### SUMMARY SHEET

Appendix to Annex A to Chapter 5 QRs 1975

# Unit: Trg Regt & Depot RLC

CO: Lt Col RLC

### Terms of Reference of the Inquiry

To investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of W1031325 Pte JAMES CM RLC on Mon 27 Nov 95 and report on the adequacy of orders and procedures for guards and ammunition within Trg Regt and Depot RLC.

### Opinion of the Inquiry

The Inquiry was of the opinion that Pte James took her own life.

# Recommendations of the Inquiry

The Inquiry made numerous recommendations, not all of which fall within the terms of reference. The recommendations and comment by HQ 2 (SE)Bd are attached as Appendix 1 to this Annex.

# Opinion and Recommendation of the Authority

Comd 2(SE) Bde agrees with the findings of the Inquiry that Pte James took her own life. The recommendations of the Comd 2 (SE) Bde are attached as Appendix 2 to

this Annex.

Proceedings forwarded to HQ 4 Div on

9<sup>th</sup> February 1996

Signed:

•••••

Retired Officer Grade 2 Staff Officer Grade 2 G1 Authorised to sign on behalf of Commander 2 (South East) Brigade

APPENDIX 1 TO HQ 2 (SE) BDE SUMMARY DATED 8 Feb 96

# BOARD OF INOUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS

<u>Para 39</u>. <u>Arming State</u>. This recommendation is relevant to the Inquiry and is agreed.

<u>Para 40</u> <u>Training</u>. This recommendation falls outside the terms of reference of the Inquiry but is covered in the Bde Comd's comments at Appendix 2 attached.

Para 41a. Guard Duty Addressed by Comd Deepcut Garrison.

Para 41b. Alcohol. Notwithstanding that alcohol had no direct bearing on the death of Pte James, the recommendation that MGS personnel should check recruits for possession of alcohol is not feasible for a variety of reasons, but must importantly because such a task is outside the criteria for employing MGS as security guards.

Para 41c and 41d. Unit Duty Personnel. Sub Unit Personnel. Addressed by Comd Deepcut Garrison.

Para 41e. Security Camera to monitor Entrance to the Female Accommodation.

Para 42. Undesirable Influences. This recommendation falls outside the terms of reference of the Inquiry.

APPENDIX 2 TO HQ 2 (SE) BDE SUMMARY DATED 8 Feb 96

BOARD OF INQUIRY - DEATH OF PIE JAMES

1. I have studied the report by the Board of Inquiry into the death of Pte James and also discussed its contents with Comd Deepcut Garrison. The report is very detailed and there is no doubt that the President conducted the Inquiry in great depth and very conscientiously. However, much of the Inquiry, and hence the resultant recommendations, go far beyond the terms of reference and impinge on matters not attributable to the death of Pte James.

2. The line of questioning of some witnesses caused one Board Member, to feel disquiet and his Statement of Disagreement forms part of the proceedings now forwarded.

3. Prior to the assembly of the board the, then, Comd Deepcut Garrison conducted, on behalf of GOC 4 Div, a review of the Phase 2 training system within Deepcut. This review resulted in comprehensive directives to both HQ RLC Trg Gp and the COTrg Regt and Depot RLC. This review is at Fag A of the board's proceedings.

4. The comments of the new Comd Deepcut Garrison are attached. It will be seen that GOC 4 Div does not envisage any further action, other than the review conducted at his behest, concerning any external recommendations.

5. I am therefore content that the directives issued by the previous Comd Deepcut Garrison, together with the endorsement of appropriate Inquiry recommendations by the present Comd Deepcut Garrison, satisfactorily address problem areas concerning duty personnel and the proper supervision of trainees.

February 1996

Brigadier Commander 2 (South East) Brigade

	Headquarters RLC Training Group The Princess Royal Barracks Blackdow Deepcut, Camberley, Surrey GU16 6	
	Telephone: Blackdown Military <i>Civil;</i> Aldershot Fax: Blackdown Military <i>Civil:</i> Aldershot	
Commander 2 (South East) Somerset House	Brigade/Dover Area	Your ref
Sir John Moore Shorncliffe	Barracks	Our reference: HQTG 1211 Gl
Folkestone Kent CT20 3HJ		Dare: 29., Jan 96

1. I have discussed this Board of Inquiry with my predecessor and our agreed comments are given below:

a. This is a detailed Board of Inquiry which, whilst addressing the requirements of the convening order, has Included issues and opinions which are not necessarily directly related to the circumstances leading to the death of Pte James. These important but largely peripheral issues are rightly being addressed by the chain of command within the RLC Training Group and are the subject of detailed direction given to the Commanding Officer, the Training Regiment and Depot RLC by the Commander RLC Training Group.

