shell has been able to adopt in its EPC Contracts its preferred positions with respect to allocation of hazard type risks given that the Supply Chain is reasonably familiar with such terms and is used to contracting on this basis.

- Pricing and payment structures. (including Cost Reimbursement Model)

A description of the Pricing Mechanisms and payment structures has been provided in Key Knowledge Deliverable 11.146 - Project Phase Supply Chain Structure. [1]; and

- Liabilities and Indemnities

The risk allocation position between Shell and the EPC Contractor for injury/death to personnel, damage to property and pollution emanating from property damage in what Shell assesses to be either high risk or high value Contracts is based on Knock-for-Knock (“KfK”) or ‘mutual hold harmless’ arrangements meaning that each party indemnifies the other for emergent risks affecting them, rather than seek recovery from the other party, irrespective of cause. Consequential loss is mutually excluded from this arrangement

Except for pollution emanating from each party’s property, the liability for loss of or damage to property of third parties or injury/death to third parties is allocated based on each party accepting responsibility for its own negligence and/or fault.

In high value or high risk EPC Contracts, Shell will be responsible for its own Company Group (meaning Shell, its co-venturers, Affiliates, directors, officers and employees (including agency personnel) and the Contractor will be responsible for its own Contractor Group. The Company Group definition does not include Shell’s other Contractors. With respect to risk, Shell’s own internal risk assessment process resulted in only the Onshore EPC Contract, being categorised as high risk.

Table 2-1 shows the risk allocation position between Shell and Contractor groups

Table 2-1: Applicable Risks

Risk	Shell (Company)	Contractor
Injury to Company Group Staff	X	
Injury to Contractor Group staff		X



Risk	Shell (Company)	Contractor
Damage to Company Group property	X	
Damage to Contractor Group Property		X
Pollution from Company Group Assets	X	
Pollution from Contractor Group Assets		X
Company Group Consequential losses	X	
Contractor Group Consequential losses		X
Fines, Penalties Punitive Damages levied against Company Group	X	
Fines, Penalties Punitive Damages levied against Contractor Group		X
Third Party Liability	Negligence /Fault based	Negligence /Fault based

The responsibility for physical loss of or damage to Contractor Group or Company Group property is allocated to the party who has possession of the property which is typically linked to ownership. Generally speaking, Shell is not in care, custody and control of the Contractor Group’s own property therefore Shell considers that it is not in a position to be held financially responsible for this property.

The responsibility for physical loss of or damage to the Permanent Work (meaning the facilities to be constructed) and pollution emanating from the Permanent Work is excluded from the KfK risk allocation. The Contractor takes full responsibility for physical loss or physical damage to and pollution emanating from the Permanent Work (which is under the Contractor’s care, custody and control) until the point at which the Permanent Work is handed over to Shell as Developer.

However, the Contractor’s liability for physical loss or physical damage to the Permanent Work is effectively capped at an agreed risk retention level. Shell will reimburse the Contractor for the reasonable, substantiated and auditable costs incurred in excess of the risk retention level irrespective of the Contractor Group’s fault/negligence.

Other than for third party liability, the KfK risk allocation applies irrespective of negligence/fault of the indemnified party. However, Shell will not indemnify, release or hold harmless the Contractor against any consequences of incidents caused by Wilful Misconduct (WM) or by Gross Negligence (GN) of the Contractor Group. This liability regime is in Shell’s experience reasonably standard for EPC Supply chains in the upstream sector.

- Fines, Penalties, and Punitive Damages:

Shell does not indemnify its Contractors against fines, penalties or punitive damages levied against them;

- Financial security in support of the risk allocation:

Shell expects all its Contractors to be fully capable of meeting their liability and indemnity obligations assumed in the Contract. To achieve this objective, Shell typically requires its Contractors to maintain specified insurance policies or to provide other means of financial security;

- Warranties

The EPC Contractor is required to warrant that:

- (i) It has the experience, capabilities, competent personnel, financial security and other means and facilities available to efficiently and in a timely manner perform the Work and complete the Permanent Work (under Construction);



- (ii) It will perform Work in accordance with the Contract and, when performed, the Work will be free from defect; and
- (iii) For the purpose of the completion of the Permanent Work and the performance of the Work in accordance with the Contract.

The EPC Contractor must also warrant that when completed, the Permanent Work will:

- (iv) Comply with all the requirements of the Contract;
- (v) Meet the Performance Guarantees and operate at the capacity and for the duration specified in the Contract;
- (vi) Be fit for the purposes specified in the Contract, or where no purpose is specified, fit for the purposes reasonably inferred from the Contract;
- (vii) In respect of the processes, methods of production, technology, and services incorporated in the Permanent Work, comply with Standards of Practice applicable at the date for Completion;
- (viii) Comply with and operate in accordance with all Applicable Laws, Standards of Practice applicable at the date for Completion, approvals, and permits;
- (ix) Operate without interruptions and with no more maintenance than as specified in the Contract; and
- (x) Be free from Defect.

