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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Stabilisation Unit

Joint Doctrine Note 6/10
Security Transitions

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JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 6/10

SECURITY TRANSITIONS

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Head of Doctrine Air and Space (Development, Concepts and Doctrine)



Head of Stabilisation Unit

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The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
Ministry of Defence
Shrivenham
SWINDON, Wiltshire, SN6 8RF

Telephone number: 01793 314216/7
Military Network: 96161 4216/4217
Facsimile number: 01793 314232
Military Network: 96161 4232
E-mail: publications@dcdc.org.uk

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JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS

The successful conduct of military operations requires an intellectually rigorous, clearly articulated and empirically-based framework of understanding that gives advantage to a country's Armed Forces, and its likely partners, in the management of conflict. This common basis of understanding is provided by doctrine.

UK doctrine is, as far as practicable and sensible, consistent with that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The development of national doctrine addresses those areas not covered adequately by NATO; it also influences the evolution of NATO doctrine in accordance with national thinking and experience.

Endorsed national doctrine is promulgated formally in JDPs.¹ From time to time, Interim JDPs (IJDPs) are published, caveated to indicate the need for their subsequent revision in light of anticipated changes in relevant policy or legislation, or lessons arising out of operations.

Urgent requirements for doctrine are addressed through Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs). To ensure timeliness, they are not subject to the rigorous staffing processes applied to JDPs, particularly in terms of formal external approval. Raised by the DCDC, they seek to capture and disseminate best practice or articulate doctrinal solutions. This can subsequently be developed in due course as more formal doctrine.

Details of the joint doctrine development process and the associated hierarchy of JDPs are to be found in JDP 0-00 *Joint Doctrine Development Handbook*.

¹ Formerly named Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

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PREFACE

1. This Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) addresses the planning, assessment and conduct of security transitions. It is written for a UK Government audience, both military and civilian, but is relevant to a range of partners across the international community. The intent is to inform decision makers and staff working on security transitions, including those deploying as part of wider government engagement, especially from the FCO, MOD, DFID and the UK Civilian Stabilisation Group.
2. The JDN complements JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution* and draws from the Stabilisation Unit's *Stabilisation Guidance Notes* and DFID's work on state-building and peace-building, and security and justice development. It represents a collaborative development process between MOD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and the UK Stabilisation Unit, with input from other government departments including the FCO, DFID and the Cabinet Office. The document was developed through participation in the Multinational Experiment 6 process, a US Joint Forces Command-led process, during which numerous international military and civilian experts provided advice on the concept development.
3. All security transitions will be unique in character; understanding this fundamental point provides the basis of this JDN. The JDN stresses that security transitions must be seen as a subset of a broader political process and emphasises the necessity of coordinating planning and implementation across the security and justice sector in support of the wider transitional process.
4. The JDN's purpose is to identify common principles and risks that must be addressed in planning and implementing security transitions. It provides guidance on how to approach these issues, but context provides the nuance and the answers; actual solutions will require individual judgments. The JDN does not provide a template, but instead outlines a framework and questions for those planning and implementing transitions in conflict-affected and unstable environments.
5. The transition of responsibility for - and execution of - security tasks from one actor to another is a growing feature of contemporary operations. Iraq and Afghanistan are prominent examples of such transitions in action, but they are by no means typical. Almost all recent stabilisation and peace-building operations have included an element of security transition, including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Timor Leste, Bosnia, Kosovo and Haiti. While national, NATO and UN military forces are building competency in stabilisation and

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peacekeeping, the process of transition to a host nation actor has often undermined earlier progress. If handled badly, security transitions can plunge a situation back into crisis.

6. The ultimate goal of security transition is sufficient stability for other processes of state-building and peace-building to mature without being dependent on an operational international military presence.² Any security transition must, therefore, be situated clearly within the political frameworks (international and national) in which it takes place. This will require UK military and civilian agencies involved in security transition to work collaboratively as part of a multinational and inter-agency comprehensive approach. For the UK Government, the FCO will provide overall leadership and direction on foreign affairs, while DFID will provide expertise on longer-term development. A range of other agencies will have important roles in shaping the overarching political framework, possibly including the UN, NATO, EU or AU. However, it is important to recognise that the outcome of the transition and the subsequent political framework lies ultimately in the hands of the host nation.

² International military presence will often remain in place for long periods after transition in a supporting and capacity building role.

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SECURITY TRANSITIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Security transitions are '*the progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities between actors in order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not dependent on a significant operational international military contribution.*' (JDN 6/10)
2. Security transitions are an important element of UK and international stabilisation and peacekeeping operations. Transitions are often a period of high risk and uncertainty in which gains made by international and national civilian and military actors can be reversed. Progress can be impeded by failing to deliver adequate security, empowering illegitimate armed actors or undermining political progress.
3. This Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) explains that while each security transition is unique, there are common approaches, principles and risks applicable to planning or implementing transition. While there can be no rigid template, a framework of questions and analysis derived from these principles and risks can increase the likelihood that security transitions will contribute successfully to lasting stability.

Approach

4. **A Multinational and Inter-agency Process.** Durable security transitions will require participation of civil and military actors within a multinational and inter-agency framework.
5. **Negotiated Process.** Security transition implies that one actor alone cannot control every stage of the evolving process. The interests, motivations and leverage of the multiple parties involved will change, requiring a negotiated approach based on sound political understanding.
6. **Monitoring and Evaluation.** Monitoring the perceptions, relationships and behaviour of transition partners is as important as inputs, outputs, outcomes and results and provides a critical feedback loop to inform the dynamic planning process that will adjust as tensions and challenges emerge.

Principles

7. **Political Focus.** Security transitions are intrinsically political. Plans and operations must therefore be reviewed in relation to the emerging political settlement.
8. **Legitimacy.** Legitimacy, in the eyes of the host nation population and those of the partner/s to whom security is being transitioned, is paramount.

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Without legitimacy the transition will lack popular support and the broader political process will be undermined.

9. **Building Comprehensive Capacity.** Capacity to support a security transition goes beyond recruiting, training and equipping security personnel and forces. It requires the creation of a systemic capacity to plan, manage, oversee and sustain an acceptable level of security on a cross-government level.

10. **Sustainability.** Longer-term success will rely on the development of sustainable models and organisations that can deliver effective day-to-day security. Sustainability should therefore be examined with regards to politics, organisations, processes and resources.

Risks

11. **Absence of credible actors.** Transition will often occur before actors feel fully capable. The time required for capability and legitimacy to develop will need to be balanced with the risks that emerge from non-delivery of key security tasks. The risks are highest where integration of former combatants into the security apparatus is taking place or where state institutions, as well as conflicting parties, behave in a predatory manner towards the civilian population.

12. **Premature Transition.** Transitioning too soon can lead to deterioration in security and a requirement to re-engage, as has been the experience of a number of peacekeeping missions.

13. **State Collapse.** The political settlement and elements of the state will be vulnerable for some time after conflict has ceased. Transition can unsettle the political balance leading state structures to fragment and /or reignite conflict dynamics.

14. **Human Rights Abuses.** Where warring parties have been responsible for large scale human rights abuse the risks of retributive violence must be carefully monitored and mitigated. Abuse within the security and justice system can further undermine the functions of governance, slowing both the transition and recovery from conflict.

15. **Conflict of Interests.** Tensions will emerge regarding the scope and vision for transition among host nation parties, neighbouring countries and the varying international actors engaged in the transition. These must be carefully negotiated to avoid undermining each others' objectives.

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Planning and Implementing Transition: Key Questions

16. The JDN proposes 5 questions for consideration when planning security transitions. Addressing these questions will not by itself provide concrete pathways and milestones. Instead, they assist in the consideration of a range of acceptable outcomes that can be achieved through multiple courses of action involving different partners.

