

AG/P/LM/20130920

20 Sep 13

CE SPVA

Copy to:

## OVERPAYMENT OF RECRUITING & RETENTION PAY (FLYING) TO ARMY PILOTS

Reference:

A. Defence Internal Audit Report – Army – Controls over the Payment of Flying Pay (RRP(F))  
DTD July 2013 Audit Code: 3031/01/13.

1. **Issue.** The write-off or recovery of a total Net Public Debt (NPD) of c.£829K paid incorrectly to 161<sup>1</sup> serving pilots and c.49<sup>2</sup> retired pilots as Recruiting and Retention Pay (Flying) (RRP(F))<sup>3</sup>.

2. **Recommendations.** It is recommended that CE SPVA notes that:

a. Procedural, systemic and regulatory failings resulted in the overpayment of RRP(F) to 161 serving and c.49 retired pilots since 2007, accruing a total NPD of c.£829K<sup>4</sup>.

b. Individual debts remain suspended pending a decision on recovery action.

c. Corrective action has been taken to ensure all serving pilots are on the correct level of RRP(F).

d. A Defence Internal Audit (DIA) (Ref A) has reported that the potential for recovery action has resulted in retention issues<sup>5</sup>; that aircrew received overpayments in good faith<sup>6</sup>; and that the cost of replacing one pilot far exceeds the total NPD, with clear VfM implications for any recovery of individual debts.

e. A continuation of the increased Voluntary Outflow (VO) beyond forecast numbers (Annex A) will result in Army Aviation failing to meet mandated Defence tasks<sup>7</sup>.

and agrees that:

<sup>1</sup> Including 8 who have transferred to the RN and 29 to the RAF. Debt range across all 161 individuals: £29 to £33,500 Net.

<sup>2</sup> SPVA have scrutinised a representative sample of 84 retired pilots from a total of 315 pilots who have retired since Apr 07. SPVA's audit revealed a total NPD of c.£34.6K accrued by 13 from the 84 sample, while 7 were found to be underpaid. Aggregated up this sample indicates c.49 retired pilots will have accrued a NPD of c.£130K.

<sup>3</sup> Formerly known as Specialist Pay (Flying) (SP(F)).

<sup>4</sup> Calculated by SPVA as £699K attributable to serving pilots and c.£130K to those retired = c.£829K.

<sup>5</sup> Ref A - Annex A para 4.2 states: "The investigation and the potential recovery action, had resulted in retention issues with increased numbers terminating their service citing this issue as the reason. In addition to the impact on manning liabilities this exodus also had significant cost implications".

<sup>6</sup> Ibid - Annex A para 4.2 states: "We found that individuals had received flying related pay in good faith. Many enquiries about the validity of flying pay payments had been raised over the period and had been checked and confirmed by; unit pay staffs, HQ DAAvn and SPVA."

<sup>7</sup> Capabilities at greatest risk include; the Apache Operational Conversion Flight, the Army contribution to JSFAW and 665 Sqn AAC, and the RAF SAR Force. Note: Time taken to train a Combat Ready Apache pilot is 4 years.

f. The accrued suspended debts of all pilots should be written off.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. Timing. Priority.

#### Background

4. Prior to the Joint harmonisation of RRP(F) in Apr 08, Army pilots had their flying pay differentiated between P2 Pilot and P1 Aircraft Commander according to experience and suitability. The rules for transition between the associated rates of flying pay (detailed in The Army Pay Warrant 1964) were very complicated: this resulted in inconsistent interpretation of RRP(F) policy by Regimental Administrative Offices (RAOs), HQ DAAvn and SPVA over many years. The application of these rules was automated with the advent of JPA in Apr 07.

5. Despite recognition of the issue and an original investigation in 07, failings during the migration to JPA resulted in continued inconsistencies in the payment of RRP(F).<sup>9</sup> This manifested in the submission of several Service Complaints (SC) by those who believed they were being underpaid. In Mar 12, D Pers Admin (then DSPS(A)) was tasked to investigate the issue.

6. The investigation was initially bounded by scrutinising an original cohort of 167 identified in 07. However, in Jan 13, sample checks outwith this cohort provided sufficient evidence of further inconsistencies in the application of RRP(F). HQ AAC then directed a 100% audit of RRP(F) for all 606 serving pilots and the 315 pilots who had retired since Apr 07<sup>10</sup>.

