

DFID Palestinian Programme

**‘Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza’**

**Independent Evaluation**



WFP/Eyad Al Baba

Final Report  
August 2015

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Abbreviations.....</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>Acknowledgements.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Executive Summary.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>1 Introduction.....</b>	<b>7</b>
1.1 Context .....	7
1.2 Overview of Programme.....	10
1.3 Overview of Evaluation.....	18
<b>2 Evaluation Questions and Methodology .....</b>	<b>20</b>
2.1 Theory of Change and High-Level Evaluation Questions.....	20
2.2 Methodology .....	22
<b>3 Findings .....</b>	<b>32</b>
3.1 Theory of Change and Summary Log Frame.....	32
3.2 Impact and Effectiveness.....	33
3.3 Coverage .....	54
3.4 Coordination .....	62
3.5 Coherence.....	64
3.6 Sustainability .....	67
<b>4 Conclusions.....</b>	<b>69</b>
4.1 Achievements compared to the Log Frame .....	69
4.2 Impact and Effectiveness.....	69
4.3 Coverage .....	71
4.4 Co-ordination.....	72
4.5 Coherence.....	72
4.6 Sustainability .....	73
4.7 M&E Regime .....	74
<b>5 Lessons Learned.....</b>	<b>75</b>
5.1 Impact and Effectiveness.....	75
5.2 Coverage .....	76
5.3 Co-ordination.....	76
5.4 Coherence.....	76
5.5 Sustainability .....	76
<b>6 Recommendations .....</b>	<b>78</b>
6.1 Recommendations for DFID .....	78
6.2 Recommendations for Implementing Partners (UNRWA and WFP) .....	80
<b>Annexes.....</b>	<b>1</b>

## List of Tables

Table 1	Transition from in-kind to vouchers planned over 2009-2014 (individuals)	16
Table 2	Emergency assistance for conflict-affected people in 2014 (individuals)	17
Table 3	Evaluation questions	22
Table 4	Overview of focus group discussions conducted	24
Table 5	Project performance summary	33
Table 6	Progress against impact indicators	36
Table 7	Number of full time equivalent (FTE) JCP positions created, 2014	38
Table 8	Change of food consumption category among VP beneficiaries, 2011-2015	42
Table 9	Transfer and delivery values of WFP main modalities (US\$ per capita per month)	43
Table 10	Progress against outcome indicators	45
Table 11	Progress against output indicators	46
Table 12	Private sector JCP placements, 2013-2014	47
Table 13	Coping strategies used by VP beneficiaries, as of January 2015	53
Table 14	Indicative caseload of potential target groups in the Gaza Strip	55
Table 15	Breakdown of JCP applications on the waiting list, as of March 8, 2015	58
Table 16	Breakdown of total JCP beneficiaries (including GTP positions), 2011-2014	58
Table 17	Breakdown of JCP beneficiaries attributable to DFID, 2011-2014	59
Table 18	Length of contract of JCP beneficiaries (including GTP positions), 2011-2014	59
Table 19	Profile of the household member who usually decides how the voucher is used	60
Table 20	Gender of the person who usually redeems the voucher	61
Table 21	Number of graduates entering the JCP Graduate Training Programme, 2013-2014	62
Table 22	Regular assistance accessible to non-refugees per vulnerability group	63
Table 23	Composition of social assistance packages to non-refugees, as of January 2013	64
Table 24	Monetary value of WFP food assistance to non-refugees, as of January 2013	64

## List of Figures

Figure 1	Number of unemployed in the Gaza Strip, 1999-2013	8
Figure 2	Real average daily wages in Palestine, 2000-2012	8
Figure 3	Incidence, depth and severity of poverty in the Gaza Strip, 2004-2011	9
Figure 4	DFID Programme Results Chain	11
Figure 5	JCP annual disbursement	13
Figure 6	Breakdown of WFP regular caseload per modality, as of December 2014	17
Figure 7	Theory of Change	21
Figure 8	Household food insecurity levels in the Gaza Strip, 2009-2013	37
Figure 9	Distribution of VP beneficiaries per food consumption category, 2011 and 2015	41
Figure 10	Distribution of VP beneficiary households per poverty status, 2011 and 2015	43
Figure 11	Average poverty gap among VP beneficiary households living in deep poverty, 2011 and 2015	44
Figure 12	Cash-for-work opportunities supported by UNRWA in the Gaza Strip, 2001-2014	57
Figure 13	Vulnerability groups among non-refugees	63

## List of Annexes

Annex 1	Bibliography
Annex 2	Log Frame
Annex 3	Original Terms of Reference
Annex 4	Terms of Reference for the Project Steering Committee
Annex 5	List of key informants consulted over the course of the evaluation
Annex 6	Core guiding questions for semi-structured interviews of key informants
Annex 7	Core guiding questions for the focus group discussions
Annex 8	Focus Group Summaries

## ABBREVIATIONS

CBO	Community-Based Organisation
DFID	UK's Department for International Development
EA	UNRWA's Emergency Appeal
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EMMA	Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis
EMOP	WFP's Emergency Operation
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FTE	Full Time Equivalent
GF	UNRWA's General Fund
GFD	General Food Distribution
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
JCP	UNRWA's Job Creation Programme
LFS	Labour Force Survey
MNR	Palestinian Registered Refugee Married to Non-refugee
MoSA	PA's Ministry of Social Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
PA	Palestinian Authority
PECS	Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey
PGI	Poverty Gap Index
PMTF	Proxy-Means Test Formula
PNCTP	Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme
PRRO	WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PSC	Project Steering Committee
ROM	EC's Results-Oriented Monitoring
RRIS	UNRWA's Refugee Registration Information System
SEFSec	Socio Economic and Food Security
SHC	Special Hardship Case
SSNP	UNRWA's Social Safety Net Programme
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
VfM	Value for Money
VP	WFP's Voucher Programme
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was prepared by an independent evaluation team from Public Administration International (PAI): Matthew Waterfield (Team Leader), Cécile Cherrier (Lead on Quantitative Data and WFP), with support from Imad Dayyah (Lead on Qualitative Data and UNRWA), and Laurence Hargreaves (research and logistics support in the final phase). PAI and Atos Consulting provided quality assurance and management oversight of the programme and its deliverables. The team was also supported by Naim Mahmoud Al Khatib during the focus group discussions in Gaza.

This final phase of the evaluation was coordinated by Gillian Mitchell, Project Officer, and Henrietta Hawxwell, Team Leader, Rights and Refugees Pillar, from the DFID Palestinian Programme. Ms Mitchell provided invaluable support and facilitated the evaluation team's meetings with UNRWA and WFP. Thanks are due to the focus group discussion participants, especially the non-beneficiary groups, programme staff consulted within UNRWA and WFP, and all those key informants listed in Annex 5.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### **Background**

This independent evaluation of the DFID-funded £25.5 million programme 'Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza' (2011-15) reviews the progress of a) the UNRWA Job Creation Programme (JCP) which provides cash to refugees for short-term work assignments for professional, skilled and unskilled workers, and b) the WFP Voucher Programme (VP), which provides food vouchers to non-refugee families assessed through the use of a proxy means test to be poor.

As a result of the Israeli blockade and successive Israeli military operations targeting Gaza, the last few years have seen the progressive destruction of Gaza's economy, resulting in massively reduced employment opportunities and reduced incomes. The majority of Gaza's population has been pushed into poverty and food insecurity, with no other choice but to rely heavily on assistance to cover their essential needs. In terms of food security, although the market is generally adequately supplied with basic food commodities, for most households these remain difficult to afford. In 2010, 66% of households in Gaza were food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity. In 2011, nearly 40% of the Gazan population lived in poverty and 20% in deep poverty. These figures have not improved since 2004.

### **DFID's Support to WFP and to UNRWA**

The funding provided by DFID is a key component of the funding for both programmes. Together they contribute to the achievement of DFID Palestine's Programme objectives of addressing poverty and food security in Gaza. DFID's desired impact for these programmes was to reduce economic hardship and hunger among food insecure, abject and absolute poor refugees<sup>1</sup> and non-refugees in Gaza. DFID's contribution to the 'Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza' programme commenced in 2011. The constituent UNRWA and WFP projects commenced much earlier; therefore there was no baseline study carried out before the start of programme activities.

### **Evaluation Methodology**

A baseline study was carried out by the evaluation team, for DFID, between January and March 2013. This final evaluation, which mirrors the baseline study, was based on fieldwork, consultations, data analysis and focus group discussions. The final evaluation was primarily conducted in Gaza and Jerusalem in March 2015. The final evaluation has examined the VP and JCP from the perspective of impact and effectiveness, coverage, co-ordination, coherence and sustainability.

The evaluation team relied on a mix of primary and secondary data, and a combination of quantitative and qualitative information. Secondary data has included statistical data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), administrative data retrieved from UNRWA and WFP management systems, as well as data extracted from relevant ad-hoc

---

<sup>1</sup> See page 12 for definitions of abject and absolute poor.

studies. Primary data was collected through key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Over the whole evaluation, a total of 40 informants were interviewed in DFID, UNRWA, WFP, Oxfam GB, Ma'an and others, and a total of 82 persons participated in the discussion groups, including 18 who participated in both March 2013 and March 2015. The discussion group participants included JCP and VP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. A discussion group was also held with VP participating vendors.

### **Key Findings: Achievements Compared to the Log Frame**

It has not been possible to quantify the programmes' impact due to a lack of poverty and food insecurity data, although some conclusions are drawn below from qualitative data. In terms of outcome, there has been a moderate under-achievement of households reporting improved Food Consumption Score (FCS) from the VP, which is likely due to the conflict in 2014 affecting food security conditions. Participating VP shops increased sales slightly more than expected. JCP's target outcome has been substantially under-achieved. Far fewer abject and absolute poor refugees have benefited from JCP than UNRWA data suggests. In terms of outputs, JCP has a mixed track record. It is creating more work-days than planned for both men and women, but spreading them out over a large beneficiary pool, so that more refugees obtain shorter placements.

### **Key Findings: Impact and Effectiveness**

**Overall, the expected primary impact of the DFID programme can be considered as only partially met.** The programme had no significant impact on poverty status and poverty gap. Both JCP and VP components effectively targeted poor households, but failed to impact beneficiaries' poverty status and poverty gap. Gaza's economic context means beneficiaries can only realistically be lifted out of poverty when the blockade is lifted and the economy improves.

**The VP component has improved food security among beneficiary non-refugees.** Nevertheless, the incidence of food insecurity among non-refugees remains on the rise. This can be explained by the two major crises that occurred over the course of the programme. The situation would likely have been worse in the absence of the VP programme.

**The JCP component has failed to improve food security among beneficiary refugees in a significant and sustainable manner.** There is little evidence available to indicate any significant and sustainable impact of the JCP on food security of beneficiary refugees. This poor performance can be attributed to an inadequate design of the JCP. Also, as reflected by the DFID output indicators, the JCP is focused on poverty rather than food security. The poor performance of JCP is particularly noteworthy given 70% of the Gazan population are classified as refugees and therefore reliant on UNRWA's services.

**Multi-year funding appears more effective than the traditional annual period of donor funding.** Multi-year funding has allowed WFP to improve the quality of its assistance, in particular by investing in an e-voucher platform. The impact of multi-year funding on the JCP component is not clear.



### Key Findings: Coverage

**The DFID-funded VP component covers approximately 9% of the non-refugee population living in food insecurity.** In February 2015, a total of 59,630 individuals benefited from the VP: 50,086 beneficiaries of the voucher-only modality and 9,544 beneficiaries of the combined modality.

**UNRWA's JCP covers approximately 15% of refugees living in abject poverty and 2.5% of refugees in absolute poverty, including dependents.** In 2014 UNRWA provided temporary employment to 20,550 beneficiaries benefitting approximately 108,000 individuals. The full-time equivalent for this is 4,970.

**Within the constraints of funding, there was no systematic exclusion of eligible groups identified, nor any systematic inclusion of ineligible groups.** UNRWA has over the past few years implemented mechanisms such as complaints boxes and community outreach officers to try and safeguard against exclusion of eligible groups.

**WFP's VP component may not have a direct impact on women's empowerment.** Women are often decision-makers with regard to food consumption in the home, but are less likely than males to purchase items.

**UNRWA's JCP has made a commendable effort with gender.** The £1.5 million uplift in 2014 assisted with the delivery of 1,110 full time equivalent (FTE) positions for women (75 professional, 723 skilled and 312 unskilled positions).

### Key Findings: Co-ordination

**Co-ordination between WFP and UNRWA is effective, with clear co-ordination mechanisms established.** Encouragingly, the sharing of data between WFP and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), and UNRWA's internal data sharing between PMTF and JCP, has improved markedly since the 2013 baseline assessment. In addition, there is some tactical coordination through working groups, e.g., sharing of the PMTF approach, however each partner modifies the formula for their programme.

### Key Findings: Coherence

**The JCP programme is based on an incoherent design and could be better organised and communicated.** The situation in Gaza is showing no signs of improvement, yet the JCP is still operating with a short-term view rather than attempting to encourage long-term economic development. JCP suffers from competing priorities in trying to meet the objectives of multiple donors.

**There is a lack of consensus amongst stakeholders regarding the best modality for reducing food insecurity.** For instance, non-refugees in Gaza living in deep poverty and food insecurity are eligible for a number of different modalities: vouchers, cash or food in-kind. This evaluation is not able to contribute to a comparison of these modalities, because the evaluation was focused on cash aspects of the JCP and the VP only. However, evidence collected in this study indicates the VP is able to have a significant impact on food security,

whilst avoiding some of the negative impacts of standard food assistance provision, such as dependency and poor nutritional status.

### **Key Findings: Sustainability**

**With further integration with MoSA's programmes, WFP's VP represents the most sustainable option for meeting food security in Gaza.** WFP has approached the MoSA about working with the e-voucher, which is a good step forward for post-emergency, institutionalised sustainability of the programme.

**UNRWA's JCP has little sustainable impact.** The JCP is designed to reduce poverty, yet there is little evidence that the programme contributes to this. This is mainly due to the structural nature of poverty in Gaza. Findings from recent World Bank research and the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) review of DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA imply that DFID funding might have a more sustainable impact on poverty if donated to the General Fund, where it could contribute to UNRWA's overall presence and service-delivery in Gaza.

### **Overall Conclusions**

**Expanding food assistance and creating income opportunities will remain a priority in the longer term.** Some 57% of the population in Gaza is unable to meet their daily food needs without support. Given it is unlikely that there will be any substantial lifting of the blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza, there are no short-term or quick-fix solutions to substantially replace the much-needed food and cash assistance by other interventions.

**Cash or food assistance will need to continue until interventions improve economic activity and increase access to jobs and income opportunities.** There is not so much a shortage in food *supply*, as there is extreme difficulty of people in lower wealth groups to *pay* for it. In other words, there is a problem of food accessibility rather than food availability.

**The evaluation has shown that WFP's voucher program is a valuable and dignified safety net that provides a positive impact on food security.** The e-voucher scheme has a positive effect on FCS. There is potential for sustainable impact, and also the support for small businesses through the food supply and distribution chains.

**The evaluation has shown that JCP does not create jobs, has little impact on food security or alleviating poverty and has limited potential for monitoring and evaluation.** However, the JCP has succeeded in providing short term 'cash for work' opportunities, particularly for women. Through the JCP, women in Gaza have had opportunities to work in non-traditional positions in packing factories and in the agricultural sector, options previously culturally restricted to men.

### **Recommendations for DFID**

**DFID should continue to support the WFP VP.** Continued support should emphasise further development of the e-voucher; platform sharing; and collaborative work with other donors, programmes and MoSA. Furthermore, increasing food basket items from local sources will

assist with the development of a local economy.

**DFID should not continue to fund the JCP.** We recommend DFID find an alternative means to support poor and vulnerable refugees in Gaza, such as funding the General Fund or investigating labour market opportunities that will generate employment and assist with the establishment of small businesses.

#### **Recommendations for Implementing Partners (UNRWA and WFP)**

**WFP should continue developing and expanding the existing VP platform.** This could be done by adding more participating shops and products. WFP should continue working and sharing information with other donors and implementing partners in Gaza with the objective that the e-voucher platform becomes the common social support platform.

**WFP should work to increase the secondary impacts of the VP.** This could be done by sourcing increasing amounts of the food basket from local suppliers, particularly non-land intensive products such as dairy, wheat and poultry. WFP could also expand the retail network to include small shops in order to maximise the secondary economic impact of the VP.

**UNRWA should conduct an internal review of the JCP objectives with its donors.** This review must look at the programme's structure, differing donor objectives to enable discussion and consensus on what the JCP is trying to achieve.

**UNRWA must strengthen their M&E regime to move beyond measuring outputs and conducting expenditure surveys.** This should involve measuring outcome and impact indicators, which eliminate reliance on external data sources.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

This first section offers a brief overview of the Gaza context over the period 2011-2015, provides the main features of the programme, as identified during the course of this evaluation, and presents an outline of the independent evaluation.

### 1.1 Context

The Gaza Strip is home to a population of approximately 1.8 million people, including more than 1.2 million Palestinian refugees. 43% of Gazans live in eight refugee camps. It is overcrowded; the density of population is ten times higher than that of the West Bank. Six decades of political instability and occupation, nearly eight years of blockade, and major destruction of private and public property during military confrontations have destroyed a once productive Gazan economy. The last 15 years have seen the progressive destruction of Gaza's private sector and a once dynamic and trade-oriented economy, together with its capacity to create jobs and income. The majority of Gaza's population has been pushed into poverty and food insecurity, with no other choice but to rely heavily on assistance to cover their essential needs.


This harsh situation is made worse intermittently by additional shocks, resulting in increased humanitarian needs. Striking events of the last three years include:

- The continuing fiscal crisis, which deepened in 2012 and has delayed payments to civil servants (44% of households in the Gaza Strip have family members employed in the public sector) and assistance from the Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA);
- An 8-day escalation of hostilities between Gaza and Israel in November 2012, highlighting the volatile security situation;
- Restrictions resulting from the Egyptian political crisis (since July 2013), including the limited functioning of the Rafah crossing and the almost total closure of informal tunnels, which created a fuel and food price increase;
- The July-August 2014 Israeli assault, which left thousands of Palestinians dead and injured, over 400,000 displaced and homeless, and 300,000 individuals in need of emergency food support.

The consequences of the protracted crisis provoked by the blockade and amplified by fiscal shocks and escalations of hostilities are devastating:

- **Unemployment.** Over the last decade, unemployment rates have oscillated around 30%. Rates are even higher among youth aged 20-24 years and women: an astounding 88% is reported among young female refugees. In late 2014, the unemployment rate exceeded 40%. Figure 1 shows the distressing trend induced by demographic growth and increased numbers of people unemployed or actively searching for work. The number of unemployed people reached 194,700 in late 2014.


**Figure 1** Number of unemployed in the Gaza Strip, 1999-2013



Source: UNRWA (2014) based on PCBS data.

- Low wages and high food prices.** Even for those who are employed, wages do not cover food expenses. The blockade has resulted in a considerable loss of purchasing power. The real average daily wage has fallen by as much as 25% since 2006, while prices went up by 24% over the period 2006-2012, with food prices soaring by more than 35% (Figure 2).

**Figure 2** Real average daily wages in Palestine, 2000-2012



Base year for price index is 2004.

Source: UNRWA based on PCBS data.


- Poverty.** As a result, poverty has remained very high over the last decade.<sup>2</sup> In 2011, nearly 40% of the Gazan population lived in poverty; over one-fifth in deep poverty.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> World Bank (2011) Coping with Conflict? Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza, Report No 61293-GZ.

<sup>3</sup> PCBS (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) (2012) Living Standards in the Palestinian Territory: Expenditure, Consumption, Poverty, 2011, June.

No improvement was seen in the depth and severity of poverty between 2004 and 2011 (Figure 3).<sup>4</sup>

**Figure 3** Incidence, depth and severity of poverty in the Gaza Strip, 2004-2011



Source: Authors based on PECS data.

- **Food insecurity.** Improvement in the access regime<sup>5</sup> put in place by the Government of Israel in June 2010 has had no significant impact on food security. Although the market is generally adequately supplied with basic food commodities, the problem for most households is that it remains difficult for them to afford these. In 2010, 66% of households in Gaza were food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity.<sup>6</sup>
- **Malnutrition.** As people compromise on both the quantity and quality of food, this is having a direct nutritional impact on the Gazan population. Children and women of childbearing age are the worst affected. The Gaza Strip has to bear a double burden of malnutrition. Stunting and overweight affect respectively 7.1% and 6.5% of children under age 5.<sup>7</sup> More alarming, 23.7% of children aged 12-15 months are overweight, while the prevalence of anaemia reaches 69.7% among children aged 12-15 months and 35.8% among pregnant women.<sup>8</sup> Persistent poor nutrition has long-term detrimental effects on health.

<sup>4</sup> The last Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS), which measures poverty, was conducted in 2010 and so no data is available after this year.

<sup>5</sup> 'Access regime' refers specifically to the system of Gaza access permits administered by the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), an Israeli Defence Ministry unit. More generally, it refers to the ease with which visitors, UN agencies and NGOs can enter and operate in Gaza.

<sup>6</sup> Al-Sahel (2010) Changes on Gaza Market and Household Conditions following Israel's 20 June 2010 New Access Regime.

<sup>7</sup> PCBS (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) (2014) Palestinian Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Key Findings Report, December.

<sup>8</sup> Ministry of Health (2012) National Nutrition Surveillance System 2012 Report.

## 1.2 Overview of Programme

As seen above, major events have occurred in Gaza since the DFID programme ‘Improving food security for the people of Gaza’ was designed in 2011. These have had implications for the implementation of the programme, and motivated a few adjustments. We provide here a summary, along with a number of additional features of the programme that have been identified during the course of conducting the evaluation. This complements and builds on the information provided in the initial findings report and the baseline report produced in 2013. The evaluation was planned on the basis of this understanding of the main characteristics of the programme.

### 1.2.1 DFID’s programme: Improving food security for the people of Gaza

The programme built on DFID’s previous experience in the Gaza Strip. It provided predictable multi-year humanitarian financing to support cash-based and voucher-based approaches to reducing poverty and food insecurity in Gaza.<sup>9</sup> This is in accordance with convincing evidence from a number of countries that cash transfers can reduce inequality and the depth or severity of poverty,<sup>10</sup> and with DFID’s approach to providing dignified support to the poor to rise out of poverty.<sup>11,12</sup>

The DFID programme has run from 1 May 2011 until 31 March 2015. It has two components, one for refugees and the other for non-refugees:

1. The **Job Creation Programme** (JCP) implemented by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has aimed to improve income for vulnerable refugee households; and
2. The **Voucher Programme**<sup>13</sup> (VP) implemented by the World Food Programme (WFP), which has aimed to improve access to sufficient food for non-refugee households.

Both UNRWA’s JCP and WFP’s VP started before 2011, in 2001 and 2009 respectively. The four-year DFID funding was therefore partial funding for programmes that were already in existence. While the expected outcome of the DFID programme relates to poverty and food insecurity, each component had actually historically largely focused on only one aspect: the JCP on poverty, and the VP on food insecurity. This is reflected in the two expected outputs of the DFID programme presented in Figure 4.

---


<sup>9</sup> DFID (2011) Business Case ‘Improving Food Security Levels for People in Gaza’, August.

<sup>10</sup> DFID (2011) Cash Transfers Evidence Paper.

<sup>11</sup> DFID (2012) Operational Plan 2011-2015: DFID Palestinian Programme, July.

<sup>12</sup> DFID (2012) Summary of DFID’s work in the occupied Palestinian Territories 2011-2015, June.

<sup>13</sup> Previously called the Urban Voucher Programme (UVP).

**Figure 4** DFID Programme Results Chain


Source: DFID Business Case.

The unique approach to DFID funding is that it was not earmarked for specific sub-components of each of these programmes and it was multi-year. This provided an important degree of flexibility and commitment to the implementing organisations. DFID aimed to support a more effective approach to the management and implementation of these two programmes. The application of these principles of aid effectiveness is innovative in a humanitarian context. The innovative nature of this approach is one aspect the evaluation team has examined.

In total, the programme has provided £25.5 million as follows:<sup>14</sup>

- £14.4 million of initial funding for the UNRWA's JCP;
- £1.5 million uplift for the UNRWA's JCP in 2014;<sup>15</sup>
- £9.6 million of funding for the WFP's VP.

In response to the 2014 crisis, DFID also scaled up its support to WFP by £3 million. This was described in a separate business case covering DFID's humanitarian response to the Gaza crisis through WFP and UNRWA. It is not considered under this food security programme.

#### Box 1: Key social support programmes in Gaza

In Gaza there are three main social support programmes:

- **UNRWA's Job Creation Programme**, which aims to improve income for vulnerable refugee households. It is implemented by UNRWA directly;
- **WFP's Emergency Operation Programme (EMOP)**, which supports non-refugees through in-kind food distribution, combined food distribution (food and voucher) and voucher-based food distribution. These modalities are implemented by MoSA, Oxfam GB, Ma'an and Global Communities;<sup>16</sup>
- **MoSA's Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP)**, which targets poor non-refugees with cash transfers.

<sup>14</sup> An additional £100,000 was budgeted for evaluation.

<sup>15</sup> DFID (2014) Addendum to Business Case 3718535 for bridge funding and scale-up cost extensions.

<sup>16</sup> Was CHF International



### 1.2.2 Component 1 for refugees: UNRWA's Job Creation Programme (since 2001)

The UNRWA's JCP aims to provide income through short-term employment with priority given to persons classified as abject or absolute poor - according to a proxy-means test formula and/or a set of socioeconomic criteria.<sup>17</sup> Employment is provided to professional, skilled and unskilled persons based on their relevant qualifications and experience. Employment is for between three to twelve months and the rate of payment is set at three levels depending upon skill level: a monthly rate of NIS 970 for unskilled labour, NIS 1400 for skilled labour, and NIS 1900 for professionals. Employment is contracted directly by UNRWA Field Office for assignments performing functions on behalf of UNRWA (referred to as internal) and for assignments on behalf of other organisations (referred to as external). The external assignments are mostly on behalf of civil society organisations.

The JCP ostensibly serves the primary objective of reducing poverty. In reality the JCP serves a number of additional objectives, including promoting the employability of JCP beneficiaries and providing workers to perform functions on behalf of UNRWA. At present it is not clear how these objectives are prioritised and targeted. This has presented a significant challenge to the evaluation of the programme.

#### Box 2: Job Creation Programme eligibility criteria

The JCP is targeted at poor refugee households only. The poor classification has three categories:


- **Abject poverty:** The abject poverty line is set at an average of \$1.53 per person per day. Families falling below the abject poverty line are considered as unable to meet their essential food requirements. In other words, the abject poverty line is the minimum cost of food that satisfies the average nutritional needs (in terms of daily required calories) of families of different sizes.
- **Absolute Poverty:** The absolute poverty line is set at an average of \$3.65 per person per day. Families falling between the abject and absolute poverty lines are considered as unable to meet their essential non-food requirements. The absolute poverty line is estimated as the sum of the cost of the food basket with adequate nutritional intake and the cost of other basic needs such as education, health, shelter, clothing, transportation, and communication.
- **Social Safety Net Programme Beneficiary ('SSN'):** UNRWA has more recently added a third poor sub-category, SSN, to identify those poor families receiving food and cash under this UNRWA General Fund programme, in order to minimise assistance duplication.

Overall, UNRWA aims that 50% of JCP beneficiaries come from SSN and abject categories, and 50% come from the absolute poor category.

<sup>17</sup> The 2015 Occupied Palestinian Territories Emergency Appeal states the desired outcomes of JCP are: 'Food-insecure refugee households have increased economic access to cover basic food needs, through Cash-for-Work' and 'Men and women earn wages, short term, to cover their basic food needs and restore their coping capacities'

The JCP is a component of the UNRWA emergency programme. It is therefore a programme that is not embedded within the core General Fund of UNRWA. The impact of this funding modality is that, despite operating for more than twelve years, the programme remains subject to large fluctuations, depending on the overall funding available to the UNRWA emergency programme that year. In 2010, the JCP dispersed \$40m of funding through salaries to refugees, while in 2012 this dipped to below \$10m. This unsteady funding has had an impact on the performance of the programme under this DFID funding.

