

Document 1 - Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 3 February 2015

Peter is happy

From: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Sent: 02 February 2015 17:21

To: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Cc: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Subject: RE: For comment ASAP Mon 2 Feb please: Sudan - invitation for Ministerial visit
OFFICIAL_SENSITIVE

[REDACT SECTION 40]

As promised, my changes attached (which build in [REDACT SECTION 40]). I've also amended earlier paragraphs to refer to the new projects we hope will come out of KhartouM process as a whole, rather than raising expectations that these will all come about from UK-Sudan cooperation.

Have left a draft on Peter's desk for him to confirm he's content with being signed up for a meeting (can't imagine he'll say no). Will confirm tomorrow.

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 2 – Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 4 May 2015

[Email related to PQ HL8113 on Sudan and Human Trafficking asked by Baroness Cox 3 May 2016. Link to question and written answer can be found here:

<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/>]

Document 3 – Letter from Peter Tibber to Matthew Kidd on migration May 2015

Matthew Kidd
Director Mediterranean Migration Unit
26 May 2015

Dear Matthew

SUDAN/ MIGRATION: A MOMENT TO RECALIBRATE?

Sudan is a major transit country for those leaving the Horn of Africa, as well as a source of economic migrants and those fleeing conflict. A policy officer has arrived at post for a month to scope operational options to support government efforts to tackle trafficking/ smuggling. But setting our ambitions high would require significant recalibration in our relationship, [REDACT SECTION 27]

Context

Sudan is not traditionally a partner of choice for the UK in tackling regional challenges of the Horn of Africa, including migration.

Embroiled for decades in civil war (which continues to intensify in the peripheries), its President an ICC indictee for war crimes in Darfur, [REDACT SECTION 27] and long-standing (albeit diminishing) ties with Hamas and Iran, the UK does not have high level contact with government, and operates an “essential-contact only” policy with the President due to his ICC indictment.

Bilateral cooperation is sufficient to enable continuation of our presence and humanitarian and conflict prevention programmes (worth over £50m), although visa and operational restrictions are significant. No funding is channelled through government. On most political issues we are at opposing ends of the spectrum, although on some regional issues interests are more aligned, and migration could be one of those areas.

Migration challenges

UNHCR estimate that over 1,000 Eritreans arrive into East Sudan each month. In 2014 over 16,000 new arrivals were recorded, up from 7,180 in 2013. Around 80% continue their journey onwards, heading to Khartoum, where they work illegally to fund their onward journey towards Libya, Egypt and Europe. Work restrictions offer little incentive to settle.

Reliance on regional smuggling networks make this group extremely vulnerable to trafficking. 113 victims were verified by UNHCR in 2014, although real numbers are not known. Alleged perpetrators are most commonly described to be Rashaida, an Arab tribe originating from Saudi Arabia. According to Sudan’s National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking, the trafficking trade in Sudan reached \$3m per annum in 2013 and 2014.

Approximately 160,000 Sudanese leave Sudan annually, largely for economic reasons. The UK received 1449 asylum applications from Sudanese in 2014, almost twice that of 2013. With intensifying conflicts in Darfur and South Kordofan/ Blue Nile, and a weak, poorly managed economy suffering loss of oil revenues to the South and sanctions, this looks set to continue.

Government policy

[REDACT SECTION 27]

But on migration, some genuine efforts appear to have been made. The Government has publicly acknowledged the extent of human trafficking, and passed a new anti-trafficking law in March 2014, subsequently acceding to the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol. Police, military and national security (NISS) periodically rescue trafficking victims through raids and interception (in January

2014 NISS rescued 124 foreign nationals it determined to be trafficking victims, and referred the women and children to government social services). Sudan is also implementing new measures to register and document the growing number of South Sudanese fleeing conflict, offering them the same level of rights as Sudanese.

Nonetheless, the picture is far from rosy. **[REDACT SECTION 27]** Poverty and unemployment, and government corruption, all contribute to the problem. **[REDACT SECTION 27]**

What more could we do?

Through our humanitarian and development programmes we already provide some assistance to refugees in camps along the border with Eritrea, and towards stabilising vulnerable communities, although UK aid is primarily targeted towards the conflict areas where most are in need.