- Insurance

All Shell's EPC Contractors will be required to hold the following insurances:

- (i) Employers Liability and/or (where the jurisdiction of where the work is to be performed or under which the employees employed requires the same) Workers' Compensation Insurance covering personal injury to or death of the employees of the Contractor engaged in the performance of the Work to the minimum value required by any applicable legislation including extended cover (where required) for working offshore but in any case up to a minimum level per occurrence and unlimited as to the number of occurrences;
- (ii) General Third Party Liability Insurance (including coverage for sudden and accidental pollution) for any incident or series of incidents covering the operations of the Contractor in the performance of the contract, in an amount agreed per occurrence and unlimited as to the number of occurrences;
- (iii) Third party and passenger liability Insurance as may be required by law in the countries of use for motor vehicles used by the Contractor in connection with the execution of the Work with a minimum indemnity limit per occurrence, unlimited as to the number of occurrences;
- (iv) Insurance for the full value of, and against all insurable loss or damage from whatever cause arising to property (including construction equipment) owned, hired or leased by the Contractor or any Subcontractor for use in connection with the execution of the Work;



- (v) In the event that the Work involves the provision of vessels by the Contractor or is performed on or over navigable waters, the Contractor shall require the owner or operator of any vessel to obtain the following additional coverage;
- a) Marine Hull and Machinery (“H&M”) and/or Property Insurance including war risk coverage and, to the extent not provided in (ii) below, collision liability in respect of all vessels used by the Contractor Group in the performance of the work in an amount not less than the full value of all vessels, craft or floating equipment owned or hired by the Contractor Group; and
 - b) Protection and Indemnity (“P&I”) Liability Insurance for each rig, vessel, barge or other watercraft used in the performance of the Work including coverage for injuries to or death of masters, mates and crews, wreck and debris removal, collision and (if applicable) tower’s liabilities not covered under the H&M insurance, excess collision liabilities, and pollution liabilities. The policy limit for this insurance must be not less than the following per occurrence limits.

Vessels involved in specialised operations within the meaning of the P&I Club rules will carry a limit for such special operations to cover loss or damage to third party installations.

- (vi) Aircraft Liability Insurance for airborne craft used by the Contractor or any of its Subcontractors in connection with the execution of the Work with a minimum indemnity limit per occurrence, unlimited as to the number of occurrences;
- (vii) If directed by Shell, adequate Goods In Transit insurance to cover loss of or damage to materials until arrival at any Worksite; and
- (viii) Such further insurances as may be required by Law.

2.1.2. Summary Conclusions on EPC Supply Chain risk allocation.

With respect to Tier 2 contracts, there is no evidence to suggest that there are any particular issues with respect to adoption of these contracting norms and/or pricing or payment structures and Shell expects that Tier 1 EPC contractors will succeed in establishing “back to back” arrangements in their own contracts.

2.2. SSE Agreements

2.2.1. Relationship between the Developer and SSE as the Generator

In essence the Developer is contracting with SSE to provide Flue Gas (i.e. CO₂) from Peterhead Power Station Block 2 for the Developer to capture, compress, transport and store.

SSE will enter into a number of agreements with the Developer for the provision of various services in order for the Developer to meet its objectives and obligations under the Project Contract.

2.2.2. Flue Gas Services Agreement (FGS)

This will be the principal contract for the provision of services by SSE to the Developer. It will commence from when SSE starts supplying flue gas and services to the capture facilities (the Services Commencement Date) and will run until the end of the CfD term.

- Pricing and payment structures



- (i) SSE receive payment via the FGS for providing a range of services, in particular the dedication of facilities including Block 2 (comprising GT13, HRSG13, Steam Turbine 20) for the duration of the term. Such dedication excludes Grey Periods which are described below; and
- (ii) On a monthly basis, from the Services Commencement Date, the Developer shall pay to SSE for the duration of the Term;
 - (a) Fixed and variable power station costs – with some escalated in line with CPI, and others on a pass-through basis;
 - (b) A monthly payment in relation to total SSE Capex net of grant payments due under the CTA. These payments are intended to run until end of the CfD period, giving a return on capital negotiated between the parties; and
 - (c) A monthly payment which compensates SSE for the loss of opportunity of operating the SSE facilities (prior to any CCS related modifications) under normal market conditions.

