Sackville's conduct at Minden cast back further doubt on the expedition's military leadership .[29] Had they done their best in the face of unforeseeable, or at least unforeseen, factors?

The bad weather and sickness during the later stages of the enterprise are valid reasons for the fruitlessness of the cruise along the Norman and Breton coast. But the attempt on St Malo raises awkward questions; Were there not towns within reach of the coast less impregnable than St Malo, the capture of which would have threatened French inland communications and impelled urgent riposte? For such work the British force should have been quite large enough; indeed, considering its impedimenta and foraging needs it was probably too large and unwieldy for its task. So large a contingent would not only have been invaluable in Germany; there it could have relied upon good depots and supply lines. Marauding on the Breton coast it would surely starve. And how feasible would it have been to re-embark horses and siege train under cannon and musketry fire? Though Marlborough cannot have doubted the fighting quality of the Guards and his senior line battalions, from the moment he was ashore at Cancale he was continually looking over his shoulder, either at the fleet anchorage or for signs of enemy troops, as if he was weighed down by fears for the safety of Britain's strategic reserve.

What was the Duke to do once he had actually seen St Malo's defences? He could cut off the water supply and set the city ablaze with red-hot shot and *'carcasses'* (but that would render it uninhabitable as a British base); he could try bluffing the garrison into surrender; or he could withdraw into the entrenched camp and still hope to attract enemy attention there. His decisions while at Paramé were unheroic but it is difficult to deny that they were realistic. But once back within the entrenchments at Cancale surely he could and should have stayed. There was the entire absence of French first-line troops and one eyewitness declared *'never was a finer situation, for a small army to make a stand against any superiority of number'*.[30] Marlborough seemed averse to attracting any number at all: perhaps the foul weather and the health of the troops led to the precipitate embarkation.

Pitt said that the conflagration in the harbour justified the expedition – and of course it was a secondary objective Yet surely a much smaller, trained force of picked infantry and dragoons, landed from a smaller fleet, could have done that work as successfully, more suddenly, more swiftly – and more cheaply. It could have made a perfect commando operation.[31]

Since we cannot study the Intelligence upon which the whole operation was based it is impossible to judge whether the generals were thoroughly misled, or whether they misled themselves as to the facts about the coast and St Malo; Ligonier and Marlborough later protested that much of their information was bad; Lord George's studies and his comment to Hardwicke before the expedition sailed shows that useful information did exist. Perhaps the generals phrased their questions to the Channel Islanders in the wrong way and received confused replies but some of the information was undoubtedly correct.[32] Or perhaps Pitt was the main author of that document of May 1758, as [redacted] suggested.

We may term the actual conduct of operations realistic, or we may call it feeble. Judged against almost every assumption and proposal submitted by the three generals it is clear that in all respects but two – the conflagration, and alarming the civilians – Marlborough failed, in some respects ignominiously. But were the proposals realistic? To whatever extent Pitt was responsible for the essence of that document he, too, must share in the failure.

However, operational failure – if without tragic loss – may be excused if the primary objective succeeds: that objective was the diversion of a significant force of French troops away from the Rhine thus affecting *'grand operations'* there. Once news reached France that an expedition was fitting out, the French high command became concerned for Flanders and began to move troops from Dunkirk to Antwerp, and coastal forces all along the Channel shores were alerted.

At this moment Frederick the Great's ally, Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick launched a new offensive and on 1 June, the very day that [redacted] and Marlborough set sail from England, Brunswick's forces crossed the Rhine near Dusseldorf and threatened the French armies. The reaction was immediate: twelve of the sixteen French battalions which had been alerted to guard Flanders and the coast were ordered to concentrate on the Rhine. So instead of Marlborough drawing these units upon himself to ease Ferdinand's position it was the latter who kept first-line troops away from the coasts – a diversion in reverse. Of course, had the British struck hard and deep at a sensitive point French problems would have been exacerbated, but it is a fact that once St Malo was seen to be the target the French high command were relieved and decided not to weaken the forces on the Rhine, leaving the provincial forces to contain the British.[33] This is a situation totally at variance with Sir Julian Corbett's conclusion.

For France in the Seven Years' War damage to overseas interests and trade – even raids on Brittany – was less serious than defeat in western Europe, and her main military problem was not manpower, of which she had an abundance, but her logistical and command systems, as the course of the war in Germany was to show. Diversionary raids were mere pinpricks in major continental warfare.

APPENDIX 1

The General Officers' Opinion

(Undated MS in clerk's hand, signed by Ligonier, Marlborough and Sackville, in the Chatham Papers, PRO30/8/85. Punctuation and the use of capitals slightly modified by me in places; underlinings as in the MS.)

IF IT IS HIS MAJESTY'S INTENTION THAT BRITISH TROOPS should be employed in attempting a descent upon the coast of France in order to cause such a diversion of the forces of the enemy as may influence the grand operations of this campaign without going at too great a distance from this country, we look upon it as our duty, supposing the measures to be resolved, to enquire into the most probable means of carrying it the most effectually into execution. And after the best information we can procure, we see nothing so advisable as the attempting a descent upon the coast near St Maloes, as there seems to be a degree of probability, if the landing is not prevented by a camp being formed or a large body of troops cantooned in the neighbourhood, that the town of St Maloes may fall into our hands; for tho' by its situation regular approaches cannot be made to it nor cannon brought to batter in breach, yet it appears practicable to bombard and set it on fire with red hot ball and carcasses, and as we are informed the water that supplys the town may be easily cut off and the carrying provisions into it may in a great degree be prevented, then circumstances besides the probability [marginal note: possibility] of carrying it by escalade encourage us in the opinion that there is a degree of probability in succeeding in this attempt, as the burghers or the garrison may be induced to surrender, both to preserve themselves from danger and their houses and property from being demolished, as well within as without the town. And if that should be the case not only a retreat be effectually secured, but a powerful army would become necessary to dislodge His Majesty's Forces from a place of such strength and importance, But as in enterprizes of this sort the unfavourable is to be looked at, we must submit to His Majesty's consideration what measures ought to be pursued if St Maloes cannot be taken, and whether such as can be offered may in any degree answer the great object proposed without rashly risking so considerable a part of the Army.

If the landing is effected, and if upon Intelligence and reconnoitring we find that a superior body of regular troops cannot soon be assembled to oppose us, we may, by taking an advantageous post and by throwing up entrenchments, preserve our communications with the sea and endeavour to secure a retreat; we may then raise contributions, burn the shipping at St Maloes and spread an alarm thro' the country, oblige the enemy to march to its relief, and when we can no longer with prudence remain, we must reimbark in the best manner the circumstances will admit of; and we may then range along the coast from St Maloes as far northward as Boulogne, and by making feints or really landing in different parts oblige the enemy to keep a great force upon that long extent of coast, which may in some degree prevent their carrying on their operations they are at present engaged in, with that success and vigour they might do were the British troops to remain inactive. How far His Majesty will think proper to risk his troops in these operations we do not presume to judge, but it is our duty to submit our sentiments upon these as the best means of executing this plan of diversion if His Majesty should be pleased to direct its being undertaken.

APPENDIX 2

Order of Battle

GOC:
The Duke of Marlborough#

Lieutenant Generals:
Lord George Sackville#
the Earl of Aucram later 4th Marq of Lothian#

Major Generals:
Hon J Waldegrave later 3rd Earl#
J Mostyn#
A Dury (sometimes spelt Drury)
Hon G Boscawen
G Elliot *

Brigadier i/c Dragoons:
G A Elliott later 1st Lord Heathfield#*

Dep Adjutant General:
Lieutenant Colonel [redacted]

QMG:
Colonel [redacted] also Captain of Engineers

Guards Brigade (Dury):
1/1st Guards
1/Coldstream
1/3rd Guards

1st Brigade (Mostyn):
Bentinck's 5th Foot (R North'd Fus)
Manners's 36th (2/Worcs)
Home's 25th (KOSB)

2nd Brigade (Waldegrave):
Loudon's 30th (1/E Lancs)
Wolfe's 67th (2/R Hants)
Kingsley's 20th (Lancs Fus)

3rd Brigade (Boscawen):
Huske's 23rd (RWF)
Lambton's 68th (1/DLI)
Hay's 33rd (1/Duke's W Riding)

4th Brigade (Elliot):
Effingham's 34th (1/Border)
Richmond's 72nd (disbanded 1763)
Cornwallis's 24th (SWB)

A battalion would usually not exceed about 650 men.

Entick's *History* speaks of 16 battalions and includes Talbot's 74th Foot, raised 1756 and disbanded 1763; this battalion went to the Isle of Wight with Marlborough's force in May 1758, but was detained for service in the West Indies.

Grenadier companies withdrawn from Line battalions and placed under Colon [redacted] and in Major General Mostyn's Brigade:
1st Bn: grenadiers of 20th, 25th, 33rd, 36th, 67th.
2nd Bn: grenadiers of 23rd, 24th, 30th, 34th, 68th.

Light Dragoons (Eliott): one troop (about 50 dragoons) from each of the following
Bland's (1 KDG)
Howard's (3 DG)
Royal Dragoons
Campbell's (R Scots Greys)
Albemarle's (3 Hussars)
Innisk Dragoons (6 Innis D)
Cope's (7 Hussars)
Mordaunt's (10 Hussars)
Ancram's (11 Hussars)

3 Coys Royal Artillery:
Captains T James and A Tovey, 1st Bn, RA;
Captain J Brome, 2nd Bn, RA.

60 cannon, 15 of which were 24-pdrs according to Entick; two 6-pdrs was the normal complement for an infantry battalion. 6-pdrs were usually drawn by 7 horses, 12-pdrs by 15 horses, and so upwards.

50 mortars of weights between 0.5 and 2 tons, on fixed beds (and transported in carts).

Article in DNB; all peers are noticed in GEC's Complete Peerage.

* No Major General Elliot, Elliott or Eliott appears in the 1757 or 1758 Army Lists, but *'Major General Elliot'* is repeatedly mentioned in Marlborough's daily orders. *'Major General Granville Elliot'* (d 1759) appears as Colonel of the 61st Foot 1758-59 in SAHR's *Succession of Colonels*, p 97. George Augustus Eliott (Heathfield) is shown in the 1758 Army List as Lt & Lt Col in the 2nd Horse Grenadier Guards and as Colonel, ADC to the King.

NOTES

This article was written in 1993 for publication in another journal, but for various reasons slipped in publication schedules. It now appears in 2001, without change to the original text.

1 Fairly modern accounts are in Julian Corbett, *England in the Seven Years' War*, 1907, and more briefly in Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, vol ii, 1899; more recently in Rex Whitworth, *Ligonier*, 1958, R Middleton, *The Bells of Victory*, 1985, and the latter in greater detail in the *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, vol 71, 1993. Others are cited in the notes below. As this article went to press, the Army Records Society published *The Journal of Corporal William Todd*, who served at St Malo. Todd's account appears to bear out the other accounts given here but there has been no time to incorporate his Journal or the editors' valuable notes.

2 For Rochefort see Corbett, and Middleton 1993.

3 Corbett,i,p 263. Frederick rightly preferred 'the sound policy' of William III and Queen Anne (ibid; i, 240). His realistic view of the forces needed for an effective diversion in France was echoed by Colonel Hotham once he had seen St Malo: '20,000 men at least' (MS diary in Hotham Papers, DDHO/4/172, Brynmor Jones Library, Hull Univ). Such a force would of course have required the depots and supply systems of conventional 18th Century warfare.

4 The third officer on the board of enquiry, Major General Waldegrave, also went to St Malo.

5 Hervey's *Memoirs*, ed Sedgwick,1931, i, pp 246-7, unfortunately too long to quote.

6 As Elector, George II was keen for a campaign in Germany but his military gifts were limited – at Dettingen he was described as 'sans peur et sans avis'.

7 Ligonier to Sackville (ca 4 July 1758), in Whitworth, p 255; Marlborough to Pitt, 11 June 1758, Hotham Papers, DDHO/4/30.

8 There is a valuable 'Account of the late Enterprize' [to St Malo], by an Officer in the *Gentleman's Magazine* for July 1758 (vol 28, pp 297-300), the essence of which appears in the Rev John Entick's *General History of the Late War*, vol iii 1763. Entick, iii, p 77 gives a full account of Pitt's instructions.