Our political strategy recognises that without an end to conflict and improved prosperity and governance in Sudan, chances of reversing the trend of Sudanese choosing to leave are small. We monitor and report human rights violations faced by migrants such as trafficking.

Our Defence attaché is in discussion with the Sudanese Armed Forces about the possibility of offering training to Sudan's Joint Border Forces through our Defence Engagement Programme.

There are a number of ways we could get more involved, and in the wake of the launch of the EU "Khartoum Process" an officer from the "Africa Roamer" team has arrived at post this week to further develop options, including:

- Capacity building support to tackle weaknesses in Sudan's border management including inconsistent procedures, poor record-keeping, lack of basic equipment and skills.
- Support to implementation of anti-trafficking law, which is badly understood by police and judiciary and little of which has been implemented (although inclusion of the death penalty for guilty parties is a complicating factor to us offering support)
- Increasing incentives for Eritreans to settle in Sudan through lobbying and support to improve government migration management and labour laws, and support for Eritrean communities including information campaigns.

Politically, we could do more to capitalise on the normalised state of Sudan-Eritrea relations as a vehicle for engaging with Eritrea. **[REDACT SECTION 27]**

Feasibility

We should be able to find projects in these areas we can pursue within the existing constraints of the bilateral relationship, and with increased engagement with the Ministry of Interior. **[REDACT SECTION 27]**. Creating greater incentives for Eritreans to stay through changes to their legal status would mean the regime taking on a political hot potato when Sudanese youth already complain of high unemployment.

[REDACT SECTION 27].

The Sudanese would probably welcome such an approach, as an opportunity to turn around their standing with the international community, although building trust would take time.

Trade-offs

Such an approach would be high risk. Any security and justice capacity building in Sudan carries the risk of misuse and reputational damage. The UK is already facing judicial review of its Defence Engagement programme, through which we offer training to Sudanese Armed Forces on issues such as International Humanitarian Law. DFID has also come under fire training the Sudanese police.

The UK has a long standing, vocal lobby on Sudan, including many senior Parliamentarians, who follow UK engagement with the government with a toothcomb, and will jump at any indication that we are softening our stance on issues of conflict and human rights.

And in a country that has seen half a million new displacements in Darfur alone in the last 15 months, including through government aerial bombardment, which actively blocks international organisations from helping the 5.4 million in humanitarian need – and which is on the road to further decline ending in destabilisation if it does not reform itself sooner or later – we need to decide whether we want to. **[REDACT SECTION 27]**.

Impact

We will use the current scoping work to build our evidence base of what could make a tangible difference, drawing on the experience of stakeholders already active in this field. At this stage we should not assume that a high ambition approach would necessarily be game-changing, given the continued situation in Eritrea and that the economic incentives for migration remain. **[REDACT SECTION 27]**

Can others help?

Some donors are already engaged, most notably, Italy (about to sign a new agreement to provide technical assistance on border management in the East), the US (focused largely on anti-trafficking), France (low levels of intelligence sharing) and Norway. The EU provides direct assistance for migrants, capacity building (such as for safe house workers) and awareness raising as part of a region-wide programme. The EU Delegation in Khartoum does not have its own programmes, but is getting a bit more proactive in its coordination of member state activity, in anticipation of increased engagement under the Khartoum Process.

Getting the EU to take the lead could help to mitigate the reputational risk of the UK stepping out, **[REDACT SECTION 27]**

Peter Tibber
HMA Khartoum

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 4 - Relevant extract from House of Lords Oral Question briefing pack for 9 September 2015. (Question asked by Lord Chidgey)

Index of Supplementary Questions

23. Will the pursuit of decreasing numbers of migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean lead to a change in UK policy towards Sudan?

- Sudan is an important country on issues related to migration, and recently became the 5th largest source of asylum claims for the UK. The UK is committed to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in Darfur, from which many have fled Sudan. We regularly press the Government of Sudan to take a lead in ending the conflicts in Sudan.
- We are also committed to working with both the Sudanese Government and Civil Society organisations on migration within the wider region. The Khartoum Process for discussions between the EU and AU provides an important framework in which to hold such discussions.

