

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

HEADQUARTERS SOUTH WEST DISTRICT
Bulford Camp Sallsbury Wiltshire SP4 9NY

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Your reference

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Our reference

0441/287 G1(PS)

Date

8 Apr 87

BOARD OF ENQUIRY

FATAL ACCIDENT - 13 FEBRUARY 1986

24351430 SERGEANT LYDEN D PARA

We enclose the Board of Enquiry Proceedings, together with the Opinions of the General Officer Commanding South West District and Deputy District Commander South West District in respect of the fatal accident of Sergeant Lyden (deceased).

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Maj
for DCOS G1/G4

Enclosures:

1. Proceedings of the Board of Enquiry.
2. Opinion of GOC SWDIST.
3. Opinion of Dep Dist Comd SWDIST.

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STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

BOARD OF INQUIRY

FATAL ACCIDENT - 13 FEBRUARY 1986

24351430 SERGEANT LYDEN D PARA

OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
SOUTH WEST DISTRICT

1. I agree with my Deputy Commander's view that the Board of Inquiry was conducted most thoroughly. Sergeant Lyden should never have died under these circumstances: the accident was a direct result of neglect of the rules of safety. Action has been taken against the 2 officers principally concerned with its conduct. I endorse the Findings and Recommendations of the Board.

2. However, the Inquiry into this accident raises a broader issue for consideration which stems from our knowledge of other fatal and serious accidents which have occurred largely, but not exclusively, on Infantry field firing during the 3 years of my tenure of command. The common thread is that they would not have occurred if the rules of conduct contained in Infantry Training Manual, Volume 4 Pamphlet 21 had been adhered to. The Board has looked carefully at this Pamphlet to see if there is any need for amendment, but they have concluded that there is not. I accept this, although it may help users in the field if a concise summary of the most important issues was produced.

3. I am led to conclude that the disregard of safety rules, which can so easily lead to death or injury, generally stems not from wilful negligence but from a lack of experience and professionalism. By their very nature, field firing exercises are dangerous and can result in serious accidents unless conducting officers are entirely familiar with the appropriate procedures and safety rules. It is therefore incumbent upon those responsible for training officers in the planning and conduct of field firing that they are not only made aware of the regulations but they are brought up to date and periodically practised. The Board has made Recommendations concerning training: whilst I do not take issue with their Recommendations in so far as they go, I note that they have not addressed the problem of keeping Infantry officers up to date and practised in these very important skills. I understand that almost all Infantry platoon commanders do achieve the qualifications necessary to run these exercises but, bearing in mind that at the time of instruction they are young and inexperienced, that will seldom be beyond platoon level. It is the competence of officers at the level of company commander and above that concerns me; this is well illustrated by the circumstances of this accident. In many cases officers appointed to command companies do so following a substantial period away from regimental duty. It seems to me that inadequate emphasis is given to this subject prior to their appointment to command a company, and later a battalion. Indeed, they may have no formal instruction after their initial course at the age of say 19 or 20.

4. These comments should be seen against the fact that there is in many units a serious lack of expertise in the organisation of skill-at-arms training - most seriously, even in some Infantry battalions. The Board have concluded in this case that both the Commanding Officer and the Company Commander concerned unintentionally disregarded the rules pertaining to the use of the 2 inch Light Mortar on field firing. The fact that no-one else said anything at the time suggests that all those in a position of authority in that Battalion either did not know of the rules or disregarded them.

I suspect that this could have happened in many battalions. There were also other serious breaches of safety on that Exercise, although they did not contribute to Sergeant Lyden's death.

5. From my experience in this appointment, I believe that every battalion should have at least one field officer qualified in advanced skill-at-arms training, including field firing. I therefore recommend that the Director of Infantry should urgently review the structure of training in the conduct and supervision of field firing up to battalion level.

6. In the meantime, I recognise that it will take time to complete such a review and the implementation of its recommendations. I therefore endorse the Recommendation of the Board that SASC Instructors should be attached to Infantry battalions whilst training on live field firing areas overseas, particularly where there is no suitably qualified senior Regimental officer.

7 April 1987



B M LANE
Major General
General Officer Commanding
South West District

BOARD OF INQUIRY
FATAL ACCIDENT - 13 FEBRUARY 1986
24351430 SERGEANT LYDEN D PARA
OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF
COMMANDER BULFORD GARRISON

1. I accept the opinions of the Board that Sergeant Lyden died as a result of a fragment from a 2 inch Mortar HE bomb entering his heart. I also accept that a bomb exploded some 3 feet above the ground and that this bomb was the direct cause of the fatal accident.

2. I am satisfied that the current regulations for conducting live firing exercises, as described in Infantry Training Manual Volume 4 Pamphlet Number 21 "Range Conduct and Safety Rules" 1978 are comprehensive. I support the Board's opinion that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate the view that the climatic conditions and deep snow in Norway alter the danger areas of weapons.

3. I am concerned that during the preparation and planning of this exercise the battalion not only failed to read and to apply the rules of Pamphlet 21 in respect of the 2 inch Mortar, they also failed to observe the following safety regulations:

a. To produce a safety trace incorporating the template danger areas of all weapons used.

b. To employ unqualified safety supervisors without the necessary authorisation by the Commanding Officer.

c. To brief and rehearse safety supervisors adequately and to equip them suitably, for their task.

d. To apply the correct safety criteria in the siting and firing of certain weapons.

4. To prevent a re-occurrence and to improve officers' awareness of the problems of live firing, I support the Board's recommendation that the Commanding Officers' (Designate) Course should include a period of revision on the planning and conduct of live firing exercises. I also support the recommendation that the time spent on the subject by the All Arms Tactics Course should be increased to one hour.

5. The Board's recommendation to attach an SASC adviser to battalions whilst training on live firing exercises overseas, is attractive. However, not only are such men scarce but also, I believe, that most Commanding Officers would prefer to seek the advice of an officer from their own battalion, who has recently trained in this field. I appreciate that the School of Infantry may have difficulties in programming a course but I recommend a study is undertaken now of the feasibility of such a course. In the meantime I recommend the attachment of SASC advisers.

6. Whilst I am satisfied that Pamphlet 21 is comprehensive, I am of the opinion that some method of drawing attention to the relevant paragraphs for the planning and supervision of all live firing exercises is required. A short aide memoire in addition to the index is all that is necessary. I so recommend.

7. I congratulate the Board for a thorough and detailed examination of the accident. Their Findings, Opinion and Recommendations have been clearly expressed.



M J EVANS
Brigadier
Commander Bulford Garrison

6 March 1987

RESTRICTED

BOARD OF INQUIRY
CONVENING ORDER

BY

MAJOR GENERAL B M LANE CB OBE
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING SOUTH WEST DISTRICT

1. A Board of Inquiry composed as under will assemble at the Court Martial Centre, Bulford at a time and date decided by the President to Investigate the circumstances under which 24351430 Sergeant LYDEN D 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment lost his life during Exercise HARDFALL SOUTH whilst training with his unit, 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment at MJOLFJELL Valey, NORWAY, on 13 February 1986.

PRESIDENT:

[REDACTED]

MEMBERS:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

2. The Board is to investigate all the circumstances and record all evidence relevant to the inquiry.
3. The evidence is to be taken on oath.
4. The Board is to report on the following matters.
 - a. The circumstances which resulted in the death of Sergeant LYDEN.
 - b. Were the regulations for the conduct of this type of training adhered to?
5. The Board is to express an opinion:
 - a. How Sergeant LYDEN met his death.
 - b. Whether current regulations for running field firing exercises in Norway require amendment in any way.
6. The Board is to record what action has been or will be taken to prevent a recurrence and is to make any recommendations to this end.
7. The President is to direct which military witnesses are to attend.
8. The President's attention is drawn to the following special instructions:
 - a. Army Act 55 Section 135.
 - b. BI(A) Rules 1956.
 - c. QR 73 Chapter 4 Annex A.
 - d. Infantry Training Manual Volume IV Pamphlet 21 "Range Conduct and Safety Rules" (with Amendment 7).
 - e. Ammunition and Explosive Regulations (Land Service) Volume 1 Pamphlet 11 (1984) Annex: E Appendix E1.

RESTRICTED

9. The President is to forward ten copies of the record of the proceedings to G1 Branch Headquarters SOUTH WEST DISTRICT.

10. Administration.

a. Commanding Officer 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment is to liaise with Commanding Officer BATAU to ensure that the Court Martial Centre BULFORD is suitably equipped for the inquiry, with a supply of stationery, manuals regulations; and copies of the following amended:

(1) MML 1955 Part 1.

(2) QRs 1975.

(3) Infantry Training Manual Volume IV Pamphlet 21.

(4) Arms and Explosives Regulations (LS) Volume 1 Pamphlet 11 (1984)

(5) The Commanding Officers' Directive for Mountain and Arctic Warfare for 1985/86.

(6) Maps and traces of the various weapons and safety areas which should have been used.

b. He is to detail an orderly for duty during the inquiry.

Bulford


Maj
for GOC
Date 6 Feb 87

SUMMARY SHEET

Unit: 1 PARA

CO: [REDACTED]

Board of Inquiry Major General B M Lane CB OBE GOC SWDIST
Convened by:

Terms of reference - investigating the circumstances under which 24351430 Sergeant LYDEN D 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment lost his life during Exercise HARDFALL SOUTH whilst training with his unit, 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment at MJOLFJELL Valley, Norway on 13 February 1986.

Date of occurrence 13 Feb 86

Date of assembly of inquiry 10 Feb 87

Date inquiry completed 17 Feb 87

References:

- A. Headquarters Special Investigation Branch RMP UKLF 06022/6 dated 21 Oct 86.
- B. HQ SIB RMP UKLF 06022/6 dated 20 Jan 87.
- C. Infantry Training Volume I Platoon Weapons Pamphlet No 8 "The Light Mortar" published 1966 Code No 70373.
- D. Infantry Training Volume IV Pamphlet No 21 "Range Conduct and Safety Rules (All Arms)" 1978 Code No 71080.

Opinion and recommendations of inquiry

1. The Board is of the opinion that Sergeant LYDEN was killed by a fragment of a 2 inch mortar high explosive bomb. In all probability this fragment came from a bomb fired by the mortar that he was crewing. The bomb detonated on striking a small tree forward of his baseplate position.
2. The field firing in which Sergeant LYDEN was participating was not planned or conducted in accordance with the regulations governing this type of exercise.
3. The Board recommends:
 - a. That a SASC adviser be attached to units intending to carry out infantry field firing on ranges that lack an integral, British, range safety authority.
 - b. That the coverage of field firing given to company commanders on the infantry special to arm briefing prior to the All Arms Tactics Course be extended, and that a similar period be included in the corresponding briefing prior to the Commanding Officers (Designate) Course.

Statement of any disciplinary action taken

Opinion and instructions of the authority
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Opinion and instructions of Superior Commander
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Proceedings forwarded to:

<u>Headquarters</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
.....
.....

Signed
by the Authority of the Officer
authorized to sign for him

[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
[redacted] [redacted] having been from

States :

Lawyer [redacted] [redacted] of the RMP SIB,
stationed at Aldershot.

was tasked on 17 Feb 86 to conduct
enquiries into the death of Sgt Lyden
Wright, who died during a field firing ex
in the Rjoffjell Valley Norway on 13 Feb
86.

I produce copies of the relevant state-
ments which I recorded during that
enquiry together with copies of the
exhibits and documentary evidence
which I recovered.

[redacted signature]

11 Feb 87.

RMP(SIB)

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] having been sworn,
states:

I am [REDACTED] of the RMP SIB, stationed at Aldershot.

I was tasked on 17 February 1986 to conduct enquiries into the death of Sergeant LYDEN 1 PARA, who died during a field firing exercise in the MJOLFJELL Valley, Norway on 13 February 1986.

I produce copies of the relevant statements which I recorded during that enquiry together with copies of the exhibits and documentary evidence which I recovered.

[REDACTED] 11 February 1987
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF SERGEANT LYDEN

1. Sergeant LYDEN met his death on Thu 13 Feb 86, at about 1400 hours, in a range accident on the MJOLFJELL ranges in NORWAY. As a member of 2 Platoon, A Company, 1 PARA he was taking part in a live firing company attack exercise when an explosion fatally wounded him and injured 3 other soldiers.

Part of Map Sheet
M816

2. The exercise was planned by [REDACTED], who also acted as the range safety officer, and was intended as the culmination of 1 PARA's training in NORWAY. The CO had directed that the exercise should be as demanding and realistic as possible; with this instruction in mind [REDACTED] planned a company level live firing exercise incorporating the use of all support and platoon weapons. Within the basic framework of the exercise each company was free to plan the attack, deploy and support itself with company weapons, as officers commanding companies saw fit.

Ref A Page 112 Line 36

3. Although neither written instruction nor overall safety trace was produced a full scale conference and orders group were held at battalion level prior to the exercise. Safety supervisors were appointed by [REDACTED] and given a detailed verbal briefing; a reconnaissance of the MJOLFJELL range area was carried out. However, not all those responsible for safety supervision on the day of A Company's exercise attended this briefing or reconnaissance. It is also apparent that not all the safety supervisors were clear in their own minds as to their specific responsibilities.

Ref A P 112 Line 10
Ref A P 114

Ref A P29 Line 8
Ref A P 27 Line 16
P 28 Para I

4. B and C Companies 1 PARA conducted the same exercise on 11 and 12 Feb 86 without incident. On 13 Feb Sergeant LYDEN as a member of 2 Platoon A Company, the leading platoon, attacked the first of the 3 objectives which the company were ordered to clear. Sergeant LYDEN's specific responsibility, in addition to his normal duties as platoon Sergeant, was to fire the platoon 2 inch mortar, as required, to support attacks by his or any other platoon. Specific instructions on this were given to Sergeant LYDEN by his company commander [REDACTED].

Ref A P 129 Line 11

5. During the course of the attack by A Company Sergeant LYDEN deployed and began firing his 2 inch mortar. At this time he was positioned on objective XII, GR 828372 and firing at objective X13, GR 831370. His baseplate position was on hard packed snow and there were some small trees in front of it but slightly to the right. Assisted by [REDACTED] as the No 1, (firer), of the mortar Sergeant LYDEN had successfully fired 2 rounds of 2 inch mortar high explosive, adjusting the fall of shot closer to his target each time. It should be noted that the correct drills for loading and firing the mortar were not being observed.

Ref A Annex A
GRs refer to the
written figures, not
the area marked on
the map.

(Ref C
(Ref A P 40 Line 18

6. It is clear that a third round was loaded. Although [REDACTED] has no recollection of firing it subsequent inspection of the barrel shows that the round must have left the mortar as designed, ie the weapon had been fired.

Ref A P 41 Line 1
Ref A P 69 Line 6

7. At this stage many witnesses describe an explosion occurring some 3 feet above the ground in the area of Sergeant LYDEN's position, generally indicated as a ball of black smoke. Immediately following this explosion it was apparent that some form of accident had occurred. Sergeant LYDEN, [REDACTED] and 2 other soldiers in the immediate vicinity of the 2 inch mortar were found to have been injured. Sergeant LYDEN died shortly afterwards. Investigation of the fragments taken from his body, and those of the other injured soldiers, suggests them to be shrapnel fragments from a 2 inch mortar bomb.

Ref A P 25 Line 25
Ref A P 54 Line 16

WERE THE REGULATIONS FOR THIS TYPE OF TRAINING ADHERED TO?

8. It appears that in their desire to make the company live firing exercise as demanding and realistic as possible, many of the regulations for the conduct of field firing were disregarded by 1 PARA.

9. There is no doubt that if the specific regulation governing the use of the 2 inch mortar on field firing had been observed, Sergeant LYDEN would not have been killed. The use of 2 inch mortar high explosive bombs on field firing exercises is expressly forbidden by Reference C Paragraph 129 and Reference D Paragraph 1262 ("Bombs are not to be fired on field firing exercises"). This is a long standing rule, which has been in force since at least 1966. Both the above references are reproduced at Reference A, Annexes H and I.

Ref A P K5 Lines 17,
32, 36

10. Although the death and injuries sustained on the company field firing exercise are attributable to the accident with the 2 inch mortar, the following additional serious breaches of safety regulations should be noted:

- a. Failure to produce a safety trace incorporating the template danger areas of all weapons to be used.
- b. Employment of unqualified safety supervisors without the necessary authorisation by the commanding officer.
- c. Failure to brief and rehearse safety supervisors adequately, and to equip them suitably, for their task.
- d. Failure to apply the correct safety criteria in the siting and firing of certain weapons.

11. While it is accepted that the nature of the MJOLFJELL ranges allows considerable flexibility, imagination and initiative in the planning of field firing, this fact should not be accepted as an excuse for disregard of minimum safety standards. The 4 points above are highlighted for the following reasons:

- a. Failure to Produce a Safety Trace. Without a safety trace it is impossible to delineate the overall danger area which an exercise encompasses. Such a trace cannot be drawn unless the templates for the individual weapons, which it is planned to fire, have been applied to the map. The drawing and use of such

a trace does not restrict any field firing exercise, except for reasons of safety.

b. Employment of Unqualified Supervisors. It is not unusual for any field firing exercise to require a greater number of safety supervisors than are School of Infantry course qualified and available within a Battalion. However, unqualified safety supervisors must be formally authorised. Such authorisation pre-supposes proper training in their duties by a course qualified individual. It is realised that the time required to complete such formal authorisation will be hard to find, but in a complex and demanding exercise, to curtail it is foolhardy.

Ref D Chap 2 Para 303

c. Failure to Brief Safety Supervisors Adequately. There is nothing wrong with allowing a measure of tactical free play within a field firing exercise but, if it is intended to do so there is an increased need to brief and rehearse safety supervisors in detail. Each supervisor must be aware of the complete exercise plan and of the inherent dangers in any course of action that the players on the exercise might take. It is clear that although briefings and reconnaissances were conducted before A Company 1 PARA's field firing exercise, some safety supervisors were insufficiently briefed, eg [REDACTED]

Ref A P 21
Ref A P 29

d. Failure to Apply Weapon Safety Criteria.

(1) The lack of an overall trace suggests that no individual weapon templates were applied. Any briefing of the safety supervisors on danger areas would be therefore, at best, imprecise.

(2) It is not possible from the evidence which the Board has seen, to be definitive as to the breaches of safety with individual weapons. However, it would appear that:

(a) The rules for conducting overhead and flanking small arms fire were largely ignored and the resultant fire dangerous.

(b) Notwithstanding the ban on firing of 2 inch mortar high explosive, the use of the light mortar on field firing in these conditions was particularly risky.

12. Finally, overall control of the exercise appears to have been less than satisfactory. Inadequate provision was made for stopping the exercise in the event of an emergency. Although radios were provided and a safety net established, some radios were not working and there was insufficient issue of red Verey cartridges. Neither does it seem to have been clear to at least one safety supervisor what constituted an emergency. Given these shortcomings, when an accident occurred at the waterfall it was inevitable that a certain amount of confusion arose, and that safety supervisors left the groups for whom they were responsible while the live firing

Ref A P 32

Ref A PP 25, 28-31

WHETHER CURRENT REGULATIONS FOR RUNNING FIELD FIRING EXERCISES
IN NORWAY REQUIRE AMENDMENT IN ANY WAY

16. The Board is of the opinion that:

a. The current regulations for running field firing exercises, as laid down in Infantry Training Volume 4 Pamphlet Number 21 "Range Conduct and Safety Rules" 1978 are comprehensive. They are applicable world wide, contain the basic rules for the safe conduct of field firing, and require no amendment as a result of this accident.

b. Common sense must be used in interpreting Pamphlet 21 in accordance with any local range standing orders and the experience of the soldiers being exercised. This is the prerogative of the commanding officer. However, it must be remembered that the pamphlet is written to avoid accidents and the rules guard against what is possible based on scientific experiment and the recommendations of many boards of inquiry into accidents.

c. The suggestion that the climatic conditions and deep snow in Norway alters the danger areas of weapons in any way, cannot be substantiated.

WHAT ACTION HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE

17. Immediately after the accident a worldwide ban was imposed on the firing of 2 inch mortar high explosive by the Directorate of Land Service Ammunition (DLSA) and a thorough investigation was conducted. The findings of this board of inquiry and its recommendations are the culmination of that investigation.

18. The Board considered the need to remind those about to command infantry companies and battalions of the rules for field firing and believe that detailed and lengthy revision is unnecessary.

19. The Infantry phase of the All Arms Tactics Course contains a brief reminder on the regulations for this type of training. At only 15 minutes this is too short, but to extend it beyond an hour is not considered to be of merit because:

a. Some "first tour" company commanders do not attend the course. It is not yet all embracing in this respect.

b. Battalion seconds in command are the officers directly responsible for training, but they do not complete the course prior to assuming their appointments, nor could the course size accommodate them.

c. To cover the subject in detail would take several days in an already crowded programme.

20. The Infantry phase of the Commanding Officers (Designate) course could include a similar refresher period. The combination of these measures should ensure that those in a position of responsibility for the safe conduct of this type of training are fully aware of their duties.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD

21. The ban on the firing of 2 inch mortar high explosive should be lifted.

22. Pamphlet 21 is a comprehensive reference book with a clear index. There is no need to revise or amend it, nor to produce a simplified aide memoire. The scale of issue to an infantry battalion is such that the pamphlet is readily available to those who need to consult it.

23. Certain ranges and training areas used by the British Army do not have integral range safety personnel such as will be found at SENNYBRIDGE or SENNELAGER; MJOLFJELL is such a range. Other examples are in BELIZE, the Falkland Islands, BRUNEI and KENYA. The Board recommends that, to prevent exercise incidents resulting from ignorance or disregard of Pamphlet 21, a SASC adviser of at least warrant officer rank is attached to any unit undertaking overseas training involving infantry field firing on such ranges. It is understood by the Board that this system already operates with the Gurkha Infantry Brigade units on exercise in BRUNEI. The Board also notes that it is normal practice for armoured and artillery units conducting complex field firing to be assisted by instructors from the appropriate Arms Schools, and that such advisers were present in Feb 86 on Exercise HARDFALL.

24. The Infantry special to arm phases of the All Arms Tactics Course and Commanding Officers (Designate) course should contain revision periods on the regulations for conducting field firing. There is no requirement for these to exceed one hour. This last recommendation is made because, in the opinion of the Board, Sergeant LYDEN's death resulted as much from disregard of the rules in Pamphlet 21 as from any professed ignorance of them.


PRESIDENT



MEMBER



MEMBER



MEMBER



MEMBER

17 Feb 87




STAFF IN CONFIDENCE
OFFICER ONLY

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION BRANCH RMP (UK)

Southern Region

Provost Barracks Maida Road Aldershot Hants GU11 2DN

Telephone 0252-24431 ext 

See Distribution

Your reference

Our reference 06022/6

Date

20 Jan 87

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

References:

- A. AGAI Vol 2 Chap 62.
- B. Manual of Army Security Vol III, Ch 5, Sect II.
- C. Initial Case Report 06022/6 dated 21 Feb 86.
- D. Interim Report 06022/6 dated 27 Feb 86.
- E. Final Report 06022/6 dated 21 Oct 86.

The attached statements, records of interview and documentary exhibits are forwarded for inclusion in Reference E.



for Commanding Officer

Distribution:

Action:

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STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

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ANNEX A:- Exhibit ACPK/3 Ex 'HARDFALL' Instructions	

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.
 Date to leave a. Command: May 87 b. Service: Open

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 6th day of January 1987 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] an officer at present serving with 1 PARA, Bulford. I currently hold the appointment of Adjutant and have done since May 86.

I have today extracted from the unit files a copy of Instructions issued on 7 Jan 86 for Ex 'HARDFALL 86' signed under the auspices of the then Commanding Officer [REDACTED]. I have handed a copy of those instructions to [REDACTED] RMP (SIB) who has labelled them as exhibit ACPK/3 and I have signed that label.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1410 hrs on Tue 6 Jan 87 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (~~consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me~~) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 14 day of Jan 1987 Signed [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

At Bulford on Tue 6 Jan 87, I received from [REDACTED], Adjt 1 PARA, a copy of Ex Instructions for Ex 'HARDFALL 86'. I labelled these instructions as exhibit ACPK/3, signed the label and retained them in my possession.

Those instructions I now produce.

Signed [REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
 Hants.
 Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of 1 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 5 day of Jan 1987 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

On Mon 22 Dec 86 at the Joint Service Defence College, Greenwich, between 1147 - 1520 hrs and 1605 hrs - 1700 hrs in the presence of [REDACTED] RMP I interviewed [REDACTED] L/PARA [REDACTED] whom I can recognise, after caution. Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions asked and answers given. At the conclusion of the interview [REDACTED] read over and signed the record of interview.

[REDACTED] also read over and signed the record.

On Tue 23 Dec 86 at the SIB Office Aldershot about 1640 hrs I was approached by [REDACTED] whom I can recognise who explained that he wished to add something to the record of his previous interview. I cautioned the Officer and made a written record of his verbal comments, which he read over and signed., The interview terminated at 1652 hrs.

Those records I now produce.

[REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot, Hants
Date to leave a. Command: Aug 87 b. Service: Aug 91

This statement, (~~consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me~~) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 23rd day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am a [REDACTED] in the Royal Military Police currently serving as the Officer Commanding Southern Region SIB RMP UKLF in Aldershot.

Between 1147 hrs and 1700 hrs on Mon 22 Dec 86 at the JSDC Greenwich, I was present when [REDACTED] RMP (SIB) carried out an interview after caution with [REDACTED], who I can recognise.

Throughout that interview [REDACTED] made a contemporaneous record of the questions he asked the Officer and of his replies which at the end of the interview, he read over, agreed with and signed.

I also read over the record of interview and signed it.

[REDACTED]
RMP

**SERVICE POLICE
RECORD OF INTERVIEW**

CASE REF NUMBER: 06022/6

PART 1

INTERVIEW OF

Number: [REDACTED] Rank/Status: [REDACTED] Surname: [REDACTED]
Forenames: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Colour of Eyes: [REDACTED]
Ship/Regt/Corps/Unit: PARA, Colour of Hair: [REDACTED]
Joint Service Defence College, Sex: [REDACTED]
Greenwich. Height: [REDACTED]

INTERVIEWED BY

Number: [REDACTED] Rank/Status: [REDACTED] Surname: [REDACTED]
Forenames: [REDACTED]
Unit & Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Rd, Aldershot, Hants.

PERSONS PRESENT

Rank/Status	Name/Initials	In What Capacity
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	RMP SIB Officer

INTERVIEW

Place: JSDC, Greenwich
Date: 22 Dec 86 Time Started: 1147 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]
Signed: [REDACTED]

HANDOVER 'NOTICE TO SUSPECT'

Record any reply:

Time: 1149 hours

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

1. *Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now? Time: 1151 hrs

"I do not want to have a legal adviser but I do want to make the point that this has been badly set up in that I had not been warned that this interview would be under caution. Had I wished a legal adviser present forewarning would have been a sensible and indeed courteous precaution."

2. *Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now? "No."
Time: 1156 hours

3. Do you wish to have an observer present now? "No."
Time: 1156 hours

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect to exercise the option(s)).

*If NO/NOT NOW to either 1 and/or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?": Record any reply: "Yes."

CERTIFICATION BY SUSPECT

I [REDACTED] certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form 811A entitled: 'Notice to Suspect' and I* DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: [REDACTED] Date: 22 Dec 86 Time: 1157 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE SERVICE POLICE

Details concerning the Legal Adviser, Observer and Appropriate Adult should be recorded as indicated below:

a. **Legal Adviser(s)**. Record time when arrangements started hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

b. **Observer(s)** Record time when arrangements started: hours

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

Witnessed by the Service Police: 


Signed: 

c. Appropriate Adult

Name:

Time when notified interview is to take place:

Time of arrival:

Time when suspect cautioned in the presence of the Appropriate Adult:

Signed by Appropriate Adult:

Witnessed by the Service Policeman:

Remarks:

PART 3

LEGAL ADVISER DELAYED

If the right to consult or the request for the presence of a legal adviser is delayed record the reason(s) and the identity of the authorising officer below:

PART 4

INFORMATION TO SUSPECT ON INTERVIEW PROCEDURE

* When the interview is to be tape recorded say to the suspect:

"The remainder of the interview will be tape recorded. I am now going to insert two tapes and place them in the tape recorder and commence to record".

*Where a written contemporaneous record is to be made say to the suspect:

"During this interview *I will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as requested by the Codes of Practice.

At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly."

*Delete if inapplicable

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6

Record of Interview of: [REDACTED] PARA

Time When Appropriate	Line	Record of Interview
Q1		"What appointment did you hold on 13 Feb 86?"
A1.		"Commanding Officer 1 PARA?"
Q2.		"At that time your unit was taking part in Ex Hardfall. Did you issue any written orders regarding the live firing company exercises conducted over the period of 11 - 13 Feb 86?"
A2.		"A comprehensive written instruction dealing with Exercise Hardfall as whole was issued by the Bn 2 I/C. Within this instruction reference was made to the company exercises at the conclusion of the company training phase. I cannot be specific as to detail, but no doubt the document remains on file. Additionally I issued under my own signature a training directive for Ex Hardfall. I do not have a copy to hand but general reference was made to the company exercise. This document will also be on file with 1 PARA.
Q3.		"What orders did you give for the writing of the exercise and what were its terms of reference with specific regard to the live firing company exercises?"
A3.		"As on the previous 2 Exercises Hardfall (1984 and 1985) I decided that the climax to the Company training phase was to be a demanding and challenging dry and live firing exercise to ensure that the company groups of 1 PARA were fit in every way for their Artic role. To this end I devised a 48 hrs exercise which commenced with a parachute insertation, a dry phase of just under 24 hrs and a final live firing phase. The dry phase was run by the new Bn 2 I/C ([REDACTED]); I tasked [REDACTED] to plan and supervise the live firing exercise. [REDACTED] had run a similar live firing exercise to my complete satisfaction on Exercise Hardfall 85. [REDACTED] discussed an outline for the live firing phase with me, I think before leaving UK. Once in Norway we skied the ground in some

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6

Record of Interview of: [REDACTED] PARA

Time	Line	Record of Interview
When		
Appropriate		
1250 hrs Coffee.		<p>detail. [REDACTED] demonstrated to me the general scheme of manoeuvre he proposed, with which I was content. I told him then to go ahead and plan it in detail. "Terms of reference" is an odd phrase to use in connection with a field firing exercise. The <u>object</u> of the exercise was to provide the Battalion's sub-units with the opportunity of rehearsing a full scale company group attack in the Arctic. Although ambitious, nothing else in my opinion, would have been sufficient to meet my prime responsibility of ensuring the Battalion's readiness for war. The style and conduct of the exercise were gone into at considerable length and in great detail at a full battalion O Group held before the 3 exercises took place."</p>
Q4.		<p>"What orders did you give in respect of the conduct of the exercise and the employment of weapons systems?"</p>
A4.		<p>"I have already described the manner in which the exercise was planned. As to conduct, I directed that the range organisation, including safety staff, was to be formed basically from uninvolved members of Sp Coy under its Company Commander [REDACTED]. The training programme was intensive during this week and in addition it was necessary to use all available personnel within the battalion to help Sp Coy out. The division of responsibility between the range organization and the particular company being exercised I laid down as follows; The general scheme of manoeuvre which I had approved could not be altered by the Company Commander being exercised, but within that constraint his detailed deployment and pace were for him to decide. I have already stated that the object of the exercise was to put each company group through a full scale attack. The weapon systems involved therefore were small arms, grenades and platoon weapons from within</p>

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6Record of Interview of: PARA

Time When Appropriate	Line	Record of Interview
		<p>the rifle companies, and 81mm mortars and Milan from Sp Coy. Additionally FGA and armed helicopters were worked into the exercise and had our affiliated 105mm gun battery been available I would also have included that weapon system. I discussed the employment of the various weapons systems with <u> </u> as I wanted to be satisfied that the exercise could safely achieve its objective. I remember being particularly concerned about the 81mm mortar and Milan, <u> </u> was able to satisfy me on these points."</p>
Q5.		<p>"What orders did you give regarding safety and in particular in respect of the 2 inch mortar?"</p>
A5.		<p>"On the question of safety I had a number of discussions with <u> </u>. I did not lay down any orders per se as I was not in a position to do so; there were many concurrent activities going on in the battalion which required my attention and there was no guarantee that I could be physically present at each of the 3 live firing attacks (Due to non-flying weather, for example). As I have already indicated, <u> </u> as the conducting officer satisfied me in discussion that he had thought through the safety aspect and I respected the judgement of this experienced officer. At the Battalion 'O' Group I have already mentioned safety was gone into at length and I accepted <u> </u> assurances that the safety supervisors had been allocated in conjunction with the Bn 2I/C, and had been or would be briefed. The history of the involvement of the 2 inch mortar in the exercise is as follows; Before going to Norway, the then 2I/C <u> </u> informed me that although no 51mm ammunition was available, the Battalion would be provided with 2 inch ammunition HE end smoke and the 2 inch mortars from which to fire it on Ex Hardfall.</p>

Witnessed by the Service Police:
 Signed:

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6

Record of Interview of: [REDACTED] PARA

Time	Line	Record of Interview
When		
Appropriate		<p>belief that had any Officer or SNCO in the battalion known that particular regulation he would have brought it up. Furthermore, none of the many other personnel from outside the Battalion who were involved with or who watched the exercise or any of its 3 runs made any comment regarding the use of 2 inch HE. Secondly, if I or any of the Company Commanders had knowingly contravened regulations it is at least rather unlikely that high ranking observers from C in C NORTH downwards would have been invited to observe the exercise and welcomed in the way they were. Thirdly, I have known and worked with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] for many years. I know them both to be highly professional and motivated soldiers. [REDACTED] high ability has been recognised by his selection for promotion to Lt Col at an early age. [REDACTED] deservedly has the reputation of being a most competent and effective trainer. I have seen him run several similar live firing exercises and they have always been a model of this form of training. Indeed, on at least 2 occasions his work in this field has been observed by the GOC SW Dist who subsequently commented most favourably on what he had seen and on [REDACTED] ability. It will be clear, therefore, that there were no grounds whatsoever for me in anyway to suspect the judgement of either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED], nor for me to suspect that the exercise under investigation was in breach of the Pamphlet. Fourthly, the exercise under investigation was the last of 3 runs. I had watched the previous 2 along with other senior observers. My opinion was that the exercise provided realistic battle training without prejudice to safety; this opinion was entirely borne out by the remarks of the observers, all of whom were most complimentary and none of whom made any adverse comment regarding safety. Finally, whilst I acknowledge the breach of the Pamphlet</p>

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6Record of Interview of: PARA

Time When Appropriate	Line	Record of Interview
		nonetheless it is apparent to me that if the explosion was caused by defective ammunition or an error of drill it is quite possible that the accident could still have occurred even if the Pamphlet had been followed to the letter."
Q7.		"Do you wish to make any form of written statement regarding this matter?"
A7.		"I've already done so."
Q8.		"You are now given the opportunity to read over the record of interview. As you do so, would you sign the bottom of each page, indicating that you have read it, agreed with the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the record of interview?"
A8.		"Yes."
1454 hrs		Record handed over.
1520 hrs		Interview terminated in order that <u> </u> could collect his wife from the station.
1605 hrs	Q9.	"I must remind you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence."
	A9.	"Having read through the record I believe it both relevant and important to emphasize certain points and place the exercise in context. Whilst as I have said I acknowledge the breach of the Pamphlet I am quite satisfied that it was unwitting and not deliberate on any persons part. I had no reason to doubt either of the Company Commander's judgement and I am

Witnessed by the Service Police:
 Signed:

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6

Record of Interview of: [REDACTED] PARA

Time	Line	Record of Interview
When		
Appropriate		

certain that neither knowingly breached the regulations. In other other words, I expected and required the exercise to run safely and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] believed in good faith that they were so doing. Had the relevant regulation been brought to my notice then I would have deleted the 2 inch mortar from the exercise; exactly the same can be said of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I deeply regret Sgt Lyden's death and it will be a continuing source of sorrow to me. But, having said that, I firmly believe that all risk cannot be eradicated from proper training for war, despite the best intentions of professional and conscientious Officers and SNCOs."

Repeat question Q8.

"Yes."

1640 hrs

Record handed over.

I [REDACTED], have read over the Record of Interview consisting of 14 pages. I have indicated where it is inaccurate. I have signed each page.

Signed: [REDACTED]
1700 hrs
22 Dec 86

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

**SERVICE POLICE
RECORD OF INTERVIEW**

CASE REF NUMBER: 06022/6

PART 1

INTERVIEW OF

Number: [REDACTED] Rank/Status: [REDACTED] Surname: [REDACTED]
Forenames: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Colour of Eyes: [REDACTED]
Ship/Regt/Corps/Unit: PARA, Joint Service Defence College, Greenwich. Colour of Hair: [REDACTED]
Sex: [REDACTED]
Height: [REDACTED]

INTERVIEWED BY

Number: [REDACTED] Rank/Status: [REDACTED] Surname: [REDACTED]
Forenames: [REDACTED]
Unit & Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Rd, Aldershot, Hants.

PERSONS PRESENT

Rank/Status	Name/Initials	In What Capacity
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INTERVIEW

Place: SIB Office Aldershot
Date: 23 Dec 86 Time Started: 1640 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

HANDOVER 'NOTICE TO SUSPECT'

Record any reply:

Time: 1641 hours

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

1. *Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now?
No Time: 1641 hours

2. *Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now?
No Time: 1642 hours

3. Do you wish to have an observe present now?
No Time: 1642 hours

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect to exercise the option(s)).

*If NO/NOT NOW to either 1 and/or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?": Record any reply: Yes.

CERTIFICATION BY SUSPECT

I [REDACTED] certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form 811A entitled: '**Notice to Suspect**' and I DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: [REDACTED] Date: 23 Dec 86 Time: 1644 hours.

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

TO BE COMPLETED BY THE SERVICE POLICE


Details concerning the Legal Adviser, Observer and Appropriate Adult should be recorded as indicated below:

a. **Legal Adviser(s)**. Record time when arrangements started
hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

b. **Observer(s)** Record time when arrangements started:
hours

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

Witnessed by the Service Police: 

Signed: 

c. Appropriate Adult

Name:

Time when notified interview is to take place:

Time of arrival:

Time when suspect cautioned in the presence of the Appropriate Adult:

Signed by Appropriate Adult:

Witnessed by the Service Policeman:

Remarks:

PART 3

LEGAL ADVISER DELAYED

If the right to consult or the request for the presence of a legal adviser is delayed record the reason(s) and the identity of the authorising officer below:

PART 4

INFORMATION TO SUSPECT ON INTERVIEW PROCEDURE

* When the interview is to be tape recorded say to the suspect:

"The remainder of the interview will be tape recorded. I am now going to insert two tapes and place them in the tape recorder and commence to record".

*Where a written contemporaneous record is to be made say to the suspect:

"During this interview *I will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as requested by the Codes of Practice.

At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly."

*Delete if inapplicable

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Signed: [REDACTED]

CONTINUATION SHEET

Case Ref Number: 06022/6Record of Interview of: PARA

Time	Line	Record of Interview
When		
Appropriate		

"I want to add that although I have covered the circumstances surrounding the use of the 2 inch mortar in some detail, I have not specifically dealt with the suggestion that I "authorised" its use. It might be inferred from this that I deliberately decided that the 2 inch mortar could be fired on the exercise in the knowledge that its use was irregular. This was not the case, as I have already made clear that such a decision was never put to me. Throughout the planning and execution of the exercise the 2 inch mortar was regarded by all concerned as simply another weapons system to be included. However, was concerned that the HE bombs might produce an unacceptable number of blinds and it was to check on this that he arranged for me to be present when a number of rounds were fired during the range recce. As I have already said, this trial showed that the possible blind problem did not actually exist. It is therefore only in this context - the avoidance of blinds - that any suggestion of "authorisation" by me makes sense."

"You are now given the opportunity to read the Record of Interview. As you do so would you sign the bottom of each page, indicating that you have read it, agreed with the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer."

I, , have read over the Record of Interview consisting of 7 pages. I have indicated where I consider it to inaccurate. I have signed each page accordingly.

Signed :

1652 hrs 23 Dec 86 at Aldershot.

Witnessed by the Service Police:

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (~~consisting of~~ pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 14 day of Jan 1987 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

On Mon 5 Jan 87 at Bulford about 2057 hrs I had occasion to interview [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PARA, whom I now recognise after caution.

Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions asked and answers given. At the conclusion of the interview both [REDACTED] read over and signed the record of interview. The interview terminated at 2200 hrs.

That record of interview I now produce.

Signed [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

Service Police Record of Interview

Case Ref Number 06022/6

Part 1

Interview Of

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Date & Place of Birth: [redacted] Colour of eyes: [redacted]
Ship/Regt/Corps/Unit: PARA, HQ 1 INF BDE, TIDWORTH Colour of hair: [redacted]
Sex: [redacted]
Height: [redacted]

Interviewed By

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Unit & Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UK, Maida Rd, Aldershot.

Persons Present

Rank/Status	Name/Initials	In What Capacity
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Interview

Place: 1 Bagdad Rd, Bulford
Date: 5 Jan 87 Time started: 2057 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]

Arrest

Prior to Interview - Place: Date: Time: hours
By Number: Rank: Name:

Part 2

I am [redacted] of the Special Investigation Branch
Royal Military Police
~~*you know~~ I am making inquiries into the death of Sgt Lyden 1 PARA, which occurred on
13 Feb 86 in Norway.

I am going to ask you some (*further) questions, but before I do, I must caution you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Time: 2059 hours.

You now have the right to:

- a. *Legal advice. (If being interviewed about a serious service offence).
- b. Request the presence of an observer at the interview.
- c. *Leave the interview unless you are in arrest or I decide there are sufficient grounds to arrest you.
- d. Consult the Service Police Codes of Practice when practicable.

You may exercise any of these rights now, but if you do not, you may do so later during the course of this interview.

* Delete if inapplicable

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]

Handover 'Notice to Suspect'

Record any reply:

Time: .2100... hours

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

- 1. * Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now?: NO Time: .2100... hours.
- 2. * Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now?: NO Time: .2100... hours.
- 3. Do you wish to have an observer present now?: NO Time: .2100... hours.

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect to exercise the option(s)).

* If NO / NOT NOW to either 1 and / or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?": Record any reply:

Yes

Certification by Suspect

I certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form 811 A entitled: 'Notice to Suspect' and I * ~~DO~~ / DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: Date: 5/1/87 Time: 2100 hours.

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed:

To be Completed by the Service Police

Details concerning the Legal Adviser, Observer and Appropriate Adult should be recorded as indicated below:

a. **Legal Adviser(s)**. Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

b. **Observer(s)**. Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed





c. **Appropriate Adult**

Name
Time when notified interview is to take place:
Time of arrival:
Time when suspect cautioned in the presence of the Appropriate Adult:
Signed by Appropriate Adult:
Witnessed by the Service Policeman:
Remarks:

Part 3

Legal Adviser Delayed

If the right to consult or the request for the presence of a legal adviser is delayed record the reason(s) and the identity of the authorising officer below:

.....
.....
.....