b. The review conducted by Commander RLC Training Group and referred to in the Inquiry was conducted for and on behalf of General Officer Commanding 4 Division. Whilst the internal recommendations have been used by Commander RLC Training Group to direct staff within the Training Regiment and Depot RLC, no further action is envisaged by GOC 4 Division concerning any external recommendations. Any further circulation of the review must therefore be authorised by HQ 4 Division.


c. Having studied the proceedings and the recommendations of the Board of Inquiry, I am satisfied that, in the absence of any contrary evidence, Pte James took her life deliberately, although there *is* no evidence to establish precisely why she did so. I therefore direct the Training Regiment and Depot RLC to include within the orders given to personnel on guard duty, orders relating to the current arming policy. I am also content to endorse the recommendation relating to the supervision provided by duty personnel, and direct the Training Regiment and Depot RLC to amend the relevant orders to include the more frequent checking of accommodation blocks, particularly during silent hours.

TDB-3.26J

d. All other recommendations made by the Board of Inquiry relating to wider issues and procedures within the Training Regiment and Depot RLC are the subject of action taken directly by the Commander RLC Training Group following the publication of his review.

Brig Comd





Your ref: Our reference:

Comd HQ 2 (SE)Bde

Dare: 19 Jan 96

# BOARD OF INQUIRY -W1031325 PTE JAMES C M RLC (DECEASED) <u>STATEMENT OF DISAGREEMENT ON FINDINGS OF BOARD</u> BY W02 - MEMBER

Sir,

A Board of Inquiry was assembled at The Princess Royal Barracks on Thursday 11 January 1996 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of W1031325 Pte James C M RLC. This Board comprised of:

President:	MAJOR
Members:	CAPTAIN
	W02

The Board was ordered to report on two issues:

1. The circumstances leading to the death of W/Pte James.

2. The adequacy of orders and procedures for guards and ammunition within the Training Regiment & Depot RLC and whether they should be reviewed.

The findings of the Board were completed on Friday 19 January 1996 and are disagreed as follows:

1. Paragraph 37 (page 14) which states "the Board find that the existing structure of Phase 2 RLC fails to provide, for immature recruits, sufficient opportunity for character development. This finding was based on extracts from the Single Entry Implementation Plan and a letter written by the Comd HQ RLC Trg Gp. None of this information relates directly to either the circumstances leading to the death of W/Pte JAMES nor the adequacy of orders. There has been nothing to suggest W/Pte JAMES was immature.

2. Paragraph 40 (page 14) <u>Training</u>. This recommendation is considered to be outside the Terms of Reference for this Board of Inquiry as no connection is made between this recommendation and the Terms of Reference given on the

Convening Order. It is accepted that the Terms of Reference could be construed to be without parameter however, common sense applied to its interpretation gives a much shallower meaning. A review of Training is considered to be outside the Board's scope. It is felt that much of the documentation researched by the Board and subsequently included in the Board's Report has been plagiarised to the point where the original intention has now been lost and somewhat tailored, to fit the circumstances.

It is appreciated that the 'wider-picture' was looked at however there was nothing given in any form of evidence to suggest that the training of W/Pte James was an inherent factor in her death. Therefore any suggestion of a recommendation for a radical review of training cannot be supported.

I feel that the line of questioning from the outset was incorrect and improper, definitive statements were made of a mysoginistic nature which I felt were not conducive to the nature of the Board of Inquiry. Orders and procedures were found to be, in the main, correct and recommendations by a previous Board of Inquiry were implemented.

> W02 Member

#### RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

A BOARD OF INQUIRY assembled at HQ RLC TRG GP, THE PRINCESS ROYAL BARRACKS BLACKDOWN, DEEPCUT, CAMBERLY SURREY GU16 6RW on 11 January 1996 by order of COMMANDER HQ 2 (SE) for the purpose of investigating the circumstances surrounding the death of W1031325 Pte S M James RLC, B Sqn, Trg Regt and Depot RLC at The Princess Royal Barracks on 27 November 1995.

PRESIDENT

MAJOR

CAPTAIN MEMBERS { W02

The following person(s) (was) (were) in attendance throughout (the whole) (part) of the proceedings in accordance with (rule) (regulation) 11 of the (Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules, 1956) (Regimental Inquiry Regulations, 1956).

\*(He was) [They were] (unrepresented.) (represented by)

The Board of Inquiry having assembled pursuant to the Convening order attached at page 2 proceed to <del>[record evidence] (on oath) beginning at page 3)</del> (hear evidence) (on oath) <del>in</del> <del>accordance with the transcript attached hereto.)</del> (or as the case maybe).

The findings \*[and opinion)of the Board of Inquiry are attached at page 6.