7. Following the 100% internal staff audit, pay banding corrections were applied to 49 serving pilots,<sup>11</sup> while underpayments have been recompensed to 21. The result is that all Army and former Army pilots who remain serving are now receiving the correct rate of RRP(F).

#### Individuals Affected

8. **Demographics (AAC).** The majority of the 161 affected are senior, experienced aircrew with a rank range Sgt to Lt Col. Three quarters are also approaching, or beyond, their Immediate Pension Point or Early Departure Point and are therefore in a better position to leave the Service(s) to find employment in what is an acknowledged buoyant civilian aviation sector.<sup>12</sup> This cohort also contains 53% of the Army's Qualified Helicopter Instructors (QHIs), a DM(A) manning pinch-point trade.<sup>13</sup> Due to relative experience and training, QHIs represent a significant additional investment (Annex B).

9. **Demographics (RAF).** Of the 29 former AAC pilots who transferred to the RAF since 1999, 25 are in current RAF flying practice<sup>14</sup>, one is and are in ground appointments. All of the personnel now in the RAF are serving on units that are suffering from manning shortfall, or who could only be replaced at significant cost to Defence. 7 of those pilots are currently serving with the Search and Rescue Force, with no ability to replace them in the short-term due to a lack of conversion aircraft as a result of the contractorisation of that Force.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid - Annex A para 4.2 states: "If investigation is not resolved in a timely manner and write off action is not approved it increases the risk of retention issues, particularly for experienced pilots that could impact on future operational capability, and increase training costs to meet this potential shortfall".

<sup>9</sup> Ibid - Executive Summary - Key Findings states: "Scrutiny of RRP(F) was not included in any Regimental/Unit Admin Office monthly Statement of Earnings checks increasing the risk of overpayments due to undetected errors".

<sup>10</sup> For expediency a representative sample of 84 of the 315 retired pilots taken from across all ranks and pay bands effected have been scrutinised to date.

<sup>11</sup> 13 in the Nov 12 pay run, and 36 in the Jul 13 pay run.

<sup>12</sup> Bristow Helicopters, Bond and CHC have advertised jobs for 150 helicopter pilots across the UK in 2013 at salaries of c. £50k to £65k. There are many opportunities in the international market too - for example AAC QHIs have submitted a PVR to take up international posts in the last 12 months with tax-free salaries c. £115K pa at 13/14 UK tax and NI rates.

<sup>13</sup> AAC QHI liability is 120; current manning is 103 - representing a 14% deficit.

<sup>14</sup> Sea King, Merlin, Chinook, Puma, Reaper and C17.

10. **Estoppel.** Some Army aircrew have, in the past, queried their RRP(F) rates with SPVA and been assured that they were being paid correctly by the Authority. Unfortunately in many cases the Authority had misinterpreted complex RRP(F) policy resulting in many, who had previously received authoritative reassurance, now being informed that they have been overpaid RRP(F) and incurred a public debt. Further details and examples are at Annex C and in Enclosures 1 and 2. Some evidence and objective DIA assessment:

a. A letter attempting to clarify RRP(F) policy was issued in 02 (Enclosure 3) giving definitive guidance and providing pilots with a degree of reassurance that they were being paid correctly. Unfortunately this letter represented a faulty understanding of the rules in place at the time. However, as this letter was issued 'with authority' by HQ DAAvn, it can be argued that those who had previously doubted their level of RRP(F) had no reason to disbelieve this direction and guidance, and therefore received the payments in good faith. A reasonable person would therefore conclude that they were indeed being paid the correct rate and were on the correct level of RRP(F). (Further detail at Annex C).

b. There is no detail of RRP(F) rates or levels included on an individual's monthly pay statement – just a total figure. It is therefore difficult for an individual to check his/her own pay.<sup>15</sup> (An example pay statement is at Enclosure 4.) This has been corroborated by the DIA audit (Ref A) that noted that RAOs have been unable to verify the correct rate/level of RRP(F) in issue. Moreover individual RRP(F) is highly complex to calculate from first principles due to the many changes to RRP(F) policy over the years. The Audit's Opinion reported 'Limited Assurance' to PUS and the Defence Audit Committee (DAC) and concluded:

*"Land Forces management of RRP(F) could not ensure that the qualified personnel received RRP(F) at the right rate, which risks overpayments continuing to occur. We found changes to the Reserve Band system and the uncertainty over the outcome of the investigation into previous errors in payments were impacting on both the Army Air Corps' career management obligations and aircrew retention".*

c. A copy of the RRP(F) related JPAC Service Request cases collated by HQ AAC is at Enclosure 5.