- a. **Why is the transition taking place?** Those involved in security transitions must understand the national and international political frameworks, objectives, red-lines and motivations driving the transition, leading to an understanding of the range of acceptable outcomes.
- b. **What functions are critical enablers of the security transition?** Practitioners should understand the security requirements of the host nation rather than impose a model that reflects their own processes. A purely geographic, district-by-district approach should be avoided. Functions should be identified across thematic, geographic and delivery domains.
- c. **Who are the potential partners and key stakeholders in the transition?** Planners must identify potential partners and partnerships that will enable the transition to succeed and understand the motivations of different interest groups, including those who may wish to undermine the process.
- d. **When should the Security Transition take place?** Security transitions should be driven by conditions rather than timelines. Considering conditions against a timeline will enable sequencing of negotiation and activity, and allow prioritisation to occur.
- e. **How will transition options be developed, negotiated and implemented?** The answers to the previous 4 questions can help create courses of action that include viable partners providing suitable functions, within defined boundaries of acceptability. An understanding of the areas of negotiation, for each partner, and how to exercise influence can then be developed. The How stage leads to a more detailed planning process that will be iterative and evolutionary.

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CHAPTER 1 – APPROACH, PRINCIPLES AND RISKS

SECTION I – THE CONTEXT

101. The debate on transitions is broad and rich, partly because there is no single agreed definition of the term. A narrow definition intended to focus the reader on the key questions pertinent to a stabilisation environment has been applied, given the practical purpose of this Joint Doctrine Note (JDN). A security transition is defined as:

‘The progressive transfer of security functions and responsibilities between actors in order to reach a durable level of stability for the host nation that is not dependent on a significant operational international military contribution.’¹

102. Security transitions occur in the context of a broader political transition of which conflict is often a symptom. Outcomes will therefore depend on the extent to which a new security profile is supportive of, and coordinated with, stabilisation and peace-building processes.

103. Security transitions involve a change in the locus of decision-making and are inherently about power dynamics. The change that occurs also marks a reduction in the level of control that external actors may have over the environment as newly empowered actors exert their authority.

104. It is rare for a transition to be a bilateral process and is more likely to take place in a multilateral, multi-agency setting, with the UK being one of several actors involved. Hence, the ability of any one actor to manage the transition as a whole, or to define its outcomes, will be severely limited.

Stabilisation, Peace-Building and State-Building

105. The UK Stabilisation Unit defines stabilisation as *‘the process of establishing peace and security in countries affected by conflict and instability’*. It is the promotion of a peaceful political settlement to produce a legitimate indigenous government which can better serve its people.² The MOD’s perspective on stabilisation, described in JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, puts forward 3 central ideas: that stabilisation must be approached *comprehensively* across the security, governance and development domains; that the central conflict relationship is that between the host government, competing elites and the wider population; and that the national strategic aim of stabilisation interventions should be to foster the

¹ This definition has been established for use in this publication only.

² <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us>

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development of a political settlement, amenable to UK interests, between these groups of stakeholders.

106. Fragile and conflict-affected environments occupy a spectrum ranging from political disorder to violent conflict. In severely conflict-affected situations, standard interventions may be constrained by extreme insecurity and restrictions on movement; even humanitarian interventions may be highly constrained. The UK has recognised the need to adapt our approach in these environments, hence the development of the concept and practice of stabilisation. Stabilisation aims to reduce opportunities for recourse to violence and to exploit opportunities to address key issues: (in) security; lack of trust and confidence; capacity; dispute and conflict management; and perceptions and relationships between conflict actors and their supporters. Stabilisation aims to make enough progress to enable longer-term processes to take root and in time to resolve the underlying, structural causes of conflict and instability.

107. Conflict-affected states have complex and inter-related impediments to achieving sustainable peace and security. Any progress in these contexts requires carefully prioritised, preferably joint, and at least coherent cross-government, multinational and inter-agency engagement that brings together the right sets of skills and tools to address these complex impediments. This usually requires a combination of political, diplomatic, development and, where necessary, military activities as part of a comprehensive approach.

108. DFID's State-Building/Peace-Building (SBPB) framework informs engagement in fragile and conflict-affected states and is increasingly referred to by other parts of HMG and the international community. This framework enables a more consistent analysis of the causes and effects of conflict and fragility and is used to inform interventions, programming and engagement. The SBPB framework rests on 4 pillars: development of core state functions; inclusive political settlements and processes; conflict resolution mechanisms; and response to public expectations.

Security

109. The aim of transition is stability and security for the host nation. While international military engagement may be focused on the more immediate protection of the population and of the state from both internal and external threats, any security transition must be implemented within a broader and longer-term, sector-wide approach to security and justice. For instance, a competent police force will be unable to deliver security without parallel development of capable judiciary, prosecution, defence, penal and other systems. This is not to say that the military should engage in, for example,

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judiciary development although they should retain awareness of wider-security sector developments.

SECTION II – THE APPROACH

110. Security transitions are political, complex operations in which ownership and therefore control of both approach and outcomes gradually passes from one set of actors to another. Hence, security transitions are fundamentally different from other types of military and security operations and require a different approach in both the planning and implementation phases.

111. Security transitions are negotiated processes, most importantly, with the host nation actors. This makes them non-linear and dependent on host nation political processes and interests, which will change over time. Any long-term, end-state-based security transition plan is therefore unlikely to proceed as expected. Flexibility is vital, requiring security transition planners to identify the range and limits of acceptable outcomes and to work within those limits to develop potential options and courses of action.

112. There are 3 key aspects that should shape any approach to a security transition:

- a. A multinational and inter-agency process.
- b. Negotiated process.
- c. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E).

A Multinational and Inter-agency Process

113. Security transitions typically occur within multinational and inter-agency environments. For instance, there may be multiple foreign military forces, several policing support teams (such as United Nations Civilian Police (UN CIVPOL) or European Union Police (EUPOL)) and multiple donors and agencies working within a host nation on security, governance and rule of law. This environment creates dependencies between actors and no one actor will have the freedom to plan and execute a security transition alone. Military actors should take particular care to work with those agencies involved in long-term state-building processes that will outlast any significant military presence.

114. Integrated planning helps to ensure that the activities of multiple agencies are coherent, mutually reinforcing and, where necessary, deconflicted to pursue a common goal; this goal might be peace-building, stabilisation, conflict prevention, state-building or counter-insurgency. It is a process which, at best, allows a common strategic aim and objectives to be

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agreed, shared assessment to be made, activity sequenced and prioritised and the magnitude of required resources identified. The process does not replace or subordinate any single departmental planning process; it aims instead to achieve coordination with the minimum addition of new methodologies and processes and rests heavily on work that the departments would conduct in preparing their own plans. Planning should be conducted by delegates from participating organisations (incorporating those who will be involved in implementation) and should include the host government and key national and multinational stakeholders.

A Negotiated Process

115. It follows that all transition partners, including competing elites, will have a view on the shape of any post-transition security environment, as will the wider population. These views will frequently conflict. Negotiating the shape of this future security environment is therefore more important than solely focusing on technical capability building.

116. This does not mean, however, that the luxury of ignoring technical issues can be afforded. A cleverly negotiated but technically unsound transition will collapse. The practitioner's skill is to deliver a flexible, technically sound and politically sensitive transition approach in a dynamic political environment that they cannot control. It follows that such initiatives have to be resilient to the occasional shock or setback and must aim not for a single preferred end-state or template for success but for an acceptable range of outcomes. Understanding what defines this acceptable range is therefore a key element of any transition planning.

117. Influence will play a critical part in any security transition. All actors in a security transition will seek to influence other actors, using leverage that addresses motivations, interests and resources. As the transition continues, the nature and levels of such influence will change and will likely diminish for international actors. It is advisable to keep as many options as possible open, in terms of transition partners and objectives, to retain flexibility.

