

14 May 13

D/TESR/01.02.04

TO: [REDACTED] PS/SofS

FROM: [REDACTED]  
TESRR - AHd Strat/H2A**POLICY OF RECRUITING UNDER-18S (U18)**

1. **Issue.** SofS has asked for advice on why, from a military capability perspective, we recruit U-18s and what the Value for Money (VfM) case is for this policy.
2. **Recommendation.** SofS is invited to note:
  - a. There are indicators of longer Lengths of Service (LoS) and higher performance, based on earlier promotion, from those joining the Army as U18s.
  - b. A sophisticated and bespoke costing model would be required to fully expose the VfM of recruiting U18s for the Army. D Manning (Army) and DS(Army) have not been tasked with generating this work.
  - c. The current policy of recruiting U18s is defensible.
3. **Timing.** Urgent. Madeleine Moon MP has laid a PQ (155524)<sup>1</sup> related to this matter.
4. **Background.**
  - a. **Current policy.** The minimum age for entry into the UK Armed Forces reflects the normal school leaving age of 16<sup>2</sup>. Evidence of age is required, and formal written consent is required from the parents of those under 18. There is no compulsory recruitment into the UK Armed Forces, and personnel under 18 have a statutory right to discharge from the Armed Forces if they wish to leave. There is no intention to change this policy, which is compliant with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. We believe that our policies on under 18s in Service are robust and comply with national and international law. In addition to the comprehensive welfare system that is in place for all Service personnel, we remain fully committed to meeting our obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, and have taken steps to bestow special safeguards on young people under the age of 18. We take pride in the fact that our Armed Forces provide challenging and constructive education, training and employment opportunities for young people and that the Armed Forces remain the UK's largest apprenticeship provider, equipping young people with valuable and transferable skills.
  - b. **U18s in each Service.** The numbers of U18s entering each Service are recorded in DASA's *National Statistics Publication*. In 2011/12, 90 U18s entered the Naval Service, 2930 joined the Army and 110 enlisted in the RAF. There is evidence that those joining at a younger age remain in service for longer. Tables 1 and 2 at Annex A detail age on entry and LoS. The Naval Service and RAF do not make a distinction in the training provided to U18s and over 18s so costs are the same. For the Army, the initial training provided for a junior entrant was changed in 2000 and again post SDSR, when all Junior Entrant (JE) training was

<sup>1</sup> To ask the Secretary of State for Defence, what assessment he has made of the implications for recruitment to the armed forces of plans to raise the school leaving age to 18; and if he will make a statement.

<sup>2</sup> The Education and Skills Act 2008 means that all young people who have ceased to be of compulsory school age, not reached the age of 18 and not attained a Level 3 qualification will be required by law to continue in education or training to the end of the academic year in which they turn 17 from 2013 and until at least their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday from 2015. They will be able to choose: full time education; work based learning, e.g. an apprenticeship; or, part time training alongside work or volunteering. The school leaving age will remain 16.

moved to AFC Harrogate (AFC(H)). The remainder of this note focuses on Army only.

c. **Inflow.** U18s (including JE) continue to account for a significant proportion of the Army's Phase 1 input demand: see Table 3 at Annex A for a breakdown of Phase 1 input from 2010 – 2013. Ceasing to recruit from this pool would require the inflow shortfall of c25% p.a. to be met by recruiting O18s only. Recruiting Group assesses that the current recruiting environment is would not generate sufficient recruits to meet Army demand through O18s alone. JE recruitment has remained relatively buoyant across the last three years and presents an opportunity to mitigate Standard Entry (SE) shortfalls, particularly for the Infantry.

d. **LoS and performance.** The LoS data at Annex A shows that JEs serve for longer but it must be noted that the individuals reported here had a different training experience from those joining now. For those joining since 2000, the Army has conducted some analysis of different behaviours and performance based on the different training routes. This showed that AFC(H) cohorts were more likely to have continued in Service than those trained under SE for every year from Year 1 to Year 6 (see Table 4). As shown in Table 5, for cohorts who joined in 2001 – 2004 and were still on strength in January 2010, those trained at AFC(H) were slightly more likely to have achieved the rank of LCpl/Cpl. Of note, 23% of the 2001 cohort from AFC(H) had achieved the rank of LCpl/Cpl/Sgt while only 16% of their SE counterparts had done so.