### Recovery Action Implications

11. **Cost.** There has been a clear increase in AAC VO since the debts have been placed on individual's pay accounts with 15 pilots<sup>16</sup> citing the incorrect payment as the deciding factor in their decision to leave the Army (Annex A). Further resignations have occurred where this issue has been identified as a factor in the decision to leave. The costs to Defence of generating aviation combat capability, already significant<sup>17</sup>, will escalate as a direct result of these resignations. This must be balanced against the total possible recoverable debt<sup>18</sup> to ascertain whether recovery action is in the public interest<sup>19</sup>.

12. **Combat Capability (AAC).** There is a threat to the continued provision of Army Aviation combat capability for Defence if more experienced aircrew and QHIs decide to leave the Service following a decision to recover RRP(F) overpayments. QHI manning is already a DM(A) pinch

<sup>15</sup> Ibid - Annex A para 4.1 states: "Onus was also on individuals to check their own pay statements, however, those in receipt of RRP(F) stated that their Statement of Earnings had not provided sufficient detail in terms of relevant rate or qualifying period to enable them to identify issues and errors".

<sup>16</sup> From 1 Nov 12 to 9 Sep 13.

<sup>17</sup> It costs c.£3.6M to train an Apache pilot and c.£2M to train a Lynx pilot.

<sup>18</sup> It will be difficult to recover debts from those not receiving a Forces Pension and at least one debtor is deceased, having been killed on a flying training sortie. Details required to calculate RRP(F) contained in personal Flying Record Folders (FRFs) for 67 of the retired 315 are currently not available.

<sup>19</sup> In addition to costs associated with replacing aircrew who resign over this issue, it is expected there will be significant costs associated with legal challenges from aircrew who believe they have received RRP(F) in 'good faith' - if recovery action is pursued.

point with current strength of 103 against a liability of 120 posts filled, representing a 14% shortfall. With 71% of the 103 being beyond their IPP, and therefore having fewer impediments to leave, the manning situation has the potential to force JHC to declare the suspension of some aspects of mandated operational capability<sup>20</sup>, if VO continues at the current abnormal rate. For example, the loss of one more Apache QHI from the operational training pipeline will reduce the trained pilot output to below the level required to maintain front-line crewing ratios. Subsequent action to stem the flow and retain capability through the use of Financial Incentives would prove extremely expensive.


13. **Combat Capability (RAF).** Most of the 29 former AAC pilots currently serving in the RAF are required for the generation of RAF operational output. While the VO rate of RAF aircrew is currently at historic norms, the demise of the Aircrew Financial Retention Initiative (FRI) in Mar 13 has created a retention fragility at Front Line. A conservative RAF Manning assessment indicates that at least 4-6 pilots could leave the Service, citing dissatisfaction of expectations and the requirement to release funds from their pensions to repay RRP(F) overpayments. As for the Army, those who remain would be similarly disaffected with a consequent impact on morale.

14. **Presentational Implications.** Whether recovery action of RRP(F) is enforced or overpayments are written-off, there is a reputational risk to the MoD. If recovery action is taken, due diligence can be argued, albeit the impact upon Defence capabilities is likely to call into question the rationale for the decision; additionally there is a significant risk of Service Complaints and legal action as some will argue hardship and/or a change of position<sup>21</sup>. Conversely a decision to write off the overpayments could be viewed as a failure to safeguard the public purse.

## Conclusion

15. The process of RRP(F) rectification has yielded a resolution of an acknowledged long standing and divisive issue; all serving aircrew are now being paid the correct level of RRP(F). As such there is now assurance that effective management processes are in place that will prevent future reoccurrence of overpayment in RRP(F)<sup>22</sup>.