118. The international actors' understanding of the host nation's multifaceted political process will never be fully complete and risks will be incurred if degrees of influence are overestimated. The security transition will, however, be more effective if inclusive of a wide range of actors, efforts are made to develop knowledge and understanding of a spectrum of host nation interests, and if it incorporates a wide range of actors within the process of negotiations.

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Perceptions-Based Approach to Transition in Northern Ireland

In Armagh, Northern Ireland, public perception became a key driver of the security transition and shaped what had begun as a conditions-based district-by-district approach. Thirty eight districts were asked a series of questions determining the level of military support they required, varying from: unable to survive on a day-to-day basis without military support; rarely needed military support; or required military surge support from time-to-time for particular operations. The districts varied dramatically in the type of military assistance they required. In some areas police needed to be flown in and out of compounds while the military provided overall security; in other areas the police were able to conduct duties in a normal way.

A more detailed examination of public perceptions about security highlighted that key border patrol towers had taken on a symbolic significance to the local community who associated them with presence and effectiveness and whether they felt secure. A phased closing of the fixed installations to meet public requirements, while being informed by military needs, was adopted. The process was constantly negotiated with local communities, security and political actors and subsequently the towers were one of the last elements of transition.

Monitoring and Evaluation

119. In the past M&E has rarely been applied to security transition as a process and has more frequently focused on the inputs and outputs of the activities encompassed within it. While this allows the quantitative outputs of an individual training programme, for example, to be audited the wider impact of the transition on the political process and longer-term stability can be overlooked. An approach to M&E that emphasises continuous learning and qualitative political analysis is therefore required to adapt planning to the transition environment which is fluid, dynamic and not subject to unitary control.

120. A rigorous M&E framework should allow progress to be tracked and risks and issues to be recognised and addressed early. Without such measurement systems elements of the security transition may become unsynchronised (for instance, the deployment of security forces may outpace the ability of the judicial system to process detainees, resulting in human rights abuses that undermine the political settlement). Even more importantly, the absence of effective M&E that identifies popular perceptions and elites' motivations may lead the security transition as a whole to become disconnected from the political process.

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121. Designing such a framework from the outset can help stakeholders to the transition clarify goals and red-lines by defining the parameters of an acceptable range of outcomes and making explicit underlying assumptions.

122. Security transition M&E needs to be directed more widely than towards host nation security force development. The primary question partners should be asking themselves is 'does the security transition and the way in which we engage in it accord with the key principles of a successful transition'? It should provide effective feedback on actors and their motivations, sustainability, legitimacy, capacity and the political environment in which the security transition is occurring. The principles can be drawn upon, both to track specific progress against transition plans and to monitor the way in which partners are behaving and engaging with one another. Qualitative measures may provide particularly valuable insights and gauging perceptions of the affected population will be critical, particularly around legitimacy issues.

123. Engaging multinational and inter-agency actors, as well as those within the host nation, in identifying, collecting and sharing an M&E methodology and the resulting indicators provides an effective means for building shared ownership of a security transition.

124. Further guidance on M&E in a stabilisation conflict-affected environment will be addressed in the future in more detailed UK doctrine.

SECTION III – THE PRINCIPLES

125. The approach detailed above provides a framework for planning and conducting a security transition. To maximise the chances of success, 4 principles serve as criteria against which to judge a security transition plan.

- a. Political focus.
- b. Legitimacy.
- c. Building comprehensive capacity.
- d. Sustainability.

Political Focus

126. Those involved in a security transition must be politically astute, maintaining a political focus responsive to the internal politics of the host nation while being embedded within the international environment and wider political context. A central goal of a security transition is to support the political process. Many actors, host nation and international, may seek to exert control

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over security functions for political ends; planners should keep in mind that the security transition should remain a subset of the political process, not a driver. For this reason it is critical that planners draw on a broad range of existing social and political analysis tools rather than relying on quantitative measures of security alone, which can be misleading (further research information can be found at Annex A).

127. As transitions progress, the ability of external actors to influence host nation decisions will gradually decline. For this reason, strengthening of systems within the host nation for accountability, including governmental checks and balances and the rule of law should contribute to the long-term sustainability of the transition.

128. Those involved in transition should focus political analysis on attempting to identify where and how the balance of power will shift in the transition environment. The drawdown of international military forces in one province may shift the balance of power in favour of a group that has national political interests. Up- or down-scaling military presence in one area may in turn displace insecurity to neighbouring areas. Recognising these political and security patterns at local, national and regional levels will be central to monitoring progress towards transition and mitigating risks.

129. The following will help to adapt transition processes to the political environment:

a. **Retain Flexibility.** Political behaviour cannot be modelled, nor can the outcome of negotiations be predicted, therefore our transition plans must accommodate uncertainty and be capable of rapid adaptation to a changing political context. Maintaining awareness of a range of outcomes and the parameters that define what is and is not acceptable will help maintain flexibility and enable practitioners to respond with agility to opportunities or threats as they arise.

b. **Identify and Understand the Actors and their Motivations.** Security transitions will incorporate UK, multinational and host nation actors; none are monolithic entities and the interests of these groups and their sub-groups are frequently in tension. Every transition initiative must be considered in the context of its impact on the motivations and interests of these different actors. Understanding diversity of perspective across government and non-state actors, including religious and tribal affiliations, genders, age groups and geographic areas provides a richer basis for planning and decision-making. However, while broad consultations and incorporation of a range of

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perspectives is valuable, a more focused group of actors will emerge as valuable partners.

c. Balance International and Indigenous Knowledge.

International experts can offer specific capability and technical knowledge while host nation actors will have a more nuanced understanding of social structures, situational understanding and appropriate local solutions. Locally-influenced solutions are likely to be more durable than those designed solely by international actors.

**Adapting to Local Political Dynamics: the Challenge for Security in
Maysan Province Iraq**

When British troops arrived in Maysan Province in Iraq on the border with Iran in 2003 following the dissolution of the Baathist state, predominant tribal groups such as the Abu Mohamed took a leading role in local security affairs through their *Fawj* units. However, during 2004-5 the return of Shiite based political parties and the rise of the Jaish al-Mahdi in Maysan led to a struggle for political power and control of state security institutions. These tensions were often played out within and between the various state and non-state security apparatuses in Maysan province, creating a challenge for British forces in determining whose capacity development to support. Ultimately, UK forces and civilians had to maintain a flexible approach as both local and national politics unfolded, re-negotiating their support throughout. During this turbulent period, local and national elections, the death of key leaders and movement of key stakeholders to Basra and Baghdad meant that balancing a range of different actors and interests was central to maintaining support to security and the wider political process.

Legitimacy

*'State legitimacy matters because it provides the basis for rule by consent rather than by coercion. Lack of legitimacy is a major contributor to state fragility because it undermines the processes of state-society bargaining that are central to building state capacity.'*³

130. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) defines legitimacy in terms of 'perceptions and beliefs rather than normative rules'. In this definition the authority to rule, enshrined in a political settlement, is derived from popular legitimacy. Lack of legitimacy and popular support for the process of security

³ OECD-DAC: The States Legitimacy in Fragile Situations, January 2010.
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/6/44794487.pdf

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transition and the partners involved will therefore undermine the political process as well as the transition itself.

131. When considering legitimacy it is important to specify **what** legitimacy entails and in the eyes of **whom**; ultimately it is domestic legitimacy that provides long-term stability. Without it the transition will lack popular support and the broader political process could be undermined. If the security transition is not seen as legitimate it is unlikely to endure. Those engaged in security transition should therefore consider the implications of any choices they make on the legitimacy of their host-nation counterparts and support the development of their legitimacy wherever possible.

132. Legitimacy can have various domestic sources, including:⁴

- a. **Performance legitimacy** that arises, for example, from effective and equitable service delivery: doing the job and doing it well.
- b. **Process legitimacy**, based on a legal mandate or by political agreement to provide that function.
- c. **Social legitimacy** derived from socially accepted beliefs about the rightful source of authority, derived for example from the principle of popular sovereignty, moral authority, prior state-formation, tribal, regional, ethnic or culture dynamics, or indeed history: being the right person or organisation.