\*Strike out where not applicable,

- Although primarily intended for boards of inquiry and regimental inquiries convened under A.A., 1955 st. 135 and 137 respectively, this form may be used for committees, etc., and this space may be filled in accordingly.
   Insert here the authority, or the rank, name and appointment of the officer convening the board of inquiry or as

Insert here the astrony, or the rank, many and oppositions to the order convening the board of inquiry or regimental inquiry.
 Here act out the terms of reference as set out in the order convening the board of inquiry or regimental inquiry.
 This may only be struck out where a regimental inquiry has not been instructed to examine witnesses on onth.
 NOTE: In the exercise of a board of inquiry or a regimental inquiry the proceedings must be signed by the president and by each of the sneubers. Attention is drawn to the Board of Laquiry (Army) Rules, 1936 or to the Regimental inquiry Regulations 1936, whichever is applicable.
 (0-3445) D4 912970 1168 12/72 8, 2.4B, 69 3445





# Our Reference Gl/1269

See Distribution

Date • Jan 96

# CONVENING ORDER BOARD OF INQUIRY - AMENDMENT

Reference:

- A. Gl/1269 dated 3 Jan 96.
- 1. Reference A is to be amended as follows:

a. Para 1. Amend initials of President to show "S E".

b. Para B. Delete the first 2 lines and insert The Board is to".

R02 for Comd

Distribution:

Action:

HQ Deepcut Garrison Board President Board Members(2) Trg Regt & Depot RLC

Information:

HQ 4Div(Gl)

 $f_{1}^{(j)} = \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot$ 

HEADQUARTERS 2 (SOUTH EAST) BRIGADE SOMERSET HOUSE, SIR JOHN MOORE BARRACKS SHORNCLIFFE, FOLKESTONE, KENT CT20 3HJ



our Reference G1/1269

See Distribution

Date 3 Jan 96

CONVENING ORDER BOARD OF INOUIRY

..

1. A Board of Inquiry, composed as under, is to assemble at a time and place to be nominated by the President, to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of W1031325 Pte JAMES CM, Trg Regt & Depot RLC at Princess Royal Bks on 27 Nov 95.

President: - School of Logistics Member: ) to be nominated by HQ Deepcut Garrison Member: )

2. The Board is to investigate all the circumstances and record all evidence relevant to the Inquiry. The Convening Officer directs that witnesses appearing before the Board shall give evidence under oath.

- The undermentioned are to be given the opportunity of being present and represented in accordance with the provisions of the  $Ar(:_, Act 1955 s 135 (4):$ 

RLC - Depot & Trg Regt RLC + 3 RSME RLC - Depot & Trg Regt RLC

4. The President is to call any person who he feels will assist with the Inquiry. The SIB Report may be accepted in its entirety as evidence in accordance with Rule 12 Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules.

5. The Board is to report on:

a. The circumstances leading to the death.

/SE

b. Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the Board is to-specifically report on:

(1) The adequacy of orders and procedures for guards and ammunition within Trg Regt and Depot RLC.

(2) Whether there should be a review of orders and procedures *in* light of the occurrence.

6. The military witnesses as listed in Para 3 above are ordered to attend.

7. The attention of the President is directed to:

a. The Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules 1956 (MML Part 1, Page 812).

b. QRs 1975, Chapter 5, Annex A.

8. The Board is to record its findings, express opinions and make recommendations as necessary, although no recommendations in respect of disciplinary measures are to be entered into.

9. The President, on finalising the Inquiry is to forward the original and 3 copies of the Record of Proceedings. (AFA2) to this Headquarters.

R02 for Comd

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
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HQ Deepcut Garrison Board President Board Member (2) Trg Regt & Depot RLC

Information:

HQ 4 Div (Gl)



HQTC 1211 GI


**18** Jan 96

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Comd 2 (SE) Bde (through S03 G1 HO RLC Trg Gp).


BOARD of INQUIRY WI031325 PTE JAMES C M RLC (DECEASED)


1.	The findings of the Board of inquiry into the death of W/Pte James are attached.			
2.	This R	ecord of Proceedings is compiled as follows:		
	a.	Army Form A2		Page 1
	b.	Convening Order		Pages 2-3
	c.	Conten	<u>nts</u> I	Pages 4-S
	d.	General		ages 6.9
		(I)	Terms of Reference	Pages 6-7
		(2)	Procedure and Evidence P	ages 7·8
		(3)	Time of IncidentP	ages 8-9
	e.	Orders and Procedures for Guards and Ammunition Page		age 9
		(I)	Servicewomen on Guard DutyP	age 9
		(2)	Arming State P	Page 9
	f.	Reason	Reason or Motive F	
		(1)	Relationships	Page 10
		(2)	Alcohol	Page 10
		(3)	Dissatisfaction with the Army	Page 10
		(4)	Guard Duties P	Page 10
		(5)	Family Background P	ages 10.11
		(6)	Anecdotal Evidence	Page 11
		(7)	Pte-	Page 11
		(8)	Conclusions about Reason and Motive P	age 11
	g.	Training and Supervision Pages 11-13		Pages 11.13
		(I)	Training Ethos Pa	ages 11-12
		(2)	Phase 2 TrainingP	age 12
		(3)	Character Development P	Page 12