**Figure 5 JCP annual disbursement**



UNRWA's approach to the programme has also evolved over the course of DFID's funding. In particular, the evaluation team has examined the implications of the following decisions on the overall targeting of the poor under the JCP:

- When this DFID programme started, officially on 19 August 2011, UNRWA was in the process of introducing the proxy-means test formula it had developed in 2010 to improve poverty-based targeting. DFID funding was specifically to employ 5,300 of the poorest refugees, annually. An increase share of abject and absolute poor among JCP beneficiaries was an expected output of the DFID programme.
- Starting 1 April 2013, UNRWA began giving priority placement in the JCP to the poorest families from its Social Safety Net Programme. More than 10,000 Social Safety Net Programme beneficiaries<sup>18</sup> were to receive at least three months of employment and income during a 24-month period. This new system was to replace

<sup>18</sup> Historically, Social Safety Net beneficiaries were called Special Hardship Cases (SHC) who had been enrolled on the basis of categorical targeting (disabled, widows, etc.)

the practice of providing direct cash assistance on the basis of US\$10 per person per three-month period, which UNRWA had to cease due to funding constraints.<sup>19</sup>

- In 2014, DFID scaled up its funding to the JCP in order to meet the needs of younger refugee women. The £1.5 million uplift was provided to allow an additional 2,863 refugees to access short-term employment (generating a total of 200,608 working days), specifically for 2,439 women (85%) and 424 men (15%). The cost extension was also intended to support the private sector, helping unlock the potential of these young women and men to contribute to the Gazan economy.

### **1.2.3 Component 2 for non-refugees: WFP's Voucher Programme (since 2009)**

The Voucher Programme (VP) is a component of WFP's Emergency Operation Programme (EMOP). It aims to reduce food insecurity among the non-refugee population of Gaza by supporting beneficiary households to procure a specific part of their dietary requirement through existing market mechanisms. The intervention strategy behind the VP is based on providing beneficiaries with access to animal protein-rich food, especially locally produced dairy products, eggs and bread. The VP uses local shops as procurement and distribution mechanisms, ensuring cash is directly injected into the local economy at the micro level. This is designed to have a positive secondary economic impact on local production, employment and small businesses.

The approach of the VP also intends to ensure that beneficiaries can exercise some choice when selecting products and gives them flexibility as to when food is collected, compared to a more typical food distribution mechanism. The VP thereby allows beneficiaries to spend any resulting savings on other items, such as fish, meat, the repayment of debts, or other basic non-food expenditure. The VP promotes local production and procurement by making it conditional that items procured with the voucher are locally produced. According to the EMOP project document,<sup>20</sup> WFP specifically aims at reducing the share of households with poor food consumption scores, by preventing a decrease in the proportion of beneficiary household expenditure allocated to food, as well as promoting the procurement of locally-produced food.

---

<sup>19</sup> UNRWA Press Release on 21 March 2013: <http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=1682>.

<sup>20</sup> <http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/internal/documents/projects/wfp271062.pdf>

**Box 3: Comparing WFP modalities**

Under the **in-kind modality**, households receive a traditional food ration composed of wheat flour, pulses, oil, sugar and salt provided every two months.

Under the **voucher-only modality**, households receive a chip card that is credited weekly and can be used in designated shops to purchase defined types of essential food items (dairy products, eggs, pulses, rice, and vegetable oil, olive oil, cereal and canned fish).

Under the **combined modality**, households receive bag(s) of wheat flour every 2 months, as well as a similar chip card that is credited weekly but with a smaller value.

The VP is implemented in partnership with the international NGO Oxfam GB and the Palestinian NGO Ma'an Development Centre. WFP's partnership with Oxfam GB is governed by annual Field Level Agreements (FLAs) that serve as a framework for cooperation regarding the implementation of the VP. Under the current FLA, Oxfam GB is responsible for i) providing services for the implementation of the VP that are part of WFP's service provision agreements with donors and other humanitarian organizations such as UNICEF and ii) participating in the implementation of complementary activities such as WFP's Nutrition Awareness Campaign. Ma'an Development Centre is Oxfam GB's long-term partner in Gaza and is bound by a partnership agreement with Oxfam GB with clear terms of implementation and supervision in relation to the implementation of the VP fieldwork at a community level. All Ma'an's staff are supervised and followed up by Oxfam GB staff and all staff are subject to Oxfam GB's required terms of accountability and transparency. Project staff are associated with Oxfam GB at the technical level but with Ma'an at the field level.

Introduced as a pilot project in 2009, the VP has been regularly reviewed and fine-tuned.<sup>21</sup> In July 2011, WFP switched from paper vouchers to electronic vouchers (using smart cards and terminals in shops), a modality that has supported enhanced monitoring. The VP has also been gradually scaled-up as part of a plan to transition progressively from general food distribution (GFD) to food vouchers. On the basis of a positive internal mid-term review, the caseload was first increased in January 2012 from 15,000 beneficiaries (2,335 households) in three governorates to 30,000 (around 5,000 households) across all five governorates. A further scale-up to 50,000 beneficiaries (around 9,000 households) took place in January 2013. In addition, WFP started to assist 10,000 more persons (around 1,100 households) with a combined form of transfers (in-kind and voucher), as per the recommendations of an internal mid-term review conducted in 2012. The share of voucher-based transfers among WFP household-targeted transfers in Gaza has gradually grown, from 4% in 2009 to 6% in 2010-2011 to 13% in 2012 to 26% in 2013-2014 (Table 1).

---

<sup>21</sup> A brief timeline of the VP was provided in Annex 2 of the baseline report.

**Table 1** Transition from in-kind to vouchers planned over 2009-2014 (individuals)

Period	EMOP #	In-kind	Value-based voucher	Combined in-kind/vouchers
Jan-Dec 2009	108140	335,000	15,145	-
Jan-Apr 2010	108140 Revision N°6	242,654	15,145	-
May-Dec 2011	108140 Revision N°8	225,000	15,000	-
Jan-Dec 2012	200298	200,000	30,000	-
Jan-Dec 2013	200298 Revision N°2	170,000	50,000	10,000
Jan-June 2014	200298 Revision N°5	170,000	50,000	10,000
July-Dec 2014	200298 Revision N°6	170,000	50,000	10,000

Source: Authors based on WFP project documents.

Similar to the targeting of the beneficiaries under the GFD programme, VP beneficiaries are selected using a proxy-means test formula (PMTF) coupled with a food consumption score (FCS). WFP targets households with the biggest consumption gap, taking into consideration the Palestinian national poverty lines determined by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS) of 2007. Beneficiaries of MoSA's Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) who also receive food assistance are excluded from the VP.

#### Box 4: Voucher Programme eligibility criteria

WFP's VP beneficiaries are selected using a **proxy-means test formula (PMTF)** coupled with a **food consumption score (FCS)**. WFP targets households with the biggest consumption gap, taking into consideration the Palestinian national poverty lines determined by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS) of 2007.

Beneficiaries of MoSA's Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) who also receive food assistance are excluded from the VP. Both voucher-only and combined modalities target people living in high vulnerability, i.e., people who are below the deep poverty line and who have either poor or borderline FCS. Households targeted under the combined modality have a higher consumption gap in terms of poverty and not in terms of FCS.

The value of the voucher is aligned with the local market value of the in-kind ration (US\$ 12/person/month as of December 2012). Vouchers can be redeemed for bread, flour, rice, pulses, vegetable oil, dairy products and eggs, equivalent to a food basket that covers some 70% of a household's food needs. Items can be collected from any of the participating shops in the Gaza Strip - 46 shops in December 2012, increasing to over 70 in the five districts by February 2015.


Following the escalation of the conflict starting in July 2014, a budget revision to the 'Emergency food assistance to the non-refugee population in the Gaza Strip' (EMOP) 200298 proposed to temporarily provide food and voucher assistance to an additional 380,000 conflict affected persons (Table 2). As a result, the total number of beneficiaries receiving vouchers reached 435,000 persons in mid-2014: 60,000 under the regular component and 375,000 under the emergency component.

**Table 2** Emergency assistance for conflict-affected people in 2014 (individuals)

Period	EMOP #	In-kind	Value-based voucher	Combined in-kind/vouchers	Total vouchers
July-Oct 2014	200298 Revision N°7	350,000	375,000	-	725,000
Nov-Dec 2014	200298 Revision N°8	90,000	300,000	-	390,000
Nov-Dec 2014	200298 Revision N°8 (contingency)	100,000	90,000	-	190,000

Source: Authors based on WFP project documents.

In December 2014, 26% of WFP beneficiaries (excluding WFP support to institutions and school feeding) received voucher-based transfers - others would receive in-kind transfers only, distributed either by the MoSA or the international NGO Global Communities (Figure 6). In February 2015, a total of 59,630 individuals benefited from the VP: 50,086 beneficiaries of the voucher-only modality and 9,544 beneficiaries of the combined modality.

**Figure 6** Breakdown of WFP regular caseload per modality, as of December 2014


Source: Authors based on WFP EMOP 200298 Budget Revision N°6.

DFID support for the VP was expected to enable the participation of approximately 40% of the estimated caseload in 2015 (over 37,000 people). DFID's contribution was to represent a significant share (about 65%) of the 2011-2015 VP budgets, as estimated in 2011. Funding in Gaza is mostly of an emergency type, although the crisis is chronic and it is not possible to make a clear distinction between transitory and chronic poor. Using short-term emergency funding to assist chronically food insecure populations is problematic. Agencies are pushed to focus on immediate results rather than longer-term impact. The predictability of DFID funding was expected to allow WFP to invest in greater programme efficiencies and longer-term approaches.

### 1.3 Overview of Evaluation

The **evaluation team** contracted to carry out this work was composed of: two senior international consultants, namely Mr Matthew Waterfield (Team Leader) and Ms Cécile Cherrier (lead on quantitative analysis and WFP); one senior national consultant, Mr Imad Dayyah (lead on qualitative analysis and UNRWA); and in the final phase of the evaluation, Mr Laurence Hargreaves (research and logistics support). PAI and Atos Consulting provided quality assurance and management oversight of the programme and each of its deliverables. Mr Naim Mahmoud Al Khatib also supported the team during the focus group discussions (FGDs) in Gaza.

A **Project Steering Committee** (PSC) for the evaluation was formally established on 16 January 2013. The PSC is chaired by DFID Jerusalem, and includes representatives of UNRWA and WFP. Annex 4 presents the roles and responsibilities for the PSC, as established in January 2013. On 3 March 2014, the PSC decided to expand its terms of reference to include action points suggested in the baseline report.<sup>22</sup> Over the course of this evaluation, the PSC met in Jerusalem on several occasions, on an ad-hoc basis, including:

- First meeting on 16 January 2013 to establish the PSC formally, revisit the evaluation priorities, and review progress in the initial findings phase;
- Second meeting on 11 March 2013 to review the methodology report submitted by the evaluation team on 4 March 2013, review progress on the baseline phase of the evaluation, and agree on the way forward;
- Fifth meeting on 3 March 2014 to discuss the need to bring forward the final report to December 2014 instead of March 2015, and review progress by UNRWA and WFP on issues raised in the baseline report.

The original **terms of reference** (see Annex 3) state that the purpose of the evaluation is to assess the DFID intervention presented above, and ‘collect wider data that gives a more detailed assessment including any additional benefits due to certainty of funding, including wider economic benefits, unintended consequences, both positive and negative, of the programs.’ The terms of reference provide a very exhaustive list of the various attributes of the programme that the evaluation team was expected to assess. They include more than 42 different questions to be answered by the evaluation.

During the initial planning phase, the evaluation team identified that the list of evaluation questions in these original terms of reference was too long, considering the time permitted for this evaluation, if the team were to answer any of the questions in any significant depth. As stated in the terms of reference, a team of 2-3 consultants was foreseen to conduct the evaluation in two steps: a baseline study in the first year and a full final evaluation study in the last year of the project. A total of 110 days were allocated for the whole team for the initial findings and baseline phases in 2013, as well as the final evaluation phase in 2015. The scale of resources available for this evaluation limited the methodological options that

---

<sup>22</sup> Minutes of the Fifth Steering Committee on 3 March 2014.

could be considered. There was no provision for the collection of primary data through representative quantitative surveys. In addition, the evaluation team was contracted more than one year into the programme, in July 2012, and the start of the evaluation was further delayed; until September 2012 due to administrative issues, and until January 2013 due to security issues.

For these reasons, it was jointly agreed with DFID Jerusalem and the PSC that the evaluation would focus on a smaller set of questions to permit a more in depth and substantive assessment of the key programme attributes. Specifically, it was decided that the evaluation would primarily aim to guide the management of the existing programme and decisions regarding the follow up programme in 2015.<sup>23</sup> For DFID in particular, there is an interest in evaluating two specific innovative features in the Gaza context: multi-year funding, and cash-based interventions. The evaluation is to serve both accountability and learning purposes. Revised priority evaluation questions were decided upon in line with these particular focuses. They are presented and discussed in the initial findings report delivered by the evaluation team in February 2013, and summarised in sub-section 2.1 below.

Before the present final evaluation report, the evaluation team produced the following **deliverables**: an initial findings report, submitted on 7 February 2013; a methodology paper, submitted on 4 March 2013; and a baseline report, submitted on 9 May 2013. The team also presented and discussed preliminary findings from the final evaluation phase in Jerusalem on 6 March 2015.

The **target audience** for the evaluation is the five organisations directly involved in the programme, namely DFID, UNRWA, WFP, Oxfam GB and Ma'an. Findings are expected to be available to other donors to inform policy decisions around social assistance in the Gaza Strip. The evaluation team has not prepared a communication or dissemination plan for the three deliverables from this evaluation, as it is understood from the terms of reference that this is the responsibility of DFID and the implementing partners.

---

<sup>23</sup> Minutes of the First Steering Committee on 16 January 2013.



## 2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

The final agreed set of evaluation questions that the evaluation has attempted to answer represents a significant departure from the original terms of reference (see Annex 3). In this section, we present the new high-level evaluation questions and related sub-questions, as approved by the PSC in 2013 (sub-section 2.1). The evaluation questions are structured according to the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria. Note that this evaluation does not cover relevance or efficiency, as agreed during the baseline phase.<sup>24</sup> We then outline the methodology adopted to answer each of these questions (sub-section 2.2).

### 2.1 Theory of Change and High-Level Evaluation Questions

The Theory of Change that underpinned this programme is presented in Figure 7. This is taken from the Business Case for the programme.<sup>25</sup> The Theory of Change links two inputs (food – including food through vouchers - and cash from work) to two outputs (improved access to food and improved household income) that are each linked to two outcomes (improved food consumption for the household, and reduced household poverty). These outcomes each lead to two impact statements (reduced hunger and reduced economic hardship for food insecure and poor Gazans). The Business Case indicates that two assumptions were considered when developing the Theory of Change: that beneficiaries can be trusted and empowered to spend effectively, and that food and cash transfer options are likely to offer similar benefits in terms of humanitarian impact. DFID presumably made an implicit assumption, not detailed in the Business Case, that the inputs are experienced by beneficiaries for long enough to have a chance to result in an outcome.

The evaluation team examined the Theory of Change for the programme in terms of logic and evaluates the validity of the overall model, the links, and assumptions in a new paragraph and validity. The evaluation focused on the higher-level links in the results chain, namely from output to outcome and from outcome to impact. This is reflected in the priority questions and sub-questions that were addressed in the evaluation. The high-level priority questions to be addressed in both the baseline study and the final evaluation were selected in accordance with the DAC and Paris Declaration on the standards for an


---

<sup>24</sup> The reason for excluding efficiency was summarised in the baseline report: Gaza is not a competitive market where one can compare a range of providers on a Value-for-Money basis only. The two implementing partners charge the UN standard overhead rates, as laid out in the Business Case. The reason for excluding relevance of the programme was also summarised in the baseline report: Both VP and JCP were already established prior to this programme of DFID funding. Therefore an evaluation of how the original projects were designed to be relevant to the context of Gaza was not possible. Furthermore, the Business Case clearly highlights that the decision to deliver assistance to refugees through UNRWA and to non-refugees through WFP was made largely on the basis of critical considerations of their comparative advantages to access these populations in Gaza. Any consideration of the specific relevance of each of their specific programme interventions was secondary in nature as can be seen from the fact that the relevance of vouchers or cash was not examined in the Business Case.

<sup>25</sup> DFID (2011) Business Case 'Improving Food Security Levels for People in Gaza', August.

evaluation. Key areas for evaluation were identified as impact and effectiveness, coverage, coordination, coherence and sustainability.

**Figure 7** Theory of Change



Source: DFID Business Case.

In 2013, the PSC finalised a list of eleven specific sub-questions to be answered at the baseline and final evaluations.<sup>26</sup> This list of sub-questions was further adapted during the baseline phase of evaluation and were presented to the PSC during their second meeting on 11 March 2013. The final list of thirteen specific questions is presented in Table 3.

<sup>26</sup> See Figure 4 in the Initial findings report submitted in February 2013.

**Table 3** Evaluation questions

Category	No	Questions
Impact and Effectiveness	1	What is the impact of multi-year funding?
	2	What is the effectiveness and impact of the programmes on poverty and food insecurity?
	3	What is their secondary impact on the local economy?
	4	What is their secondary impact on wellbeing (due to exclusion of households)?
Coverage	5	What has been the coverage of the programme in terms of reaching eligible persons?
	6	Was there any systematic exclusion of certain groups of eligible people?
	7	Were there any systematic inclusions of ineligible people?
	8	What is the level of female participation?
Co-ordination	9	How good is the co-ordination between the two programmes, and between each programme and other programmes in Gaza?
	10	How good is the co-ordination in regard to beneficiary lists and targeting?
Coherence	11	How coherent is the programme with other programmes in Gaza (i.e. Is there any double counting among social transfer programmes)?
	12	How well have the programmes been aligned with the strategy of other key partners?
Sustainability	13	Are there any alternative more sustainable options to meet food security and poverty alleviation needs in Gaza?

Source: Baseline Report (May 2013).

## 2.2 Methodology

In line with the original terms of reference the evaluation team conducted three missions:

- 14-18 January 2013, to Jerusalem, for the initial findings phase of the evaluation;
- 11-15 March 2013, to Jerusalem and Gaza, for the baseline phase of the evaluation;
- 2-6 March 2015, to Jerusalem and Gaza, to complete the final evaluation.

As mentioned above, it is important to note that what is referred to as the baseline study actually cannot provide a snapshot of the situation prior to the programme. Although the DFID funding started in 2011, the JCP had been running since 2001 and the VP since 2009. In addition, the 'baseline study' was only undertaken in 2013, that is, in the middle of the four-year programme cycle.

No input from the evaluation team was anticipated between the baseline phase and the final evaluation phase. The work of DFID Jerusalem, UNRWA and WFP to ensure the data required (as detailed in the baseline report) was collected systematically would be imperative to the success of the final evaluation. We provide below an update on the methodology eventually adopted to answer each of the priority evaluation questions. This methodology was discussed with and approved by DFID Jerusalem in the Inception Phase. The evaluation questions are presented in detail in Annex 3.

The evaluation team relied on a mix of primary and secondary data, and a combination of quantitative and qualitative information. Secondary data has included statistical data from the PCBS, administrative data retrieved from UNRWA and WFP management systems, as well as data extracted from relevant ad-hoc studies. A literature review was completed in the baseline phase to gather evidence on poverty and food security in Gaza, and also on cash and voucher programmes and how they apply in Gaza. References to this literature are included in footnotes throughout this report and the baseline report. The project bibliography annexed to this report lists this literature.

Primary data was collected through key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The FGD tools were pilot tested and validated in the baseline phase and, following this pilot testing, were modified by i) including non-beneficiaries as a comparison group and ii) by administering them directly in Arabic by the Qualitative Data lead.

- 49 informants were interviewed including DFID, UNRWA, WFP, Oxfam GB, Ma'an and others. Annex 5 provides the complete list of key informants interviewed during the course of the evaluation. Annex 6 lists the main questions that guided the semi-structured interviews.
- A total of 82 persons participated in the FGDs, including 18 who participated in both March 2013 and March 2015 (Table 4). Annex 7 presents the main questions that guided these discussions. A total of eight participants were randomly selected from the governorate of Gaza City among the following groups:
  - JCP beneficiaries;
  - JCP non-beneficiaries, drawn from the JCP waiting list;
  - VP beneficiaries;
  - VP non-beneficiaries drawn from the list of GFD beneficiaries;
  - VP participating vendors.

The selection of the FGD participants from UNRWA's database took the following steps:

a. Beneficiaries

- Identify the total population that are registered for receiving benefit under DFID's grant to JCP;
- Identify the total benefited people from the grant;
- Identify the old list of the benefited people from the baseline stage;
- Our methodology called for 9 new beneficiaries from the beneficiaries list in addition to 4 people from the old list of beneficiaries;
- The 9 new beneficiaries were selected by dividing the total beneficiary population by 9 to give an interval  $n$ , and selecting the first, first +  $n$ , first +  $2n$ , etc., based on a random start number between 0 and  $n$ , and choosing the first male or female beneficiary after this number aiming for 4 male and 5 females;
- The 4 old beneficiaries were selected in a similar way;
- The old and new selected beneficiaries were invited to the FGD by mobile phone.

b. Non-beneficiaries

- Identify the total number of non-beneficiaries;
- Identify the old list of the non-beneficiaries from the baseline stage;
- Our methodology called for 8 new non-beneficiaries in addition to 5 old non-beneficiaries;
- The 8 new non-beneficiaries were selected by dividing the total non-beneficiary population by 8 to give an interval  $n$ , and selecting the first, first +  $n$ , first +  $2n$ , based on a random start number between 0 and  $n$ , and choosing the first male or female beneficiary after this number aiming for 4 male and 4 females;
- The old non-beneficiaries were selected in a similar way;
- The old and new selected non-beneficiaries were invited to the FGD by mobile phone.

The same approach applied to the WFP VP FGDs. This random selection of FGD participants was performed in the UNRWA and WFP central offices, and equal numbers of men and women were invited. In some FGDs not all the women invited attended, likely for cultural reasons. However, the highly experienced local FGD facilitator took care to ensure women's perspectives were adequately represented in the FGDs by ensuring the women present had the opportunity to speak around half of the duration of the FGD. The FGDs were held in the UNRWA and WFP offices, although UNRWA and WFP staff did not attend, in order to create an atmosphere of openness.

**Table 4** Overview of focus group discussions conducted

FGDs conducted in March 2013	FGDs conducted in March 2015
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JCP beneficiaries (N=9)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– including 5 women</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JCP beneficiaries (N=10)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– including 5 women</li> <li>– including 2 interviewed in March 2013</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JCP non-beneficiaries (N=10)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– including 5 women</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• JCP non-beneficiaries (N=13)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– including 5 women</li> <li>– including 5 interviewed in March 2013</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• VP beneficiaries (N=16)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Including 8 women</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• VP beneficiaries (N=16)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Including 7 women</li> <li>– including 7 interviewed in March 2013</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• VP non-beneficiaries (N=8)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Including no women</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• VP non-beneficiaries (N=10)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Including 1 woman</li> <li>– including 4 interviewed in March 2013</li> </ul> </li> <li>• VP participating vendors (N=8)</li> </ul>
Four FGDs with a total of 43 participants	Five FGDs with a total of 57 participants

### 2.2.1 *Impact and Effectiveness*

#### *Impact of multi-year funding*

The evaluation team has attempted to examine the extent to which DFID's multi-year funding enabled implementing organisations to be more efficient: planning activities better, saving time on administrative tasks, procuring at lower prices, providing longer contracts, investing in equipment, etc. Efforts were also made to uncover any impact of multi-year funding on beneficiaries. Specific questions were included in semi-structured interviews with DFID, UNRWA, WFP, Oxfam GB and Ma'an. Questions were also included in FGDs with beneficiaries to appreciate whether, as a result of multi-year funding, they had been better informed about the duration of assistance, and whether this had resulted in seeing the provided transfers as a predictable and reliable source of assistance, which could enable them to plan better and feel more confident about the future.

#### *Programme effectiveness and primary impact*

The evaluation has aimed at defining whether and to what extent the programme has achieved its expected outcome and impact. As defined in the programme's Theory of Change and Log Frame, these are primarily concerned with reducing the severity of monetary poverty and hunger among vulnerable Gazans (Figure 4 and Figure 6). Acknowledging the limits of the programme Log Frame,<sup>27</sup> the evaluation team considered the following three key indicators to estimate the impact of the intervention on economic hardship and hunger reduction through: household poverty gap (using the PMTF); share of household expenditure allocated to food (WFP methodology); and FCS (WFP methodology). However, as detailed in the initial findings and baseline reports, this presented numerous methodological challenges:

- The impact evaluation had to be conducted ex-post. The evaluation team was contracted in the middle of the four-year programme, and no prospective impact evaluation had been built into programme design and implementation.
- The Gaza context makes the establishment of a counterfactual to isolate the specific impact that can be attributed to the programme particularly challenging. Nearly 80% of the Gaza Strip population, refugees and non-refugees alike, currently receive some form of assistance.<sup>28</sup> WFP alone has been assisting over half the non-refugee population in Gaza—285,000 out of 542,600 persons in 2012.<sup>29,30</sup>
- The available household survey data - namely, the Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS), the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and the Socio Economic

<sup>27</sup> These limits were discussed in the baseline report, and are outlined in the sub-section 2.2.6 of this report.

<sup>28</sup> SEFSec 2011

<sup>29</sup> WFP (2012) Budget Revision No. 2 to occupied Palestinian territory Emergency Operation 200298 'Emergency food assistance to the non-refugee population in the Gaza Strip'

<sup>30</sup> PCBS (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics) (2012) On the Eve of the International Day of Refugees, 20 June, [http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/\\_pcbs/PressRelease/RefuDay2012E.pdf](http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_pcbs/PressRelease/RefuDay2012E.pdf)

and Food Security annual survey (SEFSec) - could not be used for the purposes of this evaluation, due to periodicity and representation issues.

- Due to resource constraints, undertaking a specific representative survey to estimate the impact of the programme on beneficiary households was beyond the scope of this evaluation.

#### Box 5: Main sources of quantitative data on poverty and food security

In the absence of updated SEFSec, LFS and PECS data, our evaluation methodology relies on three main sources of quantitative data to measure the impact of the programme:

**Measuring household poverty through Proxy Means Test Formula (PMTF).** In Gaza, poverty is traditionally measured based on the PMTF tool and not based on actual expenditure/income data. PMTF is an instrument to estimate the household or individual welfare level to determine the person's eligibility for assistance, when combined with the poverty line levels extracted from the Palestinian Household Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS). (Unfortunately the PECS 2014 survey was not completed and so PMTF data is all based on PECS 2007 poverty lines. The PMTF tool aims to predict household expenditure on the basis on a number of easily observable characteristics. This formula takes into consideration vulnerability factors such as household employment patterns, household size, availability of assets and household indebtedness.

MoSA developed the PMTF with the support of the World Bank and started to use the PMTF methodology to target its Social Hardship Cases in July 2010 for its Social Transfer programme supported by the Palestinian Authority budget (health component), the EU Delegation/World Bank (cash component) and WFP (food component). UNRWA and WFP both make use of the PMTF, but weight the vulnerability factors differently, according to their own objectives and programmatic needs.

The PECS definition of poverty line levels is based on a budget of basic needs for a family of 5 persons (2 adults and 3 children). Two poverty lines were developed according to actual spending patterns of Palestinian families. The first—termed “deep (extreme) poverty line” - was calculated to reflect a budget for food, clothing and housing. The second line - termed “official (relative) poverty line” - adds other necessities including utensils and bedding, housekeeping supplies, health care, personal care, education and transportation.<sup>31</sup> Unfortunately the PECS 2014 survey was not completed and so PMTF data is all based on PECS 2007 poverty lines.

**Measuring Household Expenditure:** This is an indicator used by WFP. In most WFP assessments, poverty line information is not available. In this case, WFP measure economic vulnerability using the ‘food expenditure share’ indicator. This indicator is based on the premise that the greater the importance of food within a household's overall budget (relative to other consumed items/services) the more economically vulnerable the household. The ‘food expenditure share’ indicator is constructed by dividing the total food expenditures by the total household expenditures. The denominator and numerator should include the value of non-purchased foods consumed.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Adapted from Al-Sahel (2015), p10

<sup>32</sup> [https://resources.vam.wfp.org/sites/default/files/CARI%20Technical%20Guidance\\_Final.pdf](https://resources.vam.wfp.org/sites/default/files/CARI%20Technical%20Guidance_Final.pdf)

**Measuring Food Consumption Scores (FCS):** This is an indicator used by WFP. The FCS is a composite score based on dietary diversity, food frequency, and relative nutritional importance of different food groups. Information is collected through household interviews where the household is asked about frequency of consumption (in days) of 8 food groups over a recall period of the past 7 days. The consumption frequency of each food group is multiplied by a weight based on its nutrient content. Those values are then summed obtaining the FCS. The FCS is then used to categorise the households into acceptable consumption, borderline consumption and poor consumption.<sup>33</sup>

In the absence of updated SEFSec, LFS and PECS data, our evaluation was thus dependent on UNRWA and WFP providing quantitative data, either extracted from their administrative and monitoring systems or collected through specific studies they would have commissioned. This information was triangulated and completed with qualitative methods, KIIs and FGDs, as well as other secondary information (situation analysis reports, monitoring reports, etc.).