e. **Comparative costs of training Army U18 and O18.**

(1) **Training wastage.** In its report *One Step Forward*<sup>3</sup>, Child Soldiers International claim that U18s are less likely to complete training. ARTD<sup>4</sup> undertook site rationalisation for the initial training of soldiers during SDSR. JE(Short) delivery was subsumed into AFC(H), with Army Technical Foundation College (Winchester) re-rolling to undertake SE training following the closure of the Army Training Regiment (Bassingbourn). Phase 1 training wastage is now comparable between SE and JE when JE(Short) and JE(Long) are combined (approx 24%).

(2) **Cost of training.** The cost of initial training in the Army varies depending on the location and length of the course<sup>5</sup>. Recruits at AFC(H) undertake either a 50 week course costing £69k or a shorter course of 23 weeks that costs £32k. The cost for SE is £20k – £24k depending on location.

(3) **VfM assessment.** A full VfM case for the additional costs involved in conducting Phase 1 training at AFC(H) cannot be made until 2024 when the first cohorts who joined the new college will have completed their maximum engagement length. A very simplistic calculation of the initial investment per year of service can be made (see Table 6) but this does not reflect whole life costs. Also, the LoS is not a suitable measure as it masks what the spreads of the LoS are, which could generate very different structural flows. Were U18 recruiting to be stopped, yearly inflow would need to be substantially increased. There would need to be a significant financial incentive to make good the shortfall of c30% of the total intake to the Army were JE to be curtailed. This could drive up new entrants pay and therefore every rank above it, significantly increasing the overall pay bill. A sophisticated and bespoke costing model would be required to fully expose the VfM of recruiting U18s.

<sup>3</sup> *One Step Forward: The Case for Ending Recruitment of Minors by the British Armed Forces* (April 2013)

<sup>4</sup> Army Recruiting and Training Division

<sup>5</sup> Costs shown are per successful trainee based on FY 11/12, less Standard Entry Infantry who attend a combined Phase 1 / Phase 2 course.

f. **Financial aspects.** There are no financial implications associated with this advice.

g. **Presentation.** Child Soldiers International is an active lobby group with a track record of engagement on this issue over many years. Most critical media coverage originates from their lobbying. Recently they received coverage across national media outlets on the cost of recruiting U18s however our position was reflected in most articles and the coverage was reasonably balanced. Aside from this recent coverage, there has been very little follow up on the issue and DMC anticipates this will remain the case. Radio 4 is broadcasting a three-part documentary on AFC(H), *Signing Up at 16*, which runs from 13 – 27 May 13. DMC PR is engaged with this documentary and expects it to be fair and balanced representation of joining the military U18.



Annex:

A. Recruitment and Retention of U-18s: Supporting Data

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**RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF U-18S: SUPPORTING DATA<sup>6</sup>**

Table 1. Extract from DASA National Statistics Publication: UK Armed Forces Personnel Report Edition 2012 Released 17 May 2012 – UK Regular Forces<sup>7</sup> intake by Service and age, Financial Year 2011/12

	Officers				Other Ranks			
	All Services	Naval Service	Army	Royal Air Force	All Services	Naval Service	Army	Royal Air Force
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 070</b>	<b>280</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>13 740</b>	<b>1 940</b>	<b>10 480</b>	<b>1 320</b>
16	-	-	-	-	1 500	10	1 370	10
17	-	-	-	-	1 940	80	1 860	100
18	20	10	20	-	1 700	260	1 250	190
19	30	20	20	-	1 740	290	1 220	220
20	30	10	20	-	1 550	280	1 080	180
21	120	40	80	10	1 190	200	850	140
22	220	50	160	20	950	170	680	100
23	190	50	130	10	780	150	550	80
24	140	40	100	10	670	130	460	80
<b>25 and over</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>2 020</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>1 450</b>	<b>220</b>

Table 2. Exits and Length of Service in years by age on entry (FY 09/10, 10/11 and 11/12)

<sup>6</sup> For all tables, where rounding has been used, totals and sub-totals have been rounded separately and so may not equal the sums of their rounded parts. When rounding to the nearest 10, numbers ending in "5" have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent systematic bias. The symbol (-) represents fewer than 5 and (·) means zero or equal to zero.