9 Corbett, i, p 267.

10 Corbett, i, p 265 fn (Hardwicke) and 273 (Anson); Whitworth, p 251 (Sackville).

11 Anson's doubts in Whitworth, p 250.

12 Corbett, i, p 273 and Hawke Papers (NRS vol 129, 1990) Parts IVc & d; for Pitt's dislike of Hawke see Laughton's *DNB* article on Hawke. Wolfe, writing in the aftermath of Rochefort, awarded Howe all the honour of the enterprise (Beccles Willson, *Life & Letters of Wolfe*, 1909, pp 339-40).

13 On the subject the best modern study is D Syrett, 'The Methodology of British Amphibious Warfare in the Seven Years and American Wars', *Mariner's Mirror*, vol 58, 1972, pp 269-80; S G P Ward's splendid history of the DLI, *Faithful*,1962, not only contains much information in a small compass, but quotes the diary of a Private of the 68th.

14 In Gabarus Bay, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, Admiral Boscawen caustically commented to Amherst just after the capture of Louisbourg: "At the Isle of Wight are real Lieutenant Generals and Major Generals, in number eight, to sixteen battalions – in Gabarus Bay fourteen battalions, Rangers equal to another, detachments of Duroure's and Cornwallis's another, with only four Lance Generals – and yet we have conquered. What won't they do with so much more experience." (Spelling and punctuation slightly modernised – from R Reilly, *The Rest to Fortune*, 1960, p 201 fn, 5 August 1758).

15 Colonel Hotham's diary, and the journal of John Porter, a sergeant of grenadiers in the RWF (Huske's 23rd Foot) in *RUSI Journal*, vol 58, June 1914, pp 755-634.

16 There is an excellent map in the anon, *A Journal of the Campaign to the Coast of France*, 1758 , 2nd edition 1758, p 50, (British Library 102 d 43). A hundred and twenty years later John Singer Sargent painted the fine 'Oyster Gatherers at Cancale' which gives a good impression of the shelving beach at low tide (see R Ormond, *Sargent*, 1970, plate 4 and fig 7).

17 To this layman it seems that the two commanders and their men achieved a textbook amphibious landing. Operational details from the Duke's letters to Pitt, 6, 11 June 1758 (Hull Univ MSS, DDHO/4/30) and Hotham's diary, from Sgt Porter, from daily orders and the narrative in *A Journal*, and from Entick. The modern works I have found useful are Ward's *Faithful* , C T Atkinson's *History of the R Hants Regt* vol i, 1950 and Lt Col M E S Laws, *Battery Records of the R A 1716-1859*,1952.

18 Thus R Waddington, *La Guerre de Sept Ans*,1904, iii, p 346 who says that the governor of Brittany 'had gathered them' to resist Marlborough. Hotham noted the report that '4 or 5 battalions' had entered the city , with 'more perpetually passing in boats'. But Hotham, like the Duke, loses no opportunity of depicting the situation in the worst light.

19 Information on St Malo from *Encycl Britannica*, 11th ed, 1911, vol xxiv, pp 28-9 and from the Conservateur of the city's Museum, Monsieur Ph Petout, to whom I am greatly indebted. Much tidal information – and much hospitality – has kindly been provided by the editor of the *North Biscay Pilot*, Mr Nicholas Heath. Rooke's statement is in Burchett, *Complete History of the Most Remarkable Transactions at Sea*, 1720, pp 472-3.

20 Maj Gen B P Hughes, *British Smooth Bore Artillery*, 1969, Table 1, shows that the muzzle velocity of a 24-pdr's shot fell to a residual velocity of 70% at 500 yards and under 50% at 1000 yards; smaller guns were even less effective. An 8-inch brass mortar weighing 4 cwt could lob a 46lb shot 1600 yards (Table 4).

21 Information from M Petout who also kindly provided a sketch-map of the water pipeline

22 Entick, iii,p 89 and fn; Corbett, i, p 277.

23 For the officer of dragoons see Entick,iii, p 94 fn; the reference to the other source I have unfortunately mislaid.

24 The proclamation is in Entick, iii, p 83 fn.

25 The position on food and forage needs is taken from D G Chandler's *Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough*,1976, pp 14-16 . I am indebted to him also for much background material on this aspect of campaigning.

26 Colonel Hotham and Sgt Porter independently arrive at very similar totals. I suspect that the RWF sergeant, a worthy ancestor of the phlegmatic Pte Frank Richards of that regiment, was not greatly impressed by the 'risks' run.

27 It is difficult to gain any definite idea of the French strength. Porter spoke of a regiment of cavalry and an artillery regiment being on the far side of Dol; Hotham of 7000 men advancing from Granville into Brittany; Marlborough spoke of 'about 10,000 regular troops' in his letter to Pitt of 11 June 1758. Waddington, iii, p 349 writes of the French in Brittany three months later (September) as comprising 22 battalions of line, 3 of militia, some Invalid companies and a dragoon regiment, but this force included the Brest, Belleisle, L'Orient and St Malo garrisons (the latter of two battalions). The mobile force he estimates at 10,000 men and 13 cannon.

28 Middleton is wrong in thinking that Clerk, whose role at Rochefort and later at St Cast was so unfortunate, was QMG at St Malo; his second chance came only when Watson went to Germany. How good soldiers rated the various theatres can be seen from Wolfe's comment at the time of his appointment for Quebec in December 1758: 'If I followed my own taste, it would lead me into Germany', while in the same month G A Elliot wrote of Wolfe's appointment: 'At all events, 'tis better than Scotch quarters or an ill-digested project on the coast of France'. (Beccles Willson, 402-3,409;)

29 Even before Marlborough's fatal illness in late 1758 at least one eyewitness account (*A Journal*) had been published.

30 *A Journal*, p 50. It may be argued that food shortages made prompt evacuation necessary – and so long after the event who shall say? But the horses, train and some of the men could have departed, leaving a smaller garrison, possibly supplied from Jersey, to hold out for a while at least.

31 So thought the then Major Peter Young, 3 Commando, in December 1942 according to his marginal note in my copy of Fortescue.

32. The evidence in the *Calendars of State Papers Domestic* for the years 1693–95 shows that a considerable amount of information concerning St Malo's defences was collated from merchants, travellers and others passing in and out of Brittany with laissez-passers or on prisoner exchange. Had all such sources dried up by the 1756 war?

33 Corbett, i, pp 282-3.

THE TILT-YARD

Andrew Gordon's Rules of the Game

Spartacus

In his book *The Rules of the Game – Jutland and British Naval Command*,[1] Andrew Gordon provides a fascinating insight into the relationship between new communications technology and procedures on the one hand, and doctrine and military effectiveness on the other. Although the book considers flag signalling supported by Morse wireless telegraphy, his conclusions seem equally appropriate to battlefield digitization.

Gordon concludes with 28 *'syndromes'*, which are listed verbatim below. The reader is invited to form his own conclusions.

The Author (and the Editor) are grateful to Andrew Gordon and John Murray (Publishers) for their kind permission to publish the following extracts.

1 In times of peace, empirical experience fades and rationalist theory takes its place.

2 The advent of new technology assists the discrediting of previous empirical doctrine.

3 The purveyors of new technology will be the most evangelizing rationalists.

4 Rationalism, unlike empiricism, tends to assume an accretion of vested interests.

5 The training establishment may try to ignore short bouts of empirical experience to preserve its *'rationalist'* authority.

6 Military cultures impart doctrine by corporate ambience as much as by explicit teaching.

7 In long periods of peace, *'ambient'* doctrine may be no more than the habits of the years in which war has been forgotten.

8 If doctrine is not explicitly taught, vested interests will probably ensure that wrong doctrine is ambiently learnt.

9 In peacetime, doctrine is vulnerable to commandeering by *'systems lobbyists'*.

10 Innovations adopted in accordance with peacetime doctrine, may lock the Fleet into both systems and doctrine which will fail the empirical test of war.

11 Purveyors of technical systems will seek to define performance criteria and trials conditions.

12 A service which neglects to foster a conceptual grasp of specialized subjects, will have too few warriors able to interrogate the specialists.

13 The volume of traffic expands to meet capacity.

14 Signals *'capacity'* tends to be defined by how much the senior end can transmit, rather than by how much the junior end can conveniently assimilate.

15 Signals' prioritizing mechanisms become dislocated in times of overload.

16 Incoming traffic can act as a brake on decision-making.

17 The more signals, the more the sun shines on signallers.

18 The *'centre'* must subject its own transmissions to the strictest self-denying ordinance.

19 Signalling promotes the centralization of authority.

20 There is an inverse law between robust doctrine and the need for signalling.

21 Heavy signalling, like copious orders, is symptomatic of doctrinal deficiency.

22 The promise of signalling fosters a neglect of doctrine.

23 War-fighting commanders may find themselves bereft of communications facilities on which they have become reliant in peacetime training.

24 Properly disseminated doctrine offers both the cheapest and the most secure command-and-control method yet devised by man.

25 Every proven military incompetent has previously displayed attributes which his superiors rewarded.

26 Peacetime highlights basic *'primary'* skills to the neglect of more advanced, more lateral *'secondary'* abilities, the former being easier to teach, easier to measure, and more agreeable to superiors. [Comment: here *'primary'* skills include relatively concrete subjects such as navigation, gunnery and signalling. *'Secondary'* skills are more abstract, such as tactical skill, or leadership]

27 The key to efficiency lies in the correct balance between organization and method.

28 Doctrine draws on the lessons of history.

NOTE

1 John Murray, London 1996. ISBN 0-7195-5542-6. Also see the author's 'Ratcatchers and Regulators at the Battle of Jutland', in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds) *Challenges of High Command in the Twentieth Century*, Occasional Paper No 38, SCSI, Watchfield, 1999.

(We would only add in comment on the wisdom set out above, a recommendation that the reader takes the Syndromes in their order, rather than picking out individual items that appeal; there is a development of ideas as one progresses through the list. – Ed)

Gongs

[redacted]

THIS PIECE STARTED WHEN SJ BOUGHT HIS DAY OLD copy of *The Times* (2 August) from a bookshop in Caussade in south west France, just north of Toulouse. Following a telephone conversation with Carbuncle, pen was put to paper on the table of a small café by the war memorial in Montpezat de Quercy. When I wrote on the subject of Gallantry awards in *BAR* 127 (Summer 2001) I did not anticipate that I would have the temerity to return to the subject; certainly not so soon after.

According to *The Times*, a senior civil servant, in MOD, proposes that the Military Cross and the Distinguished Flying Cross should be replaced by the Distinguished Service Cross which has been the similar award for the Royal Navy.

SJ prides himself in keeping cool, avoiding becoming a minor Color [redacted]but, despite this, his first reaction was indeed Blimpish. *'How dare a tidy minded civil servant, zealous for change, interfere in what is essentially family business'.* With the greatest respect, this is a matter for our beloved Queen, her sailors, soldiers and airmen.

A further SJ prejudice then reared its head. *'The Times has probably made a mountain out of a molehill'*, confirming his deep distrust of the media, even the illustrious *Times*. The report also mentioned *'Progressives in MOD'*. This aroused his contempt for those barbarian architects of change for change's

sake. Are there now so few sensitive and thoughtful people left with hearts that understand what an important part sentiment plays in the lives of our fighting soldiers? Has everything, however inappropriate, got to be weighed, measured, costed and rationalised? This assault borrowed from the tidy realm of management accountants is, no doubt, cost effective but lacks all style, subtlety and humanity. There is simply no room for this sort of thing in the inspirational world of leading men and women.

Few outside the Armed Services (and not that many within) truly understood our awards system, which like our Parliamentary system, grew up piecemeal and contained some anomalies but developed its own extraordinary subtlety and diversity. That the present system of Gallantry awards, particularly for the Army, is far from satisfactory we do not dispute. To a great extent this has arisen due to John Major's ill-conceived interference when, at a stroke, he disposed of the highly prized DCM, MM and also the very useful and kindly BEM. Surely gallantry awards are not a matter for politicians? What efforts were made to restrain a Prime Minister from using our awards system to polish his egalitarian credentials?

Our view is that the system should admit past mistakes – big ones – and reinstate the DCM, MM and BEM thus returning the MC, et al, to their traditional function. Our soldiers understood and respected the old order even if a most ungracious and niggardly economy existed in awarding them.