16. There is now a pressing need to decide on a course of action regarding the suspended individual overpayments. RRP(F) uncertainty is demonstrably affecting morale across the Army and RAF aircrew fraternity and is materially influencing VO rates and frontline aviation capability. The cost and effect of a continued increased rate of aircrew outflow on the provision of aviation capability, and in the regeneration costs, are major concerns. These are the determinant factors in recommending that recovery of RRP(F) overpayment is not in the overall public interest, and should not be pursued.



R E Nugee  
Maj Gen  
Director General Personnel  
Army Pers-ComdGp-DG

<sup>20</sup> Capabilities at greatest risk include; the Apache Operational Conversion Flight, the Army contribution to JSFAW and 665 Sqn AAC.  
<sup>21</sup> E.g. One SSgt will, with an RRP(F) level correction and 4 days pcm overpayment recovery action, be £997 worse off pcm – representing a 21% drop in salary = a 'change of position'.

<sup>22</sup> Measures include the adoption of an automatic RRP(F) counter on JPA set from its introduction in Apr 07, the removal of P2 RRP(F)/tri-Service harmonisation of RRP(F) from Apr 08, and the inclusion of an RRP(F) incremental counter on future Pay Statements. All recommendations from the DIA report (Ref A) are in the process of being staffed with further changes due to be implemented to improve assurance.



Annexes:

- A. Army Pilot Voluntary Outflow.
- B. Army Pilot Training Costs.
- C. Summary of RRP(F) related JPAC Service Requests.

Enclosures:

- 1. Service Request 1241862, Incorrect Level of SP Flying, reported on 18 May 10.
- 2. D/AAvn/31/003, Authorisation of Back Pay for Flying Pay, dated 1 May 07.
- 3. D/AAvn/31/2, Flying Pay – Transition from Pilot to Aircraft commander, dated 21 Jan 02.
- 4. A redacted example of an AAC Pay Statement.
- 5. RRP(F) related JPAC Service Request Cases - evidence gathered to date.

Distribution:

### ARMY PILOT VOLUNTARY OUTFLOW

Table 1. Army Pilot Voluntary Outflow (VO) 1 Nov 12<sup>23</sup> to 9 Sep 13.

Serial	Aircrew Role	Number	Number Citing RRP(F) as Primary Reason for Leaving the Army <sup>24</sup>
1	Pilot (less Apache)	23	6
2	Pilot (Apache)	4	1
3	QHI (less Apache)	5	2
4	QHI (Apache)	7	6
5	<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>15</b>
6	Of Whom A2 QHI <sup>25</sup>	9	6

The VO of 39 Army pilots in 10 months represents a statistically significant increase above the mean VO analysed over the previous 6 years (21 per year with a range of 17 to 33).

<sup>23</sup> The initial announcement of RRP(F) overpayments occurred on this date.

<sup>24</sup> Information collated by APC from departure interviews and individual input to JPA on resignation from the Army.

<sup>25</sup> A2 QHIs are the most experienced and highly qualified instructors in the AAC.

## ARMY PILOT TRAINING COSTS

Table 1. Costs to train an AAC Apache pilot to front-line combat ready status.<sup>26</sup>

Serial	Training Element	Cost (£)
1	Army Flying Grading	28K
2	Elementary Flying Training	113K
3	Joint Single Engine Rotary Wing	222K
4	Army Operational Training Phase	246K
5	Conversion to Type - Apache	1.63M
6	Conversion to Role - Apache	1.38M
7	<b>Total Cost of Combat Ready Apache Pilot</b>	<b>3.62M</b>

1. These costs include:
  - a. Consolidated cost of flying hour by aircraft type.
  - b. Simulator time.
  - c. Ammunition.
  - d. Capitation rates for students.
  - e. Capitation rates for instructors/student hour.
2. They exclude:
  - a. Fixed administration costs.
  - b. Transport and subsistence costs throughout the course and for exercises.
3. The additional costs to train an instructor (QHI) are more difficult to quantify given that the pilot will have to have spent at least three years at a unit and have accrued a minimum of 500 flying/simulator hours (at a minimum ratio of 2:1) before being eligible for QHI selection.

Table 2. Estimated costs to train an Apache QHI based on minimum requirements.