Part 4

Information to Suspect on Interview Procedure

* When the interview is to be tape recorded say to the suspect:

~~"The remainder of the interview will be tape recorded. I am now going to insert two tapes and place them in the tape recorder and commence to record."~~

* Where a written contemporaneous record is to be made say to the suspect:

~~"During this interview * I / Rank: Name: of: will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as required by the Codes of Practice.~~

~~At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly."~~

* Delete if inapplicable

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed





Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q1 Were you previously the 2 I/C of 1 PARA?
A1 Yes.
- Q2 Between what dates did you hold that appointment?
A2 From April '84 until about the 30 Jan 86.
- Q3 Were you involved in the preparation of exercise Hardfall '86?
A3 Yes.
- Q4 What form did your participation take?
A4 I wrote the main exercise instructions, which were issued down to company level and should be included with my statement.
- Q5 Did this instruction specify the details of the company live firing exercise?
A5 As I recall it outlined various training objectives one of which was that each company would go through a live firing exercise which hopefully would be run concurrently with the Parachute programme.
- Q6 What orders did you give for the deployment and use of the 2 inch mortar?
A6 Firstly it was dependent on whether the Norwegians would let them be fired on their ranges. This agreement we did not get until arriving in theatre and prior to deployment there was always a question mark as to whether the 2 inch mortar could be fired on the Mjolfjell Ranges. The deployment and use of the mortars, once cleared for use by the Norwegians, were subject to the range orders, as was any other weapon.
- Q7 Did you issue any orders relating to the safety of the 2 inch mortar when in use?
A7 Other than the written instructions and Standing Orders I published for Mjolfjell Range, no.
- Q8 I have here a copy of those orders. Can you point out to me any written references to the safety of the 2 inch mortar? Produced a copy of Standing Orders.
A8 The reference at Ref A on Page 1 and paragraph 3 of Page 1.
- Q9 Who in a supervisory capacity within 1 PARA would have received a copy of these orders?
A9 All companies and the training team, plus a trace of the range area. Copies also went to the AMF Cell who were the controllers of the Hardfall exercise for issue to other AMF units who might use the ranges.
- Q10 During the course of the live firing company exercises conducted in Norway safety supervisors were detailed to oversee the general safety of the exercise and also allocated to some weapons groups. What steps did you take to verify the competence of the safety supervisors, their qualifications or authorisations?
A10 I was aware in outline that there was going to be three company live firing exercises as part of the overall training, but having relinquished my appointment as 2 I/C and returned to the UK on 31 Jan 86 I was not involved in any of the detailed planning allocation of safety staff or detailed briefing for this series of live firing exercises. I was aware that [REDACTED] was the project officer and support coy would be responsible for coordinating the exercise.
- Q11 As the Commanding Officer's assistant in training matters what steps did you take to ensure that the live firing exercise was written within the current safety rules?
A11 None, with the exception of the range Standing Orders as I was not involved in the detailed planning of this exercise, having left the Bn on 31 Jan 86.

Signed [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q12 Having published the Mjolfjell Range Standing Orders did you expect people planning exercises in that area or conducting live firing practices of any type to comply with those instructions?
- A12 Yes. Subject to any further restrictions that might be imposed by the Norweigians.
- Q13 And those standing orders clearly draw the attention of the user to Pamphlet 21.
- A13 Correct as does any other live firing.
- Q14 I have no further questions to put to you at this stage and propose to terminate this interview although it may be necessary to see you again at a later date. Is there anything further you wish to add to what has already been said?
- A14 No.
- Q15 Do you wish to make any form of written statement.
- A15 No.
- Q16 You are now given the opportunity to read over the Record of Interview. As you do so, would you sign the bottom of each page, indicating that you have read it, agreed with the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the Record of Interview.?
- A16 Yes.
- 2145 Interview record handed over.

I [REDACTED] have read over the Record of Interview consisting of nine pages. There are no inaccuracies. I have signed each page accordingly. I have also initialled each question and answer.

Signed [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 5/1/37 Bulford 2200 hrs.

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
 Hants.
 Date to leave a.Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 14 day of Jan 1987 Signed [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

On Tue 6 Jan 87 at Bulford about 1544 hrs I had occasion to interview [REDACTED] 1 PARA, whom I now recognise after caution.

Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions asked and answers given. At the conclusion of the interview both [REDACTED] read over and signed the record of interview. The interview terminated at 1633 hrs.

That record of interview I now produce.

Signed [REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

Service Police Record of Interview

Case Ref Number 06022/6

Part 1

Interview Of

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Date & Place of Birth: [redacted] Colour of eyes: [redacted]
Ship/Regt/Corps/Unit: PARA
1 PARA
Picton Bks
Bulford
Colour of hair: [redacted]
Sex: [redacted]
Height: [redacted]

Interviewed By

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Unit & Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UK, Maida Rd, Aldershot

Persons Present

Rank/Status	Name/Initials	In What Capacity
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Interview

Place: Picton Bks Bulford
Date: 6 Jan 87 Time started: 1544 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted] [redacted]

Arrest

Prior to Interview - Place: Date: Time: hours

By Number: Rank: Name:

Part 2

I am of the SIB RMP

~~*you know~~ I am making inquiries into ... the death of Sgt Lyden 1 PARA which occurred on ... 13 Feb 86 in Norway.

I am going to ask you some (~~*further~~) questions, but before I do, I must caution you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Time: .1544. hours.

You now have the right to:

- a. *Legal advice. (If being interviewed about a serious service offence).
- b. Request the presence of an observer at the interview.
- c. *Leave the interview unless you are in arrest or I decide there are sufficient grounds to arrest you.
- d. Consult the Service Police Codes of Practice when practicable.

You may exercise any of these rights now, but if you do not, you may do so later during the course of this interview.

** Delete if inapplicable*

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed

Handover 'Notice to Suspect'

Record any reply:

Time: 1545 hours

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

- 1. * Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now?: NO Time: 1545 hours.
- 2. * Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now?: NO Time: 1545 hours.
- 3. Do you wish to have an observer present now?: NO Time: 1545 hours.

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect to exercise the option(s)).

* If NO / NOT NOW to either 1 and / or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?": Record any reply:

..... YES

Certification by Suspect

I [redacted] certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form 811 A entitled: 'Notice to Suspect' and I * DO / DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: [redacted] Date: 6/1/87 Time: 1545 hours.

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]

To be Completed by the Service Police

Details concerning the Legal Adviser, Observer and Appropriate Adult should be recorded as indicated below:

a. **Legal Adviser(s).** Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

b. **Observer(s)** Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed





c. **Appropriate Adult**

Name

Time when notified interview is to take place:

Time of arrival:

Time when suspect cautioned in the presence of the Appropriate Adult:

Signed by Appropriate Adult:

Witnessed by the Service Policeman:

Remarks:

Part 3

Legal Adviser Delayed

If the right to consult or the request for the presence of a legal adviser is delayed record the reason(s) and the identity of the authorising officer below:

.....

.....

.....

.....

Part 4

Information to Suspect on Interview Procedure

* When the interview is to be tape recorded say to the suspect:

"The remainder of the interview will be tape recorded. I am now going to insert two tapes and place them in the tape recorder and commence to record."

* Where a written contemporaneous record is to be made say to the suspect:

"During this interview * I / Rank Name: of: will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as required by the Codes of Practice.

At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly."

* Delete if inapplicable

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q1 When did you assume the duties of 2 I/C 1 PARA?
A1 About 30 Jan 86.
- Q2 Did you take any part in the preparations for exercise Hardfall '86 involving 1 PARA?
A2 In the UK No.
- Q3 With regard to exercise Hardfall '86 three live firing company exercises were carried out over the period 11-13 Feb 86 is that correct?
A3 Yes.
- Q4 Did you take any part whilst in Norway in the planning of those exercises?
A4 No.
- Q5 Did you attend any briefings or O Groups relating to those exercises?
A5 I can't be sure.
- Q6 Were you in any way involved in the selection of supervisory staff for those live firing exercises?
A6 No.
- Q7 Did you verify any of the qualifications or authorisations for safety supervisors involved in those live firing exercises?
A7 No, the OC of support company ran a course before the exercises.
- Q8 Were you aware that 2 inch mortars were to be deployed and used on those live firing exercises?
A8 Yes.
- Q9 Did you give any orders, written or verbal, relating to the safety of the 2 inch mortar?
A9 No.
- Q10 Why not?
A10 Because I was'nt on the exercise.
- Q11 Were you satisfied that the weapons were being used correctly within the regulations governing their use?
A11 I was not involved in the detailed planning of the exercise, therefore I had not investigated that side of the exercise.
- Q12 As the Commanding Officer's assistant in training matters, what steps did you take to ensure that the exercise had been written within the current safety rules?
A12 Having only assumed my appointment as 2 I/C some 13 days or so prior to the accident involving Sgt Lyden, I was not involved in any of the detailed planning of the exercise, nor selection of safety staff, although I was present on one occasion when [REDACTED] briefed the CO in general terms on the exercise. I myself did not attend any of the actual exercises as I was fully committed with the supervision of the Parachute and dry training phases of the exercise being conducted elsewhere. Additionally I was not consulted by either [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] regarding the exercise nor were any written instructions/orders relating to it submitted for my approval or comment. Whilst I was aware that the 2 inch mortar was to be fired all matters relating to this and the live firing exercise were decided between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. As 2 inch HE mortar ammunition had already been allocated to the exercise I naturally assumed that it was clear to fire the weapon on that particular exercise.
- Q13 Do you wish to make any form of written statement regarding this matter?
A13 Not at this moment.

Signed [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

Q14 I intend to terminate this interview now and you may be seen again at a later date. In the meantime you are now given the opportunity to read over the record of interview. As you do so would you sign the bottom of each page to indicate that you have read it, agreed with the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the Record of Interview?

1626 Record of Interview handed over.

I [REDACTED] have read the Record of Interview consisting of nine pages. There are no inaccuracies. I have signed each page accordingly. I have also initialled each question and answer.

Signed [REDACTED] 1633 hrs 6th January 1987

Picton Barracks Bulford

Witnessed by the Service Police:

[REDACTED]

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the [REDACTED] day of [REDACTED] 1987 Signed:

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

On Wed 7 Jan 87 at Old Sarum about 1107 hrs I had occasion to interview [REDACTED] 1 PARA, after caution, whom I now recognise, in the presence of [REDACTED] RMP.

Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions asked and answers given. At the conclusion of the interview both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] read over and signed the record of interview. The interview terminated at 1251 hrs.

That record of interview I now produce.

Signed:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Statement by:

Surname: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Christian Names: [REDACTED]

Type of Engagement: SRC

Regt No & Rank: [REDACTED]

Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]

Full Unit Address:

HQ SIB RMP UKLF
Old Sarum, Salisbury, Wilts.

Date to leave command: N/A

Service: N/A

Who states:

This statement, consisting of 1 page signed by me, is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 7th date of January, 1987. [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] RMP, at present holding the appointment of 2IC SIB RMP UKLF.

On Wed 7 Jan 87, I was present when [REDACTED], RMP(SIB) interviewed [REDACTED] Para, in my office at Old Sarum, Salisbury, Wilts.

The interview commenced at 1107 hrs and terminated at 1251 hrs. Throughout [REDACTED] maintained a contemporaneous record of questions and answers given in accordance with the Services Police Code of Practice. I was present when [REDACTED] signed that record and appended the relevant certificate. I have also signed the record of interview.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP

Service Police Record of Interview

Case Ref Number 06022/6

Part 1

Interview Of

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Date & Place of Birth: [redacted] Colour of eyes: [redacted]
Ship/Regt/Corps/Unit: PARA Colour of hair: [redacted]
1 PARA Sex: [redacted]
PICTON BKS Height: [redacted]
BULFORD

Interviewed By

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Unit & Address: ALDERSHOT DET SIB RMP UK, MAIDA RD ALDERSHOT

Persons Present

Rank/Status	Name/Initials	In What Capacity
[redacted]	[redacted]	SIB Officer

Interview

Place: HQ SIB RMP UK Old Sarum
Date: 7 Jan 67 Time started: 1107 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

Arrest

Prior to Interview - Place: Date: Time: hours
By Number: Rank: Name:

Part 2

I am [redacted] and this is [redacted] of the SIB RMP
we are
*you know / ~~am~~ making inquiries into death of Sgt Lyden in Norway
on 13 Feb 86
.....
.....

I am going to ask you some (*further) questions, but before I do, I must caution you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Time: ..11.08 hours.

You now have the right to:

- a. *Legal advice. (If being interviewed about a serious service offence).
- b. Request the presence of an observer at the interview.
- c. *Leave the interview unless you are in arrest or I decide there are sufficient grounds to arrest you.
- d. Consult the Service Police Codes of Practice when practicable.

You may exercise any of these rights now, but if you do not, you may do so later during the course of this interview.

** Delete if inapplicable*

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

Handover 'Notice to Suspect'

Record any reply: Yes.....
.....

Time: 1109 hours

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

1. * Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now?: NO Time: 1109 hours.

2. * Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now?: NO Time: 1109 hours.

3. Do you wish to have an observer present now?: NO Time: 1109 hours.

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect to exercise the option(s)).

* If NO / NOT NOW to either 1 and / or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?": Record any reply:

Yes
.....
.....
.....
.....

Certification by Suspect

I [redacted]..... certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form 811 A entitled: '**Notice to Suspect**' and I * DO / DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: [redacted] Date: 7 JAN 87 Time: 1110 hours.

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]

To be Completed by the Service Police

Details concerning the Legal Adviser, Observer and Appropriate Adult should be recorded as indicated below:

a. **Legal Adviser(s).** Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

b. **Observer(s)** Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed







c. Appropriate Adult

Name

Time when notified interview is to take place:

Time of arrival:

Time when suspect cautioned in the presence of the Appropriate Adult:

Signed by Appropriate Adult:

Witnessed by the Service Policeman:

Remarks:

.....

Part 3

Legal Adviser Delayed

If the right to consult or the request for the presence of a legal adviser is delayed record the reason(s) and the identity of the authorising officer below:

.....
.....
.....
.....

Part 4

Information to Suspect on Interview Procedure

* When the interview is to be tape recorded say to the suspect:

"The remainder of the interview will be tape recorded. I am now going to insert two tapes and place them in the tape recorder and commence to record."

* Where a written contemporaneous record is to be made say to the suspect:

"During this interview * I / Rank: Name: of: will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as required by the Codes of Practice.

At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly."

** Delete if inapplicable*

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed 





Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q1 What experience do you have as a supervisor of Infantry Weapon Training?
A1 Well I would say in broad terms commensurate with being a platoon commander attending a platoon commanders battle course and commensurate with my subsequent appointments.
- Q2 What experience do you have of conducting live firing practices?
A2 Considerable in that I have done it as a platoon commander specialist platoon commander (RSO) on secondment and as a company commander when exercising my platoons.
- Q3 You are then conversant with the general safety criteria applied to the live firing of weapons.
A3 Yes.
- Q4 What are the inherent dangers of overhead GPMG fire in a training environment?
A4 The dangers are two fold firstly that the height of the rounds over the troops must not exceed the laid down minimum and secondly that the gun must be fired from a prepared position so as to minimise the risk of it slipping, but the term overhead fire normally means fire which is used to bring exercising troops under fire when they are for example on an advance.
- Q5 What are the inherent dangers in the use of the 2 inch mortar HE?
A5 The danger with the 2 inch mortar HE and any weapon firing any round is that the round will go somewhere other than where you intend it to, but that is not a danger it is a risk and it is a risk that is minimised by the conduct and planning of the live firing exercise.
- Q6 What particular things would effect the 2 inch mortar HE in such a manner?
A6 The training and ability of the firer, secondly the safety supervisor and the control that he exercises and thirdly the position or platform from which the weapon is fired.
- Q7 As the 2 inch mortar is a hand held weapon without any form of support or stabilisation other than the firer is this an accurate weapon?
A7 Thats not actually true the weapon has a base plate its not as if its shoulder fired. It is not designed to be a weapon of point accuracy its an area weapon and it is sufficiently accurate for that purpose.
- Q8 In view of that is the weapon safe enough or accurate enough to be used when troops are deployed on the ground either forward of or to the sides of that weapons position?
A8 Well the answer is yes to the sides certainly, to the front yes providing they are not directly in front thats a fundamentally rule for all mortars you do not fire overhead. But it comes back to the firer the safety supervisor, their ability and the platform from which the weapon is being fired.
- Maj Pike Q9 There is no fixed trajectory or directional aid other than the skill of the firer.
A9 Yes.
- Q10 What steps would you take to ensure the safety of troops on the ground during fire from a 2 inch mortar using HE in a training environment?
A10 I would take the steps that we did take on that exercise. That is, one, nominate specific firers of sufficient training and experience, in this case the platoon Sgts. Two ensure that there was no overhead fire. Three ensure that the platform on which the base plate rested was adequate and in this case I asked the conducting officer to provide sandbags for that purpose. What I have just said is what I consider to be the check points for me as the sub unit commander being exercised they do not include the wider responsibilities of the Conducting Officer which I was not.

Signed [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police:
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q11 At your own Company O group did you lay down any arcs of fire for the 2 inch mortar which ensured that your troops were well to the side of the possible line of fire of the 2 inch?
- A11 Yes, but they related not to points on the ground but to the actual position of the manouvering troops. The two weapons that were being fired by my platoon Sgts, did have specific targets to engage and their orders were to cease fire on those targets before it became unsafe.
- Q12 What situation dictated that it was unsafe to fire on a target?
- A12 The judgement of the Sgt firing the weapon and the safety supervisor.
- Q13 And this is in relation to the position of troops approaching the target.
- A13 Correct or another target if they were in a position to make firing unsafe.
- Q14 Did you lay down any minimum distances, or angles?
- A14 No because it is for the firer and the safety supervisor to make that decision when to stop firing because they know what the minimum distances and angles are. You cannot in giving tactical orders take every decision away from the people under your command they are qualified to make those decisions themselves and if you do not allow them to do so then the exercise becomes worthless. But, that is on the assumption that the field firing exercise as planned by the Conducting Officer is not in itself inherently unsafe.
- Q15 Prior to this live firing exercise did you consult Mjolfjell Range Standing Orders or any of the relevent Infantry Training Manuals?
- A15 I was conversant with Mjolfjell Range Standing Orders as I had previously exercised there as the conducting officer. I was conversant with the Battalion Instructions that the 2 inch mortar was to be fired into the 81 mm mortar impact area, I had previously consulted pamphlet 21 prior to individual, section and platoon live firing for which I was conducting officer. I have not looked at the section on the 2 inch mortar because I hadn't used it and I did not consult pamphlet 21 prior to exercise 'Coldfire' because I was not the conducting officer. When we were shown the ground by the conducting officer he explained how the rules of pamphlet 21 translated into constraints on the ground.
- Q16 Was any particular reference made to the use of the 2 inch mortar HE at that time?
- A16 Yes it was, the positions from which the weapons could be fired and the targets they could engage were pointed out. The point or points at which fire would have to stop due to the position of manouvering troops were discussed the firers were discussed and it was at that point that I decided that my platoon Sgts would fire those weapons. The platforms for the base plates were discussed and I requested that sandbags be provided for that purpose. And [REDACTED] made the point that all bombs should be prepared for firing before firing commenced so that the weapon was not brought out of the aim during the engagement. The part that the mortar played in my own tactical plan was confirmed as being within the constraints of the exercise plan.
- Q17 How long had your unit been equipped with 2 inch mortars?
- A17 The 2 inch mortar was issued for exercise Hardfall 86 but the light mortar has been with us since World War II.
- Q18 How much mortar training had been done in Norway using the 2 inch prior to the time firing exercise?
- A18 There was dry training but no live firing. We were forbidden to fire smoke and I believe that there wasn't any 2 inch HE ammunition allocated to the company for its own use. [REDACTED] and his team did fire the 2 inch mortar live prior to the exercise and the lessons that he learned were passed on and implemented by us. A Coy did not fire that weapon until those lessons had been learnt and passed on.

Signed [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q19 When was the last time that members of A Coy carried out a live firing practice using the 2 inch mortar prior to that exercise?
- A19 Certainly we have not during my tour in command.
- Q20 How long has that been?
- A20 Then it was thirteen months.
- Q21 Who conducted the instruction during your companys dry training on the 2 inch mortar?
- A21 This is misleading, the company did not carry out dry training on the 2 inch mortar because the company was not going to fire it. It is not like the LMG which is a weapon that is only used in Norway which any man could be expected to use and on which every man therefore did dry training. The two people who were going to fire the two inch mortar were the platoon Sgts they were given specific instructions in the use of the weapon in those circumstances (i.e. the Arctic) by [REDACTED] and myself. They were responsible for implementing those instructions for revising themselves in the use of the weapon and for the instruction of their No 2s.
- Q22 Was any supervised dry training carried out involving those people?
- A22 Well the No 2s were supervised by the platoon Sgts the platoon Sgts were given specific instructions as I have said. They were responsible for carrying out those instructions and for revising themselves as necessary.
- Q23 Were they furnished with the 2 inch mortar infantry training pamphlet?
- A23 They weren't furnished with it whether they had it or not I don't know. They shouldn't have needed a pamphlet to revise themselves in the use of the 2 inch mortar and if they needed one it could have been provided.
- Q24 As the Officer Commanding A Coy during this live firing exercise and the tactical commander what duty or responsibility did you have to ensure that the exercise was conducted in such a manner as to afford the maximum safety to the soldiers under your command who were participating in the exercise?
- A24 I've answered that question before. I'm not going to answer that question as it is phrased in a misleading and subjective way but I will make a statement. I was not the conducting officer the planning and conduct of that exercise was his responsibility. He had to ensure that the safety of the soldiers in all three companies was not put at risk my responsibility as the sub unit commander being exercised was two fold, firstly to ensure that my tactical plan complied with the constraints of the exercise plan which it did and secondly to ensure that my soldiers and officers were sufficiently well trained to meet the demands of that exercise, which they were.
- Q25 Had any of the live firing going on during the exercise caused you concern for the safety of your soldiers would you have drawn such matters to the attention of [REDACTED] or your CO?
- A25 Yes had that been the quickest way to put it right but the quickest way to halt or adjust the fire or manouver of one of my sub units or one of the fire units under my command would probably have been to speak to them direct.

I consider that there is sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action being taken against you in connection with Sgt Lyden's death and contravention of Standing Orders under the service Disciplinary Acts and for the prosecution to succeed. A report will be submitted without delay to your Commanding Officer and other relevant service authorities. You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Yes.

Signed [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

You are now given the opportunity to read over the Record of Interview. As you do so, would you sign the bottom of each page indicating that you have read it, agreed the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the record of interview?

Yes.

1240 hrs record handed over.

Do you wish to make any form of written statement.

No.

I [REDACTED] have read over the Record of Interview consisting of 15 pages. I have indicated where I consider it to be inaccurate and have signed each page accordingly.

Signed [REDACTED] 1251 7 Jan 87 Old Sarum

Witnessed by the Service Police: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 14 day of Jan 1987 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

On Tue 6 Jan 87 at Bulford about 1750 hrs I had occasion to interview [REDACTED] 1 PARA, whom I now recognise after caution.

Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions asked and answers given. [REDACTED] lected to make a voluntary statement after caution. At the conclusion of the interview [REDACTED] read over and signed the record of interview. The interview terminated at 1910 hrs.

That statement and record of interview I now produce.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

Service Police Record of Interview

Case Ref Number 06022/6

Part 1

Interview Of

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Date & Place of Birth: [redacted] Colour of eyes: [redacted]
Ship/Regt/Corps/Unit: 1 PARA Colour of hair: [redacted]
Sex: [redacted]
Height: [redacted]

Interviewed By

Number: [redacted] Rank/Status: [redacted] Surname: [redacted]
Forenames: [redacted]
Unit & Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UK, Maida Rd, Aldershot

Persons Present

Rank/Status	Name/Initials	In What Capacity
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Interview

Place: RMP Office, Bulford
Date: 6 Jan 87 Time started: 1750 hours

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [redacted]

[redacted]

Arrest

Prior to Interview - Place: Date: Time: hours
By Number: Rank: Name:

Part 2

I am of the Special Investigation Branch
Royal Military Police
~~*you know~~ / I am making inquiries into the death of Sgt. Lyden of your unit in Norway on ...
... 13 Feb. 86,

I am going to ask you some (*further) questions, but before I do, I must caution you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Time: 1753... hours.

You now have the right to:

- a. *Legal advice. (If being interviewed about a serious service offence).
- b. Request the presence of an observer at the interview.
- c. *Leave the interview unless you are in arrest or I decide there are sufficient grounds to arrest you.
- d. Consult the Service Police Codes of Practice when practicable.

You may exercise any of these rights now, but if you do not, you may do so later during the course of this interview.

** Delete if inapplicable*

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed

Handover 'Notice to Suspect'

Record any reply:

Time: ..1754.. hours

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

- 1. * Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now?: NO Time: ..1754.... hours.
- 2. * Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now?: NO Time: ..1754.... hours.
- 3. Do you wish to have an observer present now?: NO Time: ..1754.... hours.

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect to exercise the option(s)).

* If NO / NOT NOW to either 1 and / or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?": Record any reply:

.....YES.....
.....
.....
.....

Certification by Suspect

I certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form 811 A entitled: 'Notice to Suspect' and I * DO / DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: Date: ..6 Jan 87..... Time: ..1755.... hours.

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed
.....

To be Completed by the Service Police

Details concerning the Legal Adviser, Observer and Appropriate Adult should be recorded as indicated below:

a. **Legal Adviser(s).** Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

b. **Observer(s)** Record time when arrangements started: hours.

	First Choice	Alternative (1)	Alternative (2)
Name:			
Address:			
Telephone:			
Time Contacted:			
Result:			
Time of Arrival:			
Remarks:			

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed 



c. **Appropriate Adult**

Name

Time when notified interview is to take place:

Time of arrival:

Time when suspect cautioned in the presence of the Appropriate Adult:

Signed by Appropriate Adult:

Witnessed by the Service Policeman:

Remarks:

.....

Part 3

Legal Adviser Delayed

If the right to consult or the request for the presence of a legal adviser is delayed record the reason(s) and the identity of the authorising officer below:

.....
.....
.....
.....

Part 4

Information to Suspect on Interview Procedure

* When the interview is to be tape recorded say to the suspect:

"The remainder of the interview will be tape recorded. I am now going to insert two tapes and place them in the tape recorder and commence to record."

* Where a written contemporaneous record is to be made say to the suspect:

"During this interview * I / Rank: Name: Cf: will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as required by the Codes of Practice.

At the end of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly."

* Delete if inapplicable

Witnessed by the Service Police:

Signed [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Record of Interview of [REDACTED]

- Q1 With regard to the exercise during which Sgt Lyden died. You have previously stated that you did not consult the training pamphlet or pamphlet 21 with regard to the use of the 2 inch mortar is that correct?
- A1 Yes.
- Q2 If you had consulted either publication what course of action would you have taken with regard to the use of the 2 inch mortar?
- A2 Clearly I would have advised the CO that the weapon could not be used. The tragedy here is that as I stated previously we had test fired the 2 inch mortar to ensure that the bombs impacted on snow and we were prepared not to use the 2 inch mortar if this proved unreliable as it was we were not happy with the smoke bombs which tended to be effected by the snow and we stated that these would not be used. Although I have just stated that I did not consult pamphlet 21 over the use of the 2 inch mortar I would emphasise that I together with my support weapons platoon commanders used pamphlet 21 extensively in order to incorporate both Milan and Scimitar fire into the exercise. As far as the 2 inch mortar was concerned this was as I stated a company weapon. In fact having observed 2 inch mortar fire during platoon training on the ranges prior to the live firing company attacks, I raised the matter in conference when it was laid down that only senior NCOs would be eligible to fire the weapon and as far as the exercise was concerned the 2 inch mortar could only be fired from 3 locations, those were from Satebu Hut ledge or the high ground left of gulley to support phase 1 and from the centre of objective 1 to support phase 3. This was complied with by all three companies the tragedy being that Sgt Lyden was killed carrying out those instructions.
- Q3 Do you wish to make any form of written statement?
- A3 Yes.
- Q4 Will you write it yourself or do you want someone to write it for you?
- A4 I'll write it myself.

1815 hrs statement commenced 1855 hrs statement concluded.

1900 I consider that there is sufficient evidence to justify disciplinary action being taken against you in connection with Sgt Lyden's death and your failure to comply with Standing Orders and Infantry Training Pamphlets under the Service Disciplinary Acts and a report will be submitted without delay to your commanding officer and other relevant service authorities. You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be given in evidence

Yes

You are now given the opportunity to read over the Record of Interview. As you do so would you sign the bottom of each page indicating that you have read it, agreed with the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the record of interview?

Yes.

1903 record of interview handed over.

I [REDACTED] have read over the record of interview consisting of seven pages. There are no inaccuracies. I have signed each page accordingly. I have also initialled each question and answer.

1910 hrs 6 Jan
Bulford
[REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Police:

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Statement by:

Surname: [REDACTED] Case No: 06022/6
Christian Names: [REDACTED] Type of Engagement: [REDACTED]
Regt No & Rank: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.

Date to leave command: 6 Jan Service: N/A

I make this statement of my own free will. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and whatever I say may be given in evidence.

Signed [REDACTED]

Owing to the fact that I leave 1 PARA wef 6 Jan for Norway, following which I am posted to the MOD wef 9 Feb I wish to emphasise several points in the event that a Board of Enquiry may be held in my absence. Firstly I wish to stress the amount of planning and preparation which went into the exercise. Everyone from CO down to Pl Comd level, and in some cases section comds were talked through the exercise on the ground. Individual coys were subsequently able to train over that same ground prior to the exercise and did so.

Secondly, although it appears that no formal exercise instruction was written several written instructions covering planning for the exercise were produced, including some large painted briefing charts which were used during the CO and Coy Comd's orders. The amount of planning, reconnaissance and detailed examination of the ground surpassed any written directive.

Thirdly, I emphasise the amount of preparation that the safety staff underwent, with a full briefing from myself at Mjolfjell camp (canteen) following which they were taken out to the exercise area. The absence of [REDACTED] due to his own Board of Enquiry responsibilities did not constitute a problem, and the fact that he reported for safety duty during A Coys attack not having been at the main briefing was not critical. He was briefed on the day by other staff and was fully capable of carrying out his safety duties. It should also be recognised that [REDACTED], although not at the original briefing, replaced [REDACTED] during C and B Coy attacks and had the benefit, and prebriefing, of carrying out the exercise twice prior to A Coy. The fact that both these officers became involved with the soldiers who fell through the ice was again not a real problem, as other safety staff were on call to be moved to any position on the exercise area, and did so. I also wish to emphasise that although a couple (I am not

Signed [REDACTED]

Signature witnessed by [REDACTED]

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Case No 06022/6

Continuation of statement of [REDACTED]

certain how many) safety staff radios had failed by the time A Coy went through, there is no stated requirement that each man requires a radio. We had in fact gone to great lengths to constitute a safety net. I was able to control the safety staff on one net, and the Platoons on another. We also had a spare control net and had constituted a rebro link high on the mountain to ensure comms. There were always radios within the perimeter of any platoon down to section level on one or other of the nets.


Finally I should state that, although it may sound somewhat lame, the scale of this extensive exercise in which 81mm mortar, scimitar practice rds, MILAN, 84mm Carl Gustev PRAC and it should be noted at one stage live air to ground F5 support (which did not materialize) tended to obscure the use of the 2" mortar and its relative regulations concerning its use. The tragedy being that such regulations have been proven.

Signed [REDACTED]

The above statement was self written in my presence and signatures witnessed by me at 1855 hrs on Tue 6 Jan 87 at Bulford.

Signed [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP SIB



CERTIFIED TRUE COPY





Headquarters
Special Investigation Branch RMP UKLF
Old Sarum Salisbury Wilts SP4 6BN

Telephone: Army Network Old Sarum Mill
GPO 336222 Ext: [REDACTED]
477466
Telex: (Answer back CRIOUK) Fax: Ext: [REDACTED]



See Distribution

Your Reference:

Our Reference: 06022/6

Date: 21 October 1986

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

References:

- A. AGAI Vol 2 Chap 62
 - B. Manual of Army Security Vol III, Chap 5, Sect II
 - C. Initial Case Report 06022/6 dated 21 Feb 86
 - D. Interim Report 06022/6 dated 27 Feb 86
1. The enclosed report is forwarded for information and action as necessary.
 2. Use of Military Police reports and statements - Your attention is drawn to Reference A paras 62.071 - 62.076 inclusive.
 3. Availability of RMP witnesses - Your attention is drawn to Reference A paras 62.077 - 62.078 inclusive.
 4. Any enquiries concerning content of the report should be referred to CO HQ SIB RMP UKLF.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Commanding Officer

Distribution:

Action:

CO1 PAIRA (Personal for)*

*including Photographic Supplements

Information:

- MOD PS2(A)
- HQ UKLF G1 (Personal for)*
- HQ SWDIST G1 (Personal for)*
- Comd ALG HQ UKLF (Personal for)*
- Old Sarum Det ALG (2) *
- DLSA
- APM West
- OC Southern Region SIB RMP UKLF
- OC Western Region SIB RMP UKLF
- CCRIO
- CRIO
- File

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Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF

Aldershot Military - 3396

06022/6

Oct 86

CO SIB RMP UKLF

1. ALLEGED MANSLAUGHTER
2. ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF DUTY
3. SUDDEN DEATH
(FINAL REPORT)

Person Deceased: 24351430 Sgt LYDEN Daniel
Born: 8 Oct 57

A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.

Persons Reported: [REDACTED] PARA

For 1 & 2 Born: [REDACTED] at Ramsgate

Ht: [REDACTED]

Colour Eyes: [REDACTED] Colour Hair: [REDACTED]

For 1 & 2 [REDACTED] PARA

Born: [REDACTED]

Ht: [REDACTED]

Colour Eyes: [REDACTED] Colour Hair: [REDACTED]

Both of 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.

1. On Thu 13 Feb 86 instructions were received from HQ SIB RMP UKLF, that enquiries be made into a range accident which occurred about 1400 hrs that day, at Mjolfjell Valley, Norway, when an explosion occurred, fatally wounding 24351430 Sgt Lyden D (Born 8 Oct 57) and injuring [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] all of 2 Pl A Coy 1 PARA, at that time deployed on Ex 'HARDFALL SOUTH' in Norway.

2. Enquiries were commenced and the facts of the case are as follows. Sgt Lyden met his death while taking part in a Coy live firing exercise, conducted in the Mjolfjell Training Area, Norway, map sheet M816. A Coy, 1 PARA under command of [REDACTED] PARA, were carrying out live firing Coy attacks planned by [REDACTED] PARA, OC Sp Coy, 1 PARA, who also acted as the range safety officer but no written orders were prepared. It would appear that both B and C Coys 1 PARA had conducted this same exercise on Tue 11 Feb 86 and Wed 12 Feb 86. A copy of map sheet Mjolfjell M816 showing the relative positions of the objectives and mortar positions is attached at Annex A to this report and for ease of comprehension it is suggested that it be read in conjunction with the following narrative. Elements of Sp Coy 1 PARA including a 2 inch mortar were deployed on the ridge around the Satebu Hut, grid 826373 and along a ridge of high ground running North East of that position. The Sp Coy Mortar Pl OP was also located at this position, whilst the mortar line comprising 4 barrels, was sited at grid 822349. A Coy arrived at their DZ by helicopter and moved forward to their form up point. Elements of A Coy support group including SF GPMG, 84 mm Anti Tank and a 2 inch mortar moved to the area of the Satebu Hut in order to assist with suppressive fire being laid down by Sp Coy.

-1-

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3. The exercise was planned in such a way that three objectives, comprising of prepared, unmanned, bunkers were located to the East of the Satebu Hut in the approximate areas of grid 829374, the first objective, grid 832377 the second objective and grid 833372 the 'in depth' position. For 81 mm mortar purposes these objectives were registered and designated as targets X11, X12 and X13 respectively. During the opening stages of the exercise, X11 and X12 were to be engaged by 2 mortars each whilst fire on X13 would be provided by all four tubes. During A Coy's attack a fire mission order requiring 5 mortar rounds per tube to be fired on targets X11 and X12 was given and required both targets to be engaged simultaneously. Following this, a barbed wire entanglement which had been placed in front of the Satebu Hut, between it and the objectives was breached by a Bangalore torpedo, immediately afterwards A Coy began moving from their form up point and the mortar fire missions order was repeated. It was during this phase of the exercise whilst breaching the barbed wire that a 2 inch mortar, sited to the right of the Satebu Hut and operated by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] PD both of Sp Coy 1 PARA was in action and laid down a barrage of 24 rounds of HE for battlefield simulation. This weapon did not fire again after the breaching of the barbed wire entanglement. It is worthy of note at this time to mention that at the time of the 81mm bombardment on the target X11 troops were deployed at the Satebu Hut, the distance between this position and the target being established later by laser range finder as being 160 metres. Additionally that whilst [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were firing their 2 inch mortar troops were deployed at very short distances on either side of them and were moving in the area in front of the weapon within its arc of fire.

4. As the attack moved forward, the bunker positions were engaged by 84mm anti tank guns firing Tracer Projectile Target Practice (TPTP), and a 2 inch mortar operated by [REDACTED] and his number 2 [REDACTED] both of A Coy. All of these weapons were located at the Satebu Hut and [REDACTED] DA HQ Coy, provided safety supervision for one 84 mm and the 2 inch mortar used by [REDACTED] both of which were sited to the right of [REDACTED] position. The 84mm anti tank gun engaged its targets following which the team left the weapon pit to rejoin their platoon. [REDACTED] mortar began firing as the advance began. Once again the line of the advance would have taken the advancing troops into the weapon's danger area.

5. It was during this advance while negotiating a frozen waterfall, that several members of the leading sections fell into a frozen pond breaking the ice and became immersed. Additionally one member of the unit received a bayonet wound to the leg. In view of this situation [REDACTED] RTR att Sp Coy, 1 PARA, who was a safety supervisor accompanying 2 Pl A Coy stopped at the frozen pond to render what assistance he could. He claims that he had seen a safety supervisor moving on from that position with 2 Pl, but that some five minutes later he was approached by [REDACTED] PARA, the other safety supervisor allocated to 2 Pl, who took charge of the situation and instructed him to move forward and rejoin the pl.

Para 5 Continued

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Para 5 /Continued

██████████ account of this incident is at variance with ██████████ in that he claims to have remained at the waterfall and not to have accompanied the leading pl. It should be noted that both ██████████ and ██████████ agree that there was no detailed briefing of their responsibilities, neither were they allocated to any specific weapons group or support weapon. However, what is clear is that no safety supervisor was controlling Sgt Lyden's fire. Although provision had been made to stop the exercise in the event of a serious incident or accident neither officer was equipped with a radio or red mini flares with which to do so. It should be noted that unlike B and C Coys who advanced on their objectives one at a time, as each was seized, A Coy's assault platoons moved together giving more speed and momentum to their attack.

6. 2 Pl, the leading platoon, who were to attack the first objective moved forward and using a hand grenade and rifle fire ██████████ and ██████████ took their objective. They were then joined by the remainder of their fire support team, including ██████████ who deployed to the right. The other section under the command of ██████████, assaulted the second bunker of the first objective located some 40 - 50 metres to the left of this section. Once the position had been secured it was intended that the 2 Pl HQ would also locate itself at the bunker held by ██████████ and to this end Sgt Lyden and ██████████ who was to act as No 1 on the weapon took up positions to the rear right of the bunker where they established their 2 inch mortar and began firing at the 'in depth' position. ██████████ has described his arrival at the position and the siting of the mortar, and states that the ammunition, a total of some 28 bombs which he carried, had been prepared prior to the commencement of the exercise, at which time the bombs were removed from their primary packaging although the safety pins and tape were left in position for transit. According to ██████████ the weapon base plate was placed directly onto hard packed snow and the position was not prepared in any manner whatsoever. ██████████ has described where Sgt Lyden and he were positioned in relation to the weapon and the manner in which Sgt Lyden loaded the weapon with 2 rounds which he as No 1, fired. He claims that Sgt Lyden was also supporting the weapon, aiming it and having observed the fall of shot making any necessary adjustments. ██████████ recalls actually firing two rounds without any base plate sinkage or slippage and remembers a third being loaded following which there was an explosion and he was injured. This soldier did not see the strike of the first two rounds and has no recollection of firing this third round. Both ██████████ and ██████████ have confirmed that 2 rounds had been fired by the weapon prior to an explosion occurring as a result of which they received their injuries. According to ██████████ he described seeing Sgt Lyden and ██████████ arrive at the location and set up their 2 inch mortar. He describes both soldiers as kneeling on one knee and from the manner in which Sgt Lyden was holding the weapon he assumed that Sgt Lyden was firing whilst ██████████ loaded. He heard two rounds fired and a few seconds later a loud explosion, but saw nothing of the flash smoke or debris. ██████████ claims that at some stage during either the advance to the objective or whilst there he was aware of detonations occurring some 100 metres or so to his front.

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7. Numerous persons taking part in the exercise were in the vicinity of the first objective at the time of the explosion, or moving towards it, namely [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PARA, 2 Pl Comdr, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] both of A Coy 1 PARA. All of these witnesses have related hearing an explosion and seeing a ball of black smoke at Sgt Lyden's position. Although estimates of the dimensions of this ball of black smoke or its height vary, all of these accounts describe the smoke ball as being above ground level. None of these witnesses saw any kind of flash or fire ball associated with the explosion. As [REDACTED] reached the position he saw the 2 inch mortar lying between the prostrate bodies of Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] [REDACTED] picked up the mortar to check it and established that it was clear of ammunition. Located at the Satebu Hut was [REDACTED] GH, Sp Coy a Mortar Pl Radio Operator. Also present at the Satebu Hut as observers were Gen Sir G Howlett CinC AFNORTH and [REDACTED] RA G3 Trg HQ UKLF. All three also describe seeing an explosion at the first objective and describe a black ball of smoke above the ground with no associated flash. [REDACTED] also stated that his initial impression was that the explosion had occurred in front of the position as viewed from his vantage point and he commented on the absence of ground debris.

8. Medical assistance was summoned and [REDACTED] RAMC, the RMO 1 PARA attended the scene. On initial examination of Sgt Lyden he noted a small entry wound to the chest in the area of the heart, but he was unable to detect a pulse and the SNCO's heart had stopped beating. After initial attempts at resuscitation Sgt Lyden was conveyed by helicopter to the Regimental Aid Post where after further attempts at resuscitation [REDACTED] certified that Sgt Lyden was dead. [REDACTED] was also taken to the RAP but after initial treatment was conveyed with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to Voss Hospital where they underwent surgery for the removal of shrapnel from various wounds. Sgt Lyden's body was conveyed by [REDACTED] GV 1 PARA to the [REDACTED] by helicopter where it was received by [REDACTED] RAMC, 16 Fd Amb AMF(L), Wing Bks, Bulford from whence it was taken on by the same helicopter in the care of [REDACTED] JR RAF, 33 Sqn, RAF Odiham to Voss Hospital, handed over to a civilian ambulance crew whose details are not known and taken to Gade Institute Bergen. On 14 Feb 86 after being identified by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] PARA, 1 PARA, a post mortem examination was carried out by [REDACTED]. This examination established the presence of several sharpnel wounds and a 'crushed' right thigh bone. Whilst [REDACTED] post mortem report has been translated to read 'crushed' this is not actually the case and the bone was chipped by shrapnel fragments. Of these injuries one piece of sharpnel had entered the body in the area of the left nipple, passed through the left lung and entered the heart. This injury is given as the cause of death and that fragment together with two others were recovered from Sgt Lyden's body.