We doubt if most politicians appreciate that awards to officers differ from those to their NCOs and soldiers. Whereas the DCM and MM represented recognition of pure gallantry, the MC (under the old dispensation), although rewarding an officer's coolness under fire, very often took leadership and command factors into consideration. However junior, the young platoon commander inevitably gains his MC for winning his tiny battles or leading successful patrols – and in this characteristic lies a difference between the MC and the third level awards in the other Services.

There is a further aspect that is rarely understood by those without battle experience – and that now includes practically all politicians. In the Army, circumstances which lead to a citation being written vary enormously. Add to these, the different requirements of both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force and you will discover what a complex and sensitive subject the matter of gallantry awards has become over the last eighty years. SJ has no doubts that the span of awards for WW2 satisfied most of the Army's requirements. For obvious reasons, he is unwilling to speak for RN and RAF, although, according to *The Times* report their senior officers leave us in no doubt about their views about this civil servant's bright idea. Also bearing in mind the present workload on those serving in MOD, it suggests to us that our civil servant should not waste his time giving thought to this matter.

We both particularly regret the demise of the DCM and MM. The Warrant Officers and NCOs certainly considered them to signify a kindly and appreciative *'pat on the back'* from their Monarch; years later to be proudly worn on Remembrance Sunday, at Regimental functions and to be lovingly kept in a dressing table drawer. These awards constituted a direct link between their Monarch and the Serjeants' and Corporals' messes and the barrack room too. Sharing the Military Cross with their officers does not have the same cachet, whatever our politicians might mistakenly think. And one keeps coming back to the fact that the MC is a *'leadership'* award whilst the DCM and MM tended to be awarded for acts of bravery pure and simple.

High esteem for the BEM has to a great extent been damaged by the Whitehall cynics who branded it their *'tea lady's medal'*, losing sight of the fact that until the institution of The Queen's Gallantry Medal in 1974, any level of the Order of the British Empire (though normally only up to CBE) could be awarded for gallantry.[1] SJ knows an ex-WREN who was awarded it for pulling an unconscious Fleet Air Arm pilot from a blazing crashed Swordfish. Incidentally, her husband has an MC and Bar, so that couple certainly pulled their weight in WW2. Admittedly with little confidence, I trust that some Whitehall cynic will read this and will feel suitably ashamed. In my experience, cheap comments invariably cause damage and hurt. The fact is that the BEM provided an excellent mark of appreciation for junior ranks which is now no longer available for a thoughtful commanding officer to initiate – and it is common knowledge that the the loss is not being offset by an adequate rate of award of the MBE.

Now we come to the Mention in Dispatches, which has always seemed to hover between a commendation and an award. Surely what is required is an award similar to the Iron Cross 2nd Class, with a medal, a ribbon and an affix to put after the recipients name. MID – there is no need to change the name. Two of SJ's NCOs, [redacted] and [redacted] got the MID, almost certainly in both cases as near misses – or downgrading – for the MM which they both so richly deserved.

Armed Services aiming for a truly purple approach should not seek the grey uniformity of accountants' solutions. They should encourage a diversity of awards that offer distinction to those privileged to wear them.

NOTE

1 See Brigadier Stuart Ryder, 'The Order of the British Empire: Former Gallantry Aspects', *BAR* 120, December 1998, p 57; and Major General Edward Fursdon, 'Order of the British Empire Gallantry Awards', *BAR* 121, April 1999.



Correspondence

Command and Control

Sir,

I read [redacted]'s article *'A Year observing Command and Control'* with much interest and a great deal of agreement: on the matter of rank and age; and on those of hierarchies and numbers of staff.

When I was GOC 3 Division, a circular arrived from the War Office suggesting that, to keep up with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, certain staff jobs should be upgraded: Brigade Majors to Lieutenant-Colonel and GSOs1 (and I think also AA & QMGs) of divisions up to full Colonel.

In forwarding it to my subordinates, I stated that I did not agree: that it would only result in older officers in these important posts, reducing the opportunities for good young ones to take responsibility and gain experience early. I was sensitive on the issue, having been GSO1 of 7th Armoured Division at the battles of Alam el Halfa and El Alamein in 1942 at the age of 27. I pointed out that, at the Battle of Waterloo, which was the last for both of them, Wellington and Napoleon were the same age, only 46. One of my brigade commanders was David Fraser, who, in his reply, said that he appreciated my point of view, but would point out that the General whose intervention in the battle was decisive, Blücher, was not only over 70, but had been rolled on by his horse the day before!

On the question of hierarchies and size of staff: when I was GSO2(Ops) of HQ 30th (Armoured) Corps in the desert in 1941 and 1942, there was no GSO1 between the three GSO2s (Ops, Int & SD – all in our twenties) and the BGS. This worked perfectly satisfactorily (except in the second half of 1942 when the BGS was useless and by-passed by both the Commander & the GSO2s). What was needed was enough watch-keepers in that rank. GSO2(SD) was often away for long periods with the commander. I calculated that, between 27 May 1942, when Rommel attacked towards Tobruk, and early July, when we got back to the El Alamein line, I averaged about 2 1/2 hours sleep a day, which meant many nights without sleep, and one is not at one's best in that condition.

Above all, deputy commanders must be avoided. Nothing must get between the commander and his chief of staff. I have served under US Armoured Divisions where there were deputy commanders. They were either miserable or a nuisance, or both. They were introduced into our armoured brigades after Operation CRUSADER in the desert in November 1941, on the grounds that it was needed to allow the commander to get some sleep. They did not prove necessary and became a haven for promoted COs of armoured car regiments. I found an elderly cavalry colonel installed as one when I took over command of 4th Armoured Brigade in the middle of a battle in Normandy, its previous commander having been killed. Sensibly the colonel had not attempted to exercise operational command, but left it to the senior CO. He left very soon afterwards to sighs of relief from all, including himself.

House of Lords
Aug 01

Field Marshal Lord Carver
GCB,CBE, DSO, MC

Sir,

Thank you for sight of Field Marshal Lord Carver's letter. It seems some things don't change! My article also created some interest in another area – it was mentioned at the September meeting of the Army Doctrine Committee. To paraphrase Andy Warhol, even officers of the King's Regiment should have their 15 minutes of fame! As you know, I now work in the Command Development Branch at DCD&D. The challenge now is to make concrete deductions from some of the observations in *'A Year Observing Command and Control'* to include those deductions in doctrine, and inform force development.

I would like to make one related point here. We have just let the contract for BOWMAN and Stage 2 of Digitization. The system we are buying will require more manpower: mostly systems and information managers. However, if the Information Revolution is to deliver real benefits, it must bring some real, tangible change. We must consider what that change should be, and how to deliver it. To my mind, it should allow HQs to be much smaller, and to have much faster decision-action times. I believe that that is what we want from a fully-digitized C2 system. Therefore those aspects form a vision for Stage 3 of Digitization. However, that is but one view. The chal-

lenge is to explore that view, validate it, compare it with alternatives and (if appropriate) implement it.

Upavon [redacted]
Sep 01 *DGD&D*

Dress

Sir,

I readily agree with the thrust of [redacted]tter (BAR Issue 127, Summer 2001) on Medals and Orders of Dress. I always considered No2/Service Dress a rather uninspired, lacklustre uniform, but at least it was a dedicated parade dress. Regimental accoutrements brighten it up a little, but of course this is hard luck on the corps. Now even this drab uniform appears to be dying out.

I was surprised to learn that a gunner SNCO recently posted into my unit has had his No2 Dress, along with the other ORs of his regiment, withdrawn. When asked what the parade dress for the regiment was, *"CS95"* was the answer. He explained that all No2 Dress is being withdrawn. I have seen CS95 worn at parades, but assumed this was local aberration. I well remember Allied Forces Day parades in Berlin, when the British and French contingents marched down the boulevard, in parade dress, followed by the Americans in their *'BDU'* [1] and thinking it would never happen to us; regrettably, how in error I was!

I also remember the trials for a new parade dress in the Seventies. The option favoured by the soldiers was a pattern trialled by 1 PWO, a bottle green uniform worn with a white shirt and dark tie, very similar in fact to the Canadian uniform. I was not really surprised when the MOD made its choice – a *'new'* No2 pattern that, spookily, could be worn alongside the existing pattern, which would be merely wasted out. The new pattern was in fact cheap and tawdry. The fact that it was designed to be worn without a belt meant that when, inevitably, belts were worn on parade, they never sat properly. Once again, the soldier's self respect had been sacrificed on the altar of economy.

Prior to the First World War there was an abundance of colourful parade/walking out uniforms associated with regiments and corps, and associated with their regimental histories. These were uniforms the men could and did, wear with pride:

> *I carried my slops to the tailor; I sez to 'im, 'None o' your lip!*
> *You tight 'em over the shoulders, an loose 'em over the 'ip...'* [2]

On marching off in 1914 to war, the Contemptibles handed in their fine kit, with the promise of its return after the war. Their heirs are still waiting for it. Instead they ended up with brown SDs and then BDs which ultimately evolved into No 2 Dress, the only sop to regimental tradition in the uniform itself, less accoutrements, being the No 1 Dress hat – surely a case of mixed dress? Of course, ceremonial troops retained their peacock hues, the Household Division and King's Troop RA for example. Scottish regiments also, with the tartan and Highland dress managed to retain a fair degree of distinction. I was in London on one occasion escorting some foreign officers on a *'cultural programme'*. Naturally, it is considered de rigueur to show the Changing of the Guard on such occasions. Fortunately my former battalion, 1 RRW were demonstrating to the Guards how drill should be done in what was (naturally) a faultless performance. Imagine my feelings on hearing members of the crowd around us registering their disappointment and disapproval at the fact that *"they are not wearing red jackets and bearskins"*! (Even though they were well turned out in their pool No 1s).

So much for parade/ceremonial dress and on to other budgetary limitations imposed on service clothing during the last thirty years of my army service. When I enlisted into the Intelligence Corps in February 1971, barrack dress for us recruits consisted of an OG like fatigue tunic and trousers, the much-maligned KF shirts, DMS boots and 37 pattern canvas gaiters, blancoed. In addition we were issued with greatcoats, raincoats, olive drab combat suits, a thin pullover and No2 Dress. Belt was 37 pattern, blancoed. The fatigue tunics were never worn, normal barrack dress was the trousers and gaiters with shirtsleeve order or pullover order as appropriate (to the calendar of course, not the weather, some things never change). After we had started our trade training, the QM offloaded his surplus BD trousers on to us, and these were authorised for wear around barracks.

The thin pullover was actually, in my opinion, better than the *'jersey, heavy wool'* which replaced it in 1972, since it was much more comfortable in cool as opposed to cold weather. The JHW is usually too warm for active outdoor use in milder weather, and certainly for office wear in this age of central heating. Overall, this form of barrack dress was comfortable and acceptable sartorially. The greatcoat was (and is) an extremely practical garment, being suited for use both around garrison in severe weather, and as a cold weather parade dress, as demonstrated by both the Household Division and the AGC (PRO), or RMP as they themselves prefer to be called. Indeed, they are issued with the standard greatcoat and the more exotic *'Atholl Grey'* for ceremonials. The raincoat or *'flasher mac'* was of course not exactly the height of fashion, but it was very practical, and had the advantage of keeping your legs dry in heavy rain.

In 1971/1972 (the latter for me), there was a major revision of army dress. Out went the olive drab combats, in came DPM. On reporting to the clothing store at Caithness Barracks, Verden, I had to hand in not only my combat suits, but also my greatcoat. My protests were answered with the reply that the quilted gilet issued with the new DPM combats was the greatcoat replacement. Of course, no account was taken of any parade in cold weather; presumably the MOD rationale was that you froze. I think at about this time the 100% synthetic trousers lightweight were introduced.

Whilst at HQ 1 Armoured Division, I was ordered to wear No2 Dress trousers for barrack dress. This meant of course, that at that time of 2 x No 2 Dress per soldier, soldiers in HQs ended up with one set of matching jacket and trousers and one set of very worn trousers with new jacket. Later, the dark green barrack dress trousers came in, solving this problem. Then 37 pattern belts were replaced with the rather cheap and nasty green belts, easier maintenance admittedly, but nonetheless tatty. After several years raincoats were withdrawn, the DPM combat jacket being nominated the *'foul weather barrack dress top coat'*.[1] Of course, this meant mixed dress and wet legs in heavy rain.