Document 5 – Relevant extract from briefing Shapps-Ghandour at UNGA 2015

...OBJECTIVES

- ...State our commitment to working with Sudan on migration through the ‘Khartoum Process’. Ask Ghandour what barriers he sees...

...BACKGROUND

1. Migration: Sudan is the fifth largest source of UK asylum claims, due to its internal conflicts. It is also a key transit point in the trafficking routes from Eritrea. The “Khartoum Process” is the main regional mechanism for tackling human trafficking and people smuggling in the Horn of Africa. We are also scoping bilateral support options...

Document 6 – Relevant extract from email: Sudan and South Sudan Unit to British Embassy Khartoum 2 November 2015

...In following up I think it would be helpful (if able) to include references to the following:

- ...A line on migration? There are ongoing discussions for working together under the Khartoum Process but need to ensure HR concerns are addressed (e.g. Sudan adhering to

relevant international conventions, concerns over death penalty for traffickers) Appreciate MFA not the lead but I think good to reference just to highlight potential HR concerns that could affect our ability to work together on this...

Happy to discuss

Thanks

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 7 – Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 14 December 2015

[REDACT SECTION 40]

I also discussed with Michael what wider points we should make at COAFR on Sudan. Suggest the following:

- Migration an important area for increased EU-Sudan cooperation; UK is supporting as current Chair of Khartoum Process; need to be clear that cooperating with Government will not mean that we will water down our stances on human rights issues; welcome new mechanisms for local coordination in Khartoum on migration agenda but believe that EU MS (and CHE/Nor) should develop a joint strategy to determine priority areas for EU Trust Fund spend as well as red lines for capacity building of GoS, drawing together political and development/ humanitarian aspects; otherwise funds may be delivered in a piecemeal way.

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 8 - Relevant extract from a EUSPC Briefing for a meeting with Foreign Minister Ghandour on 16 February 2016

POINTS TO MAKE

- We want to see the EU-Sudan relationship improve and develop. We have shared interests in a number of areas, especially on regional security and migration...
- On migration, welcome Sudanese co-operation on the Khartoum Process to date – for which the UK currently holds the chair. We now want to see progress move further and faster. Pleased that Sudan will be represented at the next Khartoum Process working group in Paris on 25 February. This is an opportunity to give views on the proposals under the EU Trust Fund...

BACKGROUND

[REDACT SECTION 27] but there are some potential openings, notably around migration where the Government of Sudan have recognised that working with Europe may be to their advantage. It is likely that the Government will have highly political asks in return for their cooperation on irregular migration. We will also need to be clear that the most important thing the Government could do to address this problem is resolve its internal conflicts, a key driver of migrants (the second largest source of UK asylum claims in the last reporting period). The UK is currently chair of the “Khartoum Process”, the main regional mechanism for tackling irregular migration the Horn of Africa. Given constraints on engaging directly with the Government, we are working closely with EU member states to define projects under the €1.8bn EU Trust Fund. The next working group in Paris is a chance for African partners to feed in to the proposals currently being discussed under the Fund...

Document 9 – Relevant extract from ‘Bilateral Strategic Dialogue Crib Sheet’

How we support

UK current chair of Khartoum process – are improving coordination and information sharing by establishing new Operational WG

Will work with Sudan to co-convene meeting in May (see letter from Olly Robbins)

UK playing active role in EU to shape common approach: ensuring proposals for Trust Fund spending responsive to Sudanese asks on livelihoods (for both refugees and host communities), border management and establishing regional police training centre.

[REDACT SECTION 23]

Funding two projects to further agenda

- a) Via IoM to improve evidence base around transiting migrants
- b) Via UNHRC to improve vocational training for refugees in Khartoum

Document 10 – Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 17 March 2016

[REDACT SECTION 40]

As mentioned at today’s telekit, and yesterday’s VTC, the EU 100m Euros assigned for migration in Sudan is to be discussed by the EDF Committee at the end of the month to be transferred into the Trust Fund. See attached and below for comments from DFID on the proposed programming.