The above payments to SSE are adjusted pro-rata based on the availability of the Power Plant to deliver the requested services (accounting for planned outages)

- Liabilities and Indemnities, Warranties and Insurance

The provisions with respect to Liabilities and Indemnities, Warranties and Insurance for this Agreement are being negotiated but are expected to consider:

- (i) Liabilities and Indemnities – A predominantly fault based approach is envisaged with caps to limit total liabilities;
- (ii) Warranties – Appropriate warranties are being contemplated to give a shared confidence in the information provided to date and that both parties are well placed to deliver the project; and
- (iii) Insurance – Consideration being given to joint insurance versus each party taking out their own insurance. This Policy would be expected to cover people, property, pollution and third party claims.

These areas of risk allocation and management are further enhanced with governance processes (including the appointment of representatives, operational teams, and a steering committee), and effective change management and dispute resolution processes.

- Other key items

Other key terms that directly impact the allocation of risk and reward for the project

- (i) In the event that the CCS Chain is inoperable for a certain period Shell may declare a “Grey Period” which entitles the Developer certain relief for up to a defined maximum Total period calculated in aggregate over the term of the agreement; and
- (ii) Should the heat rate of the SSE facilities lie above a prescribed threshold then SSE shall be liable for the additional fuel gas required to restore the heat rate to the agreed contractual level. This risk to SSE is capped. SSE are entitled to receive a bonus payment should actual heat rate lie below a prescribed threshold.



2.2.3. Construction Tie-in Agreement (CTA)

This will be the principal contract for the construction of the facilities at the Peterhead Power Station Site and addressing design and construction risks. It will govern the construction phase until the completion of the Power Station commissioning.

- Pricing and payment structures for Capex. (including Cost Reimbursement Model)
 - (i) The Contract provides for a structure limited and defined cost over-run sharing arrangement (“Emerging Costs”), as detailed in the Project Contract. SSE are required to specify fixed and emerging cost estimate components at FID including their EPC content. The former represents either truly fixed costs or costs that SSE are prepared to fix. At Commissioning, at which point all actual construction costs are quantified, an estimate of the actual qualifying Emerging cost component will be made, any increases from initial estimate shall be subject to a sharing percentage and a Cap above which no reimbursement is payable. The sum of the fixed cost and qualifying emerging costs shall be the total SSE Capex eligible for reimbursement; and
 - (ii) During the effective term of the CTA, SSE shall receive a fixed proportion of the Capital Grant passed through to the developer at every milestone through to release of the final retention payment by the DECC to Shell.

- Liabilities and Indemnities, Warranties and Insurance

The provisions with respect to Liabilities and Indemnities, Warranties and Insurance for this Agreement are being negotiated but are expected to consider:

 - (i) Liabilities and Indemnities – A predominantly fault based approach is envisaged with caps to limit total liabilities;
 - (ii) Warranties – Appropriate warranties are being contemplated to give a shared confidence in the information provided to date and that both parties are well placed to deliver the project; and
 - (iii) Insurance – Consideration being given to joint insurance versus each party taking out their own insurance. This Policy would be expected to cover people, property, pollution and third party claims.

These areas of risk allocation and management are further enhanced with governance processes (including the appointment of representatives, operational teams, and a steering committee), and effective change management and dispute resolution processes.

- Other Key Items

Other key terms that directly impact the allocation of risk and reward for Shell’s project include the following:

 - (i) To incentivise both parties in respect of timely delivery of their respective construction obligations, each party is liable for payments should actual completion be delayed in respect of a prescribed target completion date.

2.2.4. Trading Service Agreement (TSA)

In respect of pricing and payment structures, the Developer shall pay the Trading Service Provider (TSP) a monthly fixed fee for services including the following:



- a) Management of interfaces between the System Operator and the National Grid Gas plc;
- b) Management of invoices related to gas, power and EUA trades;
- c) Management of invoices between the Developer and the TSP; and
- d) Baseload Hedge Fee in respect of hedging services for the purchase of fuel gas and imported power and for the sale of generated power.

The Liabilities and Indemnities regime for the TSA is still under development.

2.2.5. Lease

The main features of the Lease are as follows;

- a) A rent is payable to SSE; and
- b) The Liabilities and Indemnities, Warranties and Insurance and specific access rights are dealt with more fully within the FGS and CTA.

2.2.6. Tier 2: SSE's own sub-contracts

For the Power Station scope of work to be carried out by SSE, it is anticipated that the pricing structure will be split primarily into two distinct structures, as follows:

- A portion will be governed by the NEC 3 Option A conditions of contract with an Activity Schedule for payment agreed on a negotiated basis; and
- A portion will be governed by the NEC 3 Option C conditions of contract amended to reflect a Target Cost arrangement, as widely used throughout the construction industry.