<sup>7</sup> Figures are for UK Regular Forces (including both Trained and Untrained personnel), and therefore exclude Gurkhas, Full Time Reserve Service personnel and mobilised reservists.

	17y6m or under		More than 17y6m		Remarks
	Exits	Mean LoS	Exits	Mean LoS	
Naval Service	2480	17.6	9290	10.3	
Army	11630	9.9	21010	6.9	There are distinct differences in LoS according to capbadge
RAF	1950	22.7	8930	16.1	

Table 3. Inputs to Army Phase 1 Training (2010 – 2013)<sup>a</sup>

	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13
Total Input	7700	10170	9390
% U18 Input	30.78%	28.54%	24.27%
% O18 Input	69.22%	71.46%	75.72%
% SE (incl CIC) Input	75.83%	77.96%	83.44%
% JE Input	24.17%	22.04%	16.34%

Table 4. Numbers still on Regular Army strength at each 1<sup>st</sup> January point after entry (all soldier intakes from July 2001 to September 2004)

Entry Type	Intake Cohort	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
Total	19,820	78.9%	63.4%	56.8%	52.1%	44.2%	35.9%
AFC(H)	4,250	86.1%	70.6%	61.4%	56.2%	51.6%	44.0%
JE Other	2,030	75.7%	58.9%	50.0%	45.6%	41.4%	34.4%
SE	13,540	77.1%	61.8%	56.3%	51.7%	42.3%	33.6%

<sup>a</sup> Excludes officer entry.

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Table 5. Numbers still on Regular strength in January 2010 by Substantive Rank achieved

	Entry Type								
	All	AFC(H)	JE Other	SE					
2001 Initial Intake	All	3,400	100.0%	850	100.0%	400	100.0%	2,160	100.0%
	Pte	840	24.6%	240	28.3%	100	25.4%	490	23.0%
	LCpl	230	6.8%	40	5.3%	40	8.8%	150	7.0%
	Cpl	340	10.0%	110	12.7%	50	11.6%	190	8.7%
	Sgt	260	7.7%	90	10.3%	20	5.0%	150	7.1%
2002 Initial Intake	All	6,320	100.0%	1,320	100.0%	550	100.0%	4,451	100.0%
	Pte	1,650	26.2%	380	28.6%	120	21.6%	1,160	26.0%
	LCpl	540	8.6%	120	9.3%	50	9.6%	370	8.3%
	Cpl	700	11.2%	170	12.9%	50	9.1%	480	10.9%
	Sgt	390	6.2%	80	6.4%	20	2.9%	290	6.6%
		10	0.1%	-	-	-	-	10	0.2%
2003 Initial Intake	All	6,460	100.0%	1,161	100.0%	660	100.0%	4,640	100.0%
	Pte	1,950	30.1%	370	32.2%	170	26.2%	1,400	30.2%
	LCpl	860	13.4%	160	13.7%	100	14.4%	610	13.1%
	Cpl	800	12.4%	170	14.6%	60	9.5%	570	12.3%
	Sgt	280	4.3%	40	3.8%	20	2.3%	220	4.7%
	Lt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004 Initial Intake	All	3,650	100.0%	920	100.0%	430	100.0%	2,300	100.0%
	Pte	1,340	36.7%	400	43.7%	150	34.7%	790	34.3%
	LCpl	720	19.7%	210	22.8%	90	22.0%	410	18.0%
	Cpl	530	14.5%	180	19.4%	40	10.5%	300	13.3%
	Sgt	90	2.5%	10	1.5%	10	2.1%	70	3.0%
	Lt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Capt	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