⁴ OECD-DAC: State Building in Situations of Fragility, August 2008.

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Strengthening Accountability in Afghanistan: The Afghan National Police

In Afghanistan steps have been taken to improve legitimacy within the security apparatus at different levels. Legislation was passed in January 2010 strengthening the role of the Provincial Governor in holding the Afghan National Police to account (process legitimacy). In Helmand, the Provincial Governor's establishment of a weekly *security shura* involving the police, border police and Afghan army reinforced the accountability mechanisms. The Ministry of Women's Affairs and the Huquq (Civil Rights) department of the Ministry of Justice were also involved. The establishment of a security hot-line, with independent monitors, enabled the Governor to see and act on complaints regarding security activity with the aim of improving the conduct of security forces and their responsiveness to the population (performance legitimacy). The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission trained civil society groups on Afghan legal structures and rights as well as providing legal advice to groups marginalised from traditional justice mechanisms. District level justice committees and prisoner review shuras were also established to improve the relationship between informal community mechanisms and formal state structures (social legitimacy).

133. Transition planners can support legitimacy by considering how their choices of action might affect the capability, accountability and responsiveness of a transition partner where:

- a. Capable means the ability to get things done.
- b. Accountable means that citizens, civil society and the private sector are able to scrutinise public institutions and governments and hold them to account.
- c. Responsive means that public policies and institutions respond to the needs of citizens and protect their rights.

134. International actors will also need to consider their own legitimacy in the eyes of different groups and to understand how the role they play in the security transition may affect the legitimacy of host-nation actors. For instance, international actors will sometimes be deployed under conditions where the local population perceives their presence as illegitimate. Hence, too close an association between internationals and locals may be counterproductive. On other occasions international actors will have more legitimacy than local actors, as was the case in Kosovo.

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Kosovo: A Question of Legitimacy

Following the Kosovo War of 1998-1999, a NATO-led peacekeeping force was approved and the territory known as Kosovo was placed under transitional UN administration (UNMIK). At this stage international institutions were perceived as more legitimate locally and internationally than national arrangements.

Over the next 10 years national institutions evolved, including a parliament, civil service and legislative framework but progress was curtailed by lingering legitimacy questions. The Kosovo Protection Corps, which absorbed much of the Kosovo Liberation Army, for example, was only dismantled in 2009. Elections in 2001 were followed by the establishment of the Kosovo Assembly. In 2008 the territory made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence and was recognised by 47 UN member states. However, Kosovo's status is still undetermined and the area was unable to gain UN membership.

In 2008 the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) assumed many of UNMIK's roles. Disunity within the international community on Kosovo's status affected the legitimacy of EULEX, which faced subsequent challenges working north of the Ibar river where Kosovo Serbs perceived the organisation as an agent for independence. During the transition from UNMIK to EULEX, international institutions thus lost credibility with national partners, further undermining an eventual transition to national actors. The case study highlights that resolving questions of legitimacy at a national and international level can be as important as improving the responsiveness and accountability of institutions at a provincial and district level.

Building Comprehensive Capacity

135. Building capacity is an important element of any security transition. However, the creation of a systemic capacity to plan, manage, oversee and sustain forces on a cross-government level involves more than recruiting, training and equipping security forces. For instance, a successful criminal justice system is dependent not only on a trained and equipped police force, but on all the other criminal justice elements through which a suspect might pass, such as the judiciary, prosecution and defence service, penal system, and rehabilitation mechanisms. A security force that cannot sustain itself or pay its staff regularly and transparently is likely to revert to predatory activities that will rapidly undermine any technical competence. Development of cross-government management systems (budgeting systems, human resources, training) can take significantly longer than the establishment of a security force unit and should therefore be considered at the outset of the planning process. Furthermore, a successful security transition will depend on the development of capacity beyond the confines of the security and justice sector. Capacity

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may also need to be developed in the areas of governance, infrastructure, health and administration.

136. A population-centric approach to security capacity building will prioritise solutions that are valued by the host nation and which respond to the population's expectations. These may vary from international approaches, notably in relation to informal or non-state systems. Supporting the development of locally-owned solutions and tailoring training packages to local norms and values involves time and resources but has important benefits in terms of effectiveness. Less tangible aspects of capacity development such as will, motivation, trust, leadership, ethics and ethos should also be prioritised within an appropriate indigenous cultural framework.

137. A staged approach should be adopted to develop capacity in small steps across the system as a whole rather than in larger steps in more focused areas. For example, personnel should be careful not to leave critical areas, particularly human rights and the rule of law, to a later phase purely because it may be difficult to address them within the timeframe available. A staged approach should also consider transition from UK responsibility to international organisations or allies. While the focus of this JDN is on transition toward host nation responsibility, in many cases the UK may wish to strengthen support for international community partners with appropriate expertise in capacity development, rather than continue bilateral measures. The principles of political focus, capacity, legitimacy and sustainability apply equally for transition to international organisations, allies or host nation institutions.

138. Comprehensive capacity building is a long-term process, but security transitions can be driven at a faster pace by tight political timelines. Priority should be placed on the immediate systemic capacities to provide a solid foundation for subsequent work, including by building linkages and dependencies between security transition efforts and longer-term security reform and development programmes (e.g. demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration).

139. Further guidance on capacity building is outlined at Annex A, which includes reference to the OECD-DAC Security System Reform Handbook.

Sustainability

140. Decisions made about a security transition should look to the longer-term sustainability of security in the post-transition environment. A successful security transition enables longer-term processes of state-building and peace-building to take hold once an operational international military engagement has

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come to an end, but this is only the beginning of a longer-term reform and transformation process that will be managed by other actors.

141. Longer-term success will depend on the development of sustainable security models and organisations, which must deliver effective day-to-day operations and effective management and oversight. These functions will include strategic resource and personnel planning, fiscal responsibility, legal and constitutional accountability and ultimately the self awareness to analyse and modify the organisation's aims, policies and doctrines in the light of experience. Technocracies take years to develop in societies where they have been largely or totally absent, a fact which sits at odds with the common political desire for rapid progress. In security transitions 4 aspects of sustainability are seen as central to success:

- a. **Political Sustainability: based on an effective political settlement.** Security transitions should be designed and carried out with this in mind, and should not unduly empower one party, nor undermine the potential for future political progress.
- b. **Organisational Sustainability.** Sustainable security institutions need to develop with a balance between frontline elements, logistical support and the administrative and constitutional foundation, together with appropriate accountability and oversight mechanisms.
- c. **Process Sustainability.** The introduction and use of processes must be sustained by the host nation; sustainability will be based on various elements including ownership, cultural relevancy and effective resourcing.
- d. **Resource Sustainability.** Security transitions are frequently resource-intensive periods for host nations which need to be sustained post-transition; securing sufficient financial support to ensure resource sustainability in the long term is essential.

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Sustainability of Security Institutions in Iraq

Between 2003-2010 international support to Iraq's security forces adapted significantly as a result of the growing political violence. Earlier approaches focusing on *ad hoc* technical training and the supply of equipment were improved as US forces worked with national security forces in the Sunni dominated Anbar province to improve responsiveness to the communities that felt excluded from the national political process.

Coalition forces supported Iraqi institutions, including by incorporating excluded Sunni groups into emerging national security apparatus at all levels (Political Sustainability). They also increased communication with the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Finance to improve payment of salaries and the reach of central resourcing systems to the provinces. This enabled sub-national institutions to manage personnel and logistics more effectively (resource sustainability). Command and control mechanisms were improved to better connect front line troops to policy and decision-making within the Ministries of Defence and Interior (Organisational Sustainability). Nationally managed processes for ongoing recruitment, training and mentoring evolved as international support was reduced (Process Sustainability).