UNRWA provided only limited quantitative information. The JCP appears to have an adequate monitoring regime but a very weak evaluation regime. UNRWA Gaza Field Office reported they had limited resources for conducting monitoring and evaluation (M&E) on the project, and had not conducted anything approaching an evaluation of JCP at any point in its history. They also confirmed they had no connection with the UNRWA M&E unit in Amman. The evaluation team managed to retrieve some information from the UNRWA databases during its visit to Gaza in March 2013, albeit efforts were limited by the lack of communication between PMTF and JCP databases. For the final evaluation, the team was able to also draw from a first independent annual review of EC funding to JCP conducted by Transtec.

In contrast, the evaluation has relied heavily on quantitative studies conducted by WFP. Regular WFP monitoring and evaluation arrangements make it possible to provide pre-post estimates of the impact of the VP.<sup>34</sup> However, in the absence of a counterfactual, this would not allow for the isolation of the specific impact of the programme. Encouraged by the evaluation team, WFP agreed to attempt to provide difference-in-differences estimates, comparing changes in status between 2011 and 2014-2015 for VP beneficiaries, GFD beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.<sup>35</sup> A specific study was designed to answer the following policy questions (and inform future programming):

- What would have been the status of vulnerable households without the intervention?
- Are vouchers more effective than food-based transfers?
- Are combined transfers more effective than vouchers?

<sup>33</sup> Adapted from Al-Sahel (2015), p. 6

<sup>34</sup> Comparing the *status* (food consumption score, and possibly poverty gap index) of beneficiary households before they entered the programme in 2011 and at the end of the programme in 2014/2015

<sup>35</sup> Comparing the *changes* in poverty and food security status between the start and the end of the programme of beneficiary households and non-beneficiary households



## WFP Survey Methodology

The survey was administered with samples of beneficiary households of the two voucher modalities for whom FCS and PMTF scores were collected in 2011, and a comparison sample of non-beneficiary households who were interviewed and put on the VP beneficiaries waiting list in 2011. The survey also included a sample of households interviewed in 2011, and have been benefitting from WFP's in-kind food assistance modality since then.

For comparative purposes two groups were formulated at the onset of the assignment, the first group included the VP beneficiaries (the voucher-only and the combined modalities) which comprised the study group, while the second group represented the comparison group and included non-beneficiaries. The sample size for each group was calculated to be 364 households, which was sufficient to conduct hypotheses testing with margin of errors of no more than 4%. A stratified random sample of households was selected from each group to make estimation of indicators from the sample data more efficient, and to make all four groups as similar as possible for purposes of conducting hypotheses testing. Stratification was done using three levels:

- a. Household size categories to ensure self-weighted representation of all household size categories;
- b. FCS to ensure self-weighted representation of the two levels of food consumption; i.e. poor and borderline; and
- c. Gender of the beneficiary to ensure that women-headed households were represented in the sample.

Sample size allocation to different strata was first done using proportional allocation which gave larger strata a larger share of the sample size, and then this proportional allocation was manually adjusted to make all four groups samples as similar with regard to the stratification variables as possible. Sample selection within each stratum was done electronically using systematic random sampling procedure.<sup>36</sup>

The household survey was conducted in December 2014-January 2015, a few months after the 2014 escalation of hostilities. This posed two challenges. First, it was not possible to locate a number of the randomly selected non-beneficiary households who had become displaced as a result of the assault. Second, some of the non-beneficiary households visited were found to have been benefitting from another food and social assistance programme between 2011 and 2014, and were thus omitted from the analysis. This rendered the difference-in-differences analysis less optimal than originally planned.

### **Programme secondary impacts**

To examine the secondary impact of the programme on the local economy, the evaluation team has largely relied on WFP's monitoring system. This focuses on assessing the direct impact of the VP on the beneficiary households as well as the changes in the dairy supply

---

<sup>36</sup> Al-Sahel (2015) Evaluation Survey of the Food Voucher Intervention in the Gaza Strip under WFP/State of Palestine Emergency Operation (EMOP): Key Findings Report in Impact Indicators, Draft, 12 March

chain, which is one of the main locally produced commodities of the VP. The monitoring system aims to quantify both the impact of the VP on the beneficiary households, as well as the trickle down economic effects of the voucher system on the various local actors of the dairy supply chain (from dairy processors, to local producers/farmers and retailers). The system was piloted in 2011, and rolled out two years later in 2013. The second round of monitoring, which took place in June 2014, collected primary data from beneficiary households, participating retailers, local dairy producers whose commodities are redeemed through the electronic vouchers, and farmers supplying fresh milk to these producers. The evaluation team also conducted FGD with VP participating vendors.

Different sources of information were used to investigate the secondary impact of the programme on wellbeing. UNRWA and WFP internal administrative and monitoring data enabled quantifying female participation. FGDs with beneficiaries provided insights into the effects of each component on gender empowerment, nutrition and self-esteem. This was completed with findings from other qualitative studies.

### **2.2.2 Coverage**

The evaluation aimed to quantify the coverage of each programme component, and investigate any systematic inclusion of ineligible people, as well as any systematic exclusion of certain groups of eligible people. The ideal approach to measuring inclusion and exclusion errors would be to utilise survey data to determine these errors in a statistically significant manner from the entire refugee and non-refugee population. As this was not possible, the evaluation team has examined how the programme policy exposes the targeting to specific types of errors. It has attempted to investigate the reasons for any deficiencies in coverage, including exclusion by policy and targeting design, exclusion due to lack of overall resources to meet the needs, and exclusion due to lack of a functionality in the implementation of the targeting and enrolment processes. KIIs and FGDs, as well as existing targeting assessments, provided valuable information. On the basis of administrative data provided by UNRWA and WFP, as well as statistical data on target populations, the evaluation team has considered, whenever possible, the following indicators:

- Share of poor households and persons reached;
- Share of food insecure households and persons reached;
- Share of refugee and non-refugee populations reached;
- Share of eligible households (as per the respective eligible criteria) reached;
- Share of ineligible households included in the programme;
- Overall percentage of female participation in each component.

### **2.2.3 Co-ordination**

The evaluation has examined the inter-institutional coordination arrangements in place to ensure a coordinated approach to poverty reduction through cash transfers and job creation programmes in Gaza. On the basis of KIIs and documentation, the evaluation team considered the following specific points:

- Coordination between the two programmes;
- Overall co-ordination with other social assistance programmes targeted at refugees;
- Overall co-ordination with other social assistance programmes targeted at non-refugees.

#### **2.2.4 Coherence**

The evaluation has examined the coherence in the various cash transfer and labour market programmes in Gaza at the strategic and policy level. This was based on a review of relevant policies and strategies of key partners (MoSA, UNRWA, WFP, the European Commission and the World Bank) to determine the level of strategic alignment and potential for duplication - in particular, potential for overlap in targeting, including between MoSA assistance and VP and JCP. FGDs provided further insights.

#### **2.2.5 Sustainability**

The political impasse means the context in Gaza is incredibly complex in relation to sustainability. The long-term solution to poverty and food insecurity in Gaza is economic growth following the removal of the blockade. The entrenched political impasse means that it is not realistic, under present conditions, to expect projects in this sector to have a long lasting sustainable impact on employment or poverty. Therefore the evaluation has limited the assessment to reviewing the various alternative options under the present status quo. These have been reviewed in terms of the efficiency, effectiveness, appropriateness and scalability of each option. The detailed options examined have been as follows:

- WFP's general food distribution;
- WFP's pilot combined voucher-food assistance project;
- WFP's conditional voucher programme;
- UNRWA's Social Safety Net Programme;
- PA's Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme.

#### **2.2.6 Evaluation Limitations**

It must be noted first that the programme's targets were set assuming that the poverty and food security situations in Gaza would not get any worse. In reality, Israeli military strikes on Gaza in 2012 and 2014 (during the lifetime of DFID's support to the programmes) had a substantially negative effect on poverty and food security. For some indicators, particularly WFP's indicator that tracks number of households with improved FCS, this means that targets have not been achieved, although the overall project impact remains good.

The evaluation had three major limitations. First, the indicators set in the Log Frame were only partially useful in evaluating the performance of the programme. Several of them are not relevant to the stated objectives of the programme and can even be misleading. For instance, there is an inconsistency between the stated overall objective of the DFID programme (reduced food insecurity *severity* among the poor and food insecure) and the chosen impact indicators (food insecurity *rate*). Second, JCP is not guided by a standard Log Frame: 'UNRWA does not have targets for the JCP that are set in terms of impact and

outcomes ... The impact and outcome directly correspond to the level of available funds.<sup>37</sup> The lack of any JCP Log Frame meant that completing the DFID Log Frame required UNRWA to perform non-routine calculations as the indicators were not systematically tracked. Finally, completing the Log Frame depends largely upon external data sources that measure poverty and food security (PECS, PMTF and SEFSec). It was expected that these would be run in 2014, and the evaluation would draw on these, but the conflict situation of summer 2014 caused these to be postponed. This means that the final Log Frame is rather patchy, as shown in the summary in Table 5 and in Annex 2.

---

<sup>37</sup> Evaluators' correspondence with UNRWA, May 2015

### 3 FINDINGS

In this section, we build on findings from both the March 2013 and March 2015 missions. While the baseline study conducted in March 2013 was not designed as a mid-term review, it collected useful information on progress, challenges and opportunities of the programme. The section begins with a summary of the programme Log Frame, and then is structured along the main evaluation questions: impact and effectiveness, coverage, coordination, coherence and sustainability, answering each the 13 priority questions in turn.

#### 3.1 Theory of Change and Summary Log Frame

It has not been possible to quantify the programmes' impact, due to lack of data on poverty and food insecurity, although some conclusions are drawn below from qualitative data. In terms of outcome, there has been a moderate under-achievement in terms of the number of households reporting improved FCS from the VP, which is likely to be due to the conflict in 2014 affecting food security conditions. Participating VP shops also increased sales slightly more than expected. JCP's target outcome has been substantially under-achieved, as far fewer abject and absolute poor refugees have benefited from JCP than UNRWA data initially indicated. In terms of outputs, JCP has a mixed track record. It is creating more work-days than planned for both men and women, but is spreading them out over a large beneficiary pool, so that more people obtain shorter placements. See Table 5 below.

The Theory of Change model proposed in the Business Case has proved invalid in several aspects, both in terms of the proposed linkages between outputs, outcomes and impact, and in some underpinning assumptions. This evaluation has found that this programme did not have any significant impact on poverty status and poverty gap (see 3.2.2), which was the key change predicted by model. Given the deep structural nature of Gaza's poverty situation connected with the ongoing blockade, it was unrealistic to have linked these food security interventions to improved poverty outcomes and impacts. It is also the case that the JCP did not have any sustainable and significant impact on food security among beneficiary refugees (see 3.2.2), which was the change predicted by the model. It was unrealistic to have linked a cash-for-work scheme to improved food security, bearing in mind the very short-term nature of the inputs: the reported average waiting time for a three month position is between five and seven years.

The implicit assumption in the Theory of Change that households involved in JCP would experience a more sustained increase in income sufficient to have a more durable outcome in terms of food security was inappropriate. Most households were, on average, receiving income from JCP for a very limited duration.

The assumption that beneficiaries could be trusted and empowered to spend effectively was, however, seen to be correct, both in terms of the VP (which was tightly constrained by the food basket) and JCP, where JCP wages were prioritised on food spending well ahead of non-food spending, as expected (see 3.2.2).

**Table 5** Project performance summary

Ass't level	Indicator	Target 2014	Achieved 2014	Evaluation
Impact	Poverty Gap Index	3	n/a	No data
	Food insecurity among non-refugees	53%	n/a	No data
	Food insecurity among refugees	48%	n/a	No data
Outcome	Annual number of households with improved FCS among non-refugees (a)	5,740	4,242 <sup>38</sup>	Moderate under-achievement
	Percentage of VP participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme (b)	90%	93%	Moderate over-achievement
	Percentage of abject and absolute poor refugees benefiting from the JCP (c)	75%	15% abject 2.5% absolute <sup>39</sup>	Substantial under-achievement
Output	Number of work days created annually for men (c)	357,500	432,042	Substantial over-achievement
	Number of work days created annually for women (c)	192,500	271,394 <sup>40</sup> (96,764)	Substantial over-achievement
	Average number of work days per beneficiary (c)	104	53 <sup>41</sup>	Substantial under-achievement
	Number of JCP direct beneficiaries employed annually (c)	5,300	9,960	Substantial over-achievement
	Average number of 4-voucher booklets distributed monthly (c)	5,740	4,244 <sup>42</sup>	Substantial under-achievement
	Total cumulative monetary value of commodities indirectly supplied to beneficiaries (c)	9,205,504 USD	7,874,886 USD	Moderate under-achievement

Sources: (a) Al-Sahel (2015) (b) WFP, Secondary impact of voucher programme on local economy survey (2014) (c) UNRWA

## 3.2 Impact and Effectiveness

### 3.2.1 What is the impact of multi-year funding?

**Multi-year funding has allowed WFP to improve the quality of its assistance, in particular by investing in an e-voucher platform.** This platform not only enhanced accountability and programmatic monitoring, but also allowed a very quick response to the 2014 acute crisis. KIIs and FGDs revealed that WFP and its implementing partners used the efficiency of the electronic system to respond to complaints and rapidly respond to requests by beneficiaries to modify the list of approved food products. The improvements in the monitoring, management and complaints systems have, to some degree, been brought about by the multi-year funding permitting WFP to invest in the systems operating the VP.

<sup>38</sup> This is based on data for 10,100 households reporting in 2014 that had an improved FCS score. WFP believe that 50% and 42% of this is attributable to DFID funding

<sup>39</sup> Assuming 50% JCP beneficiaries are in the abject and SSN categories, and 50% are in the absolute poor categories, as per UNRWA's objective

<sup>40</sup> Including the £1.5m uplift. In parentheses, the figure without the uplift

<sup>41</sup> UNRWA notes that this figure may under-represent the actual output as some contracts span between 2014 and 2015. However, this is unlikely to affect the rating 'substantial under-achievement'. Further data was not available

<sup>42</sup> Assuming 42% DFID attribution, as reported by WFP

The electronic platform also opens up a range of monitoring opportunities through barcode scanning, remote monitoring of nutritional intake or brand choices. The e-voucher platform has potential to be expanded to support future multi-donor assistance programmes. The e-voucher system allowed WFP to respond to the 2014 conflict very quickly, reaching an additional 300,000 beneficiaries. The e-platform is also spurring other partners, such as UNICEF and MDM (*Médecins du Monde*), to consider using the platform for other products, such as clothes and health care. Multi-year funding also encouraged WFP to run a gender empowerment programme alongside the VP, with the consequent secondary social and nutritional impacts (as discussed in sub-section 3.2.3 below). Overall, it is particularly apparent that WFP has been able to capitalise on the multi-year funding to improve the quality of the programming.



Sample of electronic voucher (WFP)

*“A male beneficiary told me once that he started to feel like a human being, as he can hold a credit card in his pocket.”*

Ma’an Project Officer interviewed on 5 March 2015

DFID’s funding covers around 40% of the VP budget. Other funding comes from ECHO and Canadian funding. Funding of ECHO is annual, not multi-year. For implementing partner staff, participating shops and beneficiaries, the duration of contract/service has remained six months, with possible extension. Ma’an indicated that this was clearly communicated to shop owners and beneficiaries. Starting in 2014, beneficiaries began receiving SMSs informing them of the duration of the service. Phone numbers are updated constantly and communication takes place during visits and meeting with people. Most VP beneficiaries who participated in FGDs indicated not knowing for how long they would receive the vouchers, although they had received them for years. Still, they indicated that they viewed vouchers as a predictable and reliable source of assistance. The magnetic card by itself gives an indication of continuity. They all prefer the voucher system; shops are transparently monitored, and there is no need for monthly visits to the shops to collect the coupons.<sup>43</sup> Overall, beneficiaries see vouchers as an essential and reliable source of assistance. They wait for them from one week to the next.

<sup>43</sup> VP beneficiaries used to receive SMS informing them they should come to collect their monthly coupons

*“The voucher items cover 75% of our needs at home.”*

Male VP beneficiary interviewed on 14 March 2013

*“A female beneficiary told me that she can now provide a diverse meal to her children. Previously she used to receive a small amount of money from her husband’s income which didn’t cover all their needs.”*

Ma’an Project Officer interviewed on 5 March 2015



Female VP beneficiary using her e-voucher (WFP/Eyad Al Baba)

**By contrast, there is no discernible impact of multi-year funding on the JCP component.** UNRWA staff indicated that DFID’s multi-year funding allowed them to plan better internally. JCP was typically funded through emergency and flash appeals so the DFID funding was helpfully longer-term. However, it is not clear what improvements have been made internally within UNRWA as a result of the multi-year funding commitments made by DFID. UNRWA does not appear to have leveraged the longer-term funding, as WFP had by investing in a new platform - no new software/processes was established. From the beneficiary perspective too, there was no change in the programme as a result of the DFID multi-year funding. Contract duration has remained unchanged, as set in the JCP Technical Instructions.

DFID is currently the fourth-largest donor to UNRWA.<sup>44</sup> All DFID’s support to UNRWA is provided on a multi-year basis - when only very few donors provide dependable, multi-year commitments. DFID’s current Operational Plan (2011-2015) commits to £106.5 million of multi-year funding to UNRWA’s General Fund. A recent Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) review concluded that ‘several improvements, such as increased transparency, introduction of a value-for-money agenda and a move towards a more evaluative approach, can, in part, be attributed to UNRWA’s relationship with DFID.’<sup>45</sup> However, the same review warns that, in order to ensure sustainability of UNRWA’s assistance model, critical decisions must be made urgently and the pace of reform accelerated. At present, it is not clear whether UNRWA is in a position to do this.

### ***3.2.2 What is the effectiveness and impact of the programmes on poverty and food insecurity?***

**Achievement against the poverty-related impact target cannot be assessed against the chosen Log Frame indicators.** The first impact indicator ‘poverty gap index’ was to be measured by the PECS, but the PCBS has conducted no PECS since 2010. It is thus not

<sup>44</sup> DFID’s total contribution to UNRWA was £173.2 million during the period 2008-12, the fourth largest one, after the United States, the European Union (EU) and Sweden. In addition, the UK supplies further funding to UNRWA, indirectly, through its contribution to the EU, amounting to 15% of the total EU budget.

<sup>45</sup> ICAI (Independent Commission for Aid Impact) (2013) DFID’s Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA, Report 27, September 2013.




possible to assess progress quantitatively against this indicator. The impact analysis of the VP component we will present below, which is based on alternative WFP data, suggests the VP programme had no significant impact on poverty status and poverty gap (sub-section 3.2.2). While there is no comparable alternative data for UNRWA to replace the PECS, the JCP component can be expected to have a similar lack of impact (sub-section 3.2.2).

**None of the food insecurity-related impact targets were reached; and food insecurity levels remain on the rise.** Progress against the food-insecurity impact indicators can be tracked using annual SEFSec survey data. This is summarised in Table 6 and illustrated in Figure 8. The 2011 SEFSec survey reported food insecurity rates already lower than the 2014 target set in the DFID Log Frame. Unfortunately, 2012 SEFSec survey results depicted a deteriorated situation, which represented an almost complete reversal of the progressive improvements in food security that took place over the 2009-2011 period, when overall food insecurity in Palestine fell to 27%. In the Gaza Strip, the food insecure category soared from 44% of households in 2011 to an alarming 57% in 2012. This negative trend was confirmed by the 2013 SEFSec survey. The food insecurity level in Gaza remains at 57%, unchanged from 2012 level, and higher than the 2010 baseline level. Since 2009, non-refugees in the Gaza Strip are worse off with higher levels of food insecurity compared to the refugee population. The SEFSec report analyses that increased food insecurity stems from a decrease in purchasing power of Palestinian families which in turn is directly related to restrictions on access to land, water and economic markets, combined with reduced international aid and the PA's fiscal crisis.

**Table 6** Progress against impact indicators

Impact indicators	Data source	Baseline 2010	Achieved 2011	Achieved 2012	Achieved 2013	Achieved 2014	Target 2014
Poverty Gap Index	PECS	5	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	3
Food insecurity among non-refugees	SEFSec	55%	48%	60%	63%	n/a	53%
Food insecurity among refugees	SEFSec	50%	42%	56%	54%	n/a	48%

Source: Authors based on DFID Business Case, PECS 2010, SEFSec 2011, SEFSec 2012, SEFSec 2013.

**Figure 8** Household food insecurity levels in the Gaza Strip, 2009-2013


Source: Authors based on SEFSec reports.

### **Impact of UNRWA's Job Creation Programme**

**The JCP's mixed objectives make evaluation of impact difficult.** There is no quantitative data at this stage to determine the labour market impacts of the programme. The JCP appears to have a very weak M&E regime and the data that has been provided to determine impact has been inconsistent. In terms of M&E, there is a verification unit and an M&E unit. The verification unit is an internal JCP unit that verifies contract terms, payments and days of absence, while the M&E unit is an external cross-programme unit that completes the annual expenditure survey. These units provide information which could form the basis for a measure of achievements, although beneficiaries reported that this most likely does not occur. The annual expenditure survey aims to know how refugees spend their money, although this is a very new survey and the most recent report is not ready. In 2013, this survey showed that 79% of beneficiaries reported spending some of their JCP wages on food, and that wages were typically spent thus: 30% on food, 10% on paying off food debt to local stores, and then, in decreasing amounts, on savings, non-food debt, clothes, health, educational materials, transport, utilities, gifts, cigarettes, and phone bills.<sup>46</sup> Overall, it seems that JCP wages, in line with expectations for those suffering from food insecurity, are prioritised on food, although without targets expressed in JCP, it is hard to put this study into context. Overall, the expenditure survey is likely to be of limited use, as it is not testing either food security or poverty.

UNRWA JCP team considers that the primary purpose of the programme is to reduce poverty through a 'cash-for-work' mechanism, with a much higher proportion of coverage within the unskilled category of the JCP. The team 'does not envisage steady job creation' despite the name of the programme, and acknowledged that UNRWA's in-kind food support is the main support mechanism to the refugees in Gaza.<sup>47</sup> The majority of positions made available through JCP are for less than 3 months' duration, apparently to maximise the

<sup>46</sup> UNRWA (2013) Job Creation Programme: Income Use Rapid Assessment, June

<sup>47</sup> Interview with UNRWA's JCP staff on 4 March 2015

number of beneficiaries. Based on the figures provided by UNRWA, there has been a decrease in direct coverage of those in abject poverty from 9% in 2011 to 3% in 2014.<sup>48</sup> There is no evidence to demonstrate that the objective that more than 10,000 Social Safety Net beneficiaries<sup>49</sup> were to receive at least three months of employment and income during a 24-month period has not been met. In addition, FTEs were offered to 0.5% of absolute poor in 2014.

**A total of 4,970 full time equivalent (FTE) positions were created by JCP in 2014.** The total number of reported FTE positions created in 2014 is represented in Table 7. There has been no data provided to compare this with data from previous years, nor are there any data to demonstrate that the programme has impacted on abject and absolute poverty. The total number of reported jobs created was 1,110 for women (22%) and 3,860 for men (88%), equalling 4,970 FTE positions. DFID funding was specifically to employ annually 5,300 refugees, with emphasis on the abject and absolute poor. In addition, the £1.5 million uplift was provided to allow an additional 2,863 refugees to access short-term employment (generating a total of 200,608 working days), specifically for 2,439 women (85%) and 424 men (15%).

**Table 7** Number of full time equivalent (FTE) JCP positions created, 2014

Category	Female		Male		Total	
Unskilled	312	6.3%	2,730	54.9%	3,042	61.2%
Skilled	723	14.5%	968	19.5%	1,691	34.0%
Professional	75	1.5%	162	3.3%	237	4.8%
Total	1,110	22.3%	3,860	77.7%	4,970	100.0%

Source: UNRWA.

**JCP is often used to provide UNRWA with core functions, which is inconsistent with emergency social safety net programme.** The majority of employment opportunities are UNRWA positions, which are paid at less than the rate paid by UNRWA to their full time contracted counterparts (in general a JCP worker receives less than 50% of the regular UNRWA employee rate; wages are paid on daily basis and absence days are not counted). This has the potential impact of weakening staff rights. In addition, the JCP is a major source of workers to maintain the cleanliness of the camps.<sup>50</sup> This means that the maintenance of the refugee camps, which is a core UNRWA function, is highly dependent on this emergency social safety net programme. It is very difficult to see any strategic or management justification for structuring the funding of core UNRWA functions in this manner. This is also contrary to the programme objectives of the DFID funding.

<sup>48</sup> Calculated as follows: 50% FTEs / total number abject poor and 50% FTE's / total number absolute poor

<sup>49</sup> Historically, Social Safety Net beneficiaries were called Special Hardship Cases (SHC) who had been enrolled on the basis of categorical targeting (disabled, widows, etc.)

<sup>50</sup> For example, in 2013 1529 JCP beneficiaries worked in camp sanitation (equivalent to 454 FTEs), compared with 287 fixed-term UNRWA staff in the same period

**Feedback from JCP beneficiaries tends to be negative.** FGDs were held with JCP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in March 2013 and March 2015 (Table 4). All beneficiaries worked within UNRWA departments, most of them in unskilled positions (cleaners and guards), only a few as professionals (school librarian, secretary and a social worker). Overall, the beneficiaries were very negative and critical of the JCP programme. Many beneficiaries' responses showed their frustrations with the employment opportunities in Gaza in general and the UNRWA JCP programme in particular, due to extremely long waiting times and very limited duration of jobs that they received. Most felt the jobs did not contribute to economic impact at all, and there was no link to food security made.

The key points from the FDGs are as follows:

- The reported average waiting time for a three month position is between five and seven years, with some participants reporting waiting times of eight years;
- Although none of the participants had refused a JCP job opportunity, it was felt that one 3-month job opportunity prefaced and followed by a number of years with no work makes no overall difference, and can sometimes conflict with on-going intermittent work;
- Participants felt that there was no protocol relating to the duration of the interval between assignments or the duration of the assignment;
- There is minimal communication with those on the waiting list or those in employment which leads to frustrations. Many of the participants were not aware of selection criteria; one female beneficiary (secretary) was not made aware that the system allowed for maternity leave;
- Participants noted that positions are not advertised and there is no mechanism to place participants in a role most suited to their skill set. The result of this is that often the jobs offered do not match applicants' experience and qualifications. However, participants expressed willingness to take any opportunity even if it is not up to their level of education, through desperation:

*"I am a trained car mechanic but due to my need for a job, I accepted to work as a cleaner."*

Male beneficiary of the JCP interviewed on 3 March 2015

*"I am a trained teacher but due to my daughter's health needs, I accepted to work as a school cleaner/attendant."*

Female beneficiary of the JCP interviewed on 3 March 2015

- Beneficiaries doubted that application data is double-checked or validated via home visits or further investigation, and felt that there is a lack of transparency, citing

occasions where beneficiaries with connections in UNRWA had applications approved faster, or contracts extended:<sup>51</sup>

*"I don't believe the system is fair and transparent since I have been waiting for 14 years for my turn and I know of people with connections (friends and family at UNRWA) who were called back before me."*

Male beneficiary of the JCP interviewed on 3 March 2015

- Participants strongly agreed that the programme is not transparent, that jobs are not distributed fairly and that the way the programme operates can cause intra-family tensions: an example was given of a family with several brothers where only one received a job;
- A few participants noted that they used their wages to pay off small debts, carry out maintenance, pay school fees and buy assets such as fridges. However, the majority of participants reported using the wages to contribute to regular food purchases, and that they could not afford one-off asset purchases. This is confirmed by JCP's Income Use Rapid Assessment in 2013, which showed that '80% spent 30% of their wages on food'.<sup>52</sup>

**Work has a positive effect on the self-esteem of JCP beneficiaries.** However, this does not seem to be sustained over time, and it is even suggested that JCP modalities cause possible long-term psychosocial harm. The JCP provides cash assistance to people who work. This is seen as a more dignified and proactive mechanism of payment than simply providing unconditional cash transfers. As an active measure of support, the secondary impacts on dignity and promotion of a work ethic are important. The hope the programme gives and the dignity of having a job are aspects that came across strongly in the FGDs. Respondents believe that the programme is more dignified than a grant. They also appreciate that leaving home for work is good for maintaining a healthy mind and good for gaining experience. They expressed their willingness to take any opportunity even if it is not up to their level of education. In UNRWA's rapid assessment too, persons receiving JCP income have positive feedback.<sup>53</sup>

However, the first annual review of the JCP conducted by Transtec in 2014 reveals that JCP beneficiaries experience significant variance in self-esteem and self-concept during the course of their employment.<sup>54</sup> They appreciate the experience and express satisfaction that they have developed skills and are more employable than without such experience. They also stress that their standing in their families and communities has improved. But if respondents tend to see their self-esteem and confidence in the future increase slightly at

<sup>51</sup> With the resources available to this evaluation, we were not able to follow up on these examples with the participants or UNRWA to substantiate them. However, the view that having connections with UNRWA could result in a quicker approval of a placement was widely held.