Serial	Training Element	Cost (£)
1	Unit flying and simulator time (500 hrs total)	7.95M
2	Central Flying School QHI course	119K
3	<b>Minimum Additional Cost of Apache Instructor</b>	<b>8.07M</b>

<sup>26</sup> Based on FY 11-12 figures: derived from TLBs (22 Gp RAF) and UK Rotary Wing Training Pipeline – Assessment of Current Costs. Dstl/TR58690, 28 Oct 2011.

**SUMMARY OF RRP(F) RELATED JPAC SERVICE REQUESTS**

Table 1. Aircrew pay queries as at 9 Sep 13:

Serial	Reference	Date	Overpayment (£ thousand)	Remarks
1	Letter D/AAvn/31/003 SR 1324572 SR 1111174	01/05/07 13/09/10 11/11/09	31.0	Two letters to Observer Aircrew from HQ DAAvn detailing pay correction and awarding back pay.
2	Letter D/AAvn/31/003 SR 1215138	01/05/07 15/04/10	30.5	
3	SRs (unreferenced)	06/06/08 24/06/09	31.0	SPVA JPAC confirms correct levels of flying pay and/or pay level corrections in this sample of thirteen Service Requests (SR). More can be made available from the JPAC archive.
4	SR 827570	06/11/08	18.3	
5	SR 845688	27/11/08	15.6	
6	SR 902096 & 832776	12/02/09	7.0	
7	SR 903850	16/02/09	9.0	
8	SR (unreferenced)	18/05/09	14.0	
9	SRs 100116 4310304	24/06/09	5.1	
10	SRs 1055660 1036924	19/10/09	15.9	
11	SR 1132170 SR 3391196	15/12/09 05/07/11	4.7	
12	SR 1185336	02/03/10	12.5	
13	SR 1270472	24/06/10	8.0	
14	SR 1280432	07/07/10	6.7	
15	SR 3235438	16/03/11	3.9	
16	SR 996534 1036772	31/07/09	11.9	Two SRs from Unit HR to SPVA JPAC requesting corrective action to flying pay.
17	SR 1241862	18/05/10	8.0	Letter to RAF/AAC transfer confirms flying pay initiation.
18	Letter RAF PMA8b(2)a(RAF)/08/07	20/04/07	31.4	SPVA JPA transaction placing individual on incorrect level of flying pay (PES(A)).
19	JPA 175944	29/03/11	24.3	E-mail exacerbates issue by sanctioning rejoin on incorrect level of flying pay.
20	Email Re-instatement/Rejoining	22/09/08	9.6	Previously corrected flying pay incurs flying pay debt in audit.
21	Letter LX/A101/J1/01 SR 3334942	21/07/11 03/06/11	1.8	Example pay explanation from SPVA JPAC.
22	SR 3505704 & 776598	13/10/11	8.0	Eight pay enquiries from individuals to SPVA JPAC/Unit HR requesting confirmation of flying pay levels, correspondence incomplete.
23	SR 683230	20/05/08	17	
24	Email 20100909-PS10	09/09/10	5.0	
25	SR 733960	15/07/08	21.1	
26	SR 553298	27/04/09	16.7	
27	SR 1237596	12/05/10	5.5	
28	SR 1321450	08/09/10	7.8	
29	SR 1861362	14/12/10	3.9	
30	SR 2391572	19/01/11	6.7	



\* SR = Service Review with SPVA (JPAC). Many more SRs are known to exist in the JPA archives but have not been provided by individuals.

## FAIRNESS

1. Aircrew received monies in good faith<sup>27</sup> as a consequence of authoritative and ostensible direction. A brief description of the chronology of directives and assumptions follows:

a. **Authoritative Direction.** In many cases, individuals approached the SPVA (using JPAC Service Requests (SRs)) to confirm their flying pay position. Table 1 above lists the SRs; the evidence and detail is contained in the consolidated documents at Enclosure 5. In many cases the SPVA confirmed/corrected individuals' flying pay levels and, in several cases, reimbursed large sums of 'back pay'.

b. **Ostensible Direction.** It is acknowledged that ignorance of the rules is no defence for non-compliance; however it is argued that the following departments and organisations will have led individuals to conclude that they were being paid correctly:

(1) HQ DAAvn<sup>28</sup>. In 2002, the incumbent at HQ DAAvn produced Enclosure 3<sup>29</sup>, which attempted to clarify the rules concerning flying pay. This is the first attributable point at which practice diverged from policy; the authoritative guidance in the letter articulated a faulty interpretation of extant RRP(F) policy, notably endorsing P2 aircrew time as qualifying for specialist pay banding purposes. The situation was exacerbated by a number of HQ DAAvn letters to Aircrew Observers<sup>30</sup> detailing further misapplication of the rules; in many cases these resulted in the award of large sums of money to individuals.