It is worth noting a significant US organisational change was the introduction of field-based centres of excellence, which helped implement a more flexible way of learning best suited to transition and the development of more sustainable support throughout the security and governance systems.

SECTION IV – THE RISKS

142. Security transitions are inherently risky endeavours. The following risks should be accorded particular attention when planning and monitoring transition.

Absence of Credible Partners

143. In some conflicts there may be a limited number of credible partners able and willing to responsibly deliver the key functions necessary to maintain security; gaps may also emerge within particular elements of the security and justice sectors. Partners may lack credibility in a number of different ways; they may lack critical skills, may not have legitimacy in the eyes of either domestic or international audiences, may be perceived as being corrupt or may lack motivation to take on certain roles in the security arena. In any of these cases the absence of a ready partner may lead either to a compromise in the choice of transition partner/s or recognition that the transition period may have to be extended to allow capability and legitimacy of partners to develop, or to allow progress towards a political solution. That said, additional time

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does not correlate with increased likelihood of a political solution being achieved. For example, in Darfur, fragmentation of political groups from 2008-2010 has made realisation of a political solution more difficult than during earlier stages of the peace process.

144. Where host nation governments are unable or unwilling to deliver a particular security function it may be necessary to engage other actors, such as another international military force, international policing force or a peace-building/development agency as an interim measure.

Premature Transition

145. A premature transition is one that occurs prior to the point where host nation capacity is adequate to provide the required security. Transition will always occur in less than ideal circumstances, but transitioning too soon can result in such a deterioration of security that an international military force is required to re-engage. Symptoms of a premature transition environment include the absence of a political settlement (or at least a path to achieving one), lack of balance across the system as a whole (for instance a lagging judicial or penal capacity) or the absence of adequate capability within specific security functions, including oversight and accountability mechanisms.

Haiti, a Lesson in Transitioning too Soon

In July 1994, the UN authorised a US-led multinational force to restore governance in Haiti. Over 20,000 US troops were rapidly deployed and then drawn down once President Aristide assumed power. The transition did not go smoothly as the withdrawal of international troops was followed by a severe escalation of lawlessness. Between 1993 and 2001 the UN mandated, deployed and dispatched 7 multinational missions to build peace in Haiti and yet the events of 2004 mirrored those of 1994; a sudden change of government and the dispatch of a UN peacekeeping force to maintain law and order. This may have been mitigated had further steps been taken to: strengthen the Haitian police force; disarm the local population; and improve the responsiveness of governance institutions following the first withdrawal in 1994.

State Collapse or Vacuum

146. There is a risk both during and after a security transition that the state, or elements of the state, may collapse or cease to function for a period of time. This might occur as a result of coup, civil unrest, external interference, the death of a significant leader, a natural disaster, an outbreak of disease or a combination of similar events.

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147. Where state collapse occurs there is further risk that international civilian actors deployed to support the process of political recovery will also be affected, as evident in the case study of Somalia below.

148. Risk analysis should consider a range of threats to the state and to transition partners. Where the state is particularly unable or unwilling to provide security it will be important to work with a mixture of state and non-state actors, for example by working with customary legal systems or community-based groups.

State Collapse in Somalia

International actors should be aware that state collapse most likely occurs due to factors outside their control. However, it is no less important that readers analyse the risks that their security transition will unbalance power dynamics in a way that undermines an already fragile structure. Normally, a coup or death of a significant leader results in a temporary period of uncertainty during which a dialogue on the future nature of the state takes place and a new state subsequently emerges. In Somalia, a new government did not emerge for over ten years because of the continuing inter-clan civil war. Any opportunity that the international community may have had to support a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the formation of a new state structure in Somalia evaporated following the rapid departure of the UN.

In 1991 the Siyad Barre administration in Somalia fell apart. During 1992-1993 successive UN Operations (UNOSOM, UNITAF and UNOSOM II) attempted to bring peace to Somalia but none of the ceasefires and agreements brokered between the warring factions held. In 1993 the efforts of international forces were perceived to affect the balance of power between the warring factions, leading to repeated attacks upon UN forces. The deployment in parallel to the UNISOM II mission of US Special Forces and the subsequent confrontation with Somali Clans in central Mogadishu (events which became known as 'Black Hawk Down') led to the premature extraction of US forces. This undermined wider confidence in the UNISOM II endeavour, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of the entire UN mission.

In this situation withdrawal was forced by events and a security transition (as defined here) could not be achieved. Somalia was therefore left in the midst of conflict with no central institutions and the functions of governance in the hands of warring parties. Although this case study shows how the military withdrawal affected the civilian mission rather than the state itself, it usefully illustrates the severe consequences of state collapse and failure to transition.

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Human Rights Abuses

149. The abuse of human rights by any party to the transition or the widespread abuse of rights in the post-transition period may define the transition as a failure and will certainly undermine the legitimacy of the transition. UK military forces must be acutely aware of, and take appropriate action against, human rights abuses carried out by transition partners and be aware of situations where a transition partner becomes party to the conflict or becomes predatory to the people they are mandated to protect. The nature of the abuse that has occurred will determine whether a significant change in the course of the transition, such as a switch in partner, will be required. The HMG Strategy on Protection of Civilians provides further detail.⁵

Human Rights Abuses in Democratic Republic of Congo

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) demonstrates the risks of working with transition partners who have caused and continue to cause human rights abuses and highlights the importance of establishing appropriate systems to prevent and respond to ongoing human rights abuses, as well as the risks this can pose to transition.

According to the previous UN Peacekeeping Mission in DRC, MONUC, 40 percent of all human rights violations recorded by its human rights division throughout the country in the second half of 2006 were perpetrated by Congolese National Armed Forces (FARDC), including summary executions, beatings and rape.

Where the rights of the civilian population are continually abused by representatives of the national justice and security institutions mandated to protect them, the legitimacy of the host nation government and international actors providing their support can be irrevocably damaged.

Conflict of Interests

150. International actors engaged in security transitions frequently pursue goals beyond simple stabilisation, relating to, for example, development, democratisation, economic opportunity, regional balance of power, counter-terrorism or counter-narcotics. The international actors in these circumstances may see a transition plan as unsatisfactory if their goals are not addressed by the indigenous transition partners. A desire to accommodate international ambitions within the transition environment may lead to flawed analysis or partner selection incoherent with the core security transition principles outlined

⁵ FCO, MOD and DFID, UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/publications-and-documents/publications1/protection-civilians-armed-conflict>

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above. Negotiating the tensions that inevitably arise from these different interests is a core component of managing transition risks and building consensus around the post transition environment between national and international actors.

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CHAPTER 2 – OPERATIONALISING SECURITY TRANSITIONS

201. This Chapter is designed to help those involved in planning security transitions define the nature of the transition they are working towards and address key considerations for achieving an acceptable outcome. It does not provide a template, but rather a series of questions through which the approach, principles and risks identified in Chapter 1 can be considered.

202. The framework is designed to be used within a broader planning process and should draw from existing understanding such as political or stakeholder analyses. Implementation activities – such as training and equipping tasks – will require further planning based on the outcomes of those negotiations.

203. The approach and principles can be applied to a security transition in order to:

- a. Define the nature of the security transition, identifying where it fits within broader stabilisation objectives and frameworks;
- b. Identify the security functions needed to gain a durable level of security;
- c. Identify key stakeholders and potential transition partners;
- d. Establish possible transition options;
- e. Identify negotiation positions with potential partners/stakeholders.

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


Figure 2.1 – Security Mapping Framework

SECTION I – WHY?

What are the interests driving the transition, the political context, the legal framework and the nature of the environment?

204. The section on **Why** has 2 purposes:
- To ensure situational awareness.
 - To provide a nuanced understanding of what parameters define success or failure.