<sup>52</sup> UNRWA (2013) Job Creation Programme: Income Use Rapid Assessment, June

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> LaGuardia, Dorian and Mamoun Besaico (2014) The Emergency Job Creation Programme: Providing Opportunities for People and Business, Annual review (Year 1), 16 March 2014

the beginning of the contract, these measures decrease significantly by the contract end. This is related to the insecurities and anxiety associated with the loss of employment and income. Future surveys and evaluations will seek to determine if there is a significant drop in self-esteem six-months after contract expiration, to investigate whether there may be aspects of the JCP that are exacerbating psychosocial impact.

Overall, the participants were very negative about the programme. UNRWA’s JCP has continued to provide a range of short-term (most three month) cash-for-work positions for unskilled and skilled Palestinian refugees in Gaza, some of whom are poor. JCP aims to impact food security through job creation, but few jobs are created and beneficiaries are not earning the majority of the time. Given the wait period for employment, the economic effect of the wages in terms of reducing poverty or increasing food security is extremely limited. Participants did not feel that the system was transparent, and felt that there was an absence of communication and standardised protocol for employment distribution.

**Impact of WFP’s Voucher Programme**

**Voucher-based modalities are effective in improving food security**, as measured by the FCS. What follows are results from the WFP-commissioned evaluation survey conducted early 2015.<sup>55</sup> A simple comparison of the food security situation of beneficiaries before and after the programme provides a first estimate of the relative effectiveness of the different modalities in bringing people into acceptable FCS (Figure 9). While none of the beneficiaries had an acceptable FCS when they were enrolled in 2011, 79% of the combined-modality beneficiaries and 77% of the voucher-only beneficiaries reached that status in 2015, against only 36% of the in-kind modality beneficiaries.

**Figure 9** Distribution of VP beneficiaries per food consumption category, 2011 and 2015<sup>56</sup>



Source: Authors based on Al-Sahel (2015)

<sup>55</sup> Al-Sahel (2015) Evaluation Survey of the Food Voucher Intervention in the Gaza Strip under WFP/State of Palestine Emergency Operation (EMOP): Key Findings Report in Impact Indicators, Draft, 12 March

<sup>56</sup> Sample sizes used to construct this chart permit margins of error of around ±5%. In-kind modality n=360, combined modality n=361, voucher-only modality n= 362, and non-beneficiaries n=194

A case-by-case analysis reveals that the largest improvement in FCS is found among voucher-only modality beneficiaries, where nearly 91% have moved at least one food consumption category upwards since 2011 (Table 8). Combined-modality beneficiaries witnessed good but slightly lower improvement, with 88% moving upwards at least one consumption category. This still remains much higher than improvement observed among in-kind modality beneficiaries, where only 50% have upgraded from having poor and borderline consumption in 2011 to having borderline and acceptable consumption in 2015. Zooming in on beneficiaries with a poor FCS in 2011, the case-by-case analysis uncovers that 96% of those who benefited from one or the other voucher-based modality reached a borderline or acceptable FCS in 2015 - against only 72% of in-kind modality beneficiaries.

**Table 8** Change of food consumption category among VP beneficiaries, 2011-2015

Group	2011		2015			2011-2015 change	
	FC category	% of HH in category [a]	% of HH in category who remained/moved down to the poor category	% of HH in category who remained/moved up to the borderline category	% of HH in category who moved up to the acceptable category	% of HH in category who witnessed improvement in FCS category [b]	% of HH in category who witnessed improvement in FCS category, of total HH surveyed [a x b]
Voucher-only modality beneficiaries	Poor	65.7	3.4	21.0	75.6	96.6	63.5
	Borderline	34.3	2.5	18.5	79.0	79.0	27.1
	Total percentage of households who moved to a better FCS category						90.6
Combined modality beneficiaries	Poor	50.1	3.9	17.7	78.5	96.1	48.2
	Borderline	49.9	2.8	17.8	79.4	79.4	39.6
	Total percentage of households who moved to a better FCS category						87.8
In-kind modality beneficiaries	Poor	40.0	27.6	35.9	36.6	72.4	29.2
	Borderline	60.0	23.3	41.8	34.9	34.9	20.8
	Total percentage of households who moved to a better FCS category						50.0

Source: Al-Sahel (2015) case-by-case analysis based on WFP survey data.

**The voucher-only modality is more cost-effective than the combined modality to improve food security.** Results presented above show only a marginal difference between combined and voucher-only modalities in terms of impact on FCS and food consumption gap. For similar results, the voucher-only modality is less costly to deliver (US\$14.3/capita/month) than the combined modality (US\$22.1/capita/month) (Table 9). Furthermore, a recent

review commissioned by the Secretary of State established that the controls over the e-voucher are sufficiently robust to provide reasonable assurance over the risk of fraud.<sup>57</sup>


**Table 9** Transfer and delivery values of WFP main modalities (US\$ per capita per month)

Modality	Transfer value	Full cost recovery value
Voucher-only modality	11.0	14.3
Combined modality	17.0	22.1
In-kind only modality	-	11.0

Source: Authors based on Al-Sahel (2015) and WFP data.

**The VP component had no significant impact on poverty status and poverty gap.** Despite the programme, beneficiaries continue to live in deep poverty (Figure 10). Indeed the depth of poverty appears worse in 2015 than it was in 2011. Among those living in deep poverty, the average gap to the relative poverty line increased between 2011 and 2015 (Figure 11), except for combined-modality beneficiaries who were, and remain, the poorest group. Substantial recent research by ODI has shown that Gaza's economic context means beneficiaries can only realistically be lifted out of poverty when the blockade is lifted and the economy improves.<sup>58</sup> This research highlighted the severe impacts of macro structural and political influences on household-level coping strategies, and confirmed the multidimensional nature of poverty and vulnerability, and the persistence of humanitarian needs in Gaza. Poverty is widespread throughout Gaza as a direct result of the ongoing blockade, recurrent conflict, displacement, and destruction of livelihood sources and assets.

**Figure 10** Distribution of VP beneficiary households per poverty status, 2011 and 2015




Source: Authors based on Al-Sahel (2015).

<sup>57</sup> IAD (DFID Internal Audit Department) (2015) Assurance Review of the WFP Voucher Programme, Report 27-15, Draft, 15 January

<sup>58</sup> Overseas Development Institute (ODI) (2012) Transforming Cash Transfers: Beneficiary and community perspectives of the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme.



**Figure 11** Average poverty gap among VP beneficiary households living in deep poverty, 2011 and 2015



Source: Authors based on Al-Sahel (2015).

### Outcomes

**The programme has generally met outcome targets; but this does not mean food security targets are likely to be reached.** Table 10 summarises progress against outcome indicators, as set in the DFID Log Frame, over the course of the programme.

In terms of numbers of households with improved FCS score, WFP has increased its performance since 2011, from 2,335 households with improved FCS score to 10,100 households with improved FCS score. However, when considering funding attribution, WFP estimates that DFID funding has only improved 5,078 households' FCS scores in 2013 (50% attribution overall, representing a moderate under-achievement of 12%) and 4,242 households in 2014 (42% attribution overall, representing a substantial under-achievement of 26%). This is likely to be an impact of the conflict in 2014 affecting food security conditions making it harder for funding to achieve the same effects that were seen in 2011 and 2012. WFP also notes that the funding attribution is rarely precise and DFID funding was heavily used to support the development of the platform.

The link between the second outcome indicator (percentage of VP participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme) and the stated outcome is unclear. This indicator seems more relevant to measure the secondary impact on the local economy.

The only outcome indicator for the JCP (percentage of abject and absolute poor refugees benefiting from the JCP) is misleading. It is not a measure of poverty reduction among beneficiary households, but rather a simple measure of inclusion (considering the poor are the intended target of the programme). Nor is the degree of assistance factored in to this outcome indicator.

**Table 10** Progress against outcome indicators

Expected outcome	Outcome indicators		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Milestone 2013	Milestone 2014
Reduced household poverty and improved food consumption among vulnerable Gazans	Annual number of households with improved Food Consumption Score among non-refugees	Planned	3,410	5,325	5,740	5,740
		Achieved	2,335	5,336	5,078	4,242 <sup>59</sup>
	Percentage of VP participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme	Planned	90	90	90	90
		Achieved	0	91	91	93
	Percentage of abject and absolute poor refugees benefiting from the JCP	Planned	60	65	70	75
		Achieved	51	78	95	15

Source: Authors based on DFID Business Case, DFID Annual Reviews, WFP data and UNRWA data.

The apparent improvement of the percentage of poor families benefiting from the JCP (from 51% in 2011, to 78% in 2012, and 95% in 2013) is, in the view of the evaluators, misleading. The methods that have been used in recent years to calculate the percentage benefitting from JCP has tended to over-inflate the benefit, since the formula considers any JCP opportunity has a year-long effect. In reality, a large majority of opportunities are less than three months long, so weighting the impact to take account of the short-term nature of the benefit of employment reduces the outcome result substantially.

Since May 2013, in response to the findings of the baseline report, the JCP database has distinguished not only between poor and non-poor (the initial prioritisation criteria), but also whether applicants are abject, absolute or Social Safety Net (SSN) poor.<sup>60</sup> The database distinguishes whether refugee households are SSN poor (where families receive food and cash) in order to avoid the duplication of assistance. UNRWA now aims that 50% of its beneficiaries are from SSN and abject categories, and 50% are from the absolute poor category, although the Log Frame still sets one target for 'abject and absolute' poor refugees.

### Outputs

**The programme has exceeded a number of its output milestones, but missed others for a range of reasons.** In terms of number of workdays, UNRWA has substantially exceeded its targets for males and females. However, the 20% over-achievement in number of male workdays is a result of continued JCP funding shortfalls that have meant UNRWA has been unable to maintain initiatives that traditionally called for skilled and professional labour. The

<sup>59</sup> This is based on data for 10,155 and 10,100 houses in 2013 and 2014 respectively that had an improved FCS score. WFP believe that 50% and 42% of this is attributable to DFID funding

<sup>60</sup> 'Abject poor' refers to those who are unable to meet their basic food needs. 'Absolute poor' refers to those who can meet their food needs but not other essential needs such as clothing and transportation

increased targeting of unskilled labour categories, rather than skilled and professional categories, has had the following consequences:

- Due to the lower daily rate associated with the unskilled category, more workdays could be generated with the same level of funding;
- Due to the increased proportion of unskilled positions (such as guards) and social norms preventing women from applying for such positions, fewer positions were created for women on the original JCP funding stream. In 2014, the percentage of women's workdays without the uplift was 50% below the target.

The £1.5m uplift, which was directed at women's positions only, corrected the under-performance in terms of female work days, resulting in a 41% over-achievement in 2014. In terms of numbers of beneficiaries and duration of employment, UNRWA adopted the policy of giving more beneficiaries opportunities for less time, resulting in a simultaneous over and under-achievement respectively for these indicators. As for JCP, both the number of vouchers distributed each month, and the cumulative financial value show under-achievements of 26% and 14% respectively in 2014, although previous years' targets were met. This is likely to be an impact of the conflict in 2014 affecting food security conditions making it harder for funding to achieve the same effects that were seen between 2011 and 2013. WFP also notes that the funding attribution is rarely precise and DFID funding was heavily used to support the development of the platform.

**Table 11** Progress against output indicators

Output	Indicators		Milestone 2011	Milestone 2012	Milestone 2013	Milestone 2014
<b>Output 1</b> Improved household income for refugees	Number of work days created annually for men	Planned	357,500	357,500	357,500	357,500
		Achieved	468,800	574,838	451,639	432,042
	Number of work days created annually for women	Planned	192,500	192,500	192,500	192,500
		Achieved	119,700	101,132	57,813	271,394 <sup>61</sup> (96,764)
	Average number of work days per beneficiary	Planned	104	104	104	104
		Achieved	69	74	58	53
Number of JCP direct beneficiaries employed annually	Planned	5,300	5,300	5,300	5,300	
	Achieved	8,553	9,177	8,842	9,960	
<b>Output 2</b> Improved access to sufficient food for non-refugees	Average number of 4-voucher booklets distributed monthly	Planned	3,410	5,325	5,549	5,740
		Achieved	3,500	5,336	5,077	4,244 <sup>62</sup>
	Total cumulative monetary value equivalent of commodities indirectly supplied to beneficiaries (USD)	Planned	2,103,554	4,315,080	7,749,472	9,205,504
	Achieved	2,100,000	4,315,080	7,649,321	7,874,886	

Source: Authors, based on estimates in DFID Annual Reviews (*in italics*) and administrative data from WFP and UNRWA.

<sup>61</sup> Including the £1.5m uplift. In parentheses, the figure without the uplift

<sup>62</sup> 2013 and 2014 outputs based on WFP's estimate of 50% and 42% attribution to DFID funding respectively

### 3.2.3 What is the secondary impact of the programmes on the local economy?

**The JCP component gives limited support to the private sector.** The potential secondary economic impacts of the JCP relate to the range of direct economic benefits of the activities in which the JCP beneficiaries participate. There are a total of 37 external organisations (CBOs, NGOs or private firms) that are participating in the JCP, as bodies contracting JCP beneficiaries, and a small number of private sector companies have enrolled since the 2014 funding extension. All departments/sectors with double-digit percentages of contracts are internal to UNRWA, and make up the majority of the JCP contracts. This reveals the high proportion that is engaged directly by UNRWA to meet core UNRWA service functions. This would seem to corroborate suggestions that UNRWA is prioritising use of the JCP to meet their internal staffing requirements. Subsequently, the secondary impact of the JCP on the local economy may be limited to the injection of cash into the local economy, which is difficult to appreciate.

The cost extension of £1.5 million granted to the JCP in 2014 was to support the private sector, helping unlock the potential of these young women and men to contribute to the Gazan economy.<sup>63</sup> Under this extension, the programme was to give priority to placing JCP employees in projects that boost the private sector, maintain and rehabilitate public infrastructure, improve environmental conditions, and target disadvantaged groups. Funding was specified to support an additional 2,439 women (85%) and 424 men (15%) with short-term employment. In total, 4% of the private sector placements were provided to women; 91 women were offered a private sector placement in 2013. This increased marginally to 109 in 2014.

Since 2013, a total of 4,787 private sector placements were created (Table 12), which according to UNRWA, equates to 946 FTEs (19% of all FTEs). In terms of direct beneficiaries, 2,537 of the total 20,550 beneficiaries were placed in the private sector, which equates to 12% of total beneficiaries. This indicates either a miscalculation from UNRWA, or indicates that those placed in the private sector were provided with longer-term contracts and therefore more working days than those placed in other sectors. However, there are no further data from UNRWA to confirm this.

**Table 12** Private sector JCP placements, 2013-2014

Category	2013			2014		
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Unskilled	35	1,183	1,218	39	1,317	1,356
Skilled	41	949	990	29	1,044	1,073
Professional	15	25	40	41	69	110
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>2,157</b>	<b>2,248</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>2,430</b>	<b>2,539</b>

Source: UNRWA.

<sup>63</sup> DFID appendix to the Business case, 2014

**In contrast, the VP component is showing encouraging trickle-down effects in the local economy.** Thanks to DFID funding, over £9 million was directly injected into the local economy at the micro level through the network of local shops over 2011-2015. This was designed to have a positive secondary economic impact on local production, employment and small businesses. The second round of WFP monitoring in 2014 enabled this to be tested.<sup>64</sup> Below is a summary of its main findings.

***The VP has a clear positive impact on participating shops; no crowding-out effects are observed on non-participating shops.*** The current platform has proved to be flexible and scalable to deal with the emergency and the increased workload. Critically, as anticipated, the local economy responded well to supply of needed food items. Over 70 shops participate in the programme.<sup>65</sup> During FGDs, participating shop owners reported about 40% increased sales and 43% staff increases as a result of the programme. They also indicated that voucher sales constitute an average of a third of daily cash sales, and in hard times, may constitute 80%. Beneficiaries have become regular customers and tend to buy other (non-voucher) items during their weekly visit to the shop. In line with this, WFP monitoring reveals positive trickle-down effects:

- *Increased sales for participating shops* by about 40% on average since the beginning of the programme; higher for small shops that saw sales nearly triple; additional sales per voucher dollar redeemed are estimated to be around 24 cents (against 83 cents in the West Bank, reflecting a lower purchasing power among Gaza strip beneficiaries);
- *New investments only possible as a result of the increase in sales* are significantly higher than for non-participatory shops: shop expansion, additional cooling units, transport vehicles and other equipment, and internal decorations;
- *Jobs created as a result of increased business activity*: nearly 50% of participating shops increased their workforce; there was no declining business activity observed among non-participating shops in Gaza (in contrast with results in the West Bank) but a 6% increase; an estimated 80 new permanent jobs were created in the Gaza Strip since 2011 thanks to the VP - a considerable achievement particularly in the Gazan context;
- *Increased tax revenue for the Palestinian Authority* - value-added tax (VAT) at 16% of the sale price: for each dollar redeemed by beneficiaries at the retail level, the VP is estimated to generate close to 4.9 cents of additional VAT revenue to the PA.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>64</sup> WFP (2014) Secondary Impact of WFP's Voucher Programme in Palestine, Findings report

<sup>65</sup> The total number of participating shops reached 90 during the 2014 conflict

<sup>66</sup> This is in addition to the business income, which the survey could not estimate.



VP-participating shop owner in Gaza City (WFP/Colin Kampschoer)

*“After joining the project, I added three new employees. I bought a piece of land and paid half of its price in cash.”*

VP supplier interviewed on 5 March 2015

**The VP also has some positive effects on dairy processors.** The VP promotes local production and procurement by making it conditional that items procured with the voucher are locally produced where possible. As per WFP policy, no products from Israel are on the list of items included in the VP in the Gaza Strip. Almost 60-70% of the total products of the VP are from Palestinian production (West Bank or Gaza Strip, including olive oil, yoghurt, cheese, eggs, bread and flour). Obviously, products harvested/produced in the Gaza Strip only represent a small part of this (around 5-10%, mainly dairy), but the rest is either processed in the Gaza Strip (such as, some brand of vegetable oil) or brought in from the West Bank. Examining the impact of the VP on dairy processors, WFP monitoring reported:

- **Increased sales for participating processors:** in June 2014, monthly sales of participating dairy processors had tripled since the start of the programme - a 207% increase against only 64% for non-participating dairy processors; the proportion and value of increase in participating processors' sales that could be specifically attributed to the VP could not be measured by the survey;
- **Jobs created as a result of increased sales:** it is estimated that an average of about 18.6 new jobs were created per dairy processor (both in the West Bank and Gaza); most of these jobs have been created in small and medium dairy processors, which have witnessed an increase in employment of 41% and 44% respectively, compared to a smaller 17% increase in workers in large dairy processors; employment in non-participating dairy processors has remained largely unchanged since the baseline.

**The effect of the VP has not trickled down to the level of farmers.** Farmers feel that the voucher programme has had a minor impact on their business. This is evident by analysis of changes in employment and wages paid in the farms of participating farmers, ownership of milking cows, milk production capacity and farm-gate milk prices. This is believed to be due to on-going structural problems in the dairy farming system. Indeed, the survey has shown that both participating and non-participating farmers witnessed a decrease in their current ownership of cows compared to the situation before implementation of the VP. The profit margin of the two groups of farmers has also decreased (by more than 50%) when compared to their profit margins before the implementation of the programme. Farmers attribute this decrease to increases in feed prices and their inability to negotiate higher

prices for their milk with dairy processors, many of whom are establishing their own cow farms to cut down their costs, hence applying vertical integration and adversely affecting medium and small size farmers. This is considered one of the main bottlenecks faced by medium and small size farmers.

Overall, the VP brings a net benefit for the Palestinian economy as a whole. WFP's perspectives for the VP is two-fold: i) to increase the Palestinian proportion of goods in the basket; and ii) to promote the development of local production/processing in the Gaza Strip, linking it to the VP - through a 'short value chain' approach, based on a pilot experience under the DANIDA/Oxfam GB project of Economic Development linked to the VP in 2014.

**The VP component is more likely than the JCP component to have an impact on nutrition.**

Just as the JCP is unlikely, by design, to have a significant impact on poverty and food insecurity, it is unlikely to have any significant impact on the nutritional status of beneficiary household members. The list of approved items under the VP prioritises animal proteins and excludes foods such as sugar and high calorie, pre-packaged foods that are linked to obesity and associated diseases in Palestinian society. Results from an Oxfam GB-led Wheat Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis (EMMA) analysis indicated for instance that Gazans eat far more flour than is required in a balanced diet.<sup>67</sup> Vouchers encourage beneficiaries to consume a more diverse diet.

In addition, the VP has been coupled with a growing pilot project of Nutrition Awareness Campaign implemented in cooperation with the Gazan NGO Ard El Insan. The first phase from October 2011 to June 2012 targeted 264 female VP beneficiaries in the Al-Sabra and Zeitoun areas of Gaza. The project sought to engage female voucher beneficiaries in a series of nutrition sessions as a way to: i) improve food utilisation and consumption practices at household level, so as to further enhance the nutritional and dietary impact of the voucher project; and ii) give female beneficiaries, often confined to the domestic sphere, additional opportunities to interact with their community beyond the immediate family realm and develop informal support networks. Following successful implementation and positive evaluation of this initial pilot phase, WFP increased the project in 2013 to 600 female value-based voucher recipients for six months in the Northern Governorate (Beit Lahia and Jabalia areas), and then to 1,000 female VP beneficiaries in 2014.

---

<sup>67</sup> Cited in Kanoa and McCormack (2014)



Shop owner participating in the VP component (WFP)

*“Due to their high prices, I didn’t used to buy eggs at all.”*

Female VP beneficiary interviewed on 4 March 2015

*“With the provided food items, I can cook different meals every day. The items include bread, eggs, yogurt and grains. The diverse items are good for the children.”*

Female VP beneficiary interviewed on 4 March 2015

*“At the beginning, three of my sons were anaemic and we didn’t bring any dairy products or grains home and there was a general shortage of food at home. Now blood tests show that all my sons have good haemoglobin level. Moreover, I have received awareness on nutrition through WFP.”*

Female VP beneficiary interviewed on 4 March 2015



VP beneficiaries participating in the Nutrition Awareness Campaign (Ard El Insan)

*“The programme has definitely made a difference in our lives. Our refrigerator used to be empty all the time. Provided dairy and grains are important in our diet. Now we wait impatiently till the end of the week to use our voucher.”*

Male VP beneficiary interviewed on 4 March 2015

An evaluation of the campaigns, which took place in June 2012, reported a significant success in achieving the core objectives relating to nutritional awareness, dietary diversity, behavioural change and building strengthened support networks that increase women’s social engagement and influence at household level.<sup>68</sup> The study conducted in 2014

<sup>68</sup> McCormack, Ruth (2012) Nutrition Awareness Campaigns/Entertainment for Nutrition Awareness Campaigns for Women’s Empowerment in two Areas of Gaza City: Project Review and Analysis, October



provides valuable information.<sup>69</sup> Participants in the pilot campaign demonstrated better knowledge on the nutrition awareness course topics compared to a control group, even ten months after the end of the intervention. This is true for direct participants as well as other family members. The campaign also seems to have generated a greater degree of engagement and discussion between couples on food purchases. Respondents reported increased interest in diet and nutrition conversation within extended family and neighbours.

**WFP beneficiaries consistently report that the mechanism is a dignified social safety net.** A qualitative study conducted by WFP in 2012 to explore the effects of the VP on protection of beneficiaries, and on gender and community dynamics within the beneficiary population, observed that the associated training for women beneficiaries in Gaza designed to enhance nutritional impact of food exchanged for vouchers was an important protective tool to work towards their empowerment.<sup>70</sup> The study also reported that the VP helps beneficiaries to preserve dignity, by allowing them to choose what they want to eat, when they want. Beneficiaries did not note stigma associated with the collection of vouchers, rather stating that shopkeepers treated them well or preferentially.

The VP provides food to poor families through the same mechanism as non-poor families, namely through procurement of foodstuffs from the local shop. The only difference is that VP beneficiaries do this on the basis of exchange of vouchers rather than cash. This exchange can take place at any given time and it allows beneficiaries to choose their own food items. This is a much more dignified means to improve food security than simply providing direct food assistance. The impact on the dignity and self-esteem was most eloquently presented by one of the female participants in the 2013 FGDs:

*“I do not have to queue for food for hours on a quarterly basis with men and then try to carry the food back to the house. Now I can simply shop for food like everyone else and buy what I need and carry this myself. This is a more dignified way.”*

Female beneficiary of the VP interviewed on 14 March 2013

The approach of the VP also ensures that beneficiaries can exercise some choice when selecting products and gives them flexibility as to when food is collected, compared to a food distribution mechanism. The VP thereby allows beneficiaries to use the resulting savings to spend on other items, such as fish and meat, or on repayment of debts and other basic non-food expenditures.

<sup>69</sup> Kanoa, Basil and Ruth McCormack (2014) Nutrition Awareness Campaign for Female Beneficiaries of the Value Based Voucher (VBV) Programme in Gaza: Comparative Analysis of Current & Past Beneficiaries using Baseline & Post-Implementation Survey Data, Draft, 21 February

<sup>70</sup> WFP (2012) Implications of Cash & Voucher Transfers on Beneficiaries’ Protection, Gender Relations and Social Dynamics: Case study of WFP assistance in the occupied Palestinian territory, May-June

**Table 13** Coping strategies used by VP beneficiaries, as of January 2015

Coping strategy	Combined modality	Voucher-only modality
<b>Food-related coping strategies</b>		
• Relied on less preferred, less expensive food	78%	76%
• Borrowed food or relied on help from friends or relatives	50%	48%
• Reduced the number of meals eaten per day	28%	21%
• Reduced portion size of meals	25%	21%
• Reduction in the quantities consumed by adults/mothers for young children	12%	17%
• Sent household members to eat elsewhere	5%	12%
• Went an entire day without eating	1%	0%
<b>Non-food related coping strategies</b>		
• Sold last female animals	0%	0.3%
• Sold household assets/goods (radio, furniture, refrigerator, television, jewellery, clothes etc.)	7%	4%
• Purchased food on credit or borrowed food	80%	74%
• Spent savings	6%	4%
• Borrowed money	49%	41%
• Sold productive assets or means of transport (sewing machine, wheelbarrow, bicycle, car, etc.)	1%	3%
• Consumed seed stocks that were to be held/saved for the next season	2%	2%
• Withdrew children from school	1%	0%
• Sold house or land	0%	0%
• Begged	0%	0%

Source: WFP based on household survey administrated in Dec 2014-Jan 2015.

### 3.2.4 What is their secondary impact on conflict (due to exclusion of households)?

There is a clear policy and process of targeting beneficiaries under the VP, although the complexity of the PMTF and FCS means the process is not entirely transparent to beneficiaries. The approach to targeting used under the JCP is much less clear and open to local management discretion. The evaluation team found no evidence that these targeting characteristics for each programme have led to widespread conflict by households excluded from the programme. As such, there was no evidence that the programmes either created or ameliorated conflict at a supra-household level. Yet the evidence from the FGDs did reveal a higher level of suspicion of nepotism and favouritism in the awards made under the JCP compared to the VP. Furthermore, several participants in JCP beneficiary FGDs suggested it had caused some degree of intra-household conflict. The JCP is a benefit awarded to individuals, unlike the VP which is awarded to households, and several FGD participants reported tension with family members who were not in receipt of the benefit despite also being on the waiting list for many years.

**Focus group participants noted that the vouchers increased harmony in the household.** Participants reported that harmony had increased because there was a guaranteed food source every week. FGD participants reported that providing the voucher (or in-kind assistance) to men, as the head of household in this context, was also found to be most appropriate. This proved true not only in terms of respecting Palestinian cultural norms, but also in protecting the dignity of the men (who are extremely dis-empowered by their inability to provide for their families or find work under the occupation and blockade). Providing the voucher to men and recognising their role as the head of household reduced potential household tension that might have arisen if women had been designated assistance recipients. This approach had a protective impact for women.

### 3.3 Coverage

#### 3.3.1 *What has been the coverage of the programmes?*

The coverage of the programme can be summarised as the proportion of the intended beneficiary population that are actually included in the programme. This is a function of the overall resources available as well as the efficacy of the selected targeting mechanism.

- **WFP's VP has a direct coverage of around 19%;**
- The programme operates in all of Gaza's five districts and geographical location is not a factor in programme design, so no-one is disadvantaged because of location;
- 315,908 non-refugees living in food insecurity in 2014, compared to 193,000 in 2012, with the WFP programme affecting approximately 60,000 non-refugees directly each month.
  
- **UNRWA's JCP has an indirect coverage of 15%;<sup>71</sup>**
- The programme operates in all of Gaza's five districts and geographical location is not a factor in programme design, so no-one is disadvantaged because of location;
- SEFSec data (2013) indicated that there were 1,258,559 refugees, of whom 679,622 are living in food insecurity (54%);
- SEFSec data (2013) indicated that 83,064 (6.6%) of refugees in Gaza are living in abject poverty and a further 492,097 (39%) are living in absolute poverty;
- The JCP programme benefits around 20,000 refugees annually; employment contracts are an average duration of 3 months; there is a five to eight year wait period;
- UNRWA have translated this number of beneficiaries as 4,970 FTEs in 2014, 1,110 of whom were women;
- However, this is not all attributable to DFID funding.