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Table 6. Investment per year of Service

Entry (a)	Recruiting Costs (b)	Ph 1 Training Cost (c)	Average LoS (years) (d)	Investment per Year of Service [((b)+(c))/(d)] (e)
AFC Long	£10k	£69k	8.2	£9630
AFC Short		£32k	11.4	£3680
SE (Long Capbadge equiv)		£20 - £24k	5.4	£5920
SE (Short Capbadge equiv)		£20 - £24k	8.1	£3950
SE (Other)		£20 - £24k	10.6	£3020

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**JE v SE Project: Summary of findings**

- AFC(Harrogate) recruits were less likely to have left the Regular Army before March 2007 than both the SE recruits or the other JE recruits.
- AFC(Harrogate) recruits were less likely to go illegally absent than other JE recruits.
- AFC(H) recruits were more likely to remain on Regular strength than both the Standard Entry recruits and the other Junior Entry recruits.
- By March 2007 AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have achieved the substantive rank of Lance Corporal or Corporal than the other JE recruits.
- By January 2010 AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have achieved the substantive rank of Corporal than other JE recruits.



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## JE v SE Project

### Definition of the intake cohort & data issues

1. I extracted untrained intake from Civil Life with no previous service (intake codes 10, 20, 80) from July 2001 to Sept 2004 for all ages. Some records had intake dates before 01/07/2001 so these were excluded. A further 15 cases had an intake date before the enlistment date, which suggests that one of these dates is incorrect. Because Intake date is needed to calculate age on intake these were excluded. Of the remaining cases 3 appeared to be aged under 16 on the intake date, these were excluded.
2. It became apparent that many individuals had joined, left and re-joined the Army strength within the period July 2001 to Sept 2004. This includes people going illegally absent. I deleted all second (and third) entries into the Army within the period so that there was only one record per individual. There were a number of individuals whose posted UIN was not a training establishment and these were also excluded. When the extract was then limited to those joining the Infantry, RA or RAC the extract contained 19,825 records.

The Posted UINs included in this analysis are:

ATC Pirbright	A0514A
ATC Glencorse	A0639A
ATR Bassingbourne	A0643A
ATR Litchfield	A0647A
Depot R Irish	A0649A
ATR Winchester	A0651A
AFC Harrogate	A5589A
Catterick	A5826A
	A5826B
	A5826C

3. We had thought that Enlistment Status code 75 identified those attending the AFC at Harrogate however a comparison of Enlistment Status code and Posted UIN suggested that this was not the case. Of the 4,944 cases with Enlistment Status code 75 only 83% had a Posted UIN which suggested that they went to AFC(H). Annual intake by Posted UIN suggests that around 1,350 individuals went to AFC (Harrogate) which is consistent with a document found on the Defence Intranet (ABN 01/04) which says that there were 1344 places available annually at AFC(Harrogate). It was therefore decided not to use Enlistment Status to define the intake groups for this project but to use age and Posted UIN at entry instead.

The minimum and maximum ages for intake to AFC(Harrogate), ADC and Standard Entry are defined below:

Arm / Service	AFC		ADC		SE	
	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max
Infantry	16y 0m	17y 1m	16y 3m	17y 1m	16y 9m	33y 0m
RA	16y 0m	17y 1m	16y 6m	17y 1m	16y 9m	33y 0m
RAC	16y 0m	17y 1m	16y 6m	17y 1m	16y 9m	33y 0m

Using these minimum and maximum ages each record in the intake cohort was allocated to an entry type according to the following rules:

- **AFC Harrogate** – Posted UIN = A5589A .
- **Other JE** – Posted UIN **not** = A5589A and aged 16Y 8M or younger at intake.
- **Standard Entry** – Aged 17Y 2M or older at intake or posted UIN is Pirbright, Litchfield, Winchester or Catterick..