9. [REDACTED] AT RAOC, AMF(L) Ord Coy who was in the exercise area attended the scene. During his examination of the area he was able to recover two live 2 inch HE mortar rounds with their safety caps and pins in place, three 2 inch mortar safety caps and two safety pins. Visual inspection of the area failed to show any signs of a ground signature and examination of the ammunition boxes from which the bunker has been constructed also failed to produce any shrapnel or signs of shrapnel damage. [REDACTED] did note that a small tree located to the right side of the bunker had been struck by an explosive device and showed signs of blast and burn damage. [REDACTED] has related that due to the number of people moving about over the scene during the initial attempts to assist the injured soldiers together with the arrival of several helicopters, the scene was somewhat disturbed prior to his arrival. All items of equipment were removed from the scene for a more detailed examination during which [REDACTED] was assisted by [REDACTED] RAOC of his unit. [REDACTED] had made a video recording of these items, the damage to them and the scene and has related how he recovered one piece of shrapnel from a waterbottle in one set of webbing. Another piece of shrapnel was handed to [REDACTED] by an unknown person having been allegedly removed from [REDACTED]. The 2 inch mortar was recovered and examined by [REDACTED] REME, an armourer serving with AMF(L) Wksp REME. This examination was not carried out with all gauges or barrel history sheet (AF G 8025) but nevertheless established that the weapon was mechanically serviceable and bore no sign of an internal premature detonation.

10. As a result of the foregoing, vital but protracted lines of enquiry involving shrapnel producing weapons have been taken in an attempt to establish which weapon caused the explosion resulting in Sgt Lyden's death including the submission of debris to DLSA and RARDE for detailed analysis. These will be discussed in the following paragraphs. Additionally all soldiers taking part in the exercise have been interviewed but statements have only been recorded from those persons with information pertinent to this enquiry. It is confirmed that no other troops were exercising in the area at the relevant time.

81 MM MORTARS

11. The Mortar Pl Sp Coy 1 PARA, was under the command of [REDACTED] Canadian Armed Forces, an exchange officer who acted as the overall range mortar safety officer and [REDACTED] PARA who acted as the safety supervisor for the Observation Post (OP) Mortar Fire Controller (MFC). The mortar base plate positions were prepared using 'Raschen Bags' on Mon 10 Feb 86, the bags and base plates being left in situ throughout the period of the exercise. Daily sight testing was carried out on the mortars and the weapons fired in order to observe and adjust their belts of fire as required. As the No 1 and No 2 mortars were to fire on the first objective X11, No 3 and No 4 mortars were to fire on the second objective X12 and all four mortars were to fire on the in depth position, only the No 2 and No 4 mortars were used for this adjustment, the weapons having been paralleled in accordance with normal practice.

Para 11 /Continued

Para 11 /Continued

██████████ PARA, was detailed to act as the A Coy MFC and as such relayed instructions for mortar fire from ██████████ to the OP MFC, ██████████ PARA, who after verifying them with ██████████ passed the instructions to the mortar line. Fire mission orders were issued calling for mortars No 1 and 2 to fire five rounds each on to target X11 and No 3 and 4 to fire five rounds each on to target X12 simultaneously. This fire mission order was repeated to coincide with the breaching of the barbed wire and fire was then switched to the 'in depth position' X13 on to which each mortar fired 3 rounds, a total salvo of 12 rounds. ██████████ counted down all 20 rounds onto the targets from the first salvo and both he and ██████████ observed the strikes of the 20 rounds from the second salvo. There were no blinds. With regard to the third salvo fired onto the target X13 both NCOs observed all 12 rounds impact into the target area. According to ██████████ as the last round of this salvo struck he became aware that there had been an explosion at the first objective. ██████████ attention was drawn to this incident by ██████████, the OP MFC radio operator as the last 81 mm round struck. ██████████, ██████████ and ██████████ are qualified in the use of mortars having attended courses at the School of Inf Weapons Wing Netheravon. ██████████ has been trained at Bn level. Following the report of the accident at the first objective, the mortar teams were ordered to 'stand clear' and the weapons and sights checked by ██████████ who was able to verify that all four weapons were correctly adjusted to fire onto the 'in depth position' X13.

L2 HAND GRENADES.

12. No 2 P1 were issued with two L2 hand grenades for use during the exercise. One was carried by ██████████ and used on his bunker position, the other by ██████████ which was used on his bunker position. Both grenades exploded prior to the explosion which killed Sgt Lyden.

84 mm ANTI TANK.

13. The 84 mm Anti Tank Guns deployed during the exercise fired Tracer Projectile Training Practice (TPTP) which is inert. Additionally these weapons only fired on to the objective at the initial stages of the advance and then moved forward to rejoin the sections and platoons. They were not operating at the time of the incident.

OTHER EXPLOSIVE NATURES.

14. Whilst there were no other explosives devices used at the first objective, Gen Howlett, ██████████ and ██████████ all made reference to explosions occurring forward of the first objective. Gen Howlett describes two or three explosions some 150 metres forward which appeared to him to originate from a single weapon as opposed to a battery and ██████████ whilst aware of explosions occurring some 50-60 metres forward, did not associate them with the 81 mm bombardment. ██████████ however, is not quite sure whether the explosions were occurring whilst he was skirmishing towards the position or actually at it but he describes two or three explosions occurring some 100 metres forward and claims that he was also aware of other detonations further away in the area of the 'in depth' position.

OVER HEAD GPMG FIRE.

15. Reference has been made by [REDACTED] to overhead GPMG fire above the first objective. In view of this [REDACTED] D PARA, A Coy's SF GPMG controller has been interviewed and states that his brief was to lay down suppressive fire on the first objective up until the time that the Bangalore Torpedo detonated at which time he was to switch targets to the second objective. He was to continue firing on this objective until such time as 3 Pl passed through the gap in the barbed wire when he would again switch targets. The third target given to [REDACTED] and the SF GPMG gun groups was a group of fig 11 targets sited on the far wall of the valley between the first and second objective. The weapons fired as briefed. [REDACTED] was not aware of any REME testing of his weapon for overhead fire prior to the exercise and it should also be noted that the weapons fired using iron sights not the C2 sight and aiming post.

2 INCH MORTAR

16. The pieces of shrapnel recovered from Sgt Lyden's body, [REDACTED] and the webbing were submitted to RARDE Fort Halstead. Electron microscopic examination was carried out on the fragments and comparisons made with control specimens of mortar shrapnel originating from 2 inch mortar bombs of the same manufacturer's batch. These comparisons established that both the control and the subject specimens had the same metallic and chemical composition. In addition, the sample recovered from the web equipment bore traces of tin whilst the fragment removed from Sgt Lyden's heart bore traces of copper. As neither tin nor copper are component parts of the 2 inch mortar bomb the only possible explanations for the presence of either are that these particles of shrapnel have ricocheted off particles of those metals at or shortly after the time of the explosions. Under test conditions using witness plates of tin and copper in both the vertical and horizontal planes shrapnel from a detonated 2 inch mortar bomb has been found to have collected traces of both metals. Due to the earlier use of 7.62 mm ammunition and L2 hand grenades traces of both metals would have been available at the scene. It should be noted that the information regarding the fragment of shrapnel recovered from the tin water bottle in the webbing was not made known by the Ammunition Technicians to either the investigator nor RARDE until the examinations were completed. Consequently no tests or comparisons of the tin water bottle or cup have been made. The RARDE examination showed that the fragments could not have originated from a 81 mm mortar nor from any of the other weapons used in the exercise and in view of the results of the tests conducted, the conclusion drawn was that the fragments originated from a 2 inch mortar bomb.

17. It is known that Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] had fired two rounds from their mortar immediately prior to the explosion and that whilst a third mortar bomb had been loaded, there is no clear evidence from any person present at that location of it being fired.

Para 17 /Continued

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Para 17 /Continued

It should be noted that the base plate position had not been prepared and the mortar was thus vulnerable to sinkage or slippage whilst being fired. Additionally it is known that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were operating their 2 inch mortar, firing from the Satebu Hut. When interviewed, [REDACTED] explained that he used a piece of wood for the base plate which split and he then used a bergen side pouch on which to steady the weapon. He did not observe the fall of the first shot but relied on [REDACTED] his safety supervisor to ensure that this round fell on target. It should be noted that [REDACTED] has no formal weapon trg qualifications. From the statements of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the mortar engaged the second objective but at [REDACTED] direction the target impact area was switched to a position in the open ground in between the first and second objective, but beyond them. However, [REDACTED] claims that he fired eight mortar bombs at the second objective and with the exception of the first which was observed by [REDACTED] he observed all of the strikes and none of his rounds fell short.

18. With regard to the damaged tree noticed by [REDACTED] at the location where Sgt Lyden received his injury; as the area was used as a mortar impact area on several occasions prior to the day of the accident it could not be established when the damage occurred. [REDACTED] was taking photographs during the attack and these together with the negatives have been handed to the undersigned. Photographic enlargements of parts of those negatives showing the first objective just prior to the incident have been produced in an attempt to establish the condition of the tree and position of it relative to Sgt Lyden's mortar. Unfortunately due to the distance involved and the camera equipment used, these failed to resolve the problem. The negatives have also been submitted to the Home Office Police Research and Development Establishment for computer enhancement, but this was also unsuccessful due to the computer's inability to resolve the grain of negative. It is therefore not possible to establish whether the tree was damaged at the time of the incident or at any time prior to it.

19. It can be seen from [REDACTED] evidence that he considered that the distance between the mortar tube and the reported heights of the explosion that killed Sgt Lyden, was too short for the mortar bomb to have armed itself. Enquiries were therefore made in an effort to determine the method of detonation of a 2 inch mortar bomb. The bombs in use with 1 PARA at the relevant time originated from batch no GD 0269016956 and were fitted with the standard No 161 fuze which was manufactured at ROA Blackburn. Accordingly enquiries were made at ROA Blackburn where it was established that manufacture of the fuze in question ceased somewhere between 15 to 20 years ago. Detailed drawings of the fuze were no longer available and it was therefore not possible for a definite answer to be given about the arming distance of the 2 inch mortar bomb. [REDACTED] ROA Blackburn, stated that in his opinion the fuze would be set and the bomb armed within a metre of leaving the mortar tube.

Para 19 /Continued

Para 19 /Continued

When asked to provide a written statement to that effect, [REDACTED] referred the matter to his superiors who refused to allow him to make any form of written statement as the ROA Blackburn were not the design authority for the 2 inch mortar bomb, and without express permission from the design authority the factory authorities would not allow a statement to be made. Due to the production date of the 2 inch mortar bombs it has not been possible to date to ascertain exactly who the design authority is. Efforts to establish this and produce expert documentary evidence of the workings of the fuze continue and should they prove successful the results will be forwarded to all addresses under separate cover.

20. From the foregoing there can be little doubt that Sgt Lyden was killed as a result of a 2 inch mortar bomb explosion. There can only be two possible sources of the explosion: either an outgoing bomb from the SNCO's own mortar or an incoming mortar bomb which could only have originated from the mortar operated by [REDACTED]. There was no count of the unused bombs remaining at the scene, so the amount of bombs fired by Sgt Lyden cannot positively be ascertained. However, the evidence of those present shows that three bombs were loaded and the recovery of 3 nose caps from the scene tends to support this. The fact that the explosion occurred shortly after the third bomb was loaded tends to suggest that the explosion was caused by an outgoing bomb. The only possible causes of an explosion at this location are:

- a. An outgoing bomb striking the tree which was within Sgt Lyden's arc of fire.
- b. An outgoing bomb being struck by over head small arms fire.
- c. An incoming bomb landing on the position or tree.
- d. On incoming bomb being struck by overhead small arms fire.
- e. Faulty ammunition detonated prematurely.

Here it should be noted that Inf Trg Vol 4 Pamp 21 sec 43 para 1487 draws the attention of the safety supervisor of a mortar detachment to the dangers of overhead foliage and barrel obstructions.

21. Examination of the records held by the Directorate Land Services Ammunition have established that no previous accidents under similar circumstances have occurred involving 2 inch mortar HE bombs. A ban on the use of 2 inch mortar ammunition initiated as a result of this incident remains in force.

22. The scene of the incident was visited by [REDACTED], Depot PARA & AB Forces, and from his observations at the scene and evidence of the witnesses, it is apparent that safety regulations involving the planning and preparation of the exercise, the siting of the weapon group and general execution as required by Inf Trg Vol IV Pamp No 21 Range and Safety and Conduct and Inf Trg Vol 1, Pamp 8 (Old Series), had not been observed. [REDACTED] was able to detail specifically the breaches of regulations as follows:

Para 22 /Continued

Para 22 /Continued

- a. Failure to produce detailed written exercise instructions.
- b. Failure adequately to brief and rehearse safety supervisors.
- c. The employment of unqualified safety supervisors.
- d. Failure to apply the safety criteria in the siting and firing of all weapons.
- e. The use of the 2 inch mortar firing HE bombs the requirements of which are contained in Inf Trg Vol 4, Pamp 21, Sect 36, Para 1262 and Inf Trg Vol 1 (Old Series) Pamp 8, the Light Mortar (2 inch) Para 129, which state:

Inf Trg Vol 4, Pamp 21, Sect 36, Para 1262:

1262 HE Bombs The following additional rules are to be observed:

- a. During firing no-one is to be in the danger area forward of the mortar line. Range conducting staff and the firers only are to be on the mortar line. Waiting details and spectators are allowed within the danger area provided that they are behind the mortar line, protected by blast proof cover and are wearing steel helmets.
- b. The kneeling position only is to be used for firing.
- c. Individual mortar positions are to be 20 metres apart.
- d. Firing is to be from behind splinter proof cover at least 800 mm high. It may be of compacted earth, a sand bag wall or a shallow pit. Immediately the fall of the bomb has been observed, firers and supervisors are to lower their heads behind this cover.
- e. Only the amount of bombs required for one detail is to be on the mortar line. The remainder are to be on a ready line outside the danger area or if inside the danger area they are to be behind the mortar line and protected by blast proof cover. Bombs are NOT to be prepared for firing until they are on the mortar line.
- f. Bombs are not to be fired on field firing exercises.

Inf Trg Vol 1, Pamp 8, (Old Series), Para 129:

Field Firing Exercises

129. HE Bombs are not to be used on field firing exercises. This is because the mortar is a hand-held weapon and its accuracy is accordingly dependent entirely on the skill of the firer.

Para 22 /Continued

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Para 22 /Continued

██████████ produced copies of the relevant paras together with a 2 inch mortar safety trace extracted from Inf Trg Vol 4, Pamp 221, Range Construction & Use, and was of the opinion that the firing of the 2 inch mortar under the existing climatic conditions was particularly foolhardy due to the high risk of base plate sinkage and slippage.

23. Various other enquiries have been made in an attempt to pinpoint the seat of the explosion resulting in Sgt Lyden's death. As no ground signature of an explosion was located and witness accounts of the position are unreliable as to its exact position these enquiries have been unsuccessful. It should be noted that both Sgt Lyden's and ██████████ wounds are predominately to the left side of the body. In view of this the assistance of ██████████ and ██████████, Dispersents Div, CDE Porton Down was sought. Having been given access to all of the evidence accumulated to date they have expressed the opinion that the source of the shrapnel was probably some short distance from Sgt Lyden and ██████████ and to their left forward side. Due to the lack of available technical data relating to the speeds, weights and sizes of shrapnel fragments produced by the 2 inch mortar neither ██████████ or ██████████ could make any further comment or draw any other conclusions, consequently no written statements have been obtained from them.

24. Copies of course reports regarding the attendance of both ██████████ and ██████████ on Platoon Commanders Battle Course (PCBC) at the School of Infantry Warminster, a basic qualification to act as range supervisors have been obtained from the Adjt 1 PARA ██████████ PARA, and are attached to this report. A copy of the Mjolfjell Range Standing Orders written and published by ██████████ PARA, DCOS 1 Inf Bde Tidworth, formerly 2IC 1 PARA, have been obtained and are also attached to this report.

25. It is drawn to the attention of all addressees that, regardless of which weapon was responsible for the accident resulting in Sgt Lyden's death, had the various requirements of Inf Trg Pamps as outlined in Para 22 above, been complied with the 2 inch mortar would not have been deployed on the exercise and the SNCO would not have been killed nor others injured.

26. On Fri 29 Aug 86, ██████████ was interviewed by SIB after caution. During this interview the officer explained the planning and preparation of the exercise. He acknowledged that he had failed to check on the requirements regarding the 2 inch mortar nor had he applied the weapon safety trace. ██████████ alleged that the weapons had been deployed with the knowledge of the 2IC ██████████ PARA, who had published a letter outlining 2 inch mortar ammunition allocations for the exercise. He declined to make any form of written statement.

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27. [REDACTED] has been interviewed with regard to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] allegation and a copy of the letter produced to him. Whilst [REDACTED] has acknowledged authorship of the letter he states that it is only an ammunition allocation and not a specific authority for the use of a 2 inch mortar during live firing company exercises. He went on to state that he was aware of the possible use of the 2 inch mortar on these exercises and had no objection providing the safety criteria were applied.

28. On Tue 16 Sep 86 [REDACTED] PARA, was interviewed by SIB after caution. He explained his role in the exercise as being that of the Tactical Commander. His responsibilities were to ensure that his tactical plan was within the constraints placed on the exercise by virtue of its location and scenario. He admitted that he had not verified by reference to the various publications the conditions under which specific weapons including the 2 inch mortar could be used, nor had he applied the various safety traces claiming that it was not his responsibility to do so. [REDACTED] expanded on this by saying that the use of the 2 inch mortar had been authorised by his Commanding Officer although he could not specifically recall the details which were given to him at a verbal briefing. He also expressed the opinion that as a member of a PARA Bn it would not be in keeping for him to verify the work or double check the instructions of his superiors or contemporaries. He elected to make a written statement reiterating his verbal comments.

29. A Board of Inquiry is to be convened to investigate the incident under report and in view of this, neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] have yet been notified that they are to be reported as to do so might jeopardize any further enquiries the Board may require to be made. Similarly, although other personnel apparently committed breaches of the relevant regulations, these have not to date been pursued, because they have no direct bearing on Sgt Lyden's death. Should these further enquiries be deemed necessary the appropriate action will be taken and a further report submitted.

30. Copies of all maps, photographs, documents and statements referred to are attached to this report, the originals of which together with the shrapnel are retained available for production if so required.

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.
 Date to leave a.Command: Mar 86 b. Service: Aug 92

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 21st day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.

During Feb 86, I was taking part with my unit in Ex 'HARDFALL' in Norway. Over the period Tue 11 to Thu 13 Feb 86, Coy live firing exercises were to be conducted in the Mjolfjell Valley. Prior to this I assisted in building the bunker positions for the Coy attacks.

The attack was planned in such a way that each pl was to pass through a gap in a barbed wire entanglement, which had been blown by a Bangalore Torpedo and then attack one of three prepared positions. The attack was to be supported by 81 mm mortars, 84 mm Anti Tank guns and GPMG SF.

About 1310 hrs on Thu 13 Feb 86, A Coy began their attack. The objectives had been designated as X11, X12 and X13. Mortar fire was laid down on both X11 and X12. When this fire finished suppressive fire from SF GPMGs, SLRs and a 2 inch mortar operated by myself was brought down from the area of the Satebu Hut to cover the advance of the pioneers, who moved forward to the barbed wire some 80-100 mtrs in front of me. The pioneer Sect laid their bangalore and it was during this time that I was firing my 2 inch.

My weapon was sited to the right of the Satebu Hut on the open ground. [REDACTED] was acting as my number 2. The base plate position was prepared on the permafrost using broken polystyrene foam. Myself and [REDACTED] fired a total of 22 rounds or thereabouts, I fired 14 and [REDACTED] fired 8. All of the rounds were fired at the right hand bunker of the target X11 and the open ground to the right of that bunker. I saw all of the rounds strike and explode. There were no blinds.

My mortar finished firing before the bangalore torpedo blew the gap in the barbed wire and was not fired again that day.

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

The spread or belt of fire I laid down with the 2 inch mortar was about 60 mtrs. Having considered the type of surface from which I was firing I do not think this was excessive. The weapon will jump about when fired and even when taking what you believe to be the same point of aim the bombs will fall in different places. I was taking what I believed to be the same point of aim each time.

My mortar as I have previously stated finished firing before the barbed wire had been blown and A Coy were still in the dead ground at the left side of the Satebu Hut, they had not begun their advance.

Located to my right was another 2 inch mortar and an 84 mm gun group. The 2 inch was operated by [REDACTED] of A Coy.

I cannot recall if there was any further 81 mm mortar fire on X11 and X12 or not. I had gone inside the Satebu Hut to get my binoculars and camera when I finished firing.

When I came back out of the hut A Coy were already going through the wire. [REDACTED] mortar was firing. I could not see where his bombs were falling but I could see the direction in which his barrel was pointing. It was directly across the front of the hut towards the area of X12.

I had taken some photographs of the general advance towards the right hand bunker of X11 and then stopped as a belt of 81 mm mortar fire landed on X13. I can't be certain but I think some troops had reached this right hand bunker by this time.

The last photograph I took from this position was of [REDACTED] fire trench.

I then moved to the other side of the Satebu Hut where I was going to take some more photographs however, somebody drew my attention to the right hand bunker where I saw a ball of black smoke above the ground.

As a result of a conversation with the CO I went to the location with other people, travelling on skidoos. When I arrived I could see Sgt Lyden lying on his back with his head towards the Satebu Hut. [REDACTED] was propped up against the bunker facing towards him, whilst [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were lying forward of the bunker. These four were all injured. Several other people were present and still more arrived after me and first aid was given.

I could not see any mortar bombs or the mortar itself until somebody picked it up and threw it to one side, I cannot recall who this was. I could not see what [REDACTED] was using as a base plate but a photograph I took of his position shows his base plate on the snow.

I have handed the negatives of those photographs to [REDACTED] RMP (SIB), who has labelled them as exhibit WSE/1. I have signed that label.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1030 hrs Fri 21 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
 Date to leave a. Command: Nk b. Service: Nk

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with Sp Coy, 1 PARA.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 about 1230 hrs or thereabouts I was taking part in a Coy live firing field exercise being carried out by A Coy, 1 PARA, in the Mjolfjell Valley or Range Valley, Norway.

I was tasked with various admin responsibilities and to assist [REDACTED] in firing the 2 inch mortar from the Satebu Hut at the various objectives and the area behind the barbed wire, to simulate battle field conditions. 81mm mortars were firing on to the objectives.

Firing stopped and the pioneer Sect went forward to place Bangalore Torpedos to breach the barbed wire. When the wire was breached the Coy attacked through the gap.

The mortar that [REDACTED] and I had been firing was not needed anymore so I watched the attack going on. I could see people attacking the nearest objective X11. Due to the distance which I estimate at 300 to 350 mtrs I could not distinguish individuals or weapons groups. I could see a safety supervisor, discernible because of his orange headband and arm band in the dead ground just behind the Sect at the right hand bunker of X11. I'm sure that other people were standing just behind the Sect watching them.

I saw a puff of black smoke at this location. It was above the Sect, I did not see any flash. I saw somebody fall backwards and a couple of people roll over. The people who fell down were at the right side of the bunker towards the rear and those who rolled over were level with the bunker on the right side.

A 2 inch mortar sited at the Satebu Hut, being operated by [REDACTED] was firing about the time I saw the puff of smoke but I'm sure that it did not fire again afterwards as people were shouting for medics.

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

While I was watching I could see the fall of [REDACTED] mortar and this was to the left of the objective where I had seen the puff of smoke. As far as I am concerned all of his rounds appeared to fall on the outer objective which was away to the left.

Myself and [REDACTED] experienced no problems with our ammunition, or any problems with the mortar itself.

I do not know if [REDACTED] had any problems with either his ammunition or weapon.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1600 hrs Tue 18 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: 1 pl, A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.
 Date to leave a. Command: Jun 87 b. Service: NK

This statement, (consisting of 6 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] PARA, at present on Ex 'HARDFALL SOUTH' in the Voss Area, Norway with my Unit.

About 1700 hrs Mon 10 Feb 86, I went with my OC [REDACTED] the pl Comdrs [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], the other pl Sgts Sgt Lyden, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and the CSM Sp Coy [REDACTED] to the area known as Mjolfjell Valley Range at Grid 829375, where we were briefed by the OC on an exercise that was to take place. I was briefed that it was going to be a Coy live firing attack there were to be 3 objectives with each pl to take one objective in turn. He briefed us that there were to be support weapons including Milan, Scimitar and 81mm and 2 inch mortars, a helicopter gun ship and a fighter ground attack by a fighter plane which would not infact open fire. To explain the positions to be adopted by the support weapons and the routes to be taken to reach the objectives. Today I have been shown by [REDACTED] RMP (SIB), a plan marked Coy live firing attack, to which was attached an exhibit identification label marked JRP/1 which I have signed.

With regard to exhibit JRP/1 I recognise this plan as being the one used by [REDACTED] to brief us on the exercise. I was briefed by [REDACTED] as to what my role was to be. However, the day before the exercise I was injured and my role in the exercise was changed by the OC who then briefed me that I was to be in charge of the fire support for the attack comprising of 2 GPMGs in the SF role, 2 x 84 mm Anti Tank weapons (Carl Gustavs) and 1 x 2 inch mortar which the OC told me I was to fire. [REDACTED] further told me that I was to position the fire support to the left side of the Satebu Hut which is a small hut overlooking the range in the valley below.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 starting from about 1130 hrs A Coy flew by helicopter to the landing zone which was about 1 kilometre away from the form up point (FUP). We all arrived at the FUP which was located about 800 m from the range. Once the fire support team had all arrived I reported this to the OC.

By this time I had been briefed that I was to engage positions X11 and X12 with the 2 inch mortar I was to fire. The GPMGs were to engage X11, X12 and X13 and the 84 mm anti tank weapons to engage the bunkers on X11. These positions are marked an exhibit JRP/1. After I reported to the OC that we were all present he told me to move onto the range with the fire support. We moved onto the range and I looked for a position to the left hand side of the hut. When I reached this area I saw that the positions to the left of the hut were already occupied by members of Sp Coy. I positioned the 2 GPMGs in the area of these occupied trenches together with one 84 mm. I then went to look for a position for myself with the 2 inch and the other 84 mm. [REDACTED] who was my safety supervisor for the 2 inch mortar told me that there was a position to the right of the hut where B Coy had fired their 2 inch mortar from on the previous exercise. I went to the right handside of the hut where I saw a trench about 10 metres to the right of the hut. I got into the trench with the 2 inch mortar and the 84 mm crew. My No 2 [REDACTED] was lying to the left hand side of the trench. The brief I had received was that I was to open fire on X11 and X12 when the Bangalore Torpedo exploded breaching a gap in the wire for A Coy to go through to the positions they were to attack.

After about 10 minutes I saw the assault pioneers running down the side of the valley towards the barbed wire. They prepared the Bangalore Torpedo which exploded and breached the wire. Both 84 mm then fired as briefed at the bunkers on X11, my 84 mm crew then left the trench. I looked around the target areas and I could see members of A Coy approach the gap in the wire which was the start for X11. I decided not to fire any bombs at X11 because of this. I then told [REDACTED] to load the mortar and I fired a bomb at X12. I did not see this bomb strike. I said to [REDACTED] did you see that one land and he said yes. I fired a further 7 bombs at X12. I didn't fire any more after this as I stopped to observe the movements of the troops below and [REDACTED] told me to stop firing. By this time the pl attacking X12 were getting quite close to their objective. At no time did I fire any bombs at X11. Out of the 8 rounds I fired there was one misfire which I rectified by clearing snow from the pad and firing the bomb and as far as I observed there were no malfunctions or drop shorts. For the first few bombs the base plate for the mortar was on a wooden base, which split and I then put the base plate on a bergen.

I did not observe any accidents and it was only later I learn't that there had been casualties during the exercise.

For the exercise I was issued with 18 bombs, 8 of which I fired, 8 were returned and 2 were later destroyed as the caps and pins had been removed.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1435 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86 Oppheim Norway.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22nd day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with A Coy, 1 PARA.

On Thu 13 Feb 86, my Coy was taking part in a live firing Coy exercise in the Mjolfjell Valley, Norway. I had been asked by my OC, [REDACTED] to act as the no 2 on a 2 inch mortar.

I was given instruction on the 2 inch mortar during basic training in 1979/80 but have never fired the weapon and I cannot recall receiving any continuation training on the weapon since then.

I was to assist [REDACTED] in firing this weapon. We moved before the Coy attack and took up a position in a trench to the right of the Satebu Hut. An 84 mm gun group also deploying in this trench. The Satebu Hut and trench were located on high ground overlooking three objectives.

The exercise started with a mortar bombardment on the two nearest objectives followed by the breaching of a barbed wire entanglement. A further mortar bombardment from 81mm was laid down at this point and the Coy began to attack.

The 84mm fired one or two rounds at one of the objectives. It was at this time that [REDACTED] and I were to start firing our mortar. The 84mm leaving to rejoin thier pl.

I got out of the trench and moved to the left side of it where I laid down on the snow. [REDACTED] remained standing in the trench at the extreme left hand side of it. The mortar was in front of him slightly to his left. The base plate was positioned on a piece of wood. I was lying down at a right angle to the mortar.

I prepared two rounds for firing. To do so I unscrewed the metal nose cap and unwrapped the tape leaving it attached to the safety pin. When [REDACTED] ordered load I pulled the pin and placed the bomb in the mortar barrel. I then prepared the next round in the manner I have described so that I had two bombs ready for firing at any one time.

I cannot recall the exact sequence of events but I believe that one of our early bombs was a misfire. [REDACTED] took the mortar apart and cleared some snow from the area of the firing pin and we began firing. Again I cannot be certain as to which round it was but at some time the piece of wood we were using for the base plate broke and we then placed a bergen or a side pouch under the mortar on top of the broken wood to use as a base plate position.

We fired about eight rounds, but I did not see any of them strike. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] the safety supervisor were observing the strike and adjusting the weapon accordingly.

There were to the best of my knowledge two misfires that were placed to one side and marked for disposal later.

When we were firing the mortar barrel was at 45 degrees or thereabouts in order that we could obtain maximum range. It was directed to the left into the area of ground near to the second objective but on its right hand side.

I cannot recall which rounds they were probably the first few when the base plate was on the piece of wood that I held the barrel to steady the weapon. I'm sure that later on when we changed the base plate position that it was firm and I did not have to hold it.

While we were firing I could see people moving through the gap in the barbed wire in front of me and deploying in front of the first objective. I don't know exactly how many rounds we'd fired by that time it could have been four or five. I believed that we were firing bombs about ever 15 seconds or so.

While we were firing I can remember [REDACTED] shouting 'On' several times but I do not know if this was every time we fired or not. I do not remember him giving any corrections for elevation or bearing. The only other commands I can recall [REDACTED] giving was to switch targets. When he gave the instructions [REDACTED] adjusted the mortar further to the left.

When I stated that I have had no formal continuation training on the 2 inch mortar, I should qualify that by saying that on the morning of 13 Feb 86, I was told that I would not be permitted to fire the weapon and the preparation of bombs and loading was explained to me.

I have been shown a photograph showing the target area and the trench that [REDACTED] and I fired from. On a photocopy of that photograph I have marked the positions that I believe we fired at and the positions of the troops during firing as I have explained them in this statement.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1500 hrs Sat 22 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: HQ Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
 Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: 1993

This statement, (consisting of 7 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 19th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Parachute Regiment at present serving with HQ Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.

During Feb 86 I was serving with my unit in Norway, taking part in Ex 'HARDFALL'. On the 11 Feb 86 sometime during the evening I was warned verbally by either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED] that I would be required the following day to act as a safety supervisor for live firing field exercises to be carried out on Wed 12 Feb 86 and Thu 13 Feb 86.

Sometime during the late morning of Wed 12 Feb 86, I went with several other people, all safety supervisors to the area of dead ground just behind the Satebu Hut in the Mjolfjell Valley, this place is sometimes referred to as 'Range' or Rjoanddalen' Valley.

I was detailed by [REDACTED] OC Sup Coy to act as the safety supervisor for a pl 2 inch mortar. My brief was that I was to act as safety but I cannot now recall the specifics of that brief. My own interpretation of my instructions was that I was to ensure that the weapons was fired from a safe place, that it was aimed at a safe point, an area in which there were no troops and that weapon handling drills were carried out correctly.

I should point out that I have no formal weapon training qualifications, although I have attended a Section Commanders Course in 1980, and a Platoon Sgts Course in 1984, at the School of Infantry, NCOs Tactical Wing, Brecon. I have received instruction in the use of the 2 inch mortar both in basic training and pl continuation training. I have fired the weapon on approximately six occasions including live firing of HE during Coy field firing exercises in Keyna in 1973 or thereabouts.

I consider that I was sufficiently proficient in the use of this weapon to have carried out my duties competently. However, I still tried to obtain a copy of the Infantry Training Pamphlet relating to the weapon but this was not available to me in the field. I did not try to obtain a copy of pamphlet 21, "Range Conduct and Safety".

On both Wed 12 and Thu 13 Feb 86 I made contact with the 2 inch mortarmen of the pl that I was attached to. Having made myself known to them and been briefed by them as to their tasks I moved forward to wait for the attacks to begin, waiting just before the Satebu Hut.

On Wed 12 Feb 86, I met the pl Sgt as the Coy advanced and went with him to the area on the left of the Satebu Hut, where he established his position. An 84 mm Anti Tank gun also deployed in the same trench, as there was no safety supervisor with this weapon, I took it upon myself to supervise that weapon as well.

From my position I could see the start of the route of the advance down a gully. I lost sight of the route then until it reached the area in front of the barbed wire and I could see from there to the first, or nearest objective the second and the in depth objective.

As the troops started to advance the 84 mm fired twice at the first objective. I can't be certain as to exactly where the troops were but they were actually moving in or towards the gully when the 84 mm was firing. The 84 mm was sited to the left the Satebu Hut in the extreme left trench, next to the gully, which was about 10 metres away at about 10 O'clock. The 84 mm teams remained where they were and the pl Sgt then fired 18, 2 inch mortar bombs at the second objective. During this time troops were moving through the dead ground in front of him and the breach in the barbed wire entanglement. As the troops reached the first objective fire was switched from the second objective to the area of open ground beyond the two objectives but between them.

Having fired all of the 18 bombs the pl Sgt and the 84 mm team then moved off and joined the pl at the first objective. Neither weapon fired again that day.

The following day I met [REDACTED], A Coy's 2 inch mortarman and was briefed by him as to his role, in the manner I have described. The exercise began about mid day with a mortar bombardment. This was followed by the blowing of barbed wire entanglement and more mortar fire. The troops began moving when the barbed wire was breached [REDACTED] and his No 2 were already established at the Satebu Hut, this time to the right of it, with an 84 mm.

The 84 mm fired one round at the first objective and then stopped. [REDACTED] then began to fire his 2 inch. By this time the leading troops were in the breach in the barbed wire. He was supposed to fire into the second objective but due to the position of the troops on the ground I directed him to fire into the open ground beyond both objectives but in the centre of them. [REDACTED] fired 8 rounds in all. I observed all eight strikes and all of the rounds fell into the open ground.

[REDACTED] mortar had stopped firing before I became aware, because of the activity and lack of fire that something had happened at the first objective. I did not know what had happened.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

With regard to [REDACTED] position I can recall that initially the base plate was placed on some wood but as this kept shifting with firing it was discarded and the base plate placed against the snow which was hard packed from three days use. There was to the best of my recollection only one misfire and that was the first round, this was caused by snow on the base plate, which was cleared and the weapon operated satisfactorily.

I do not recall [REDACTED] using a bergen as a base plate position as far as I am concerned he did not.

He remained in that trench and did not change his position throughout.

To elaborate upon the briefing I was given by [REDACTED]. I was given an outline of the battle plan, but I was not shown any maps nor were the positions on the ground pointed out to me. At no time did I receive any instructions as to what targets could be engaged by the two inch or what areas were safe to fire upon. Nor was any information given to me to indicate at what position troops could reach on the ground prior to fire being terminated.

I was aware that troops were passing underneath the mortar rounds being fired.

When I directed fire into the open ground I knew that the first and second objectives were to each side of the line of fire but I considered this to be a safe place on which to fire.

All safety supervisors taking part in the exercise wore orange bands around their helmets and were distinguishable by this.

I should also add that provision had been made to stop the exercise by use of radio or the firing of red mini flares. I do not recall in what circumstances such action was permitted. I was not issued with red flares, but there were radios in the vicinity.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1100 hrs Wed 19 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: 2 RTR, Wessex Bks, Fallingbostel, BFPO 38
 Date to leave a.Command: 24 Mar 86 b. Service: NK

This statement,(consisting of 8 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] RTR, at present attached to 1 PARA in Norway for the period of exercise 'HARDFALL' and serving as the 2IC Sp Coy, 1 PARA.

On or about Thu 6 Feb 86 I was tasked to assist with 3 Coy live firing attack exercises that were to take place the following week. Over the next few days I visited the range area known as Mjolfjell Valley or just Range Valley located in Rjoanddalen Valley at grid 828374. During these visits I was briefed by [REDACTED] the OC Sp Coy that I was to act as a safety supervisor for the first assault pl for each Coy during each Coy attack. That I was to watch out for grenade range safety and battle players running in front of each other and the danger areas for the support weapon particularly back blast and also the use of L2 grenades when clearing bunkers. The exercise was to be a realistic Coy attack and the safety supervisors were there to prevent injury or loss of life and not to interfere with tactics. There were to be 2 other safety supervisors also for the first assault pl.

The first 2 exercises for C and B Coy took place on 11 and 12 Feb 86 and passed without incident. I acted as safety supervisor for the first assault pl on each occasion and became very familiar with the workings and tactics of the exercise.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 A Coy were to take part in the exercise. H hour was at 1300 hrs and was signalled by the detonation of a Bangalore Torpedo breaching the barbed wire defences allowing the first assault pl to move out of the dead ground behind Satebu Hut. I saw that [REDACTED] and a Cpl who were also safety supervisors for the first assault pl moved to near the front of the column for the first pl, the pl passed by and I joined the rear of the column. The column moved out of the dead ground past the road leading to the hut and down the waterfall. The route which had been taken on the two previous occasions. The pl started to slide down the frozen waterfall which is surrounded on both sides with a big bank of snow until you reach the actual frozen waterfall which had a big bank of snow on the right.

When I reached I saw that the bank on the left had collapsed and about four people had fallen about 15 feet onto the frozen pond and had broken through the ice, including the pl comdr [REDACTED]. I saw that one of the men had injured his leg which was bleeding heavily. I signalled people following me to stop until I had control of the situation and then waved them past. I remained at this location and supervised the rescue of those people in the water and their equipment.

From my position I could see that the attack was continuing and that members of the initial assault pl were attacking the location known as X11. I saw the orange flash on a helmet in the area of X11, identifying a safety supervisor, so I continued to supervise the rescue.

About 5 minutes later [REDACTED] returned to the frozen waterfall he told me to go up forward with the pl and he would take control of the rescue. I then ran towards X11. When I reached the gap in the wire I looked around and saw that there was not a safety supervisor with the group by the right hand bunker of X11, so I ran towards this bunker. As I approached the bunker I was able to see that Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] were kneeling beside the right hand side corner of the bunker. Sgt Lyden was on the right facing the enemy with his back towards me and [REDACTED] was on his left up against the side of the bunker. I could not see the 2 inch mortar but I knew they were operating it as I heard it being fired and from their posture it appeared it was being fired towards the in depth position X13. I did not see who was loading or firing the mortar. I saw them fire one or two rounds and when I was at a distance of about 10 metres from them when an explosion occurred in the vicinity of the right hand side of the bunker, in front of Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] and approximately 3 feet above ground level. I could not see the flash of the explosion as Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] obscured the centre of the explosion and all I could see was a black burst about 3 feet above the ground. The noise of the explosion was very loud. I realised that some type of accident had occurred and I saw Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] flinch backwards. I ran toward them after a moments hesitation. The remainder of the Sect immediately started running towards Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED]. I ran towards them, I saw that Sgt Lyden was lying on his right hand side facing towards the bottom of the valley. He was huddled up and I heard a gurgling noise coming from him. I looked towards [REDACTED] who was lying in the entrance of the bunker with his head towards the bottom of the valley. He was bleeding from his forehead and his cheek. I could also see that [REDACTED] was lying on the front right side of the bunker lying flat on his stomach. I could see that he was bleeding from the back buttock and rear of his legs. To the left of [REDACTED] I saw [REDACTED] lying in front of the bunker he was also bleeding from the buttocks and legs.

By this time the Sect were arriving and putting first field dressings on the wounded. I ran back towards Sgt Lyden who was being attended to by a soldier whose name I do not know. The only visible injury I could see was blood staining his camouflage whites in the area of his groin. I could see that Sgt Lyden was going into shock and blood was coming from his mouth not from his face wound. I told the soldier to continue dressing the wound to the groin. I rolled him onto his back to check for other wounds at this stage he appeared to be losing consciousness.

[REDACTED], Sp Coy CSM, then arrived he and I then noticed blood soaking his clothing in the area of his chest, we moved away his clothing and I saw what appeared to be a small but very deep wound on the edge of his left nipple. We applied a first field dressing to the wound and pulled his clothing back down. Whilst doing this Sgt Lyden gave a gasp and appeared to stop breathing. I checked and found that he had stopped breathing. I then started mouth to mouth resuciation. I checked the pulse which at first was very weak and then faded until I could not feel the pulse so I commenced external cardiac massage as well as mouth to mouth until the arrival of [REDACTED] the RMO 1 PARA and shortly afterwards a helicopter in which Sgt Lyden was conveyed away from the range.

I then continued to assist with rendering and supervising first aid and control of the area. I spoke with [REDACTED] and asked him what had happened. He said, "We were firing the two inch mortar, we fired three rounds and then I don't know what happened."

I then looked around the area and saw a 2 inch mortar lying half in and half out of the entrance to the bunker. The muzzle was pointing into the bunker and the base plate was just outside of the bunker. I then saw somebody pick up and clear the mortar, by tipping the muzzle downwards and I saw that no bomb came out of the mortar it was clear.

During Sep 85 I attended the Other Arms Div (OAD) Small Arms Course at Warminster. I believe that I was also authorised by the CO 1 PARA to act as a safety supervisor for the Coy live firing attack.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me about 1650 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86 at Oppheim Norway.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: 2 RTR, Wessex Bks, Fallingbostel, BFPO 38
 Date to leave a.Command: 24 Mar 86 b. Service: NK

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

Further to my statement dated 16 Feb 86.

I have served as a commissioned officer with the Royal Tank Regiment for about 1 yr 7 mths. As an Armoured Corps Officer I do not complete an attachment to an Infantry unit. However, during Sep/Oct 85 I attended an Officers and WOs Small Arms Instructors Course (Other Arms), No 11 at the School of Infantry, Warminster.

Since passing my course I have conducted range practices with my Unit on about 6 occasions. Each day would have involved some 40-50 men firing SMG, SLR and GPMG using ETR and gallery ranges. I have no previous experience of conducting live firing field exercise of the type carried out in Norway.

I joined 1 PARA on 11 Jan 86 on a temporary attachment as an assessment for a long term attachment to the Regiment.