The withdrawal of greatcoats and raincoats did in actual fact seriously disadvantage ORs in Berlin. Sector Standing Orders for Visits to East Berlin specifically laid down shirtsleeve order for summer (by the calendar of course), and No2 Dress in winter. Any form of DPM clothing was expressly forbidden, as was the wearing of JHW. RMP and SNCOs were to report anyone seen infringing these regulations. Thus, an other rank, issued only with a DPM combat jacket for foul weather, could expect to freeze in winter in No2 Dress, swelter in a warm early spring or Indian Summer, and get soaked in rain. And of course, similarly suffer in shirtsleeve order. I know several RMP officers who generally disapproved of this policy, but no one challenged it. I personally, on observing soldiers in pullovers or combat jackets, would look the other way. As for myself, having managed to retain a raincoat (ask no questions), and being attached to 2 RMP, been issued with a greatcoat, could legitimately wear these issue items. Officers in any case, being allowed to wear *'service approved topcoats'* in East Berlin, could wear greatcoats, raincoats and even British Warms. Of course, service in Berlin is now history, but it amply demonstrates the problems created by parsimonious accounting methods where cost takes precedence over comfort and self-esteem.

Today, barrack dress trousers have been withdrawn leaving the scruffy CS95 or lightweight trousers for wear around garrison and in offices. Indeed, the latter can now be worn by all ranks with shoes, a sloppy custom practised by officers for many years now. As for bad weather, it is still the combat jacket or goretex jacket. Except of course, that the goretex is designed to be worn under a combat jacket, with no facility to wear rank badges and no attempt at styling. Thus, I need to wear a combat jacket to work in inclement weather, regardless of the ambient temperature. No matter whether I wear combat or goretex jacket, my legs will still get wet as water rolls down from the jacket and/or falls directly on my legs.

Thus in summary, my twofold plea is for a practical and aesthetically appropriate manner of dress for everyday use around camp in all weathers, and a reversal of the policy of sidelining or even withdrawal of No2 Dress. My vision would be for a redesigned parade dress, harking back to traditional regimental patterns (scarlet for the RRW!). This would do much to instil pride and do away with the *'scruffy and undistinguished'* look criticised by Col Deverell; it is difficult to imagine Kipling's refugee from civilian life getting so excited over No2 Dress. To briefly discuss medal ribbons, these could be incorporated into a smart barrack dress, as is the custom in other armies.

Sadly all this is doubtless destined to remain the fond vision of an old soldier, given the modern obsession with *'budget, budget, budget'*[2]

RAF Henlow V [redacted] *N*
Sep 01 *JACIG*

1 Battle Dress Uniform.
2 'Back to the Army Again', *Barrack Room Ballads*, Kipling.

(From time to time we are accused of devoting too much space to dress, medals, and so on. We are unrepentant. Outward and visible signs do matter – and this includes recruiting and retention issues. It used to be the British Army view that wearing DPM combats all the time – and parading in them – was the mark of a banana republic army – Ed)

[redacted] – a Postscript

Sir,

One of the perks of being Director Land Warfare is that you can occasionally wander down the corridor to visit the Editor of BAR. Better still, if he is feeling generous, you may even get sight of the latest [redacted] ring. Sadly, with the last issue of BAR (127), this perk came to an end with the declaration that [redacted] will retire. This redoubtable pair of military thinkers have educated, informed and amused countless readers throughout the long period that they have written in these columns. They are the very epitome of what I think the *British Army Review* is all about, a professional

journal, where writers are quite prepared to present views, sometimes contentious, always well founded and well written, on a whole range of military issues. They will be simply irreplaceable. However, I hope the *'scheme of manoeuvre'* that they have adopted and carried forward will be seen and used by others who are keen to probe the legitimacy of current military thinking, to question so called military truths and revisit our history to rediscover some of our lessons (sometimes painfully) learned. Who knows, if you write something sufficiently stimulating we may yet persuade one or both to come out of retirement, like Frank Sinatra, for another encore. I do hope so, for this journal will surely be the poorer without them.

Upavon
Aug 01

[redacted]

(Though they may have completed their series of organisation/equipment/TTP articles, a duly flattered J&C have not given up on other issues (see the Tilt-Yard). However, they are a little concerned to find that they have adopted something called a 'scheme of manoeuvre'. Having been raised on 'Information, Intention, Method, Adm, and Intercomm', and with Carbuncle regarding 'General Outline' as having done him very well later on, they confess that they find these Americanisms a bit much to absorb – let alone 'adopt'. [redacted]

Adventurous Training and Other Risks

Sir,

With nine months left to serve in the Army, I finish at Regimental level. I would imagine that this is a relatively rare experience at my age, but highly educational! I write to comment on Campaigner's article in the latest BAR (127). I sympathise with the author for despite my best efforts to produce meaningful, imaginative, and at times slightly dangerous training, I find I am constantly beset by the problems encountered by General Hankley- Pirbright.

It surprises me that it took General H-P so long to crunch up to I[redacted]t and his laws. For the whole Army knows of these yet we passively accept ever more restrictions. So who set these laws? Who is the man, or woman, who declare that a once practical exercise is now diluted in a minefield of bureaucratic procedures. Designed to remove impact and form, but leaving just the dreariest of plans.

Perhaps our less fictional Generals should set themselves the task of finding these [redacted] and demand a less soft attitude to our training. Returning the once natural *'Risk Assessment'* from the umbrella stand to the vanguard of military planning – and not just to appease [redacted]

Edinburgh
Oct 01

[redacted] *MBE RA*
105 Regiment RA(V)

Book Reviews

18th Century and Earlier

The Renaissance at War
By Thomas Arnold *(Cassell & Co., £20.00, ISBN 0-304-35270-5)*

Warfare in the Seventeenth Century
By John Childs *(Cassell & Co., £20.00, ISBN 0-304-35289-6)*

These two volumes in Cassell's *History of Warfare* series span the period from 1453 to 1700, which saw a dramatic transformation of European warfare. After almost a millennium in which armoured shock cavalry had dominated combat, the rise of gunpowder artillery and infantry firearms led to an increasing recognition that the future lay with all-arms battlefield teams. Naturally, 16th and 17th Century commanders didn't describe their forces in those terms, but the French and Spanish armies which clashed in the Italian Wars of the early 16th Century routinely combined light and heavy cavalry, pikemen, firearm infantry, close support artillery and engineers. Pontoon bridges and field defences played a vital role in many battles of the period, notably at Ravenna in 1512. Unsurprisingly, this transformation was not a smooth process – lingering medieval notions of honour and glory were still apparent well into the 16th Century. In 1528 and 1536 King Francis I and the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V challenged each other to trial by combat.

The first half of the 250 years covered by these studies saw the greatest technological advances, including the introduction of mobile field artillery and the first flintlocks, both of which were to remain in service with only relatively minor improvements until the mid-19th Century. The developments of the 17th Century were largely refinements of the trends already apparent before 1600. Increasingly sophisticated national economies could support larger armies – the Spanish army fighting the Dutch in the 1590s had a nominal strength of less than 60,000, but a century later, William III could field 120,000 men for his campaign of 1693 against Louis XIV.

Both these volumes are highly recommended as introductions to a fascinating period of military history. Both are full of excellent colour illustrations which give a true period atmosphere, backed up with some equally fine coloured maps. They also include very useful chronologies and biographical notes of the principal monarchs and commanders of the period – features which many other military historians would do well to emulate!

Lutzen 1632, Climax of the Thirty Years War
By Richard Brzezinski (Osprey Publishing, £11.99, ISBN 1-85532-552-7)
Edgehill 1642, First Battle of the English Civil War
By Keith Roberts and John Tincey (Osprey Publishing, £11.99, ISBN 1-85532-991-3)

The fact that these two studies are reviewed jointly should certainly not be taken as any adverse reflection on their quality. It is simply that the lessons of Lutzen and the Thirty Years War in general, had considerable impact on the English Civil War as a result of the stream of publications written by English and Scottish officers who had served in the Dutch and Swedish armies. Many of these went on to serve as senior commanders on both sides in the Civil War, notably the Earl of Essex, Sir Thomas Fairfax, Prince Rupert and Sir Jacob Astley.

The volume on Lutzen is particularly valuable as there are few modern concise accounts in English and 'traditional' descriptions of the battle have often been distorted by over-concentration on Gustavus Adolphus and his death in action. The author has certainly carried out some painstaking research based wherever possible on accounts written by participants in the battle, combined with a careful study of a wide range of prints and paintings. The result is an exceptionally readable study of a complex battle, which does a fine job of piecing together fragmentary and often conflicting evidence.

Whilst Edgehill is a much more familiar battle to British readers, it too has suffered from 350 years' worth of folklore, with the facts further distorted by writers influenced by Royalist or Parliamentarian sympathies. This study makes no pretence of unearthing any startling revelations, but gives a good, concise account of how the raw armies of both sides fought the Edgehill campaign. In common with the Lutzen volume, it contains a wealth of both contemporary and modern illustrations (including some highly atmospheric colour plates). A special mention should be made of the superb quality of the colour maps in both books covering the campaigns as well as the battles themselves. These are indeed *'worth a thousand words'* and are invaluable in clarifying the often complex battlefield manoeuvres.

These volumes provide excellent introductions to two of the important campaigns of the 17th Century and are highly recommended.

Instrument of War, Volume 1 of the Austrian Army in the Seven Years War
By Christopher Duffy *(The Emperor's Press, £45.00, ISBN 1-883476-19-4)*

It is a fair bet that whilst most British readers of military history have at least a passing knowledge of the army of Frederick the Great, they know precious little of the Austrian forces which put up such a fierce fight against him. Christopher Duffy's study admirably fills this gap and counters the popular impression of easy Prussian superiority throughout the Seven Years War.

It is a true tour de force of almost 500 pages, which begins with an excellent introductory survey of the Hapsburg monarchy and the labyrinthine administration of its fragmented empire, which stretched from Ostend to the gates of Belgrade. The heart of the book is a detailed study of the army, with separate chapters devoted to officers, NCOs and ORs, which are followed by equally comprehensive coverage of the infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers. It seems invidious to single out any one part of this outstanding book, but Part 3, *Waging War* gives an unrivalled account of mid-18th Century Austrian battlefield tactics.

The author now faces a real challenge in making the next volume as good as the first, which is representative of modern military history at its best.

Napoleonic Wars

Napoleon's Commanders (1) c1792-1809
By Philip Haythornthwaite and Patrice Courcelle *(Osprey Publishing, £9.99, ISBN 1 84176 055 2)*

This is the first of two volumes of brief biographies of French commanders of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Although concentrating on those individuals who achieved prominence in the period up to 1809, it includes some who survived to have surprisingly long careers. Perhaps the most prominent of these survivors was Marshal Mortier, who had a 20 year career after Waterloo, which included service as ambassador to Russia and minister of war. It was quite an achievement to survive the hazards of the time – during the Revolutionary Wars, French commanders had as much to fear from politicians as the enemy. No less than 55 generals were guillotined during this period! The tactics and weaponry of the day made battlefields as dangerous for commanders as for the rank and file-Marshals Lannes and Bessieres were both killed in action, whilst Oudinot was wounded at least 22 times).

With a total of 26 commanders to cover in only 64 pages, the biographical notes are naturally brief, but they are supplemented by excellent illustrations, including magnificent colour plates of the peacock splendour of the uniforms of the First Empire. Whilst some of the most extravagant versions were toned down on campaign, dress uniforms were truly amazing-the plate depicting General Junot as Colonel-General of Hussars perhaps provides the best example.

This is a useful quick-reference guide to some of the commanders who helped create the Napoleonic legend-the second volume in the series is eagerly anticipated.

19th Century

Eyewitness in the Crimea – The Crimean war letters of Lieutenant Colonel George Frederick Dallas
Michael Hargrave Mawson (ed) *(Greenhill Books, NPG, ISBN 1-85367-450-8)*

The 137 letters of George Frederick Dallas to his family provide a very human and personal record of the operations in the Crimea. From the point of view of an infantry company off7icer and subsequently an ADC on the staff of General Garrett (nicknamed *"General Chaos"*) commanding the 2'd Division.