This left 681 recruits with an unknown entry type because of the overlap of the maximum age for Junior Entry (less than 17y 1M) and the minimum age for Standard Entry (16Y 9M). ARTD checked the service numbers against their records and were able to identify all but 8 cases as either JE or SE. The 8 cases which they did not find in their records were excluded from the analysis.

4. Analysing the intake cohort by entry type assigned as described above and by posted UIN gives table 1 below.
5. An analysis by Education on enlistment was requested. However in this intake cohort we found 37 "graduates" aged under 20 (28 under 18) and 45 "Undergraduates/University entrants" aged under 18. This suggests that the coding of Education on enlistment is not reliable.

**Comparison of the 3 population groups**

**Table 1: Untrained Intake (July 2001 – September 2004) by Posted UIN and Entry Type**


POSTED UIN		Total	Entry Type		
			AFC(H)	JE Other	SE
<b>Total Intake</b>		<b>19,825</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>13,537</b>
ATC Pirbright	A0514A	2,259			2,259
ATC Glencorse	A0639A	628			628
ATR Bassingbourne	A0643A	2,200		1,991	209
ATR Litchfield	A0647A	800			800
Depot R Irish	A0649A	149		43	106
ATR Winchester	A0651A	1,591			1,591
AFC Harrogate	A5589A	4,254	4,254		
ITB Catterick	A5826A	2,831			2,831
ITB Catterick	A5826B	2,091			2,091
ITB Catterick	A5826C	3,022			3,022

**Table 2: Untrained Intake (July 2001 – September 2004) by Arm/Service and Entry Type**

Arm/Service	Entry Type			
	Total	AFC(H)	JE Other	SE
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,825</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>13,537</b>
RAC	1,974	561	141	1,272
RA	2,902	793	200	1,909
Infantry	14,949	2,900	1,693	10,356

**Table 3: Untrained Intake (July 2001 – September 2004) by Age at intake and Entry Type**

Age at intake	Entry Type			
	All	AFC(H)	JE Other	SE
<b>All Ages</b>	<b>19,825</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>13,537</b>
16Y 0M	305	208	97	-
16Y 1M	414	299	115	-
16Y 2M	406	288	118	-
16Y 3M	466	318	148	-
16Y 4M	588	437	151	-
16Y 5M	623	417	206	-
16Y 6M	599	397	202	-
16Y 7M	624	419	205	-
16Y 8M	621	394	222	5
16Y 9M	783	342	196	245
16Y 10M	673	294	148	231
16Y 11M	672	272	140	260
17Y 0M	607	138	86	383
17Y 1M	455	29	-	426
17Y 2M	389	1	-	388
17Y 3M	349	1	-	348
17Y 4M	313	-	-	313
17Y 5M	325	-	-	325
17Y 6M	286	-	-	286
17Y 7M	305	-	-	305
17Y 8M	305	-	-	305
17Y 9M	280	-	-	280
17Y 10M	260	-	-	260
17Y 11M	238	-	-	238
18 & over	8,939	-	-	8,939
<b>Average age at intake</b>	<b>18.68</b>	<b>16.55</b>	<b>16.57</b>	<b>19.67</b>



### Differences in behaviour between the 3 population groups

It should be noted that if the selection criteria for the AFC(Harrogate) recruits are different to those for Other JE recruits any differences in subsequent behaviour between these 2 groups could be due to the different entry requirements rather than any "value added" by AFC(Harrogate).

### Losses

- To examine losses from this cohort I extracted outflow records for this cohort during the period July 2001 to March 2007. I excluded those with outflow code 130 Illegal Absence as these people have not left the Army. As with the intake records some people in the cohort had outflowed more than once, even after excluding outflow due to illegal absence, and second and subsequent outflows were excluded. This left 10,817 outflow records. Table 4 below shows that AFC(H) recruits were less likely to have left the Army before March 2007 than both the SE recruits or the Other JE recruits.