On 13 Jan 86, I left with Sp Coy 1 PARA for Ex 'HARDFALL' in Norway. Other than the Coy live firing attacks carried out on Tue 11, Wed 12 and Thu 13 Feb 86, I took no part in field firing exercise.

I was one of several people selected to act as safety supervisors for these live firing exercises and was briefed by [REDACTED] OC Sp Coy, the exercise controller. My brief, given to me by [REDACTED] in the field on the morning of Tue 11 Feb 86 was that I and the Regtl Adjt [REDACTED] and a JNCO both of whom were present, was in general terms that we were to oversee the general safety of the range. No battle plan or operation order or anything of that nature was produced. We were instructed that in the event of an accident involving death, danger to life or injury the exercise could be stopped either by radio signal or by firing a red mini flare. One radio was allocated to each supervising team, which was carried during Tue 11 and Wed 12 Feb 86 by the Regtl Adjt. I was not personally issued with a red mini flare although I believe that these were carried by the Regtl Adjt.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Although we were to act independantly of each other none of the safety supervisors, to my knowledge was detailed to accompany any particular Sect, or allocated to any particular weapon group, certainly I was not. In view of this fact we tended to attach ourselves to those fire groups which were in action but lacked a safety supervisor.

I was not given any detailed brief on the use of specific weapons, in particular the 2 inch mortar, a weapon with which I am not familiar and have never fired.

The situation remained the same throughout the field firing exercise, the only change occuring on the Thu 13 Feb 86, when the Regtl Adjut was replaced by [REDACTED], HQ Coy and another JNCO was to accompany us. To the best of my Knowledge neither had been participating in the exercise during the previous two days and they were both briefed in my presence. [REDACTED] was carrying the radio that day and I assume that he also had the red mini flares.

With regard to the incident at the waterfall. The following pls were in a highly excited condition, determined to push on to their objectives. It was apparent to me that unless somebody took charge of the situation, that no rescue would be attempted and that the danger existed of more soldiers falling into the water. My initial opinion was that there was some danger to life, but as I did not have a radio or red mini flares I was not able to stop the exercise. The situation was resolved very quickly, within 2 to 3 minutes and we were getting people out of the water. The need to terminate the exercise had passed, the situation was under control and it was about this time that I began to think about moving forward with the rest of the pl.

I am certain that [REDACTED], who had been in front of me in the pl had gone forward and then returned some two to three minutes after the incident, at which time he instructed me to move on with the leading Sects. [REDACTED] had not remained at the waterfall, he had gone foward and then returned. The other safety supervisors had also gone forward and I had not seen him.

I consider that my judgement and actions at the waterfall were correct and justifiable. Several men had been immersed in water in sub zero temperatures in arctic conditions, the presence of blood indicated a further casualty and the situation needed resolving at that time, with a view to a possible immediate casevac.

With regard to the explosion at X11, at the time that I was approaching this position I was in dead ground and about to crest the rise. I was therefore looking upwards at Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] I can add nothing further to my description of that explosion. I was familiar with the sound of an 81 mm mortar detonating and from the sound of this explosion I did not believe it to have originated from that weapon.

I do recall that at least two rounds had been fired from Sgt Lyden's mortar as I had heard the popping sound. I believe that a third round was fired.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1020 hrs Tue 18 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Int Offr, HQ Coy, 1 APRA, Picton Bks, Bulford,
 Wilts.
 Date to leave a. Command: Jun 87 b. Service: Jun 2015

This statement, (consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving as the Int Offr, HQ Coy, 1 PARA. I am at present on Ex 'HARDFALL' with my unit in Norway.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 at Mjolfjell Valley Range commonly know as Range Valley, I was to act as a safety supervisor for a Coy live firing attack which was to be conducted by A Coy 1 PARA. I had initially been detailed for this task by the OC Sp Coy [REDACTED] and on the day of the exercise I was briefed on the running of the exercise by [REDACTED] 2 RTR att 1 PARA.

[REDACTED] briefed me that we would accompany the first pl through who would split into 2 assault Sects. That once they had captured their objective they would go firm that is they would not move forward from that objective. They would then provide fire support for the depth position. It was agreed that we would accompany one of the Sects each. I understood that the first pl was to attack the nearest group of bunkers on the right for which myself and [REDACTED] were to act as safety supervisors. [REDACTED] was also to act as a safety supervisor for the heavy weapons sect of the first pl who were to take up their position overlooking the valley.

I took up a position with [REDACTED] in the gully leading down to the hut. The signal for the start of the attack was to be the detonation of a Bangalore Torpedo breaching a barbed wire obstacle. When the Bangalore Torpedo was detonated the first pl moved towards the hut and then to the left down a frozen chute.

Myself and [REDACTED] joined the rear half of the column together and followed the column into the chute. Once in the chute we slid down following the column. Towards the bottom of the chute where it passed very close to the frozen river a section of the bank had dropped away and two soldiers and a GPMG in SF role mounted on a small sledge had fallen from the chute onto and breaking through the ice into the river. One of the soldiers was trapped underneath the sledge.

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

The other soldiers present were uncertain as to whether to continue the advance or rescue their colleague. I started to organise the rescue of the soldiers in the frozen pond and after no more than about 2 minutes I told [REDACTED] who was present to go on. [REDACTED] then left with other soldiers towards the objective.

I remained at the frozen pool for about 5 minutes after [REDACTED] had left, everybody was then rescued from the pool and the injured soldier moved to safe ground. I then moved towards the gap in the wire at which time a skidoo came down the valley from the direction of the hut. The driver ignored my waving and drove straight through the hole in the wire to the nearest bunker. I pursued him and arrived at the bunker where I saw [REDACTED] and others administering first aid to wounded soldiers including Sgt Lyden whom I recognised.

On Sep 84 I attended the Platoon Commanders Battle Course at Warminster.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me about 2145 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86 at Oppheim Norway.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: HQ Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.
 Date to leave a.Command: NK b. Service: Jun 2015

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22nd day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

Further to my statement dated 16 Feb 86.

With regard to my briefing as a safety supervisor for the exercise, I was briefed by [REDACTED] in as much as he told me that the exercise would be conducted in the same manner as that of the previous year. I had drawn a radio from Sp Coy for use on the Bn safety net.

Myself and [REDACTED] discussed the exercise in general terms, at which time he described to me the manner in which the safety supervisors had been operating during the previous two days. We agreed between us that we would accompany a Sect each during the attack although no decision was made as to who would accompany which Sect. We were to act as the situation dictated in that we would go with which ever Sect was closest at the time.

I was aware that a 2 inch mortar was to deploy with the pl that I was acting as a safety supervisor for, but I did not know that this weapon was to fire H.E. ammunition. No specific instructions were given to me regarding this 2 inch mortar. I should point out that had I known that 2 inch HE mortar ammunition was to be used I would have stayed close to that weapon on the ground.

Regarding the incident at the waterfall at the beginning of the attack. I had gone down the path and moved forward with one of the Sects to see where they were going. I was aware that there had been an accident at the waterfall at that time and in order to assist with the rescue of those in the water I needed to remove my snow shoes. I had not gone very far forward, maybe 5 mtrs. When I got back I saw that there were only two people in the water. Others may have fallen in and been rescued by that time I did not see any others. As I am an Artic Warfare Instructor I was aware of the potential danger and decided that I should stay at the waterfall and take charge of the situation and casualties, one of whom had a bayonet wound.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

I had not been at the waterfall very long when I instructed [REDACTED] to go forward and join the attacking sects.

I was unable to use my radio to call for a casualty evacuation as my set was unserviceable. I therefore tried to stop a skidoo coming down the hill, when he did not stop I chased after him and came upon the incident at the bunker involving Sgt Lyden.

With regard to stopping the exercise in the event of an emergency. It has in the past to my knowledge been possible to do so by firing a red flare. However, I was not issued with any red flares.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1330 hrs Sat 22 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: 2 pl, A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp,
Salisbury, Wilts.
Date to leave a.Command: May 87 b. Service: May 87

This statement,(consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with my unit on Ex 'HARDFALL SOUTH' 86 in Norway.

About 1330 hrs Thu 16 Feb 86, I was engaged on a live firing Coy attack in 'Range Valley', Mjolfjell, Norway. I was acting as the Sect 2IC for 1 Sect, 2 pl of A Coy, 1 PARA. The aim of my part of the exercise was to take an objective named X11 which were two bunkers supposedly occupied by enemy forces.

H hour, the start of the exercise was to be 1330 hrs Thu 16 Feb 86. The H hour was to be signified by the detonation of a 'Bangalor Torpedo', which is a device designed to demolish a barbed wire obstacle which was between my Sect and our objective.

To this end about 1330 hrs the Bangalor Torpedo detonated and myself and my Sect began to advance. My Sect and 2 Sect negotiated an 'Ice Chute' at the bottom of which was a pool of water. However, 3 Sect got held up in the pool. My Sect continued to advance down the hill to our bunker objective approximately 200 metres away. At the same time 2 Sect advanced off to our right flank to take their bunker objective, which was about 50 metres to the right of our objective.

We eventually gained our objective no more than 5 minutes later. After this 3 men from my Sect went off to our left to take another objective and I moved back from the bunker to the mortar impact pits about 5 metres behind and to the left of it. From this position, together with 2 other soldiers from my Sect, the other bunker was 50 metres off to my right and behind my right shoulder. About 2 minutes later I saw the grenade go into the bunker location which indicated to me that 2 Sect whose objective it was, were in the process of taking their objective.

After this time I paid no attention to 2 Sect location as I was concentrating on directing fire into another location about 400 metres in front of us.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

About eight minutes later I recognised the voice of Sgt Lyden say, "Get the fucking mortar working". I've no doubt it was Sgt Lyden who said this and on looking behind, and to my right, I saw in 2 Sect location three other soldiers. I could not clearly see the soldiers as they were behind a slight incline but he appeared to me to be on the edge of the bunker.

I continued looking over and about 3 to 5 seconds later I saw a black ball of smoke appear in the middle of X11's location. The ball of smoke was almost immediately preceded by a very loud explosion. In relation to the soldiers at the bunker the explosion was not more than about a metre away from them. My immediate thought was that an accident had occurred with a mortar in the bunker. However, I did not move from my location as the exercise was still in progress and people on the exercise were still firing onto the location 400 metres from mine. I considered it unsafe to move across open ground under such circumstances. A few minutes later all firing had stopped so I went cross to the bunker where the explosion had occurred.

When I got there the injured soldiers had already been evacuated to a Puma helicopter close by. When I got into the actual bunker location I saw a two inch mortar lying on the ground to the back of the bunker. The mortar appeared to be in good condition and not damaged.

I would like to add that I believe that the black ball of smoke from the explosion appeared to be about 3 feet off the ground.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me at The Oppheim Hotel, Oppheim, Norway about 1540 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86.

Signed: [REDACTED]

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: 2 pl, A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp,
Salisbury, Wilts.
Date to leave a.Command: May 87 b. Service: May 87

This statement,(consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 17th day of September 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

Further to my statement dated 16 Feb 86. I would like to add that when my section attacked the second bunker of the first objective, I went forward and used a hand grenade on the bunker. At this time I was alone the remaining five members of my section being some 50 yds behind me in an extended line.

With regard to the shouted instructions I heard Sgt Lyden giving prior to this I had seen mortar rounds impact and explode in the area of the 'in depth' position. I cannot recall how many explosions there were. I do recall that the 81 mm mortars had fired on that position and that that bombardment had stopped some time prior to the explosions of which I speak.

I was not personally aware of any other mortar fire coming down in front of or to the sides of my position.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 0935 hrs on Wed 17 Sep 86 at Hereford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a.Command: NK b. Service: Oct (0

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 21st day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with 1 PARA in Bulford.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I together with other members of A Coy, 1 PARA, was taking part in a live firing Coy assault at a place known to me as 'Range Valley', Norway.

The attack began when some barbedwire entanglements were blown up and supporting fire was laid down on the bunker targets designated as X11, X12 and the in depth target X13.

I was a Sect Comdr in 2 pl of A Coy. One of my allotted tasks was to clear the bunkers, X11. My Sect had moved forward and together with [REDACTED] I cleared the bunker using grenades and rifle fire.

Having done so we moved forward in front of the bunker. [REDACTED] was to my left some 5 mtrs and 2 or 3 mtrs in front of the bunker. Both of us were lying prone and the rest of the Sect were deployed in an extended line to my right.

I checked around and saw that the 2 inch mortar crew, Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] had arrived. By looking to my left at an angle of 45 degrees I could see them starting to set up some two to three mtrs behind me. They were centrally located behind [REDACTED] and I. Sgt Lyden shouted to me to ensure that none of my Sect were in front of the weapon as he would be opening fire with it. I checked the position of the rest of my Sect and noted that the area in front of the mortar was clear. I had to adjust the position of [REDACTED] and then gave a fire order. I heard the 2 inch mortar open fire from behind me.

I heard two rounds fired from the mortar and then there was an explosion and I was thrown around so I was facing back towards the bunker.

I could not see any smoke or signs of an explosion in the area.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Due to the other live firing going on at the same time I am unable to say if another 2 inch mortar was firing or not.

As a result of the explosion I sustained the following shrapnel wounds.

1. A shrapnel entry wound to the left side of the bottom of my nose.
2. A shrapnel wound to the rear of the left buttock.
3. A shrapnel wound to the outside rear of the upper left thigh.
4. Shrapnel wound to the outside rear of the mid left thigh.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1700 hrs on 21 Feb 86 at RAF Wroughton.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 21st day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of 1 PARA at present serving with my unit in Bulford. I was born on 26 Dec 65.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was taking part in a Coy live firing exercise with 2 pl, A Coy 1 PARA, in a place known to me as 'Range Valley', Norway.

The attack had started when a barbed wire entanglement been blown by Bangalore Torpedos and bombardment of the targets designated as X11 and X12, the indepth target being X13.

[REDACTED] and I were tasked to clear the bunker designated as X11 once the mortar and other support weapons had changed targets we moved forward as a Sect.

Having disposed of the bunker using grenades and rifle fire [REDACTED] and I moved forward. I took up a position some 2 to 3 yards in front of the bunker at its left edge facing in the direction of the advance. [REDACTED] took up a position level with my position some five yards or so to my right. We were in the prone position.

It was while we were in this position that I heard a sharp explosion behind me. I looked around and saw that [REDACTED] and Sgt Lyden had sited a 2 inch mortar to what would have been the right rear side of the bunker from my position. I could see that [REDACTED] was facing towards the line of the advance and that the mortar was sited to his right side. To the right of the mortar was Sgt Lyden. I could see that he was almost facing directly towards me but slightly off to his left.

I did not see any rounds fired, but I heard another round and then a third explosion at which time I was injured.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

My injuries were shrapnel wounds, two to the right hip entry and exit, one to the outside rear of the right thigh, the other to the outside rear of my right calf.

I cannot comment on the rhythm of the mortar firing. Additionally the 81 mm mortars and other weapons were firing on other targets and due to all the noise I am unable to say if any other 2 inch mortars were firing or not.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1630 hrs on Fri 21 Feb 86 at RAF Wroughton.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
 Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: Apr 88

This statement, (consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 21st day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of 1 PARA.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 about 1345 hrs, I was operating as part of 2 pl, A Coy, 1 PARA, taking part in a live firing exercise in a place known to me as 'Range Valley' Norway.

I was with the HQ Sect with Sgt Lyden. Prior to the commencement of the exercise both Sgt Lyden and I were issued with about 28 rds each of 2 inch mortar ammunition which we carried on our bergen rucksack. I was also carrying two 84mm rounds, my personal weapon an SMG and the 2 inch mortar itself.

The start of the attack was signalled by the blowing of some barbed wire by Bangalore Torpedos. At this we advanced towards the targets, which were bunkers designated as X11 and X12, the in depth target was X13. As the attack began the 81mm mortars, and other support weapons were firing on the targets and as we approached they changed target.

Sgt Lyden and I arrived at the target known as X11 and took up a position at the rear of the bunker X11 and to the right of it. We had not fired the mortar up to this point.

Assisted by Sgt Lyden I sited the mortar having removed my rucksack. Sgt Lyden removed the ammunition from my rucksack as he required it for firing. I was kneeling with my right knee up facing my front across the barrel to 1 o'clock the mortar was held by my left hand for aiming whilst I was to operate the lanyard to fire the weapon with my right hand. Sgt Lyden was on the other side of the mortar, facing $\frac{3}{4}$ away from it towards the target area. I know that Sgt Lyden loaded two rounds into the mortar which I fired at his command. He was observing the fall of the rounds and was adjusting my aim accordingly.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

I can recall that Sgt Lyden loaded what I believe was the third round, but I have no recollection of firing this round. It was at this point that I was injured. I do not recall any explosion.

With regard to the position that Sgt Lyden and I occupied, I can recall small trees or bushes to my front right and at least four or five yards away.

The ammunition we used had been prepared prior to the exercise starting, they had been removed from their standard packaging and loaded into the rucksacks with the safety pins in position and white tape about the nose cone. Due to the amount of live firing going on at the time of my injury and before it I cannot recall if any other mortars were firing at the time or not.

My injuries are all shrapnel wounds. They are as follows:

1. A wound above the right eye.
2. A wound to the left lower cheek.
3. A wound to the area above the right upper lip.
4. A wound to the area between my left shoulder and neck.
5. Three small puncture wounds to the left shoulder.
6. Numerous puncture wounds to the left upper arm.
7. Four puncture wounds to the rear of my left side and back.
8. A puncture wound to the left side of my mid chest.
9. Numerous small puncture wounds to my left upper leg.
10. Bone damage to the right kneecap.
11. Shapnel wounds to the right calf and thigh on the interior side.

I did not to the best of my knowledge slip or move the weapon suddenly during firing, nor did Sgt Lyden.

I did not see Sgt Lyden drop or mistreat any ammunition.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1730 hrs Fri
21 Feb 86 at RAF Wroughton

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
 Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: Apr 88

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 17th day of September 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

Further to my statement of 21 Feb 86.

When Sgt Lyden and I arrived at the bunker position we set up our mortar as I have previously described. My position was about 3 ft to the rear of the bunker and about 1 ft away sideways. I removed the mortar from my bergen and Sgt Lyden sited it. Neither of us placed anything beneath the base plate, this was placed directly on to the hard packed snow to the best of my recollection.

As we arrived and set up the weapon I was aware of explosions occurring to my front at distances of some 50 to 60 metres. I did not associate these explosions with the 81mm bombardment on the 'in depth' position which I had seen as we were approaching the position.

With regard to the target area that we were firing at I can only say that it was to our front. There was a very large boulder or mound of snow in the middle distance and our rounds were aimed to fall to the left side of this.

I should also add that the mortar tube was aimed at an angle of more than 45 degrees but less than 60 degrees.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1625 hrs on Wed 17 Sep 86 at Headley Court.

Signed: [REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp, Wilts
Date to leave a. Command: May 87 b. Service: May 89

This statement, (consisting of 6 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22nd day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with my Unit at Ex 'HARDFALL SOUTH' 86 in Norway.

On the afternoon of Thu 13 Feb 86 I was the 2IC of 2 Sect, 2 pl, A Coy 1 PARA, who at the time were engaged on a live firing Coy attack in Range Valley, nr Mjolfjell, Norway. The other members of my Sect were [REDACTED], the Sect Comd, and [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. The Sect was split into two sub Sects comprising of myself, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in one sub Sect and [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] in the other.

We had originally formed up some distance from the actual exercise area and walked in. The objective in the exercise area was to take a bunker identified as X11 which was supposedly occupied by enemy forces.

On entering the actual exercise area I saw that we had to descend a steep slope onto the start of the valley floor.

From the top of the slope I could see X11 off to our right about 200 metres away. In a straight line ahead was the objective X13 which was some 600 metres away and off to my left about 220 metres away was the objective X12 which was to be taken by the other Sect of my pl.

We moved down the slope, 1 Sect leading and my Sect behind.

As we went down the slope we lost a couple of blokes into a water pool at the bottom of the slope. However, only [REDACTED] was held up by this hazard so the rest of my Sect continued on towards the objective.

To do this we had to negotiate a barbed wire obstacle between ourselves and X11. The barbed wire was breached by a device called a 'Bangalore Torpedo' and once this had been taken down 1 Sect veered off to their objective, on the left, and 2 Sect, my Sect, went off towards X11. Our Sect advanced in extended line towards X11. Our two sub Sections leapfrogged each other until we came to a point some 20 metres from the objective. At this time my Sect gave covering fire as ██████████ and ██████████ went forward to post a grenade into the bunker. Once they had done so they moved back five metres or so while the grenade exploded. After the explosion ██████████ and ██████████ moved forward through the bunker clearing it with rifle fire as they did so.

Then they went to ground on the far side of the bunker and ██████████ gave the signal for me to move forward with my Sect to the bunker. My Sect then deployed in a straight line from the right side of the bunker and we all put fire down on the objective X13.

About a minute to two minutes later Sgt Lyden of my unit arrived at the bunker together with ██████████. Sgt Lyden proceeded to set up the 2 inch mortar he had brought with him and as far as I am aware ██████████ bought up the ammunition for the mortar in a bergen he was carrying. I am unable to say what kind of surface Sgt Lyden used for putting the mortar on. However, I can say that both Sgt Lyden and ██████████ were kneeling down on one knee as the mortar was fired. The mortar was directed towards X13 and Sgt Lyden was on the right of the mortar closest to me and ██████████ was on the left side of the mortar furthest away from me. I do remember seeing Sgt Lyden holding the mortar which indicates to me that Sgt Lyden was actually firing the mortar and ██████████ was loading it. Also during the time I heard two rounds being fired from the mortar I am positive that two rounds were fired but am unsure if any further rounds were fired.

To make it easier and more clear as to the position of the persons around the bunker I have drawn a plan of the bunker. About 2230 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86, ██████████ RMP (SIB), attached an exhibit label marked JJB/1 to the sketch. I have signed that label. I then handed the sketch to ██████████.

While the mortar was being fired my half Sect plus ██████████ & ██████████ were laying down rifle fire on X13. A few seconds later I heard a very loud sharp sounding explosion immediately to my left which was where the mortar was positioned. I laid down my rifle and put my finger in my left ear in an attempt to clear my ear as the explosion had a kind of pinging sound and it affected my left ear.

I then looked to my left and saw Sgt Lyden lying on the ground on his right side. ██████████ was also lying on the ground across the side of the bunker. On looking at ██████████ I saw he was still in the same position but had turned towards me and said he had been hit. At that time I didn't look at ██████████ to see what condition he was in as I went to the assistance of Sgt Lyden, but as far as I could tell he ██████████ was still lying on the ground in the prone position.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Following the explosion I was not aware of any shock wave or a black ball of smoke. On reaching Sgt Lyden I didn't see any obvious injury. I asked him if he was all right and he complained of having a broken leg. The only injury I did see was some blood coming from the corner of his mouth. Sgt Lyden's speech was clear at this time. I then started to take his snow shoes off and he complained of pain in his legs. I then loosened his clothing and on pulling up his jumper I saw a puncture like wound about 2 inches above his left nipple. I put a field dressing on the wound and pulled his jumper down. I then tried to tend to his groin because he seemed to have puncture wounds on the left and right side of his groin. Other people then started to arrive and rendered medical aid to all four soldiers prior to them being evacuated from the area by helicopter. While helping Sgt Lyden his condition started to get worse in that his speech was very slurred and when I tried to find a pulse in his left wrist and on the side of his neck I couldn't feel a pulse.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me of the Oppheim Hotel, Oppheim, Norway about 1430 hrs Sat 22 Feb 86.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp, Wilts
 Date to leave a.Command: May 87 b. Service: May 89

This statement,(consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 20th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

Further to my statement dated 22 Feb 86.

When I took up my fire position at the Sect objective I did so by bracing myself against a tree. The tree was to my right side and I had my right hand resting against it, holding my weapon. If I looked back over my left shoulder at an angle of about 45 degrees I could see Sgt Lyden, [REDACTED] and the 2 inch mortar. Sgt Lyden was no more than 4 ft to the side, but diagonally about 6 ft from me.

At the time of the explosion I heard a very loud bang and had to clear my ear. I did not feel the tree move at all, nor did I feel any blast or heat from the explosion. No debris struck me nor was any of my equipment torn or damaged.

I have been shown a colour photograph exhibit BJM/2 showing the Sect objective from the right side. This photograph shows a red grid laid to from the right side of the bunker in which is located a tree. This tree is in the 3rd row from the bunker and 3rd row from the bottom of the photograph. The top of the tree is damaged.

This is the tree against which I was resting, I was between it and the bunker. I have signed the label attached to the photograph.

I am unable to comment on how the tree was damaged or whether it was damaged before I took up my position.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1600 hrs on Thu 20 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp, Wilts
Date to leave a. Command: May 87 b. Service: May 89

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18th day of September 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

Further to my previous statements of 22 Feb 86 and 20 Mar 86.

I now realise that when I identified the tree against which I was leaning I was mistaken. I was actually resting against the next tree to the right.

Additionally I wish to add that at some time after we arrived at our position I was aware of explosions occurring in front of me. I believe there were two or three which happened about 100 metres or so in front, there was a time lag between each explosion of at least 5 seconds. I believe that there were other explosions going on further away about the same time and that those closest to me could have been part of the 81 mm bombardment on the 'in depth' position. If that were the case then the explosions could have been happening as we skirmished up to the position I really do not recall exactly.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1515 hrs on Thu 18 Sep 86 at QEMH.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp, Salisbury
Wilts.
Date to leave a.Command: May 87 b. Service: [REDACTED]

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving as the pl comdr for 2 pl of A Coy, 1 PARA at present serving on Ex 'HARDFALL SOUTH' 86 in Norway.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 my pl and myself were engaged on a live firing Coy attack in 'Range Valley' Mjolfjell, Norway. The actual exercise involved my pl taking a specified objective, in this case referred to as X11, which was a group of four bunkers supposedly occupied by enemy forces.

To achieve this my pl was divided into 2 Sects who were actually on the ground involved in the events I am about to describe. H hour, the start of the exercise, was given about 1330 hrs Thu 13 Feb 86.

As part of the exercise a device called a 'Bangalore Torpedo' was used to breach barbed wire defences between my 2 Sects and our objective, X11. The detonating of the Bangalore Torpedo was the signal for my two Sects to begin our move forward. The reason I say 2 Sects is that following an incident after the Bangalore Torpedo detonated my other Sect was unable to reach X11, as they had advanced forward into a pool of water and this held up their advance. At the time we went into the pool our objective X11 was about 200 metres South West of us and downhill from the pool.

Despite the incident at the pool numbers 1 and 2 Sects carried on forward together with Sgt Lyden the pl Sgt. I was stuck at the pool and by the time I had extricated myself and moved forward I could see that Sgt Lyden had already taken X11 and was situated in a bunker which formed part of X11 together with [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

My impression of the scene as I approached was that Sgt Lyden was in front of and to the right of the bunker. [REDACTED] was about 2 or 3 feet away from Sgt Lyden, to the left and front of the bunker. Behind the two on the other side of the bunker was [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

As I got closer I saw that Sgt Lyden was operating a 2 inch mortar and that [REDACTED] was next to him loading the mortar with ammunition. When I was about 18 feet away from the bunker I saw a black ball of smoke appear very close about 3 or 4 feet away from Sgt Lyden. The black ball of smoke was accompanied by a very loud explosion and I then saw all four soldiers fall to the ground. A few seconds later I reached the bunker. By this time Sgt Lyden was lying on the ground on his left side. My first impression was that he wasn't injured as he was mumbling but I was not aware of him forming any words I could make out.

I then saw [REDACTED] who was lying about 6 or 7 feet away from Sgt Lyden. [REDACTED] was evidently injured as he was lying on his front and on looking at his back view I saw that his camouflage white trousers were ripped and that he was bleeding from wounds to his buttocks and legs. I asked [REDACTED] if he was okay and he said, "Yes".

I then saw [REDACTED] who was also lying on the ground some seven feet from [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was also lying on his front and from what I initially saw I could see that he too was injured in that he had sustained wounds to his right leg. I asked [REDACTED] if he was okay and he also replied, "Yes".

By this time other members of my pl started arriving at the bunker and started to administer help to the four injured soldiers. I remember seeing [REDACTED] going over to help Sgt Lyden and I believe a [REDACTED] went to assist [REDACTED]. I stayed with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] then as more people arrived they also went to assist the injured men.

During the twenty minutes or so prior to the soldiers being evacuated I asked what had happened and [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were unable to say what they thought had happened. I asked [REDACTED] if a grenade had exploded amongst them and he said, "No".

I was unable to speak to Sgt Lyden as by the time I was able to look at him some 2 or 3 minutes later I saw that [REDACTED] was administering mouth to mouth resuscitation and also closed chest cardiac massage in an apparent attempt to revive Sgt Lyden.

I did not see any injuries to Sgt Lyden apart from a cut lip which he had sustained. I should also mention that the black smoke which resulted from the explosion appeared to me to be centred in the middle of the four soldiers around the bunker. Whether or not the explosion was an air burst or ground burst I am unable to say.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me at The Oppheim Hotel, Oppheim, Norway about 1425 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilsts.
Date to leave a.Command: NK b. Service: Apr 93

This statement,(consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 20th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with A Coy, 1 PARA in Bulford.

During Feb 86 I was with my unit in Norway taking part in Ex 'HARDFALL'.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was the radio operator of 2 pl A Coy. We were taking part in a Coy live firing exercise in a place I know as Range Valley. The attack started about mid day or shortly after. I was part of the pl HQ which comprised myself, [REDACTED], Sgt Lyden, [REDACTED] the 2 inch mortarmen and [REDACTED] the 84mm.

As the attack started we had to negotiate a steep snow covered bank, which gave way and we fell into a pond. Several other people fell including [REDACTED] and I believe [REDACTED]. There was some delay while we got ourselves and our equipment out. In the meantime the rest of the pl had pushed onto their objectives.

Having got out I ran to join Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] at the first bunker of our objective. I could see both of them there and that was to be the pl HQ. I must have been about 75 mtrs away when I saw an explosion at the bunker. I could no longer see any individuals as I was in dead ground. All I saw was a puff of black smoke, it was a ball of smoke. I ran on to the position and when I saw that there were casualties I sent a radio message.

I cannot recall seeing anything to indicate that there had been an explosion on the bunker, although the entrance was smoke blackened. Having sent my radio message I picked up a 2 inch mortar that was on the ground between [REDACTED] and Sgt Lyden, both of whom were injured and looked down the barrel. Seeing the weapon was clear I put it down. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were also both injured.

I don't remember seeing any mortar rounds lying loose in the snow although there was a rucksack nearby full of 2 inch bombs.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Both Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] had their rucksacks off.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1645 hrs Thu 20
Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: HQ Sect, 2 pl, A Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford,
 Wilts.
 Date to leave a.Command: Jun 87 b. Service: Dec 93

This statement,(consisting of 6 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] HQ Sect, 2 pl, A Coy, 1 PARA at present serving with my unit on Ex 'HARDFALL' in Norway. During the morning of Thu 13 Feb 86, I was given orders by Sgt Lyden for a Coy live firing attack to be held later that day at Mjolfjell Valley. I was told that we were going to attack a Coy position which he illustrated using a map and a plan he drew. He told me that I would fire on one objective and then on another using the 84mm Carl Gustav then after [REDACTED] had fired the 2 inch mortar I would fire the 2 inch mortar. Sgt Lyden asked me if I had fired the 2 inch mortar before and I told him that I fired one smoke bomb last year. He then jokingly said that he would have to fire them all. Then Sgt Lyden opened two cases containing 2 inch mortar bombs, 18 bombs in each box. To the best of my knowledge all of the bombs were contained in intact sealed cylinders within these two sealed boxes. Sgt Lyden then told me to load a patrol pack with these bombs. I then opened one sealed cylinder at a time and loaded the bombs into my patrol pack in which I put seven bombs. Sgt Lyden told [REDACTED] to load his bergen with bombs. [REDACTED] broke the seal on one of the canisters and then asked me if it was okay to carry the bombs in this fashion. I told him that it was. [REDACTED] then loaded 29 bombs in his bergen. I then left the immediate area. On my return about 30 minutes later I returned to where [REDACTED] was who told me that he had been give some more mortar bombs as one of the other pls did not have their 2 inch mortar.

I picked up [REDACTED]'s bergen which was very heavy and I brought this to Sgt Lyden's attention, who also picked up [REDACTED] bergen, which he said was too heavy and he should put them in another bergen which he would carry. [REDACTED] then started to repack some of the bombs into another bergen. As he did so I saw that some of them were still contained in the sealed metal canisters. Sgt Lyden told [REDACTED] to leave some of them in the metal canisters as he did not think he would have time to fire them all. [REDACTED] continued to transfer some of the bombs and when Sgt Lyden left the area some of the bombs he transferred he removed from their sealed metal canisters.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Shortly after this we boarded the helicopter and moved to the LZ near the range. From there we moved to the form up point (FUP). Shortly afterwards we were told to start the attack. I was towards the front of the pl with Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED]. We moved forward towards the range into dead ground behind Satebu Hut. We waited there for some time during which 1 pl were putting fire down on the objectives whilst the Bangalore Torpedo was being laid. Then we were told to go, the Bangalore Torpedo exploded then my pl started to move down a frozen waterfall towards the range. On the way down most of my pl left the ice track and fell into a frozen pond the ice on top of which broke and we ended up in the water with our equipment. I got out of there fairly quickly with everyone's help as I had to reach the objective and fire my 84 mm Carl Gustav. Once out I went through the wire and headed towards our objective. I started running towards the left as I thought I saw Sgt Lyden. I was corrected by my pl comdr who directed me towards a bunker on my right. I looked to my right and saw a bunker where Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] were. Sgt Lyden was on the right of [REDACTED] who was about one yard behind and to the right of the right hand rear corner of the bunker. I could see Sgt Lyden was holding a bomb in his right hand and the mortar tube in his left as if about to load the mortar. He was kneeling to the right of the mortar. [REDACTED] was kneeling to the left of the mortar and he was taking his bergen off.

I was about seven yards behind them. I looked down at the ground in order to see where I could step and almost instantly I heard a very loud explosion. I looked up and saw Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] lying on the ground. [REDACTED] was running towards Sgt Lyden shouting for a medic. I ran towards them and ripped off my field dressing which I handed to [REDACTED]. I knelt beside Sgt Lyden and when I looked around I saw [REDACTED] knelt beside [REDACTED]. Sgt Lyden tried to get up I told him to stay still, as he tried to raise himself he shouted that his legs were hurt. [REDACTED] called me over to help with [REDACTED] and I left Sgt Lyden with [REDACTED]. I then assisted [REDACTED] in treating [REDACTED] with wounds to his legs. I then continued to assist with first aid until the casualties were evacuated.

The seven mortar bombs I had been issued with were never fired.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me about 1825 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86 at Oppheim Norway.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: HOWLETT Forenames: Geoffrey
Service No: 411979 Rank: Gen Sir
Type of Engagement: Reg C Height:
Date & Place of Birth: 5 Feb 30 at Bangalore India
Full Unit Address: CinC AFNORTH BFPO 50
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 21st day of March 1986 Signed: G HOWLETT

I am Gen Sir Geoffrey Howlett. My present appointment is CinC AFNORTH.

About lunchtime on Thu 13 Feb 86 I was present at the Satebu Hut, Mjolfjell Valley, Norway as an observer. A Coy 1 PARA, were to carry out a live firing Coy attack, on the positions prepared in the valley.

The actual attack was preceeded by an 81 mm mortar bombardment of the objectives and a gap was blown in a barbed wire entanglement in front of my observation position. The Coy attack was supported by various SF GPMGs, 2 inch mortars and 84 mm anti tank guns fired from the Satebu Hut area.


I was aware that a 2 inch mortar was sited to the right of the Satebu Hut and this weapon was firing into the valley.

I cannot recall exactly how long the exercise had been in progress, but I was looking towards the right hand bunker of the first objective, a distance of approximately 300 mtrs where I could see a fire support team deployed in action. I could not see what weapons were in use. I saw an explosion at this location. The explosion occurred some three feet or so above the ground, I did not see any flash only a ball of smoke blackish in colour. Almost immediately I saw people at the location falling over.

I am unable to accurately pin point the time that the mortar to my right ceased firing. However, I was aware of it firing about this time. I am unable to comment as this mortar's base plate position.

Signed: Gen Sir GEOFFREY HOWLETT

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1510 hrs on Fri 21 Mar 86 at Aldershot.

Signed: 
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: HOWLETT Forenames: Geoffrey
Service No: 411979 Rank: Gen
Type of Engagement: Reg C Height:
Date & Place of Birth: 5 Feb 30 at Bangalore India
Full Unit Address: CinC AFNORTH BFPO 50
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 20th day of August 1986 Signed: G HOWLETT


Further to my statement of 21 Mar 86.

I wish to add that during the field firing exercise carried out by A Coy 1 PARA in the Mjolfjell Valley on Thu 13 Feb 86, I was aware of explosions taking place in the open ground forward of the first objective. There were two to three explosions over a period of approximately one minute. I can only say that the fall of shot gave me the impression of a single weapon as opposed to a battery. The rounds fell in the dead ground some 150 metres, forward of the first position. I commented on this fact to Maj Clement RA another observer.

With regard to rounds falling to the left of the bunker where the accident happened I am unable to comment, I did not personally see any explosions in this area, I was concentrating on the first objective.

Signed: G HOWLETT

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1040 hrs on Wed 20 Aug 86 at Crickhowell.

Signed: 
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: G3 Trg, HQ UKLF, Wilton
 Date to leave a. Command: Jan 87 b. Service: NA

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 26th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED], at present serving with HQ UKLF, where I hold the appointment of G3 Trg (S02 (NATO)).

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was present at the Satebu Hut, Mjolfjell Valley Range Norway, as an observer at a Parachute Bn live firing exercise.

The exercise began shortly after 1315 hrs, with a mock fighter aircraft attack, followed by a live mortar bombardment with small arms fire onto the objectives. A 2 inch mortar had been sited to the right of the Satebu Hut and was also firing. Following this a barbed wire entanglement in front of the objectives was blown by a Bangalore Torpedo.

I saw members of the unit run forward and place the charges in the barbed wire and at this time I saw that the supporting small arms fire was still being laid down, but directed to targets to either side of them. The exercise seemed to progress well and was very realistic. I watched the leading sections pass through the barbed wire to attack the nearest objective to me. I should point out that at the Satebu Hut an area of snow, perhaps a couple of yards wide had been cleared and the 2 inch mortar had been sited in this area initially and at some stage during the attack, I do not know when, it was moved some 5 or 6 yards further to the right outside of the area of cleared snow. With regard to this mortar's second position I can only offer the opinion that this was a hastily prepared location, in that it was on the side of a steep snowy bank.

I saw the troops take the first objective and whilst my observations were not detailed as I was not using binoculars I could see people moving around. It would have been about 1345 hrs that I was looking towards the first objective when I saw an explosion close to it. I saw only black smoke, no ground debris or flash. My first impression was that a round had fallen just beyond the position as there were soldiers silhouetted by the pall of smoke. It would have been 3 or 4 seconds after this that I saw people falling over in that location.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

At the time of this explosion the 2 inch mortar to my right had been firing. However I cannot comment as to which target it was engaging. I did not observe the fall of its bombs due to the other activity going on at the time.

I should point out that when this mortar was first sited close to the hut I had seen the crew prepare their base plate position by packing it with broken bits of expanded polystyrene foam or a similar substance that was grey in colour. I did not see them use either wood or a bergen for their base plate on this or their subsequent position.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1740 hrs on Wed 26 Feb 86 at Wilton.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Mortar Pl Sp, Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a.Command: NK b. Service: Nov 89

This statement, (consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22nd day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with the Mortar Pl, Support Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford. I am employed as a radio operator within the pl.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was taking part in a Coy live firing exercise carried out in the Mjolfjell Valley, Norway. A Coy 1 PARA was to attack three objectives, which had been designated, for mortar fire as X11, X12 and X13 the in depth position.

I was positioned in an OP at the Satebu Hut with [REDACTED], OC Mortar Pl and [REDACTED]. We had adjusted the mortars on to the targets and recorded the details.

It would have been about 1300 hrs that the MFCs (Mortar Fire Controllers) arrived and they were then give the fire plan proformas with all of the recorded details.

I can recall that A Coy were deployed in dead ground behind the hut but some of their fire support including a 2 inch mortar were deployed in the area of the Satebu Hut.

The first fire mission order called down mortar fire on the 2 nearest objectives X11 and X12, following which a breach was blown in a barbed wire entanglement midway between the hut and the objectives. With this more mortar fire was brought down on to these two positions. It was after this salvo that the Coy began to move forward towards their objectives and mortar fire was switched to the in depth position X13.

Whilst this was going on I was watching the Sect moving onto their objectives. I saw a Sect move up onto the first bunker of X11. I could see that some of the Sect were lying down in firing positions to the right of the bunker and two people were crouched down at the back right corner of the bunker.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

All the time that this was going on SF GPMGs were firing live ammunition above the position a few feet above their heads. These weapons were firing from the Satebu Hut and I could follow the line of the tracer rounds.

Suddenly I saw what I took to be an explosion in the area of the bunker. What I actually saw was a cloud of dense black smoke. It appeared to be directly in front of the two people crouching at the rear of the bunker and appeared to be about a foot above their heads. The smoke shot out left and right and a central column shot up vertically. I did not see any flash. My initial reaction was that a grenade had exploded.

The two men at the rear of the bunker fell over and I saw other members of the Sect, get up, throw down their weapons and run towards them.

The only other thing I can say is that from my position the Sect was deployed in almost a straight line at an angle of about 30 degrees.

After this [REDACTED] took over my radio and went to the position.

At the time that the accident occurred SF GPMGs were deployed very close to me and due to the noise of their firing I cannot say if the 2 inch mortar at the Satebu Hut was firing or not.

I can recall seeing the 81 mm mortars landing in the target X13 but was not aware of any other explosions in the area of X11.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1055 hrs Sat 22 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: RMO 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.
Date to leave a. Command: Dec 86 b. Service: NK

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving as the Regimental Medical Officer for 1 PARA, who are at present deployed on Ex 'HARDFALL' in Norway. My qualifications are MB ChB which I gained at Sheffield University in 1982.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was on duty at the regimental aid post which had been established about 400 m away from Satebu Hut in Mjolfjell Valley Range. About 1345 hrs I was informed that there had been 4 casualties in the A Coy live fire attack which was taking place on the range. I travelled to the range arriving there about 5 minutes later. On my arrival I saw a male person dressed in arctic combat clothing who was identified to me as Sgt Lyden 1 PARA. He was lying on the ground unconscious, his clothes open from the waist upwards. I noticed a small entry wound in the chest over the area of the heart. On examination no pulse was palpable and his heart had stopped with corresponding clinical signs. I made attempts at resuscitation but was unsuccessful. I arranged for the helicopter evacuation to the regimental aid post and I accompanied him on the journey.

At the regimental aid post further attempts at resuscitation were made by myself and staff, but were again unsuccessful. At this point [REDACTED] was also brought to the regimental aid post and I made the decision that Sgt Lyden was dead and stopped further treatment. I observed that Sgt Lyden had a minor cut to the lower lip but further investigation was not necessary as resuscitation was of primary importance.