	(4)	Structure and Culture Page 12
	(5)	Alternative Solutions Pages 12.13
b.	Pastrol Care	Page 13-14
	(1)	Alcohol Page 13
	(2)	Sexual Behavior Page 13
	(3)	Off Duty Supervision Pages 13-14
	(4)	Undesirable Influence Page 14
i.	Findings and Op	inion of the Board Page 14
<i>j.</i>	Recommendation	<u>18</u> Pages 14-15
k.	List of Flags	Page 15

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# BOARD OF INOUTRY - W1031325 PTE JAMES C M RLC (DECEASED)

References:

- A HQ 2 (SE) Bde Gl/1269 dated 3 Jan 96-Convening Order.
- B. 3I Sect SIB RMP CCRIO No 02696195 dated 29 Nov 9.5 Initial Case Report.
- C. Trg Rcgt and Depot RLC P/James dated 5 Jan 96 -Report on Coroner's Inquest.
- D. MML Schedule 9, Rules of Procedure (Army) 1972.
- E. QRs 1976 Annex A. Boards of Inquiry.
- F. HQDT/28/3 dated § Jun 93 Single Entry Implementation Plan
- G. UKLF ATSM Ops 2 (UK) 4303 dated Jul 94.
- H. HQ RLC Trg Gp HQTG 1550 Gl dated 14 Dec 96
- I. Trg Regt and Depot RLC Security Standing Orders.
- J. HQ RLC Trg Centre and Deepcut Garrison HQTC 2000 G2 dated 5 Oct 94.
- K. Board of inquiry, Pte RLC (Deceased)

# GENERAL

1. The Board of Inquiry assembled at The Princess Royal Barracks. Deepcut, Surrey on Thu II Jan 96 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of W/Pte James, as directed at Reference A At the time or her death. W/Pte James was serving in B Sqn the Trg Regt and Depot RLC at Deepcut She had completed Phase 2 training at ASMT Leconfield on Thu 16 Nov 95 and was awaiting posting; the unit received her posting order by signal on the day she died. Mon 27 Nov 95.

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. The Board was ordered to report on 2 issues

a. The circumstances leading to the death of W/Pte James.

b. The adequacy of orders and procedures for guards and ammunition within the Trg Regt and Depot RLC, and whether they should be reviewed.

3. It will be seen from what follows that the second task was straightforward. No general review or revision was found to be necessary, although recommendations concerning 2 matters of detail are made below.

4. The Board's first task was more complex, requiring it to consider and take a view about a number of inter-related issues. These include the nature and effectiveness of the training process; the structure and culture of the unit responsible for that training; management and leadership within the unit; the attitudes and behavior of Phase 2 RLC recruits in general; and the personal circumstances of Pte James herself. The Board found itself focusing, in particular, upon the issue of 'out of hours'


supervision of Phase 2 recruits. Comd RLC Trg Gp has recently written a review of Phase 2 RLC training which is a comprehensive aid to understanding all these issues. It has been incorporated into the document evidence examined by the Board and should be read in its entirety.

5. Reference E directs Boards of Inquiry investigating unnatural deaths.to consider the following:

a **If** the death has apparently been caused by the act or omission of the deceased - the reason or motive.





	b. Whether relevant orders were deliberately or negligently breached.				
	c. Whether any lack of training or supervision, which should be rectified, was a contributory factor.				
	d. Whether the deceased was on authorised leave of absence at the time death occurred; (in this case the deceased was on duty so this question will not be examined further).				
	e. The medical cause of death as shown in the death certificate or as given in evidence.				
	f. The circumstance which was instrumental in bringing about the death. e.g. a traffic accident, drowning or a fire; (this question is not relevant in this case and will not be examined further).				
PRC	PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE				
6	6 The following documentary evidence was admitted by the Board.				
	a <u>The RMP Initial Case Report</u> . This report at contains a précis of events, which is indicated atand which should be read The Board noted that the Initial case report stated that foul play is not suspected and that no further report would be submitted. Consequently the Board has not considered the possibility of foul play.	Flag B Side Flag 1			
	b. <u>Report on the Coroner's Inquest.</u> The Report on the Coroner's Inquest is at The Coroner recorded an Open Verdict this was to be expected given the lack of direct evidence of suicide. such as a note, or of accidental death, such as a witness.	Flag C			
	c. Statements of Witnesses. Statements to the SIB RMP, provided to the Coroner's Office, are at	Flag D			
	These will be referred to separately as required. Included are the statements of the unit doctor who pronounced W/Pte James dead	Side Flag 2			
	and of the forensic scientist who testifies that a post mortem examination confirmed that W/Pte James died of a gunshot wound to the head				
	d. <u>Trg Regt and Depot RLC Security Standing Orders</u> . Relevant extracts from these orders are enclosed as follows:				
	(1) The Regimental Orderly Officer (ROO), also referred to as the Barracks Duty Officer (BOO).	Flag E			
	(2) The Regimental Orderly Sergeant (ROS)	Flag F			
	(3) The Guard Commander	Flag G			
	(4) The Guard 2ic / Canteen NCO	Flag H			
	(5) The Static Guard	Flag I			
	(6) The Royal Way Gate Guard	Flag J			
	(7) Authority for Arming Soldiers with Weapons or Ammunition	Flag K			
	e. Incident Log Sheets and Guard Reports	Flag L			