**Table 4: Cohort Outflow July 2001 – March 2007 by Outflow reason**

Outflow	Entry Type							
	All		AFC(H)		JE Other		SE	
<b>Total Cohort</b>	<b>19,825</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>13,537</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>Total Outflow</b>	<b>10,817</b>	<b>54.6%</b>	<b>2,088</b>	<b>49.1%</b>	<b>1,208</b>	<b>59.4%</b>	<b>7,521</b>	<b>55.6%</b>
<b>Untrained Outflow</b>	<b>7,045</b>	<b>35.5%</b>	<b>1,452</b>	<b>34.1%</b>	<b>818</b>	<b>40.2%</b>	<b>4,775</b>	<b>35.3%</b>
Recruit wastage	3,771	19.0%	832	19.6%	430	21.1%	2,509	18.5%
SNLR	1,904	9.6%	402	9.4%	241	11.8%	1,261	9.3%
Medical	864	4.4%	192	4.5%	78	3.8%	594	4.4%
Defect in enlistment	446	2.2%	14	0.3%	64	3.1%	368	2.7%
Misconduct	26	0.1%	6	0.1%	-	-	20	0.1%
Other	34	0.2%	6	0.1%	5	0.2%	23	0.2%
<b>Trained Outflow</b>	<b>3,772</b>	<b>19.0%</b>	<b>636</b>	<b>15.0%</b>	<b>390</b>	<b>19.2%</b>	<b>2,746</b>	<b>20.3%</b>
SNLR	2,426	12.2%	501	11.8%	323	15.9%	1,602	11.8%
PVR	805	4.1%	61	1.4%	17	0.8%	727	5.4%
Medical	216	1.1%	34	0.8%	23	1.1%	159	1.2%
Misconduct	178	0.9%	29	0.7%	17	0.8%	132	1.0%
Other	147	0.7%	11	0.3%	10	0.5%	126	0.9%
<b>No Outflow record</b>	<b>9,008</b>	<b>45.4%</b>	<b>2,166</b>	<b>50.9%</b>	<b>826</b>	<b>40.6%</b>	<b>6,016</b>	<b>44.4%</b>

Note that some individuals who left the Army subsequently re-joined and will therefore re-appear in strength figures.

## Gains to Trained Strength

7. Of the original cohort two thirds made it onto trained soldier strength by March 2007. This includes people who left the Army and re-joined, so this includes some people shown in table 4 above as outflow. Table 5 below shows the numbers in the original cohort who joined trained strength, by their *original* entry type and the Arm/Service they joined as trained soldiers. AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have made it onto trained strength by March 2007 than Other JE recruits.

**Table 5: Cohort Gains to Trained Strength July 2001 – March 2007 by Arm/Service**

Arm/Service	Entry Type			
	All	AFC(H)	JE Other	SE
<b>Total Cohort</b>	<b>19,825</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>13,537</b>
<b>Total GTS</b>	<b>13,292</b>	<b>2,901</b>	<b>1,296</b>	<b>9,095</b>
Infantry	9,132	1,525	1,010	6,597
RA	2,204	718	128	1,358
RAC	1,401	473	103	825
RLC	260	59	39	162
H CAV	79	39	2	38
RE	59	17	3	39
R SIGNALS	40	25	6	9
REME	33	22	2	9
AG CORPS(SPS)	24	6	2	16
AAC	23	10	-	13
RAMC	22	3	1	18
AG CORPS(PRO)	7	2	-	5
RAVC	5	2	-	3
INT CORPS	3	-	-	3
<b>Did not join trained strength in period</b>	<b>6,533</b>	<b>1,353</b>	<b>738</b>	<b>4,442</b>
	<b>33.0%</b>	<b>31.8%</b>	<b>36.3%</b>	<b>32.8%</b>

## Illegal Absences



8. Table 6 below shows the numbers of the intake cohort who had one or more periods of illegal absence during the period up to March 2007. AFC(H) recruits were less likely to go illegally absent than other JE recruits.