[REDACT SECTION 40] comments are spot on. This is funding that was previously programmed towards the wide development agenda in Sudan. But it’s now been badged migration, and publicly

announced [REDACT SECTION 27]. On the other hand, as [REDACT SECTION 40] says, simply un-doing previous programming decisions is also not so simple.

This is a DFID lead in UKREP; maybe worth making FCO aware too to support these points?

Michael – could you raise this with [REDACT SECTION 40] when you next see him? It would be good to get his take on how the EU proposes to handle this with the Sudanese.

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 11 – Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 28 March 2016

Yes, this refers to the Khartoum Process meeting in May, and Home Office have already suggested Brokenshire attendance at a telekit on this last week. Given the meeting is being pitched at expert level, I doubt he'd be the right person to co-Chair, but if he wants to use it as a hook to come out, I think we could live with it. Shall we discuss at our VTC on Wednesday?

[REDACT SECTION 40]

From: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Sent: 24 March 2016 14:39

To: Michael Aron (Sensitive); [REDACT SECTION 40]

Cc: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Subject: RE: Readout: PUSH meeting with James Brokenshire on migration and NSC. 23/03

Thanks for forwarding Michael. I actually had a quick chat on Tuesday with [REDACT SECTION 40] in the HO International team who was listening in on the call. I briefed him on our policy and its impact on the migration agenda. Presumably Brokenshire was referring to the Khartoum Process organised immigration crime workshop due to take place in Khartoum in May – I haven't heard that he is planning to attend and am happy to feed back that we don't think he should!

We also now have a monthly Africa migration VTC with HO colleagues, DFID and Posts so can pick these points up in the next one (in April).

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 12 – Attachment email from British Embassy Khartoum 10 May 2016

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Below, please find the feedback we agreed on to feed back on the NGO paper:

Overall, while we note the concerns on this process raised as valid, we also point out that the Khartoum Process should not be viewed as separate from the other important efforts which the British government makes within Sudan on a range of other issues.

- We are aware that Sudan is a source country for migration in addition to being a transit country. This has been acknowledged publicly both by the UK as well as by the Sudanese government.
- This dynamic has been addressed by the Valletta Summit, which includes addressing root causes of the first of its pillars. These pillars are particularly important, since, as noted in a Senior Officials Meeting of the Khartoum Process in January, 2015, the Khartoum Process will monitor the implementation of the Valletta Pillars. These pillars have also fed into the EU Trust Fund discussion.
- The UK continues to work on addressing the root causes of migration from Sudan, both in terms of development as well as corruption, poor governance, and continuing conflict. The Khartoum process and work on migration should be seen as a careful and cautious work to increase capacity for necessary governance structures using human rights safeguards that are already in place across all of the UK's programming.
- While government capacity building is by no means an apolitical issue, we view capacity building for lower level officials as a way to improve governance , encouraging lower level officials to uphold the rule of law.
- The Khartoum Process has been developed as a political mechanism to provide structure and create a regional approach to issues of migration. It is not meant to replace internal political dialogue efforts within countries, but rather to coordinate efforts between countries.
- While migration is a greater priority for the EU than for Sudan, Sudan as signed on to the political mechanism and as a member, is entitled to raise its own concerns on issues of migration. In turn, we continue to work on Human Rights, good governance, and conflict reduction through other political mechanisms.
- We recognize the challenges of working with this regime; however, working with governments is essential to any cross-border work on migration. We are also aware that the Sudanese government is not monolithic, and we seek to test statements and government efforts that signal a willingness to work on this issue, using mechanisms we have already developed to assess and mitigate the risks to our other priorities.

- **[Redact section 35]**

Let me know if there's anything else I should include, but otherwise I think this is everything we covered in our meeting.

All the best,

[REDACT SECTION 40]

**Document 13 – Email from Sudan and South Sudan Unit to British Embassy
Khartoum 5 May 2016**

Thanks **[REDACT SECTION 40]**. Yes, I will definitely relay relevant points to Home Office and UKRep. I am attaching an updated version of the NGO paper, which they sent yesterday,

[REDACT SECTION 40]

From: **[REDACT SECTION 40]**

Sent: 04 May 2016 06:26

To: **[REDACT SECTION 40]**

Cc: Michael Aron (Sensitive); **[REDACT SECTION 40]**

Subject: RE: Sudan/migration NGO meeting

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Thanks for this interesting and useful readout. It's good to have had this opportunity to hear the concerns of NGOs, which as you say are not unexpected. We'll have a look at the paper and get you some comments. Is it also worth feeding back some of these points to the Home Office (eg on whether there is a forum for engaging NGOs on migration/ Valetta) and to UKREP (on presentational dimensions of the 100m)?