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f. <u>UKLF Anti-Terrorist Security Measures (UKLF ATSM)</u> Section 5 of UKLF ATSM which deals with the arming of guards and sentries is at .	Flag M
g. <u>HO RLC Trg. Centre and Deepcut Garrison letter</u> . Clarification of UKLF instructions in relation to arming states is included at	Flag N
h. Comd RLC Trg Gp Review of Phase 2 Training	Flag A
i. <u>The Single Entry Implementation Plan</u> . This document written in 1993 details Army policy for the training of Phase I and Phase 2 recruits.	Flag O
7. Verbal evidence was taken from a number of witnesses who were able to testify to fact and/or assist the Board in its inquiry into the various issues detailed in paragraphs 2-4 above. This allowed the Board to obtain confirmation and amplification of evidence previously presented in statements made to the SIB. Additional evidence was provided by;	
a. RLC, the Adjt of the Trg Regt and Deport RLC. He formally presented documentary evidence relating Io unit Security Standing Orders and answered the Boards queries as to the implementation of those orders.	
b. RLC, the Unit Provost Sgt. He gave evidence about the implementation of unit Security Standing Orders.	
b. RLC. the Regimental Sergeant Major of the Trg Regt and Depot RLC. His evidence relates to the time of the incident and to W/Pte James' manner shortly before her death.	
8. The purpose of the Board of Inquiry and the rights of witnesses to be represented and to decline to answer questions which they felt might incriminate them, were explained to all witnesses. Notwithstanding that all verbal evidence was heard on oath, the Board was gratified by the full and frank manner in which all witnesses were prepared to answer the Boards questions.	
TIME OF INCIDENT	
<ul> <li>9. Further to the SIB RMP Initial Case Report at</li></ul>	
10. This evidence conflicts with, James at about 0830 hours as he drove through the Royal Way Gate. The Board considers recollection of the time at which he spoke to W/Pte James to be imprecise because;	
<ul><li>a. is clear about the time he left his home.</li><li>b. had to open tube Education Centre before the start of the first lesson at 0830 hours.</li></ul>	







# **REASON OR MOTIVE**

REASON OR MOTIVE	
16. The Board noted various factors which may have been significant. A précis of each is detailed in the paragraphs which follow.	
<u>RELATIONSHIPS</u>	
17. There is evidence of W/Pre James' tangled emotional and sexual relationships. This is clearly conveyed in the statements made to the SIB by both her boyfriends, and by her close female fried, W/Pte . Despite the fact that on the surface, W/Pte James was a robust character the Board formed the impression that she possessed a somewhat more complex personality. She was not as tough as some of her actions would imply. She remained close to her family and was clearly finding it difficult to choose between her boyfriends. Although by no means an objective witness, remarked about her mood swings and said that he felt she was someone who "appeared to be chirpy" rather than someone who "was chirpy". He also said that shedid not like herself very much and felt guilty of course. these comments were made with the benefit of hindsight after some 7 weeks reflection!	
ALCOHOL	
18. Despite attending a 'block party' the night before,.       found W/Pte James to be fit for duty         and the forensic scientist testified that she was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol       Thus the Board considers her comments to       at approximately 0730 hours, that she was 'hung over', to be in the nature of bravado         although. having only had some 4 hours rest, she was probably tired.       DISSATISFACTION with THE ARMY	Sideflas6 Sideflas7 Sidcflas8
19. The evidence concerning her desire to leave the Army is contradictory. Her close friend, W/Pte stated to the SIB that "she hated the Army and would try to get out by pretending that she was suffering with migraines"	Side Flag 9
This evidence is supported by that of But says she did not discuss getting out of the Army with him and indeed wanted to get her posting	Side flag 10 Side Flag 11
When WPte James saw the unit doctor on 21 <i>Nov</i> 96.7 days after her final opportunity to apply for Discharge as of Right, an appointment which was required for posting purposes and not requested by her, she was concerned that her slight migraine history should not affect her posting!	Side Flag 12
Her father gave evidence to the Coroner's inquest that "his daughter showed no displeasure with the Army and she appeared happy and contented.	Side Flag 13
GUARD DUTIES	
20. Despite the fact that B Sqn was under some pressure to provide guards at this time and the evidence of others that W/Pre James was "sick of doing continual guard duties"	Side flag 14
FAMILY BACKGROUND	
21. and both gave evidence about past difficulties in her home and family life. Her Personal File indicates that she was told to leave her home at 15 years of age. also described her as a 'tearaway' nevertheless she clearly remained in close touch with her parents and spent the weekend prior to her death buying Christmas presents them. W/Pte stated to	