(2) AAC Chain of Command (CoC). As a result of the HQ DAAvn direction the practice of early advancement through flying pay increments became standard procedure in many parts of the Corps. It is stressed that this was understood to be the 'rules' as a direct consequence of Enclosure 3.

(3) Regtl Administration Offices (RAO). There remains no recorded explanation why many aircrew incremented to a higher RRP(F) Pay Band early. However it is considered likely that individual pay clerks incremented aircrew early automatically due to their own mis-understanding of the regulations.

2. The MoD's defence of recovery action may prove difficult in the event that a 'class action' is brought by aircrew predicated on their belief that they received RRP(F) in 'good faith', something underpinned by this authoritative and ostensible direction.

### Appendix:

1. Summary of two case histories (Enclosures 1 and 2).

<sup>27</sup> Ibid - Executive Summary para 8.

<sup>28</sup> Now HQ AAC.

<sup>29</sup> D/AAvn/31/2 dated 21 Jan 02.

<sup>30</sup> A specialism that has since been subsumed into the pilot Career Employment Group (CEG).

**SUMMARY OF TWO CASE HISTORIES (ENCLOSURES 1 AND 2)**

1. Enclosures 1 and 2 detail confirmation of corrected pay to two pilots. These are from the SPVA JPAC and HQ DAAvn respectively and are indicative of many cases.
2. Enclosure 3 is the first attributable point at which practice definitely diverged from policy. The incumbent HQ DAAvn SO2 Pers attempts incorrectly to clarify the position on flying pay.
3. **Enclosure 1.** Unit HR administrator requests confirmation of a SNCO's flying pay from the SPVA JPAC. Chronology:
  - a. Sep 01 – Qualifies as a pilot.
  - b. Nov 04 – Qualifies as an Ac Comd.
  - c. SPVA JPAC Service Request (SR) 1241862 authoritatively confirms a move to P1 Top rate in Jul 05 (c.7 years early). Furthermore, the SR directs the move to Enhanced rate in Jul 09 (again c.7 years early). SP's flying day counter amended and SPVA directed to reimburse the perceived anomaly. Individual retains SR on JPA archive, ostensibly directing that his individual RRP(F) is correct.
  - d. Nov 12 - GPD of £8.1K and pay correction of c.£2.4K p.a. calculated by RRP(F) audit.
4. **Enclosure 2.** HQ DAAvn letter<sup>31</sup> confirms to a SNCO that his flying pay has been corrected in accordance with Enclosure 3. Chronology:
  - a. Jul 97 – Qualifies as an Aircrew Observer.
  - b. Dec 03 – Qualifies as a pilot (from award of Army Flying Badge - 'Wings').
  - c. Apr 04 – Qualifies as an Ac Comd.
  - d. May 07 – HQ DAAvn letter directs this SNCO's RRP(F) should have been at P1 Top rate in Jul 05 (c.6 years early) and that, as a consequence, he was entitled to back pay.
  - e. Nov 12 - GPD of £31K and pay correction of c.£2.4K per annum calculated by RRP(F) audit.

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<sup>31</sup> HQDAAvn/31/003 dated 1 May 07.



Service Request: 1241862 - INCORRECT LEVEL OF SP FLYING -



Cancel

Status Closed

Reported On 18-MAY-2010 16:30:08

Progress

Expand Collapse

Date ▲	Updated By
20-MAY-2010 11:42:11	[REDACTED]
Status changes from "New - Assigned SRMG Owner" to "Closed".	
20-MAY-2010 11:41:45	[REDACTED]
Status changes from "New" to "New - Assigned SRMG Owner".	
20-MAY-2010 11:41:17	[REDACTED]
Flying Pay balance adjusted. Arrears owed should be paid in June 2010 salary.	
18-MAY-2010 17:14:33	[REDACTED]
Good Afternoon Mr [REDACTED]. Thank you for your enquiry.	