The liabilities and indemnities associated with the above include the following;

- Employers Risks;
- Contractor's risks are effectively all risks which are not noted as being Employers Risks;
- Indemnities – Defines that each party shall indemnify the other against all claims, proceedings compensation and cost due to an event which is at their risk; and
- Insurance cover – it is likely that a Construction All Risks (CAR) policy will be placed and provided to cover the Contractor for all of the associated risks (on an owner controlled basis) and that other policies are required to be put in place by the Contractor (Employer Liability, Third Party and Public Liability, Motor Vehicle Insurance Materials In Transit etc.).

The warranties included are as follows:

- SSE Form of Contracts details the general warranties flow down (from the Project Contract); and
- Confirmation that “The Contractor provides the Employer with a collateral warranty agreement in favour of the Employer in the form set out in Schedule Part 1 Appendix 8 executed in self proving form from the Subcontractors”.

Other key provisions within the SSE ITT pertinent to the allocation of risk and which the Tier 2 Contractors are required to provide include:



- Parent Company Guarantee - The Contractor gives to the Employer a pro forma guarantee of the Contractor's performance;
- Delay Damages for Section Completion and the whole of the works;
- Performance Bonds – The provision of a performance on demand bond to the value of an agreed percentage of the contract value;
- Retention at an agreed % until completion;
- Low performance Damages related to Performance Guarantees relevant to the EPC Contractors scope – currently under negotiation; and
- Availability Guarantees relevant to the Contractors scope.

2.2.7. Summary Conclusions on Generator and Supply Chain risk allocation for future Projects.

SSE's role in the Project is as a Key-Sub Contractor dedicating Block 2 of the Peterhead Power Station to the Project. It is not the Developer, and therefore does not assume the risk or reward profile of the Developer. Given that DECC's desired Commercialisation Outcome is that private sector electricity companies can take investment decisions to build CCS equipped fossil fuel power stations in the early 2020's without the need for Government Capital Subsidy (the commercial construct employed in this Project), a structure whereby the Developer is separate from the Generator may not be appropriate for future Projects, and therefore future Developers will need to give careful consideration to this matter.

SSE has sought to limit its risks to those it fully understands and has control over, and for this reason they are shielded from the demonstration risks (i.e. CCS Specific Risks) that may face the Developer and DECC. That said, certain provisions - for example the "Grey Period" regime described above are bespoke, in recognition of the novel aspects of the Project.

Future CCS Developers may consider a similar commercial construct in which the Generator has a commercial arms-length relationship to the Developer and specifically where a "flue gas supply" service is provided by the Generator to the Capture Plant Owner. However, for follow-on projects where the technology has been demonstrated, it may be appropriate to consider the alternatives of a "capture service" provided by the Capture Plant Owner to the Generator, or the establishment of a joint entity to undertake the full-chain activities.

2.3. Cansolv Agreements

Cansolv's role in the project is as follows:

- Technology provider;
- Absorbent supplier; and
- Critical equipment supplier.

The first two services described above are encompassed into one Agreement between Cansolv and the Developer (Licence Process and Engineering Agreement, of which the Absorbent Agreement is a Schedule) whilst the critical equipment will be supplied under a direct Agreement between the Project's Onshore EPC Contractor and Cansolv (the Critical Equipment Agreement).

The Licence Process and Engineering Agreements will be novated to the Onshore EPC between the start of execution and the completion of Cansolv's performance test at which date it will be novated back to the Developer. Such novation enables the Developer to have a single point of accountability



in respect of the overall performance guarantees (both process and construction/assembly guarantees) for the Capture Plant, and will require the Onshore EPC Contractor to assume responsibility for the first Amine fill in the capture plant.

2.3.1. Tier 1: Shell's own Key-Subcontracts with Cansolv

- Pricing and payment structures.

Each agreement negotiated between Cansolv and the Developer shall be considered in turn.

- (i) License Process and Engineering Agreement

The Developer has agreed the payment of a Licensing fee to access the right to the Cansolv Technology and some basic engineering services (FEED support and document verification).

Any additional services required by the Developer over the course of the project are billed on a reimbursable basis indexed to the labour cost as published by the Association of Professional Engineers, Geologist and Geophysicists of Alberta; and

- (ii) Absorbent Supply Agreement:

The cost of the Absorbent is billed per kg supplied. The price excludes transportation, drumming and palletisation charges.

Any additional services the Developer might require as part of the Absorbent supply are charged at the same rate as for the License and Engineering Agreement.