It should be built on the inter-agency analysis conducted to date to develop situational awareness and political understanding focused on the overarching intent, goals, mandates and objectives of the transition. This should provide a vision of what an acceptable range of outcomes would include and define the space within which a transition can be negotiated. This will assist in

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addressing issues of acceptability, red-lines, prioritisation and potential partner selection.

Situational Awareness

205. The fundamental elements of situational awareness with regards to security transitions are:

- a. **Political Drivers.** Who are the key international and national actors and what are their interests? What are the political drivers of the transition?
- b. **Legal Mandate.** What is the legal mandate or framework for the mission? What are the parameters of that mandate? To what international legislation is the host nation a signatory?
- c. **National and Local Political Settlements in Place.** Has the political settlement broken down and if so why? What is the host nation's plan for political change? What are the key political milestones?
- d. **Existing National Strategies.** To what national security or poverty reduction strategies with security and political implications is the host government committed?

Defining the Negotiation Space

206. What parameters define success or failure from a UK perspective? How would such definitions and issues be prioritised? What are the red-lines we need to be aware of and what range of outcomes would be acceptable?

SECTION II – WHAT?

Determining the functions that will be required to ensure stability during and immediately after the transitional period and the dependencies between them.

207. Specific outcomes that need to be achieved in order for the security transition to be successful can be described as *functions*. The specific nature of a function will vary depending on the geo-political area to which it relates. Examples of functions may range from border security to market security, from the protection of internally displaced persons to counter-terrorism. In general, functions are security outcomes and not the specific tasks that lead to them. For instance, route security can be provided by patrols, by checkpoints or by access control.

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208. Functions should be identified by assessing the level of security required to allow normal life to continue in the post-transition environment. An indigenous perspective that addresses what security functions are valued by the population, both now and in the future, will provide more insightful analysis than a purely structural approach that replaces like for like. In fact, there are inherent risks in *mirror-imaging* functions, when international actors define or shape host nation security structures to reflect their own cultures or the institutions of a predatory regime, rather than responding to the need as it exists on the ground. Security systems develop to meet social expectations and to overcome specific types of threat or challenge. By identifying functions and needs, rather than starting with identifying partners and providers of security, a locally-owned solution can be developed that better addresses the causes of violence or instability.

209. There are 3 possible starting points for conducting an analysis of functions and while each of these will be an element of any identified function, there is no prescribed order for assessing them. They are tools for locating future action and for determining interdependencies:

- a. Technical Function.
- b. Geographic Area.
- c. Organisational Level.

Technical Function

210. Technical Function refers to the purpose of the security functions and responsibilities that are being transitioned:

- a. Provision of security and justice to the people from internal threats such as criminality, including human security and the rule of law.
- b. Defence of the sovereign political authority from internal threats such as terrorism, insurgency or coup, including the protection of key institutions and people including government buildings, political figures, public servants and security forces.
- c. Defence of the State from external threats such as military invasion: border security and defence of air, sea and land.

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Geographic Area

211. Geographical areas refer to the geographic scale on which a security transition takes place:

- a. **Local level:** e.g. village, town or district.
- b. **Sub-national level:** e.g. governorate, province, state or cluster thereof.
- c. **National level:** e.g. ministerial functions.

212. Transition can occur by geographic region. However, political linkages exist between geographic areas and levels meaning that transition in one area can have an impact elsewhere. Transitioning functions at the national level to a ministry dominated by a particular group may exclude other groups and therefore undermine the political process. In Southern Sudan, attempts to conduct civilian disarmament using an area-by-area approach left some communities vulnerable to attack by their yet to be disarmed neighbours.

Organisational Level

213. There are several levels to the provision of security and it is important to ensure that the security transition applies the principles to each of these levels:

- a. **Policy and Resource Level:** who is responsible for making the decisions about what priorities and requirements the security systems exist to fulfil and who will resource it?
- b. **Management Level:** the provision of resource management and allocation, and managerial systems (e.g. training and human resources). The host nation will require capable and sustainable management processes for its security sector.
- c. **Delivery Level:** the provision of security services. The transition will need to address uniformed forces and other providers of security.

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A Multi-Functional Transition in Timor Leste

The withdrawal of UN peacekeeping mission (UNMISET) and observers from Timor Leste was phased to coincide with conditions being met on key political and security functions including: progress on the peace process; border demarcation; operational ability of border police; and customs services and the establishment of legal arrangements. An agreement between the UN and the Government of Timor-Leste was reached outlining the mechanisms for transferring police executive tasks. The gradual handover of tasks proceeded in parallel with the certification of police officers and the accreditation of their districts.¹ The process incorporated functions across geographic and technical spheres. It also incorporated policy functions regarding legal arrangements with managerial functions for customs services and district level policing delivery.

Although this provides a helpful example of a multilateral approach to identifying transition functions, the transition itself failed because it paid inadequate attention to the political context, policing and justice components and accountability mechanisms. A resurgence of political violence and human rights abuses therefore led to UNMISET re-engaging in Timor Leste.

Oversight and Accountability

214. Oversight and accountability mechanisms associated with each function should also be identified, as should dependencies (horizontal and vertical) across the broader security and justice domain and into other domains such as governance or development. Security sector institutions should be developed with clear relationships to the organisations outlined in the box below, who will have a critical contribution to their development of capability and legitimacy as well as in monitoring their behaviour. In addition to these domestic frameworks there may be international mechanisms that provide legitimate oversight and accountability. These may include War Crimes Tribunals, Human Rights Commissions, regional organisations, treaty bodies and others. These different mechanisms should be consulted as part of the monitoring of security.

215. An example of possible main external oversight and control mechanisms are outlined in the box opposite:²

¹ Pottelbergh, G. (2010) Handover from International to Local Actors in Peace Missions, NUPI www.nupi.no

² DFID Practice Paper, *Justice and Accountability*, May 2009, with amendments.

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Main External Oversight and Control Mechanisms

Executive Control. Heads of States and Ministries have ultimate responsibility for the performance of executive institutions. For example, the police, prisons or parastatal agencies (e.g. Law Reform Commission) should be accountable to the government for their financial and operational performance (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Justice).

Parliamentary Oversight. Parliamentary committees can hold public hearings, scrutinise the use of public funds, be involved in senior appointments and can also promote reforms.

Independent Bodies. Ombudsmen, Human Rights Commissions or specialised bodies, such as Independent Police Complaints Commissions, can be mandated to oversee the performance of executive institutions, including the military.

Media. Journalists can be trained to understand security issues and accurately report on military and policing issues to promote informed public debate. They can also facilitate understanding of the law, for example through radio programmes on legal or police issues.

Civil Society Groups. Bar Associations, Human Rights Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) or religious groups are essential watchdogs, for example monitoring sensitive trials or conditions in prisons. NGOs or research bodies can also undertake studies and public consultations on security and justice.

SECTION III – WHO?

Who are the potential transition partners? Who else has a significant interest in the transition that should be accommodated?

What are the conditions on which we will need to engage with/support respective potential partners?

216. The aim of this step is to identify potential partners from among the actors, the issues that will need to be negotiated and the support they will need to be an effective transition partner. This step will also identify other actors with significant interests in the transition who may need to participate in the process.

217. Security functions will be provided by a range of partners who may comprise multiple actors. For example, the development of a police force may require engagement with both the state and with tribes. Host nation stakeholders are not unitary; they may have competing or even conflicting

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interests. When negotiating with partners it will be important to develop approaches that take into account the core principles outlined in Chapter 1.

218. Although the framework considers each required function in turn, it is important to constantly return to a system-wide perspective and consider the implications of any choices on the security system and political context. While different actors may be perfectly plausible transition partners for a security function when considered in isolation, in aggregate this might affect the balance of power, creating tensions between groups or factions that may undermine a political settlement.