On your specific points, yes I believe the 40m refers to BMM. Worth pointing out that promoting options for legal migration is one of the Valetta pillars so won't be overlooked.

[REDACT SECTION 40]

From: **[REDACT SECTION 40]**

Sent: 04 May 2016 00:09

To: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Cc: Michael Aron (Sensitive); [REDACT SECTION 40]

Subject: Sudan/migration NGO meeting

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Please see below for main points on today's meeting with NGOs ([REDACT SECTION 40]) on our approach to migration from Sudan. They had asked for this meeting to gain some insight into the Khartoum Process and to share their concerns about the EU approach to engaging with Sudan on migration. Their concerns are set out in the attached paper, on which they would welcome comments (I'm happy to collate if people have particular thoughts. I'd be particularly interested in [REDACT SECTION 40] and [REDACT SECTION 40]'s take on the Defence Engagement point pp.2-3).

- [REDACT SECTION 40] were worried that our strategic dialogue augured a new era of engaging with GoS on migration at the expense of human rights and conflict resolution which the UK has traditionally championed in Sudan. They cited the lack of a UK statement on the Darfur Referendum as evidence – the US had been out on its own occupying the moral high ground. We pushed back on seeing the strategic dialogue as a new approach and stressed that we will continue to raise human rights and conflict, including in the context of migration given their relevance to the agenda. You explained that we chose to raise our concerns on the Darfur Referendum in private and to focus on the Roadmap which the GoS had signed the week before. You emphasised that we remain focused on the peace process and are under no illusions as to the role the conflicts play in driving migration.
- In a similar vein, the NGOs thought the lack of EU statement on Bashir's trip to Indonesia signalled a decision to stop public condemnation of the regime.
- In response to the criticism that engaging with Sudan on the Khartoum Process ignored that Sudan is a source country for migrants/refugees, we pointed out that GoS had moderated their narrative and now accepted that they had a source, as well as a transit, problem (albeit only to certain audiences).
- All were concerned that the EU was handing money to GoS for capacity-building of security forces responsible for human rights abuses and often heavily implicated in illegal border activity (people, arms, drugs) themselves. [REDACT SECTION 40] said that the head of NISS was Sudan's most successful arms trader. Why would these actors change their behaviour given the funding available from the EU was dwarfed by their likely income from these activities? We explained that the 100m Euro Special Measure for Sudan was destined for development/livelihoods programmes already in the pipeline and that projects on border management and security were still at the very early stages and agreed they should advance cautiously. We, along with other Member States, would continue to flag these risks in EU discussions and to work to ensure that programmes were adequately monitored to mitigate these risks [Comment: given GoS tendency to restrict access, especially to border and conflict areas, this seems to me one of the key obstacles to effective implementation of EU programmes and needs serious consideration. I know [REDACT SECTION 40] and team are trying to ensure some of these risks are factored into the UK-chaired KP workshop on organised immigration crime later this month].
- [REDACT SECTION 40] suggested that the UK had been burned by this kind of engagement with GoS before – we had pulled a project supporting Sudanese police after the violent suppression of protests in 2013 and had pared down our defence engagement in response

to legal challenge. We countered that we kept our policy of defence engagement under constant review and pointed out that the High Court had found in MoD's favour in the recent judicial review.