He begins his campaign, his first, as a Lieutenant, full of enthusiasm for the war and afraid that he would arrive too late too take part in the operations (*"thank heavens we are in time"; "we were afraid we should be too late"*). This was quickly replaced with *"a more dreadful position you cannot conceive than where our camp is placed, close to the field of Battle, dead and dying on every side"*. He proceeds to record the activities of himself and those around him giving not only a soldiers view of the operations but also a detailed insight into the social conditions of the army in the Crimea. As an infantry officer personally involved in battle, including the Inkerman, and as a staff officer his insights cover not only the life of the soldiers but a] so the command and direction of operations and the social activities of the generals. He is unstintingly critical in his comments on the administration of the war where neces-

sary, but also sees and records the daily running of operations and of the staff. His writing is interesting- amusing in places and easily read. For those interested in the Crimea or Victorian soldiering generally, this is a very welcome addition.

The book includes an excellent and comprehensive biographical index of those mentioned by Dallas. Although there is no general index the Chronology provided allows reference to the major events witnessed. The maps provided are all contemporary and illustrate the letters well, though a single general modern map of the campaign would have been a useful addition for those not well aquainted with the geography of the area and the changed place names. Amongst the illustrations are a number of photographs of the battlefields as they are today..

Battle Tactics of the American Civil War
By Paddy Griffith *(Crowood Press, £9.99, ISBN 1-86126-460 7)*

This is a very welcome revised edition of a volume which was first published in 1989. The author has made a good job of his thesis that *'....claims for the influence of technology on the Civil War battlefield are, to say the least, anachronistic and exaggerated. They have more to do with late twentieth century habits of thought than with the military realities of the 1860s. As in so many other eras of military history, in fact, it transpires that human factors such as training and doctrine – or the lack of them – exerted a much greater underlying influence upon the outcome than did the precise specifications of the weaponry in use.'*

The assessments of the convoluted evolution of both armies and their command and control are generally well-argued. This is especially true of the psychological impact of the initial Confederate victories in the eastern theatre, which acted as a significant force multiplier until the tide began to turn in the aftermath of Gettysburg. Another key point is the failure of both sides to create a specialised all arms reserve force akin to the Imperial Guard of the First Empire, or even a battlefield heavy cavalry. The author points to the repulse of Pickett's charge as a point at which Lee's army could have been destroyed if the Union had been able to launch *'a massed charge of cuirassiers'*. Gettysburg and earlier battles are full of other incidents where such forces might have been equally decisive, notably the chaotic Union retreat after First Bull Run. In this case, an effective Confederate cavalry pursuit could have turned the *'Great Skedaddle'* into a rout which might have ended the war.

There are some excellent analyses of the impact of the widespread use of the rifled musket and the introduction of early rifled artillery on the battlefields of the Civil War, with the author making a compelling case for his argument that they produced little more than minor improvements over Napoleonic performance.

This thought-provoking study is highly readable and should certainly be on the reading list for all American Civil War battlefield tours.

The Great War

Forgotten Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities
Gary Sheffield *(Hodder Headline, £20.00, ISBN 0-7472-7157-7)*

'Forgotten' or *'Still Unacknowledged'*? It is a depressing fact that the revisionist, or post-revisionist historian of the Great War still has to overcome a mass of folk myth before being able to deploy rational argument as to the whys and wherefores, or even the facts, of that conflict. One would hope that BAR readers mostly hold to the view that although a lot went wrong in the execution of the war, it was better managed than the public view would allow; and that like most wars, although it were been better that it had not come to pass, in the circumstances of August 1914 the British Government could not have stayed on the sidelines.

I have used the term *'post-revisionist'* above and I hope that the author will not have any problems with the descriptor. In my view, a post-revisionist treatment of the Great War is one which approaches the conflict with normal historical objectivity; perhaps Paul Fussell's line on its *'unique'* nature has been allowed to dictate a suspension of the rules. But as the war can now be fairly said to have dropped below the memory horizon, there is no remaining justification for treating it as any sort of special case – though I would deny the necessity in the first instance.

Gary Sheffield's book is not a blow by blow history of the war. Its scope is limited in the main to the Western Front, and to the doings of the Empire and the American forces in that theatre. It is more concerned with the how and why rather than the what, but in the military rather than the political or industrial dimensions. The author is concerned with the dual requirements of relating the war to its context, and fitting it into present-day thought processes.

The book deals with topics rather than chronology, and has something of the feel of one of the many collections which have appeared in recent years, with the difference that having one author produces a far greater consistency of treatment and continuity than can be produced by even the best of editors. Sheffield tackles problem of popular perception head-on in his first chapter (beginning with Blackadder and including a glorious gaffe by the present Deputy Prime Minister, placing the generals' châteaux behind the ***enemy*** lines), relating *'futility'* to disillusionment with post-war conditions, and drawing an interesting parallel with American attitudes to the Vietnam War. His treatment of the origins of the war concludes that there was a will to war in the German leadership from 1912 and that the Versailles *'war guilt'* clause was in principle correct. British involvement was inevitable if Germany were to establish herself on the Belgian (or, for that matter, the French) coast. And, inevitably, Britain could not ignore a potential major shift in the balance of power.

The next chapter is an exposition of the development of total war, which for once includes a brief mention of the implications of the secret treaties granting Constantinople and the Dardanelles to Russia, and lays stress on the importance of Wilson's vision of the world *'made safe for democracy'*. Sheffield then grasps the nettle – British strategy – concluding that no real set of other options existed (he glosses over the disaster which was Turkish commitment to the Central Powers). He stresses the contribution of sea power to Allied victory – there is insufficient space here to debate this vital factor, but I think he is insufficiently critical of Royal Navy performance, particularly with regard to the U-boat threat, though the . There follows a chapter on the evolution of trench warfare in 1914–15, followed by a study of Haig and the BEF which in the case of the Commander-in-Chief is guardedly positive, and of his troops and their equipment less guardedly so. A chapter on the Somme campaign stresses the learning process undergone by the British Army, and also the hammering sustained by the German – something that although emphasised by John Terraine, is all too often glossed over by British authors.

In folk-lore, 1917 is the year of Passchendaele. Sheffield calls it *'the year of the set-piece'* and it is difficult to argue with his contention. In 1917, the effectiveness of British

artillery/infantry TTPs and platoon-based infantry tactics was proved, while at Cambrai the effectiveness of predicted fire in achieving surprise was at least as important as the use of massed tanks. As for Third Ypres, the author stresses the abnormality of the 1917 weather, and suggests that the failure at Poelcapelle should have signalled the end of the battle. For 1918, he presses all the right buttons, though I am coming round to the idea that the Hundred Days -- particularly as regards human factors – are a lot more complicated than we are accustomed to think. The 1918 chapter also includes an extended analysis of the AEF contribution to victory.

The final chapter of the book deals with the aftermath, the rights and wrongs of the peace settlement, and the consequences. Given that the main concern of the book is the war against Germany, the fact that the emphasis here is on the Versailles Treaty is understandable, but as regards the seeds of the next conflict I feel that the St Germain settlement – far more draconian in its dismemberment of the Empire than was the Versailles treatment of Germany – ought to be given a much higher profile, both here and generally. Sheffield considers that the framers of Versailles should have read their Machiavelli, and inflicted either an all-out crushing of Germany or a very mild settlement giving the Weimar regime the best possible start. The latter being incompatible with the wishes of the electorates, the solution adopted was neither the one thing nor the other, giving Germany (and her apologists) enough to whinge about while leaving her in fact less hindered than was apparent on the surface.

The book is rounded off with an appendix covering events in other theatres, and a further reading list. It is thoroughly researched and heavily referenced, so it is more for the academic, than the the general reader; this is a pity because the treatment is actually very accessible, the ideas are thought-provoking, and the narrative fairly rattles along. The grown-up Big Book of the Great War aimed at converting the populace to a balanced view is still waiting to be written, but (verb sap) this would make a very good basis for it. Meanwhile, one hopes that a new generation of history students will take to heart the messages contained here.

Pessimism and British War Policy 1916-18
Brock Millman *(Frank Cass, NPG, ISBN 0-7146-5079-X)*

This is an account of geopolitics and grand strategy, of misappreciation, roguery, opportunism and, occasionally, integrity. It deals with the greatest issues, yet cannot be in any way be accused of being a rarified academic treatise. In fact, the narrative cracks along like a high-class political novel (that is intended as a compliment)

Millmann defines his aim as not to provide a comprehensive rewriting of the history of the second half of the war, but to answer, in outline and with a view to stimulating more detailed study, the questions *'why pessimism?' 'Who were the pessimists?' 'What revisions of grand strategy did they produce?' 'What effect did this have on British conduct of the war?'* and *'What were the consequences for post war reality?'* It has to be said that the *'outlines'* are much more than sketches.

The argument of the book is that the Somme campaign left British policy-makers doubting whether an outright victory (in 1914 terms) could ever be achieved. The U-boat campaign bit into import levels, the competing pressures on manpower for the Army and for industry became ever less reconcilable, and the 1917 fighting in France and Flanders showed no diminution in casualties (the Arras/Bullecourt battles produced the highest daily casualty rates of the war, if prisoners are excluded). In the circumstances, a pessimistic view of Britain's prospects seemed entirely justified.

Three schools of thought emerged. The Westerners (equating to the Haig-Robertson element in the Army), thought that some respectable sort of victory, probably a peace negotiated from a favourable military position, could still be achieved if sufficient resources were concentrated on the Western Front. The defeatists, who included many sailors as well as civilians, considered that by1917 the war was actually lost or at best was being lost, and the solution was to get the least worst settlement at the earliest possible date. A variant of this school saw the cost of any form of victory as excessive, and again advocated an early finish; better to lose gracefully in 1917 than pay the price of *'winning'* in 1919. Lloyd George and the middle school, the 'New Easterners', unwilling to commit to either extreme but seriously pessimistic, sought a solution by a complete reworking of strategy. Their aim was to continue fighting to achieve a tolerable peace but on a new paradigm – by building a substantial military structure in the Near and Middle East and liquidating the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires (the first always an aspiration of the British Liberal Party -- to the great detriment of Britain's interests). This, it was posited, would impose pressure on Germany which might be sufficient to bring about a favourable settlement, or as a worst case to permit the relaunching of a peripheral war, accepting German success in the West. This was seen as bringing about an advantageous drawn outcome sometime in a 1919-21 timeframe. After this a period of internal upheavals across the Western world was foreseen, which would have a more debilitating effect on Germany than the UK. War would be resumed on a purely Britain versus Germany basis, which given Germany's weakened state, Britain would win.

The shift to the *'New Eastern'* policy was opposed by the Westerners and effectively delayed by the expert Whitehall warrior, Robertson, though his influence was nearly extinguished by late 1917 -- some months before he was dégommé and replaced by Henry Wilson, enthusiastic New Easterner/opportunist. Its rationale was destroyed by the unexpected successes of late1918 – but Haig's chronic manning problems in that year were to a large extent the result of a manpower plan designed to meet the requirements of the 1919 campaigns and armaments programme.

The rationale had been destroyed and the implementation delayed, but nevertheless not only was much of the structure for the New Eastern strategy in place by the end of 1918, but the destruction of the empires was already taking place. Despite the fact that from the death of Franz Josef in 1916 the new Emperor Karl was doing his damnedest to extract the Dual Monarchy from the war, the Allies gave greater weight to the possibility of extracting a few Czech divisions for the Western Front from a broken Empire, and to the blessings of self-determination, than to a negotiated settlement which would have left the Empire in being. The result was the between-wars Eastern Europe of immature mini-states, the Anschluss, and in the longer term the current disintegration (Macedonia - that's a nation-state?). Millman holds to the view that there can be no stability in south-eastern Europe without a major state to underpin it, a position with which this reviewer finds himself totally in agreement.

The necessity for the Near/Middle East deployments had departed with the German defeat, and the military effort required, sustainable in war (though at the expense of the truly decisive theatre) was entirely beyond the capability of a Britain which did not have the resources or the

will (which if forthcoming might have generated the resources) to don the mantle of superpower – which was there for the taking. Nevertheless some attempt was made. The commitments in Russia succeeded only in antagonising the Bolsheviks while failing to bring them down (Millman does not mention that this also destroyed any chance of repayment of those Russian loans). Despite eventual withdrawal from Russia and Persia, Britain retained deployments in Egypt, Sudan, Cyprus, Aden, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and the Gulf, and with these the burden of conflicting promises; promises rashly or cynically made, and not intended for keeping while a massive British presence was seen as remaining indefinitely in the region. The fallout from these expressions of bad faith continues. However, he suggests that the territorial base established at in 1918-19 permitted the development of the Middle Eastern/Mediterranean strategy of the Second World War – a peripheral strategy having much in common with the ideas of the New Easterners. Opinions may differ as to whether this was a good or a bad thing.