219. Stakeholder analysis can help to identify potential partners for functions identified through the **What** analysis. Partner analysis should deepen understanding of motivations that emerge from a wide set of social factors including the cultural (e.g. shame/pride/honour), political (e.g. pursuit of power), value/moral and financial. If there is no political appetite for the transition to take place, investments in technical training may not be an effective way to create the conditions for transition.

220. Potential partners can be identified by asking 5 questions. Each should be considered within the time frame and resources available:

- a. What are their interests in the transition?
- b. Are they perceived as, or could they be perceived as, a legitimate partner in the eyes of the wider host nation population?
- c. Do they have, or could they develop, appropriate accountability mechanisms that are effective?
- d. Do they have, or could they develop, the required capacity (including motivation) to perform the function?
- e. Would they, or could they, conduct the function in a sustainable manner (including resources)?

221. Answering these questions will identify where potential partners may need further support, what conditions will be appropriate and the issues that will need to be negotiated. Identifying these conditions will contribute to the design of transition plans and the ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). Where indigenous actors have a particular interest in the transition, positive or negative, it may be necessary to incorporate new functions that address their legitimate concerns or which mitigate possible disruption to the transition, as well as to draw on their resources to support the transition. This may include actors perceived as having malign interests.

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222. A key factor in successful peace processes is the parties' own motivation to reach a negotiated settlement. While reconciliation and peace processes are a diplomatic activity led across HMG by the FCO, they often incorporate a process of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants that will form part of the security transition at a provincial or district level.

223. Parties who waged conflict and are responsible for abuse will be part of the DDR process, which will be complemented by appropriate justice mechanisms and systems for monitoring human rights. A challenge for UK personnel working on DDR is that engagement with former combatants may be thought to confer legitimacy to the group's cause or tactics, undermining relationships with civilians affected by the violence. Support to those individuals being demobilised and the communities who host them will need to be carefully balanced if DDR processes are to strengthen the transition process.

SECTION IV – WHEN?

When can the activities leading to the transition take place and when will the moment be right for transition?

224. The aim of this step is to identify timings and dependencies which have implications for the transition. This should facilitate phasing, sequencing and prioritisation, highlighting shifts in potential influence that could be used as opportunities to advance the transition.

225. There is no single point in time when the balance of decision-making and capability shifts between parties. Even when a solid *transition date* exists, this will normally mark a stage in a process. In some cases transition will be forced by external political factors (a change in political appetite within the international community, possibly through domestic drivers), by one particular event (as occurred in 1993 in Somalia) or by the host nation itself (DRC 2010). However, it will most likely be dictated by a gradual shift in the situation on the ground. M&E can help to identify these shifts and ensure that the transition plan adopts the optimal sequencing for transition success.

226. Analysis of **When** should consider:

- a. **Time Frame.** The setting of a time frame for transition will be politically sensitive; ideally, a time frame should be conditions-based. However, there may be an anticipated time frame to which partners are working, outlined by a national security or development strategy, or an international mandate.

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- b. **Milestones.** Outline any established milestones that will affect a transition: elections (in either party to the transition), mandates, funding cycles, unit rotations, resource constraints, seasonal issues such as harvest and weather patterns, or religious or cultural festivals. Transition is inherently a time of instability with multiple transitions across different domains taking place. Grouping transitions will increase potential for disruption while dispersing and sequencing transitions over a period of time will mitigate risk.
- c. **Sequence and Duration.** Consider the order in which functions and areas should be transitioned and how long such developments will take. Key to sequencing is drawing out the interdependencies identified in the *What* section. For instance, should an army unit be transitioned before a Ministry of Defence is capable of transparent and prompt salary payments?

The Challenge of Time Lines: Transition and DDR in Sierra Leone

In Sierra Leone security and governance functions were successfully decentralised from executive control at the capital down to district councils. However, there were tensions between the practical timelines required for security reform and political imperatives for transition. In 1999, DDR efforts were inhibited as the rebels were not ready to disarm. Once the DDR process was established, the national committee for DDR in Sierra Leone, working on the basis of reintegrating 7,000 soldiers every 6 months, noted that it would be 2004 before the remaining 24,000 out of 55,000 combatants could be fully reintegrated. Efforts were made to upscale the process to meet the 2002 deadline when the conflict was officially declared over and elections held, but this is often not possible. Tailored packages of assistance were required, for men, women and the large numbers of child soldiers as well as for the communities absorbing them. Cutting any elements of the DDR process to shorten timelines can undermine the security and political outcomes they are designed to support.

SECTION V – HOW?

How to prepare the environment for and conduct the negotiations?

227. The first 4 steps of this framework identify a series of acceptable combinations of potential partners, actors and security functions. These should help define a security transition that meets our objectives and the interests of the host nation. Consistency with the principles identified in Chapter 1 will improve the likelihood of success. The intent is not to chart a precise step-by-step process to an optimal solution but to enable those

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involved in transition with the information required to navigate to one of a number of potentially acceptable outcomes. The aim of this final step is to pull the analysis together into a statement of possible options and the activities required to deliver them to inform further detailed planning:

a. **Articulate Outcomes.** The first objective should be to articulate the various transition options. A transition option is an amalgam of the preceding aspects of this framework: a group of connected (i.e. interdependent or mutually supportive) functions, with possible combinations of providers, resource donors and likely timelines. Included in each course of action is an understanding of plausible and acceptable outcomes, red-line issues, potential partners' political positions and key areas for negotiation. These may be illustrated as possible scenarios. Risk analysis will identify and mitigate factors likely to critically undermine the transition: this should incorporate the risks outlined in Chapter 1.

b. **Negotiation and Influence.** The second objective is to identify what activities will be required to achieve a favourable negotiation and establish the required partners' capacity and legitimacy. Creating an environment that is conducive to transition may require reducing the impact of adverse influences, strengthening or supporting those actors that contribute to positive change as well as activities that test critical assumptions and increase understanding of partners' positions.

Managing the drawdown of Military Assistance

228. Key to security transition is the management of the drawdown of international forces and monitoring the impact it has on the political and security environment.

229. Security transitions present a unique challenge for planners. The nature of the handover means that a reduction in visible presence – and ultimately control – is combined with an increased need for situational awareness.

Monitoring and Evaluating Security Transitions

230. M&E should support planning and implementation by identifying milestones and indicators that allow progress to be assessed and risks and opportunities to be tracked, thereby enabling plans and activities to be adapted.

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231. The impending M&E Joint Doctrine Note³ will give further and more detailed guidance on designing an M&E framework, but the following key considerations might be helpful:

- a. Designing an M&E framework should address the theory of change underpinning actions and should pay as much – if not more – attention to the emergence of negative trends, second-order effects and unintended consequences as to positive reports of progress.
- b. Indicators, or measures of effect, must therefore be capable of showing failure and address issues of quality. For example, measures that simply show numeric rates of success (such as number of security forces trained and equipped) without addressing issues such as legitimacy and sustainability are insufficient. Risk analysis may help in developing ‘measures of failure’.
- c. A balance of quantitative and qualitative indicators should be used to capture perceptions and intangible outcomes (e.g. trust) as well as more directly measurable indicators (e.g. reports of corruption). The use of proxies (e.g. freedom of movement) may be helpful, especially for sensitive issues.
- d. Given the inherent difficulties of gathering reliable data in difficult security situations, it may be helpful to draw upon and compare across different sources, such as independent media, NGO reports and academic studies, rather than seeking to gather all data directly.

232. An M&E system should be an integral part of the planning process from the outset and should be developed with all parties involved in the transition process to ensure ownership throughout. Questions to ask when designing an M&E system may include:

- a. **Partners.** What has been learnt about partner interests, motivations and needs, how supported are the partners by the relevant population and elites, and how much space for negotiation do they have?
- b. **Population.** Assessing the needs, expectations and perceptions of communities and populations with regards to security can provide valuable perspective on the approaches that will be sustainable, legitimate and effective in the long term.