- **[REDACT SECTION 40]** accepted that the 100m Special Measure was harmless, but said the EU's announced 40m Euros focused on security/border management was much more worrying [Comment: I assume she must have been referring to the funds for Better Managed Migration?]
- **[REDACT SECTION 40]** stressed the prevalence of trafficking in East Sudan and the complicity of Sudanese authorities. **[REDACT SECTION 40]** reported obvious signs of this but did not feel safe enough to investigate trafficking.
- The NGOs said there was a need for more research and hoped the UK-funded research on migration drivers would be published. We explained that the (CSSF-funded) research was to inform thinking on programming but was unlikely to result in a public report. We pointed out that the EU Trust Fund is establishing a Research and Evidence Facility.
- There was concern that ODA money is being used for migration-focused activities, which the NGOs thought was inappropriate.
- **[REDACT SECTION 40]** cited the need to address demand by developing safe and legal routes for migrants who would otherwise risk their lives and livelihoods on dangerous and expensive journeys. They acknowledged that this was not a straightforward issue, but pointed out that, unlike the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process does not aim to establish legal channels at all.
- All were keen to know about the follow-up to the Valletta Summit and how they could input into the process.

Comment: a lot of these concerns are a result of the opacity and confusion of the various migration initiatives and point to the need for us to develop clear lines on our (and the EU's) approach. But some of them are substantive and mirror the risks we have internally highlighted in engaging with GoS. The statements coming from some EU quarters have done little to reassure concerned onlookers. I've attached the report of EU Commissioner Mimica's visit to Sudan for those who haven't seen it **[REDACT SECTION 27]**. While we have seen some success in cooperation on operational issues e.g. **[REDACT SECTION 23]**, mitigating the wider risks of human rights abuses, corruption etc will be a huge and enduring challenge. We can expect NGOs, civil society and opposition to continue to raise these concerns.

Please do all let me know if you have specific comments on the NGO paper, which is in draft and on which they are expecting feedback.

Thanks,

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 14 - Relevant extracts from email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 15 May 2016

[REDACT SECTION 40]

...Bilateral Relations

...The Ghandour visit was something to work towards, and that this next phase would be about building trust and confidence to get to that point, making the most of upcoming engagement opportunities via the Khartoum Process, AU Summit and UNGA. You agreed we should arrange a meeting London in the Autumn...

[REDACT SECTION 27]

[REDACT SECTION 23]

Document 15 – Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 16 May 2016

[REDACT SECTION 40]

To be aware of a Telegraph enquiry to the Home Office on reports of EU cooperation on migration with Sudan. They are responding with lines proposed from Brussels which look fine to me. You may want to flag our interest to the Home Office on this.

The German media articles are:

[EU To Work with Despot in Sudan to Keep Refugees Out - SPIEGEL ONLINE](#)

<http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/eritrea-sudan-101.html>

A meeting on smuggling is taking place in Khartoum under the “Khartoum Process” next week, chaired by the UK. Home Office is developing a Q&A script which I’ve asked them to share with us as soon as possible.

Best,

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 16 – Email from British Embassy Khartoum to Sudan and South Sudan Unit 18 May 2016

[REDACT SECTION 40],

See below. There is a pre-briefing with Director from the Home Office Richard Riley on Thursday. I am happy to cover this but wanted to give either of you the option of doing so?

From an FCO angle we need to flag:

- On the Khartoum Process in general, that this meeting is an important step forward on law enforcement cooperation but carries reputational risks (as NGO/media interest shows)
- That the issues can't be divorced from the political context in the region driving migration and important to reinforce these points in any political level engagement (eg need to end conflict in Sudan)
- UK delegation should be sensitised to the **[REDACT SECTION 27]** track record of the security state **[REDACT SECTION 27]**

Let me know if you would like to do this, or if not, if there's anything else you'd like me to flag **[REDACT SECTION 40]**. I've also provided some written lines attached.

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Document 17 – Relevant extracts from 'Lines to Take' 22 May 2016

EU Migration support to Sudan

Prompted by a report published in Der Spiegel in 13 May, international media started questioning the EU's "Better Migration Management" programme. Criticisms centred on why the EU was on the verge of giving EUR 40m worth of support to the Government of Sudan in return for measures to cut migration to Europe. Similar reports were carried in the UK, including in the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Express.

UK lines to take

A Government spokesperson said:

"There are currently no plans to provide equipment or funding to the Sudanese Government, or build reception centres in Sudan."