I then examined [REDACTED] who at the time of the examination was face down on a stretcher. He was conscious and orientated. He had a large soft tissue injury to the left buttock of about 5 inches in diameter and no further injuries at this time were detectable. An intravenous drip was set up and a field dressing applied to his wound. In addition I gave an intramuscular dose of morphine. He was then carried out by stretcher to a waiting helicopter for evacuation to hospital.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

About 45 minutes later I visited Voss hospital casualty department and saw [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] together with [REDACTED] in the casualty treatment room. [REDACTED] had shrapnel wounds to the upper and lower part of the back of his right leg all of about 2cm in diameter. He was later x rayed and I examined the films which showed no fractures but did show that shrapnel had entered all of the wounds to his legs.

[REDACTED] had shrapnel wounds to the right knee entering from the front and a shrapnel wound over the right eye and a further shrapnel wound to his left elbow entering from the outside of the elbow. He was also X-rayed and I examined the films which showed that shrapnel had entered all of these wounds. He was later operated on under a general anaesthetic to remove the shrapnel including a piece in the right knee joint.

I again examined [REDACTED] who had the aforesaid wound to the buttock and a shrapnel wound to the nose comprising of a small entry wound to the left nostril. [REDACTED] was X-rayed and on examination of the films I saw that there was shrapnel in the wounds to the buttock and nose. These three soldiers were all operated on by the Norwegian doctors from the hospital and on Fri 14 Feb 86 they were evacuated to RAF hospital Wroughton for further treatment.

Having examined all of the wounds and from the patients accounts of their position and posture I am of the opinion that all of these wounds are as the result of an explosion causing shrapnel occurred between all four soldiers.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me about 2030 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86 at Oppheim Norway.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: HQ Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: May 87 b. Service: Sep 88

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 1st day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with 1 PARA in Bulford.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was on duty at the Regimental Aid Post (RAP) set up near to the Satebu Hut in Range Valley Norway.

It was about lunchtime that Sgt Lyden A Coy, who was known to me and I could recognise arrived at the RAP by helicopter accompanied by [REDACTED]. I assisted [REDACTED] with first aid and resuscitation of Sgt Lyden until such time as [REDACTED] said he was dead.

Having dealt with other casualties I then accompanied Sgt Lyden's body by Puma Helicopter to the MRS of 16 Fd Amb at Borreon where I handed the body over to a member of that unit, who I believe was [REDACTED].

Whilst I was assisting [REDACTED] with Sgt Lyden I saw that he had sustained an injury to his bottom lip and wound to the right of the left nipple. It looked like a little hole.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1225 hrs on Wed 1 Oct 86 at Tidworth.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: 16 Fd Amb AMC (L), Wing Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: Mar 87 b. Service: Dec 99

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 1st day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the RAMC and trained Combat Medical Technician.

On Thu 14 Feb 86 I was taking part in an exercise at Bonaen Norway, where my unit had established a Medical Reception Station. Sometime about 1500 hrs the MRS received casualties room 1 PARA by helicopter.

When the helicopter arrived members of my unit unloaded it and brought in two stretchers. One was carrying a soldier with a bayonet wound the other was used to carry a dead body. Both stretchers were carried into the MRS and having established that the man was dead I instructed my unit orderlies to take the dead body back to the helicopter for onward transmission to the Park Hotel landing area and transfer to a Civil Ambulance.

I do not know who unloaded the dead body from the helicopter or who put it back on to the aircraft. I believe that it was conveyed from my location by the same helicopter it had arrived on.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1445 hrs on Wed 1 Oct 86 at Tidworth.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: 33 Sqn, RAF Odiham.
Date to leave a. Command: Dec 87 b. Service: Dec 90

This statement, (consisting of 4 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 6th day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] currently serving with 33 Sqn at RAF Odiham, Hants.

I do not recall the exact dates but during the period mid Jan 86 to mid Mar 86 I was serving with my unit on as a Load Master on a Puma helicopter in Bonoen Norway.

On 13 Feb 86 I was in the crew room within Bonoen camp, when a call came in that an accident had occurred on the Mjolfjell range and helicopters were required at the scene. [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and I then boarded a Puma helicopter and began the journey to the scene of the accident. I believe this flight took approximately 15 to 20 minutes.

On arrival we landed and waited for instructions from the ground forces. Approximately 3 minutes later we were called forward to collect a dead body and 1 injured soldier. Neither the dead body or the injured soldier were identified to me. I only recall them being both male and dressed in DPM combat suits.

I do not recall receiving orders to convey the two soldiers to any particular destination. As all the other helicopters had returned to Bonoen camp we initially conveyed the two soldiers to MRS within Bonoen camp.

On our arrival at the MRS both soldiers were off loaded and taken into the medical centre. I helped carry the stretcher holding the dead body.

Once in the medical centre the dead body was examined by one of the medical staff. After this examination we were instructed by the same person to convey the dead body to Voss hospital.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

The body was again loaded onto the Puma helicopter and conveyed to Voss hospital. I believe this flight took approximately 5 minutes.

As there was no known landing site at the hospital we landed at the nearest available point.

Once we had landed we were met by a civilian ambulance crew who boarded the aircraft and examined the body. Once the examination was completed the body was removed by the ambulance crew and transferred into a ambulance. We then left the area and returned to Bonoen camp.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me at RAF Odiham on 6 Oct 86 about 1840 hrs.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP att SIB

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Adjt, HQ Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts.
Date to leave a.Command: Jun 86 b. Service: 2011

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 17th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] PARA, at present serving with my unit on Ex 'HARDFALL' in Norway.

About 1300 hrs Mon 17 Feb 86, at the Gade Institute, Haukland Hospital, Bergan, Norway, I saw the body of 24351430 Sgt Lyden Daniel, a member of my unit, whom I recognised. I identified the body of Sgt Lyden to [REDACTED] (SIB).

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me about 1810 hrs Mon 17 Feb 86 at Oppheim, Norway.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): [REDACTED]
Occupation:
Address: University of Bergen, The Gade Institute
Department of Forensic Medicine, 5000 Bergen - Norway
Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the [REDACTED] day of [REDACTED] 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am a professor of forensic medicine, which I have practised for 30 years at The Gade Institute of Pathology the University of Bergen. I am a member of the British Association in Forensic Medicine.

On Friday the 14th of February 1986, I performed a post mortem at the Haukeland University Hospital in Bergen on D. Lyden, who died on the 13th of February following an accident.

I found multiple scratch wounds and entry wounds. The most important entry wound was found in the left breast, just beside the papilla mammary. From this skin wound we could follow a track through the left lung, through the pericardial sack and through the apex of the heart. A small piece of metal was found lying in the pericardial sack. This was delivered to the Norwegian policeman who attended the autopsy. There was about 1.00 ml fluid blood in the plura, and about 300 ml in the pericardial sack. Other important injuries were a large scratch mark in the lower lip, an entry wound in the skin on the back of the left shoulder. Here a metal bit was found subcutaneously. There were three entry wounds in the lower front of the left thigh. Here the femoral bone was splintered. A metal piece was found in the soft tissues. These two metal pieces were also given to the police officer. We did not attempt to recover all metal pieces.

In my opinion the cause of death was due to the puncturation of the left lung and of the heart by a piece of metal with subsequent haemorrhage and heart failure.

In Norway we do not put the organs back into the body. The organs have been incinerated.

Signed: [REDACTED]
Professor dr. med.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: AMF (L) Sup Coy RAOC, Log Sup Bn AMF(L), Ludgershall.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 88 b. Service: Jun 92

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 1st day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] RAOC a fully qualified Ammunition Technician.

On Thu 13 Feb 86 I was taking part in Ex HARDFALL SOUTH in Range Valley, Norway. My initial task was to monitor the firing of Milan Anti Tank Missiles.

About 1300 hrs that day or thereabouts I became aware that an accident had occurred at the bunkers of the first objective being used by 1 PARA on a Coy field firing exercise in the valley below.

I went initially to the Satebu Hut where I spoke to [REDACTED] OC Sp Coy 1 PARA, who informed me that an ammunition accident had occurred. Two mortars were deployed at the ridge on the right side of the Satebu Hut.

I went then to the scene of the accident where I was informed that there had been one fatality and that other soldiers had been injured by an explosion at that location. I carried out a search of the area during that and the following days, assisted by [REDACTED] AT RAOC of my unit, who also made a video of the area and later removed equipment from the scene.

During my initial search I saw a 2 inch mortar which was lying beside the bunker, I examined that weapon and established that it was clear. Two HE rounds inside of a bergan rucksack at that location had been struck by shrapnel fragments and were later destroyed.

During my searches of the area of the incident I was unable to detect any signs of the ground signature of any type of mortar explosion. However, it should be noted that 3 or 4 helicopters had overflown the area and landed and that numerous troops had trampled the area in between the incident and the beginning of my examination. On digging down in the snow I found carbon deposit. It was during this phase of my examination that I found three 2 inch mortar safety caps and two 2 inch mortar safety pins.

I dismantled the bunker in total. It had been constructed of empty wooden ammunition boxes. Whilst I found signs of damage to the boxes caused by the explosion of L2 hand grenades, detonated inside the bunker leaving exit holes, there were no signs of shrapnel entering these boxes from the outside.

I also examined the mortar and established that there were no signs of an internal explosion, nor were there any visible scoring to the exterior of the barrel.

During my examination I noted that there was a small tree located some 2 metres forward of the rear of the bunker and no more than 2 metres to the right. The top of this tree was forked and showed signs of having been involved in an explosion as one fork had been broken off and the other was splintered and charred. It was not possible to determine when this explosion had occurred and from my own knowledge I know that the area had been used as a mortar impact area earlier that day and during the preceding days.

From my observations and examinations at the scene I prepared a written report, a copy of which I have handed to [REDACTED] RMP (SIB), who has labelled it BJM/1.

Additionally whilst at the Satebu Hut and the scene of the accident I caused photographs to be taken. I retained the exposed film which I had developed at DLSA Didcot, from which photographic enlargements were made. I have handed a set of these photographs to [REDACTED], who has labelled them BJM/2. Those photographs show:

1. View from Satebu Hut showing [REDACTED] trench and mortar position.
2. View of right rear quarter of bunker.
3. Colour photograph showing damaged tree and broken off branch.
4. Search grid of position.
5. Right hand front of bunker looking rearwards.
6. Close up of damage tree.
7. Front of bunker slightly left.
8. Front of bunker slightly right.
9. Right rear of bunker.
10. View of right side of bunker.
11. Left side of bunker.
12. Rear left side of bunker.
13. Front left of bunker.
14. Front left of bunker towards Satebu.
15. General view of right rear of bunker.
16. Position of [REDACTED] Mortar.
17. Trench and position of [REDACTED] Mortar.

I have also handed to [REDACTED] the video tape made by [REDACTED] which has been labelled BJM/3.

On or about 14 Feb 86 I was handed a piece of shrapnel which had been removed from [REDACTED]. I retained this in my possession.

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

On 5 Mar 86 I was handed by [REDACTED] the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment

and another metal shrapnel fragment marked originating from web equipment.

I retained these items in my possession until I forwarded them to DLSA.

Today 1 Oct 86 the fragment I recovered and that handed to me by [REDACTED] originating from the web equipment have been shown to me by [REDACTED] [REDACTED] labelled as exhibit CN/4 and CN/5 respectively. I recognise them as the same items as I have described above.

I have signed all of the labels referred to.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1700 hrs on Wed 1 Oct 86 at Tidworth.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: AMC (L), Sup Coy RAOC, Ludgershall.
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 3rd day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] RAOC an ammunition technician at present serving with my unit in Ludgershall.

On Fri 14 Feb 86 I was tasked to assist [REDACTED] of my unit at the scene of an ammunition accident at Range Valley Norway. I assisted in the search of the area.

Later we returned to Vinge Hotel, Vinge where [REDACTED] RAOC handed to me four plastic sacks that contained web equipment and combat helmets in another sack. I examined the webbing and found the following.

Two sets of webbing were undamaged. One set had shrapnel damage to the water bottle carrier. I removed the water bottle and cap and found a piece of shrapnel which had pierced the metal cup and embedded itself in the inside of the opposite face.

The remaining set of webbing had a tear in the centre of the rear nylon this was some 5 mms long. There was another tear in the front left of the yolk. I retained the piece of shrapnel in my possession.

I also made a video film showing the scene of the accident and all of the equipment recovered including the helmets and webbing, as well as clothing belonging to Sgt Lyden. All of this clothing was returned by me to the QM 1 PARA.

On Mon 17 Feb 86 I received from [REDACTED] RMP (SIB), the following items labeled accordingly.

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder.

I retained all of these items in my possession until 17 Mar 86 when I handed them together with the shrapnel I had recovered and the video tape to [REDACTED] of my unit.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Today Thu 2 Oct 86 [REDACTED] PWF RMP (SIB) has shown me the following items marked accordingly.

CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch.

BJM/1 - Video Tape of scene.

I recognise both these items are being those I have described above.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1900 hrs on Thu 2 Oct 86 at Kineton.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: AMF (L) Wksp REME, Ward Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: May 94

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 1st day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] REME a fully qualified class 1 armourer at present serving with my unit in Bulford.

During Feb 86 I was taking part in Ex HARDFALL SOUTH in Voss, Norway.

On 14 Feb 86 at Voss, at the request of [REDACTED] ATO RAOC I examined a OML 2 inch mortar Mk 8, barrel no L/159574, body L/159574. The barrel history sheet AF O 8025 was not available, nor were EMERs relating to the weapon.

I carried out my examination visually and I can state that the barrel showed no signs of an internal explosion. By this I mean that there was no distortion of the barrel nor were there any visible signs of explosive residues. I tested the mechanical function of the trigger mechanism and this worked satisfactorily. When dismantled there were no obvious defects.

I was in possession of a 2 inch mortar barrel running gauge with which I tested the barrel. The barrel accepted this and it passed through the barrel freely and there was no excessive movement of the gauge inside the barrel.

The weapon bore no outward signs of paint scraping or scratching or other external damage. The weapon was as far as I could ascertain from my inspection in a serviceable condition.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1110 hrs on Wed 1 Oct 86 at Shipton Bellinger.

Signed: [REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: OC Mortar Pl, Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 17th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Canadian Forces. I am at present on an exchange tour with 1 PARA, where I am employed as the Mortar Pl OC. I attended a Mortar Pl Comdrs/2ICs course at the Support Weapons Wing, Neatheravon during Sep/Nov 84.

During Feb 86 1 PARA was taking part in Ex 'HARDFALL' in the area of the Mjolfjell Valley Norway. This area is sometimes referred to as 'Range Valley' or Rjoanddalen Valley.

Initially the mortar pl, comprising four tubes was deployed at grid 811349 of map sheet M816, on Mon 10 Feb 86. Because of the nature of the base plate position and its preparation using 'Raschen' bags the base plates were left in situ from that time, live firing was carried out on the 11 and 12 Feb 86 and each morning the mortars were sight tested at the mortar line.

Live firing in support of C Coy was carried out on Tue 11 Feb 86 and again on Wed 12 Feb 86 in support of B Coy. A Coy were to carry out their live firing Coy exercise on Thu 13 Feb 86. On each day three targets designated as X11, X12 and X13 (the depth position) were to be engaged. These remained constant and were at grids 828372, 830374 and 831370 respectively to the best of my recollection.

Each morning after the mortars had been resited and sight tested, the mortars were bedded in and their belts of fire checked. Mortars were fired in pairs on each of the targets X11 and X12. In order to standardise the firing the two right hand mortars (No 2 and No 1) were to fire on X11 and the two left hand mortars (No 4 and 3) were to fire on X12. All four mortars were to fire on X13.

My basic task was that of overall safety officer for the 81 mm mortars. [REDACTED] was operating as the safety for the MFC OP and the mortar line was under command of [REDACTED] as safety NCO with [REDACTED] as the CPO, (Command Post Operator).

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

On the morning of Thu 13 Feb 86 the mortars were bedded in, their belts observed and fire adjusted in the normal manner by [REDACTED].

Mortar fire was laid on the targets X11 and X12 during a lull in the mortar fire the Bangalore Torpedo was laid to breach the barbed wire and as that detonated fresh mortar fire was laid on the targets X11 and X12. A Coy began its advance and all four mortars switched their aim to X13. I am aware that five rounds were fired on X11 and X12, as fire for effect before the blowing of the barbed wire and that this fire order was then repeated before the Coy began its attack. All four mortars then fired 3 rounds, a total of 12 rounds on X13. No further 81mm fire was laid down. But the 81mm mortars were at readiness for another fire mission order.

I heard a sharp crack, not the sound of an 81mm round exploding, come from almost directly in front of me. I looked towards X11 and saw some black smoke dispersing. I assumed from the sound that this was a hand grenade. I could see a soldier running towards the objective and then looked back towards X13.

[REDACTED] who was also watching the advance of the pl advancing on X13 drew my attention to the fact that he considered that this pl was now approaching an unsafe position for any further fire. I agreed with him and the order 'Check fire' was given to the mortars to which the mortar line responded.

About this time I was made aware that there had been some sort of accident at X11 involving casualties and gave the order to the mortar line to 'Stand Clear'. [REDACTED] was then sent to the mortar line to check those weapons.

I should point out that at the time of the incident on X11, the order rounds complete had been given by the mortar line and there was no live mortar fire coming down on any targets. 81mm mortar fire had ceased prior to the explosion on X11, as best as I can recall.

The only incident involving the mortar line during the period Mon 10 - Thu 13 Feb 86 occurred at the end of firing on Wed 12 Feb 86 when the Raschen bag of No 2 mortar had to be repositioned as it had slipped and this was done that day. The following days bedding in and adjusting confirmed the mortar to be firing on line.

There were no other incidents involving the 81 mm mortars or their ammunition during this period that were brought to my attention.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1626 hrs Mon 17 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service: Nov 86

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 17th day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] I am at present serving as the 2IC of the mortar pl Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford. I attended a mortar pl comdrs/2ICs course at Support Weapons Wing, Neatheravon during Dec 79.

During Feb 86 my unit was exercising in the Mjolfjell Valley, Norway. This location is sometimes referred to as the 'Range' or 'Rjoanddalen' Valley. Live mortar fire was to be provided for Coy live firing exercises during the period Tue 11 - Thu 13 Feb 86. To this end I was to act as the MFC Op safety supervisor.

The mortar line was prepared using Raschen bags on Mon 10 Feb 86 at grid 811349 on map sheet M816 but no firing took place.

The following day Tue 11 Feb 86, the mortars were bedded in and the belts of fire observed and adjusted on X13. Each other target ie: X11 and X12 were then fired on mortars Nos 2 and 1 fired on X11 and mortars Nos 4 and 3 fired on X12. To adjust these targets I used the No 2 and No 4 mortars, thereby ensuring that fire from the other two mortars would fall further away from the friendly forces. The targets were recorded after adjustment. This procedure was repeated on each day prior to firing in support of the Coys.

Prior to the first days firing I issued instructions for sight testing. I did not repeat this instruction daily as this is a Standard Operational Procedure.

On the morning of Thu 13 Feb 86 I satisfied myself that the mortars were firing on target. To the best of my recollection only a slight adjustment was needed to X12, this was fired and then a second round to confirm the fall of shot. Having re recorded the targets I prepared an AB 545, Artillery Fire Plan Proforma for the incoming MFC (Mortar Fire Controller) at Op, a copy being handed to the Coy MFC and another to [REDACTED] the mortar range safety officer.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

On this form I specified the targets, which mortars were to fire on targets and instructions as to when fire was to commence and be checked.

I briefed the OPMFC, [REDACTED] whilst [REDACTED] briefed the Coy MFC, [REDACTED]

I had issued fire mission orders to the mortars who were waiting for the order to fire from the MFCs, who had been briefed and could exercise their own judgement as to the rate of fire required by the Coy Comdr. The mortars fired at the command of the MFCs from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and then to the mortar line. The fire mission order given was for each pair of mortars to engage their respective targets simultaneously. Following this the Bangalore Torpedo was placed and the barbed wire breached, at which the fire mission order repeated. The advancing troops were still behind the start line and did not move until firing on X11 and X12 was completed.

As the troops advanced across the start line 81 mm mortar fire was switched to X13 and 3 rounds fired from each mortar 'for effect'. Having completed that fire mission the mortar line was standing by to repeat the mission.

I was monitoring the progress of the pl advancing on to the target X13, as I was aware that the mortar line was prepared to fire. I became aware of a group of people gathering around X11, but as I was not aware that anything untoward had happened there I paid little attention to it. The troops moving on X13 were now moving towards what would have been the danger area and after speaking to [REDACTED] the order to check fire on the mortar line was given. I was not paying attention to the time but it would now have been about 1400 hrs and the attack had been in progress for 16 to 20 minutes.

It was then that I became aware that there had been an accident involving casualties on X11. The order 'Stand clear' was given to the mortar line and I was later instructed to go to the mortar line, with [REDACTED] PARA and check the weapons.

I would have arrived at the mortar line some 20 to 30 minutes later. Having obtained the relevant information regarding the bearing and elevation of the target X13 myself and [REDACTED] then checked that these were corrected applied to the sights and that the sights were correctly aligned with the aiming posts. Having done so we then checked with a compass that all barrels were on the same bearing.

Everything on the mortar line was correct.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1800 hrs Mon 17 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Mortar Pl, Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.
Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: Mar 2002

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22nd day of March 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with the Mortar Pl, Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford. I am employed as a Mortar Fire Controller (MFC).

On Thu 13 Feb 86 about 1315 hrs I was detailed to act as the Op MFC, for a Coy live firing exercise, conducted in the Mjolfjell Valley, Norway, which involved A Coy 1 PARA. Present at the OP with me were [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of the Mortar Pl. [REDACTED] was acting as OIC safety.

When operating in the field the method used is that one MFC, in this case [REDACTED] accompanies the Coy Comdr and relays instructions for mortar fire from the OC to me. As targets had previously been adjusted and recorded, on an AB 545 Artillery Fire Plan Proforma, by [REDACTED] there was no need to adjust on to the targets, when fire was called for. All requests for mortar support were referred to [REDACTED] for verification before I passed the order to the mortar line for firing to begin.

The OP in which I was situated was to the left of a place called the Satebu Hut. Grouped around this hut was fire support team of Sp Coy and elements of A Coy fire support team, including a 2 inch mortar and 84 mm Anti Tank Guns.

The first fire mission order I received was to fire five rounds for effect on both of the first two objectives designated as X11 and X12, simultaneously. I called this fire in.

A bangalore torpedo was then laid in a barbed wire entanglement between the hut and the first objective, X11 and prior to this actually detonating the fire mission order was repeated. On each occasion I counted all twenty rounds down onto the two objectives X11 and X12.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

A Coy began its advance and another fire mission order was passed to me calling for four mortars to fire 3 rounds each for effect on the objective X13.

I passed this order to the mortar line and then the rounds began falling on the target. I counted all of the rounds down. They were all on target.

As the last round landed on X13 I heard the A Coy signaller, who was with [REDACTED] the OC, say something like 'there's a grenade gone off down there'. I put down my binoculars and looked down into the valley. At the nearest bunker of the first objective, X11, I could see a group of people lying around the bunker. I looked away and looked back again almost immediately and it was then that I realised that people were injured as they did not appear to have moved. Other people were also running towards them.

The mortars had been left at readiness to repeat their last fire mission order, that is 3 rounds each for effect on X13. As the pl advancing on X13 was still pushing on toward its objective I ordered 'check firing' on the instructions of both [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] then told me, some minutes later, to pass the order to the mortar line to 'stand clear', shortly after which he left my location telling me he was going to the mortar line.

It would have been sometime later, when people had cleared the area, that I took a laser range finder and on the instructions of [REDACTED] lased the distance between the Satebu Hut and the bunker where the accident had happened. The distance was 160 mtrs. I did not measure the distance to any of the other objectives although I would calculate the distances as about 260 mtrs to X12 and about 560 mtrs to X13. When viewed from the Satubu Hut X11 was at 12 o'clock or 6400 mils. X12 was to the left about 10 o'clock some 6000 mils. X13 was spread out a lot more, the central point would have been about 1 o'clock or 200 mils.

As I had my headset on and was observing the target X13 I cannot comment on whether the 2 inch mortar at the Satebu Hut was firing or not. I was paying attention to the fall of the mortar rounds.

My mortar training has been restricted to Bn training. I am a mortarmen 1st class and have attended Bn MFCs course which I passed I am due to attend an MFC course at the Support Weapons Wing Neatheravon in June 86.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1000 hrs Sat 22 Mar 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Sp Coy, 1 PARA, Bulford Camp, Salisbury, Wilts.
 Date to leave a. Command: b. Service:

This statement, (consisting of 8 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with my unit on Ex 'HARDFALL SOUTH' 86 in Norway.

On the afternoon of Thu 13 Feb 86 I was involved in a live firing Coy exercise at 'Range Valley' Mjolfjell, Norway.

During the exercise I was employed as the 'Alpha' Mortar Fire Controller and as such was used in support of A Coy, 1 PARA who were carrying out the exercise. Under my control I had 4 81mm mortars.

My qualification for the employment as a Mortar Fire Controller is the Mortar Fire Controller and Command Post Operator's course. I attended the course at the Support Weapon Wing, Netheravon, Wilts, in Nov 80. As a result of the course I gained a B grade pass.

My responsibilities as the MFC for this particular live firing exercise was to advise [REDACTED] the OC of A Coy 1 PARA, who were engaged on the exercise. It is my job to advise [REDACTED] on all safety aspects about the mortars he intended to use, in this case four 81mm mortars, what ammunition was to be used, the position of the mortars, how they were to be used, what targets could be fired on and also when the mortars could be used bearing in mind the safety aspect of firing mortars in support of soldiers in the exercise area who may be in potential danger from the firing of the mortars.

My tasking for the exercise was to position my 4 81mm mortars approximately 2 kilometres South West of the target we were to engage in the exercise area. Two of these targets were X11 and X12. The mortars were positioned about 1000 hrs Thu 13 Feb 86 ready for use after 'H' hour, the start of the exercise, which was to be at 1330 hrs Thu 13 Feb 86. During the exercise I was to be positioned close to the actual area of the exercise and in order to give orders to the soldiers manning the four mortars I was using a radio to speak to them.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

In the normal course of events the fire orders for the mortars are as follows:

I am given an Artillery Fire Plan Proforma which outlines what my tasking will be. Once this has been noted I am able to plan where the mortars are, how many are needed, what the targets are and how much ammunition I need. On the actual day of the exercise I was close to the observation post looking over the exercise area. I had spoken to [REDACTED] OC A Coy, and told him that I had decided to use 2 mortars to engage the first target (X11) and 2 mortars to engage the second target (X12). I also told [REDACTED] I was ready and had checked with my mortars that they were ready to carry on.

I then walked down with [REDACTED] towards the edge of the exercise area. This would have been shortly after 1330 hrs Thu 13 Feb 86. [REDACTED] said, "Fire it now." I then used the radio I had to speak to my 'Bravo Operator', [REDACTED] of my unit, who was situated in the observation post overlooking the exercise area. I said to him, "Fire, cancel at my command". I then heard [REDACTED] relay this message to the mortars who in turn repeated the message back to [REDACTED] to indicate that they had received the message and also act as a safety precaution so that I know that messages I pass to fire mortars via [REDACTED] are correctly received. I should mention at this time that the mortars were aware that on the command "Fire cancel at my command", they would fire five mortar rounds from each mortar. Therefore a total of 20 rounds were fired, 10 at each target, in this case X11 and X12. The mortar line then told me, via [REDACTED] "Rounds complete", which means all 20 rounds were on their way into the targets. I then said to the mortar line, via [REDACTED], "At my command repeat". The mortar line acknowledged this order and stated that they were ready to repeat the exact fire order again.

I then informed [REDACTED] that the mortar line was ready to fire again. The rounds that were fired all impacted into the target areas some 50 seconds after I had given the order "Fire, cancel at my command". I only saw five rounds impact into the target area X11. However, if all 20 rounds had not impacted into the target area [REDACTED] would have told me. As it was [REDACTED] said nothing to me, which is normal procedure to indicate that all rounds had impacted.

[REDACTED] then informed me that he wished the next salvo of 20 mortar rounds to be fired when the Bangalore Torpedo was detonated. At this time I should explain that I had moved to a position close to the exercise area observation post.

The exercise area was below and in front of me slightly to my right and 200 metres away was target X11. Slightly to my left and about 220 metres away was target X12. Directly in front of me about 600 metres away was a further target, X13. Also directly in front of me but very slightly to my right and about 100 metres away was a barbed wire barricade which had to be negotiated by soldiers from A Coy who were to attack both X11 and X12. In order to breach the barbed wire for the advancing soldiers who were in front of me the Bangalore Torpedo was detonated and the soldiers advanced, away from me, through the gap in the wire. They then split into two groups each group heading for the objectives X11 and X12.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

Prior to the Bangalore Torpedo being detonated [REDACTED] said he wanted the next salvo of mortars fired as the Bangalore Torpedo was detonated. However, bearing in mind that the mortars took all in all 50 seconds to reach the objectives then the soldiers may have been in danger if they had advanced too quickly towards the objectives. Therefore, Maj Trigger's request was overruled and [REDACTED] gave the order to the mortar line to open fire with the 20 round salvo before the Bangalore Torpedo was detonated.

The procedures were carried out again as per the orders for the first salvo and then I gave the warning order to the mortar line to prepare for firing again, this time onto the objective X13.

I should add that I saw all 20 rounds from the second salvo impact onto their objectives (X11 & X12).

I then watched what the soldiers in front of me were doing and saw 2 Sect each attack X11 and X12. A third Sect which had got stuck in a water pool at the bottom of an ice chute had by this time extricated themselves and had carried out a right flanking movement and were heading towards X13 which was about 460 metres away from where they were at that time.

[REDACTED] then gave me the order to fire 3 rounds from each mortar onto X13 instead of the originally agreed five, which I did. After doing so I counted 12 impacts onto X13 which had been fired from my mortar line.

I then gave the order 'At my command repeat', which was acknowledged and then watched the soldiers on the exercise area who by this time had taken their respective objectives.

As I was watching, [REDACTED] who was stood next to me on my right said something very similar to "What the fucking hell was that." He then said something like, "Look Sir there's bodies been blown back there". I think [REDACTED] was addressing [REDACTED] who was our pl comdr.

I then looked towards X11's location and saw a ball of black smoke in the actual location of the bunker. Because of the distance between myself and the bunker I could not make out much detail apart from seeing the black ball of smoke and the sound of an explosion. From my position the explosion didn't sound very loud and I couldn't say what kind of ammunition caused the sound of the explosion. From my experience of operating 81mm mortars it didn't sound like the detonation of a 81 mm mortar round. I should also add that at the time of the incident [REDACTED] was using binoculars but whether or not he saw the explosion through the binoculars I don't know.

I then told [REDACTED] to give "Check fire" to the mortar line which he did. "Check fire", means to stop firing.

I should add that about 1315 hrs Thu 13 Feb 86, I met Sgt Danny Lyden from A Coy 1 PARA, as he was on his way into the exercise area. We talked about the ammunition he said he had in his bergen which he was complaining about because of its weight. However, as to what kind of ammunition was in the bergen Sgt Lyden didn't say.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

While up at the observation post [REDACTED] radio operator received a message which he relayed to [REDACTED]. It was about casualties from X11's location and shortly after the people in the post ran down to X11. By the time we reached it, soldiers were giving medical aid to four soldiers who were lying on the ground injured. One of the soldiers was Sgt Lyden. However, what his injuries were I've no idea. Shortly after the casualties were evacuated by helicopter.

Apart from the mortar rounds that I had ordered to be fired onto locations X11, X12 and X13 I was unaware of any other mortar rounds being fired onto or near to those three locations.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me at The Oppheim Hotel, Oppheim, Norway about 2000 hrs Sun 16 Feb 86.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

RMP

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: A Coy 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford
 Date to leave a.Command: May 87 b. Service: Aug 96

This statement, (consisting of 3 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 28th day of August 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with A Coy 1 PARA, where I am employed as a GPMG SF Gun Controller.

I was operating in this role whilst deployed on exercise Hardfall on 13 Feb 86 in the Mjollfjell Valley Norway. I was the controller of 3 Pl GPMG which was manned by [REDACTED] the No 1 and [REDACTED] the No 2. The gun was mounted on its SF pulk. The pulk is a sledge like item fitted with a GPMG SF mounting which is then secured by four stakes prior to firing. This gun was located on the ridge to the left of the Satebu Hut and the approach to the waterfall.

When we arrived at the assembly area we were briefed by the OC, [REDACTED] that we were to provide suppressive fire on the first objective until such time as a bangalore torpedo had breached the barbed wire in front of us. After this we were to change our fire and fire upon the second objective. Additionally I was told that the target would be changed at the time that I saw 3 pl pass through the breach in the wire and begin their attack on this position. I was then to direct my fire across the valley at fig 11 targets on the far side of the valley between the first and second objective.

We were taken forward by [REDACTED] and given an area in which to site the gun. [REDACTED] also pointed out to me the objectives on the ground. With the start of the exercise my gun fired as briefed. We were firing belted tracer (red) one in five rounds. As we did not have time to register the targets the C2 sight and aiming post was not used and we fired using Iron sights. I do not recall receiving any instructions to that effect. A [REDACTED] from the patrol pl acted as the safety supervisor on my gun. At no time after the bangalore torpedo had detonated did my gun fire at or over the bunkers of the first position.

I can recall two other GPMGs being sited at the Satebu Hut, the first which was located behind and to the left of mine was operated by [REDACTED] with his gun team. The other GPMG was from the patrols pl and this was deployed in the light role, to my right near the hut.

I did not see the accident at the first objective. I was aware of a 2 inch mortar operated by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] being located at the Satebu Hut but I do not know if it fired, when it fired or at what targets.

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

I do not know if there was an examination of my GPMG by a REME armourer or not prior to the exercise.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1107 hrs on Thu 28 Aug 86 at Bulford.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Depot PARA and AB Forces, Browning Bks, Aldershot
Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: NA

This statement, (consisting of 5 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 3rd day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] Arms School Corps. I have been a member of the SASC since 1964. I am qualified Advisor on Infantry Weapons encompassing Small Arms, Medium Mortars and Heavy Anti Tank Guns.

On 14 Feb 86 I was tasked to attend the scene of a fatal range accident in the Mjolfjell Valley Norway, to assist [REDACTED] (SIB) and [REDACTED] RAOC.

At the scene I spoke to various witnesses including [REDACTED] PARA, the OC Sp Coy 1 PARA, the exercise planner. The nature of the exercise and locations of various weapon positions and objectives were explained to me. From my observations and discussion with witnesses it became apparent that safety regulations involving the planning and preparation of the exercise, the siting of weapons group and general execution as required by Infantry Training Vol IV Pamphlet No 21 Range Safety and Conduct had not been observed. Specifically:

1. Failure to produce detailed written exercise instructions.
2. Failure to adequately brief and rehearse safety supervisors.
3. The employment of unqualified safety supervisors.
4. Failure to apply the safety criteria in the siting and firing of all weapons.
5. The use of the 2 inch mortar firing HE bombs which is specifically forbidden during field firing exercise by Inf Trg Vol 4 Para 21 Sect 36 Para 1262 and Inf Trg Vol 1 (old series) Para 8. The light mortar (3 inch) Para 129.
6. I consider that the firing of this weapon under the existing climatic conditions was particularly foolhardy due to the high risk of base plate sinkage or slippage.

During my observations at the scene of the incident I noted the presence of a small tree some 2 metres to the right of the rear of the bunker and 2 metres forward.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

There was a fork at the top of the tree which bore signs of damage. One fork had broken off and the other was splintered. From my observations I was unable to determine whether the damage was due to small arms fire or shrapnel or a combination of both. Nor could I ascertain when the damage occurred as the presence in the area of mortar strikes combined with the knowledge that exercises had taken place during the days immediately preceding the incident made apparent that damage could have occurred at any time.

I was also shown the firing position of another 2 inch mortar, which had been operating from a weapon's pit some 20 metres or so to the right of a place called the Satebu Hut. This weapon was known to have been firing to support the assault through the barbed wire and onto the objectives and was allegedly still firing at the time of the incident. I was also shown the positions occupied by SF GPMGs, which were to the left of the Satebu Hut and the 84mm Anti Tank Guns and 81 mm Mortars.

From these positions and my discussions with witnesses I was of the opinion that the accident involved a shrapnel producing weapon I therefore investigated the firing of the 81mm and 2 inch mortars. I was satisfied that the 81 mm mortar was not firing at the time of the incident. While I cannot exclude the possibility that a round fired from the 2 inch mortar operating at the Satebu Hut caused the fatality, although I consider this to be unlikely, I am of the opinion that the 2 inch mortar being operated at the scene of the incident was responsible. I am convinced that a muzzle premature occurred on this mortar caused by:

1. Faulty Ammunition
2. Error of Drill
3. A combination of both the above.
4. The round impacted some object or being struck by small arms fire.

I have handed to [REDACTED] (SIB) certified true copies of Inf Trg Vol IV, Pamp 21, Section 36 Para 1263 and Inf Trg Vol 1 (old series) Pamp 8, para 129, these are labelled TW/1 and TW/2 respectively and I have signed those labels.

From Inf Trg Vol 4 Pamp 22 Range Construction and Regulations I have provided [REDACTED] with a certified copy of the 3 inch mortar HE bomb trace now labelled TW/3. I have signed that label.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1300 hrs Fri 3 Oct 86 at Aldershot.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: DLSA Vauxhall Barracks, Didcot, Oxon, OX11 7ES
Date to leave a.Command: 290687 b. Service: 290687

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 19th day of September 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] RAOC employed at DLSA Didcot.

On 6 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] RAOC, the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Sharpnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Sharpnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Sharpnel Fragment left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Sharpnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Sharpnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I retained these items in my possession until 7 Mar 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED] RAOC of my unit.

I have signed those labels.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1555 hrs on Fri 19 Sep 86 at Didcot.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: DLSA Vauxhall Barracks, Didcot, Oxon.
Date to leave a.Command: Jun 88 b. Service: 20/11/1993

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 19th day of September 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] employed at DLSA Didcot.

On 7 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I retained these items in my possession until 11 Mar 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED] RAOC.

I have signed those labels.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1600 hrs on Fri 19 Sep 86 at Didcot.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Directorate of Land Service Ammunition, Vauxhall
Bks, Didcot, Oxon OX11 7ES
Date to leave a.Command: 1 Oct 86 b. Service: Army

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22nd day of September 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] RAOC employed at DLSA Didcot.

On 11 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] RAOC the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I retained these items in my possession until 12 Mar 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED] RARDE.

I have signed those labels.

Signed: [REDACTED]

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): Over 21 years
 Occupation: Superintendent MP 1 Div
 Address: MP 1 Div RARDE, Fort Halstead
 Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 19th day of Sep 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] employed at RARDE Fort Halstead.

On 12 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] DLSA the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I retained these items in my possession until 24 Mar 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED] RARDE.

I have signed those labels.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1000 hrs on Fri 19 Sep 86 at Fort Halstead

Signed: [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): Over 21 years
 Occupation: Professional & Technical Officer
 Address: RARDE, Fort Halstead
 Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18th day of Sep 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] employed at GC3 RARDE.

On 24 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] of RARDE the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I retained these items in my possession until 25 Mar 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED] RARDE.

I have signed those labels.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 13~~2~~ hrs on Thu 18 Sep 86 at Fort Halstead

Signed: [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): Over 21 years
 Occupation: Senior Scientific Officer
 Address: RARDE, Fort Halstead
 Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18th day of Sep 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED], employed as the Senior Scientific Officer, in the Metal Physics Dept (PM 1 Div) RARDE Fort Halstead.

On 25 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] RARDE the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I retained these items in my possession until 26 Mar 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED] of my department.

I have signed those labels.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1146 hrs on Thu 18 Sep 86 at Fort Halstead

Signed: [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): Over 21 years
Occupation: Higher Scientific Officer
Address: PM 1 Div RARDE Fort Halstead
Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 18th day of Sep 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] employed as a Higher Scientific Officer at PM 1 Div RARDE Fort Halstead.

On 26 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] of my Department the following items labelled as indicated:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment [REDACTED]
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Webbing Side Pouch

I have signed those labels and retained the items in my possession.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1105 hrs on Thu 18 Sep 86 at Fort Halstead

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): Over 21 years
 Occupation: Government Service
 Address: RARDE, Fort Halstead, Stevenoaks, Kent.
 Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 7th day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] currently employed by the MOD as a Senior Scientific Officer with RARDE, Fort Halstead, Sevenoaks, Kent. My qualifications are HNC and BA degree, obtained from the Open University in 1975. I have held my current position since 1967.

On Wed 27 Aug 86 I received from [REDACTED] RMP (SIB), a set of technical drawings relating to the 2 inch mortar exhibited as SMO/1.

On 30 Sep 86, I handed to [REDACTED] RMP (SIB), five fragments exhibited as CN/1 - CN/5.

I have today Tue 7 Oct 86 handed to [REDACTED] RMP at SIB a full report of my findings after examination of the aforementioned fragments. To this report [REDACTED] attached an exhibit identification label marked JAM/1. I have signed and dated this label.

I have also handed to [REDACTED] a drawing of a 2 inch mortar, exhibited as SMO/1.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me at Fort Halstead on 7 Oct 86 about 1500 hrs.

Signed: [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

RMP att SIB

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Fleet Photographic Unit, Tipner, Portsmouth
 Date to leave a. Command: N/K b. Service: May 94

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 10th day of April 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with the Fleet Photographic Unit RN, Tipner, Portsmouth. I am a fully trained photographer and dark room technician experienced in the production of colour photographic prints.

On Wed 2 Apr 86, I received from [REDACTED] (SIB) a set of colour photographic negatives labelled WSE/1.

From these unretouched negatives I made photographic enlargements which I now produce showing:

1. Several soldiers in firing positions in the snow.
2. Troops advancing across a snow field.
3. A partial enlargement of photograph No 2.
4. Troops advancing across snow field and deploying.
5. Partial enlargement of photograph No 4.
6. Troops deployed in fire position in snow field.
7. Partial enlargement of photograph No 6.

On Thu 10 Apr 86 I handed these photographs to [REDACTED], together with the negatives. These photographs have been labelled RT/1.

I have signed the labels mentioned.

Signed [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1035 hrs on Thu 10 Apr 86 at Portsmouth.

Signed [REDACTED]
 RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Age of Witness (if over 21 enter "over 21"): Over 21
Occupation: Professional Technical Officer
Address: Royal Arsenal West, Woolwich
Identity Card No: Status:

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 21st day of August 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] employed in Weapons Engineering Division of the Royal Arsenal Woolwich as a PTO.

I have today, Thu 21 Aug 86, extracted from the records held at my office, the following drawings all of which relate to the 2 inch High Explosive, Mortar Round.

Drawing No	Nomenclature
DD(L) 8821/1	ECMB ML HE 2 inch
CIA(A)439	Body Pressing
DD(L) 12021	Method of Filling
DD(L) 9532B	Tail Unit No 3
CIA(A) 2049	Tail Unit No 4
SD 1152	Exploder Mortar Bomb
SD 1153	Collar Paper 7" long
SD 1154	Washer
SD 1155	Washer
SX 62	Disc 1.25" dia
SX 205	Tube Paper
SX 328	Disc .875" dia x .25"
CIA(A) 2977	Painting and stencilling
QX 346 GF	Fuse 161 Mk 4

I have handed all of these items to [REDACTED] SIB RMP who has labelled them collectively as exhibit SMO/1.