³ Due to be promulgated in late 2010.

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- c. **Politics.** What can be learnt and measured about the political power dynamics and what is the implication of this knowledge? What is the status of the political settlement and the balance between communities and sectors? What negative impacts could the transition have on the settlement and how can they be recognised?
- d. **Legitimacy.** How legitimate is the security transition and how legitimate are those with whom we are engaging, according to the perspectives of the relevant stakeholder communities? What impact might our own legitimacy and actions have upon the legitimacy of our partners and how are such changes recognised?
- e. **Capacity.** How capable is the security and justice sector – are there critical gaps (including managerial and oversight) that will undermine the transition and what progress is being made in addressing them?
- f. **Sustainability.** How well does the model in question conform to local norms, how affordable is it and how do its processes lend themselves to long-term replication and improvement? Will the transition hold once international military assistance comes to an end?

In developing courses of action an iterative re-examination of previously identified assumptions and risks will be required for each phase in a transition; possibly each day.

SECTION VI – CONCLUSION

233. In developing courses of action an iterative re-examination of previously identified assumptions and risks will be required for each phase in a transition. The more flexibility a transition can retain, the more likely it is to succeed.

234. Transitions depend on the cooperation of partners on all sides. They can succeed if seen as a negotiated approach by the international actor that is **politically** informed, reinforces **capability** building with the development of **legitimacy**, takes account of **risk**, has an inbuilt **M&E** process and ensures that **sustainability** is at the heart of security transition.

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ANNEX A – QUICK-LOOK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Stabilisation Guidance and Tools

- JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*
- Stabilisation Unit *Stabilisation Guidance Note and Stabilisation Issues Notes* (See specifically: Security Sector and Rule of Law, Human Rights and DDR) <http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/index.php/about-us/key-documents>
- USIP, *Guiding Principles for Stabilisation and Reconstruction* <http://www.usip.org/programs/initiatives/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version>
- FCO, MOD and DFID, UK Government Strategy on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/publications-and-documents/publications1/protection-civilians-armed-conflict>

Analytical Tools

Political Power Analysis

Numerous political power analysis tools are available to those engaged in mapping, planning, or carrying out security transitions. Such analysis needs to focus not only on formal, but also on informal, political landscapes. See, for instance:

- SIDA (Swedish Overseas Development Agency) quoted via the UK Overseas Development Institute, <http://www.odi.org.uk/>
- DFID and the World Bank have developed a list of tools for institutional, political and social analysis (TIPS), available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTOPPSISOU/Resources/Volume201Tools-Sourcebook.pdf>
- DFID's Drivers of Change Analysis Tool can be found at <http://portals.wi.wur.nl/files/docs/SPICAD/DriversofChange.pdf>
- Mapping Political Context is another tool from ODI that can be found at <http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/152.pdf>
- Further tools are listed at <http://www.gsdr.org/go/topic-guides/political-economy-analysis/tools-for-political-economy-analysis>

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Stakeholder Analysis

- Multiple methodologies for stakeholder analysis exist. A common tool is the 'Power & Interest Grid' which divides stakeholders based on their ability to influence the situation and the impact the situation has on them: <http://www.tiplady.org.uk/pdfs/StakeholderAnalysis.pdf>
- The DFID Stakeholder Participation Analysis tool is available at http://www.dfid.gov.uk/FOI/tools/tools_pdf/dfid_tools_annexe_3.pdf
- The Australian Government's stakeholder analysis matrix tool is available at <http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/DSE/wcmn203.nsf/LinkView/86D3534A103DB113CA257089000A2FB3B3D050C7331FFEBCA257091000FEF77>
- For another sectoral approach to stakeholder analysis - but one with much applicability to security transitions – see the Pan-American Health Organization's Policy Toolkit for Strengthening Participation, at <http://www.lachsr.org/documents/policytoolkitforstrengtheninghealthsectorreformpartii-EN.pdf>

Building Capability

Security Sector Reform

- The starting point for any capability building in the security sector should be the OECD-DAC SSR Handbook, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf>
- Adding a useful political context is Dr. Andrew Rathmell's paper on 'reframing SSR for Counterinsurgency – getting the politics right', at <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=201>
- The SSR Network is a good resource for further material, including their *Beginners Guide to SSR*, http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR_A_Beginners_Guide_to_SSR_v2.pdf

Security and Justice Sector Tasks

- The Conflict Prevention Web has an exhaustive list of security and justice sector tasks that should be taken into consideration, available in the toolbox at http://www.caii.com/CAIStaff/Dashboard_GIROAdminCAIStaff/Dashboard_CAIAdminDatabase/resources/ghai/

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- A practical example of a list of (non-military) tasks can also be derived from the US Department of Homeland Security Universal Task List, at <http://www.comcare.org/uploads/Universal%20task%20list.pdf>

Legitimacy

- OECD-DAC's State Building in Situations of Fragility <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/9/41212290.pdf>
- OECD-DAC's Strengthening State Legitimacy in Fragile Situations: www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/6/44794487.pdf
- The DFID Capable-Accountable-Responsive (CAR) framework is a very valuable addition to a toolbox, and can be found within <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/whitepaper/building-our-common-future.pdf>
- An interesting academic paper on the topic can be found at http://www.povertyfrontiers.org/file_download.php/COIN+of+the+Realm_The+Role+and+Importance+of+Legitimacy+in+Counterinsurgency_Crane.pdf

Monitoring and Evaluation

- Joint Doctrine Note on Monitoring and Evaluation due to be promulgated in late 2010: <http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/MicroSite/DCDC>
- The OECD DAC SSR Handbook again has information on this topic, as does NUPI, http://www.nupi.no/content/download/9637/99547/file/070809_M&EAagenda.pdf

Trend Analysis

- Trend analysis within security transitions and counterinsurgency has a long history: <http://fas.org/irp/cia/product/insurgency.pdf>
- More contemporary approaches centre around the Cynefin Decision Model, <http://kwork.org/Resources/narrative.pdf> and via strategic future analysis, http://www.european-futurists.org/wEnglisch/pdf/Presentations2008/Kaestner_EFCL_08.pdf

Security and Justice Sector Indicators

- GSRDC offers a guide to the institutional assessment of security and justice sectors, at <http://www.gsrdc.org/docs/open/HD604.pdf> An

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indispensable guide to Justice Sector Indicators is VERA's Developing Justice Sector Indicators,
http://www.vera.org/download?file=9/207_404.pdf

Security Transitions Planning

Negotiations Planning

- There is much academic and practical background on negotiations planning. The following provides a brief introduction to the subject:
<http://www.usc.edu/programs/wise/private/docs/events/NegotiationsPlanning.pdf>

Evolutionary Planning

- The Cynefin Model, above, is a concise and relevant approach. For models with direct applicability, see Rondinelli, *Development Projects as Policy Experiments*, Routledge, 1993, or, online, Piotukh & Wilson, *Security Sector Evolution*, Libra Knowledge Network, July 2009, <http://libraadvisorygroup.com/assets/docs/SecuritySectorEvolutionLibraJuly2009.pdf>

Transition in Peacekeeping Missions

- *No Exit without Strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations*, UN Doc. S/2001/394, 20 April 2001.
- *Handover from International to Local Actors in Peace Missions, Lessons from Burundi, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste*, Pottelbergh, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs:
<http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2010/Handover-from-International-to-Local-Actors-in-Peace-Missions>

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CIVPOL	Civilian Police
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EU	European Union
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission
EU POL	European Union Police
FARDC	
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
JDP	Joint Doctrine Publication
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD-DAC	OECD-Development Assistance Committee
OGD	Other Government Department
SBPB	State-Building/Peace-Building
UN	United Nations
UN CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNOSOM	United Nations Mission in Somalia

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