Table 14 provides data on food insecurity, poverty and labour for the refugee and non-refugee populations. This is the basis against which to assess the coverage of the two components.

---

<sup>71</sup> Calculated as follows: 6.6 % of 1,258,559 refugees (2014 figures) = 83,064 abject poor refugees; 50% of 4,972 FTEs created = 2,485 /83,064 abject poor refugees directly impacted = 3%, abject poor refugees indirectly impacted assuming household size of 5 = 15%

**Table 14** Indicative caseload of potential target groups in the Gaza Strip

		Source	Refugees	Non-refugees	Total Population
<b>Available data</b>					
Total population, 2014 est.	[a]	PCBS			1,760,000
Total refugee population, 2014	[b]	UNRWA	1,258,559		
Abject poverty rate, 2010	[c]	PECS	6.6%	6.4%	
Absolute poverty rate, 2010	[d]	PECS	39.1%	43.0%	
Food insecurity rate, 2013	[e]	SEFSec	54%	63%	
Labour force, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[f]	LFS			454,900
Labour participation rate, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[g]	LFS			44.9%
Labour participation rate, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[h]	LFS	45.1%	44.3%	
Female labour participation rate, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[i]	LFS	21.8%	15.2%	
Unemployment rate, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[j]	LFS			42.8%
Unemployment rate, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[k]	LFS	43.0%	42.4%	
Female unemployment rate, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[l]	LFS	52.5%	59.8%	
Number of unemployed, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[m]	LFS			194,700
Number of female unemployed, 4 <sup>th</sup> quarter 2014	[n]	LFS			53,600
<b>Caseload estimates</b>					
Total non-refugee population, 2014 est.	[a - b]			501,441	
Individuals living in abject poverty, 2014 est.	[b x c]		<b>83,065</b>	32,092	
Individuals living in absolute poverty, 2014 est.	[b x d]		492,097	215,620	
Individuals living in food insecurity, 2014 est.	[b x e]		679,622	<b>315,908</b>	
Number of unemployed, 2014 est.	[j x f x b/a]		<b>139,800</b>	54,900	

Sources: Authors based on PCBS, UNRWA, PECS 2010, SEFSec 2013 and LFS 2014.

**The DFID-funded VP component has coverage of around 9% of the non-refugee population living in food insecurity.** In February 2015, a total of 59,630 individuals benefited from the VP: 50,086 beneficiaries of the voucher-only modality and 9,544 beneficiaries of the combined modality. Evidence presented by WFP indicates that the vouchers are targeted effectively to food insecure households (Figure 9), among the poorest (Figure 10). VP beneficiaries represent 26% of the WFP caseload (Figure 6), and nearly 19% of the non-refugee population living in food insecurity in 2014, which can be roughly estimated to 316,000 individuals (Table 14). As stated in the business case, DFID support was expected to enable the participation of around 5,750 households (that is, over 37,000 people) by March 2015, or approximately 40% of the total estimated voucher requirements in 2015. In 2013, DFID funding represented around 45% of VP funding. It can thus be estimated that DFID funding to the VP has covered around 9% of the non-refugee population living in food insecurity.

With two serious escalations of hostilities over the course of the programme, in 2012 and 2014, demand for food assistance has increased since 2011. During the 2014 crisis, WFP provided 3-month emergency vouchers to an additional 240,000 persons. This emergency


uplift was made possible thanks to a substantial DFID contribution of £3 million (outside this food security programme) and contributions from other donors, including ECHO. As of March 2015, beneficiary numbers have reduced to 25,000 persons. WFP is in the process of conducting another complementary PMTF/FCS survey (expected in June 2015) covering the cases affected by the war, cases in the waiting lists, in addition to the people who were rejected previously by the PMTF exercise of 2013/2014. The complementary survey will allow WFP to capture the additional food needs resulting from the conflict of 2014. In particular, it will assess the situation of the 25,000 residual cases from the emergency and identify what assistance needs to be provided to this group. Eligible cases might be assisted under GFA in-kind or voucher transfers depending on FCS status and poverty level.

**UNRWA's JCP has indirect coverage of around 15% of refugees living in abject poverty and 2.5% of refugees in absolute poverty, including dependents.**<sup>72</sup> In 2013, UNRWA provided temporary employment to 17,054 beneficiaries (1.4% of the total refugee population), benefiting approximately 89,500 individuals, including dependents (7% all refugees). In 2014 this number increased to 20,550 (1.6%), benefitting approximately 108,000 individuals (9 % of refugees). The FTE for this is 4,970. However, there is no clear evidence that the positions are awarded to the target beneficiaries in the proportions that UNRWA said they aimed for. With the assumption that 50% of all beneficiaries are selected from the population of those in abject poverty, including those from the SSN program (FTE 2,485), and 50% were selected from those in absolute poverty (FTE 2,485), as per UNRWA's stated objective, UNRWA's coverage is extremely low (3% and 0.5% direct coverage of beneficiaries in abject and absolute poverty respectively, and 15% and 2.5% indirect coverage including dependents), mainly due to the large beneficiary pool and the diluted nature of the intervention. Even if all beneficiaries were those in abject poverty, direct coverage would still only be 6%, which is a 3% decrease from previous coverage (2011).

The JCP caseload fluctuates with funding (Table 11). The erratic nature of funding presents challenges to a consistent policy aimed at targeting the poor. UNRWA continually reports that this programme is underfunded, yet the coverage could be significantly increased and the duration of the waiting lists reduced, if the rate of assistance paid under the JCP was reduced to a rate equivalent to a standard cash transfer rate. However, this would lead to an even greater discrepancy between the salary paid by UNRWA and the amount paid to refugees for carrying out the same task.

---

<sup>72</sup> We have used an average household size of 5

**Figure 12** Cash-for-work opportunities supported by UNRWA in the Gaza Strip, 2001-2014


Source: UNRWA Emergency Appeal OPT 2013; UNRWA data 2014

There has been a significant increase in the number of applicants, particularly unskilled applicants, on the JCP waiting list, with the current number of beneficiaries at 135,646 (Table 15). Positions were offered to 20,550, which is 15 % coverage of applicants. Of the 135,646 applicants, 105,439 were unskilled, and 13,476 (12.8%) of these were given a position at some point in 2014, mostly for a duration of up to three months. UNRWA believe that JCP positions may enhance the chances of beneficiaries gaining sustainable employment, through gaining experience and on-the-job training during the JCP placement that can be transferred to employment opportunities in the future. However, there is no data provided by UNRWA relating to the number of beneficiaries who have found long term employment as a direct result of the JCP. For unskilled labourers, the average waiting time for a JCP post has been reported by FGD participants as five to eight years. It is not clear how accurate the JCP database is in measuring the length of time applicants wait; this is concerning as waiting time is put forward by UNRWA as the main eligibility criteria. The number of female beneficiaries on the waiting list has increased by more than 40% between March 2013 and March 2015. This indicates more women approaching the scheme for employment.

The number of professional applicants on the waiting list has decreased substantially, from 6,018 to 281 females, and from 2,379 males in 2013 to 619 in 2014. Although no data is available, this potentially indicates that UNRWA has reduced the positions for professionals, or that professionals are losing confidence in JCP and its potential to offer a position. UNRWA reported that of the 20,550 JCP contracts that were issued in 2014, 821 contracts 'professional' category contracts of one-year duration were distributed.

**Table 15** Breakdown of JCP applications on the waiting list, as of March 8, 2015

Category	Female		Male		Total	
Unskilled	47,550	35.1%	57,889	42.6%	105,439	77.7%
Skilled	16,059	11.8%	13,248	9.8%	29,307	21.6%
Professional	281	0.2%	619	0.5%	900	0.7%
Total	63,890	47.1%	71,756	52.9%	135,646	100.0%

Source: UNRWA JCP database.

The total number of contracts offered in 2014 was 20,550, of which 18,245 were JCP positions and the remainder were GTP positions. The majority of these were for a period of three months only (76%) with only 6 unskilled contracts issued for a period of 9 to 12 months in 2014 (Table 18). Of the 20,550 contracts issued in 2014, 5,153 (25%) were issued to women. The percentage of women employed in terms of FTEs is 22% in 2014. This indicates that the lengths of contracts are shorter for women than for men. Although this is an improvement from the baseline study and previous data, there is still an under-representation of women on the programme. However, the high percentage of female employment in UNRWA's programme compared to a 10% female participation in the work force in general indicate that the programme has a positive effect on the gender balance.

**Table 16** Breakdown of total JCP beneficiaries (including GTP positions), 2011-2014

Breakdown	2011		2012		2013		2014	
Per category								
Unskilled	17,126	55.3%	8,580	75.0%	10,999	64.5%	13,476	65.6%
Skilled	10,731	34.6%	1,710	14.9%	4,959	29.1%	6,253	30.4%
Professional	3,115	10.1%	1,154	10.1%	1,096	6.4%	821	4.0%
Per poverty status								
Poor/Special Hardship Case	15,796	51%	8,134	71.2%	14,765	86.6%	17,676	86.0%
Non poor	15,176	49%	3,292	28.8%	2,289	13.4%	2,874	14.0%
Per gender								
Female	9,201	30%	1,946	17.0%	3,599	21.1%	5,153	25.1%
Male	21,770	70%	9,498	83.0%	13,455	78.9%	15,397	74.9%
Per sector								
External	8,013	26%	1,211	10.6%	3,306	19.4%	4,608	22.4%
Internal	22,959	74%	10,233	89.4%	13,748	80.6%	15,942	77.6%
Per disability status								
Disabled	27	0.1%	39	0.3%	27	0.2%	27	0.1%
Total	30,972	100.0%	11,444	100.0%	17,054	100.0%	20,550	100.0%

Source: UNRWA JCP database.

**Table 17** Breakdown of JCP beneficiaries attributable to DFID, 2011-2014

Breakdown	2011		2012		2013		2014	
Per category								
Unskilled	4,301	80%	8,004	87%	7,923	90%	7,515	75%
Skilled	557	10%	804	9%	817	9%	2,375	24%
Professional	508	10%	369	4%	102	1%	70	1%
Per poverty status								
Poor/Special Hardship Case	2,737	51%	7,158	78%	8,400	95%	9,342	94%
Non poor	2,629	49%	2,019	22%	442	5%	618	6%
Per sector								
External	1,157	22%	399	4%	261	3%	936	9%
Internal	4,209	78%	8,778	96%	8,581	97%	9,024	91%
Total	5,366	100%	9,177	100%	8,842	100%	9,960	100%

Source: UNRWA.

**Table 18** Length of contract of JCP beneficiaries (including GTP positions), 2011-2014

Year	Category	0-3 month	3-6 month	6-9 month	9-12 month
2014	Unskilled	11,202	2,252	16	6
	Skilled	3,958	1,964	275	56
	Professional	504	276	35	6
2013	Unskilled	9,493	1,483	16	7
	Skilled	3,147	1,355	402	55
	Professional	385	648	62	1
2012	Unskilled	7,645	906	21	7
	Skilled	657	885	204	63
	Professional	881	144	31	-
2011	Unskilled	14,984	2,113	21	7
	Skilled	8,164	1,849	663	152
	Professional	712	1,608	677	21

Source: UNRWA.

### 3.3.2 Was there any systematic exclusion of certain groups of eligible people?

In terms of WFP's VP, beneficiaries represent 26% of the WFP caseload in Gaza. Other WFP in-kind beneficiaries would meet VP eligibility criteria but funding available for VP is limited (although increasing). Thus, within the limits of VP funding, there was no systematic exclusion of eligible people identified.

In terms of UNRWA's JCP, there was no evidence seen that there was any exclusion of eligible people, and indeed UNRWA's policies of promoting women's placements shows that UNRWA is trying to include all eligible cases. Furthermore, UNRWA has over the past few years implemented mechanisms to try and safeguard against exclusion of eligible groups by



giving refugees who feel they have been excluded a range of ways to have their complaints addressed:

- Installing complaints boxes;
- Promoting community outreach, whereby community members can complain or raise queries with members of staff;
- Conducting poverty surveys conducted by its M&E unit; and
- Instigating a poverty survey special appeal mechanism if people feel they have been misrepresented in the survey.

### 3.3.3 *Were there any systematic inclusions of ineligible people?*

In terms of WFP's VP, all beneficiaries were living in food insecurity and deep poverty when they were enrolled in 2011, as defined by the FCS and PMFT. Thus, no systematic inclusions of ineligible people were identified. In terms of UNRWA's JCP, there was no evidence seen in data provided or in our randomly-selected discussion groups that JCP included any refugees other than those living in abject or absolute poverty.

### 3.3.4 *What is the level of female participation?*

**WFP's VP component may not have any specific impact on women's empowerment.** Women are often the decision-makers with regard to food consumption in the home (Table 19) but are less likely than males to purchase items (Table 20), due to cultural norms. As such, the percentage of redemption may not be a useful indicator. In the Gazan cultural context women traditionally prepare the list of items to purchase, in some cases together with men, but do not necessarily leave the home to do shopping themselves because their ability to go out may be hindered by household chores and child-care.<sup>73</sup>

**Table 19** Profile of the household member who usually decides how the voucher is used

Household member deciding how the voucher is utilised	Combined modality	Voucher-only modality
Husband	11.1%	8.3%
Wife	82.0%	87.3%
Sons	5.8%	2.8%
Others	0.3%	0.3%
Not specified	0.8%	1.4%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: WFP, based on household survey administrated in Dec 2014-Jan 2015.

<sup>73</sup> Kanoa, Basil and Ruth McCormack (2014) Nutrition Awareness Campaign for Female Beneficiaries of the Value Based Voucher (VBV) Programme in Gaza: Comparative Analysis of Current & Past Beneficiaries using Baseline & Post-Implementation Survey Data, Draft, 21 February

**Table 20** Gender of the person who usually redeems the voucher

Gender	Combined modality	Voucher-only modality
Male	85.3%	84.8%
Female	12.5%	13.0%
Both	2.2%	2.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: WFP, based on household survey administrated in Dec 2014-Jan 2015.

**UNRWA's JCP has made a commendable effort with gender.** The £1.5 million uplift assisted with the delivery of 1,110 full time equivalent (FTE) positions for women in 2014 (75 professional, 723 skilled and 312 unskilled positions). This is from a total of 4,970 FTEs created in 2014 (22%). The loss of skilled level jobs had previously resulted in a decrease in contracts for female workers, who up until July 2011 were employed through key UNRWA JCP initiatives which included UNRWA's support teacher initiative, and JCP support to UNRWA health centres. In terms of direct individual beneficiaries, in 2012 approximately 17% of JCP positions were given to women; in 2013 the percentage of positions had increased to 21% and in 2014 this had increased further to approximately 25%.

UNRWA is working to identify other employment options for skilled and professional women, and expand opportunities for unskilled women. However, with respect to unskilled jobs, cultural and societal factors limit the number of positions available to women (for example, jobs related to sanitation and security remain culturally unacceptable for women). UNRWA is working to close this gap by expanding the range of jobs available to women by pushing social boundaries, including work in packing factories and community-based projects in agriculture (jobs previously culturally restricted to men). This is anticipated to provide increased opportunities to unskilled female workers in the coming period.



Women participants in JCP are increasingly engaging in agricultural activities (UNRWA)

**UNRWA's Graduate Training Scheme offers opportunities for women.** This scheme is a component of JCP that targets recent graduates (three years or less after graduation) by offering them short term contracts in accordance with their skills and merits. The number of graduates entering this programme has increased significantly, with 946 entrants in 2013 and 2,305 in 2014. Data presented in Table 21 also indicates that a significantly higher proportion of females than males entered the Graduate Training Scheme in 2014, with females being placed in 78.5% of the 2,305 contracts offered. This indicates a greater emphasis on female placements by UNRWA.

**Table 21** Number of graduates entering the JCP Graduate Training Programme, 2013-2014

Gender	2013	2014
Female	417	1,810
Male	529	495
Total	946	2,305

Source: UNRWA.

### 3.4 Coordination

#### 3.4.1 *How good is the co-ordination between the two programmes?*

**Coordination between WFP and UNRWA is effective, with clear coordination mechanisms established.** The evaluation team examined the level of coordination between the various key providers of cash transfers and labour market services. Preliminary assessment reveals that the level of coordination between WFP and UNRWA is effective, with clear coordination mechanisms established. There is some tactical coordination through working groups, e.g., sharing of the PMTF approach, but each partner modifies the formula for their programme. Encouragingly, sharing of data between WFP and MoSA, and UNRWA's internal data sharing between PMTF and JCP, has improved markedly since the 2013 baseline assessment.

#### 3.4.2 *How good is the co-ordination in regard to beneficiary lists and targeting?*

**There is increasing consensus over the use of PMTF for poverty targeting.** With the launch of the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) in June 2011, coordination in the area of social assistance has been strengthened between MoSA, WFP and UNRWA. They, along with others, are relying on the PNCTP unified database to identify beneficiaries for their programmes and to improve their targeting approaches. In 2012, a World Bank assessment concluded the PMTF was an accurate model for identifying extremely poor and poor households in Gaza.<sup>74</sup> Generally there is a degree of coherence among the main donors, including the EC, DFID and the World Bank with respect to the strategies for supporting the PA and other complementary programmes in Gaza.

Both voucher-only and combined modalities target people living in high vulnerability, i.e., people who are below the deep poverty line and who have either poor or borderline FCS (Figure 13). Households targeted under the combined modality have a higher consumption gap in terms of poverty and not in terms of FCS.

<sup>74</sup> World Bank (2012) West Bank and Gaza, Targeting Assessment of the Cash Transfer Program, Report No ACS890, June

**Figure 13** Vulnerability groups among non-refugees

		Food Consumption Score		
		Poor	Borderline	Acceptable
Proxy-Means Test Score	Below deep poverty line	G1 High vulnerability	G2 High vulnerability	G3 Medium vulnerability
	Between deep and relative poverty lines	G4 High vulnerability	G5 High vulnerability	G6 Low vulnerability
	Above relative poverty line	G7 Medium vulnerability	G8 Low vulnerability	G9 Low vulnerability

Source: WFP.

**Table 22** Regular assistance accessible to non-refugees per vulnerability group

Vulnerability group	MoSA's assistance	WFP's assistance
<b>High vulnerability</b>		
Deep poverty and poor/borderline FCS (G1, G2)	Cash transfers	Combined, voucher-only or in-kind transfers
Moderate poverty and poor/borderline FCS (G4, G5)	-	Voucher-only or in-kind transfers
<b>Medium vulnerability</b>		
Non-poor with poor FCS (G7)	-	In-kind modality
Deep poverty and acceptable FCS (G3)	Cash transfers	-
<b>Low vulnerability</b>		
Non-poor with borderline/acceptable FCS (G8, G9)	-	-
Moderate poverty with acceptable FCS (G6)	-	-

Source: Authors based on MoSA and WFP information.

The beneficiaries under the combined modality receive a ration of fortified wheat flour that is equivalent to the quantity provided to the beneficiaries under the GFD (in-kind modality) in addition to a value-based voucher of USD\$ 9/person/month value to be redeemed from the shops for the dairy products, eggs, pulses, rice, and vegetable oil, olive oil, cereal and canned fish (Table 23).

**Table 23** Composition of social assistance packages to non-refugees, as of January 2013

Household size	Benefit level (per household)			Frequency	
	1-2	3-5	6-8	9 +	
<b>In-kind transfer</b>					
Wheat flour (kg)	50	100	150	200	2 months
Pulses (kg)	2	5	8	12	
Oil (litre)	4	8	12	16	
Sugar (kg)	2	5	8	12	
Salt (kg)	1	1	2	3	
<b>Voucher-based transfer</b>					
Value-based voucher (ILS)	56	156	268	384	weekly
<b>Combined transfer</b>					
Wheat flour (kg)	50	100	150	200	2 months
Value-based voucher (ILS)	48	128	224	320	weekly
<b>Cash transfer</b>					
Cash transfer (ILS)	250	n/k	n/k	600	monthly

Source: Authors based on WFP, PCBS and MoSA information.

**Table 24** Monetary value of WFP food assistance to non-refugees, as of January 2013

Household size	Monthly value of household benefit (ILS)				Average monthly value per capita (ILS)
	1-2	3-5	6-8	9 +	
In-Kind	92.2	190.0	288.4	392.9	48.5
Voucher	56.0	156.0	268.0	384.0	39.3
Combined, including:	109.1	250.2	407.3	564.5	64.1
<i>In-kind</i>	61.1	122.2	183.3	244.5	-
<i>Voucher</i>	48.0	128.0	224.0	320.0	-

Source: Authors based on WFP and PCBS data.

The JCP programme has made some modest technical improvements since the baseline, including ensuring the JCP and PMTF databases communicate. This will assist with identifying overlaps in funding. All beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries who participated in the JCP FGDs are registered hardship cases and subsequently receive food assistance from UNRWA. Some also received government compensation/subsidy for war injuries or casualties.

### 3.5 Coherence

#### 3.5.1 Is there any double counting among social transfer programmes?

It is highly likely there are elements of “double counting” between programmes. The three main areas where this could be occurring are:

- Between UNRWA’s JCP and MoSA’s Cash Transfer Programme (MoSA-EU-WB): there are reports of refugees declaring that they do not receive UNRWA benefits and signing onto MoSA;

- Between WFP's VP and UNRWA's JCP or CTP: WFP indicated that they checked their databases and returned any refugee cases to UNRWA;
- Between other NGOs, such as Islamic NGOs that raise funds through *Zakaat* (Islamic tax).<sup>75</sup>

As there is very limited cooperation between UNRWA and MoSA, there is no formal mechanism for comparing databases, nor is there any administrative mechanism that both have agreed to that would mitigate the potential for duplicate payments. A report from an EU project providing technical assistance to MoSA concluded that 15% of MoSA beneficiaries in the West Bank and Gaza are refugees and a proportion would likely be JCP beneficiaries.<sup>76</sup> Additionally, recent research by ODI and Al Quds University on the PNCTP concluded that, while there was growing cooperation between UNRWA and the Gazan ministries to avoid duplication of support, coordination for social protection programmes was weak.<sup>77</sup> Thus, following an assessment of the policies and targeting criteria of WFP, UNRWA and MoSA, the evaluation team considers that there is significant potential for double counting to exist between programmes. Excepting WFP, which takes measures to mitigate beneficiary double counting with UNRWA, no other systems or agreements were seen to be in place to identify and respond to double counting.

### ***3.5.2 How well have the programmes been aligned with the strategy of other key partners?***

**JCP has an incoherent approach as it tries to align with different donors' strategies.** JCP also receives funding from the EU, which has different funding objectives related to private sector development. The EU funding supports a 3-year project within JCP ending in October 2015, targeting wood and furniture, garment and textile, leather, and food processing sectors. The project has its own mechanism (JCP contribution is about 50%); business owners have the right to select a proportion of the employees and the remaining employees are JCP beneficiaries. This shows that JCP is incoherent its approach, mixing this economic development focus demanded by the EU with the food security focus demanded by DFID.

**There is a lack of consensus regarding the best modality for reducing food insecurity - vouchers, cash or food in-kind.** UNRWA globally regards cash as the best way to reduce food insecurity, except in Gaza, where it still operates a food assistance programme. This exception has been made due to the entrenched nature of the food aid programme for refugees. The perceptions of refugees regarding their status as a refugees is often linked to the provision of services by UNRWA, and the provision of food assistance is considered to be a very physical manifestation of the provision of services. This evaluation did not look at the food assistance programme of UNRWA, nor did it look at the food aid programme of WFP for non-refugees. Thus, this evaluation is not able to contribute to a wider comparison of the three modalities because it was agreed that the evaluation was to be focused on a very specific cash aspect of the JCP and the VP.

<sup>75</sup> Interview with the World Bank official in Gaza, March 2015

<sup>76</sup> EU (2015) EU Technical Assistance to MoSA programme report

<sup>77</sup> ODI (2012) Transforming Cash Transfers, Beneficiary and community perspectives of the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme, Part 1: The Case of the Gaza Strip

However, the evidence collected from the FGDs and the study of poverty and food security status of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries conducted by WFP<sup>78</sup> do allow some conclusions to be drawn comparing food in-kind and voucher modalities. This evidence indicates that the VP is able to have a significant impact on food security, whilst avoiding some of the negative impacts of standard food assistance provision, such as dependency, poor nutritional status due to the supply-driven nature of food provided, and the social stigma associated with food assistance (sub-section 3.2.2).

**There is a lack of coherence over cash benefit levels.** The minimum public sector salary within the PA in 2011 was NIS 1,000 per month. This is unlikely to have increased substantially since then. The MoSA presently pays a cash transfer rate at NIS 250-600 per month under the PNCTP. However, the UNRWA JCP monthly rates are much higher, as an unskilled worker earns around NIS 970 per month, a semi-skilled worker NIS 1,400, and a professional NIS 1,900 per month.<sup>79</sup> The UNRWA salary and assistance rates are much higher than the PA salaries. International best practice indicates that, for cash transfers to have an impact on poverty, the transfer needs to be set at a rate to meet immediate needs only, in order to avoid encouraging aid dependency.<sup>80</sup> It could be argued that the high rates of payment provided by JCP create disincentives to employment. This issue cuts to the core of the objective of the JCP. If the rate is seen as a salary, then the primary objective may be to supplement UNRWA staffing cheaply. If the rate is seen as a cash transfer to the poor, with a limited labour market element included, then the rates appear too high.

However, UNRWA notes that their pay scales were set, in coordination with the Gaza Cash Programming Cluster Working Group, at a slightly less attractive level compared with the scales in the private sector. UNRWA claims that by keeping the wages lower than in the local market, the leakage of JCP opportunities to non-eligible people is avoided and the negative impact of diverting workforce from the local labour market is minimised. UNRWA further stated that they used three possible comparators for their pay scales. The first one is the formal minimum wage, which has recently been set by the PA at NIS 1,450 per month, although such a measure is not yet implemented. The second is the average daily wage in the private sector, which in 2014 was NIS 1,507 per month, and finally, the average daily wage in the construction sector of NIS 1,312 per month, broadly equitable with JCP's semiskilled wage.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> Al Sahel (2015)

<sup>79</sup> UNRWA data shared with evaluators. Based on a 5 day working week

<sup>80</sup> See International Labour Organisation Guidance and Policy documents

<sup>81</sup> All data extracted from PCBS quarterly labour force survey, fourth quarter 2014

### 3.6 Sustainability

#### 3.6.1 *Are there any alternatives more sustainable options to meet food security and poverty alleviation needs in Gaza?*

**With further integration with MoSA's programmes, WFP's VP represents the most sustainable option for meeting food security in Gaza.** WFP has used DFID funding to invest in a flexible and robust platform that has proved it can help poor families access food even in conflict situations. WFP has approached the MoSA about working with the platform, which is a good step forward for post-emergency, institutionalised sustainability of the programme.

**The increased access and coverage of the PA MoSA PNCTP provides an alternative potentially more sustainable public sector led social safety net.** MoSA run their own PNCTP with 100 staff in Gaza, and 70,000 Gazan beneficiaries (a 7,000 person increase since 2010). MoSA's databases are integrated between Gaza and the West Bank. Recognising that MoSA payments are often late (like salaries), the sustainability of this programme depends on the wider sustainability of the PA as a governance entity in Gaza, including how sustainable is the budget revenue. In addition, WFP's use of the multi-year funding has encouraged other donors (such as USAID) to investigate similar, longer-term funding opportunities.

**The evaluation did not identify any practical sustainable options for poverty reduction.** Ultimately, poverty reduction will rely upon improving structural factors in the economy, in particular, lifting the Gaza blockade. This would enable the population to engage in trading activities and have access to work opportunities.<sup>82</sup>

**The UNRWA JCP programme is an emergency response programme and therefore the programme is not intended to be sustainable.** There is some up-skilling of beneficiaries that may assist with future employment but there is no evidence to support this in practice. Involvement of the private sector may offer some contribution to the economic development of Gaza but in general, the programme does not promote or create sustainability.

**JCP funds might provide a more sustainable impact if donated to the General Fund, where they could contribute to UNRWA's overall presence and service-delivery in Gaza.** The World Bank poverty report found that poverty in both Gaza and West Bank is significantly higher amongst the refugee population compared with the non-refugee population.<sup>83</sup> There is widespread evidence, including the 2013 ICAI report,<sup>84</sup> that provision of services by UNRWA has a substantial positive impact on poverty of refugee population. The ICAI report also identifies that the General Fund is significantly under-funded and there is a widening

---

<sup>82</sup> See, for example, *Coping With Conflict: Poverty And Inclusion In The West Bank And Gaza*, World Bank, October 2011

<sup>83</sup> World Bank (2011) *Coping with Conflict? Poverty and Inclusion in the West Bank and Gaza*, Report No 61293-GZ

<sup>84</sup> ICAI (Independent Commission for Aid Impact) (2013) *DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA*, Report 27, September



gap between the demand for services and the ability of UNRWA to provide services. Thus, investment in the General Fund would, most likely, result in an impact on poverty of refugees. However, this is a complex issue, and resourcing the General Fund would need to be considered by DFID within the wider political context of DFID's support to UNRWA and the reform agenda.