Background:

- The UK does not provide any funding directly to the Government of Sudan.
- We are working with the EU and other member states to ensure the Trust Fund on migration adheres to strict rules and delivers the best value for money for taxpayers.
- Helping countries cope with refugee flows and tackling the root causes of migration is firmly in the UK's interests.
- No EU funding will be decentralised to, or channelled through, the beneficiary countries' Government structures.
- Programmes in Sudan will adhere to the existing EU sanctions regime against Sudan, which amongst others establishes an embargo on arms and related material, and a ban on the provision of related services.

[REDACT SECTION 27]

**Document 18 – Email from Sudan and South Sudan Unit to British Embassy
Khartoum 31 May 2016**

A further press release from Human Rights Watch on this story, which has been picked up by several regional publications: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/30/sudan-hundreds-deported-likely-abuse>

[REDACT SECTION 40]

From: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Sent: 27 May 2016 11:29

To: [REDACT SECTION 40]

Subject: Article: Sudan and Eritrea crackdown on migrants amid reports of EU incentives

In case not seen.

[REDACT SECTION 40] – grateful for any more info you might have on the reported round up in Khartoum.

Thanks,

[REDACT SECTION 40]

[Link to article mentioned in email]: <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2016/05/25/sudan-and-eritrea-crackdown-migrants-amid-reports-eu-incentives>

Document 19 – Diptel 2 June 2016 Khartoum Process meeting

Diptel KHARTOUM

Foreign & Commonwealth Office Diplomatic Telegram

Summary

First 'thematic' meeting of the Khartoum Process, focused on people smuggling, marks a step towards a mature EU-African partnership and another win for the UK chairmanship. It helps lay the ground for enhanced strategic action in the region, putting operational flesh onto the bones of the Khartoum and Valletta declarations. Sudan continues to be an important and constructive partner in this area. There were lessons learnt, given less operational presence than we had hoped for, **[REDACT SECTION 27]**.

The next meeting in July will aim to consolidate the gains made.

1. On 24-25 May, the UK (Richard Riley, Serious and Organised Crime Director, Home Office) chaired the first 'thematic' meeting under the EU-Horn of Africa Khartoum Process, focused on people smuggling, co-convened in Khartoum with the Government of Sudan **[REDACT SECTION 40]**. Across two days of increasingly animated discussion, the meeting's four substantive sessions focused on information sharing, investigations, border management and prosecutions.
2. As a whole, the meeting should be considered a success. We have come away from Khartoum with a set of chair's conclusions across the four areas of focus. Presentations spurred increasingly animated plenary discussions, with African partners clearly supportive of further action, although also underscoring the challenges they (and we jointly) face – notably in terms of capacity and equipment, and regional coordination.
3. While the focus was on action against criminality, many participants also emphasised broader areas for action, including the needs of genuine refugees and the root causes of migrants' journeys. While agreeing on their broader relevance, we recommended that these issues be considered at future thematic meetings. We will now take the chair's conclusions on to the second 'working group' meeting in Rome on 8 July as the next step in delivering enhanced strategic action against criminality in the region.

4. There were also lessons learned. Despite clear messaging ahead of the meeting, representation from African partners was often political rather than expert, limiting substantive operational exchange, although we were able to reach broad consensus on priority actions.

[REDACT SECTION 27]

5. The meeting was a positive step forward in our efforts to develop engagement with the Government of Sudan, who proved effective partners in making logistical arrangements and contributed constructively to discussions throughout. Even an opening statement by Under-Secretary Alrazam **[REDACT SECTION 27]** focused on Sudan's commitment to the Khartoum Process. For our part, we ensured broader human rights concerns were flagged clearly, but in a manner that ensured they did not prevent open discussion. We will now want to consider how we follow up this meeting via a proposed visit by the Minister for Immigration.

COMMENT

6. The worsening of the situation in the Mediterranean underscores both the opportunities offered by the Khartoum Process, and the risks of not continuing to ensure its development. While the Khartoum Process remains rightly focused on the medium term, it opens the way for enhanced engagement with key African partners that can help us in the immediate perspective.