I have forwarded your request to the Basic Specialist Pay Office for further investigation. Please allow up to 10 working days for a response, should you have any further queries please do not hesitate to contact the JPAC Enquiry Centre either by I-support or telephone on Civ 01412243600 or Mil 945603600.

Regards [REDACTED] JPAC Enquiry Centre.

18-MAY-2010 17:11:54 [REDACTED]

Status changes from "Open" to "New".

18-MAY-2010 16:30:10 [REDACTED]

I am the HR Administrator for the above mentioned soldier. On 03 Jul 05 [REDACTED] moved onto the top rate of flying pay. He subsequently should have moved to the enhanced rate of flying pay WEF 03 Jul 09 (after 4 years on the preceding rate). Please can you amend his record and reimburse the soldier as necessary.

Thanks

18-MAY-2010 16:30:10 [REDACTED]

\*\* This query will be dealt with most efficiently if iSupport is chosen as the preferred option for contact. If you prefer an alternative to iSupport (Telephone, Fax, Mobile or Email) please enter the details below.

95235 7838

\*\* Please enter your Service Number

\*\* Please enter your rank, service and type of engagement

SGT, OPEN

\*\* Please enter the name of your parent unit (this is where you go to resolve administrative issues)

[REDACTED] SQN AAC

RESTRICTED



Headquarters Director Army Aviation,  
Middle Wallop, Stockbridge,  
Hampshire, SO20 8DY



Telephone:  
Fax:

[Redacted]

Reference D/AAvn/31/003

7 Flight Army Air Corps  
Brunei  
BFPO 11

Date: 1 May 07

**AUTHORISATION OF BACK PAY FOR FLYING PAY**

Reference:

A: D/AAvn/31/003 dated 1 Mar 07.

1. Following on from Ref A, it is confirmed that you are now on top rate of flying pay wef 1 Apr 07. In addition you are entitled to back pay from 19 Jul 05. This has been calculated as follows:

P2 init 19 Jul 97 (Aircrew Ob cse) – 19 Jul 00 (9 yr point), P2 mid 19 Jul 00 – 19 Jul 05 (extra yr due to change in rules)  
AC Comd 12 Apr 05 = P1 mid until 19 Jul 05  
P1 top 19 Jul 05

2. DSPS(A) have requested that your RAO makes this transaction on the JPA spreadsheet using this letter as authority.

*Obs (w) mid P2?*  
*Jul 97 Jul 00*

(Original signed)

*Continued...*

[Redacted]

SUZGT  
for DAAvn

*Pr...*

*[Faint handwritten notes and signatures]*





Headquarters Director Army Aviation  
Middle Wallop, Stockbridge, Hampshire,  
SO20 8DY

Telephone:  
Fax:


Military Network:  
Email:



See Distribution

Reference: D/AAvn/31/2


Date: 21 Jan 02



**FLYING PAY - TRANSITION FROM PILOT TO AIRCRAFT COMMANDER**

Stockbridge 31/02/02

References:



- A. D/SPPoIP+C/7/11B dated 23 Feb 01.
- B. D/DSPS(A)/166/RA dated 14 Sep 01:

1. Confusion has arisen regarding the progression from the middle 'pilot (P2)' rate of flying pay to 'aircraft commander (P1)' rates of flying pay. The current rules contained at Reference A ('2001 Pay Review - Revised Pay Rates and Charges for the Regular Army and R IRISH') are contradictory and difficult to interpret.
2. Reference A allows progression from the initial to middle 'pilot (P2)' rate after 9 years' total service, subject to the completion of 3 years' productive aircrew service. Reference A also allows progression from the initial to middle aircraft commander rate once the initial rate has been in issue for 4 years. This is the point at which confusion reigns, the rates overlap - the middle rate of flying pay is higher than the initial aircraft commander rate but lower than the middle aircraft commander rate.
3. Currently it is possible for a pilot on the middle rate to be granted the status of aircraft commander after 3 years productive aircrew service (qualifying him for the middle rate (P2)) but before he has served on an initial rate (be it a combination of aircrewman, pilot (P2) or aircraft commander (P1)) for 4 years. Depending on interpretation - any of 1 of 3 options could be adopted:
  - a. Move to the initial commander rate - a drop in flying pay of £1.47p per day.
  - b. Move to the middle aircraft commander rate - a rise in flying pay of £5.91p per day. The problem with this option is that this has been achieved within 4 years, potentially up to 1 year sooner than an aircraft commander serving on the initial rate.
  - c. Remain on the pilot middle rate until 4 years productive service are complete and then move to the aircraft commander middle rate.
4. Reference B promulgated Option 3c above as the most logical and fair solution.