British policy in the second half of the Great War was determined in the absence of one essential input – reliable intelligence as to the true measure of German national fighting power. The result was a massive over-estimation as to German capability, a failure to identify the developing hollow centre of the German war machine. It was this which led to the collapse of belief in outright victory in the main theatre, and to adoption of the policy intended to develop a position in the Near and Middle East from which Germany could be fought in a second world war following a compromise peace, a position which would also provide a block against German or Bolshevik threats to India. During 1918 the purity of this policy was diluted, as it became apparent that the application of American manpower and the matériel coming out of British and American factories could produce a result in the West in 1919 or 1920. However, the decision to go East had been made. The German collapse in 1918, the victory achieved by Haig and his commanders, as the author puts it, in defiance of grand strategy – and, one might also say, by stealth – left the British with their Eastern commitments in place. What had happened was a classic illustration of the importance of the fighting power concept – attrition had left the Heer apparently strong on a count-the-divisions basis but desperately weakened in qualitative terms outside the Stosstrupp formations. Haig and his barons were getting a feel for this effect as the tide turned in April 1918; by the end of June this was gelling into confidence, and after Amiens it rapidly became conviction. It was this conviction, continuously justified by events on the ground, which left the leaders of the BEF so far in advance of thinking in London in the late summer and autumn of 1918.

Millman suggests that there are no villains in this story; the New Eastern policy was a defensible reaction to the pessimistic assessment of the 1917 situation, even if it was not the only course available. He presents Lloyd George and the New Easterners as prisoners of events; however, in my view there is a villain, *'Henri'* Wilson. There is something macabrely comic in the picture of Henri, arch-architect of the British Western Front commitment but new-found supporter of Lloyd George's ideas, scheming with all the enthusiasm of the convert for the post of CIGS as Robertson's grasp on it weakened.

This book is brimming with ideas, and it has been possible in this review to highlight only a small proportion. You may not find yourself in agreement with all of Millman's thinking, but I will guarantee that any student of the Great War will come away stimulated.

Managing Domestic Dissent in First World War Britain
Brock Millman *(Frank Cass, £45.00 ISBN 0-7146-5054-4 HB, £18.50, ISBN 0 7146-8105-9 PB)*

'Placed in a room without windows and only one door, Lloyd George could normally identify three or four possible exits.'

The revisionist school of historians and commentators on the Great War has tended to demonize Lloyd George for his handling of the military leadership, particularly Robertson and Haig. It needs to be emphasised that Lloyd George was as dedicated as any soldier to achieving a satisfactory outcome to the war – after all, he had assumed the Premiership as the man who could win it. Winning this new form of war called for the application of the Principles of War not only in the operational theatres but on the home front - notably Security and Maintenance of Morale. The problem was not only the maintenance of war production – though this was a major consideration – but also the breakdown of the will to go on supporting the war. Leaving the United States out of consideration as a newcomer, all the major combatants suffered from home front war-weariness. In the case of Russia and Austro-Hungary internal collapse was more significant than defeat in the field in bringing the empires down; in the case of Germany, it is difficult to separate out the military and home front elements in the national collapse. Among the Allies, Italy was having to be propped up from the end of 1917. Britain and France survived, Britain in the better shape. Significantly, Britain's mechanisms for internal control were the least formalised and the least severe of any of the major powers. After the war, one prominent dissenter, Snowden, was moved to put on record his appreciation of the amount of freedom allowed, and his surprise.

There were, essentially, three strands of dissent which applied throughout the war, and a fourth which became more apparent in the latter stages. The first three were: politically-based conviction pacifism/objection; religious ditto; and organised labour's objection to conscription and control/direction of the civilian workforce. The fourth strand is the re-emergence of the socio-political divisions which had made the period immediately before the war one of the most politically turbulent in modern British history. Subdued by the genuine surge of support for the war in its first two years, as disillusionment set in the threat posed by left-wing extremist solutions allied to the traditional concerns of organized labour became very real. By 1918 the possibility of an attempted Bolshevik revolution was being taken very seriously; Millman makes a credible case for the proposition that the retention of sizable manoeuvre forces in the home islands in 1918 was driven by the need for a substantial coercive force against civil unrest rather than the threat of invasion or Lloyd George's manpower vendetta against Haig. In London, the war was seen as going on at best into 1919 and possibly longer, with the likelihood of unrest increasing. The unlooked-for victory in 1918 had more than the obvious effects; its timeliness was emphasised by an attempted rising on Clydeside in January 1919, which was suppressed before it could get going by the deployment of a six-brigade military force including tanks.

The methodology of control of all dissent was based on minimising direct confrontation between the forces of the state and the dissenters, of whatever background. In this approach, at least until late 1917, there was a large measure of collusion by the dissenting elements themselves - the majority of whom had no desire for open confrontation. The aim of government was not to eliminate dissent but to ensure that its open expression was severely limited. The methods used were various; censorship, some short periods

of imprisonment, but above all the use of unofficial counter-dissent forces, 'patriots', encouraged to break up meetings of dissenting organizations by a hands-off policy on the part of the authorities.

The patriots were an interesting mix, covering almost the whole of the political spectrum from die-hard Tory peers, through discharged and on-leave servicemen to patriot trade unions. Millman expresses disquiet as to where the movement might have developed had the war not ended. Certainly its characteristics had a more than superficial resemblance to right-wing street political groupings of the between-wars period on the Continent. Even more than in the case of the left-wing revolutionaries referred to above, the end of the war removed the rationale for the patriot bully-boy groups. The Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries may have learned something from their example, and the General Strike of 1926 provided a momentary opportunity for some of their elements to reappear, but it was Britain's good fortune never to be brought so far down that the fascist alternative appeared credible – although it is arguable that if the British Union of Fascists had been fully organised by 1930 it might have attracted a larger constituency.

Though the patriot movement may have rapidly died out post-war, while the war lasted it was a difficult beast to control. Lloyd George was in the position of having to keep on-side, if the war effort was maintained, both the forces of organised labour and extreme patriotism, each of which pushed him in a different direction. Millman's view is that this balance could not have been sustained into 1919, and that the form of government which would have ensued would have less legitimacy than the system which just succeeded in lasting the course.

This book is essential to an understanding of the British military effort in the Great War. I came away feeling an emotion which I have not felt before – a degree of sympathy for Lloyd George.

Scots Guard on the Western Front, 1915–18
Wilfred Ewart *(Strong Oak Press, £11.95 (PB), ISBN 1-871048-27-3)*

Despite poor health and eyesight, Wilfred Ewart joined the Scots Guards at the outbreak of war. He went out in February 1915, in time to experience a period of line-holding before Neuve Chapelle, during which he was wounded and evacuated to England. Returning to his battalion in October 1915, he served with them in the Salient and on the Somme, went through 3rd Ypres and the latter stages of Cambrai including the Bourlon Wood battle. He was on leave (he seems to have managed a lot of leave) during the early part of the German Spring 1918 offensive, but returned in late April; laid low with trench fever in June, he was back in the line in August but his war ended with a riding accident in September. Having survived four years of war, his life was ended by a freak accident; in Mexico City in 1923, he was killed on his hotel balcony by a stray bullet from a Saturday night reveller.

This book is memorable for two features. The first is the quality of the descriptive writing - whether dealing with military occasions, the countryside, or French townscapes. Ewart's prose, particularly in his country scenes, recalls the Georgian school of poets. The second is in the minutiae of military matters – minor tactics (artillery formation in use at Neuve Chapelle), dress details (make sure your tunic can be buttoned up to the neck), weapons (a digging party unearths a British Maxim MG converted with a German barrel and lock and brings it back for reconversion), Blighties (sought just as openly by officers as soldiers), and social (a crack about Americans being preferable to Temporary Gentlemen, and some rude remarks about New Army discipline at Bourlon Wood).

Other items of interest are the fact that despite his length of service in France he was called upon to go over the bags only three times – contrasting with the popular view of the war; and his frank admission of being worn out in mid-1918. This is an understated, old-fashioned account of one man's war in a good battalion. I read it at one sitting, held by the quality of the observation and the writing.

A Military Atlas of the First World War
By Arthur Banks *(Leo Cooper, £14.95, ISBN 0-85052-791-0)*

This is a welcome paperback edition of a volume which has been in print for over 25 years. The popularity of this atlas is understandable, as it contains no less than 270 maps, covering the background to the war as well as land, sea and air operations on all fronts.

This diversity is the greatest strength of this study-few other volumes contain whole series of detailed maps on the German and British air offensives, the war at sea and campaigns in Italy, the Balkans, Russia, the Middle East and Africa besides such comprehensive coverage of the more familiar Western Front.

It is only when the author strays from maps into the area of weaponry that any real weaknesses become apparent-quite simply, there is not enough space to include a truly representative selection of weapons with a meaningful assessment of their capabilities and relative merits. The 16 pages of this section would have been better used either for additional maps or to enlarge some of the existing smaller maps.

Despite this criticism, the atlas is excellent 'ready reference' volume for anyone studying the period and would be especially useful in planning battlefield tours.

Second World War

Hitler's Atlantic Wall
By Anthony Saunders (Sutton Publishing, £19.99, ISBN 0-75092-544-2)

Even today, the defences which formed the Atlantic Wall have received relatively little detailed attention from historians, in contrast to the mass of material which has appeared on the Normandy landings. A few specialist volumes have covered them as part of the general history of fortification, but this is one of a small number of publications to examine them in real detail.

The author has clearly put in a tremendous amount of research to ferret out the details of the staggeringly convoluted development of the Atlantic Wall, with protracted infighting between the Heer, Kriegsmarine and the Todt Organisation as each sought to secure resources to meet their conflicting construction priorities. An equal effort has gone into describing and illustrating the details of the bewildering variety of bunkers and casemates which dotted the coastline from the Pyrenees to Norway. This well illustrated study naturally concentrates on the fortifications along the French Atlantic and Channel coasts and includes good summaries of a selection of actions fought to capture some of the key positions.

Whilst the book breaks much new ground, it does have its weaknesses including a garbled account of the technicalities of concrete construction and a tendency to underestimate the value of the defences. This latter point stems from a tendency to judge the fortifications in isolation rather than as a component of an overall defence plan. Undoubtedly, the plan itself was far from perfect, but it is interesting to speculate on what might have happened if Rommel had been allowed to station all of the seven available panzer and panzer grenadier divisions within striking distance of the coast. Nonetheless, this is a fascinating book, which will be especially valuable to anyone preparing a battlefield tour to Normandy.

The Imperial War Museum Book of the War in Italy 1943-45
Field Marshal Lord Carver *(Sidgwick & Jackson, £30.00, ISBN0-283-07924-6)*

The Italian Campaign of World War II seems to be exciting more interest today than ten or fifteen years ago, particularly as battlefield touring becomes ever more popular. It needs to be said, however, that those who take the attractions of the climate into account in choosing to tour Italian battlefields are missing an essential element of the campaign. This is the fact that much of the hardest fighting was conducted in the quite appalling weather conditions found in the Appenines in winter – conditions that led to comparisons with the worst of World War I. The obstacles presented by the rivers also cannot be fully appreciated at summer water levels.

The book follows the pattern of other IWM campaign accounts – liberal use of personal accounts from the IWM archive, introduced, linked, and rounded off by FM Lord Carver's narrative and commentary. The mix, as usual, works very well. The extracts from the archives give the right impression of immediacy and, as always, impress with the articulation and descriptive abilities of the contributors. Lord Carver is, as one might expect, quite prepared to be critical in his inputs. The maps are good and the photographs excellent, but the photo captions bear out the maxim that it is dangerous to take IWM archive captions at face value – the Spitfire is a Kittybomber (P-40), and the Crocodile is a Wasp.