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the SIB that she had "made friends with her (mum) again" ...... On balance it would appear that her relations with her parents Were encouraging .rather than the converse.

# Side Flag 15

# ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE

22. told the Board that Mr and Mrs James had told him. when he met them at W/Pte James' funeral, that he was very similar in appearance to her cousin who bad died of a drugs overdose, at the same age, on the same date 3 years previously. Apparently some of W/Pte James' relatives held her responsible for this cousin's death as she had known be was taking drugs. The Board has chosen not to pursue this line of enquiry; Was not convincing when recounting these details and Mr James did them. Consequently the Board considers that it would be difficult and nugatory to verify these matters, and that to attempt to do *so* might unnecessarily upset her parents.

### PTE ... · -----

23. The Board feels it may well be significant that Pte spent 45 minutes in more or less intimate conversation with W/Pte James immediately prior to W/Pte James' death (despite her being on duty). There is no evidence that he knowingly said anything to upset her state of mind and they apparently parted company amicably when Pte was told by RLC to leave her to her duties, making arrangements to meet that afternoon. Thus whatever the significance of this meeting to W/Pte James, no blame for her death can reasonably be attached to this soldier.

### CONCLUSIONS ABOUT REASON AND MOTIVE

24. The Board has not been able to make any qualitative or quantitate judgment about these factors. It is impossible to establish any clear reasons or motive for W/Pte James to shoot herself. Notwithstanding the Coroners verdict, it is the opinion of the Board that *W/Pte* James shot herself and that the possibility of her action being accidental is negligible. W/Pte; James apparently took 6 distinct and positive actions in relation to her weapon and ammunition which were clearly beyond her duty at the time. the omission of any one of which would have meant she would not have been killed;


- a. She removed a charged magazine of 10 rounds from her pocket
- b. She placed the charged magazine on her weapon.
- c. She cocked her weapon.
- d. She released the safety catch.
- e. She reversed the weapon so that it was aiming at herself.
- f. She pulled the trigger.

25. Equally no other individual or group, military or civilian can be held responsible for her actions! The Board found no evidence that W/Pte James was pregnant nor that she bad significant debts.

### TRAINING AND SUPERVISION

# TRAINING ETHOS

26. The Single Entry Implementation Plan emphasizes the need for a progressive transition from Phase 1 to Phase 2 training, which takes account of the need for soldiers to be encouraged to develop and mature as well as to acquire knowledge and skills. It envisages:



"an ethos linking all Phase 1 and Phase 2 training. with a progressive lifting of supervision and control throughout the period, so as to prepare the soldier for the self-discipline required in the Field Army."

Because of the dislocated nature of RLC Phase 2 training this progression is particularly difficult for the RLC to achieve.

# PHASE 2 TRAINING

27. B Sqn Permanent staff do not undertake Phase 2 training itself, thisbeing the task of specialist instructors. Having examined the routine of B Sqn in depth and having interviewed at length the squadron Commander, RLC. the Board concludes that the Trg Regt and Depot RLC already makes strenuous efforts to provide imaginative and progressive training. as reiterated in the Review of Phase 2 Training by Comd RLC Trg Gp, for those recruits who are awaiting Phase 2 courses or posting. The unit is inevitably hampered in this effort by a training process which imposes upon B Sqn a continually shifting population for whom the squadron has complete command and administrative responsibility but at best marginal and disrupted daily contact.. Bluntly, B Sqn Permanent Staff are bound to shoulder the responsibility for the behavior of recruits cu whom they have little opportunity to establish moral authority.

# CHARACTER DEVELOPMENT

28. Sadly it is apparent from the evidence of widespread off-duty misbehavior in barracks involving drink and sex, which this Boardhas reviewed, that a significant proportion *of* recruits who enter Phase 2 training are not maturing at the rate which the Army requires. This should come as no surprise at a time when the national media has focused upon a perceived 'moral malaise' amongst young people this situation is exacerbated by the pressure on ATR Pirbright to 'pass *out* as many Phase 1 recruits as possible and the lack of a moral component in Phase 2 training. This Board coasiders that it is vital to re-introduce into Phase 2 recruit training, the capacity for character development which only high grade leadership, in the context of a stable, cohesive sub unit can provide.