- Liabilities and Indemnities

The L&I regimes in the agreements are as follows:

- (i) Licence Process and Engineering Agreement.

- (a) IP breach: Cansolv is liable to the Developer for up to a Cap;

- (b) Breach of Process warranty: Cansolv is liable to the Developer for up to 100% of the Licensing fee, as per performance Warranty;

- (c) Both of the liabilities above are additive;

- (d) The Developer holds Cansolv harmless against:

- i. 3rd party claims;

- ii. Consequential loss;

- iii. People; and

- iv. Property.

- (e) Other such provisions that are standard for Licensing Agreements of this type.

- (ii) Absorbent Agreement:

- (a) A Mutual hold harmless regime for people, property, the environment and consequential loss has been adopted; and

- (b) Liability for off specification product: Cansolv to replace product including transportation costs; Termination right if repeated breach.

- Warranties

- (i) Licence Process and Engineering Agreement:



(a) Cansolv Warrants :

- i. The performance of the process as per the Performance Guarantees; and
- ii. It has the rights to the License Process.

(ii) Absorbent Supply Agreement:

(a) Cansolv Warrants:

- i. The Product will not infringe any patent;
- ii. The Product will conform to the specifications; and
- iii. The Product shall be delivered free from any lawful security interest, lien or other encumbrance.

- Insurance

Cansolv is to hold all insurances as required by Law in Canada and the United Kingdom.

2.3.2. Tier 2: Shell's Contractors own sub-contracts with Cansolv

The Critical Equipment Agreement is to be entered into between the Onshore EPC Contractor and Cansolv. At time of writing, Cansolv is still engaged in negotiations with EPC tenderers. Whilst the pricing and payment structures remain valid across the various negotiations, the risk allocation is expected to be specific to each tenderer with respect to the guarantee commitments they are willing to make. The materiality of these commitments has to be determined at the time of writing. The final structure, at the time of writing is as follows:

- Pricing and payment structures.

Critical equipment is charged per unit equipment. The price includes basic services such as witnessing of factory acceptance tests, inspections at the Peterhead site but excludes freight and administrative fees; and

- Liabilities and Indemnities, Warranties and Insurance

At the time of writing all remain to be finalised between the selected Onshore EPC contractor and Cansolv.

2.3.3. Summary Conclusions on Technology Provider risk allocation for future Projects.

The EPC Contractor will have responsibility for the overall performance of the capture process up to the point of handover to the Developer which is expected to be six months following the issue of the Commissioning Certificate under the Project Contract.



3. Conclusion

Other than the general obligations specific to publicly funded Projects which ultimately are derived from the Project Contract, and the novel structure of the commercial arrangements in place between the Generator and the Developer as described above, it is Shell's view that the general approach to contracting in the Supply Chain is largely in line with the service contracting norms seen in the Upstream industry and also in line with industry norms for licensing of Technology.

Whilst this Project has its own detailed specificities which may deserve special treatment in certain contractual arrangements, Shell is of the view that there are no unique characteristics of CCS that have required a wholesale re-think on how Shell should contract with its supply chain, or which would require the special attention of potential CCS Developers.

What is clear however, is that future CCS Developers will need to proceed with their projects with the full understanding that the risk the supply chain is willing to bear, whether it be EPC Contractors, Technology Providers, or even Generators providing services (if they are not themselves the Developer) is limited. It should be understood that full recovery of consequential losses to the Developer in the event that commissioning is late, operations are interrupted or fail altogether may not be possible given the value of such projects to the Supply Chain.



4. References - Bibliography

[1] PCCS-00-PTD-VA-5756-00010. Key Knowledge Deliverable 11.146, *Project Phase Supply Chain Structure..*



5. Glossary of Terms

Term	Definition
CAR	Construction All Risks
CCGT	Combined Cycle Gas Turbine
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CfD	Contract for Difference
CP	Contracting and Procurement
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CTA	Construction and Tie-in Agreement
DECC	Department of Energy and Climate Change
EPC	Engineering, Procurement and Construction
EUA	European Union Allowance
FEED	Front End Engineering Design
FGS	Flue Gas Supply Agreement
FID	Final Investment Decision
GN	Gross Negligence
GT	Gas Turbine
H&M	Marine Hull and Machinery
ITT	Invitation to tender
KfK	Knock-for-Knock
L&I	Liabilities and Indemnities
NEC	New Engineering Contract
P&I	Protection and Indemnity
SSE	SSE Generation Ltd
TSA	Trading Services Agreement
TSP	Trading Service Provider
UK	United Kingdom
WM	Wilful Misconduct