Judgement: was the campaign worth the expenditure of blood and treasure on what was indisputably a diversion? Lord Carver gives an unqualified *'yes'* on the basis of the German strength diverted from the main theatres. My own feeling is that the campaign was essential, but the need for it goes further than the force diversion argument – which, when one takes into account infrastructure and supply commitments, as well as a straight comparison of numbers of divisions engaged, looks less clear cut. The major justification for the campaign, and for carrying it right through to the Venezia, goes beyond strategy to geopolitics. The fact that Anglo-American forces were on hand in Northern Italy at the war's end meant that any Yugoslav advance into Italy and Austria could be contained, and that non-Communist forces were immediately available for the occupation of Western Austria. This had far-reaching consequences for the post-war settlement, including the blocking of a probable Communist takeover in Italy. The continuing existence of a major operational front within the Mediterranean theatre also ensured that substantial forces were available for stabilisation throughout the theatre, eg in Greece.

This is a valuable addition to the literature of the Italian campaign. Recommended.

The Battle of the Hurtgen Forest
Charles Whiting *(Spellmount, £16.99, ISBN 1-86277-094-5)*

The Hurtgen battle – or perhaps it should be referred to as a campaign, for the fighting lasted from September 1944 to February 1945 – is one of the least written-up episodes of the Second World War. This is not surprising; castigated as an unnecessary enterprise by James Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne, it achieved very little, cost a great number of casualties, and left a lot of reputations in tatters. As a result it has been regarded as one of the byways of history, overshadowed by the Ardennes counter-offensive which overlapped it both in time and geography. In fact, one of the crucial events in the Ardennes battle was the collision between the US 2nd ID and 12 SS Panzer Division on 16 17 December - , as the former attacked southward as part of the Hurtgen fighting. This stabilised the northern shoulder of the German penetration and effectively took 12 SS Panzer out of the battle.

This is a reprint of a 1989 first publication which was not reviewed in *BAR*, and is given space here as one of the very limited number of accounts of the Hurtgen fighting. It is, as usual with this author's work, very much geared to the individual human aspects of the story, and the style is, also as usual, strongly blood and guts; in this case, the approach works. Although the tactical picture is difficult to decipher (the mapping is limited), the texture of the fighting comes through very strongly. Essentially, the Hurtgen in autumn and winter combined a jungle-like forest terrain with an extreme example of cold/wet climate. Add expertly emplaced wire, mines and booby-traps, the bunkers of the West Wall, and a lot of defensive firepower, and the result was fifty square miles of Germany that was best left alone and bypassed. Unfortunately Collins, commanding VII Corps and advancing north of the Hurtgen, did not like the idea of leaving a forest full of undisturbed Germans on his right flank. What started as a flank security operation eventually became the *'Roer dams offensive'* which dragged in and shredded eight US infantry and two armoured divisions. The Germans employed just two infantry divisions, consecutively. One of the factors contributing to the early German success in their Ardennes counter-offensive was that two of the divisions holding the American front were there to recuperate from time in the Hurtgen (cf the British divisions on the Chemin des Dames in May 1918).

This was a battle in which non-battle casualties (cold injury, self-inflicted wounds, psychiatric – and a high incidence of STD from R&R) were almost as serious a problem as were battle. Officers up to regimental commander level were falling victim to battleshock. Divisional and higher HQ were out of touch with conditions in the forward areas, and despite the casualty levels no divisional commander, until Gavin (whose division was only put in at the end of the battle) was prepared to protest to higher HQ at the cost, or the totally misinspired concept of operations.

There is much to be drawn from this book on both the conceptual and the moral components.

At Hitler's Side: The Memoirs of Hitler's Adjutant
Nicholas von Below *(Greenhill Books, £18.95, ISBN 1-85367-168-0)*

This excellent volume covers the eight years of Nicholas Von Below's time as Luftwaffe Adjutant to Adolf Hitler in annual chapters. Having started his career in the infantry in 1928 he was trained to fly in Russia in 1929 but remained on army strength until his transfer to the embryonic Luftwaffe in 1933. After four years service on fighters Van Below was called for interview for the post of Luftwaffe Adjutant to the

Führer. He then served Hitler until the last days in Berlin, including being present in the conference room in the Wolfschanze when the bomb exploded on 20 July 1944. He sought and obtained permission from Hitler to leave the Führer's bunker on 29 April 1945 and attempt to make his way westward. After a period with his family and then in Bonn he was betrayed to the Allies and arrested by the British on 7 January 1946.

The diary was written up from memory after the war, largely while held in Nuremberg as a material witness to the war crimes trials. Hence it is not a day by day account (his notebooks were destroyed by himself and his wife separately at the end of the war) but rather a chronological series of memories and impressions. He touches on all of the major facets of the war, and many of the minor actions. His accounts of his dealings with Hitler's allies and generals during both good and bad times, and Hitler's reactions to their views and news, provide a detailed insight into the working of the Nazi and Axis machine both in peace and war.

The index is extensive and detailed and the book contains forty-five photographs. For those uncertain of the locations of the smaller places mentioned the one missing item is a map, but this does not detract from a useful, interesting and easily read volume that complements the many books covering the same subject from the Allied viewpoint.

The Moscow Option, An Alternative Second World War
By David Downing *(Greenhill Books, £16.95, ISBN 1-85367-463-X)*

This is yet another excellent alternative history from Greenhill Books, who are fast becoming the specialist publishers for this genre. It is a surprise to see that it first appeared back in 1979, making it a relatively early example of its type, but this revised edition stands comparison with any later works on this theme.

The story begins on 4th August 1941 with Hitler in a coma after being injured in a crash-landing on his return flight from a conference at Army Group Centre. With the Fuhrer out of action, the army obtains effective carte blanche on the Ostfront and gives top priority to resuming the advance on Moscow instead of diverting resources to the Ukraine. This decision allows the Germans to take Moscow by early October and Leningrad four months later. By the time that Hitler recovers in January 1942, the strategic situation has been transformed and the war is about to take a very different course...

It is always tempting to reveal the full plot of such well-written alternative histories, but that would spoil the anticipation of what is a very good (and generally highly convincing) read.

Current Concerns

Afghanistan The Bear Trap – The Defeat of a Superpower
Mohammad Yousaf & Mark Adkin (Leo Cooper £12.95 ISBN 0-85052-860-7)

Brigadier Yousaf was Director of the Afghan Bureau of the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) from 1983 to 1987 and was effectively the Mujahideen's commander-in-chief. He worked directly for General Akhtar, the head of ISI, who in turn answered to the President of Pakistan General Zia. The author states that the purpose of the book is to record the lessons of the Soviet/Afghan war for historians and for political and military leaders in the future. This the book certainly does. It is written in the best tradition of clear '*staff college English*', is entirely free of jargon and highly readable. It also has numerous clear diagrams and sketch maps. Perhaps the most important lesson in the book, and one easily be overlooked by a reader without a military background, was the decision by Zia at the very start of the campaign to demand from General Akhtar and his staff a thorough military '*appreciation of the situation*' on a national grand-strategy level. Quoting from the book:

'An "appreciation" is a meticulous, logical, step by step examination of a given situation, where all relevant factors are considered, along with likely enemy objectives, to produce a recommended course of action and an outline plan to achieve it.'

The course of action and plan decided on was to support the disparate Afghan Mujahideen groups in a classic 'death by a thousand cuts' guerilla war; to turn Afghanistan into a 'Soviet Vietnam'. However the plan also had to balance this with need to maintain the pretence of Pakistan neutrality lest the Soviets take serious reprisals against Pakistan or even declare all out war. This added greatly to the author's problems particularly as apart from the detailed planning of operations he was responsible for provision of weapons and the training of the Mujahideen. Vast amounts of matériel and finance came from the CIA and Saudi Arabia and had to be channelled through Pakistan, over the mountain passes and onward into Afghanistan itself often by pack animal. The Mujahideen had to be trained in special secret camps inside Pakistan on a wide range of weapons including the sophisticated and deadly US Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, which were used with such devastating effect against Soviet helicopters. The author recounts his frustrations over dealing with the CIA but also acknowledges the overriding importance of the support they provided. The author reminds us of four requisites that guerillas need to defeat a superpower:

'...to sink their differences for the sake of the jihad; an unassailable base area, which President Zia provided in Pakistan; adequate supplies of effective arms to wage the war; and proper training and advice on how to conduct operations,"

The book finishes with the Soviet departure but with the Najibullah regime still in power in Kabul and the author infers that victory was therefore not complete. Later events have proved that militarily the campaign did indeed succeed spectacularly even if the subsequent political finale in Afghanistan was unfortunate.

The author, despite being a major player and intimately involved in the story himself manages to write from the detached viewpoint of a professional soldier and is prepared to recount the successes and failures of both protagonists. The book is a mine of information and lessons; it is therefore essential reading for anyone even remotely involved in the current situation in Afghanistan.

Regimental Histories and Related Subjects

Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard: A History of The First of The Royal Regiment of Foot, The Royal Scots (The Royal Regiment) 1633-2000
Robert Paterson *(HHQ The Royal Scots, £85.00, ISBN 0-954-0906-08).*

A regimental history from the oldest infantry regiment in the British Army should be something pretty special, and, make

no mistake, Pontius Pilate's Bodyguard really is unique. Indeed, -Despite having reviewed some 500 books, I have never come across any history like it. This is partly due to the Royal Scots' Regimental Council, which decided, seven years ago, to aim for something really ambitious. The result is two volumes amounting to 1059 pages in all, 83 maps and 400 illustrations, many in colour.

The author, Robert Paterson, a former Royal Scot, concentrates on the people who served in the Regiment throughout the world. But it is also a history of the British Army, all within the political and social context of the time, and also reflecting the changes in organisation and weapons.

Paterson puts to excellent use the reminiscences published in earlier centuries as well as the various histories of the British Army. He avoids repetition and includes the warts, unlike too many other regimental histories. (I once attended a meeting of Editors of Service journals. We were horrified to hear from a Gunner that matters of major controversy should best be emitted).

Wherever the British Army has been stationed, the 1st of Foot, now the Royal Scots, almost invariably has been there. Some tours, such as that in Southern India for 23 years, were probably longer than the soldiers would wish, but they were fortunate to avoid serving excessively long periods in a single garrison – the 38th Foot, later the Staffordshire Regiment, remained forgotten and unrelieved in the Leeward Islands for 60 years in the 18th century.

Paterson has achieved a remarkable success: every single page is worth reading. Anecdotes and minor detail all bring the text alive, whether it be a General's mistress who was captured by Indians in North America, tortured and then eaten, or the scale of operations mounted by the Sinn Feiners eighty years ago. Ambushes of 30 or more strong were not unusual in the early 1920s. The Irish terrorists took on large convoys and fought more of a pitched battle, often with the aim of capturing British equipment or prisoners. Let's hope the 1st Battalion Royal Scots, now on a residential tour in Ballykelly, is enjoying a rather quieter tour!

Readers of this fascinating book will no doubt turn first to campaigns of particular interest to them. Having run half a dozen large battlefield tours in Hong Kong, I was intrigued that, within weeks of the Japanese capturing the Colony, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief discussed with the Royal Scots former Company Commander, Captain C R Jones, on the precise ground over which they had just fought, how the Shingmun Redoubt on the vital ground could not possibly have been held by only the Company Headquarters and a single under-strength platoon. It is improbable that Jones told the Japanese General how a Royal Scots Private locked the grille at the entrance to the Company Headquarters' underground position and went off with the key, thereby largely trapping his HQ and the co-located artillery observation post.

The Royal Scots provided thirty-five battalions in the First World War and served in five major theatres in the Second. This excellent history deserves to be widely read. The Volumes can be purchased from RHQ The Royal Scots,The Castle, Edinburgh EH12YT for £85.

For England and St George
Simon Dunstan *(The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers £25.00 Available from The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, HM Tower of London, EC3N 4AB.)*

It is perhaps a sign of the times that a regimental history has now appeared that begins in 1968. But For England and St George, Simon Dunstan's history of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, manages to use the regiment's short history to say a great deal about army and its unique way of life.

The RRF came out of the deep cuts in army strength that followed the end of National Service during the early and mid-1960s. This was a traumatic time for the infantry regiments as they were *'reorganised'* in order to reduce the size of the army. For the Fusilier regiments it was particularly worrying. There was even talk at one point of replacing the rank of fusilier with that of a mere private or rifleman.

Hearing of the threat while fly-fishing in Ireland, the Brigade Representative Colonel of the Fusilier Brigade Major General Cosmo Nevill first commandeered the local Donegal telephone exchange to fire off a succession of verbal broadsides to the War Office and then hurried back to London to chair a hastily convened Council of Colonels. Cosmo Nevill was clearly not a man to be crossed, having originally planned to disband the brigade, the War Office found itself agreeing to increase its size with the addition of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment.