# STRUCTIJRE AND CULTURE

29. Phase 2 training in the RLC is not ideally structured for the exercise of effective leadership. The system relies instead on the general culture of disciplined behavior which prevails in the Army at large and on the values inculcated during 10 weeks Phase I training. For some recruits this provision is clearly inadequate! No amount of excellent management processes and formal welfare provision can hope to compensate for the lack of sustained exposure to excellent junior leadership which the present training regime imposes upon recruits at the Trg Regt and Depot RLC. The Board. recommends that a radical review of Phase 2 RLC training is conducted to achieve synergy between the functions of Command, Administration and Training.

# ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

30. The alternatives to radically re-structuring Phase 2 RLC training, if good order and military discipline are to be maintained this can be summarized as;

a. Impose a level of administrative supervision which will be costly to man and which defeat the laudable aim of progressively developing self-discipline.

b. Develop a significantly more effective screening process during Phase 1. In this context it should be noted that W/Pte James was not identified as a 'risk' category Phase 2 recruit. Unfortunately it must be doubted whether present SCAMF figures, let alone the present recruiting climate, will sustain a significant increase in Phase 1 failures.

c. Establish a Remedial Tp for those Phase 2 recruits whom B Sqn identify as problem soldiers who arc nevertheless worth retaining. Considerable care would need to be taken though to ensure that these recruits are prevented from adversely influencing others.

d. Retain the existing Phase 2 training structure and accept the risks associated with an essentially functional training process.

### PASTORAL CARE

31. It is the opinion of the Board that existing arrangements to occupy the working hours of Phase 2 recruits, arc generally good. It was noted, however, that recruits were apparently free during rest periods while on guard duty, to return to their accommodation. In future this should be more rigorously controlled. More significant is the problem of off-duty supervision and the Board makes the following observations;

32. <u>Alcohol</u>. Alcohol is presently routinely taken into barrack accommodation. This is a particular problem when large quantities of drink arc purchased outside camp by recruits. The physical layout of the camp means that recruits have no difficulty whatsoever in avoiding the Guardroom when bringing drink into camp; thus the requirement to book in has no deterrent effect at all. The Board recommends that HQ RLC Trg Gp investigate the possibility of using MGS personnel at the main gate to check whether recruits are bringing alcohol into the barracks.


33. <u>Sexual Behavior</u>. Anecdotal, but nonetheless convincing, evidence was given to the Board to the effect that virtually all female recruits had boyfriends, and that virtually without exception they were having regular sexual intercourse in barracks. Despite clearly knowing they are in breach of Military regulations, no attempt is made to hide these activities and punishment is no more feared than discovery! There was no evidence of civilian involvement Clearly this has wider implications for the public image of the Army and its duty of care towards recruits, as well as an impact on operational effectiveness. Such behavior demonstrably undermines good order and military discipline within The Princess Royal Barracks. To what extreme the prevailing conditions of sexual freedom contributed to W/Pte James state of mind is impossible to judge. Clearly though they did nothing to limit the consequences of her tangled relationships!

34.. Off-Duty Supervision. While the Board welcomes the proposal to increase the female Permanent staff to 25%, it notes that most misbehavior involving drink and sex, occurs in male accommodation and/or in unoccupied accommodation blocks. OC B Sqn is fully aware of the need for off-duty supervision and, in the opinion of the Board, rightly believes that this must, in appearance least, be relatively informal. Only in this way can the requirement of the Single Entry Implementation Plan to give recruits progressively more freedom, be matched to a continuing need for supervision. A traditional, holistic training structure would mean the presence of Permanent Staff during off-duty hours would not be resented. In the meantime the Board recommends that the following formal measures would increase the Permanent Staff presence during off-duty hours without being unduly intrusive;

a. <u>Unit Duty Personnel</u>. It is recommended that the orders for the ROO and the ROS be rewritten to include a tour of male accommodation as well as the barracks. The ROO and ROS should report to OC B Sqn at the beginning of the day in order to be given precise instructions as to where to visit. The orders for the Guard 2ic/Canteen NCO should be revised to ensure his more frequent presence in the NAAFI.

t.. <u>Sub-Unit Duty Personnel</u>. When manning levels permit a female NCO should always be present in the female block. In order to cover those times that a female NCO is not available, a security camera linked to l.be Guardroom should be placed at the entrance to the female accommodation. Alternatively, the Trg Regt and Depot RLC should consider using non-instructor female Permanent Staff for this duty. Despite the impact on already hard working male Permanent Staff it is recommended that B Sqn initiate with immediate effect a duty roster

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for a Sqn Orderly Sgt (SOS), a JNCO sleeping duty within the male accommodation which would include the requirement to tour the male accommodation during silent hours. These measures will provide a similar level of supervision to that which is found in the Field Army.