I have signed that label.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 0940 hrs on Thu 21 Aug 86 at Woolwich.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: 1 Bn Parachute Regiment, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts
Date to leave a.Command: May 87 b. Service: Open

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 6th day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] an officer of the 1st Bn the Parachute Regiment, Picton Bks, Bulford, Wilts. I currently hold the appointment of Adjutant. I have held this position since May 86.

Amongst the records held by my unit, are the service details of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] both of my unit.

I have personally examined these records and have handed to [REDACTED] (SIB) on 29 Aug 86 the following certified true copies of course reports pertaining to the aforementioned officers. To these documents [REDACTED] attached exhibit identification labels marked as annotated below:

- ACPK/1 - A Platoon Commanders Division course report, pertaining to [REDACTED], attended during the period 26 Mar 72 to 3 Jun 72.
- ACPK/2 - A Platoon Commanders Division course report, pertaining to [REDACTED] attended during the period 9 Jun 74 to 17 Aug 74.

I now produce these exhibits and certify them as true copies of the original documents. I am authorised to sign these documents on behalf of the Commanding Officer.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was recorded and signatures witnessed by me at Picton Bks on 6 Oct 86 about 1430 hrs.

Signed: [REDACTED]

RMP att SIB

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: DCOS, HQ 1 Inf Bde, Tidworth.
Date to leave a. Command: b. Service: NA

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 16th day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] PARA and until 30 Jan 86 I held the appointment of 2IC of 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford.

On 11 Dec 85, under the auspices of AMF(L) Cell, HQ SWDIST I published Standing Orders for Mjolfjell Ranges. These orders were distributed to AMF(L) units and within 1 PARA to Companies and Specialist Platoons. All Companies received a copy of these orders.

I have today Thu 16 Oct 86 handed a certified true copy of those orders to [REDACTED] PWF RMP (SIB), who has labelled them BKM/1. I have signed that label.

[REDACTED] has also shown me a copy of a 1 PARA letter G3/5/04, G3/11/01 "2 INCH MORTAR AMMUNITIONS AND MORTARS FOR EX HARDFALL 86" dated 9 Jan 86 labelled JRP/1 I have signed that label.

I can state that in my capacity at that time as 2IC 1 PARA I had arranged for the issue of 2 inch mortars and ammunition. This letter is the ammunition allocation it is not an authorisation for the use of 2 inch mortars using HE ammunition during live firing exercise.

I was aware that the 2 inch mortar might be used during live firing company exercise and that should that occur the normal safety criteria should be applied.

I do not recall on any occasions indicating to either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED], either verbally or in writing that I sanctioned the use of this weapon in circumstances other than those which fulfilled the safety requirements for that weapon.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and signatures witnessed by me at 1515 hrs on Thu 16 Oct 86 at Tidworth.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: CCTV, RMPTC, Roussillon Bks, Chichester, W. Sussex.
Date to leave a. Command: NK b. Service: Apr 89

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 9th day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] MP at present serving with CCTV RMPTC at Roussillon Bks, Chichester, W. Sussex.

I am employed as a video operator. I have carried out such employment since Sep 84. I am a qualified video operator, a qualification I attained at Beconsfield in 1985.

About 1030 hrs Thu 9 Oct 86 I was handed by [REDACTED] (SIB) the following:

BJM/3 - 1 x L-500 Beta Max video tape marked 'Ammo Investigation 2" Mortar".

Attached to the tape was an exhibit label marked as indicated. I have signed and dated this label.

At the request of [REDACTED] I reproduced exhibit BJM/3 onto a blank VHS E-120 video tape. I did this with the aid of two connected video tape player/recorders.

I retained both the aforementioned video tapes in my possession until about 1530 hrs Thu 9 Oct 86 when I handed them to [REDACTED], who attached an exhibit label marked GAS/1 to the VHS copy.

I have signed and dated this label.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Statement recorded and all signatures witnessed by me about 1535 hrs Thu 9 Oct 86 at RMPTC, Roussillon Bks, Chichester.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot
Date to leave a.Command: Dec 87 b. Service: Jun 89

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 8 day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] Royal Military Police, at present attached to Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Provost Bks, Maida Road, Aldershot, Hants.

On 7 Oct 86 at RARDE, Fort Halstead, Sevenoaks, Kent, I received a report from [REDACTED] a Senior Scientific Officer. To this report I attached an exhibit identification label marked JAM/1. I have signed and dated this label.

I also received from [REDACTED] drawings of a 2 in mortar, exhibited as SMO/1. I have signed and dated the attached exhibit label.

About 1800 hrs that same day I handed both exhibits to [REDACTED] RMP (SIB).

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height:
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Provost Bks, Maida Road,
Aldershot, Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 88 b. Service: NK

This statement, (~~consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me~~) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 10th day of October 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] at present serving with Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF at Provost Bks, Maida Rd, Aldershot, Hants.

About 1425 hrs Wed 8 Oct 86, I was handed by [REDACTED] (SIB), of my unit the following:

BJM/3 - 1 x L-500 Beta Max video tape marked "Ammo Investigation 2" Mortar".

Attached to the tape was an exhibit label marked as indicated. I have signed and dated the label.

I retained the aforementioned exhibit in my possession until about 1030 hrs Thu 9 Oct 86 when I handed it to [REDACTED] RMP, CCTV RMPTC, Roussillon Bks, Chichester.

About 1530 hrs that day [REDACTED] returned exhibit BJM/3 to me together with a VHS E-120 video tape. I attached an exhibit label marked GAS/1 to the VHS tape. I have signed and dated this label.

I retained both tapes in my possession until about 1630 hrs Thu 9 Oct 86, when I handed them to [REDACTED] (SIB).

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Provost Bks, Maida Road,
 Aldershot.
 Date to leave a. Command: Mar 86 b. Service: Mar 86

This statement, (consisting of 2 pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 24th day of February 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch of the Royal Military Police, at present serving with Aldershot Det SIB RMP.

On 15 Feb 86 in the Voss area of Norway I received from [REDACTED] OC Sp Coy, 1 PARA, the following document to which I attached an exhibit identification label marked as follows:

JRP/1 - 1 x Hand Produced Map marked Coy Live Firing Attack.

I signed the exhibit label, exhibit JPR/1 I now produce.

On Sun 16 Feb 86 at the Satebu Area of the Rjoanddolen Valley, Norway, I took photographs of and around a location identified to me as the first objective, X11.

On Sun 16 Feb 86 at Oppheim near Voss, I received from [REDACTED] JJ, A Coy, 1 PARA, the following documents to which I attached an exhibit identification label marked:

JJB/1 - 1 x Diagram depicting X11.

I signed the exhibit label. Exhibit JJB/1 I now produce.

On Mon 17 Feb 86 at Police Headquarters Bergan, Norway, I received from [REDACTED] the following items which I marked and attached exhibit identification labels marked as follows:

CN/1 - 1 x Jar marked left foot, containing a metal like object.

CN/2 - 1 x Jar marked heart, containing a metal like object.

CN/3 - 1 x Jar marked left upper shoulder, containing a metal like object.

I signed these exhibit labels and later that same day handed them to [REDACTED] M, AMFL Sup Coy RAOC, AMFL Log Bn.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED] (SIB)

Case No: 06022/6

I developed the exposed film in the normal manner and from the resultant unretouched negatives I made photographic enlargements which I now produce in supplement form labelled exhibit CN/6 showing:

1. View Eastwards from Satebu Hut, towards area of Bangalore Torpedo and X11.
2. View from trench positions left (North) of Satebu Hut, Eastwards towards area of Bangalore Torpedo and X11.
3. View showing trench position right (South) of Satebu Hut, North Eastwards towards X11 and X12.
4. View showing trench position right (South) of Satebu Hut in relation to Satebu Hut.
5. View from area of Bangalore Torpedo, Westwards towards Satebu Hut, showing hut, and frozen waterfall.
6. View from area of X11, Westwards towards Satebu Hut and frozen waterfall.
7. View showing North Western aspect of right bunker of X11, showing X13 in distance.
8. View showing Western aspect of right bunker of X11.
9. View showing Northern aspect of right bunker of X11.
10. View showing Eastern aspect of right bunker of X11.
11. View showing South Eastern aspect of right bunker of X11, showing stump of small tree (centre photo).
12. View from left (North) bunker position of X11, towards right bunker position X11.
13. View showing remains of small tree at right bunker of X11 being held in place.

On the 21 Feb 86 I handed the JRP/1 and JJB/1 to [REDACTED] PWF RMP (SIB), of my unit.

I have signed all the exhibit labels referred to above.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
 Hants.
 Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the *17* day of *October* 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

On Fri 21 Feb 86 I received from [REDACTED] (SIB) the following items labelled accordingly:

JRP/1 - A hand produced map marked Coy Live Firing Attack.

JJB/1 - A hand drawn sketch plan.

I signed the labels and retained those items in my possession. Those items I now produce.

On Mon 10 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] RAOC, a set of 16 photographs in colour and black and white which I labelled as exhibit BJM/2. I signed the label and retained this item in my possession. That item I now produce.

On Fri 21 Mar 86 I received from [REDACTED] PARA, a set of colour negatives. I labelled these as exhibit WST/1. I signed the label and retained this item in my possession. That item I now produce.

On Wed 2 Apr 86 I handed the colour negatives exhibit WSE/1 to [REDACTED] Fleet Photographic Unit, Portsmouth.

On Thu 10 Apr 86 at Portsmouth, [REDACTED] returned the exhibit WSE/1 to me and handed to me a set of colour photographic enlargements which I labelled RH/1. I signed that label and retained these photographs in my possession which I now produce in supplement form labelled RT/1.

On Thu 10 Jul 86 at Ludgershall I received from [REDACTED] RAOC, a copy of a report concerning a fatal range accident at Mjolfjell Ranges on Thu 13 Feb 86. I labelled that report BJM/1, signed the label and retained the item in my possession. That report I now produce.

On Thu 21 Aug 86 at the Royal Arsenal Woolwich, I received from [REDACTED] a set of technical drawings relating to the 2 inch mortar. I labelled those drawings SMO/1, signed the label and retained those items in my possession. Those drawings I now produce.

On Wed 27 Aug 86 I handed the drawings SMO/1 to [REDACTED] RARDE.

On Fri 29 Aug 86 at Bulford I received from [REDACTED] PARA, Adjt 1 PARA, a copy of a Platoon Commanders Division Course Report relating to [REDACTED] PARA which I labelled ACPK/1 and a copy of a Platoon Commanders Divison Course Report relating to [REDACTED] PARA which I labelled ACPK/2. I signed the labels attached to both those items and retained them in my possession. Those items I now produce.

On Fri 29 Aug 86 I received from [REDACTED] PARA a copy of a letter reference G3/5/05 and titled 2 Inch Mortar Ammunitions and Mortars for Ex HARDFALL 86 dated 9 Jan 86, which I labelled JRP/1. I signed the label attached to that letter and retained it in my possession. That item I now produce.

On Tue 30 Sep 86 I received from [REDACTED], the following:

- CN/1 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Foot
- CN/2 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Heart
- CN/3 - Metal Shrapnel Fragment Left Upper Shoulder
- CN/4 - Metal Shrapnel Fragement Tony Baldwin
- CN/5 - Metal Shrapnel Frgement Webbing Side Pouch

All of which had been set in Bakerlite.

I signed the labels attached to these items and retained them in my possession. Those items I now produce.

On Wed 1 Oct 86 I received from [REDACTED] RAOC a Betamax Video Tape which I labelled BJM/3. I signed the label attached to that Video and retained it in my possession. That video I now produce.

On Fri 3 Oct 86 at Aldershot I received from [REDACTED] a extract of Inf Trg Vcl 4, Pamp 21, Para 1262, which I labelled TW/1, an extract from Inf Trg Vol 1, Pamp 8, (Old Series) Para 129 which I labelled TW/2 and extracted Inf Trg Vol 4, Pamp 22 Safety Trace of a 2 inch mortar. I signed the labels attached to these items, and retained them in my possession. Those items I now produce.

On Tue 7 Oct 86 at Aldershot I received from [REDACTED] RMP of my unit, a copy of RARDE Report relating to the examination of exhibits CN/1 - CN/5 inclusive which was labelled JAM/1 and the exhibit marked SMO/1. I signed the label JAM/1 and retained that item in my possession which I now produce.

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

Continuation of Statement of: [REDACTED]

Case No: 06022/6

On Wed 8 Oct 86 I handed the video tape marked as exhibit BJM/3 to [REDACTED] SN RMP (SIB), of my unit. On Thu 9 Oct 86, [REDACTED] returned that exhibit to me together with a VHS video tape labelled as exhibit GAS/1. I have signed that label and retained that item in my possession which I now produce.

On Thu 16 Oct 86 at Tidworth I received from [REDACTED] PARA, a copy of Standing Orders for the Mjolfjell Ranges which I labelled BKM/1. I signed that label and retained that item in my possession which I now produce.

Signed: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 1 day of *Sept* 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

Between 0855 hrs and 1510 hrs on Fri 29 Aug 86 at Picton Bks, Bulford, I carried out an interview after caution with [REDACTED] PARA, whom I can recognise. Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions I asked and the replies given by [REDACTED]. At the conclusion of the interview [REDACTED] read over the record and signed it as a true and accurate record.

That record I now produce.

Signed: [REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

FIRST EDITION

MOD FormB

Case Ref No: 06022/6

SERVICE POLICE
RECORD OF INTERVIEW

PART 1

INTERVIEW OF:

Number: [REDACTED] Rank/Status: [REDACTED] Surname: [REDACTED]
Forenames: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Colour of Eyes: [REDACTED]
Regt/Corps/Unit: 1 PARA Colour of Hair: [REDACTED]
Interviewed by: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Persons Present: Sex: [REDACTED]

Place of Interview: Sp Coy Office 1 PARA
Date: 29 Aug 86 Time Commenced 0855 hrs

PART II

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch Royal Military Police and I am making inquiries into the death of Sgt Lyden.

I am going to ask you some questions, but before I do, I must caution you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Time: 0855 hrs

You now have the right to:

- a. *Legal advice. (If being interviewed for a serious service offence).
- b. Request the presence of an observer at the interview.
- c. Leave the interview unless you are in arrest or I decide there are sufficient grounds to arrest you.
- d. Consult the Service Police Codes of Practice when practicable.

You may exercise any of these rights now, but if you do not, you may do so later.

Signed: [REDACTED] Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

*Delete if inapplicable.

HAND OVER 'NOTICE TO SUSPECT'. Record any reply:

Time: 0856 hrs

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

1. *Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now? No Time: 0856 hrs
2. *Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now? No Time: 0857 hrs
3. Do you wish to have an observer present now? No Time: 0857 hrs

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect exercise the option(s)).

*If NO/NOT NOW to either 1 and/or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?" *YES

CERTIFICATION BY SUSPECT

I [REDACTED] certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form A entitled: 'NOTICE TO SUSPECT' and I* DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: [REDACTED]

Date: 29 Aug 86

Time: 0858 hrs

PART V

INFORMATION TO SUSPECT ON INTERVIEW PROCEDURE

During this interview *I will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as required by the Codes of Practice.

At the conclusion of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly.

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

*Delete if inapplicable

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
0855	Provided Coffee	
Q1	"Who was responsible for planning the Company attacks during Ex Hardfall?"	
A1	"The one where the accident took place, I was."	
Q2	"Do you have any formal weapon training qualifications?"	
A1	"Yes"	
Q3	"What courses have you attended?"	
A3	"Platoon Commanders Division Warminster and Support Coy Commanders Course Neatheravon."	
Q4	"With regard to the A Coy live firing exercise on 13 Feb 86 did you produce a written exercise instruction?"	
A4	"In part."	
Q5	"Could you explain that?"	
A5	<p>"Initial warning orders and admin instructions were issued. However, a fully detailed step by step instruction was not practical. We did this last year but this was found to be, in retrospect unnecessary and impractical the reasons being the shape of the exercise was subject to change depending on weather for instance the exercise started with a parachute insertion which could have been aborted. Phase 2 was a snow vehicle move through the mountains to the start line. Indeed the vehicle move proved to be impossible to guarantee arrival at the start line in time and at the last minute we used helicopters. This for instance effectively changed the general out line in the situation paragraph of our original exercise out line. During the first day of C Coys attack the weather closed in the helicopters were late and mist obscured all objectives. In this case the mortars were lifted well beyond the objective and C Coy carried out their attack continuously in very slow time. I describe this in detail because having run a similar exercise last year the original exercise bore little resemblance to the final production. Additionally the sheer mechanics of producing paper work in the Artic discourages paper work as we know it in the UK. That is not to say that planning did not take place. A great deal of preparation planning and administration was carried out. Firstly, having established the general out line of the exercise the Commanding Officer, Second in Command and other interested parties walked the ground discussing and approving objectives, start lines, approaches, support weapon positions, 81 mm mortars, Milan and CVRT.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">(Continued over page)..</p>	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
	<p>Answer continued from previous page</p> <p>"We then sited in details enemy trenches in such a way that individual sections could attack a single trench without compromising concurrent flanking attacks. During the next three weeks each Company Commander, whose Company was training over that ground in any case, was made aware of the general shape of the exercise and subsequently Platoon Commanders and Sgts. About one week prior to the exercise which involved a parachute insertion following by a 24 hr dry exercise, using blank, (involving an advance to contact through the Llangadhalen valley culminating in a helicopter lift into the live firing phase of the exercise, a full scale conference and 'O' group was held at battalion headquarters by the Commanding Officer. Present at this conference were the 2IC responsible for the dry exercise, all Company Commanders, support weapons Platoon Commanders, RAF liaison officers for FGA and helicopter support and many other interested parties. All phases of the exercise were discussed at length timings were confirmed ammunition allocated and many other details squared away. In the days following this conference prior to deploying each company O group visited the live exercise area and physically walked the ground. Indeed C Coy took the opportunity to use the mortar target registering to attack the position backwards, (from the river upwards). On this occasion I personally briefed OC C Coy on all details of the ground including the way in which I saw the attack developing. I similarly did this with OC B Coy. OC A Coy was similarly shown the ground by [REDACTED] who throughout this period was living virtually on the position whilst constructing the substantial enemy bunkers. On this day A Coy shared the range with support Company and were exercising in and around the area. At this point therefore one day prior to any of the Companys deploying on phase one of the final exercise all officers, Platoon Sgts and indeed the many of the soldiers had walked the ground and were fully aware of the shape and requirement of the exercise. This was deliberate as the exercise was not designed to test Company or Platoon Commanders but was aimed at section level tactics albeit several sections at the same time. Finally the night before B Coy deployed I briefed all members of B Coy Officers and Sgts Mess with diagrams at their base location. Similarly prior to A Coy deployment I personally briefed OC A Coy on the final shape and details of the attack. I should stress at this point that each Company was free to deploy, plan the attack and support itself with company weapons, as Officers Commanding Companys saw fit within the structure of the general out line and support weapons footprint. Company Commanders issued their orders in the Llangadahlen Valley where blank ammunition was extracted and live ammunition issued. It should be noted that the use of GPMG SF, 84 mm Carl Gustav, 2 inch mortar and grenades was intergal to respective Companys who had been training with these weapons under their own arrangements.</p>	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
	<p>Answer continued from previous page</p> <p>As Companys arrived by helicopter into the live firing exercise area I personally met and discussed the Company plan with the OCs, adjusted timings for them, and verified the position of their Milan sections. MFCs were escorted to the main OP to marry up with OC Mortar Platoon, when respective OCs were ready to cross the start line. I controlled the 81 mm mortar opening barrage, the launch of the bangalore torpedo and initial small arms support onto an empty enemy objective. Once the torpedo had breached the wire I gave the nod to the Company Commanders to launch their attack. At this stage the momentum and shape of the attack lay with individual companies. My concern now lay with the control of 81 mm support, the general shape of the platoons positioning on the ground, (being on high ground and able to observe the attack in plan) and controlling Milan and CVRT fire via the safety officers."</p>	
1015	Break for coffee	
1023	"I must remind you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence."	
Q6	"Do you have copies of any of the instructions that you did publish?"	
A6	"Personally I don't."	
Q7	"Were there any rehearsals of the Company attacks carried out over the ground?"	
A7	"Not officially other than what Companys did themselves, but the instruction was down to Corporal Level"	
Q8	"Was it part of your responsibility to appoint safety supervisors?"	
A8	"Yes, but at the conference we discussed this at length because I did not have the staff within my Company. During the conference the CO trawled all departments for suitable and qualified range staff."	
Q9	"Did you verify those qualifications?"	
A9	"The second in command did."	
Q10	"What you are saying is that you were supplied with a list of names of available qualified or authorised range staff and that you employed them as needed?"	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
A10	"Yes"	
Q11	"Were you able to distinguish which personnel were qualified and which were authorised?"	
A11	"Yes. What we did was split staff available into three teams evenly balanced in terms of seniority experience and so on. That is we didn't have three CSMs with one Platoon and three junior Sgts or Cpls with another. All the safety staff gathered at the exercise reception area where I met respective Company Commanders each team was allocated the same task for all three Company attacks, the first team married up with the fire support Pln adopting their position on the high ground left of the gully grid 828378. This group automatically became therefore the depth assault group on the third objective. The second team married up with the lead assault Platoon (objective one) as they led off down the gully. Team 3 therefore married up with the second assault platoon (objective 2) who also moved down the gully."	
Q12	"Apart from your planning conference some time prior to the exercise, what detailed briefings were given to your safety supervisors on the ground?"	
A12	"All safety staff arrived at Mjolfjell camp on the morning of C Coys attack. I briefed them in the dining hall with diagrams and charts giving them exactly the same briefing I had given to Company Commanders we then drove out to the range and walked the ground describing to them where they were to meet their Companys and where each Platoon was expected to go."	
Q13	"Did you give them specific briefings on arcs of fire?"	
A13	"Yes I would have done because all arcs of fire were described and the order in which mortar fire could expect to arrive."	
Q14	"Bearing in mind the use of live ammunition did you make any provision for stopping the exercise in the event of an accident or injury?"	
A14	"Yes"	
Q15	"What were those provisions?"	
A15	"We had an extensive radio net on its own radio frequency each range safety officer was on this net I personally carried the control set and was able to speak direct to the safety staff. I also had beside me a signaller on the company net. Also beside me was the mortar 2IC who had total control over 81 mm fire. At all times I had control over all support weapons and the general movement of platoons." Continued over page...	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
	<p>Answer continued</p> <p>"To enhance this net we had a battalion radio station in direct contact with battalion headquarters at the Hilland Hotel furthermore we had laid line between Mjolfjell Camp and Range Hut. I was in radio contact with Range Hut which in turn could relay messages to Mjolfjell Camp and its normal telephone system. As far as medical support was concerned we established the battalion aid post with the unit doctor and full medical support including ambulance at the top of the gulley behind the start line. Finally red mini flares from any quarter without prior permission authorised an immediate cease fire."</p>	
	<p>"How many safety supervisors were involved in the exercise?"</p>	
A16	<p>"Additional staff from battalion headquarters were three per platoon in addition to which we had support weapon qualified staff to support weapons positions, with Milan, CVRT and around Sabebu Hut where the patrols platoon were manning LMGs."</p>	
Q17	<p>"It would appear to me that apart from your support weapons safety supervisors you employed another 12 safety supervisors with the Company in that correct?"</p>	
A17	<p>"Yes"</p>	
Q18	<p>"And each one of those was equipped with a radio on the safety net and red mini flares?"</p>	
A18	<p>"The nine accompanying the attacking platoons had radios but not necessarily mini flares."</p>	As the Bn had run out.
Q19	<p>"With regard to stopping the exercise did you give any instructions on what type of incident would necessitate such action?"</p>	
A19	<p>"I don't believe I actually said if you've got a casualty stop it but everyone knew what to do."</p>	
Q20	<p>"Having regard to the use of various platoon support type weapons did you allocate a safety supervisor to each weapon group?"</p>	
A20	<p>"Not personally but as the bulk of the Company support weapons, less section GPMGs could only go to two places, that is beside the Satebu Hut or the high ground on the left with the Milan they automatically married up with staff on those positions. Thinking about those radios by the time we got to A Coys some of them had gone U/S and were unable to be replaced at the same scale. Accordingly we had to reallocate radios."</p>	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q21	"When preparing for this exercise did you submit a safety trace to any of the range authorities?"	
A21	"Well no there was no range authority out there they don't require it in the same way that we do here."	
Q22	"Did you prepare a range safety trace?"	
A22	"Yes"	
Q23	"Do you have a copy of it now?"	
23	"No we did not produce a School of Infantry type trace but we did plan and draw charts which we used for briefings. Arcs of fire for the 81 mm mortar, Milan and CVRT were clearly defined. Both Milan and CVRT had dedicated targets in the form of wooden screens placed in front of large boulders to engage. The mortar DFs were visible adjusted prior to the attack and lifted by myself via the mortar OPs as the attack developed. Arcs of GPMGs and rifles in the form of a trace did not apply as all small arms fire was within the overall range template but consideration had been given to these safety arcs in siting the enemy positions and individual bunkers. Individual platoons were required to attack their respective positions from a specified direction."	
Q24	"Were you aware that the 2 inch mortar was to deploy during this exercise and that it was to operate using the bombs?"	
A24	"Yes"	
Q25	"Are you familiar with the contents of pamphlet 21 Range Conduct and Safety?"	
'25	"I am aware of the pamphlet and the aims of its contents I could not quote them and would have to refer to this extensive pamphlet."	
Q26	"Did you consult this pamphlet or pamphlet 22 Range Construction and Regulations when planning your exercise?"	
A26	"No"	
Q27	"Did you issue any particular instructions regarding the firing or siting of the 2 inch mortars?"	
A27	"Yes in that the two fire postions available to the Companies were described and shown to them and these were used."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q28	"Where were those positions?"	
A28	"Satebu Hut ledge and left of gully. What respective Companies choose to place here or take forward through the wire was subject to respective Company plans."	
1150 hrs	Coffee provided	
1155	"I will remind you that you are still not obliged to say anything and that what you say may be given in evidence."	
Q29	"Did you issue any specific instructions as to what targets could be engaged by the 2 inch mortar having regard to the position of troops in the grounds?"	
A29	"Not specifically the 2 inch mortar, GPMG or 84 mm. What was covered was the use of support fire on to the objectives in that the Satebu Hut position was to give support to the first objective, the left of gully position onto the second objective. Once in position on objectives one and two, both of those Platoons would support the depth Platoon onto the third objective. No provision was made for support fire onto the third objective from Satebu Hut or left of gully."	
Q30	"Are you saying that there were no instructions issued to prevent the 2 inch mortar at the Satebu Hut from firing overhead of the advancing troops?"	
A30	"I did not personally categorically state that the 2 inch mortar should not be fired overhead from Satebu Hut. During the previous two weeks all rifle companies had trained and used their 2 inch mortars for live section attacks as directed by their OCs. It had been directed by the CO that only Senior NCOs or Brecon qualified personnel were to have anything to do with the 2 inch mortar. Indeed I'm not aware of any Company using anyone less than the rank of Sgt. Although I was overall responsible for the exercise, I saw the tactical use of 2 inch, 84 mm, GPMG and Rifle and SMG as being the responsibility of respective Companies who had been training for this exercise under their own direction."	
Q31	"Are you able to supply any information other than this with regard to the briefing of the 2 inch mortar teams of A Coy or the particular use of the weapon in the field on that day."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
A31	<p>"I had no idea of A Coys plan until I spoke with the OC A Coy at the top of the gully when I discovered that A Coy were not following the expected deployment as had B and C Coys in that they were not deploying their main fire support group including GPMG SF to the high ground left of gully, but appeared to push everything in and around the Satebu Hut. Furthermore unlike the previous Companys which secured objective one first and using support from left of gully attacked position two with a clear break in between A Coy appeared to attack positions one and two simultaneously following up quickly with position three. There was nothing to prevent A Coy doing this and this should have in no way compromised the general shape and execution of the exercise. It did however, increase the pace somewhat."</p>	
32	<p>"Is it fair to say that you sanctioned the use of the 2 inch mortar during this exercise?"</p>	
A32	<p>"No that is not fair. The 2 inch mortar along with other weapon systems was written into the exercise at battalion level. Indeed a written instructions allocates 46 HE and 30 smoke to each company attack. In the event we earlier discovered smoke to be useless in snow and proved HE to be 100% effective in snow. We established this during the early recce with the COs 'O' group when we physically fired the 2 inch from the "left of gully" position. Additionally each Company was issued with 162 rds with which to train. In retrospect I acknowledge vis a vie para 1262 of pamp 21, that I along with respective Company Commanders and battalion headquarters failed to hoist in relative regulations. From my point of view when rifle Companys joined Ex Coldsteel they had been training with and were well practiced in the use of the 2 inch mortar."</p>	<p>Produced G3/5/04 dtd 9 Jun 86 exhibit JRP/1</p>
1230	<p>Break for lunch.</p>	
75	<p>"I must remind you that you are still under caution and that you are not obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be given in evidence."</p>	
Q33	<p>"With regard to the GPMGs can you tell me how many of these weapons were deployed in the support role?"</p>	
A33	<p>"There was definitely one from patrols and I can't recall it there may have been a second but we did not have a great deal of ammunition."</p>	
Q34	<p>"How many of A Coy's GPMGs were deployed at the Satebu Hut?"</p>	
A34	<p>"I've no idea but I do know that they had some SF GPMGs to the left of the OP."</p>	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q35	"Were they sited in the same place as for B and C Coys attacks?"	
A35	"No B and Cs were right up on the left of gulley with the Milans and in fact they were drawn on the diagram to go up there but A Coys came down to the gulley. It should be noted that on this day the Colonel Commandant Gen Howlett and Brig Evans were visiting and observing the attack. Having spoken with OC A Coy at the top of the gulley I immediately joined the VIPs and briefed them on the exercise. Unlike B and C Coy exercises I did not observe or become involved in the location or deployment of personnel or weapons in and around the Satebu Hut."	
Q36	"Did you work out the arcs of fire for these SP GPMGs?"	
A36	"No"	
Q37	"Do you know who did?"	
A37	"Presumably OC A Coy."	
Q38	"What were the targets given to the GPMGs manned by members of the patrols platoon?"	
A38	"The first objective. The role of the patrols platoon was to secure the Satebu Hut objective having captured it during the night. This was part of the exercise scenario to enable us to attack down hill. In fact the patrols did this for real in their own live firing night exercise prior to C Coys live firing attack. Their role there after was to provide battlefield effects as respective companies moved down the gulley to the assault line. They provided intimate support to the assault engineers whilst placing their bangalore torpedo. They had little ammunition and effectively ceased their task once companies launched their attack from the ledge at Satebu Hut."	
Q39	"Was there any overhead or flanking fire from these weapons?"	
A39	"There was no provision or directive for overhead fire from these hand held GPMGs."	
Q40	"Was there a set incident or time during the exercise when they ceased firing?"	
A40	"Not as an order by me but then I wasn't controlling them, but it was effectively when the companies launched themselves over the ledge. They literally could not fire any more. That is not to say that they did not fire to the flanks as directed by their gun controllers, there was plenty of scope on the open right flank."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q41	"Where any of the GPMGs inspected and cleared by REME for overhead or flank firing?"	
A41	"No"	
Q42	"Were these GPMG teams briefed by you with regard to overhead fire?"	
A42	"No"	
Q43	"Were they or their controllers briefed by you with regard to their arcs of fire once the attack had started?"	
+3	"They were controlled by [REDACTED] who was privvy to all planning with regards to the patrols support to the assault pioneers."	
Q44	"Was [REDACTED] aware of the arcs of fire?"	
A44	"There were no specific arcs save those within which the objectives lay."	
Q45	"So the patrols platoon GPMGs had only one target and that was the first two objectives?"	
A45	"Yes"	
Q46	"They had no specific moment during the exercise defined by a particular incident, like the bangalore detonating or the position of troops on the ground at which they were to cease fire or switch targets?"	
A46	"No"	
Q48	"Who would have made such a decision?"	
A48	"The safety officers with them, for instance during B Coy's attack instead of pouring through the breach in the wire B Coy secured this breach and built up an assault section, and then assaulted the first trench. Bearing in mind that troops were wearing skis and snow shoes and movement is extremely slow this created an unexpected gap of easily five minutes during which there were no troops on objective one. It was quite safe and reasonable therefore to expect the patrols support group to renew fire support on parts of objective one. This situation can be seen quite clearly from the video of B Coys attack. It is quite unreasonable therefore to attempt to define start and finishing limits of small arms. As at this stage no troops for phase two, (that is the assault on objective two) had even left the ledge at Satebu Hut. Anyone of the patrols fire support group including the Carl Gustav teams were free to engage objective two even though they may not have been part of the original plan. <p style="text-align: right;">Answer Continued over page.....</p>	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
	<p>Answer Continued</p> <p>"I use this as an example to demonstrate that this whole exercise was not run, indeed no such exercise could be run, as a computer like pre planned exercise in which the involvement of each individual soldier or firing of each individual bullet could have be preordained. Within each company attack down to section level there remained, as was the intention, plenty of scope for individual movement applications of five and second phase fire support."</p>	
Q49	"It appears to me that if all weapons at the Satebu Hut were to fire at the first objective and those on left of gulley only fire on the second objective that there must come a point in time when it is unsafe to fire at either objective?"	
A49	"Yes"	
Q50	"When do you consider that that point arrives with regard to the first objective?"	
A50	"That is an unrealistic situation for the same reasons that I described for the B Coy attack above because conversly A Coy rushed straight through the gap in two platoon strength with the second platoon assaulting their objective simultaneously. In this case therefore there was no scope for the support group to switch left for the same duration. As far as the safety arcs are concerned the outstretched open hand is unusually used to judge the safety arc in front of advancing troops."	
Q51	"Did you apply the safety template of the 2 inch motor when planning and locating that weapon on this exercise?"	
A51	"No"	
Q52	"Was there any reason for that?"	
A52	"The use of the 2 inch mortar which was a company weapon, was directed by respective company commanders in their plans of attack. The one exception being the 2 inch mortar fired by [REDACTED] which was specifically used on objective one to bridge the gap between the company move up to the assault line and the 81 mm barrage as part of battle simulation. This was only used on the A Coy day, when the VIPs were present to boost the effects as we were limited in 81 mm ammunition."	
Q53	"But you did not apply the safety trace for [REDACTED] 2 inch mortar?"	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
A53	"Yes in that there were no troops forward of Satebu Hut at this time. All these rounds were fired onto an empty range."	
Q54	"Whilst I understand that you ensured that the area to the front of [REDACTED] mortar was clear of troops you did not apply the actual safety trace did you?"	
A54	"No"	
Q55	"According to regulations for use of the 2 inch motor, its use is strictly governed in that it requires considerable control to be exercised by the safety supervisor and that fire should have been from behind splinter proof cover, with no other troops in the vicinity. Did you take any steps whatsoever to ensure that these regulations were complied with?"	
A55	"I can see no point in persuing detailed questions concerning the 2 inch mortar. Retrospectively we are aware that we got it wrong therefore any question you wish to ask concerning the 2 inch mortar must surely be in breach of regulations. I repeat that from my point of view and position within the exercise the 2 inch mortar came under the control of the rifle companies. I fully acknowledge however, again retrospectively, that I could have influenced the correct use of the 2 inch within this exercise."	
Q	"I intend to terminate this interview now, and it may be necessary to speak to you again. Before I do so I must ask you if you wish to make a written statement?"	
A	"No"	
Q	"You are now given the opportunity to read over the record of interview. As you do so would you sign the bottom of each page indicating that you have read it, agreed with its contents and make a note against anything you consider to be inaccurate. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the record of interview?"	
1435	<p>Record handed to [REDACTED]</p> <p>I [REDACTED] have read over the Record of Interview consisting of 25 pages. I have indicated where I consider it to be inaccurate and have signed each page accordingly. I have also initialled each question and answer.</p> <p>Signed: [REDACTED] 29 Aug 86 [REDACTED] 1510 hrs [REDACTED] Bulford Camp</p>	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
Full Unit Address: Aldershot Det SIB RMP UKLF, Maida Road, Aldershot,
Hants.
Date to leave a. Command: Sep 87 b. Service: Sep 87

This statement, (consisting of [REDACTED] pages each signed by me) is true to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that, if it is tendered in evidence, I shall be liable to prosecution if I have wilfully stated in it anything which I know to be false or do not believe to be true.

Dated the 22 day of Sep 1986 Signed: [REDACTED]

I am [REDACTED] of the Special Investigation Branch, Royal Military Police at present serving with my unit in Aldershot.

Between 1036 hrs and 1244 hrs on Tue 16 Sep 86 at Picton Bks, Bulford, I carried out an interview after caution with [REDACTED] PARA, whom I can recognise. Throughout the interview I maintained a contemporaneous record of the questions I asked and the replies given by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] elected to make a voluntary statement after caution. At the conclusion of the interview [REDACTED] read over the record and signed it as a true and accurate record.

That statement and record I now produce.

Signed: [REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)

FIRST EDITION

MOD FormB

Case Ref No: 06022/6

SERVICE POLICE
RECORD OF INTERVIEW

PART 1

INTERVIEW OF:

Number: [REDACTED] Rank/Status: [REDACTED] Surname: [REDACTED]
Forenames: [REDACTED]
Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED] Colour of Eyes: [REDACTED]
Regt/Corps/Unit: A Coy 1 PARA Colour of Hair: [REDACTED]
Interviewed by: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
Persons Present: Sex: [REDACTED]

Place of Interview: Picton Bks, Bulford

Date: 16 Sep 86 Time Commenced 1036 hrs

PART II

I am [REDACTED] Special Investigation Branch Royal Military Police and I am making inquiries into the death of Sgt Lyden of your unit in Norway on 13 Feb 86.

I am going to ask you some questions, but before I do, I must caution you that you do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so, but what you say may be given in evidence.

Time: 1037 hrs

You now have the right to:

- a. *Legal advice. (If being interviewed for a serious service offence).
- b. Request the presence of an observer at the interview.
- c. Leave the interview unless you are in arrest or I decide there are sufficient grounds to arrest you.
- d. Consult the Service Police Codes of Practice when practicable.

You may exercise any of these rights now, but if you do not, you may do so later.

Signed: [REDACTED] Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

HAND OVER 'NOTICE TO SUSPECT'. Record any reply:

Time: 1038 hrs

Ask the suspect the following questions. Record any reply.

- 1. *Do you wish to consult a legal adviser now? No Time: 1039 hrs
- 2. *Do you wish to have a legal adviser present now? Not at the moment Time: 1039 hrs
- 3. Do you wish to have an observer present now? Not at the moment Time: 1039 hrs

(If YES, it is the responsibility of the service police to assist the suspect exercise the option(s)).

*If NO/NOT NOW to either 1 and/or 2 ask: "Do you agree to commence the interview without a legal adviser present?"
*YES but I reserve the right to call for one later.

CERTIFICATION BY SUSPECT

I [redacted] certify that I have been told of my rights and understand them. I have received a copy of MOD Form A entitled: 'NOTICE TO SUSPECT' and I* DO NOT want legal advice at this point.

Signature: [redacted] Date: 16 Sep 86 Time: 1040 hrs

PART V

INFORMATION TO SUSPECT ON INTERVIEW PROCEDURE

During this interview *I/ will make a record of the questions asked and the replies given. A record of events will also be made, such as breaks for refreshment, as required by the Codes of Practice.

At the conclusion of the interview, you will be given the opportunity to read over and sign the Record. If you consider it to be inaccurate, you may make a note on the Record accordingly.