**Table 6: Illegal Absences during July 2001 – March 2007 by Entry Type**


Arm/Service	Entry Type			
	All	AFC(H)	JE Other	SE
<b>Total Cohort</b>	<b>19,825</b>	<b>4,254</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>13,537</b>
No. of soldiers who went illegally absent	1,068	138	128	802
	5.4%	3.2%	6.3%	5.9%
No. of Illegal Absences	1,267	166	150	951

**Retention**

9. The graphs below show the numbers of the original intake cohorts still on the Regular soldier strength (trained or untrained) at subsequent 1<sup>st</sup> January points. For all intake years the AFC(H) group has a higher proportion still on Regular soldier strength throughout the period. In some years the differences are quite wide, however for the 2001, 2002 & 2003 cohorts by 2010 the differences have reduced.



All Intake Years



**Table 7: Numbers still on Regular strength at each 1<sup>st</sup> January point after entry (all intake years)**

Entry Type	Intake Cohort	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6
<b>Total</b>	<b>19,825</b>	<b>78.9%</b>	<b>63.4%</b>	<b>56.8%</b>	<b>52.1%</b>	<b>44.2%</b>	<b>35.9%</b>
<b>AFC(H)</b>	<b>4,264</b>	<b>86.1%</b>	<b>70.6%</b>	<b>61.4%</b>	<b>56.2%</b>	<b>51.6%</b>	<b>44.0%</b>
<b>JE Other</b>	<b>2,034</b>	<b>75.7%</b>	<b>58.9%</b>	<b>50.0%</b>	<b>45.6%</b>	<b>41.4%</b>	<b>34.4%</b>
<b>SE</b>	<b>13,537</b>	<b>77.1%</b>	<b>61.8%</b>	<b>56.3%</b>	<b>51.7%</b>	<b>42.3%</b>	<b>33.6%</b>



## Substantive Rank Achieved

Tables 8 and 9 below show the numbers of the original intake cohorts who were on the Regular Army strength in March 2007 (table 8) and January 2010 (table 9). In March 2007 and in January 2010 AFC(H) recruits were more likely to be on strength than both the Standard Entry recruits and the other Junior Entry recruits. In March 2007 AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have achieved the substantive rank of Lance Corporal or Corporal than the other JE recruits. In general AFC(H) recruits were less likely to have been promoted than their SE counterparts, however in the 2001 intake AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have been promoted to Lance Corporal than the SE recruits. By March 2007 14 of the original intake had transferred to the Regular Officer strength, all were SE recruits.

**Table 8: Numbers still on Regular strength in March 2007 by substantive Rank achieved.**

Intake still on strength by substantive Rank	Entry Type							
	All		AFC(H)		JE Other		SE	
<b>2001 Initial Intake</b>	<b>3,397</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>853</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2,147</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>1,302</b>	<b>38.3%</b>	<b>416</b>	<b>48.8%</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>42.6%</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>33.3%</b>
<b>Still on strength</b>								
<b>March 2007</b>								
PTE	762	22.4%	247	29.0%	119	30.0%	396	18.4%
LCPL	487	14.3%	157	18.4%	49	12.3%	281	13.1%
CPL	50	1.5%	12	1.4%	1	0.3%	37	1.7%
2LT/LT	3	0.1%	-	-	-	-	3	0.1%
<b>2002 Initial Intake</b>	<b>6,317</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1,316</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4,451</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>2,663</b>	<b>42.2%</b>	<b>856</b>	<b>49.8%</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>38.7%</b>	<b>1,792</b>	<b>40.3%</b>
<b>Still on strength</b>								
<b>March 2007</b>								
PTE	1,838	29.1%	512	38.9%	181	32.9%	1,145	25.7%
LCPL	765	12.1%	142	10.8%	32	5.8%	591	13.3%
CPL	58	0.9%	2	0.2%	-	-	56	1.3%
2LT/LT	2	0.0%	-	-	-	-	2	0.0%
<b>2003 Initial Intake</b>	<b>6,463</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1,161</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4,642</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>3,264</b>	<b>50.5%</b>	<b>605</b>	<b>52.1%</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>43.3%</b>	<b>2,366</b>	<b>50.9%</b>
<b>Still on strength</b>								
<b>March 2007</b>								
PTE	2,682	41.5%	533	45.9%	263	39.8%	1,886	40.6%
LCPL	566	8.8%	72	6.2%	23	3.5%	471	10.1%
CPL	8	0.1%	-	-	-	-	8	0.2%
2LT/LT	8	0.1%	-	-	-	-	8	0.2%
<b>2004 Initial Intake</b>	<b>3,648</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>924</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2,297</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>2,046</b>	<b>56.1%</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>60.4%</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>50.4%</b>	<b>1,272</b>	<b>55.4%</b>
<b>Still on strength</b>								
<b>March 2007</b>								
PTE	1,916	52.5%	549	59.4%	214	50.1%	1,153	50.2%
LCPL	127	3.5%	9	1.0%	1	0.2%	117	5.1%
CPL	2	0.1%	-	-	-	-	2	0.1%
2LT/LT	1	0.0%	-	-	-	-	1	0.0%