## 4 CONCLUSIONS

### 4.1 Achievements compared to the Log Frame

It has not been possible to quantify the programmes' impact due to lack of poverty and food insecurity data, although some conclusions are drawn below from qualitative data. In terms of outcome, there has been a moderate under-achievement in terms of the number of households reporting improved FCS from the VP, which is likely due to the conflict in 2014 affecting food security conditions. Participating VP shops also increased sales slightly more than expected. JCP's target outcome has been substantially under-achieved, as far fewer abject and absolute poor refugees have benefited from JCP than UNRWA data suggests. In terms of outputs, JCP has a mixed track record. It is creating more work-days than planned for both men and women, but spreading them out over a large beneficiary pool, so that more people obtain shorter placements.

### 4.2 Impact and Effectiveness

#### 4.2.1 *What is the impact of multi-year funding?*

**Multi-year funding appears more appropriate than the traditional annual period of donor funding.** In the context of Gaza's protracted crisis, multi-year funding for cash-based assistance appears particularly appropriate to improve food security in a way that supports the beneficiaries' dignity and self-esteem.

**Multi-year funding has allowed WFP to improve the quality of its assistance, in particular by investing in an e-voucher platform.** The impact of multi-year funding on the JCP component is not clear.

#### 4.2.2 *What is the effectiveness and impact of the programmes on poverty and food insecurity?*

**The programme had no significant impact on poverty status and gap.** The programme Log Frame had no indicator of reduced household poverty at the outcome level. There was thus no incentive for the organisations involved to measure performance against the outcome. Both JCP and VP components effectively targeted poor households, but failed to impact beneficiaries' poverty status and poverty gap. Gaza's economic context means beneficiaries can only realistically be lifted out of poverty when the blockade is lifted and the economy improves. In addition, the recent ICAI review concluded that 'poverty reduction programmes, delivered through cash and food transfers, now demonstrate only minimal impact.'<sup>85</sup>

**The VP component has improved food security among beneficiary non-refugees.** Nevertheless, the incidence of food insecurity among non-refugees remains on the rise.

---

<sup>85</sup> ICAI (Independent Commission for Aid Impact) (2013) DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA, Report 27, September

This can be explained by the two major crises that occurred over the course of the programme. The situation would likely have been worse in the absence of the VP programme.

**The voucher-only modality is a cost-effective strategy to improve the FCS of beneficiaries.** Both voucher-only and combined modalities are much more effective in improving the FCS of beneficiaries than in-kind transfers. For similar results, the voucher-only modality is less expensive to deliver than the combined modality.

**The JCP component has failed to improve food security among beneficiary refugees in a significant and sustainable manner.** There is little evidence available to indicate any significant and sustainable impact of the JCP on the food security of beneficiary refugees. This poor performance can be attributed to an inadequate design of the JCP. Also, as reflected by the DFID output indicators, the JCP is focused on poverty rather than food security. The poor performance of JCP is particularly unfortunate considering 70% of the Gazan population are refugees and reliant on UNRWA's services.

**The JCP model is inadequate to address poverty, unemployment and food insecurity.** Given the structure of the programme and sporadic nature of the distribution of employment opportunity, the JCP has little or no effect on poverty or food insecurity. In addition, there is no evidence that suggests that employment is created as direct result of the JCP.

**Cash-based assistance is appropriate in the Gaza Strip.** The market appeared to respond well, as expected. Encouraging trickle-down effects on the local economy have been measured. It has a positive effect on the dignity and self-esteem of beneficiaries.

#### ***4.2.3 What is the secondary impact of the programmes on the local economy?***

**The VP component is showing encouraging effects in the local economy.** Participating shops have seen sales increase by about 40% on average since the beginning of the programme, with the effect being most pronounced for smaller shops. Additional sales per voucher dollar redeemed are estimated to be around 24 cents. Additionally, nearly 50% of participating shops increased their workforce as a result of the programme, and in total, an estimated 80 new permanent jobs were created in the Gaza Strip since 2011 thanks to the VP, a considerable achievement particularly in the Gazan context.

**The JCP component has made a commendable effort for women's empowerment.** While initially underperforming on the number of JCP workdays created for women, UNRWA has used the £1.5 million uplift to offer in total 1,110 FTEs to women in 2014. UNRWA is also working to further expand opportunities for women by giving them access to unskilled jobs previously culturally restricted to men such as packing factories and community-based projects in agriculture. 4% of the private sector placements were provided to women, and 109 women were offered a private sector placement in 2014.

**Both JCP and VP components tend to improve the dignity and self-esteem of beneficiaries, although further investigation is needed on the JCP component.** The e-voucher

distribution modality gives VP beneficiaries greater choice in the food they buy as well as greater ease and flexibility to access their transfers. Providing job opportunities has a positive effect on the self-esteem of JCP beneficiaries. However, this does not seem to be sustained over time, and may even be linked to possible long-term psychosocial harm, through providing only temporary jobs.

#### **4.2.4 What is their secondary impact on conflict (due to exclusion of households)?**

There was no evidence seen that there was widespread conflict caused by the exclusion of eligible households in either JCP or VP. As such, there was no evidence that the programmes either created or ameliorated conflict at a supra-household level. There was some indication of conflict caused by some individuals being seen to 'short circuit' the waiting list for JCP, which was perceived by a number of FGD participants to be the result of individuals relying on the use of their connections with UNRWA staff. The evidence on intra-household conflict caused by the apparent arbitrary nature of the selection of JCP beneficiaries also underlines the conflict risks caused by the lack of a clear and transparent process of selecting beneficiaries for the JCP.

**Focus group participants noted that the vouchers increased harmony in the household.** Participants reported that harmony had increased because there was a guaranteed food source every week. Beneficiaries reported that providing the voucher to men and recognising their role as the head of household reduced potential household tension that might have arisen if women had been designated assistance recipients.

### **4.3 Coverage**

#### **4.3.1 What has been the coverage of the programme?**

**WFP's VP has a coverage of around 19% of the eligible population.** DFID's support has benefited about 5,750 households annually, meaning DFID's support gives coverage of around 9% of the eligible population. All of them were living in food insecurity and deep poverty when enrolled in 2011, as defined by the FCS and PMTF.

**UNRWA's JCP has direct coverage of around 3% of refugees living in abject poverty and 0.5% of refugees in absolute poverty.** There has only been a slight increase (1%) in the number of refugees in abject poverty since 2011 (83,064 from 81,958), therefore the decrease in coverage cannot be attributed to a larger pool of beneficiaries.

**Both JCP and VP components demonstrated good coverage during recent escalations of hostilities.** In November 2012, the VP showed a higher than 96% redemption rate, and UNRWA kept most of its health centres open and maintained its assistance programmes, which the JCP helps to support. In July 2014, both components scaled up their coverage.

#### **4.3.2 Was there any systematic exclusion of certain groups of eligible people?**

**Within the constraints of funding, there was no systematic exclusion of eligible groups identified.** UNRWA has over the past few years implemented mechanisms such as

complaints boxes and community outreach officers to try and safeguard against exclusion of eligible groups.

#### **4.3.3 *Were there any systematic inclusions of ineligible people?***

**There was no systematic inclusion of ineligible people identified.**

#### **4.3.4 *What is the level of female participation?***

**UNRWA's JCP has made a commendable effort with gender.** The £1.5 million uplift assisted with the delivery of 1,110 full time equivalent (FTE) positions for women in 2014 (22% of all FTEs). UNRWA is working to expand the range of jobs available to women by pushing social boundaries, including work in packing factories and community-based projects in agriculture (jobs previously culturally restricted just for men).

**UNRWA's Graduate Training Scheme offers opportunities for women.** This scheme is a component of JCP that targets recent graduates (three years or less after graduation) by offering them short term contracts in accordance with their skills and merits. A significantly higher proportion of females than males entered the Graduate Training Scheme in 2014, with females being placed in 78.5% of the 2,305 offered contracts. This indicates a greater emphasis on female placements by UNRWA.

### **4.4 Co-ordination**

#### **4.4.1 *How good is the co-ordination between the two programmes?***

**Coordination between WFP and UNRWA is effective, with clear coordination mechanisms established.** There is some tactical coordination through working groups, e.g., sharing of the PMTF approach, but each partner modifies the formula for their programme. Encouragingly, sharing of data between WFP and MoSA, and UNRWA's internal data sharing between PMTF and JCP, has improved markedly since the 2013 baseline assessment.

#### **4.4.2 *How good is the co-ordination in regard to beneficiary lists and targeting?***

**There is increasing consensus over the use of PMTF for poverty targeting.** With the launch of the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme (PNCTP) in June 2011, coordination in the area of social assistance has been strengthened between MoSA, WFP and UNRWA. They, along with others, are relying on the PNCTP unified database to identify beneficiaries for their programmes and to improve their targeting approaches.

### **4.5 Coherence**

#### **4.5.1 *Is there any double counting among social transfer programmes?***

**It is highly likely there are elements of "double counting" between programmes.** The main areas where this could be occurring are between UNRWA's JCP and MoSA's Cash Transfer Programme (MoSA-EU-WB), between WFP's VP and UNRWA's JCP or CTP, and with other Islamic support programmes, such as *Zakaat (Islamic tax)*.

#### **4.5.2 How well have the programmes been aligned with the strategy of other key partners?**

**The JCP programme is based on an incoherent design and could be better organised and communicated.** The situation in Gaza is showing no signs of improvement, yet the programme is still working with a short-term view rather than attempting to encourage any long-term economic development. JCP suffers from trying to meet the objectives of different donors.

**There is general coherence among the main donors with respect for supporting the PA and complementary programmes in the Gaza Strip.** Nevertheless, important points for improvement remain, including:

- **Modality.** There is a lack of consensus regarding the best modality for reducing food insecurity in Gaza. For instance, non-refugees living in deep poverty and food insecurity are eligible for different modalities: vouchers, cash or in-kind. However, this evaluation is not able to contribute to a wider comparison of the three modalities because the evaluation was focused on a very specific cash aspect of the JCP and the VP.
- **Eligibility.** There is increasing consensus over the use of PMTF for poverty targeting, to identify possible overlaps between UNRWA's JCP, WFP's VP and MoSA's PNCTP beneficiaries. It remains, however, unclear how the poorest and most food insecure are prioritised among the whole poor and food insecure populations.
- **Benefit level.** There is a lack of coherence over cash benefit levels and duration of placements within the JCP, and the JCP team did not identify any need for any major step-change in performance or structure of the programme.

## **4.6 Sustainability**

### **4.6.1 Are there any alternatives more sustainable options to meet food security and poverty alleviation needs in Gaza?**

**With further integration with MoSA's programmes, WFP's VP represents the most sustainable option for meeting food security in Gaza.** WFP has approached the MoSA about working with the e-voucher, which is a good step forward for post-emergency, institutionalised sustainability of the programme.

**The evaluation did not identify any practical sustainable options for poverty reduction.** Ultimately, poverty reduction will rely upon improving structural factors in the economy, in particular, lifting the Gaza blockade.

**UNRWA's JCP has little sustainable impact.** The JCP programme is designed to reduce poverty, yet there is little evidence that the programme contributes to this. This is mainly due to the structural nature of poverty in Gaza.

**JCP funds might provide a more sustainable impact if donated to the General Fund, where they could contribute to UNRWA's overall presence and service-delivery in Gaza.** However, re-assigning JCP funds to the General Fund would need to be considered by DFID within the wider political context of DFID's support to UNRWA and the reform agenda. The final decision for how DFID could fund UNRWA depends on a wider assessment that is beyond scope of this evaluation.

#### 4.7 M&E Regime

Finally, the evaluation team determined that the M&E regime did not support the evaluation well, as it was limited in three major ways:

**The programme's targets were set at the start of the programme assuming that the underlying poverty and food security situations in Gaza would not get any worse.** In reality, Israeli military strikes on Gaza in 2012 and 2014 had a significant negative effect on poverty and food security. This adversely affected some indicators, which were not updated.

**The indicators set in the Log Frame were only partially useful in evaluating the performance of the programme.** For instance, there is an inconsistency between the stated overall objective of the DFID programme (reduced food insecurity *severity* among the poor and food insecure) and the chosen impact indicators (food insecurity *rate*).

**UNRWA does not use a standard Log Frame to guide the performance of the JCP.** This means that JCP can easily flex its stated objectives to meet different donor requirements, but the programme overall is confused about what it is trying to achieve.

**Completing the Log Frame depended largely upon external data sources that measure poverty and food security (PECS, PMTF and SEFSec).** It was expected that these would be run in 2014, and the evaluation would draw on these, but the conflict situation of summer 2014 caused these to be postponed. This means that the final evaluation had to rely much more on qualitative data than quantitative data.

## 5 LESSONS LEARNED

The section below contains lessons learned from the evaluator's perspective. It does not contain lessons learned from the implementing partners' perspectives.

### 5.1 Impact and Effectiveness

#### 5.1.1 *What is the impact of multi-year funding?*

The primary lesson learned in regard to multi-year funding is that to have a transformational effect on programmes, implementing partners must have thought through an 'investment plan' that relies upon the multi-year funding modality to pass a 'step change' onto beneficiaries: WFPs' e-voucher 'investment plan' enabled WFP to achieve something much greater than they could have achieved through repeated annual funding. However, this transformational effect was not seen with JCP, where the multi-year funding largely served to make UNRWA's internal cash flow planning easier but did not result in any extra benefits to the beneficiaries.

#### 5.1.2 *What is the effectiveness and impact of the programmes on poverty and food insecurity?*

The primary lesson learned in regard to impact and effectiveness is that development programmes struggle to have any impact on poverty in the context of the Gaza blockade. Donors can have an impact on food insecurity, but this is best achieved through vouchers, rather than short-term work placements.

Another lesson learned is that measuring of impact for both JCP and VP relied too heavily on external surveys (PECS, LFS and SEFSec), none of which were completed, which left substantial gaps in the evaluation. Whereas WFP conducted a specific survey for this evaluation that filled in some of the gaps left by the uncompleted external surveys, UNRWA had no alternative sources of evaluation data. In future, WFP and UNRWA must evaluate the risk of relying on external data sources, over which they have little influence on timing, scope or quality, or consider budgeting appropriately to complete internal impact assessments.

#### 5.1.3 *What is their secondary impact on the local economy?*

The primary lesson learned in regard to secondary impact is that Gaza's agricultural, food processing and retail sectors have a surprising capacity to supply the VP, and have responded very well to the VP, as demonstrated through the 2014 conflict. This gives confidence that the VP can be expanded and trickle-down benefits will continue to expand.

#### 5.1.4 *What is their secondary impact on conflict (due to exclusion of households)?*

The primary lesson learned in regard to conflict is that a perceived lack of transparency regarding the selection of JCP beneficiaries, and a perceived 'short circuiting' of the waiting



list by well-connected individuals, was remarked on by FGD participants as fuelling some inter-family tensions. The VP is sufficiently personal and discreet that beneficiaries have little chance to know what other beneficiaries are receiving, and there were almost no examples of conflict reported by FGD participants.

## 5.2 Coverage

### 5.2.1 *What has been the coverage of the programme?*

The primary lesson learned in regards to coverage is that UNRWA's method of estimating JCP coverage was misleading and has tended to overstate coverage. This is because UNRWA made the assumption that a placement, regardless of its duration, impacts the whole family for the whole year the placement occurred. In reality, the placements typically last less than 3 months and the wages are typically spend on food, meaning the effect is short-lived and the effective coverage should be proportionately reduced.

### 5.2.2 *What is the level of female participation?*

The primary lesson learned in regards to female participation is that with perseverance, Gaza's social barriers that often restrain women from working in agricultural and food processing sectors can be broken down, and women can participate productively in these sectors.

## 5.3 Co-ordination

The primary lesson learned in regards to co-ordination is that impact and effectiveness would have been easier to compare if the implementing partners had adopted the same PMTF component weightings. Another lesson learned is that the overall co-ordination of these social support programmes could have benefited from a deeper understanding of non-traditional donors that typically fall outside of traditional co-ordination mechanisms, in particular Islamic donors and Islamic NGOs and funding mechanisms like *Zakaat* (Islamic tax).

## 5.4 Coherence

The primary lesson learned in regards to coherence is that DFID's programming would have benefited at the start from a common understanding between implementing partners and donors regarding the best modality for reducing food insecurity. For instance, refugees and non-refugees living in deep poverty and food insecurity in Gaza are eligible for different modalities: vouchers, cash or in-kind.

## 5.5 Sustainability

The main lesson learned in regards to sustainability is that the development of MoSA has been under-estimated by donors, and since the baseline assessment, has developed rather faster and in a more integrated manner with the West Bank than was expected: MoSA supports a substantial population of 70,000 with its PNCTP. This mean MoSA is now a major

player in Gaza's social support programmes and should be regarded much more seriously as a longer-term sustainable option for social support.

## 6 RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 Recommendations for DFID

#### 6.1.1 Impact and Effectiveness

- **On the basis that WFP's VP is having a positive and cost-effective impact on food security in Gaza, DFID should continue and expand support to the VP.** To have greater impact on food security through the VP, DFID should:
  - Encourage e-voucher further development and platform sharing. The platform has potential to be a unified social safety net covering not just food but other needs. Voucher-based food assistance is gradually becoming the default modality;
  - Continue to provide multi-year support to VP, given the evidence that WFP has been able to make good use of this funding modality. It has allowed WFP to give financial and stability and assurance to shop owners and beneficiaries.
- **To maximise secondary impacts of the VP, DFID should:**
  - Consider scaling up the voucher programme significantly to increase the (currently limited) trickle-down effects at the production level, particularly for small dairy producers and farmers.
- **As UNRWA's JCP is not having any impact on food security, DFID should not support JCP with further funding.** To have greater impact on food security through UNRWA, DFID should:
  - Consider switching support from JCP to the General Fund, noting that this decision would need to be assessed by DFID within the wider political context of DFID's support to UNRWA and the reform agenda, and against other options such as focusing on youth, countering extremism, or supporting vocational training. The final decision for how DFID could fund UNRWA depends on a wider assessment that is beyond scope of this evaluation;
  - Investigate alternative approaches to increasing labour market opportunities to get more refugees into more intensive (if not full-time) work e.g., setting up small businesses;
  - Investigate UNRWA's internal food assistance programme to understand whether there may be an opportunity to develop this further, drawing on the experience of WFP's Voucher Programme;
  - Encourage UNRWA to conduct in-bound and out-bound performance conversations with beneficiaries at the end of their contracts. These should be designed to both remind beneficiaries of the gains they have made in skill development and employability and provide counsel on how best to manage some of the psychosocial issues related to sudden unemployment;
  - Consider multi-year funding if UNRWA can present a convincing 'investment plan' that will have an increased impact on beneficiaries;
  - Review the linkages and assumptions in any future Theory of Change concerning support to JCP, to ensure that the models adequately consider the effect on

outputs and outcomes of very short-term inputs, such as the JCP wages when viewed from the beneficiaries' perspectives.

- To improve the effectiveness of food security programmes in general, DFID should:
  - **Ensure implementing partners, particularly UNRWA, strengthen their M&E regimes for future programming.** This will involve ensuring partners conduct baselines, mid-point reviews and final evaluations at the right time. DFID should also ensure that methodologies measure outcomes as well as outputs, and are not over-reliant on external data sources such as PECS or SEFSec.
  - **Promote multi-year funding,** particularly where there is an 'investment plan' that will allow new approaches and platforms to be developed that can bring a 'step change' in programme performance.

#### **6.1.2 Coverage**

- **DFID should expand assistance to food insecure populations.** DFID should consider re-focusing on food security rather than poverty, recognising that the only way to significantly improve the Gazan economy and reduce poverty is to lift the blockade, and that food insecurity will be a long-term ongoing issue that needs to be addressed.

#### **6.1.3 Co-ordination**

- **DFID should promote dialogue between actors working in the food security space,** in particular MoSA, WFP and UNRWA, and encourage each actor to fix on the same version of the PMTF, to enable information sharing.

#### **6.1.4 Coherence**

- **DFID should conduct a full assessment of all assistance programmes in Gaza** (MoSA, WFP, UNRWA) to understand which has the greatest impact on food security and poverty. This assessment should be followed by workshops involving MoSA, UNRWA and WFP to build a consensus regarding the best modality for reducing food insecurity: vouchers, cash or in-kind and to identify overlaps between UNRWA's JCP, WFP's VP and MoSA's PNCTP beneficiaries.

#### **6.1.5 Sustainability**

- DFID should encourage WFP to work further with MoSA. MoSA is interested in the e-voucher system and some preliminary discussions have been held. WFP is looking to present their system to MoSA. Currently, though, there is no direct coordination with MoSA in Gaza;
- DFID should support the transition of the VP system to a new payment platform based on a regular banking platform, which could pave the way for participants to gain access in the longer term to bank accounts. A pilot payment mechanism, "PayPal", via Bank of Palestine started a pilot in January 2015, with the aim of replacing the current Jordanian service provider to reduce transaction costs and thus improve efficiency of the programme.

## 6.2 Recommendations for Implementing Partners (UNRWA and WFP)

### 6.2.1 Impact and Effectiveness

- To improve the impact of the VP, WFP should:
  - Continue developing and expanding the existing VP system through adding more participating shops and products;
  - Continue research mapping food products' nutritional content and analysing consumption patterns through the barcode system, in order to incentivise food purchasers to purchase food combinations that will have the greatest impact on FCS;
  - Monitor those who enrolled in the VP to determine if there is continuing knowledge, attitudinal and behavioural change with regards to nutrition and balanced diet;
  - Continue working and sharing information with other donors and implementing partners in Gaza with the objective that the e-voucher platform becomes the common social support platform.
  
- To increase the secondary impact of the VP, WFP should:
  - Source increasing amounts of the food basket from local sources, particularly non-land intensive products such as dairy, wheat and poultry;
  - Expand the retail network of shops to include small shops as this would maximise the secondary economic impact of the VP;
  - Continue and expand the nutritional training programme for women. This would have a positive impact with regard to female empowerment by increasing their education, awareness, and confidence;
  - Continue the current practice of ensuring that the empowerment of women does not disempower men, to ensure cultural norms are respected. This could be ensured by keeping males as the designated head of household for the VP, and engaging them alongside women in nutritional courses.
  
- To improve the impact of the JCP, UNRWA should:
  - Conduct an internal review of JCP objectives with the donors, with the aim of reviewing the programme's structure (currently favouring lots of short-term positions and supplying core services through JCP) and different donor objectives (food security vs. private sector development in the case of DFID and EU respectively) to come to a consensus on what the JCP is trying to achieve;
  - Lobby donors for multi-year funding to reduce fluctuations in the numbers of opportunities offered each year;
  - Creating or updating the JCP foundational documentation (Log Frame, Policy Documents) to reflect the revised structure to better meet donor and programme objectives;
  - Investigate alternative approaches to increasing labour market opportunities to get more refugees into more intensive (if not full-time) work e.g., setting up small businesses;
  - Strengthen the M&E regime to move beyond measuring outputs and conducting expenditure surveys, to setting and measuring outcome and impact indicators,

conducting baselines at the right time, building in flexibility for reviewing indicators after major events (such as conflicts), and de-risking the M&E regime from reliance on external data sources such as PECS or SEFSec, and relying more on partner-collected data;

- Consider options for updating refugees on their position in the waiting list by SMS or email, with the objective of increasing transparency and reducing the many visits refugees make to UNRWA to check their position;
- Conduct in-bound and out-bound performance conversations with beneficiaries at the end of their contracts. These should be designed to both remind beneficiaries of the gains they have made in skill development and employability and provide counsel on how best to manage some of the psychosocial issues related to sudden unemployment;
- Further investigate the psychosocial impact of the JCP and explore options to address any undue harm that may be attributed to Programme. This should be done through additional surveys and through a self-reporting questionnaire and the (planned) 360-degree assessments.

### **6.2.2 Coverage**

- WFP must quickly complete the review of the residual caseload of 25,000 left over from the 2014 conflict, and quickly complete the additional PMTF/FCS survey in order to continually refine the VP;
- UNRWA and WFP should re-focus JCP and VP on food security rather than poverty, recognising that the only way to significantly improve the Gazan economy and reduce poverty is to lift the blockade, and that food insecurity will be a long-term ongoing issue that needs to be addressed;
- UNRWA should continue to increase the proportion of women's placements in JCP and in the GTP, and continue to break down social barriers to involving women in the workplace.

### **6.2.3 Co-ordination**

- UNRWA and WFP should consider aligning their use of the PMTF so that results can be directly compared.

### **6.2.4 Coherence**

- UNRWA should consider re-orienting JCP away from short-term views towards labour market interventions, and should consider whether or not to accept donor funding for JCP if donor objectives are not in alignment;
- UNRWA should review the internal coherence of JCP, with particular regard to the wide range of placement lengths and cash benefit levels;
- UNRWA and WFP should work together to gain a consensus on the best modalities for reducing food insecurity;

### **6.2.5 Sustainability**

- WFP should strengthen its efforts to work with MoSA and support MoSA's adoption of the e-voucher system, in order to support MoSA transition into the primary long-term provider of a public social safety net in Gaza;
- WFP should strengthen its efforts to locate local suppliers for food products that do not require much agricultural land (dairy, poultry, eggs) so that the agro-processing sectors have an opportunity to strengthen and start supplying Gaza's wider population;
- UNRWA should Investigate alternative approaches to increasing labour market opportunities to get more refugees into more intensive (if not full-time) work e.g., setting up small businesses that might last longer and provide more sustained support for families than very short-term placements.

