

301A

FM FCO  
 TO DESKBY 021700Z BRASILIA  
 TELNO 97  
 OF 021543Z JUNE 93  
 AND TO [REDACTED]  
 AND TO [REDACTED]  
 INFO [REDACTED]  
 INFO [REDACTED]  
 INFO IMMEDIATE [REDACTED]  
 INFO IMMEDIATE [REDACTED]

02235	
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY	
- 9 JUN 1993	
DESK OFFICER	REGISTRY
INDEX	PA
	Action Taken

*for  
Bosnia*

297

UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO [REDACTED] AND WELLINGTON TEL [REDACTED]  
 BOSNIA:SAFE AREAS

SUMMARY

1. Instructions to lobby in support of draft UNSCR on safe areas.

DETAIL

2. TUR reported on negotiations in New York on the French draft UNSCR and proposed rapid action with your host governments to seek their support for this draft. Grateful if action addressees would do so urgently and report reactions. (We were grateful for the action already undertaken by Wellington, reported in second TUR and see no need for further action there at this stage). Please draw on the following points:

A. Implementing concept of safe areas an important, immediate step to help stabilise situation on ground, relieve suffering and create improved climate for negotiated settlement. Adoption of UNSCR an essential first step. Should be done rapidly.

B. Strong preference to proceed in Security Council by consensus. Understand Non-Aligned concerns. But much of what they are proposing is simply not realistic. Exploring scope for compromise.

C. Much NAM criticism based on misinterpretation of Washington agreement on 22 May. Key point is that neither we - and, we are sure, none of the co-sponsors - regard safe areas as a permanent solution. Washington agreement on 22 May made clear our continuing commitment to the political process, building on work

of Vance and Owen, leading to a lasting and equitable peace. (A full line-to-take on this is in Guidance 13). Spelt out clearly in PP L in the present draft UNSCR. Exerting pressure on Serbs to that end.

D. A degree of local agreement among parties on the ground remains essential. No UN contingent would be prepared to fight their way into a safe area. Use of force by UNPROFOR should remain limited to self-defence. In practice, believe there would be little distinction between an attack on the local population and an attack on UNPROFOR: a bombardment would threaten both. Local UNPROFOR commanders would need to judge, in consultation with UNPROFOR HQ, what action was justified to deter attacks.

E. A new element is that the UK has said that it is prepared, like US and others, to use air power to defend UNPROFOR in safe areas. We envisage that air support would be made available in response to requests from UNPROFOR.

F. More troops will be required. Requirements should be further clarified by report by UN Secretary General on implementation of UNSCR to follow shortly after adoption. We favour attracting Muslim and other contingents such as the Pakistanis.

G. The Secretariat concept paper (UKMIS New York telno [redacted]) was not the factual report on the situation on the ground which Council members had commissioned, but a heavily-slanted concept paper. It was not a considered statement of the Secretariat's opinions and did not have the endorsement of the Secretary-General.

HURD

YYYY

DISTRIBUTION

229

MAIN

181

YUGOSLAVIA

.EAU

[redacted]  
PAGE 2  
[redacted]