By January 2010 a quarter of the original 2001 intake were still on the trained Regular strength. AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have achieved the substantive rank of Corporal than other JE recruits and the 2001 AFC(H) recruits were more likely to have reached Corporal than their SE counterparts.

However for the other intake years AFC(H) recruits were less likely to have been promoted to Corporals than their SE contemporaries.

**Table 9: Numbers still on Regular strength in January 2010 by Substantive Rank achieved.**


Intake still on strength by substantive Rank	Entry Type							
	All		AFC(H)		JE Other		SE	
<b>2001 Initial Intake</b>	<b>3,397</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>853</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2,147</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Still on All	835	24.6%	241	28.3%	101	25.4%	493	23.0%
Regular Pte	230	6.8%	45	5.3%	35	8.8%	150	7.0%
Trained LCpl	341	10.0%	108	12.7%	46	11.6%	187	8.7%
Strength Cpl	260	7.7%	88	10.3%	20	5.0%	152	7.1%
January 2010 Sgt	4	0.1%	-	-	-	-	4	0.2%
<b>2002 Initial Intake</b>	<b>6,317</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1,316</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4,451</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Still on All	1,653	26.2%	376	28.6%	119	21.6%	1,158	26.0%
Regular Pte	544	8.6%	122	9.3%	53	9.6%	369	8.3%
Trained LCpl	705	11.2%	170	12.9%	50	9.1%	485	10.9%
Strength Cpl	394	6.2%	84	6.4%	16	2.9%	294	6.6%
January 2010 Sgt	7	0.1%	-	-	-	-	7	0.2%
Lt	3	0.0%	-	-	-	-	3	0.1%
<b>2003 Initial Intake</b>	<b>6,463</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1,161</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>660</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4,642</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Still on All	1,947	30.1%	374	32.2%	173	26.2%	1,400	30.2%
Regular Pte	864	13.4%	159	13.7%	95	14.4%	610	13.1%
Trained LCpl	801	12.4%	169	14.6%	63	9.5%	569	12.3%
Strength Cpl	277	4.3%	44	3.8%	15	2.3%	218	4.7%
January 2010 Sgt	1	0.0%	-	-	-	-	1	0.0%
Lt	4	0.1%	2	0.2%	-	-	2	0.0%
<b>2004 Initial Intake</b>	<b>3,648</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>924</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>427</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2,297</b>	<b>100.0%</b>
Still on All	1,341	36.7%	404	43.7%	148	34.7%	789	34.3%
Regular Pte	718	19.7%	211	22.8%	94	22.0%	413	18.0%
Trained LCpl	529	14.5%	179	19.4%	45	10.5%	305	13.3%
Strength Cpl	91	2.5%	14	1.5%	9	2.1%	68	3.0%
January 2010 Sgt	1	0.0%	-	-	-	-	1	0.0%
Lt	1	0.0%	-	-	-	-	1	0.0%
Capt	1	0.0%	-	-	-	-	1	0.0%

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2003 Intake



2004 Intake