7. However, growing media, civil society and Parliamentary concerns over UK and EU engagement in the region will continue to require careful handling. We can and should be transparent and forthright on this engagement given the importance of upstream efforts in dealing with the flows from the Horn of Africa. However we will need to remain clear that our position on the broader humanitarian and political questions has not changed; indeed, we see those concerns as deeply linked to the issue of drivers and 'root causes'. The Khartoum meeting also served as a reminder that action on 'root causes' will remain integral to maintaining our partnerships with African countries and international organisations through the Khartoum Process.

8. For now, however, the meeting has taken that engagement another step forward, both on the specific actions required to tackle organised immigration crime, and on the Khartoum Process as a whole. That the Sudanese Ministry of Interior did not allow its disappointment over Brussels' cancellation of a parallel EU needs assessment mission on migration capacity building to dampen spirits makes their efforts all the more encouraging. But if that commitment is to be maintained, we will need to ensure the EU side now moves quickly on substantial concrete action.

ARON

Authorised

[REDACT SECTION 40]

Contact

[REDACT SECTION 40]

**Document 20 – Email Sudan and South Sudan Unit to British Embassy
Khartoum 15 July 2016**

[Email related to PQ HL1252 on Sudan and Human Trafficking asked by Lord Sheikh on 14 July 2016. Link to question and written answer can be found here:

<http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/>]

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Document 21 – Letter from Sudan and South Sudan Unit 17 May 2016

[REDACT SECTION 40]

17 May 2016

Our reference: MOP/96699/2016

Dear [REDACT SECTION 40],

Thank you for your email to the Minister for Africa on 21 April concerning Sudan and the Khartoum Process. It was good to have the opportunity to discuss your concerns at our recent meeting with other NGOs on 27 April but I also wanted to respond to the important points you raise in writing.

You raised the concern that the EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative – the ‘Khartoum Process’ – has a narrow focus on migration management. As you know, the Khartoum Process is the main regional mechanism to tackle trafficking and smuggling across the Horn of Africa. This is a crucial aspect of the EU’s approach to irregular migration. Since last November’s Valletta Summit, the Khartoum Process has formed part of wider cooperation between the countries of the Horn of Africa and other key countries of origin and transit across five key areas. These include legal migration and mobility, the protection of migrants and asylum seekers, increased development and humanitarian assistance, addressing illegal migration (including migrant smuggling and human trafficking) and better cooperation on returns and reintegration.

Sudan is a particularly important country to engage with as it is both a source and transit country for migrants, many of whom are vulnerable and may fall victim to people trafficking. We have made clear that we see Sudan as a source, transit and destination country for migrants on a number of occasions – I did so most recently during my visit to Khartoum last week. Sudan has taken a number of positive steps, such as passing anti-trafficking legislation, acceding to the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons and has made a constructive contribution to Khartoum Process discussions to date. But I do not underestimate the challenges of engaging with the government.

Bilaterally and as part of the EU, we are firmly committed to ensure that our engagement in Sudan makes a positive contribution to our human rights objectives. I share your concern at reports of collusion between Sudanese border officials and traffickers, and continue to raise this with the Government as part of our engagement. Alongside the Khartoum Process, the €1.3 billion EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was announced at the Valletta Summit in November 2015. This will help support a comprehensive solution to irregular migration, including addressing its root causes. The Trust Fund includes a €100 million Special Measure for Sudan, much of which will fund development projects focused on improving the livelihoods of migrant and refugee communities. The UK is closely engaged in the management of the Trust Fund and will work to ensure that resources are directed towards priorities and that programming is done in a coordinated and transparent way. The Trust Fund's new Evidence and Research facility will help improve the evidence base to inform approaches to irregular migration in the future.

Engaging with the Government of Sudan on migration issues does not mean that we will reduce our focus on the conflicts or human rights concerns. These were key themes during my meetings with the Government in Khartoum last week. We continue to make clear that we remain deeply concerned by the ongoing violence in Darfur and the Two Areas and the country's poor human rights needs to change. I agree that the recent violence and displacement in Jebel Marra is particularly concerning and we continue to call on the Government of Sudan to allow access.

As I said during our recent meeting I think it is important that we continue to discuss these issues as the Khartoum Process and Valletta Action Plan are implemented. In the meantime please do keep in touch with **[REDACT SECTION 40]** at **[REDACT SECTION 40]**.

Yours sincerely,

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