Signed: [redacted] Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [redacted]

*Delete if inapplicable

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q1	"What part did you take during A Coy live firing exercise at the Mjolfjell Valley on 13 Feb 86?"	
A1	"I was the Company Commander."	
Q2	"Were you responsible for any part of the exercise?"	
A2	"Be more specific."	
Q3	"Did you have a particular role to play in the exercise as the Company Commander?"	
Q	"You'll have to be more specific when you say the exercise you'll have to say whether you mean the planning or the conduct or the tactical command."	
Q4	"Did you take any part in planning the exercise?"	
A4	"No"	
Q5	"Did you play any role in the conduct of the exercise?"	
A5	"Only in so far as I was the tactical commander and I cleared my tactical plan with the exercise controller prior to the exercise."	
Q6	"How then would you define your responsibilities?"	
A6	"I was the tactical commander."	
Q7	"When you talk of your tactical plan could explain what you mean?"	
A7	"I was given a tactical task the basic plan for the achievement of this task was fixed in accordance with the overall exercise constraints. In other words I had to attack from a particular direction some of the fire support available to me was also fixed in accordance with the exercise constraints such as 81mm mortar targets. My plan for manoeuvre and fire support was discussed with [REDACTED] prior to the exercise to ensure that my plan remained within his exercise constraints."	
Q8	"Did you have freedom of choice as to the sighting of company support fire teams?"	
A8	"I had a limited freedom of choice but only in so far as my sighting remained within [REDACTED] exercise plan."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q9	"Did you authorise the deployment and use of 2 inch mortars by your company during this exercise?"	
A9	"I did not authorise the deployment and use. No."	
Q10	"Who did?"	
A10	"The CO."	
Q11	"Were you given written or verbal instructions to that effect?"	
A11	"Verbal."	
A2	"Can you recall where and when these orders were issued?"	
A12	"No I can't. The use of 2 inch mortars in this exercise was discussed several times prior to it between the CO, 2IC and Company Commanders. The decision to use them was as far as I was aware, was taken after they had been fired live under the supervision of OC Sup Coy [REDACTED] We (A Coy) had not fired them live in Norway before this exercise and the provision of the platform for the base plate was based upon [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advice and experience."	
Q13	"Did you nominate the 2 inch mortar teams?"	
A13	"Yes I nominated the firers not the number twos, but only for the two teams from my Company."	
Q14	"Who did you nominate?"	
A14	"[REDACTED] and Sgt Lyden."	
A5	"Why these two Senior NCOs?"	
A15	"It was those two Senior NCOs because they were the SNCOs of the platoons that were to fire the 2 inch."	
Q16	"Why did you use SNCOs?"	
A16	"Because I felt that this weapon in these circumstances required an experienced firer who understood the tactical and safety responsibilities of his task."	
Q17	"Did you verify the experience of either man with this weapon prior to detailing them to use it?"	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
A17	"No I didn't need to."	
Q18	"Why not?"	
A18	"Because a platoon Sgt who has the experience and training that they have had would have fired the weapon before and would have understood the responsibility that I had placed on them."	
Q19	"Did you brief both Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] as to the specific siting and use of their weapons?"	
A19	"Yes"	
A20	"What brief did you give [REDACTED]"	
A20	"I briefed him on his location and I told him that he was to engage objective two the left forward objective until the advance of 3 Platoon dictated that he should cease fire."	
Q21	"With regard to his location where did you instruct him to position his weapon?"	
A21	"In essence he was on the high ground over looking the objective to the left of the approach track with the company's SF GPMGs."	
Q22	"And is that where he positioned the weapon?"	
A22	"No he was positioned on the right of the approach track. He was placed there by the range safety staff, I don't know who put him there. I believe that this was because a trench was available on the right and not because of any safety implication of his being on the left."	
Q23	"Were you aware of this change prior to the advance beginning?"	
A23	"No but it did not affect my plan."	
Q24	"Had you been would you have repositioned the weapon?"	
A24	"Yes I would."	
Q25	"Why?"	
A25	"Because in the position that I sited him he was better placed to command the SF teams with whom in my plan he was co-located. He had a radio and was in overall command of the company fire support base."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q26	"Did you consider that with this mortar to the right of the approach track that for it to engage the second objective would have meant firing over the heads of the advancing troops?"	
A26	"No one of the reasons that I sited him on the left was to give him maximum engagement time prior to the advancing troops reaching his arc. By being sited on the right his engagement time was reduced because the advancing troops would have been beneath his line of fire soon after crossing the start line."	
Q27	"What instructions were given to Sgt Lyden as to the location and use of his mortar?"	
A27	"When his platoon had taken their objective he was to set up his mortar and engage objective three, the depth objective until the advance of one platoon dictated that he should stop."	
Q28	"Did he go to the position you had instructed him to occupy?"	
A28	"Yes"	
Q29	"You have used the phrase 'until the position of the platoon dictated that he should stop' with regard to your instructions to both [REDACTED] and Sgt Lyden. Is that the actual phrase you used when briefing them?"	
A29	"I cannot remember if that was the phrase but that was the meaning as it is with any fire support on to an objective that is being assaulted by troops."	
Q30	"Did you give them any indication as to when the troops on the ground would have reached such a position?"	
A30	"No neither would I normally with to i/c fire support where he could see the advancing troops. I would add that I could direct him to cease firing by radio, if I considered his continuing action to be unsafe, as could the safety staff with the platoon."	
1136	Break for coffee	
1141	"I must remind you that do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be given in evidence."	
Q31	"Do you have any formal weapon training qualifications?"	
A31	"Yes I attended the Platoon Commanders Course in 1974."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q32	"Did you prior to the use of the 2 inch mortar on this exercise obtain a copy of the weapon trace and apply it?"	
A32	"No neither was it my responsibility to do so."	
Q33	"Did you consult the 2 inch mortar weapon training pamphlet?"	
A33	"Same answer neither was it my responsibility to do so neither is it necessary to consult a pamphlet to remind myself of factors that I as the tactical commander should consider on the siting and employment of the weapon such as no overhead fire."	
4	"Did you consult pamphlet 21 range safety and conduct with regard to the 2 inch mortar?"	
A34	"No neither was it my responsibility to do so."	
Q35	"Did you after the decision had been made to use the 2 inch mortar give orders for any dry handling training for the weapon firers?"	
A35	"No because it wasn't necessary but I did give specific orders for the firing of the weapon which stemmed from [REDACTED] experience from the other two companies who had gone through before us. Plus during the exercise recce when I walked the exercise with [REDACTED] and my platoon commanders and platoon Sgts I asked that sandbags be left on objective one for Sgt Lyden to mount his mortar on."	
Q36	"Are you aware that the use of the 2 inch mortar with HE ammunition during field firing exercise using troops is forbidden by pamphlet 21?"	
A36	"Yes, I am now but I wasn't at the time. I would have been had I consulted pamphlet 21 but it was not my responsibility to do so."	
Q37	"Were you able to observe the fall of shot from [REDACTED] mortar?"	
A37	"Not initially but when the platoons crossed the start line I moved forward to a position from which I could observe all three platoon objectives."	
Q38	"Did you see any mortar bombs exploding in the areas of the first and second objectives?"	
A38	"Not in the first because [REDACTED] wasn't engaging the first. If the first objective had been engaged by the range control mortar [REDACTED] then I would not have seen him engage objective one because he did so as I understand it prior to me crossing the start line. Seven months after the event I seem to recall seeing 2 inch bombs landing on objective two but I cannot be sure."	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

Continuation of Record of Interview of: [REDACTED]

Time	Record of Interview	Notes
Q39	"Can you pinpoint by reference to troop movements over the ground or any other reference point the time at which [REDACTED] mortar ceased firing?"	
A39	"No I can't."	
Q40	"With regard to the attack on the first objective I believe the platoon was divided into 2 sections one for each bunker is that correct?"	
A40	"As far as I am aware but the plan to do so was the platoon commanders."	
Q41	"Do you know how many hand grenades were issued to each platoon or section?"	
A41	"I did then but I can't recall now."	
Q	"Do you wish to make a written statement regarding this matter?"	
A	"Yes"	
Q	"Will you write it yourself or do you want someone to write it for you?"	
A	"I'll write it."	
1221	Statement commenced. Concluded 1231	
Q42	"You are now given the opportunity to read over the record of interview. As you do so would you sign the bottom of each page indicating that you have read it agreed with the contents and make a note against anything you consider to be incorrect. You are also invited to place your initials against each question and answer. Do you wish to read the record of interview?"	
A42	"Yes"	
1234	<p>Record handed over.</p> <p>I [REDACTED] have read over the Record of Interview consisting of 18 pages. I have indicated where I consider it to be inaccurate and have signed each page accordingly. I have also initialled each question and answer.</p> <p>[REDACTED] 16 Sep 86. 1244 Bulford</p>	
Q	"After further enquiries it may be necessary to see you again?"	

Signed: [REDACTED]

Witnessed by the Service Policeman: [REDACTED]

STATEMENT

Case No: 06022/6

Surname: [REDACTED] Forenames: [REDACTED]
 Service No: [REDACTED] Rank: [REDACTED]
 Type of Engagement: [REDACTED] Height: [REDACTED]
 Date & Place of Birth: [REDACTED]
 Full Unit Address: 1 PARA, Picton Bks, Bulford Camp, Wilts SP4 9PF
 Date to leave a. Command: Jan 87 b. Service: 2005

I make this statement of my own free will. I understand that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so, and that what I say may be given in evidence.

Signed: [REDACTED]
16 Sep 86

In answering [REDACTED] questions I have several times used the phrase "neither was it my responsibility to do so". This is a harsh statement of fact which is forced upon me by the tone of the enquiry. It does not reflect my continuing high regard for the professionalism experience and judgement of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. I was the tactical commander on the exercise where Sgt Lyden was killed. I did not plan or set up the exercise. It would have been wholly unreasonable for me to have challenged the judgement of those who did. To have done so would have been and would still be completely at odds with the working relationship between colleagues and superiors/subordinates in an operational parachute battalion.

Signed: [REDACTED]

The above statement was self written in my presence at Picton Bks Bulford on Tue 16 Sep 86 at 1231 hrs and signatures witnessed by me.

Signed: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
RMP (SIB)


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Serie M 816 Series
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Utgave 2 NOR Edition


MJÖLFJELL


LEGEND

- x 12 2nd Objective Grid 830374
- x 11 1st Objective Grid 828372
- x 13 In Depth Position Grid 831370
- Mortor line Grid 811349



Målestokk, Scale 1:25000





PR DANATTEK.

Over General
Target area.

1 First target

2 Second Target.

A break in
barbed wire

Red line.
position of
troops.


22-3-86



x 1,2



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Drawn By

████████████████████

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE


ANNEX F TO
CCRIO 06022/6
DATED 21 OCT 86

DLSA REF: M09496
AMF(L) REF: - 86/002

10 JULY 1986

FATAL ACCIDENT AT RJOANDDAHLEN RANGE,

NORWAY ON 13 FEB 1986



Distribution:

DLSA
File

F-1

STAFF IN CONFIDENCE

FATAL ACCIDENT AT RJOANDDAHLEN RANGE, NORWAY ON 13 FEB 1986

References:

- A. Ammunition and Explosive Regulations Vol 3, Pam 12, Pt 1 Ammunition for the Ordnance, ML, 2 in Mortar (Army Code No 11962).
- B. Infantry Trg Vol 1, Infantry Platoon Weapons Pam No 8, The Light Mortar (2 inch) (Army Code No 70373).
- C. Infantry Trg Vol IV, Ranges Pam No 22, Range Construction and Regulations (Army Code No 71053).
- D. Infantry Trg Vol IV Ranges Pam No 21, Range Conduct and Safety Rules (Army Code No 71080).

INTRODUCTION

1. On Thursday 13 February 1986 a fatal accident occurred at Rjoanddahlen Range, Mjolfell, Nr Vossevangen, Norway. The accident involved a 2 inch mortar firing a high explosive round.
2. The fatality was a Sgt Lyden. Three other soldiers, [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were injured. All four men were members of A Company of 1st Bn the Parachute Regiment.
3. The incident and events leading up to it were investigated jointly by myself, [REDACTED] RAOC, [REDACTED] SASC, [REDACTED] SIB and [REDACTED] SIB. A separate report has been completed as a result of SIB investigations into this incident.

AIM

4. The aim of this report is to determine the cause of the accident.

BACKGROUND TO THE INCIDENT

5. The accident occurred during a live firing attack by A Company, 1 PARA. There were three objectives, X11, X12 and X13, each to be taken by a different platoon in turn. The objective concerning us here was termed objective X11, consisting itself of three bunkers, which was to be taken by 2 Platoon.
6. The attack was supported by live firing from Milan, Scimitar, Mortars (both 2 inch and 81 mm) GPMG in the SF and light role, 66 mm Rockets and 84 mm Carl Gustav. Additional weapons used in the attack were SLR, SMG and L2 Grenades.
7. H-Hour for the attack was to be 1330 hrs and did occur around that time. So as not to get involved in extraneous detail, only relevant details relating to the attack will be described.
8. 2 platoon went forward to take X11. 2 section of 2 platoon were to take the bunker where the accident was later to occur.
9. The attack was supported, in part, by a [REDACTED] firing HE bombs from a 2 inch mortar from a position to the right of Satebu hut. The distance from the hut to the bunker was 160 metres. Another mortar was being fired from the corner of the hut, also firing 2 inch HE bombs, by a [REDACTED]. This latter mortar can be discounted from this report as 24 bombs were fired beyond X11 by [REDACTED] and his firing had finished before the accident had occurred. The mortar fired by [REDACTED] was firing at the time of the accident.

10. At Figure 1 is a diagram indicating basically the relevant details and approximate distances involved.

11. At Plate 1 is a photograph looking from behind [REDACTED] position onto X11 whilst evacuation of the injured is still in progress.

12. 2 section took the bunker using small arms fire and an L2 HE grenade and took up positions forward and to the right of the bunker. The soldiers who concern us here are [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. All others at this time were to the right of [REDACTED].

13. After these men had taken up fire positions looking onto objective X13 Sgt Lyden and [REDACTED] arrived with their 2 inch mortar. They began firing rounds from the right rear corner of the bunker. The approximate positions of all these men is shown schematically at Figure 2. Also shown are [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who are two important witnesses to the incident.

14. It has been established from witness's statements that Lyden was loading the mortar and [REDACTED] was firing it. They apparently fired two rounds adjusting the aim after each round and when they fired a third an explosion occurred in front of the mortar a metre or so above the ground.

15. In order that the reader can further orient himself, Plates 2 - 8 are photographs taken a few minutes after the incident occurred showing various angles of Lyden, [REDACTED] position.

16. Information so far discussed should give the reader the background to the exercise and events leading up to the incident.

PROCEDURE SUBSEQUENT TO ACCIDENT

17. As I had been covering firings of Milan on the range I was able to arrive on the scene fairly quickly and I began investigations as soon as the last casualty had been evacuated. Check firing had been given on all weapons. A local ban was imposed on the use of 2 inch mortar, 81 mm mortar and L2 grenades. The ammunition involved in the accident was not at this stage clear, the ban on 81 mm mortar and L2 grenades was later lifted.

18. First of all I ensured that all weapons had been made safe, this had been done. Then mortar bombs prepared for firing were segregated for subsequent disposal. These were 2 x 2 inch HE bombs by Satebu hut and 2 x 81 mm HE rounds on the 81 mm mortar position.

19. Photographs were taken of the area where the accident occurred and also the mortar positions by Satebu hut (Plates 1 - 8).

20. Understandably the accident area was strewn with equipment. All those present were asked to remove their own equipment from the area leaving only the equipment belonging to the injured. All ammunition was removed from the equipment and inspected for safety. Two of the 2 inch HE rounds from the packs had been struck by fragments (fortunately on the tail fins). These were later destroyed. All equipment and the mortar were then bagged and later removed from the range along with the mortar bombs.

21. The area was searched repeatedly for any evidence.

22. Relevant witnesses had been segregated but due to the extreme cold it was decided to talk to these people the next day. Failing light put an end to investigations until the next morning.

23. Interviewing of witnesses took place during the next two days. The key witnesses were then taken to the range and were allowed to "talk through" the incident on the ground indicating the positions of individuals at the time of the accident. Formal statements were taken on 16th February.

24. A grid was made over the immediate accident area to ensure that the position of the items found could be recorded. (Grid is shown at Plate 9.) The snow was dug over to a depth of about 20 - 30 cms. Two mortar bombs HE were found (complete with safety caps and safety pins). Three safety caps and two safety pins were also found.

25. The snow on top of the bunker was removed and sifted but nothing found. The bunker, made of wooden ammo boxes, was dismantled. Each box was given a close examination for shrapnel entry points.

26. Finally a metal detector operated by a member of the Norwegian Army was used to sweep over the entire area in an effort to find any metallic objects buried in the snow, none were found.

27. The "on-site" investigation was completed by 21st February. This may seem a long time but it must be realised that this area could only be reached by over-snow vehicle or by helicopter. Additionally the investigation was slowed by extreme cold and short daylight hours.

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED FROM INVESTIGATION

28. Evidence will be discussed under four separate headings:

- a. Evidence found at the scene.
- b. Evidence from equipment, clothes and personnel.
- c. Evidence from ammunition inspection.
- d. Evidence from witness's statements.

Evidence Found at the Scene

29. The evidence found at the scene can only be described as pitiful. The collection of evidence was made next to impossible. First of all by the depth of snow (2 metres) and secondly by the fact that this was the third live firing attack on this bunker/area. Grenades had been used twice before in this bunker and the area mortared heavily during all three attacks. Within a thirty metre radius of this bunker eight craters were found which were caused by mortar fire. The amount of shrapnel lying over the area can well be imagined.

30. On the initial search of the area 2 x mortar bombs were found complete with caps and safety pins. Later found were three safety caps and two safety pins.

31. A small tree approximately 2 metres in front of the position showed evidence of being struck by an explosive item. The branch, at this point about 3 cms in diameter, was broken and badly charred. Plate 10 shows this branch in relation to the mortar position and Plate 11 shows a close-up of the damage. When the damage occurred and what caused it cannot be established.

32. Pieces of shrapnel were covering most of the area but these could have come from any of the previous bomb bursts during the past three days.

33. Obviously what could not be found is also indicative. No prepared mortar bombs could be found during the search. Nor could any mortar tail fins be found even though a metal detector was used over the area. There was no evidence of a ground burst occurring on the position. Even taking into account the fact that the ground was heavily trampled during the evacuation some sort of crater would always have been visible. Additionally carbon deposits were only found a few centimetres under the top layer of snow. A good view of the ground on the position is shown at Plates 2 - 8.

34. The bunker was immediately to the left of the mortar position. Snow covered the bunker to a depth of about 150 mms. This snow was removed and sifted through but nothing found. When the bunker was dismantled and each wooden box checked no entry holes from shrapnel could be found. Numerous small exit holes were found, presumably from the grenades used inside the bunker previously.

Evidence from Clothes, Equipment and Personnel

35. Fragments were removed from personnel and also one fragment was removed from webbing. No other fragments can be considered significant as they could have come from other bomb bursts. All fragments available were forwarded to LSA(4), DLSA, Didcot. Incidentally not all fragments have been, or will be, removed from personnel.

36. Lyden's main injuries were to his thighs, chest and rear left shoulder (see Appendix A8 to Annex A). [redacted] were numerous (see Appendix A9 to Annex A). These two men were in the kneeling position. Their helmets were examined and showed signs of fragment strike towards the top of the helmet. Lyden's clothes were later examined in order to establish fragment entry points which were, naturally, consistent with the above.

37. [redacted] and [redacted] were forward of the mortar in a prone position; they had wounds to backs of legs and buttocks (see Appendix A10 and A11 to Annex A).

Evidence from Ammunition Inspection

38. All rounds returned from the range were inspected and all but two were in acceptable condition, complete with safety caps and pins. Two rounds had been struck by fragments, fortunately in both cases on the tail. These two rounds were subsequently destroyed. My only comment concerning the inspection is that the method of taping used to secure the safety pin in position is not the best I have seen. In some cases the tape seemed to have "dried up" and was only just fulfilling it's function.

39. Quantity 36 rounds were forwarded to CAD, Kineton for subsequent technical investigation. All others were disposed of as they could not be made safe to travel.

40. It should be emphasised at this stage that [REDACTED], Lyden and [REDACTED] were carrying in excess of forty rounds between them to be fired from this particular mortar. All had been removed from their containers and were held loose in rucksacks. This seems to be far in excess of a requirement for an attack of this duration.

Evidence Established from Witnesses' Statements

41. The witnesses' statements are of necessity long, involved and somewhat detailed. So it is probably better to bring out salient points provided by the statements and show their relevance later. All statements are attached as Appendices to Annex A.

42. a. Witnesses agree that the burst occurred approximately a metre or so above the ground. This, of course, may not be an accurate estimate due to circumstances. It could have been higher but nevertheless it was an airburst.

b. Lyden was loading the mortar and [REDACTED] was firing it. Lyden was on the right, [REDACTED] on the left. They were both in a kneeling position and firing towards objective X13. It is not known if they were firing directly off the snow surface or a hard base.

c. The only grenade available had been used well before the arrival of the mortar team.

d. The position of individuals is as depicted at Figs 1 and 2.

e. Two rounds were definitely fired and a third loaded.

f. The mortar was clear immediately after the incident, ie, no mortar bomb was found in the barrel.

g. The burst was between all four individuals hit.

h. The last thing Lyden was seen doing was loading the third bomb with his right hand whilst holding the mortar with his left. A second or two afterwards the explosion occurred.

j. A considerable amount of small arms fire was taking place at the time the accident occurred. Particularly important were GPMGs in the light and SF role. Tracer rounds from the GPMGs were seen to be fired approximately "4 - 5 feet" above the heads of those personnel who had gone firm on X11.

DEDUCTIONS FROM ALL EVIDENCE

43. The following deductions can be made from all the evidence so far detailed which may assist in determining the cause of the accident:

a. The explosion was definitely an air burst, a metre and a half to three metres above ground level and in between all four men. This is apparent not only from witnesses' statements but from the wounds caused. Lyden had wounds to his front chest and rear left shoulder. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] were in the prone position and received injuries to backs of legs and buttocks. These injuries would be consistent with a burst in between them and above the ground. Probably the most important observation is that there was no indication on the snow surface of a ground burst.

- b. [REDACTED] knew very little about the 2 inch mortar or the ammunition.
- c. The explosion occurred a second or two after the placing of a third bomb in the mortar tube was witnessed.
- d. The mortar was perfectly serviceable after the incident (see armourer's report at Annex B). So no explosion occurred in or near the barrel.
- e. The weapon was clear after the incident. No prepared mortar bombs could be found afterwards indicating that the third bomb was fired. A mortar bomb would definitely have been found in the subsequent search of the area.
- f. Three safety caps were found in the immediate vicinity. Presumably these were from the three bombs fired by Lyden/[REDACTED]. Only two safety pins could be found but it must be realised that the search for the third was like the search for the proverbial "needle in a haystack".
- g. The small tree mentioned previously showed evidence by its fracturing and charring of being struck by an explosive item. It must be emphasised that this could have occurred at any time prior to this incident and cannot be proven to be related to the accident. No details are available as to the state of the tree prior to the incident occurring.
- h. Considerable breaches of regulations had taken place during this field firing exercise. This will be discussed later in the report.
- j. Small arms fire from GPMGs was passing over the heads of personnel on X11. Exactly where is not known but it was estimated to be 1.2 m - 1.5 metres above their heads.

THEORETICAL POSSIBILITIES AS TO THE CAUSE

44. The most important fact to be established initially, if possible, is whether the accident was caused by an incoming or outgoing mortar round.

Incoming or Outgoing Mortar Bomb?

- 45. The possibility of an incoming mortar bomb causing the accident comes immediately to mind. The 2 inch mortar to the rear fired by [REDACTED] was suspect both by its position and that it was firing at the time the accident occurred.
- 46. There was definitely no ground burst in the area of the accident so what could have accounted for an airburst? No personnel or equipment were hit directly so the only feasible possibility is for the mortar bomb to have hit the small tree in front of the position.
- 47. The arguments against this being the cause are as follows:
 - a. The range from Satebu hut to X11 was 160 m (established by laser rangefinder). The minimum practical range for the 2 inch mortar is 200 m at a high angle of 1333 mils (75 degrees). In order to land a bomb on X11 the mortar would have had to be almost vertical. This does not of course mean that this is impossible.
 - b. The explosion occurred within a second or two of Lyden loading a mortar bomb. No prepared mortar bomb(s) were found at the site. After the accident the weapon was clear. Probability alone points to the round being fired and for some reason initiating in front of the position.
- 48. Discussion at para 47 points to a muzzle premature occurring for some reason.

Possible Causes of a Muzzle Premature

49. It must be emphasised that at the distance from the muzzle the explosion occurred the fuze could not have been armed and was incapable of initiation by its normal method of functioning.

50. Error of Drill. There is no indication of an error of drill contributing to the accident. No double loading of the mortar occurred as it was perfectly serviceable after the incident. There is no evidence either of a bomb being fired and striking another bomb about to be loaded. The mortar had not fired from any previous position so a round could not have been prepared, picked up and an attempt made to fire it at the new position.

51. Tampering/Bad Handling. Despite the fact that [REDACTED] knowledge of the weapon/ammo was next to nil and only two safety pins could be found at the scene there is no evidence of tampering with/bad handling of ammunition.

52. Bomb Striking Tree in Front of Mortar. The possibility of the bomb striking the tree in front of the mortar is feasible even though the tree at this point was only 3 - 4 cms in diameter. As previously stated though the fuze should not have been armed at this point. Additionally no proof exists as to exactly what caused this damage.

53. Bomb Functioning Due to Internal Fault. No evidence to indicate this has been found but it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out.

54. SAA Hitting Mortar Bomb. There is a possibility, which cannot be proven by fact that the bomb was fired and struck by small arms fire a metre to two metres from the muzzle. Small arms fire was witnessed, by following tracer rounds, travelling "4 - 5 feet" above the heads of those on X11. It is feasible, bearing in mind the considerable amount of SAA fire, that a round fired by one of the GEMGs struck and initiated the mortar bomb.

ATC Opinion

55. Unfortunately none of the possible causes discussed are conclusive in their own right and stating the cause would be a matter of conjecture.

CONTRAVENTIONS TO RANGE REGULATIONS

56. Contraventions to regulations as regards this particular field firing exercise were considerable. It is intended in this report to discuss only those infringements which could have possibly contributed to the accident.

57. Most of these contraventions were contrary to References C and D. For convenience the main extracts from these two publications are reproduced at Annex C and D respectively.

58. The contraventions were as follows:

- a. No written instruction was provided for the exercise.
- b. No safety brief was given before the exercise.
- c. Certain of the safety supervisors allocated to the exercise were not qualified for that purpose.

d. Overhead fire was provided, in part, by a GPMG in the light role.

e. [REDACTED] had had no training on the use of the 2 inch mortar and its ammunition.

f. The danger areas for the 2 inch mortars used were not in accordance with Reference C.

g. There was no safety supervisor with Lyden/[REDACTED] mortar when the incident occurred. The safety supervisor's duties are detailed at Reference D.

h. Personnel were allowed to enter the danger areas of the 2 inch mortars. In fact it would be true to say that no account whatsoever was taken of the danger area of the 2 inch mortar and its high explosive bomb when the exercise was planned.

j. Firing of the 2 inch mortar was not behind splinterproof cover at least 800 mm high.

k. A quantity of mortar bombs far in excess of requirements was held at Lyden's mortar position. Additionally the bombs were not behind blast proof cover.

l. The most flagrant contravention to regulations is that 2 inch mortar HE bombs were fired on a field firing exercise.

59. It would seem that an almost total disregard for safety regulations was taken by the unit on this occasion. Whilst it is impossible to establish exactly what caused the accident, had regulations been complied with it is likely that this accident would not have occurred.

CONCLUSION

60. In conclusion the cause of the accident is indeterminable. The normal safety criteria for firing infantry weapons were not observed and it is likely that this accident only occurred because the 2 inch mortar was being fired illegally.

RECOMMENDATIONS

61. The recommendation of this report is that the accident be investigated, in accordance with Queen's Regulations, 1975, Chapter 5, by a Board of Inquiry.

BULFORD
JULY 1986

Figures:

1. Diagram of range ~~area~~.
2. Diagram of accident area and relevant individuals.

Annexes:

- A. List of witnesses' statements.
- B. Armourer's report.
- C. Extract from Reference C.
- D. Extract from Reference D.

Plates:

1 - 11




FIG 1 - DIAGRAM OF RANGE AREA





FIG 2 - DIAGRAM OF ACCIDENT AREA AND RELEVANT INDIVIDUALS

INDEX TO PHOTOGRAPHS EXHIBIT BGM/2

1. View from Satebu Hut showing [REDACTED] trench and mortar position.
2. View of right rear quarter of bunker.
3. Colour photograph showing damaged tree and broken off branch.
4. Search grid of position.
5. Right hand front of bunker looking rearwards.
6. Close up of damage tree.
7. Front of bunker slightly left.
8. Front of bunker slightly right.
9. Right rear of bunker.
10. View of right side of bunker.
11. Left side of bunker.
12. Rear left side of bunker.
13. Front left of bunker.
14. Front left of bunker towards Satebu.
15. General view of right rear of bunker.
16. Position of [REDACTED] Mortar.
17. Trench and position of [REDACTED] Mortar.


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DATED 21 OCT 86



ANNEX G TO
CCRIO 06022/6
DATED 21 OCT 86




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
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




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
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
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
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Amdt 2/Nov/80

- (1) To check that the safety cap and safety pin are removed from each HE bomb before loading.
- (2) To ensure that bombs are loaded tail first.
- (3) To check that local foliage does not obstruct the line of departure.
- (4) To look at the angle for firing of the mortar and ensure that crest clearance between mortar and target is maintained.
- (5) To follow the flight of each bomb so that in the event of a blind its position is noted.

1262. *HE Bombs.* The following additional rules are to be observed:

- a. During firing no-one is to be in the danger area forward of the mortar line. Range conducting staff and the firers only are to be on the mortar line. Waiting details and spectators are allowed within the danger area provided that they are behind the mortar line, protected by blast proof cover and are wearing steel helmets.
- b. The kneeling position only is to be used for firing.
- c. Individual mortar positions are to be 20 metres apart.
- d. Firing is to be from behind splinter proof cover at least 800 mm high. It may be of compacted earth, a sand bag wall or a shallow pit. Immediately the fall of the bomb has been observed, firers and supervisors are to lower their heads behind this cover.
- e. Only the amount of bombs required for one detail is to be on the mortar line. The remainder are to be on a ready line outside the danger area or if inside the danger area they are to be behind the mortar line and protected by blast proof cover. Bombs are NOT to be prepared for firing until they are on the mortar line.
- f. Bombs are not to be fired on field firing exercises.

1263. *Smoke Bombs.* The following additional rules are to be observed:

- a. Firers, firing point staff and any exercising troops are to wear ear defenders.
- b. The mortar may be fired in the open.

4-43

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SJSC

of the mortar position. Immediately the fall of the bomb has been observed, all firers and supervisors must have their heads down below the level of the cover. Mortar positions are to be at least 20 metres (22 yards) apart.

123. Only the officer in charge, instructors, firers and, if necessary, loaders are to be on the firing point. Waiting details and spectators at demonstrations are to be outside the danger area or under cover in rear of the firing line.

124. Only the amount of bombs necessary to fire one detail are to be on the firing point. All other bombs must be on a ready line outside the danger area, ie, at least 100 metres behind the mortar or under cover a suitable distance to the rear.

125. Bombs are not to be prepared for firing until brought to the mortar position.

126. Firing must stop when any aircraft flying at any height enter the firing area.

127. The target area must always be visible from the firing point or control tower.

128. When practising in peace time or when giving demonstrations, the mortar is not to be fired at a greater angle than 1333 mils (75 degrees) from the horizontal. Bombs fired at this angle will fall approximately 200 metres (219 yards) away. Care must be taken to ensure that the ground beneath the mortar provides a firm base and that adequate allowance is made for head winds.

Field firing exercises

129. HE bombs are not to be used on field firing exercises. This is because the mortar is a hand-held weapon and its accuracy is accordingly dependent entirely on the skill of the firer.

Danger areas - light mortar

Amdt. 11/Mar/79

130. Templates of danger areas for all types of light mortar bomb are illustrated at Figure 158 of Infantry Training, Volume IV, Ranges, Pamphlet No. 22, Range Construction and Regulations (All Arms) 1976 (Army Code No. 71053).

131. A single line of fire offers little scope; the ideal is a range with an arc of fire of no more than 1067 mils (60 degrees).


132. The size of the arc usually depends on the ground available;

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NOTE VERTEX HEIGHT (INCLUDING 1.5 in/40 mm PARA-ILLUMINATING FLARE): 1000 ft/305 m



SINGLE LINE OF FIRE

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SAGC

Fig 158—2 inch Mortar
R—158

MEMORANDUM

To [REDACTED]
XM1, RARDE
Date 31 July 1986

Your Ref

From [REDACTED]
XM4, Q6
Tel 3099, 3002

Our Ref XMD/181A/06

Subject PROVISIONAL REPORT ON THE EXAMINATION OF MORTAR BOMB FRAGMENTS

1. Introduction

Five small metal fragments were submitted to XM4 Division, Metal Physics Section for examination and analysis. The fragments had been removed from two servicemen casualties following an incident which occurred during a training exercise using 2" mortars, and possibly other ammunition, in Norway.

2. Object of Examination

To confirm that the fragments originated from a 2" mortar bomb and to ascertain, if possible, how the incident may have occurred.

3. Experimental Details

The five fragments were all examined in the Cambridge S180 scanning electron microscope (SEM). Where necessary, fragments were cleaned and corrosion products removed using an ultrasonic cleaner and 'Decon 90' alkaline detergent.

The fragments were checked for the presence of high order detonation signatures to confirm that they originated from an explosion caused by a military-type explosive. Analysis of the fragments was carried out using a Link energy-dispersive (ED) X-ray system attached to the SEM.

A small piece of outer casing from a 2" mortar bomb, together with part of a L201 grenade which may have been in use at the time, were also examined and analysed to confirm which ammunition-type had been responsible for the incident.

4. Results

All the fragments showed clear evidence of having originated from a high order detonation, and were ferrous in origin. Other elements detected are summarised in Table 1.

Fragment 5, labelled webbing pouch, had one flattened end. The surface of the flattened area was shown to contain substantial amounts of tin, which appeared to have been molten.

Results of the analysis of various component parts of the control L201 grenade and 2" mortar bomb are shown in Table 2.


5. Discussion and Conclusions

From the results obtained so far, it is not possible to state how the incident occurred. More information on the nature of the training exercise, the types of ammunition in use, the positions of the various service groups involved and the location of the casualties are required so that the events leading up to the event can be reconstructed. However, the following points can be put forward until more evidence is available.

- (1) The fragments originated from an explosion almost certainly involving an item of ammunition.
- (2) There is no evidence to confirm the ammunition type involved.
- (3) The presence of copper could have originated from an item of ammunition having a copper tube or similar component inside the explosive.
- (4) Fragment 5, bearing traces of manganese, phosphorus and tin, is difficult to place. The tin has been molten, and may have been removed from a component made or coated with tin shortly after the explosion. The manganese and phosphorus probably originate from a coating commonly used as a pre-treatment before painting.
- (5) The control fragment from the 2" mortar bomb bears a mixed phosphate coating containing both zinc and manganese. It is possible that a different batch of mortars could have received this coating.
- (6) The presence of tin on one fragment is not easily explained.
- (7) There is, at present, no evidence to explain why the explosion occurred so close to the servicemen.

Copies to: [REDACTED]

2" MORTAR INCIDENT - TABLE 1

Fragment No	Fragment identification	Elements detected		Remarks
		Main	Trace	
1	L Foot side (a) shiny	Fe	K (trace)	
	L Foot side (B)	Fe only		
2	Upper L shoulder side (a)	Fe only		
	Upper L shoulder side (b)	Fe only		
3	Heart side (a)	Fe/Cu K	S&P (tracé)	Surface deposit of copper on one side
	Heart side (b)	Fe/Cl SP		
4		Fe only		
5	Webbing Pouch flattened end	Sn Fe		
	" " side (a)	Fe/P Mn		Mn phosphate coating
	" " side (b)	Fe only		

GRENADE L201/2" MORTAR BOMB - TABLE 2

Fragment No	Sample location/description	Elements detected	Remarks
1	Square section notched wire after removal of bitumen coating	Cd Cr	Passivated Cadmium coating on steel
2	Inner side of outer casing	Sn Trace Fe	Tin coated steel
3	Outer side of casing after removing paint coating	Sn only	
4	Piece cut from casing of 2" mortar bomb	Fe Mn P Zn	Appears to be type I + II mixed phosphate coating - ie not the same as webbing pouch fragment

PM1/RARDE METAL PHYSICS

REPORT ON THE EXAMINATION OF FRAGMENTS RECOVERED FROM AN AMMUNITION INCIDENT

Introduction

A provisional report gave preliminary findings following investigations by PM1 Division, RARDE, Fort Halstead (PMA/181A/06).

Further studies have since been carried out to establish the origin of the five fragments that resulted in several casualties (including one fatality) during an army training exercise in Norway.

The earlier investigation described scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and energy-dispersive (ED) analysis of the surfaces of the fragments in the as-received condition, together with control samples from an unexploded 2" mortar-bomb and L2A1 grenade. These results showed that all the fragments were of a ferrous material. One of the fragments removed from a casualty bore traces of copper, while a second removed from a webbing pouch, had a small deposit of tin. This fragment also bore traces of a phosphate coating. It was not possible to state the origin of the fragments, although it was known that the 2" mortar is phosphated, whilst the wires from the L2A1 grenade are cadmium plated.

Further analysis of the fragments and simulated firing experiments have now been completed, and form the subject of the present report.

Experimental Details

Two 2" mortar-bombs were detonated in a Fort Halstead explosives test chamber. The first firing was designed to capture as many fragments as possible in strawboard packs built into a square formation with the mortar at its centre. The fragments were extracted from the strawboard and examined for shape, size, weight and appearance. Because the previous work had shown the presence of copper and tin on some of the fragments, the second firing was designed to establish whether the fragments could ricochet from copper and tin plates and pick-up traces of these elements. Figs 1 and 2 illustrate the experimental arrangement in the explosives test chamber.

After completion of the firings, the fragments were sorted, weighed, and compared with fragments from the incident. A number of fragments from the experimental firings, together with the five from the incident were mounted in conducting bakelite, and a small area of each polished for ED analysis and electron-probe microanalysis (EPMA).

The ED analysis was carried out on the SEM using Link Systems equipment and the EPMA on a Cameca Camebax electron probe microanalyser. The ED method gives a rapid indication of the main elements present, and results from all samples were obtained using identical operating conditions. Based on these results and knowledge of the steel specifications used, accurate analysis of manganese and silicon concentrations was made using EPMA.

Results

Table I lists the weights and dimensions of the five fragments recovered from the incident. All these fragments showed evidence of having been exposed to explosive deformation. Figs 3 and 4 illustrate examples of rolled edges and Fig 5 a pit caused by the impingement of a high velocity particle on the surface.

From a single RARDE mortar trial firing, a total of 287gm of fragments were collected. This represents approximately one-third of the total weight of the mortar minus nose cap and explosive. The range of fragment sizes obtained is shown in Fig 6. These varied from about 1mm to 35mm across the longest axis. The weights of the fragments were in the range 0.05gm to almost 4.0gm. Examination of these fragments showed that many of them were similar in shape, size, weight and general appearance to those from the incident. Surface markings on the two sets of fragments also showed many similarities. Comparison of selected fragments with those from the incident is illustrated in Figs 7 and 8. It can be seen that those produced from the RARDE firing, Fig 7, are very similar to those recovered from the casualties, Fig 8.

The experiment to determine whether copper and tin could be picked-up from fragments that had ricocheted from plates of these materials proved positive. Comparison in the SEM of the fragments from the RARDE firing with those from the incident showed many similarities in the manner in which these elements were deposited on their surfaces. Fig 9 shows that the fragment recovered from the webbing pouch of one of the casualties had impacted on another surface, producing a localised flattened area on which was found a deposit of tin. Fig 10 shows a fragment from the RARDE firing, with one that had impacted on to the copper sheet, and picked-up copper.

Results from the ED analysis are shown in Table II. Spectra were obtained from small area scans on 'clean' metal well away from inclusions. These results show very similar concentrations for all incident fragments, the mortar case, and grenade wire controls. The spectra from Fragment 1 and the controls are shown in Figs 11, 12 and 13. The steels are known to be of commercial low carbon type and matching the compositions was not possible using the ED method. Sample 8 was known to be spheroidal graphite cast iron, confirmed by the ED result. It can be positively stated that none of Fragments 1-5 originated from an 81mm mortar.

Quantitative EPMA analysis results for manganese and silicon (assuming iron balance) are shown in Table III.

Table III shows all the steel compositions to be within their respective specifications but, unfortunately, the differences in actual composition were not sufficient to match the incident fragments conclusively to the mortar or grenade. The level of silicon measured is close to the detection limit of EPMA and present only as very low traces.

Close comparison of the manganese figures, however, enables some conclusions to be drawn as follows:

- a. There is very good agreement between the five incident fragments confirming that they all almost certainly originated from the same source.
- b. Slightly higher concentrations were measured on Sample 7, cut from an unused mortar and on Sample 6, a fragment from the RARDE firing. The specification for the mortar case is described only as 'body-pressing steel' and these figures are consistent with steels of this type, possibly from different suppliers or batches.
- c. Sample 10 was a conveniently available steel of the same type which showed a similar manganese level but much higher, measurable, silicon. These figures corresponded exactly to those obtained from chemical analysis and gave added overall confidence to the results.

d. The result from the grenade wire gives a manganese result some 50% higher than those from the incident fragments but the actual value is slightly more than the stated maximum (0.50) for the En2A steel given in the specification.

The accuracy of the manganese figures is estimated to be $\pm 0.02\%$ assuming reliable analysis figures for the reference standard used.

The ED and EPMA analysis results thus suggest the incident particles are a closer match to the mortar rather than the grenade.

Discussion and Conclusions

All fragments from the incident had originated from a high order explosion, and were very similar in composition. Two fragments showed traces of other elements on their surfaces, one a deposit of copper and another a small deposit of tin. The latter also showed traces of a phosphate coating on one surface.

The fragments from the RARDE trial were very similar in size, shape, weight and general appearance to those from the incident. It was also possible to pick-up deposits of copper and tin on some of the fragments which had ricocheted from copper and tin plates placed in the firing chamber.

The fragments from the incident could not have originated from the body of an 81mm mortar bomb as this was known to be manufactured from spheroidal graphite cast iron, and which has a significantly higher silicon content not found in the fragments from the incident.

This is consistent with a report that firing of 81mm mortar bombs had already ceased.

The appearance of the fragments from the incident rule out any possibility that they had originated from general purpose machinegun fire, although it had been reported that gunfire striking an armed mortar bomb could cause it to explode.

It is not possible to state with certainty where the copper and tin deposits on the fragments originated. The tin coating on the mortar bomb canister may have been struck by one fragment before it entered the webbing pouch from where it was recovered. Copper-jacketed bullets may have been carried by the servicemen, and there is a chance that a fragment could have struck these and picked-up some of the copper.

Expert advice from EC3 Division confirmed that there was no possibility of forming particles of this size and shape from an L2A1 grenade (Annex A). This is consistent with the PM1 Division findings that the breadth of the largest fragment from the incident is greater than the cross section of the wires from the grenade.

In summary, from the examinations and trials carried out at RARDE, evidence suggests that the fragments from the incident originated from one 2" mortar-bomb.

It cannot be proved from the appearance or analysis of the fragments that the mortar was one which had been fired by the servicemen injured in the incident, or whether a mortar fired by a second unit had exploded close by. This remains an issue that cannot easily be resolved.

Approved: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PM1

JPWC

TABLE I
DETAILS OF FRAGMENTS FROM INCIDENT

Weights of Fragments from Incident		
Description	Weight	Size
No 1 "Left Foot"	0.3g	Dimensions (mm) 7.5x7.0
No 2 "Left Upper Shoulder"	0.75g	" 9.0x9.0
No 3 "Heart"	0.08g	" 5.0x4.0
No 4 XXXXXXXXXX	0.45g	" 14x10
No 5 "Webbing Pouch"	0.9g	" 14x11

TABLE II
ED RESULTS

Sample	Main Elements	Low Conc
Fragment 1	Fe	Mn
" 2	"	"
" 3	"	"
" 4	"	"
" 5	"	"
Fragment from experimental firing of 2" mortar (6)	"	"
Sample cut from unfired 2" mortar case (7)	"	"
Sample cut from body of 81mm mortar (8)	"	Mn, Ni, Si
Sample cut from fragmenting component of L2 grenade (9)	"	Mn
Sample cut from body of Cook-set No 4 for comparison (10)	"	"

JF

Table III
EPMA RESULTS

Sample	Mn %	Si %
1	.39	.03
2	.39	.03
3	.40	.02
4	.39	.02
5	.39	.01
6	.45	.01
7	.48	.02
8	Not measured	
9	.59	.02
10	.49	.20

MEMORANDUM

ANNEX 'A'

MOD Form 4A

To: [REDACTED]
PM1/RARDE

From: [REDACTED]
EC3/RARDE

Date: 6 October 1986

Tel. 3157

Our ref.

Our ref.

Subject: FRAGMENTS FROM AMMUNITION INCIDENT

- 1) Five fragments resulting from detonation of an explosive store were recovered as a direct result of the incident. These were subjected to a visual inspection followed by considerable analytical examination.
- 2) On visual examination, the size and shape of the fragments was noted.
- 3) Possible explosive ordnance from which the fragments originated were quoted as a) L2A3 grenade b) 2" Mortar bomb.
- 4) Of the five fragments recovered, one was of such a size that it could not have originated from an L2A3 grenade, for the following reasons.
- 5) The L2A3 grenade body is constructed of rectangular section steel wire 0.085" x 0.100" notched at 0.125" intervals. The particular fragment noted was much larger in size, particularly in width. It was homogeneous and such that its original internal and external surfaces were visible. It bore no notches consistent with an L2A3 grenade fragment or of a number of such fragments welded together.

Prepared by: [REDACTED]
Department: [REDACTED]

Name in
Block Letters: [REDACTED]

Signature: [REDACTED]




FIG 1. CAPTURE OF FRAGMENTS




FIG 2. CAPTURE OF RICOCHET FRAGMENTS




FIG 3
ROLLED EDGE
X100




FIG 4
ROLLED EDGE
X70




FIG 5
PIT
X100



FIG 6. RANDOM SELECTION OF FRAGMENTS FROM 2" MORTAR-BOMB FIRING TRIAL SHOWING SHAPE AND SIZE DISTRIBUTION.





FIG 7. SELECTED FRAGMENTS FROM 2" MORTAR FIRING TRIAL




FIG 8. FRAGMENTS REMOVED FROM CASUALTIES.