(Distribution to (P310))






Many Regts are unaware of the existence of Reference B therefore; we have now reached a stage where aircraft commanders are on top rate (P1) in under 8 years and enhanced rates (P1) in less than 12 years.

5. Authoritative guidance to the interpretation of these rules can be sought from the undersigned, however with immediate effect this letter, and in accordance with Reference A, no aircraft commander will be entitled to move between middle, top and enhanced rates of aircraft commander (P1) flying pay till s/he has completed the following productive aircrew service whether it be a combination of P2, P1 or aircrew flying pay from the award of wings:

- a. - Middle rate - 4 years
- b. Top rate - 8 years
- c. Enhanced rate - 12 years

  
Maj  
for DAAvn

Enclosures:

- 1. Reference A.
- 2. Reference B.

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List A - less serial 21

Information:

Internal:

Information:

EXAMPLE STATEMENT OF EARNINGS (SoE)

JPA E017		Statement of Salary and Deductions			JUL 2013	
Name [REDACTED]		Paid Rank [REDACTED]	Organisation / Unit [REDACTED]		Pay Date 31-JUL-13	Page 1 of 2
NI Number [REDACTED]	Employee No. [REDACTED]	Spine / Level of Max Available [REDACTED]			Payroll Type SUP	
Tax Basis: Cumulative		Tax Code: 939L	NI Category: D		Uniform Tax Relief: -62.49	
Balances Current Period		Value	Balances Current Tax Year		Value	
Gross Pay PTD		[REDACTED]	Gross Pay YTD		[REDACTED]	
NIable PAY PTD		[REDACTED]	NIable PAY YTD		[REDACTED]	
Taxable PAY PTD		[REDACTED]	Taxable PAY YTD		[REDACTED]	
PAYE YTD		[REDACTED]	PAYE YTD		[REDACTED]	
Split Amount [REDACTED]	Pay Method BACS	Exchange Rate 1.0000 GBP	Bank Details [REDACTED]		Payment [REDACTED]	
Total Payments: [REDACTED]		Total Deductions: [REDACTED]		Net Pay: [REDACTED]		
Pay and Allowances		Value	Charges and Deductions		Value	
Basic Pay		[REDACTED]	PAYE		[REDACTED]	
Basic Pay Arrears		[REDACTED]	NI D		[REDACTED]	
SP Fly Offr Pilot		720.75	Service Days Pay Giving		[REDACTED]	
			Salary Sacrifice CCV		[REDACTED]	
			Accm Ch (Qtr)		[REDACTED]	
			CILOCT Qtr		[REDACTED]	
			Garage Rent		[REDACTED]	
			F&L O/seas		[REDACTED]	
Payroll Information			Other Balances		Value	
JPA will be unavailable between 23 Aug and 3 Sep 13. More details are available from your Admin Office and on the SPVA InfoCentre website.			LSA (Shown in Days)		[REDACTED]	
[REDACTED]						
[REDACTED]						
Basic Pay : Annual Salary [REDACTED] (AIP Available 0)						
[REDACTED]						

1. It can be seen that RRP(F) information available to aircrew on their SoE is limited.
2. There is no indication of RRP(F) level or elapsed time in that level for an individual to scrutinise pay.
3. As a direct consequence of the DIA report, areas for improvement have been proposed for a future JPA Request For Change (RFC):
  - a. An indication of RRP(F) level: initial, middle, top or enhanced.
  - b. A counter<sup>1</sup> to describe the elapsed time within this level, i.e. 450 days (of 1461).

<sup>1</sup> In a similar format to the LSA counter.