35. <u>Undesirable influence</u>: B Sqn Permanent Staff are rightly concerned at the influence which soldiers placed in C Sqn for disciplinary reasons, have on impressionable recruits; these include recruits who are due tobe discharged and adult soldiers from the Field Army awaiting administrative or disciplinary action. W/Pte James associated closely with some of these soldiers. In this respect there is a conflict between the roles implicit in the title Trg Regt and Depot RLC. Permanent Staff are convinced that these 'rotten apples' have a pernicious influence upon the weakest recruits. The Board recommends that Comd RLC Trg Tp takes steps to resolve this conflict. either by meeting the standards indicated in the Single Entry Implementation Plan with regard to accommodation or by removing from the Trg Regt and Depot RLC the function of being a repository for some of the worst elements of the Corps.

# FINDINGS AND OPINION OF THE BOARD

36. The Board finds that W/Pte James shot herself between 0819 • 0824 hours on Mon 27 Nov 95. The Board cannot deduce from the evidence, any clear motive or reason for her action, but wishes to emphasize that no other individual or group, military or civilian, can be held directly responsible.

It is the opinion of the Board that her action was not accidental.

37. The Board finds that the existing structure of Phase 2 RLC training fails to provide, for immature recruits, sufficient opportunity for character development.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

38. Notwithstanding the findings above the Board considers that the recommendations below will make more clear, the rules and procedures for guards and ammunition, and enhance good order and military discipline within The Princess Royal Barracks.

39. <u>Arming State</u>. The Board recommends that the written orders for the ROO, the ROS, the Guard Commander and all guard duties, contain a space for the manuscript insertion of the current 'arming state'; (paragraph\_I5).

40. <u>Training</u>. The Board recommends that a radical review of Phase 2 RLC training is conducted to identify how the training structure can achieve synergy between the functions of Command, Training and the Administration of recruits; (paragraphs 28 and 29).


41. <u>Supervision</u>. The Board makes the following recommendations with regard to the supervision of Phase 2 RLC recruits.

a. <u>Guard Duty</u>. Existing rules which require duty personnel not on guard to remain in the Guardroom to form the Fire Piquet should be rigorously enforced (paragraph 31).

b. <u>Alcohol</u>. HQ RLC Trg Gp should investigate the possibility of using MGS personnel at the Barracks Main Gate to check whether recruits are bringing alcohol into barracks; (paragraph 32).

c. <u>Unit Duty Personnel</u>. Orders for the ROO and ROS should be revised to include a tour, during *silent* hours of male accommodation, as well as the barracks. The ROO and ROS should further report to OC B Sqn at the beginning of the day in order to be given precise instructions about where to visit The orders for the Guard, 2i/c/Canteen NCO should be revised to ensure his more frequent presence in the NAAFI; (paragraph 34.a.).

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d. <u>Sub-Unit Duty Personnel</u> A female NCO should always be present in the female accommodation block during off-duty hours. If insufficient instructors are available, the Trg Regt and Depot RLC should employ non-instructor female Permanent Staff for this duty. A male Sqn Orderly Sgt duty should be instituted with immediate effect; (paragraph 34b.).

e. <u>Security Camera.</u> A Security Camera, monitored in the Guardroom, should be placed to cover the entrance to the female accommodation block.

42. <u>Undesirable Influences</u> The Board recommends that Comd RLC Trg Gp takes steps to prevent soldiers held at the Trg Regt and Depot RLC for disciplinary and/or administrative reasons, from adversely influencing recruits. The attention of Comd RLC Trg Gp is drawn to the accommodation standards indicated in the Single Entry Implementation Plan; (paragraph 35).

Maj President Capt Member W02 Member List of Flags:

- A. Comd RLC Trg Gp Review of Phase 2 training.
- B. RMP Initial Case Report.
- C. Report on the Coroner's Inquest.
- D. Statement of WitnessesRMP Assistance to Coroner's Office.
- E. Orders for the Regimental Orderly Officer (ROO).
- F. Orders for the Regimental Orderly Sergeant (ROS).
- G. Orders for the Guard Commander.
- H. Orders for the Guard 2ic *I* Canteen NCO.
- 1. Orders for the Static Guards.
- J. Orders for the Royal Way Gate Guard.
- K. Authority for Arming Soldiers with Weapons or Ammunition.
- L. Incident Log Sheets and Guard Report
- M. Section S to UKLF Anti-Terrorist Security Measures (ULKF ATSM).
- N. Arming States HQ RLC Trg Centre and Deepcut Garrison letter.
- 0. Single Entry Implementation Plan.