FIG 9.
FRAGMENT No 5.
TIN DEPOSIT ON
IMPACT AREA
X 40




FIG 10.
RARDE TRIAL FRAGMENT
COPPER ON IMPACT
SURFACE.
X 18

X-RAY

lt: 200s Prst: 100s Rem: 0s
rt: 230s 13%Dt





FIG II. INCIDENT FRAGMENT. No 1.

X-RAY

Lt: 200s Prst: 100s Rem: 0s
Rt: 233s 14%Dt




< 1.280 6.400keV 11.520 >
FS= 2K CH 330= 10079CTS
1:Frag.6.Exp.(A).Firing trial

FIG 12. FRAGMENT FROM 2" MORTAR. RARDE TRIAL.


X-RAY

Lt: 200s Prst: 100s Rem: 0s
Rt: 200s 14%Dt



< 1.280 6.400keV 11.520 >
FS= 2K CH 330= 9942CTS
1: Frag. 7.2" Mortar body, unfired


FIG 13. SAMPLE CUT FROM 2" MORTAR CASE. UNFIRED



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PLATOON COMMANDERS DIVISION

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behalf of CO



PLATOON COMMANDERS DIVISION
COURSE REPORT

Course No: 13 From: 26 March 1972 To: 3 June 1972

Rank: [REDACTED] Name: [REDACTED] Number: [REDACTED]

Regiment: The Parachute Regiment Unit: 1st Bn The Parachute Regiment
Division: The Parachute Regiment

Grading: B

[REDACTED] is an enthusiastic officer who worked very hard throughout the course. He is sound and sensible as a leader. He commanded forcefully, maintained a firm grip of his subordinates and led them in a very positive manner.

He needs to pay closer attention to detail especially in his orders, but also in planning and preparation of exercises with special regard to safety and administration. He showed considerable imagination and drive in planning and running a Stage V exercise. His written work was well presented and above average as was his final test result.

His navigation is sound and he is fit.

During syndicate discussions he was always willing to put his point of view in a mature fashion, especially and most usefully with regard to his own experiences in Northern Ireland.

Individually he maintained a high standard throughout the course. He was always willing to help the other members of his group and often spurred on other students in command appointments by his own example and initiative.

[REDACTED] has a forceful and direct manner. He has plenty of offensive spirit and above average ability to control a platoon, nevertheless he should guard against being over-aggressive. He has fully deserved his high grading.

[REDACTED]

Major
CC Platoon Commanders Division

3 June 1972

A very good report, which he thoroughly deserves, but I want to underline the middle sentence of the last paragraph above. I sincerely hope that his forthright and aggressive views on IS matters are largely bravado, - if they are not, they are dangerous!


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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Commandant, Officers Wing

Authorised to sign on



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Com

AUTHORISED TO SIGN ON



PLATOON COMMANDERS DIVISION
COURSE REPORT

Course No: 20 From: 9 June 1974 To: 17 August 1974

Rank: [REDACTED] Name: [REDACTED] Number: [REDACTED]

Regiment: The Parachute Regiment Unit: 1st Bn The Parachute Regiment

Division:

Grading: B

[REDACTED] has had a very successful course. From the outset he adopted an interested and determined attitude and his above average grading has been well earned. He is an aggressive soldier who has tackled all tasks given to him with enthusiasm. He is a mature and forthright officer who set and expected high standards. He was well-liked and respected in his syndicate for his high level of professionalism. He is physically very fit and displayed a high standard of mental and physical stamina throughout the ten week course.

He arrived at Warminster with a sound knowledge of army organisation, weapon characteristics and tactics at platoon and section level. He was an attentive listener and active participant in syndicate room discussion and put forward some interesting views and opinions. Throughout the course he expressed himself clearly, if a little bluntly at times. He did well on TETs showing a good eye for ground and an ability to apply his knowledge of tactics in the field.

[REDACTED] had particular success when in the field. He was a natural and effective leader who always appeared to enjoy the responsibilities of command. At times he showed signs of impatience and intolerance with superiors and subordinates alike (student appointees) when the momentum was not maintained, and on occasions this led to over-reaction on his part; sometimes this involved himself and his soldiers in unnecessarily hazardous situations. He was always quick to take the initiative; his mind was flexible and quick-thinking and his early decisions often caught the enemy off-balance. He controlled well whenever in command. His personal organisation is of a high quality and as a platoon sergeant he showed a good understanding of platoon administration. In this appointment, he gave able assistance to his platoon commander and effectively maintained the morale of a fairly weary platoon.

His written work has been of an average standard. His solution to the training programme problem was realistic and well-thought-out, though it lacked certain administrative details and was scruffily presented. It would have provided his platoon with an interesting and valuable training period.

/Continued on page 2

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[REDACTED]
Authorised to sign on

His skill at arms work has been well above average and he produced some very good results throughout the course. His personal standards were very high and he was of great assistance to some of the other less experienced and less able students in his syndicate. He supervised skill at arms instruction well and is now qualified to plan and conduct live firing with all platoon weapons, including the destruction of blinds. [redacted] made steady progress throughout the course. He is now judged to be a well above average student and able to command and train a rifle platoon with minimal supervision. He must guard against being over impetuous, and must learn to look before he leaps.

17 August 1974

[redacted]
[redacted]
Major
OC Platoon Commanders Division

A richly deserved grading as a result of ten weeks hard work from start to finish. [redacted] made a considerable impression on his fellow students and I am deeply grateful for the enthusiasm he injected into the course by his own personal efforts. It would be wrong of me not to enforce the warning against over reaction in a tight situation. [redacted] I feel confident realises the growing importance of this factor.

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
Commandant, Officers Wing

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[redacted]
Authorised to sign on



ANNEX N TO
CCRIO 06022/6
DATED 21 OCT 86

UK AMF(L)



STANDING ORDERS FOR MJOLFJELL RANGES

PART ONE

USE OF THE MJOLFJELL RANGES BY UNITS OF AMF(L) DURING EK HARDFALL

References:

- A. Infantry Training Volume IV Pamphlet No 21, Range Conduct and Safety Rules (All Arms) 1978.
- B. Map Mjolfjell, Norway, Series M816, Edition 2 NOR, 1:25,000.
- C. UK Mjolfjell Range trace dated Dec 85.

INTRODUCTION

1. The Standing Orders for the Mjolfjell Ranges and Training Area are divided into three parts as follows:
 - a. Part I. Special orders applicable to the AMF(L) units training during the HARDFALL deployment, including control of the ranges.
 - b. Part II. General Orders for the use of Mjolfjell Ranges.
 - c. Part III. Detailed Range Specifications for the Mjolfjell Ranges.
2. Parts II and III are a translation of the Norwegian Range Orders and adapted for the use of AMF(L) units. More specific orders mainly concerning the infantry battalion (1 PARA) but applicable to other units in the AMF(L) are contained in Part I which must be adhered to.
3. Use of the ranges and supervision of weapons by all British units are to be as per Reference A, in addition to the Norwegian orders in Parts II and III. All CIC range practices or safety staff are to be qualified or authorised in accordance with Reference A. They must also have copies of Reference A to C.

ALLOCATION AND CONTROL OF MJOLFJELL RANGES

4. General.

- a. The Mjolfjell Range is controlled and administrated by the S02 G3 IR10. He is assisted by his Norwegian Range Officer who is responsible for the day-to-day management and maintenance of the ranges.
- b. AMF(L) units who wish to use the Range have to make their initial bids on the HARDFALL recos where their requests are confirmed by IR10. Primary use and control of the Range during the HARDFALL deployment is vested in the AMF(L) infantry battalion, currently 1 PARA.
- c. Should non infantry units during the HARDFALL deployment wish to use a range, because it is not being used, or wish to transit across the area between Brandsot Camp and Mjolfjell Camp, they are to consult the Ops Offr 1 PARA at Dn HQ.
- d. In cases of conflict, the S02 G3 AMF(L) Control Cell, will adjudicate.

5. Control by the Infantry Battalion (1 PARA).

a. Prior to the deployment, companies will know their range allocation as per the Battalion training programme. Should they wish to change it, or use the range concurrently with another company, they are to inform the Ops Offr.

b. Ops Offr. He is responsible for coordinating the daily range programme and notifying IR10, 2 Flt AAC and 33 Sqn RAF of the programme and any changes that occur. He is also to liaise with IR10 over the ranges.

c. OC Sp Coy. OC Sp Coy based at Mjolfjell Camp is responsible for controlling and maintaining the range throughout the deployment. Companies on their range days (or other units) are to obtain the key for the Range Hut and target shed and indent for their targets from them in advance. At the end of the shooting, targets are to be repaired and any deficiencies etc to be notified to Sp Coy so replacements can be obtained. OC Sp Coy is also responsible for ensuring the range and Volvo tracks are marked and kept open throughout training.

d. OC Brandset Camp. OC Brandset Camp (OC C Coy) may use the Brandset side of the Range (Area A) for zeroing (see map trace) outside the agreed range programme. However, he must liaise with the company using the Range on that day, and also inform the Ops Offr. (The same also applies to HQ Company based at the Oppheim Hotel.) OC C Coy is to liaise with OC Sp Coy over keeping the Volvo track open from his location to Mjolfjell Camp.

TARGETS

6. QM. The QM is responsible in providing targets at the beginning of the deployment and replacements, as applicable, to the Mjolfjell and Brandset Camps.

7. Mjolfjell Range. Sp Company are responsible for ensuring there are adequate targets at the Mjolfjell ranges (Area D) throughout the training period for all companies and other units.

8. Brandset Range. Brandset Camp (OC C Coy) are to hold sufficient targets from the QM to use on this part of the range (Area A). C Coy will be responsible for maintaining and accounting for these targets throughout the training period.

9. Hard and Thermal Targets. There are no hard or thermal targets on the range for MILAN (Heat).

10. DART Targets. There are a small amount of DART (radio controlled) targets available from IR10. Companies who wish to use them (only with SAA) must indent at least 3 working days in advance as the targets are set up by the Norwegian Range Officer and his staff. (Note. These targets have to be well dug in to avoid damage from SAA.)

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SPECIALIST WEAPONS

11. OC Sp Coy is responsible for ensuring, through the Ops Offr, that all the necessary cover for specialist weapons is obtained well in advance when the weapons are used on the range. These include:

- a. NOTAMS. Minimum of 7 working days notice for 81mm mortars.
- b. ATO. MILAN firing.

FIELD FIRING

12. Field firing may take place in both Areas. However, only Area B can use mortars or HE ammunition.

13. Bn HQ is to be informed when field firing at Platoon or Company level is planned on the Range by Companies.

RESTRICTIONS OF WEAPONS

14. Grenades. These may not be thrown at present until clearance has been obtained from IR10. A separate instruction will be issued.

15. 2"/51mm Mortars. HE ammunition must be fired only into the 81mm mortar impact area. All blinds are to be noted as per Part II of these orders.

16. Explosives. Small charges may be used outside the range area for simulation in unpopulated areas. Clearance is to be obtained through Bn HQ.

HELICOPTERS

17. Visitors to the Range arriving by a helicopter are to liaise with the company prior to landing, so as not to disrupt firing or endanger the helicopter. The main IS is beside the Range Hut which is to be always marked.

RANGE STAFF ASSISTANCE

18. The Bn Training Team may be able to assist companies during field firing with safety Staff. Companies are to liaise with the Ops Offr for assistance.

RANGE CHECK LIST

19. Listed below is a quick check list which is to be adhered to prior to firing by British units on the Mjolfjell Range. Details are in Parts II and III.

- a. All ranges and sentry posts are to be in radio contact.
- b. Companies firing on the range are to be in radio contact with a location (Mjolfjell Camp, Kaarvåls, Brandset) with a civil telephone to deal quickly with emergencies.
- c. Before firing commences, if possible, a check is to be made of the range area by ... helicopter.

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d. All ranges are to have binoculars to observe for Skiers entering the range.

e. There is to be no firing outside the ranges and danger areas. Particular care is to be taken when firing on the infantry ranges in Rjoandalen that weapons are kept low so that bullets do not go over the Rjoandeggi. Arcs are to be marked and soldiers are to be briefed.

f. There is to be no firing across the range road running from GR 816334 to 827374 and from 819345 to 730359. The only exception is Sp Wpn fire. When this occurs the OIC range is to ensure that traffic cannot move through the danger area.

g. When firing in Rjoandalen ranges a red flag (Lamp by night) is to be hoisted on the flag pole GR 821325 and there is to be a sentry with radio.

h. All ranges are to have a first aid kit. Companies must have a medical orderly present during all live firing.

j. A red flag is to be flown before firing on the firing point of each range. Flags are to remain up when firing is in progress.

k. Firing is to stop in the event of helicopters/aircraft overflying at low altitude.

l. The emergency signal to cease firing is a series of red vary lights. When the signal is seen all ranges are to stop firing and weapons are to be unloaded until the matter is sorted out.

RANGE MAP

20. All users on the Range are to have a copy of the map at Reference B. They are also to have seen a copy of the range trace at Reference C which gives boundaries, individual ranges, and Volvo tracks.

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PART TWO

GENERAL ORDERS FOR THE MJOLFJELL RANGES

DIVISION OF RANGES AND TRAINING AREA

1. The Mjolfjell Ranges are the primary training area for the Vestlandet Region. The ranges and training area are divided into two parts by a natural ridge. Both areas from Mjolfjell Camp to Brandset Camp are linked by a track.
 - a. Area B. Containing 16 prepared ranges in Rjoandalen/Grojuvet, including the mortar and artillery impact area.
 - b. Area A. Containing 6 proposed ranges and a zeroing area in Djosudalen.
2. Details of each range and the weapons which can be used on the Mjolfjell Ranges are contained in Part III.
3. Each area contains hard firing points for artillery.
4. Dry training can take place anywhere within the two areas of the Mjolfjell ranges, except for the prepared ranges which are marked on the range map.

RANGE BOUNDARIES

5. Details concerning the range boundaries are marked on the overlay to the 1:25000 map for the Mjolfjell ranges. In outline the boundaries of both Areas are:
 - a. NORTH. Brandsett river (GR 7444) along Osthusdalen Osthus River to the district Fylk Boundary (GR 8045) to the South and East District boundaries till point 1305 (GR 8445).
 - b. EAST. From point 1305 along the District Boundary through point 1427 (N Sateggi) and point 1220 (S Sateggi). Then East through points 1189 and 1168 (GR 8539) to GR 869397, then SSE to point 1223 (GR 8723C7) then to GR 3713C3. From there SW to point 1386 GR 847363 and to GR 835344, point 1158 (GR 8333) point 1149 (GR 8333) points 1074 and 1019 (GR 8332).
 - c. SOUTH. From point 1019, river GR 818334, point 1189 (GR 7933), GR 765359, lake 760357, point 1158 (GR 7337).
 - d. WEST. From point 1158, GR 724384, point 1168 (GR 7239) GR 721399. From thence the boundary runs NW.
6. Marking of the Boundaries. The overall Mjolfjell Range boundary on the ground is not marked except for warning posters. (See para 12.)

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7. Marking of Individual Ranges. Each range is marked with signs which show firing points, boundaries and area. Polos are orange and range numbers are in white.

ADMINISTRATION

8. The Mjolfjell Ranges are administered by IR10 at Bomoen, through the Norwegian Range Officer and SO2 G3. All bids to use the ranges or training area are made through them by units. (HARDFALL RECCE)

9. The whole range is rented and consequently:

- a. The owners are permitted to graze animals on the area.
- b. Any digging has to be authorised by IR10.

WARNING OF LIVE FIRING - EXECUTED BY NORWEGIANS

10. General. IR10 will generally warn the public of all live firing on the ranges and training area in January and August, covering each period. This warning will be given twice before each six month period using the format in UD2-1 point 608 and 609. The warning includes:

- a. The range can be used through the whole year for short or long periods by day or night.
- b. Exact timings of use must be announced in the local media.
- c. The boundaries for the danger areas are as in para 5.
- d. When firing is in progress no unauthorised person is to be allowed to enter within the boundaries.

11. Specific Warning. IR10 will also issue a specific warning for daily live firing on the ranges. This is in the following format:

"Shooting at Mjolfjell Range

Firing will start at the following time
For the area affected see the warning posters which are displayed on the routes and the advertisements in the local press. Further details can be obtained from the Adjutant IR10 (Tel C55 - 11744)."

12. Warning Posters. Warning Posters will also be displayed by IR10 at the following places:

Fyre (GR 749454), Erandset (730427), Roimo (767296), Mjolfjell Station (823310), Botnarest (820327), Mjolfjell Bridge (826310), Ljosardalen (857326), Mjolfjell Youth Hostel (874316), Upssto Station (916340), Myrdal Station (977347), Flam Station (975492) and Flam Shop, Unrodal 975589, Fronnes 989517 and Aurlandsvangen.

MAINTENANCE OF PERMANENT BUILDINGS AND MARKERS

13. All markers of range boundaries and arcs must be in good condition and in the correct place in accordance with Norwegian Regulations.
14. Range installations, permanent equipment, markers etc shall be periodically checked in accordance with rules below. The responsibility of these checks are:
 - a. Ranges and boundary markers are to be annually inspected by the Norwegian District Engineer. The Norwegian Range Officer is to ensure that this inspection occurs. A check of installations and boundaries is to be made every 6 months by the Norwegian Range Officer.
 - b. The Officer/SNCO IC a range is to inspect it before use.
 - c. The Norwegian Range Officer is to check daily as far as possible all ranges in use by units.
15. Buildings. The Range Hut and target shed is at GR 813344. There is an mortar Op hut at GR 813374.

RANGE TRAFFIC THROUGH THE RANGE AREAS

16. There should be no traffic through the danger area which includes the firing target and safety area. Because of the absence of markers, especially in the winter, troops must be familiar with all the range details and danger areas.
17. Troops in transit, especially between Mjolfjoll and the Brandset Camps must be familiar with firing on the ranges and are responsible for their own safety. They should first check with the unit firing before transitting the area.
18. All traffic should only enter and leave the range along the Brandset/Rjocandalen main track. In the winter this is marked by a volvo track (see map and trace).
19. Range traffic can pass freely from the parking place to the range lavatories at GR 813344 unless there is ATGW, mortar shooting or field firing. Where possible traffic going to the various parking places or small ranges use the main road or the shortest and safest route.
20. Cross Country Skiing/Orienteering. It is forbidden to ski or orienteer in the training area by individuals without the permission of the Norwegian Range Officer or the OIC Range during firing.

LIVE FIRING SAFETY PRECAUTIONS

21. When live firing is taking place on the range the following action is to be taken by the unit involved, depending on the area used:

Area A. A red flag (by day) or a red light (by night) is to be hoisted at Botnaraset (GR 821325) and a warning sign displayed beside the flag post.

Area II. A red flag (by day) or a red light (by night) is to be hoisted at the crossroads at GR 737437 and a warning sign displayed beside the flag post.

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22. If there are no warning signs available, they may be replaced with a poster described at paras 11 and 12.

23. In addition, OIC each specific range is to ensure a red flag (day) or red light (night) is displayed at the firing point at each range during use.

24. Range Sentries. Range sentries are to be posted when live firing is taking place with the Mjolfjell Ranges as follows:

a. Area E. A sentry is posted at the flag at Botnaraset GR 821325. If field firing is taking place in the Samvirke impact area or onto the main impact area in Nedslagsomr, a sentry should be posted in the area of GR 854386 to cover likely access to the range by walkers or skiers.

b. Area A. A sentry is posted at the flag at GR 738425.

HIGH EXPLOSIVE AMMUNITION AND RANGE RESTRICTIONS

25. There are six ranges in the Mjolfjell complex where HE ammunition can only be used - see map trace. These are:

a. Ranges 1 and 4. (Carl Gustav GR 8233).

b. Range area in Grodjuvenuten GR 8236. (For mortars and ATGW).

c. Artillery and Mortar Impact Area. (GR 820430 - 840430, 840390, 845385, 833379, 826383, 822380, 810386, 810400, 820410, 820430).

d. Range 15. Hand grenades. (Summer only - see Part 1).

e. Range 16. Demolition charges.

26. Unauthorised entry into the 6 range danger areas is forbidden without prior permission from the Norwegian Range Officer. Traffic in the satodalø area must remain on the track.

27. Blinds.

a. Unit OIC Practico. He is to:

(1) Ensure that blinds are reported and marked.

(2) Ensure that troops do not enter the danger area except to mark blinds.

(3) Inform the Norwegian Range Officer at IR10 as soon as possible, with a written report giving details of the blind(s).

b. Norwegian Range Officer. He has overall responsibility for ensuring that known blinds are rendered harmless and is, as soon as possible, to:

(1) Ensure that blinds are found and marked.

(2) Ensure that blinds are blown up.

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ACTION OF FIRES

28. In the summer there is a high risk of fire, and the Norwegian Range Officer may impose a ban on tracer, HE, phosphorus or illuminating rounds. However, if no ban has been imposed, and there is a risk of fire, the OIC practice must use his commonsense to avoid a possible fire.

29. The following fire fighting equipment is located at the Range Hut GR 818344:

- a. 15 brooms.
- b. 15 fire extinguishers.

30. In event of fire, shooting must stop until the fire is extinguished. Under no circumstances should troops enter the HE impact area to fight it. The OIC range is to take command of firefighting.

31. Any fire on the range is to be reported to the Norwegian Range Officer at IR10. If the fire cannot be dealt with by the troops present, IR10 duty officer must be warned. The civil fire brigade will be tasked by the duty officer. For telephone numbers see Annex C.

USE OF RANGES BY UNITS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

32. The ranges or training area on the Mjolfjell Ranges can only be used by units who have been allocated them by the Norwegian Range Officer at IR10.

33. All weapons to be fired on each range must be declared to IR10 on the initial booking. No unauthorised weapons are to be fired without permission from IR10.

34. Officers or NCOs in charge of live firing are to be qualified or authorised in accordance with Norwegian Regulations or the UK equivalent. (Reference A). They are to have read these orders and be familiar with them. In particular:

- a. Red flags or lights are to be hoisted in accordance with the orders at para 33. All roads leading on to the range are to be closed and safety sentries are to be briefed in accordance with Annex E.
- b. All ammunition salvage and rubbish must be removed from the range to ensure there is no danger to civilians or animals when the range is not used.
- c. Without the permission of the Norwegian Range Officer, the felling of trees, stripping bark from trees and digging (except in designated areas) is strictly prohibited.
- d. Range users are to be aware of the special orders applicable to the range on which they are firing.
- e. The appropriate first aid cover is available on the range.
- f. Trenches, hard firing points and bushes are to be cleaned after use.
- g. Safety communications are established as appropriate and post range sentries.

II-5


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h. All range stores are to be returned after use.

i. The Norwegian Range Officer is to be informed when shooting has finished.

COMMUNICATIONS

35. As there are no permanent telephones on the area, units are to ensure there are radio and telephone links on each range as appropriate, including a safety net to Mjolfjell Camp incase of a serious accident which needs to task a helicopter.




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PART THREE

DETAILED RANGE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE MJOLEJELL RANGES

1. Part Three is to be read in conjunction with the 1:25,000 range map and trace. It concerns details on each range.
2. Annex A gives a summary of the 16 ranges in Area II.
3. Appendix 1 to 16 of Annex A gives a more specific breakdown of each range in this Area.
4. Annex B gives a summary of the 5 proposed ranges in Area A and the small arms firing that can take place in that Area.
5. Annex C gives a list of useful telephone numbers. This list is to be checked and confirmed at the beginning of each HARDMAIL deployment.
6. Annex D are the orders for the range sentries when posted.


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Annexes:

- A. Summary of Ranges and Weapon Specifications in Area II.
- B. Summary of Ranges and Weapon Specifications in Area A.
- C. Useful Telephone Numbers.
- D. Orders for Range Sentries.

ANNEX A TO
 AMF (I) STANDING ORDERS
 FOR THE INFANTRY RANGES
 DATED 16 JAN 85

SUMMARY OF RANGES AND WEAPON SPECIFICATIONS IN AREA B

Ser	Range Number/Area	Capacity	Range of Firing	Weapons	Remarks	Description
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
1.	1	3 Mjns	120 to 900m	84mm HEAT 84mm TPTP 21mm Sub Cal 5.5mm Outdoor	HEAT to be fired at Stationary Targets Only	Anti Tank Range (Large Moving Target)
2.	2			Rifle GPMG + SF LMG	Only Live Plastic Training Ammunition to be Fired	AA Range (Small)
3.	3	4 Mjns	1000ms	84mm MAF TPTP 21mm Sub Cal 6.5mm Outdoor	The Range Must be set up before use	Anti Tank Range (Small) Moving Target
4.	4	2 Mjns	1000ms	65mm LNW	HEAT to be fired at Stationary Targets Only	Anti Tank Range Stationary Target
5.	5	Section	50-350ms	Rifle GPMG and SF LMG SMG 21mm Sub Cal and 6.5mm Outdoor		Section in Defence
6.	6	30 Mjns	50ms	Pistol, Rifle, SMG, LMG, GPMG and SF		Close Quarter Range

III-A-1

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
7.	7	Section	300ms	Rifle, IAG, GIVE and SF, SMG, 21mm Sub Cal and 6.5mm outdoor	Section Range
8.	8	Section	350ms	Rifle, SMG, IAG, GIVE, 21mm Sub Cal and 6.5mm Outdoor	Section Range
9.	9	Section	300ms	As Serial 8 above	Section in Defence
10.	10			Under Construction not yet in use	Machine Gun Range
11.	11		TOW MIKAN	For number of launchers OC Range to consult Norwegian Range Officer	ATGM
12.	12	Mortar 21	Mor DP or pts between GR 818344-828372 or the road between GR 828358-845379	a. Impact area as per the trace. b. Mor OP hut at GR 813374	Mortar Range
13.	13	One	600ms	12.7mm MG	ATGM AA Range
14.	14	Arty Regt	Gun posns. Also in Area D	105 and 155mm Guns	Artillery Range

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)
15.	15	One Thrower		Hand Grenades with a lethal radius of 250m or less	All roads leading into the target area to be closed	Hand Grenade Range. Not to be used in the winter without specific clearance by IR10.
15.	15	25 kg Demolition Charge		25 Demolition Charge Maximum allowed	Range to be sealed off in accordance with orders	Demolition Range


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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX 1 TO
PART III

ORDERS FOR RANGE I - ANTI TANK

1. General. The exact location is GR 818335. The range is to be used only by 3 firers. The OIC range is to be familiar with the general range orders Parts 1 and 2.
2. Types of Weapon. The following types of weapon can be used on the range:

Weapon	Type of firing
84mm HEAT	Danger area on mountainside. Moving targets can be used. As above.
84mm TPTP	
84mm 6.5mm Sub calibre	
66mm Training Ammunition	

Note: Care should be taken when firing at a moving target not to damage the sledge.

3. Safety. Firing is to be conducted in accordance with regulations. When the range is being used a sentry is to be posted at the flag post. It is to ensure that general observation is maintained. A red flag is to be hoisted. In the event of an accident causing casualties a helicopter can be tasked by the Norwegian Army (Tel civil 17205) or initially, a UK helicopter.
4. Special Orders. The main range track must remain free for traffic. The moving target is only to be operated by the range admin staff. No other personnel are allowed in the target machine room. Contact is to be maintained with other ranges by helicopter.



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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 2 - ANTI AIRCRAFT

1. General.




- a. The exact location is GR 815337.
- b. The maximum capacity is 5 weapons.
- c. The OIC range is to be familiar with the general range and training orders contained in Parts 1 and 2.

2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
12.7mm Machine Gun GFMG, Rifle, SMG	Only plastic training ammunition to be used.

3. Safety. Firing will be in accordance with regulations. A red flag or light by night is to be hoisted at Botnaresot.

4. Special Orders. The moving target equipment is to be used only by the range staff. No-one else is to enter the enginercom. Communication are to be by radio.




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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 3 - MOVING TARGET ANTI TANK RANGE SMALL

1. General.

- a. The exact location is GR 818339.
- b. The CIC range is to be acquainted with the general range orders contained in Parts 1 and 2.

2. Weapons.




Weapon	Remarks
84mm, 66mm 21mm Sub cal 6.5mm Rifle, SMG	Training ammunition only, no HEAT or HE

3. Safety. Firing is to be in accordance with current regulations. A red flag is to be hoisted at Botnaresot.

4. Special Orders.

- a. The range is only to be operated by personnel authorised by the range officer.
- b. Machine Guns are not to be used on the range. The moving target apparatus is not to be fired at.
- c. Traffic for Range 3 must receive permission to pass Range 1, when 84mm and 66mm are firing.

5. Communications. Communications with sub units and other ranges are to be by radio.




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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 4 - STATIC AMBI TANK RANGE

1. General. The location of the range is GR S20344, no more than 2 weapons are to fire at any one time. The OIC range is to be familiar with the general range orders Parts 1 and 2.

2. Weapons.


Weapons	Remarks
56mm 60 and 80mm	HEAT within current rules for firing

3. Boundaries. All targets are to be within the marked out danger area. The raised up firing point is to be used only.

4. Safety. Firing is to be in accordance with current regulations. A red flag is to be hoisted at Botnareset when firing is in progress. In the event of an accident causing casualties a Norwegian helicopter can be tasked through civil telephone number 170203 - initially, a UK helicopter.

5. Special Orders. In the event of a blind, a blind report must be made immediately after the end of firing.

6. Communications. Communications are to be maintained with other ranges and troops by radio.



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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 5 - SECTION IN DEPTH

1. General. The location of the range is GR 814345. The range capacity is a section. The range officer is to be aware of the general range orders contained in Parts 1 and 2.

2. Weapons.




Weapons	Remarks
Rifle, SMG, GPMG GPMG SF 20mm Cannon	(Training ammunition only)

3. Boundaries. All targets are to be clearly placed within the arcs.

4. Safety. Firing is to be carried out in accordance with regulations. A red flag is to be hoisted at Botnareset.

5. Special Regulations. The range road from Grodjuvelbu to Grodjevobotn is to remain open. There is to be no firing across it.

6. Communications. Radio communications are to be maintained with other ranges.




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APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 6 - CQB

1. General. Range location is GR 819347. The range capacity is 30 firers. The OIC range is to be acquainted with the general orders for Mjolfjell ranges contained in Parts 1 and 2.




2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
Pistol	
Rifle/SMG	
GPMG	
GPMG SF	

3. Safety. Firing is to be in accordance with current regulations. A red flag is to be flown at Dotnareset.

4. Special Orders. There is to be no firing across any range road.

5. Communications. Communications are to be by radio.




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
APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 7 - SECTION RANGE

1. General. Range location is GR 823350. Range capacity is a Section.
2. Weapons.

Weapons	Remarks
Rifle/SMG GPMG 20mm	Training Ammunition

3. Safety. Firing is to be conducted in accordance with current regulations. A red flag is to be displayed at Botnaroset.



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APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 3 - SECTION

1. General. Range location is grid 829356. The range capacity is a section. The range officer is to be familiar with the general range orders contained in Parts 1 and 2.


2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
Rifle/SMG GFMG GFMG SF 21mm training Ammunition	

3. Safety. Firing is to be in accordance with safety regulations. A red flag is to be flown at Dothnareset.

4. Special Regulations. There is to be no firing across roads and these are to remain open for traffic.

5. Communications. Communications are to be by radio.



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APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 9 - SECTION IIF DEFENCE

1. General. Range location is GR 829358. Range capacity one section. The range officer is to be familiar with the general orders for the range which are contained in Parts 1 and 2.


2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
Rifle/SMG GPMG GPMG SR 20mm	Training ammunition only

3. Safety. Firing is to be carried out in accordance with current regulations. A red flag is to be hoisted at Botnareset.

4. Special Instructions. All roads are to remain open and there is to be no firing across them.

5. Communications. Communications are to be by radio.


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APPENDIX 10 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 10 - MACHINE GUN RANGE

1. General. Range location is GR C30360. The range capacity is 4 weapons. The CIC range is to be familiar with the general range orders contained in Parts 1 and 2. This range is not yet in use.




2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
GPMG GPMG SF 12.7mm MG	

3. Safety. Firing is to be conducted in accordance with current regulations.

4. Special Orders. All targets must be placed clearly within the range arcs.

5. Communications. All communications are to be by radio.




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APPENDIX 11 TC
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 11 - ATGW (TOW/MILAN)

1. General. Maximum number of weapons, One. In addition to the hard firing points the OIC range can select other firing points on either side of the Rjeandani river.

2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
TOW MILAN ATGW	Any authorised ammunition

3. Boundaries. The main road within the danger area must be closed. The Norwegian Range Officer should be consulted on the danger area to be used.

4. Safety. Firing is to be carried out in accordance with current regulations. In emergencies a Norwegian helicopter can be tasked through civil telephone 17205. A red flag must be hoisted at Botnaset.

5. Special Orders. All rounds must be either recovered or their location reported to the range officer. The targets must be placed so that missiles fall into the danger area.



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APPENDIX 12 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 12 - MORTAR RANGE

1. General. The location of the range is given at the map. In addition to the hard firing points, the OIC range can select other firing points between Grodjuvorbu GR 818344 and GR 828372 and along the road between 828358 and 845379. The OIC range is to be familiar with Parts 1 and 2 of Range Orders.

2. Weapons.

Weapons	Remarks
81mm Mortar 107mm Mortar 2" or 51mm Mortar	All authorised types of ammunition


3. Boundaries. Mortar firing closes all roads and ranges between the baseplate position and the target area.

4. Safety. Firing is to be carried out in accordance with current regulations. In case of accidents involving casualties a Norwegian helicopter can be tasked via civil telephone No 17205, or initially a UK helicopter. A red flag must be hoisted at Botnareset.

5. Special Orders. Any blinds are to be reported to the range officer as soon as possible after firing. All fire is to be clearly directed within the danger impact area.

6. Communications. Communications are to be by radio.

7. Mortar OP Hut. An OP can be established in the hut at GR 813374 to direct fire as necessary.



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APPENDIX 13 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 13 - HEAVY MG AA RANGE (AIR TOWED TARGETS)

1. General. The range is located on the road at GR 928359. The range officer is to be familiar with the general range instructions contained in Parts 1 and 2.
2. Weapons.

Weapon	Remarks
12.7mm MG 7.62mm MG	Shooting is to be in accordance with current regulations

3. Boundaries. Firing is to take place only within the arc 6255 mils through N to 0200 mils. The maximum elevation for firing is 65 degrees or 1150 mils. Arcs included on the range map.
4. Safety. Firing is to be conducted in accordance with current regulations. In case of an accident involving casualties a Norwegian helicopter can be tasked through civil telephone No 17205.
5. Special Instructions. The arcs are to be marked in the ground in front of each weapon.
6. Communications. Field telephones are to be laid between weapons to control firing before the start of the practice. The air ground link to the aircraft is to be controlled from the place where the range officer is.




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

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APPENDIX 14 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 14 - ARTILLERY FIRE FROM RJOANALEN AND BRANDSET (AREAS A AND B)

1. General. Locations are given on the attached map. In addition to the marked firing points the officer in charge can select other firing points along the road from Grodjuvobu, Grodjuvebotn and Grodjuveb-Satebu. In Brandset Dalen only the hard firing are to be used. The OIC range is to be familiar with the general range orders in Parts 1 and 2. The range can be used by up to an artillery regiment (Norwegian Bn).
2. Weapons. The range can be used by 105 and 155mm guns firing all approved types of ammunition.
3. Boundaries. Field artillery fire closes all roads, ranges and areas between the firing point and the danger area. There is to be no firing from gun positions close to the cottages at GR 744426 and the houses at Brandset and Nystolen GRs 743424 and 764408 respectively.
4. Firing is to be conducted in accordance with regulations. In cases of accidents involving casualties a Norwegian helicopter or initially a UK helicopter can be tasked via civil number 17205. Red signals must be displayed at Botnareset and by the range construction at Brandset.
5. Special Orders.
 - a. A damage control officer shall be appointed for each battery. All damage must be reported in writing to both IR10, the Norwegian Range Officer and the owner of the property.
 - b. All blinds are to be reported after shooting to the range officer whether they are destroyed or not.
 - c. The Norwegian Range Officer must be informed before direct firing is carried out.
6. Communications. Communications are to be by field telephone or radio.



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APPENDIX 15 TO
ANNEX A TO
PART III

RANGE 15 - HAND GRENADE RANGE

1. General.

- a. For range location see range map. The range capacity is one thrower at a time. The OIC range is to be familiar with the range orders in Parts 1 and 2 of this instruction.
- b. Hand grenades can be used on the range which have a lethal radius of 250m or less.
- c. In the winter, hand grenades are not to be used without special permission from IR10.

2. Boundaries.

- a. When the range is in use the road between Rjoandalen and Nordsmannaskaret GR 779359 is to be closed.
- b. Grenades shall be thrown so that all fall within the constructed danger area.

3. Safety.




- a. The range is to be operated in accordance with current regulations. The following sentries are to be deployed:

- (1) One outside the danger area on the west side on the road leading to Nordmannaskaret.
- (2) One on the East side outside the danger area on the road leading to Rjoandalen.

- b. In event of an accident causing casualties a Norwegian helicopter, or initially a UK helicopter can be tasked via civil telephone No 17205. A red flag/light is to be raised at Botnareget.

4. Special Orders. Only one section is to wait in the waiting area. The rest of the troops are to wait outside the danger area. A blind report is to be made to the Norwegian Range Officer whether the blind is destroyed or not.

5. Communications. Communications are to be by radio.




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RANGE 16 - DEMOLITION RANGE

1. General.

a. For range location see map. The officer in charge of the range is to be familiar with the general range orders contained in Parts 1 and 2.

b. The maximum charge is 25 Kgs or less.

2. Boundaries. When the range is in use all roads leading into the danger area must be closed. The largest charge which can be used is 25 Kgs.



3. Safety.

a. The range is to be conducted in accordance with current regulations. 3 warning signs are to be posted on the outside of the danger area as follows:

- (1) One sign in the area GR 798367.
- (2) One sign at GR 801351 on the road.
- (3) One sign at GR 780359 on the road.

b. In the event of accidents a Norwegian helicopter, or initially a UK helicopter can be tasked through civil tel no 17205. A red flag must be hoisted at Botnareset.

4. Communications. Communications are to be by radio.



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ANNEX B TO
AMF (I) STANDING ORDERS
FOR INFANTRY RANGES
DATED 16 JAN 65

SUMMARY OF RANGES AND MATCH SPECIFICATIONS IN AREA A

1. Brandset Ranges in Area A are still under construction - see the trace. They will consist of the following ranges:
 - a. Range 20 AA Range.
 - b. Range 21 Anti Tank Range Small.
 - c. Range 22 Machine Gun Range.
 - d. Range 23 Section in Defence.
 - e. Range 24 8 Lane Rifle/GPMG Range.
 - f. Range 25 Anti Tank Live Firing Range.
2. There are 3 arty gun posn in Area A - see the trace and details at Appendix 14 of Annex A.
3. Zeroing. No 26 on the trace (GR 745447) indicates where small arms zeroing may take place.
4. IE. No IE is to be used in Area A except for arty firing onto the impact area in Area I.
5. Small Arms Firing. Small arms live firing up to company level may take place in the Range 20-25 area if cleared by IR10 and within the current regulations.



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USEFUL TELEPHONE NUMBERS

1. The following are useful telephone numbers:

- a. Helitourist Voss (Civilian Casevac).
- b. Fire Service (Outside No).
- c. Fire Service in Mjolfjell.
- d. Adjutant IR10.
- e. Guardroom IR10.
- f. Duty Officer Bomoen.
- g. RMP Bomoen.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

NOTE: To be checked at the beginning of each HARDFALL deployment.
Radio must be used for a safety net when live firing on the
ranges.

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
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ANNEX D TO
AMT(L) STANDING ORDERS
FOR MJCLEFJILL RANGES
DATED 16 JAN 86

ORDERS FOR RANGE SENTRIES

1. You are to prevent any unauthorised person entering the range whilst firing is in progress. In the event of civilians persisting in entering you are not empowered to stop them by force but are to report the fact immediately.
2. You are not to leave your post unless properly relieved.
3. You are to be in Radio/Telephone communication with the unit range control.
4. You are to be equipped with binoculars and are to maintain general surveillance of the area for low flying aircraft and helicopters. You are to report any sightings immediately.
5. You are to ensure that when posted you are briefed on where firing is taking place. You are to also control traffic on the roads if required to do so.
6. When firing is on the Rjoardalen ranges (Area B) a sentry is to be posted at the flag at Botnarsset (GR 321325). When there is firing in Bjoerdalen (Area A) a sentry is to be posted at the flag (GR 738425) at the track to the area.
7. If platoon or company live firing is taking place in the Samvirke impact area or onto the main impact area in Nodslagsoms, a sentry is to be posted in the area of GR 854386 to cover a likely access to the ranges by walkers or skiers.


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ANNEX O TO
CCRIO 06022/67
DATED 21 OCT 86

Bn HQ
1 PARA

G3/5/04
G3/11/01

Ext 4844

See Distribution

9 Jan 86

2 INCH MORTAR AMMUNITIONS AND MORTARS FOR EX HARDFALL 86

References:

- A. MODUK Army ACA/DAA/ORA 021630Z Jan 86 (Releasing ammo).
- B. MODUK Army ACA/DAA 060911Z Jan 86 (Non availability of illum).
- C. HQ UKLIF G4 Sup 52376 dated 31 Dec 85 (Pool of 2" Mors).
- D. 1 PARA Ex HARDFALL Instrs - Annex D to Serial 2 (Ammo allocation).

1. We have managed to obtain 2" Mor ammo in lieu of the non availability of 51mm ammo, for Ex HARDFALL. This ammo cannot be used with 51mm mors and we have to draw up 2" mors. Unfortunately the illum ammo originally allocated is no longer available.

2. The allocation to companies of the mors and ammo is as follows:

a. Ammo.

Coy/Ammo	Coy Trg on Ex HARDFALL		Ex COLD FIRE		Ex ANCHOR EXPRESS
	HE	Smk	HE	Smk	Smk
A	40	40	46	30	30
B	40	40	46	30	30
C	40	40	46	30	30
Sp	42	-	-	-	-
Total	162	120	138	90	90

b. Mors. Each rifle coy are to be issued with 3 x 2" mors (9) and Sp Coy with 1 x 2" mor. Total of 10 on loan to the Battalion.

3. Safety.

a. HE Rounds. These can only be fired on the authorised Mjolfjoll range area for 81mm mors, or the extended area for mors with company group live firing.

b. Smoke Rounds. In the Voss area these can only be fired within the Mjolfjoll range area unless permission is obtained from the Norwegians. We will fire them on Ex ANCHOR EXPRESS in the north.

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4. Drawing up Ammo and 2" Mors. QM(T) is responsible in drawing up the ammo in UK and moving it to Voss (under current regulations) for the start of Ex HARDFALL on 27 Jan. He is to draw up the 1C x 2" Mors and issue them to Companies in Norway.

5. 51mm Mors. Riflo companies do not need to take their 51mm mors with them on Ex HARDFALL, except for A Coy who need to take 2 for the weapons demo at the start of Ex ANCHOR EXPRESS.




2IC

Distribution:

List A - Addl copy to be sent to QM, OC B, C, Sp Coy and Ops Offr on

Ex PRE HARDFALL

QM(T)

2

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