## ANNEXES

Annex 1	Bibliography
Annex 2	Log Frame
Annex 3	Original Terms of Reference
Annex 4	Terms of Reference for the Project Steering Committee
Annex 5	Evaluation Questions
Annex 6	List of key informants consulted over the course of the evaluation
Annex 7	Core guiding questions for semi-structured interviews of key informants
Annex 8	Core guiding questions for the focus group discussions
Annex 9	Focus Group Summaries



## Annex 1 Bibliography

- 2011 PTMF Data, WFP, 2011
- Budget Revision No. 2 to occupied Palestinian territory Emergency Operation 200298 'Emergency food assistance to the non-refugee population in the Gaza Strip', WFP, 2014
- Cash Voucher Programme - Review of voucher assistance, WFP-Oxfam, 2012
- Coping With Conflict: Poverty And Inclusion In The West Bank And Gaza, World Bank, October 2011
- DFID Annual Reports, DFID, 2012, 2013, 2014
- DFID Business Case 'Improving Food Security Levels for People in Gaza', 2011
- DFID International Audit Report, DFID, 2015
- DFID Methodology Sampling Frame, DFID, 2014
- ECHO funded Household Economic Approach Study in Gaza, funded by Oxfam, ECHO, July 2013
- EU Technical Assistance to MoSA programme report, EU, 2015
- Evaluation Survey of the Food Voucher Intervention in the Gaza Strip Under WFP/State of Palestine Emergency Operation (EMOP), Al Sahel, 2015
- First monitoring report on the secondary impact of WFP's Voucher Programme, WFP, 2013
- Impact evaluation of the EU contribution to cash transfer programme PEGASE, EU, 2013
- Implications of cash and voucher transfers on beneficiaries' protection, gender relations and social dynamics, WFP, 2012
- Job Creation Programme Income Use Rapid Assessment, UNRWA, 2013
- Nutrition Awareness Campaign for female beneficiaries of value-based voucher programme, WFP, 2013
- Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 2007-2009, WFP
- Secondary Impact of WFP's Voucher Programme in Palestine, WFP, 2014
- SEFSec 2013 report, WFP, 2013
- The Emergency Job Creation Programme: Providing Opportunities for People and Business, Annual Review, Transtec, 2014
- Transforming Cash Transfers: Beneficiary and community perspectives of the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), 2012
- West Bank and Gaza: Targeting Assessment of the Cash Transfer Program, WFP, 2012
- WFP Palestine Electronic Vouchers: A platform for humanitarian and development interventions, WFP, 2015

**Annex 2 Log Frame**

PROJECT NAME	Improving food security levels for people in Gaza								
<b>IMPACT</b> Reduced economic hardship and hunger amongst food insecure, abject and absolute poor refugees and non refugees in Gaza	<b>Impact Indicator 1</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 1</b>	<b>Milestone 2</b>	<b>Milestone 3</b>	<b>Milestone 4</b>		
	Poverty Gap Index	<b>Planned</b>	5	N/A	N/A	N/A	3		
		<b>Achieved</b>							
		<b>Source</b>							
		Annual Palestine Expenditure & Consumption Survey, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)							
	<b>Impact Indicator 2</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 1</b>	<b>Milestone 2</b>	<b>Milestone 3</b>	<b>Milestone 4</b>		
	Food Insecurity in Gaza (disaggregated by refugees)	<b>Planned</b>	55% (non refugees)	N/A	N/A	N/A	53% (non refugees)		
		<b>Achieved</b>							
		<b>Source</b>							
		Annual Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)							
<b>OUTCOME</b>	<b>Outcome Indicator 1 WFP</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Milestone 2014</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
Reduced household poverty and improved food consumption amongst vulnerable Gazans	Annual number of households with improved Food	<b>Planned</b>	0	3,410	5,325	5,549	5,740	Political and security environments do not deteriorate. Beneficiaries eat (not swap or trade) the 9 food commodities provided by the vouchers and use additional income saved from vouchers to buy further diversified and nutrient rich foods to supplement the diet. Local producers and suppliers are able to meet demand sustainably. Traders are willing and able to expand their business with additional income. Changes in crossing regime into Gaza do not hinder import of inputs for production or import of Palestinian goods for resale. JCP contractors are able and willing to complete their assignments. There are no imposed restrictions on availability of cash or external pressures such high levels of inflation	
		<b>Achieved</b>		2,335	5,336	5,078	4,242		
		<b>Source</b>							
		The Food Consumption Score survey reported in the World Food Programme (WFP) annual progress report							
	<b>Outcome Indicator 2 WFP</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Milestone 2014</b>		
	Percentage of participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme	<b>Planned</b>	0%	90%	90%	90%	90%		
		<b>Achieved</b>		0%	91%	91%	93%		
		<b>Source</b>							
		WFP annual progress report							
	<b>Outcome Indicator 3 UNRWA</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>		
The percentage of abject and absolute poor	<b>Planned</b>	55%	60%	65%	70%	75%			
	<b>Achieved</b>		51%	78%	95%	15%			
	<b>Source</b>								
	JCP Database, reported in UNRWA Annual progress report								
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DRD (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>		<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>			
	£25.6m								
<b>OUTPUT 1 UNRWA JCP</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.1</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Milestone 2014</b>	<b>Assumption</b>	
Improved household income for refugees	Number of work days created annually (men)	<b>Planned</b>	0	357,500	357,500	357,500	357,500	Security situation or access issues do not prevent beneficiaries from taking up available assignments. Cash payments are unhindered by restrictions and increased demand in shops does not create inflationary pressures for beneficiaries and non beneficiaries JCP contractors are able and willing to complete their assignments. There are no imposed restrictions on availability of cash	
		<b>Achieved</b>		468,800	574,838	451,639	432,042		
		<b>Source</b>							
		UNRWA Annual progress report							
	<b>Output Indicator 1.2</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Milestone 2014</b>		
	Number of work days created annually (women)	<b>Planned</b>	0	192,500	192,500	192,500	192,500		
		<b>Achieved</b>		119,700	101,132	57,813	206,764		
		<b>Source</b>							
		UNRWA Annual progress report							
	<b>Output Indicator 1.3</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Milestone 2014</b>		
Average number of work days per beneficiary.	<b>Planned</b>	0	104	104	104	104			
	<b>Achieved</b>		69	74	58	53			
	<b>Source</b>								
	UNRWA Annual Progress report								
<b>IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)</b>	<b>Output Indicator 1.4</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>		
60%	Number of JCP direct beneficiaries employed	<b>Planned</b>	0	5,300	5,300	5,300	5,300		
		<b>Achieved</b>		8,553	9,177	8,842	9,960		
		<b>Source</b>							
		UNRWA Annual progress report							
		UNRWA Annual progress report							
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DRD (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>		<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DRD SHARE (%)</b>		
	£15.9m								
<b>OUTPUT 2 WFP UVP</b>	<b>Output Indicator 2.1</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>	
Improved access to sufficient food for	Average number of food vouchers booklets	<b>Planned</b>	0	3,410	5,325	5,549	5,740	All 9 food items will be available in shops and not subject to inflationary pressures. Security situation does not negatively affect supply chain, shops or access to shops. Increased demand of voucher project does not negatively affect prices or availability of goods for non beneficiary population. Contingency plans are in place in event of supply chain breakdown due to external events (i.e conflict) Beneficiaries eat (not swap or trade) the 9 food commodities provided by the vouchers and use additional income saved from vouchers to buy further diversified and nutrient rich foods to supplement the diet. Local producers and suppliers are able to meet demand. Traders are willing and able to expand their business with additional income. Changes in crossing regime into Gaza do not hinder import of inputs for production or import of Palestinian goods for resale.	
		<b>Achieved</b>		3,500	5,336	5,077			
		<b>Source</b>							
		WFP annual progress reports							
		WFP annual progress reports							
<b>Output Indicator 2.2</b>		<b>Baseline 2010</b>	<b>Milestone 2011</b>	<b>Milestone 2012</b>	<b>Milestone 2013</b>	<b>Target (2014)</b>			
Total cumulative monetary value equivalent of commodities indirectly supplied to beneficiaries	<b>Planned</b>	0	2,103,554	4,315,080	7,479,472	9,205,504			
	<b>Achieved</b>		2,100,000	4,315,080	7,649,321	n/a			
	<b>Source</b>								
	WFP annual progress reports								
<b>INPUTS (£)</b>	<b>DRD (£)</b>		<b>Govt (£)</b>		<b>Other (£)</b>	<b>Total (£)</b>	<b>DRD SHARE (%)</b>		
	9.6m								

## Annex 3 Original Terms of Reference

### Independent External Evaluation Improving Food Security for People in Gaza

First component: Job Creation Programme (JCP)

Implementing Partners: United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA)

Second Component: Urban voucher Programme (UVP)

Implementing Partner: World Food Programme (WFP)

#### Introduction:

Resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a high priority for the UK Government. DFID supports UK Government objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) by helping build Palestinian institutions and promoting economic growth, so that any future state will be stable, prosperous, well-run, and an effective partner for peace with Israel.

Our support to the Occupied Palestinian Territories is focused on three areas; helping the Palestinian Authority to build strong institutions and enable them to deliver essential services; promoting private sector growth to stimulate the economy; and providing humanitarian assistance and support to the vulnerable.

DFID will provide £349 million in support of Palestinian development over the next four years.

#### *What we will achieve*

- Help develop the private sector to stimulate the economy and create 8,000 new jobs;
- Give predictable financial support to help deliver basic services to ordinary Palestinians;
- Improve accountability, security and justice for the Palestinian people – this will include helping women victims of violence by improving facilities at three family protection units and providing full legal representation for 460 cases affecting people in the most vulnerable communities;
- Provide basic services to refugees across the region through the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA);
- Support cash transfers benefitting over 215,000 individuals;
- Provide primary education for over 35,000 children; and
- Immunise nearly 30,000 under five-year olds against measles.

#### *Who we work with*

- A strong partnership with the PA is central to our programme – we provide technical and financial assistance to the PA to support our state building objectives and to deliver public services to non-refugees in the OPTS.
- We support the UN Relief and Works agency (UNRWA) as the main provider of basic services to Palestinian refugees across the region.
- We also work closely with a wide range of other partners to ensure that our programme is aligned to the political context and to support our development objectives, including non-governmental organizations, the Palestinian private sector, UN agencies and the Office of the Quartet representative.

**Background:**

Food insecurity prevalence remains high in Gaza both among the refugee and non-refugee population (1.1 of the 1.5 million Gazans are refugees) and this is going to remain the reality for the foreseeable future. 60% of the population are currently either food insecure or vulnerable to food insecurity<sup>86</sup>. The new access regime put in place by the Government of Israel in June 2010 has had no impact on food security. Although the market is generally adequately supplied with basic food commodities the problem for most households is that it is difficult for them to afford these.

We will be supporting the main actors addressing food insecurity in Gaza: UNRWA for refugees, and WFP for non-refugees<sup>87</sup>.

The Gaza Urban Voucher Programme (UVP) is a part of WFP's Emergency Operation (EMOP). It was implemented in 3 out of Gaza's 5 governorates (Gaza, Khan Younis and North Gaza) between October 2009 and December 2011, however it is now being implemented in all five governorates since January 2012. With previous DFID support, the programme has already provided 2,335 households (15,000 people) with a voucher-procured food basket comprising nine food commodities which could be collected from any of the 23 participating shops; since the scale up of the voucher project which took place in January 2012, the caseload increased from 15,000 to 30,000 beneficiaries and the number of participating shops increased from 23 to 46. The basket covers on average some 70% of a household's food needs. DFID support for this programme will enable the participation of around 5,750 households (i.e. over 37,000 people) by March 2015 i.e. approximately 40% of the total estimated voucher requirements in 2015.

The Job Creation Programme (JCP) is part of UNRWA's Emergency Programme, established in 2001. By the end of 2009, it had created 15,247,970 workdays for 227,442 unemployed, vulnerable refugees. This is the equivalent of 7,330 full time jobs over 12 months. The programme gave the refugees and their 1,205,44288 dependants a dignified way to support themselves. DFID's four year funding for UNRWA will enable 5,300 vulnerable refugees per year to meet their basic needs through the provision of temporary jobs. The jobs themselves will increase the capacity of UNRWA's health and education facilities and other community organisations as well as providing necessary human resources for the private sector. The programme is expected to benefit: 48 community based organisation and NGOs providing essential social services to communities; 238 UNRWA schools, attended by 213,000 pupils; 20 UNRWA health clinics; 8 refugee camps on infrastructure maintenance; 11 fishery and agricultural projects and 2,032 private sector businesses.

UK funding to the World Food Programme (WFP) will enable over 37,000 people to have better access to essential food items, and support to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) will mean that 5,300 vulnerable refugees per year can meet their basic needs. We will contribute £9.6 million to WFP and £14.4 million to UNRWA up to March 2015.

**The Objective:**

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess our intervention "Improving Food Security for People in Gaza project", implemented by the World Food Program and the United Nations Relief and Works agency, and collect wider data that give a more detailed assessment including any additional benefits due to certainty of funding, including wider economic benefits, unintended consequences, both positive and negative, of the programs.

The evaluation will assess:

---

<sup>86</sup> Preliminary results of 2011 Socio-Economic and Food Security survey (WFP/FAO/UNRWA/PCBS).

<sup>87</sup> Gaza population estimated at 1.56 m, of which 70% are refugees (PCBS, 2007).

<sup>88</sup> This represents total JCP results, not just those attributable to DFID.

1. **Immediate consumption benefits** – the direct value of the vouchers, and the income effect that this produces on the household in freeing up resources to spend household income more efficiently, optimising consumption of food, health, education<sup>89</sup>.
2. **Longer term ‘externalities’** or investment leverage benefits of the vouchers, in the form of:
  - a. **Nutritional gains:** for adults improving quality of life, health and labour productivity;
  - b. **Nutritional gains for under 16s:** giving rise to better cognitive development, performance at school, thus contributing to longer term productivity gains in the labour market;
  - c. **Local economy multiplier effects:** increasing demand for local products and shops;
  - d. **Increased social cohesion:** as economic hardship is reduced (not quantified);
  - e. **Avoided healthcare costs:** as households are healthier (not quantified);
  - f. **Household investment gains:** as households use the money to invest more in productive assets (not quantified);
  - g. **Short term** direct benefits of increased income transfers to target beneficiaries to meet immediate needs enabling short term improvements in nutrition, health, education, and a reduction in negative coping strategies due to consumption smoothing;
  - h. **Secondary** benefits of infrastructure development and public services available to poor people;
  - i. **Beneficiaries Views:** what are the beneficiary’s views about the programme?
3. **Compare the cost effectiveness** of the two programmes with other programmes operation in Gaza.

The evaluations will meet the three criteria necessary for the evaluation to be funded by the programme, as set out below:

- **Independent** – the evaluations will be independent. Steering Committees will be used to oversee the evaluations and to ensure independence.
- **Robust Methodology** – the Steering Committees will also agree the methodology for the evaluation. The MENAD Evaluation Adviser will play a key role in quality assuring the methodology.
- **Transparent Findings** – a clear process for agreeing the findings will be set out in the Terms of Reference and the Steering Committee will agree the final report and ensure the findings are published.

---

<sup>89</sup> WFP (2005) Evaluation of the vouchers programme in the West Bank; Paxton and Schady (2005).

## Improving food security levels for people in Gaza

Results Chain	Indicators	Source	
<b>IMPACT</b>	<p>Reduced economic hardship and hunger amongst food insecure, abject and absolute poor refugees and non refugees in Gaza</p>	<p>Poverty Gap Index</p> <p>Food Insecurity in Gaza (disaggregated by refugees and non refugees)</p>	<p>Annual Palestine Expenditure &amp; Consumption Survey, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)</p> <p>Annual Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS)</p>
<b>OUTCOME</b>	<p>Reduced household poverty and improved food consumption amongst vulnerable Gazans</p>	<p>Number of households with improved Food Consumption Score (FCS) amongst non refugees</p> <p>Percentage of participating shops which show at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme</p> <p>The percentage of abject and absolute poor benefiting from programme</p>	<p>World Food Programme (WFP) annual progress report</p> <p>UNRWA Annual progress report</p>
<b>OUTPUTS</b>	<p><b>OUTPUT 1 UNRWA JCP</b></p> <p>Improved household income for refugees</p>	<p><b>OUTPUT 1 UNRWA JCP</b></p> <p>Number of work days created annually</p> <p>Average number of work days per beneficiary</p> <p>Number of JCP direct beneficiaries employed annually</p>	<p><b>OUTPUT 1 UNRWA JCP</b></p> <p>UNRWA Annual progress report</p>
	<p><b>OUTPUT 2 WFP UVP</b></p> <p>Improved access to sufficient food for non refugees</p>	<p><b>OUTPUT 2 WFP UVP</b></p> <p>Average number of food vouchers booklets (containing 4 vouchers each) distributed monthly</p> <p>Total monetary value equivalent of commodities indirectly supplied to beneficiaries (US\$)</p>	<p><b>OUTPUT 2 WFP UVP</b></p> <p>WFP annual progress report</p>

### The Scope:

This evaluation should cover the following areas:

Evaluation Criterion	Evaluation Questions
<b>Relevance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How relevant were the two programmes to the situation in Gaza?</li> <li>Did the activities meet the needs of the people in the region?</li> <li>How were stakeholders involved in the design and implementation of the programme?</li> </ul> <p><b>WFP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the composition and value of the vouchers meet the needs of the</li> </ul>

	beneficiaries?
<b>Effectiveness</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the desired outputs achieved?</li> </ul> <p><b>WFP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How effective was the proxy means testing approach, were the right people included and excluded?</li> <li>What were the beneficiaries' experiences of receiving vouchers? Were they on time?</li> <li>What were the beneficiaries' experiences in terms of spending the vouchers? Were they able to find shops nearby?</li> </ul> <p><b>JCP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What were the key characteristics of beneficiaries: gender, age, previous economic activity, education level, number of children?</li> <li>Did beneficiaries receive payments on time?</li> <li>How effective was the JCP targeting of beneficiaries?</li> <li>What was the beneficiaries experience with the payments?</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How much did the overall programmes cost?</li> <li>What has been the overall cost effectiveness of the programmes, including transaction costs?</li> <li>In particular, assess the assumptions in Section C of the Appraisal case, on the other input costs external to the programme, which contribute to the benefits? (Thus a better estimate of the labour intensity figure can be made.)</li> </ul>
<b>Impact</b>	<p><b>WFP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What was the impact on beneficiaries to help them to smooth their consumption?</li> <li>What were the positive and negative changes produced by programmes, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended?</li> </ul> <p><b>JCP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What was the impact on businesses survival and on longer-term employment within the private sector, what impact can be measured? How can this impact be maximised? What needs to change to do so?</li> <li>What was the impact in terms of providing skills development to unemployed or women?</li> <li>What were the impact on infrastructure and services provided by the programme and the impact on the life of the communities? How many people benefitted from the new infrastructure and services? How did the poor benefit from these?</li> <li>What was the quality of the work done and the use by community, characteristics of workers, including what was the location of projects?</li> <li>What were the positive and negative changes produced by programmes, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended?</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What steps have been taken to ensure the programmes will be continued?</li> </ul> <p><b>WFP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What steps are MoSA taking to incorporate these beneficiaries into their own mechanisms? Taking into account the role of MoSA in Gaza.</li> </ul> <p><b>JCP</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How many programme beneficiaries transitioned from JCP to formal sector employment?</li> </ul>
<b>Coverage</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What has been the coverage of the programmes?</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were there any systematic inclusions of people who should not have been targeted?</li> <li>• Was there any systematic exclusion of certain groups of people, e.g. poor households living with extended families; the “new poor” or foreigners with no passports?</li> </ul>
<b>Coherence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How well were other activities taken into account in these programmes and their implementation?</li> <li>• Were beneficiaries receiving any other forms of assistance?</li> </ul>
<b>Co-ordination</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How well have the programme been aligned with the countries own priorities?</li> <li>• How well have the programmes been aligned with the strategies of other key partners?</li> </ul>

Specifically the consultants will consider:

- How the Project overall is managed and run;
- How its long-term planning relates to its regular and “emergency” activities; How did the two agencies benefit from certainty of funding
- What systems are in place to guide strategic decision making;
- How UNRWA and WFP strategically prioritises their resources between activities and between their geographical fields;
- How UNRWA’s and WFP’s management relates to, and coordinates with, the wider UN system and other relevant services providers;
- How UNRWA and WFP develops policies and strategies, and how these reflect wider ownership and participation of its stakeholders;
- How UNRWA and WFP stimulates an enabling environment for policy development
- How UNRWA communicates to its various stakeholders.
- Accountability of the two agencies to beneficiaries

A team of consultants is required to undertake an independent, external review of the implementation of the project management, operations and outcomes. For the review to have maximum transparency and impact it will be undertaken with UNRWA’s and WFP’s full backing.

The evaluation will be undertaken through a review of key documents, interviews with key informants, including refugee representatives, beneficiaries (including direct beneficiaries, participating shops, companies or organizations/other benefiting from JCP work) and visits to the region, including to UNRWA’s and WFP’s field offices in Gaza and country office in Jerusalem for WFP. Consideration should be given to holding meetings with OXFAM and local NGO partner Ma’an, MoSA, donors and other stakeholders.

The literature review will include:

- UNRWA’s and WFP’s annual reports and biennial budgets.
- External Audits
- WFP’s and UNRWA’s Gaza emergency appeal (project documents)
- DFID Business case and Log frame
- UNRWA and WFP website
- Papers/reports from/by the PA and working groups/Clusters
- DFID’s full economic appraisal
- Other reports as appropriate

#### **Requirements:**

The review team should interview, either individually or through a workshop mechanism – or a combination of both – a broad range of donor and MoSA representatives, other UN representatives, other relevant service



providers representatives, non-refugee and refugee representatives/beneficiaries, and a strategic mix of UNRWA and WFP personnel in main office in Jerusalem and field offices, at both senior and junior level.

**Consultancy Company:**

The review team of 2-3 consultants should include the following relevant profiles:

- Institutional and organizational development expertise;
- Knowledge of UN organizations and their governance mechanisms (of UNRWA and WFP particularly would be an advantage);
- Facilitation and participatory assessment skills;
- Knowledge of the donor community and their objectives with regard to Food Security sector;
- Knowledge about donor coordination and their objectives in this field;
- Knowledge of the socio/political/cultural context of the Middle East in general, and Gaza/oPt in particular;
- Policy and programme design, management, and evaluation skills;
- Behavioural change, information and communications skills;
- At least 5 years' experience in humanitarian and or development programming
- Advanced degree in social studies or similar;
- Knowledge and extensive experience of Food Security project;
- Experienced trainer and able to provide mentorship to data collectors/analysts;
- Experienced in evaluating similar programs, evaluation methodologies, design and implementation including data collection and analysis;
- Excellent management and organizational skills. Able to work with diverse stakeholders and collaborate with partners (especially UNRWA and WFP staff) as required;
- Ability to work both independently and with close supervision as required;
- Able to work in both English and Arabic, with a local consultant based in Gaza;
- Ability to deliver results under time pressure.

**Constraints and Dependencies:**

1. The consultancy team are expected to have security clearance to conduct field visits to the OPTS, including West Bank and Gaza strip;
2. The team is expected to start working by August 2012;
3. Interwork with different stakeholders but not to interface with their organizational systems;
4. Respect UNRWA and WFP schedule and availability.

**The Recipient:**

The results and recommendations of this evaluation will be used by four main organizations:

- Department for International Development (DFID)
- World Food Programme (WFP)
- United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA)
- OXFAM

The results will also be made available for other donors to use.

**Reporting:**

1. One report drawing the baseline in the first year and one in the last year of the project.
2. Baseline report should not exceed 30 pages and should include a 5-page summary; draft report will be submitted by January 2013. The evaluation team will present the results to stakeholder's Final report by March 2013.

3. The full final evaluation report will be submitted by March 2015 and should not exceed 70 pages and should include a 10 page summary.

**Time Frame:**

- 25 August 2012 - Data collection tools finalised and coordination with UNRWA and WFP completed.
- 25 September 2012 - Data collection completed and all data available for data entry.
- 10 December 2012 - Qualitative and quantitative data entered and analysed. Data analysis report produced.
- January 2012 - Review of first draft of the report by consultant and relevant stakeholders.

The evaluation will cover four years of the project period in which the first year will be used to draw and establish baseline data; the last year of the evaluation will be used to assess the impact of the project following the evaluation plan.

## Annex 4 Terms of Reference for the Project Steering Committee

### Terms of Reference

#### Steering Committee for the Evaluation of Improving Food security Levels in Gaza

##### 1. Background

The evaluation will be conducted by ATOS/PAI in the form of a dual evaluation. It will be managed by a Steering Committee consisting of technical representatives of DFID, WFP and UNRWA.

##### 2. Steering Committee's Composition

The Steering Committee will be chaired by DFID's Monitoring and Evaluation team.

DFID's representatives:

- MENAD Advisory, Regional and Corporate Team (Emily Poskett/Rachel Beaven)
- Palestinian Team (Zeina Gheith and Eilya Costandinides)

UNRWA's representatives:

- Evaluation Division

WFP's representatives:

- Evaluation Team

Participants will act as a collective group, i.e. providing a technical support/challenge function for the evaluation team. Members will, to the extent possible, offer evaluation expertise.

##### 3. Steering Committee's Responsibilities

The Steering Committee will:

- Finalise the action plan for the evaluation;
- Receive a debriefing from ATOS/PAI about the process and outcome of the evaluation;
- Endorse the inception report (including methodology, timeline and work plan for the evaluation process);
- Engage periodically with the substance of the evaluation, providing preliminary feedback to the evaluation team during the debriefing sessions (one during and one at the end of the field mission);
- Manage the commenting process on the draft evaluation report, within 10 days of receiving the draft;
- Endorse the final report (as an appropriate fulfilment of the TORs) before the report is submitted to DFID's Quality Assurance Unit, within a week of receiving the final report.

During its work, the Project Steering Committee will strive towards reaching consensus on any issues that are discussed. Should this not be possible with regard to comments on the draft evaluation report, minority views will be reflected in an annex to the final evaluation report.

## Annex 5 Overview of evaluation questions and sources of information

Below is an overview of the evaluation questions under each of the DAC evaluation criteria, as well as the sources of information used in the final evaluation phase conducted in March 2015.

High-Level Evaluation Questions	Priority Questions	Log Frame Indicators	Sources of Information
<b>Relevance</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the activities meet the needs of the people in the region?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not a priority but will be assessed during course of evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP VP mid-term reviews</li> <li>WFP Combined Programme Evaluation</li> <li>EC ROM report on JCP</li> <li>Transtec JCP Evaluation</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
<b>Effectiveness</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the effectiveness of the programme?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the effectiveness of the VP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outcome indicator 1: Average number of households with improved Food Consumption Score (FCS) amongst non-refugees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food Consumption Score survey, reported in WFP annual progress reports</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outcome indicator 2: Percentage of participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP monitoring system, reported in WFP annual progress reports</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the effectiveness of the JCP?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outcome indicator 3: the percentage of abject and absolute poor benefiting from programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP database, reported in UNRWA annual progress reports</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency</b>			

High-Level Evaluation Questions	Priority Questions	Log Frame Indicators	Sources of Information
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were the specific intended outputs achieved?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not a priority but will be assessed during course of evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output indicator 1.1: Number of work days created annually</li> <li>Output indicator 1.2: Average number of work days per beneficiary</li> <li>Output indicator 1.3: Number of JCP direct beneficiaries employed annually</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNRWA annual progress reports</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Output indicator 2.1: Average number of food vouchers booklets (containing 4 vouchers each) distributed</li> <li>Output indicator 2.2: Total cumulative monetary value equivalent of commodities indirectly supplied to beneficiaries (US\$) (total UVP caseload)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP annual progress reports</li> <li>WFP VP Mid-Term Reviews</li> </ul>
<b>Impact</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the impact of the programme?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the impact of multi-year funding?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with key informants in the implementing organisations</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with VP shop owners</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with VP beneficiaries</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the impact of the programme on poverty and food security?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impact indicator 1: Poverty Gap Index</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Palestine Expenditure &amp; Consumption Surveys</li> <li>Household poverty gap, reported in WFP reports</li> <li>Share of household expenditure allocated to food, reported in WFP reports</li> </ul>

High-Level Evaluation Questions	Priority Questions	Log Frame Indicators	Sources of Information
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> <li>JCP evaluation report by Transtec</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impact indicator 2.1: Food insecurity in Gaza amongst refugees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey</li> <li>WFP evaluation of the Combined Transfer</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with VP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impact indicator 2.2: Food insecurity in Gaza amongst non-refugees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Socio-Economic and Food Security Survey</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with JCP beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the secondary impact of the programme on the local economy?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outcome indicator 2: Percentage of participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP monitoring tool to measure the secondary economic impact of the VP</li> <li>Interviews with VP implementing partners</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with UNRWA key informants</li> <li>Interviews with key informants in organisations benefiting from the JCP</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the secondary impact of the programme on conflict?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with field staff in implementing organisations</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the programme produce any other positive and negative changes, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with implementing partners and other key informants</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNRWA annual reports</li> <li>Interviews with UNRWA key informants</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with JCP beneficiaries and</li> </ul>

High-Level Evaluation Questions	Priority Questions	Log Frame Indicators	Sources of Information
			non-beneficiaries
<b>Sustainability</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What are the alternative programme mechanisms to support the food insecure and poor in Gaza after 2015, particularly if Israeli authorities have still not lifted the restrictions on the Gazan economy?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Are there any alternative more sustainable options to meet food security needs in Gaza?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Programme documents and evaluation reports</li> <li>Interviews with key informants involved in other social assistance programmes</li> </ul>
<b>Coverage</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Did the programme reach the intended eligible persons and exclude ineligible persons?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What has been the coverage of the programme?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Outcome indicator 3: the percentage of abject and absolute poor benefiting from programme</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNRWA annual reports</li> <li>WFP annual reports</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Were there any systematic inclusions of ineligible people?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNRWA policy documents</li> <li>WFP policy documents</li> <li>UNRWA JCP database</li> <li>WFP monitoring system</li> <li>Interviews with key informants</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Was there any systematic exclusion of certain groups of eligible people?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UNRWA policy documents</li> <li>WFP policy documents</li> <li>UNRWA JCP database</li> <li>WFP monitoring system</li> <li>Interviews with key informants</li> <li>Focus Group Discussions with beneficiaries and</li> </ul>

High-Level Evaluation Questions	Priority Questions	Log Frame Indicators	Sources of Information
			non-beneficiaries
<b>Coherence</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How coherent is the programme with other programmes in Gaza?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Is there any double counting among social transfer programmes?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy documents</li> <li>Interviews with social assistance providers</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How well have the programme been aligned with the strategy of other key partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Policy documents</li> <li>Interviews with UNRWA and WFP key informants</li> <li>Interviews with other social assistance providers</li> </ul>
<b>Co-ordination</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How well coordinated is the programme with other programmes in Gaza?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How good is the co-ordination between the two programme components?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with key informants involved in other social assistance programmes</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How good is the co-ordination in regard to beneficiary lists and targeting?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>n/a</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World Bank's study on targeting</li> <li>Policy documents</li> <li>Interviews with key informants</li> </ul>



## Annex 6 List of key informants consulted over the course of the evaluation

Name	Function	March 2013	March 2015
<b>DFID</b>			
Mr Eilyla COSTANDINIDES	Programme Officer, Palestinian Programme, DFID Jerusalem	X	
Ms Nicola CRISSELL	Team Leader Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger, Palestinian Programme	X	
Ms Rachael BEAVEN	Statistics Adviser	X	
Ms Emily POSKETT	MENA Monitoring and Evaluation Adviser	X	
Ms Henrietta HAWXWELL	Team Leader – Rights and Refugees Pillar		X
Ms Gillian MITCHELL	Project and Security Officer		X
<b>UNRWA</b>			
Mr Robert STRYK	Chief, Evaluation Division, Amman Headquarters	X	
Mr Scott ANDERSON	Deputy Director, Gaza Field Office	X	
Ms Siobhan PARNELL	Deputy Director, Gaza Field Office		X
Mr Kurian JAMES	Field Programme Support Officer, Gaza Field Office		X
Mr Maher SAFI	Acting JCP Manager, Gaza Field Office	X	X
Mr Philip BROWN	Head of Projects Unit, Office of Director of UNRWA Operations, Gaza Field Office	X	
Ms Fadwa U'BAID	Administrative Officer, Job Creation Programme, Programme Support Unit, Gaza Field Office	X	
Mr Ibrahim AL HADDAD	System Analyst, Gaza Field Office		X
Ms Najah KHADER			X
Mr Mohammed INSHASI			X
Mr Hosam ELIAN			X
Mr Abdullah			X
Mr Jamal			X
Mr Ahmad			X
<b>WFP</b>			
Mr Pablo RECALDE	WFP Country Director	X	
Ms Laura TURNER	Head, Programme Support Unit, WFP Jerusalem	X	X
Mr Salah AL-LAHHAM	Programme Officer, VAM Unit, WFP Jerusalem	X	X
Ms Rosella FANELLI	Head of Partnerships and Communications Unit		X
Ms Arwa SMEIR	Monitoring & Evaluation Officer, Programme Support Unit, WFP Jerusalem	X	
Mr Raoul BALLETO	Head of WFP Gaza	X	X
Mr Tahir NOUR	Deputy Head of Office	X	
Ms Anna TROLLE-LINDGREN	External Relations	X	
Mr Amir YASIN			X
Mr Bola KHALAF			X
Mr Inas			X
<b>Oxfam</b>			
Ms Elena QLEIBO	Food Security and Livelihoods Coordinator	X	
Mr Wasim MUSHATAH	Representative		X

Name	Function	March 2013	March 2015
<b>Ma'an</b>			
Mr Ibrahim DABOUR	Project Officer	X	X
Mr Iyas AFANAH	Field Supervisor		X
Ms Sabreen AL GHERBAWI	Field Monitor		X
<b>European Commission</b>			
Ms Meriem EL HAROUCHI		X	
Mr Michael MANSOUR	Task Manager, Office of the European Union Representative	X	
Ms Anabelle HAGON		X	
Ms Esmée DE JONG	Head of Office, Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection	X	
<b>World Bank</b>			
Ms Samira HILLIS	Head of West Bank/Gaza Operations	X	X
<b>Ministry of Social Affairs</b>			
Mr Khalid BARGHOUTI	Head of PNCTP	X	
<b>Other</b>			
Ms Katharina HACKSTEIN	Team Leader, EC Evaluation Team	X	

## Annex 7 Core guiding questions for semi-structured interviews of key informants

The indication [Q1-Q13] refers to the priority evaluation question the question specifically relates to.

### DFID

- What were the benefits DFID aims to achieve with multi-year funding? To what extent has multi-year funding enable you to save time on administrative tasks and monitor activities better? Do you think this has had an impact on the programme efficiency? Do you think this has had an impact on beneficiaries? Has this motivated other donors to provide multi-year funding? [Q1]

### WFP

- To what extent has DFID's multi-year funding enabled you to plan activities better, to save time on administrative tasks, to procure at lower prices, to provide longer contracts, increase investment etc.? Can you provide concrete examples of changes that it has brought about, either compared to the previous situation or to situations with other donors? Do you think this has had an impact on the programme efficiency? Do you think this has had an impact on beneficiaries? Has this motivated other donors to provide multi-year funding? [Q1]
- What have you told beneficiaries about the duration of assistance? If there has been an increase in contract length, has this been communicated to beneficiaries or impacted on the entitlement policies? [Q1]
- Do you monitor progress towards expected outputs and outcome as stated in the DFID Business Case? Do you use DFID funding and other funding sources for the same activities? [Q2]

### Oxfam

- What is the duration of your current contract with WFP? Has this contract length increased since 2011? If so, what has it changed in the way you operate? [Q1]
- What have you told beneficiaries about the duration of assistance? If there has been an increase in contract length, has this been communicated to beneficiaries? [Q1]
- Do you monitor progress towards expected outputs and outcome as stated in the DFID Business Case? [Q2]

### Ma'an

- What is the duration of your current contract with WFP/Oxfam? Has this contract length increased since 2011? If so, what has it changed in the way you operate? [Q1]
- What have you told beneficiaries about the duration of assistance? If there has been an increase in contract length, has this been communicated to beneficiaries? [Q1]
- Do you monitor progress towards expected outputs and outcome as stated in the DFID Business Case? [Q2]

### UNRWA

- To what extent has DFID's multi-year funding enable you to plan activities better, to save time on administrative tasks, to procure at lower prices, to provide longer contracts, increase investment etc.? Can you provide concrete examples of changes that it brought, either compared to the previous situation or to situations with other donors? Do you think this has had an impact on the programme efficiency? Do you think this has had an impact on beneficiaries? Has this motivated other donors to provide multi-year funding? [Q1]
- Do you monitor progress towards expected outputs and outcome as stated in the DFID Business Case? Do you use DFID funding and other funding sources for the same activities? [Q2]
- Who's involved in the selection process? Is it transparent? Is selection made against fixed criteria or simply guidelines? [Q6, Q7]

- How frequent is it for selected applicants to turn down a job offer? What seem to be the main reasons (over-qualification, working conditions, illness, etc.)? [Q6]

## **Other partners**

### *ECHO*

- How useful could the HEA study be to investigate the impact of the DFID's programme? When is the next HEA study envisioned? [Q2]

### *EU*

- Multi-year funding? [Q1]
- EC strategy compared to World Bank and PA? [Q11, Q12]

### *MoSA*

- PA's CTP efficiency, coverage, absorption capacity and oversight in Gaza? [Q11, Q12]

## Annex 8 Core guiding questions for focus group discussions

The indication [Q1-13] refers to the priority evaluation question the question specifically relates to.

### Beneficiaries

#### *WFP Voucher Programme Beneficiaries*

- Since when have you been receiving vouchers? When you entered the programme, were you told for how long you would be receiving it? Has this changed since 2011? For how much longer do you expect to receive vouchers? [Q1]
- Do you see vouchers as a predictable and reliable source of assistance? If so, has this predictability helped your household planning better/making investments? [Q1]
- According to you, what are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process? [Q6, Q7]
- What are the benefits of vouchers compared to food distribution? [Q2]
- Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict? [Q4]
- How do females benefit from this programme or not? [Q4, Q8]
- What other programmes do you or other household members benefit from? [Q11]

#### *UNRWA JCP Beneficiaries*

- Have you ever turned down a JCP job because it was too physically demanding/not 'up to your level of education'? [Q6]
- According to you, what are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process? [Q6, Q7]
- Does working mean the programme is more dignified than a grant? [Q2]
- Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict? [Q4]
- How do females benefit from this programme or not? [Q4, Q8]
- What other programmes do you or other household members benefit from? [Q11]

### Non-beneficiaries

#### *UNRWA waiting list for JCP*

- According to you, what are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process? [Q6, Q7]
- Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict? [Q4]
- How do females benefit from this programme or not? [Q4, Q8]

#### *WFP GFD beneficiaries*

- According to you, what are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process? [Q6, Q7]
- What are the benefits of vouchers compared to food distribution? [Q2]
- Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict? [Q4]
- How do females benefit from this programme or not? [Q4, Q8]

## Annex 9 Focus group discussion summaries

8.1 WFP Voucher Programme Beneficiaries .....	23
8.2 WFP Voucher Programme Non-beneficiaries .....	25
8.3 UNRWA JCP Beneficiaries.....	27
8.4 UNRWA JCP Non-Beneficiaries.....	29
8.5 Shopkeepers’ Focus Group Discussion .....	30

### 6.3 WFP Voucher Programme Beneficiaries

Date of Focus Group Discussion: 04 March 2015

Participant Summary		
1. Oun Ahmad Isbaia	M	
2. Zuhair Yaqoub Shrair	M	
3. Akram Husain Abu Khaled	M	
4. Murad Mohd Al Souod	M	
5. Islam Younis Ghalieh	M	
6. Mohammad Hassan Marouf	M	
7. Jihad Atta Abu Shaqra	M	
8. Nabil Mohd Abu Elian	M	
9. Bilal Khalil Al Astal	M	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
10. Nema Rashwan	F	
11. Wedad Suliman Al Azaizah	F	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
12. Muna Ibrahim Al Qeshawi	F	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
13. Amal Khuzaiq	F	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
14. Badr Al Kilani	F	<i>(Her spouse Nael was met last time)</i>
15. Sanaa Akeilah	F	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
16. Mnwar Al Raei	F	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>

#### 6.3.1 Summary

The beneficiaries engaged well with the facilitator and responded candidly to the questions. Overall, the beneficiaries were positive about the VP. Many beneficiaries’ responses showed their satisfaction with the process, their diverse diets, and that they are hoping for continuity of the programme. Beneficiaries depend on vouchers as a reliable source and prefer them to food or cash distribution.

#### 6.3.2 *Since when have you been receiving vouchers? When you entered the programme, were you told for how long you would be receiving it? Has this changed since 2011?*

- On average they started receiving vouchers 4 years ago (ranging from 3 – 5 years)
- The majority of beneficiaries have not been informed for how long they will be receiving the vouchers. Two of them mentioned they have been told by the field workers that the programme duration is 6 months with a possible extension. They all hoped the programme would continue as much as possible.
- 4 were beneficiaries prior to 2011. They used to receive SMS and come to collect 4 coupons monthly. They all preferred the voucher system as the magnetic card by itself gives an indication of continuity, shops are transparently monitored as both beneficiaries keep receipts of trade, and there is no need for monthly visits to the shops to collect the coupons.

### **6.3.3 Have you noticed any positive impact on the family?**

- *“At the beginning, three of my sons were anaemic and we didn’t bring any dairy products or grains home and there was a general shortage of food at home. Now blood tests show that all my sons have good haemoglobin level. Moreover, I have received awareness on nutrition through WFP”, a female beneficiary.*
- *“The programme has definitely made a difference in our lives. Our refrigerator used to be empty all the time. Provided dairy and grains are important in our diet. Now we wait impatiently till the end of the week to use our voucher”, a male beneficiary.*

### **6.3.4 For how much longer do you expect to receive vouchers?**

- None of the participants knew, but they hoped it would continue as long as it was still needed.
- *“As a local resident [non-refugee], this is the only assistance I am receiving. Therefore, I wish it will continue”, a male beneficiary.*
- 2 beneficiaries are now IDPs in shelters. Their vouchers have been stopped temporarily due to their change in status, which shows the fine degree of control that can be applied to the system.

### **6.3.5 Do you see vouchers as a predictable and reliable source of assistance? If so, has this predictability helped your household planning better/making investments?**

- Participants saw vouchers as essential and reliable source of assistance. They wait for it from one week to another.
- *“The voucher items cover 75% of our food needs at home”, a male beneficiary.*
- *“We have a family of 5 members, 3 of my sons are unmarried youth, and we receive a voucher of an amount of 39 NIS weekly. It suffices our food needs for almost 3 days. We need 100 NIS weekly for food”, a female beneficiary.*
- *“Due to the high price of eggs, I didn’t use to buy eggs at all”, a female beneficiary.*
- *“Including flour in the 10 and 15 Kg packages in the voucher is good. Bread is essential for our daily diet”, a female beneficiary.*
- The participants often mentioned that the money saved on food now is used to cover other expenses like clothes, cleaning products and other home necessities.
- Most of the beneficiaries depend on intermittent work opportunities as free labourers or farmers (daily wage around 20 NIS) as sources of income to compensate for other expenses including food needs.
- The maximum value of the voucher is 96 NIS (for family size of > 9 members). They think very large families should be treated as special cases. Moreover, participants believed ages of family members should be considered, and some mentioned that an adult needs more food than an infant, which should be considered.

### **6.3.6 According to you, what are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process?**

- All beneficiaries held a general perception that the criteria such as family size and income was being considered.
- They were satisfied with the process, believing that it is fair and WFP wants to help as much as it can.

- They appreciated that field workers regularly make visits to update monitoring and data.

**6.3.7 What are the benefits of vouchers compared to food distribution?**

- Some of the beneficiaries have been transferred from previous food distribution services managed by CHF, where they received flour and sugar only.
- They all preferred the voucher to food distribution as it provides for more diversity in the daily diet.
- *“With the provided food items, I can cook different meals every day. The items include bread, eggs, yogurt and grains. The diverse items are good for the children”*, a female beneficiary.

**6.3.8 What are the benefits of vouchers compared to cash assistance?**

- The participants universally believed that vouchers ensured spending money on food. They all agreed it is better to have vouchers valid weekly rather than a sum of money every 3 months, as they believed the money would be spent not on food.

**6.3.9 Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict?**

- *“My brother in law receives a voucher and his son doesn’t. It created a little tension as he’s not sharing any with him. The amount of the voucher is corresponding to the family size”*, a female beneficiary.
- *“My son and his family joined us at home. Adding them in the family increased the voucher value from 67 to 96 NIS. He asked me for the amount difference”*, a female beneficiary.

**6.3.10 How do females benefit from this programme?**

- Some widows and single mothers receive vouchers.
- In general, participants responded that the whole family benefits from the voucher. Women at home are responsible for managing cooking and food related matters.

**6.3.11 What other programmes do you or other household members benefit from?**

- One female beneficiary received an UNRWA JCP 3-month job at a shelter as she is an IDP, regardless of her non-refugee status.

**6.4 WFP Voucher Programme Non-beneficiaries**

Date of Focus Group Discussion: 04 March 2015

Participant Summary		
1. Abdullah Mohd Ajour	M	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
2. Salman Nayef Al Astal	M	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
3. Abdullah Rabah Hellis	M	
4. Mahmoud Zohdi Al Basous	M	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
5. Jawad Tawfiq Esleem	M	
6. Mustafa Mohd Marouf	M	<i>(Met in baseline)</i>
7. Fadi Jamjoum Al Attar	M	
8. Emad Hamdi Saad	M	
9. Adel Mahmoud Fares	M	
10. Injoud Faraj Al Abadlah	F	



#### 6.4.1 Summary

The participants engaged well with the facilitator and responded candidly to the questions. Overall, the participants were critical and negative about the VP. Many participants' responses showed their dissatisfaction with the process and noted unawareness of the selection criteria or the complaint mechanism. All previously-met participants from last time are still on the waiting list. Some received temporary emergency assistance during the latest offensive.

#### 6.4.2 According to you, what are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process?

- The participants had a general perception of the criteria such as family size and income, but the majority of participants have not been informed about the precise selection criteria. Moreover, they don't know where to go for further information/follow up.
- Generally, the participants were not at all satisfied with the process, thinking they deserve to benefit more than some existing beneficiaries.
- *"The economy in Gaza is very bad. We deserve the assistance, but have not received it"*, male participant.
- *"I work with my brother on a horse cart. I am married with 3 little children. I think I am eligible"*, male participant [NB: He is also a beneficiary of MoSA cash assistance; we met him last time meaning he is still in the system but no one has informed that he is not eligible for a voucher because of his MoSA assistance.]
- *"I have a family of 8 members and one of them has a hearing disability. I work intermittently as a farmer. I trust that international organisations are fair and I am waiting for my turn. I received voucher assistance temporarily in the aftermath of the latest war"*, male participant [met last time]
- 4 previously-met candidates from last meeting were still waiting for their turns.

#### 6.4.3 What are the benefits of vouchers compared to food distribution?

- Some participants perceived the voucher to be better for diversity of food items. Others thought flour provided via food distribution is more substantial.

#### 6.4.4 Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict?

- *"My brother is a beneficiary and he doesn't share anything with me. I understand that it only meets his family needs"*, a male participant
- *"When I received a temporary emergency assistance during the war, my brother complained and felt some bitterness as he didn't"*, a male participant
- *"My brothers are beneficiaries, and I'm not, but that's not causing any trouble among us"*, a male participant

#### 6.4.5 How do females benefit from this programme or not?

- Participants knew of some females receiving vouchers, but thought males constituted the majority.

#### 6.4.6 What other programmes do you or other household members benefit from?

- Three of the participants received temporary assistance via vouchers under the emergency programme (3 rounds)

- 2 participants received cash assistance from MoSA; 1 of them started only a month ago. They didn't know if that excluded them from voucher eligibility.

## 6.5 UNRWA JCP Beneficiaries

Date of Focus Group Discussion: 03 March 2015

Participant Summary		Placement
1. Yousra Salamah Belly	F	UNRWA Emergency Office, North (social worker - <i>Met last time</i> )
2. Mohammad Mousa Al Ejlah	M	UNRWA Environmental Dept. (sanitation labourer - <i>Met last time</i> )
3. Abdalnaser A.Q. Shorrab	M	UNRWA school (guard)
4. Anam Said Al Madhoun	F	UNRWA school (guard)
5. Akram A.K Al Hennawi	M	UNRWA school (guard)
6. Majdoleen Mohd Ibrahim	F	UNRWA school (secretary)
7. Seham Jamal Hannouna	F	UNRWA school (guard)
8. Alaa D.A. Al Zamli	M	UNRWA school (guard)
9. Amro Kathem Al Kathemi	M	UNRWA school (guard)
10. Nisreen Yousef Mansour	F	UNRWA schools (librarian)

### 6.5.1 Summary

The beneficiaries engaged well with the facilitator and responded candidly to the questions. Overall, the beneficiaries were very negative and critical of the JCP programme. Many beneficiaries' responses showed their frustrations with the employment opportunities in Gaza in general and the UNRWA JCP programme in particular, due to extremely long waiting time and very limited durations of job that they received. Most felt the jobs didn't contribute to any economic impact at all, and struggled to see a link to food security.

### 6.5.2 Background about the application process and provided opportunities

- Average waiting time among the group of beneficiaries was 5.5 years (ranging from 1 – 10 years).
- They typically check on the status of their applications monthly. They're told constantly to go home and wait for a call back in couple of years, as the manager of the database knows roughly which month/year are being processed. Contact data can be updated any time and people are keen to do this so they receive the call.
- The ten beneficiaries received jobs as follows: 7 unskilled (cleaners and guards), 3 professionals (school librarian, secretary and a social worker).
- All beneficiaries have received one 3-month opportunity, except one contract for a professional (social worker) was renewed/extended to 12 months.
- All beneficiaries worked within UNRWA departments.
- The majority of beneficiaries are registered 'hardship cases' (eligible for UNRWA food supply).
- The majority know of the application/re-application process except for one who thought applications are renewed automatically by the system.

### 6.5.3 Have you ever turned down a JCP job because it was too physically demanding/not up to your level of education?

- None of them has turned down a JCP job opportunity.
- One male beneficiary (guard) had his job cycle postponed for 2 months due to a broken arm.

- One female beneficiary (secretary) left after 1.5 months due to pregnancy conditions, and she was not aware that the system allowed for maternity leave (i.e., that she can resume the post for the same overall duration after 2 months of having the baby).
- All beneficiaries expressed they are willing to take any opportunity even if it is not up to their level of education. The group showed that jobs don't always match the experience and qualifications of the beneficiaries:
- *"I am a trained car mechanic but due to my need for a job, I accepted to work as a cleaner"*, a male beneficiary.
- *"I am a trained teacher but due to my daughter's health needs, I accepted to work as a school cleaner/attendant"*, a female beneficiary.

#### **6.5.4 What are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process?**

- The majority of participants were not aware of the selection criteria.
- The majority didn't believe in the transparency of the process and referred, without giving specific cases, to examples of where they perceived that individuals with connections (*wasta*) had had their applications approved faster. Some noted that it was possible to lie on the initial interviews.

#### **6.5.5 Does working mean the programme is more dignified than a grant?**

- All of the participants believed that the programme is more dignified than a grant.
- They also appreciated that leaving home for work was good for maintaining a healthy mind and gaining some experience in case of skilled and professional jobs.

#### **6.5.6 Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict?**

- The majority agreed that exclusion of the programme sometimes causes tension even within the same family as only one member receives an opportunity per round (usually the eldest).

#### **6.5.7 What other programmes do you or other household members benefit from?**

- All of the participants received food assistance from UNRWA.

#### **6.5.8 What did you spend the money for?**

- The participants mostly used their earnings to contribute to the family income, pay the rent, pay their children's university tuition, and assist in house renovation.

#### **6.5.9 Other complaints and wishes**

- There is no noticed impact/change since the last review. Beneficiaries spend whatever money they get to support their needy families.
- Beneficiaries doubted that application data is double-checked or validated via home visits or further investigation.
- In general, beneficiaries agreed that a JCP worker receives less than 50% of the regular employee rate, and supported the idea that JCP is used by UNRWA as 'cheap labour'.
- Wages are paid on daily basis and absence days are not counted.

- In general, the beneficiaries agreed that one 3-month job opportunity in 5.5 years makes no difference.

## 6.6 UNRWA JCP Non-Beneficiaries

Note: Although the beneficiaries were selected from the baseline non-beneficiaries pool, by the time of the evaluation, 4 of them had subsequently been awarded a JCP programme, although this was only ascertained in the focus group. They were still included in the FGD. One further participant revealed he had been awarded a placement in 2001, but it was decided to keep him in the focus group as it was 14 years ago.

Date of Focus Group Discussion: 03 March 2015

Participant Summary		Placement
1. Refat Fayez Abu Abed	M	No placement since baseline (3 month placement in 2001). <i>Was met in baseline</i>
2. Wael Abu Khater	M	Worked 3 months at a distribution centre since he was <i>met in baseline</i>
3. Nidal Said Abu Akar	M	Worked 3 months as a school guard since he was <i>met in baseline</i>
4. Rawand Abu Saman	F	Worked 6 months at an UNRWA centre since she was <i>met in baseline</i>
5. Almaza Jouda	F	Worked 6 months as a school attendant since she was <i>met in baseline</i>
6. Feryal A.R Barhoum	F	No placement since baseline
7. Eman Khamis Al Bayouk	F	No placement since baseline
8. Reem Adel Al Qouqa	F	No placement since baseline
9. Khaled Bassam Kotkot	M	No placement since baseline
10. Tawheed Juma Musallam	M	No placement since baseline
11. Yousef Asad Hamdan	M	No placement since baseline
12. Nourdeen Naser Al Faqawi	M	No placement since baseline
13. Mahmoud Rezeq	M	No placement since baseline

### 6.6.1 Summary

The participants engaged well with the facilitator and responded candidly to the questions. Overall, the participants were very negative and critical of the JCP programme. Many non-beneficiaries' responses showed their frustrations with the employment opportunities in Gaza in general and the UNRWA JCP programme in particular, due to extremely long waiting time and very limited duration of jobs. Four of the participants (who had been non-beneficiaries in the baseline FGDs) had subsequently received JCP jobs.

### 6.6.2 Background about the application process and provided opportunities

- Average waiting time from registering with JCP to the present day was 7 years (ranging from 3 – 14 years since applying without getting a position).
- The non-beneficiaries checked on the status of their applications monthly. They're told constantly to go home and wait for a call back.
- One of the male participants received a 3-month JCP job in 2011, 2 of the previously-met male participants received a 3-month JCP job each since the baseline, and 2 of the previously-met female participants received a 6-month JCP job each since the baseline.
- All beneficiaries with a JCP opportunity worked within UNRWA departments.
- All beneficiaries are registered hardship cases (eligible for UNRWA food supply).

### 6.6.3 What are the selection criteria? How fair and transparent is the selection process?

- The majority were not aware of the selection criteria. Some believed this included family size and income.
- None of them were satisfied, due to their long waiting times and their desire to gain either employment or a JCP opportunity.

- “I don’t believe the system is fair and transparent since I have been waiting for 14 years for my turn and I know of people with connections who were called back before me”, a male participant.

**6.6.4 Does exclusion of households from this programme cause any tension or conflict?**

- All strongly agreed that the way the programme operates can cause intra-family tensions. An example was given of a family with several brothers and only one brother received a job, causing tensions.

**6.6.5 What other programmes do you or other household members benefit from?**

- All of them currently receive food assistance from UNRWA.
- Some of them applied for job opportunities with MercyCorps, Islamic Relief and USAID. Some said that they were not successful, as these projects target fresh graduates only.

**6.6.6 How do females benefit from the programme or not?**

- Some women reported that they were not eligible for the JCP because their spouses work for the PA.
- Educated women receive equal opportunities compared to their male counterparts.

**6.6.7 Other complaints and wishes**

- There is no noticed impact/change since the last review for participants who received a single JCP job during the last 2 years.
- The general perception was that a 3-month job opportunity in a very long waiting time made no difference, and sometimes it contradicted with the participants’ ongoing intermittent/casual work.
- Most of them keep looking for intermittent work and small jobs, while others received government compensation for war injuries or casualties, so there was a degree of coping around not obtaining a placement.

**6.7 Shopkeepers’ Focus Group Discussion**

Date of Focus Group Discussion: 05 March 2015

Participant Summary		Area and number of participating families
1. Manar Qudaih	s. 2014	Al Madinah (96)
2. Mohammed Saleem	s. 2014	Al Haremein (158)
3. Mohammed Sarhan	s. 2012	Sarhan (166)
4. AbdulKareem Al Najjar	s. 2012	Ebad El Rahman (93)
5. Awny Harara	s. 2011	Harara (122)
6. Maher Al Bar	s. 2013	Hassouna (199)
7. Jihad Hassouna	s. 2014	Al Raed (114)
8. Mahmoud Younis	s. 2014	Al Quds (126)

**6.7.1 Summary**

The shopkeepers engaged well with the facilitator and responded candidly to the questions. Overall, the shopkeepers were very positive about the Voucher Programme and were satisfied with the process. They believe the service is providing health and diverse food to vulnerable beneficiaries in an efficient and dignified way, and they hoped that the coverage will be extended and the targeting frequency increased. They indicated a very positive enhancement on their lives and businesses after joining the programme.

### **6.7.2 Brief introduction on your involvement in the process**

- 1 shopkeeper joined the programme in 2011, 2 in 2012, 1 in 2013 and 4 in 2014.
- Average number of beneficiaries per shop is 134 (ranging from 93 to 199).
- The shopkeepers have received training on the system, and believe they are competent using the system.
- At the beginning of the programme, shopkeepers reported that beneficiaries used to ask for other items (sugar, tea, coffee – items not on the voucher), *‘but now they know the routine and everything is smooth’*.
- *“I have 166 beneficiaries coming to my shop in Khan Younis. There are no complaints and everybody is happy”*, a shopkeeper.
- Both the beneficiaries' and the shopkeepers' IDs are requested upon distribution.
- *“Vouchers are much better than the coupon system. It's very transparent. We inform beneficiaries of any remaining or near expiring credit”*, shopkeeper.

### **6.7.3 What do you communicate to the beneficiaries?**

- Beneficiaries are informed that shopkeepers are implementers. The items, prices and other instructions are available for them to view.
- Beneficiaries are informed by the shopkeepers of the complaints and application mechanisms. In each participating store there is a suggestions/complaints/registration box.
- Project monitors have the keys to the complaints box.
- Shopkeepers are instructed to use the term “voucher” or “card” and not “coupon” in order to help change old stereotypes about the culture of food distribution.
- *“When a beneficiary tries to add an item from outside the list, I tell him politely if he can't afford it, he can take it as a courtesy of the shop as a way of showing that exceptions are not allowed”*, a shopkeeper

### **6.7.4 How does your involvement impact your daily sales?**

- On average, shopkeepers reported that voucher sales constitute 35% of daily cash sales (ranging from 15% to 60%). In hard times, voucher sales constitute 80%.
- Shopkeepers reported that beneficiaries have generally become regular customers, and they tend to buy other (non-voucher) items during their weekly visit to the shop.

### **6.7.5 How many of the voucher items are produced locally?**

- Israeli products are not included.
- Shopkeepers reported that local products (from Gaza and the West Bank) are included in the programme, and include olive oil, yogurt, cheese, eggs, bread and flour. Imported items include vegetable oil and grains. Local products constitute 80% of the voucher items [We heard separately from WFP that probably only 5-10% is from Gaza, the rest then by deduction from West Bank].
- Demand differs from one shop/locality to another, since rural people make their own cheese and dairy.

## **6.7.6 What do you like about programme?**

- Shopkeepers reported they were happy with money being received as a cash transfer every 15 days.
- They have good communication with project staff and they reported the system was transparent.
- Shopkeepers were happy that vulnerable beneficiaries have access to healthy food in a dignified way.

## **6.7.7 How do you benefit from your profits?**

- Shopkeepers were typically using profits for expanding their shops, paying rent and debt, and supporting their families.
- *"After joining the project, I added 3 new employees. I bought a piece of land and paid half of its price in cash", a shopkeeper*
- *"I am planning to move to a bigger shop. I buy products for my shop with half of my profits", a shopkeeper*
- *"From my profits, I bought and furnished 2 apartments for my brothers and helped them with their marriage expenses", a shopkeeper*
- *"I expanded my business, and created another branch for my shop", a shopkeeper*