Although Cosmo Nevill had undoubtedly saved the Fusiliers, it was to be only a temporary respite. A further reorganisation of the infantry only a few years later led in 1968 to the creation of the Royal Regiment of Fusiliers. Dunstan modestly suggests that it is impossible to get across what it means to be a member of an army regiment, but splendidly succeeds in proving himself wrong. Given the larger canvas that the regiment's short history allows, he fills his book with the shared experiences that are the building blocks of the regimental system. Like all good writers, he has learned the trick, too often ignored, of letting a good story tell itself.

As a result, the operations in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and the Gulf that have dominated soldiers' lives over the past 30 years are vividly brought to life, often with a healthy sprinkling of squaddy humour. One fusilier writing in the regimental journal during a tour in Belfast described how they were frequently attacked from above by residents of the Divis Flats. *"A patrol was bombarded with one chest of drawers; one bedstead; one fridge; one live dog (which is still alive); and two TV sets, all dropped from at least three floors up. The most cheering news is that to date the CO and three Rifle Company commanders have all been engaged by the enemy. Major Buckton was missed; Major Spackman's walking stick was broken and Major Bibbey's Pig was destroyed."*

But it is Dunstan's minute-by-minute account of the *"blue-on-blue"* tragedy during the Gulf War when an American A10 tankbuster aircraft attacked one of the regiment's Warrior armoured personnel carriers, killing nine young soldiers that is most riveting. The memories of those that survived are all intensely moving. But one moment alone manages to encapsulate the regimental spirit that Dunstan believes so difficult to define. A soldier recalls how a severely wounded Sergeant Trevor Smith, having just lost nine of his men, sat in the rear doorway of an FV432 ambulance refusing to accept morphine because he wanted to monitor the survivors' condition. *"True to form, with a bandage around his eyes and a cigarette in his mouth, he kept on cracking a stream of awful jokes, unconcerned for himself, to keep the spirits up of everyone around him – he was fantastic."*

For England and St George is full of such men.

Cadets: The Impact of War on the Cadet Movement
L J Collins *(Jade Publishing, £14.95, ISBN 1-900734-03-6)*

Given the mass of factual literature dealing with British military activity over the last two centuries, it is interesting that the Home Guard did not receive a full historical treatment

until 1995 (S P Mackenzie, *The Home Guard*, OUP 1995), and that the Cadet movement has had to wait until now for its turn. Although the core of the book is the Cadets in World War II, it covers the span from the beginnings of the movement (linked with the growth of the Volunteers from 1859) to the present day. As always, there are exceptions outside the mainstream of development, and the first cadet unit (as opposed to the common phenomenon of boys serving in normal combat units) can be identified as being formed by Shrewsbury School in 1581.

The history of both Sea and Army Cadets, and of the *'closed'* school-based contingents under various titles preceding Combined Cadet Force, is one of bottom-up development driven by volunteer – and do-gooding – management. Involvement of the Services themselves was initially limited and frequently grudging, particularly in the case of the Navy where the relationship between the Navy League and the Admiralty was – well – complex. Probably the most interesting period for the historian is the twenty years prior to the outbreak of the Great War. At this time the variety of youth organisations having a greater or lesser military connection, plus the inclusion not only of drill and PT but basic military instruction in the elementary school syllabus, gives the impression of a country whose youth was militarised to a degree which is unthinkable today.

In 1908, as part of the Haldane reforms, the public school cadet contingents were redesignated as the Junior Division of the OTC, and in 1910 all Army cadet units, whether non-OTC school or open, were included in the new Territorial Cadet Force. Haldane had a vision of unifying all the uniformed youth organisations as a nationwide feeder for his Territorial Force. That this did not come to pass was probably due to the fact that the Scouts developed as a non-military organisation. The author suggests that this was the result of opposition to Baden-Powell's ideas from within the cadet movement rather than B-P himself being opposed – *Scouting for Boys* was originally directed at *'Cadet officers and Brigade* (ie Boys' and Church Lads') *leaders'*. It is significant that in 1911 the membership of the Boys' (63000+) and Church Lads' (36000) Brigades far exceeded that of the non-OTC Army Cadets (14400), indicating the greater popularity of the moral/citizenship-based organisations. However, in 1911 the CLB affiliated to the TCF, reinforcing the social development aspects of the latter.

The Great War saw a surge of enrolment in the cadet forces by those too young even to lie their way into the adult forces, and a greater level of recognition of the value of cadet pre-entry training by the War Office. More resources were made available and the breadth of the training syllabus increased. At the same time, many OTC contingents and TCF detachments were affected by their officers and adult instructors leaving to join the expanding adult forces. The Admiralty were much less appreciative than the War Office.

The greatest impact of the Great War on the Cadet movement was, however, felt in the between-wars period. In the 1920s, the reaction to matters military, retrenchment (eg the Geddes Axe of 1922), and a failure to re-emphasise social and citizenship training – and fun (where the Scouts were particularly strong) – led to a collapse in numbers. The Church-based Brigades broke away from the Cadet Force and, with the Scouts, had no problems with recruiting. In 1923 administration of Army Cadets was handed over to County TA Associations, and 31 elected not to maintain cadet detachments. In 1930 the Labour administration effectively wound up the Cadet Force (the book is in a slight muddle over dates here). For two years voluntary efforts on the fringe of legality kept the movement ticking over until a measure of recognition was restored. In 1937, with war again imminent, realistic funding again became available for Army Cadets. At the same time, a major expansion of the Sea Cadet Corps – still a Navy League organisation – took place. 1938 saw the foundation of the Air Defence Cadet Corps, under sponsorship of the Air League, a similar arrangement to that for the Sea Cadets. As the country moved towards war, the cadet movement once again became primarily a pre-service training organisation.

For the larger part of the Second World War the number of cadets under training stood at nearly half a million. 80,000 pre-trained young men were joining the Armed Forces annually. A measure of semi-direction of adolescents into cadet forces took effect in order to keep the unruly young off the streets. From 1942, the Armed Services formally took over the direction of their cadet forces. Names changed: the Sea Cadets dropped *'Navy League'* from their title, the TCF had become the ACF, and the ADCC was given the title Air Training Corps in 1941. And although girls were not permitted to join the cadet forces proper, parallel girls' organisations were established. The scope of training in all three elements of the movement was modernised, expanded and more closely focused on Service needs – for example the *'Bounty'* scheme generating telegraphists and visual signallers for the Navy. The ACF developed close training links with the Home Guard, with cadets being expected to join the HG at age 17 before progressing to adult service. As well as training, cadets took part in a variety of war work (eg assistance to agriculture), and with the Services proper having better things to do, public parades involved a large proportion of cadet participants – a foretaste of the present day situation. In the author's words, the Cadet movement came of age during the Second World War.

The mistakes of the post-First World War period were not repeated after the Second. The formalised relationships between cadets and their parent Services were retained - though the Sea Cadets continued their arms-length status. Citizenship training was re-emphasised, adventurous training and the Duke of Edinburgh's Award Scheme began to figure largely in activities.

This is an extremely valuable account of the Cadet movement, not just in war but throughout its existence. It would have benefited from more ruthless editing, in that the author has obviously wanted to get everything in, but I am not disposed to damn it on that score. The movement remains as valuable to the Armed Services as it has ever been; ex-cadets form 30 percent of Army recruits, while the RAF has costed the advantages of ex-cadets in terms of training wastage and retention. As regards cadets and the community, attitudes in this anti-organisational age preclude the proactive quasi-directional approach adopted by the authorities in 1940 –but one might hope.

Tactics, Equipment, Uniforms

One More River to Cross: The Story of British Military Bridging
Jim Joiner *(Pen & Sword £25.00, 0-85052-788-0)*

This admirable book is a comprehensive and detailed account of its subject which should be required reading for all military engineers, and should also form part of the education of any aspirant to a broad knowledge of the military art, and the price is such that there is no excuse for not acquiring it. Colonel Jim Joiner is immensely knowledgeable in his subject, and a skilled writer as well, bring-

ing to life what could have been a somewhat dreary catalogue; there is a lot of technical information, but the less digestible items are in the appendices. If I have one criticism of the book's coverage of its subject, it is that a military bridging system is not just the equipment and the people who put it together. The TTPs that put these ingredients together at the appropriate where and when are an equally essential component of the system, but this aspect receives little attention; this is a book about the kit. It is also a history of the establishment which for many a year and under a variety of titles, of which MEXE was the best known (and the snappiest), provided the R&D support for the Army's bridging and sundry other Sapper matters. Now a minor part of QinetiQ (ugh!) Chertsey and with a tiny test facility remaining at Christchurch, one can only reflect on the lines of 'sic transit', or perhaps *'they'll be sorry...'*

The history of military bridging as recounted here is one of development from the use of basic materials and commonly available components to almost complete reliance on specialist equipments. Superimposed on this has been the move in the Sappers, as in the rest of the Army, away from equipping men and towards manning equipments. The end product of this is that in warfighting, field engineers in the combat zone now don't do bridging. The BR90 equipments are operated either by the armoured engineers or the MT, and if it's a long wet gap, send for the amphibians. I look back to the days when every field squadron was trained to attack any sort of gap, only having to be issued with the appropriate equipment, and wonder whether progress has gone a bridge too far. And I recall another book by a Sapper reviewed here some years back (*Never A Shot in Anger*) whose author commented on the ingenuity, speed and effectiveness of WWII German Pionieren and Russian Sappers using improvised bridging methods, contrasting it with the reliance of RE on Bailey and other equipments. With BR90, the Sappers have saddled themselves with the ultimate in legacy systems, at a time when the emphasis is swinging to worldwide operations. The MGB-based MLC 35 Air Portable Ferry Bridge briefly mentioned here may have wider application than might at first have been apparent.

The Bailey story is central to the book, and rightly so. Previous attempts to produce a component-based bridging system (eg the Inglis Bridge) had lacked the flexibility of different constructions which the Bailey system, at a stroke, provided. Bailey was not only a triumph of military engineering, but also of design, development and production. It is a common criticism of British industry that it is not good at high rate production of components to close tolerances. The fact that Bailey was being delivered to troops only a year after design work started (December 1940 to December 1941) is an example to anyone involved in procurement, while the eventual decentralised production arrangements were a lesson in organisation. I have one small moan about the portrayal of Bailey; it was always the big ones that got photographed and are reproduced here, but the vast majority of wartime builds were hasty little bridges of around 40 foot span or even less, built under trying circumstances (there are quite a few still in use up the East coast of Italy).

Bailey's successor as the forward area bridge, Medium Girder, although structurally a very different beast, carried on with the principle of a flexible system made up of small modules – I would argue that the British Army failed to make full use of this flexibility, particularly with regard to floating MGB (politics came into it – wet bridging was to be amphibious bridging). However, it is interesting, and easy to see from the book, that today's combat zone bridging traces its origins not to the Bailey concept but to another family – the Large and Small Box Girder bridges of the between-wars period, where the principle of large uniform section individual main span components and special ramp sections was established. Although there is also a family resemblance between the BR90 bridges and previous tank bridges, particularly the No 8, the fact that the main modules of the newer bridges are of constant depth is a crucial difference. This works well for the General Support (ABLE) bridges, but less so for the tank bridges; look at the under-bridge clearance on a Chieftain bridgelayer with a No10 bridge mounted.

As for the Bailey story, it continues; the current logistic support bridge is the Mabey Compact 200, which is a direct descendant of Bailey; the panel retains Bailey's 10-foot pin spacing in length, but increases the depth to 7 feet – one cannot help but feel that this is what Heavy Girder Bridge should have been. (Incidentally, full marks to the author for using Imperial units for equipments which were designed in Imperial, and no messing with three places of metric decimals.)

From a parochial point of view, I am impressed with the coverage of armoured engineer gap-crossing equipments, from the WWI lock bridge to the BR90/pipe fascine capability of today. There is an omission, however, and it's to do with the disappearance of the term *'assault'* and its replacement with *'armoured'*. Even in WWII, only the fascine and AVRE-launched SBG were regarded as true assault equipments, with the Jumbo and the scissors bridges as rapid, but not forefront of the battle, gap-crossers. The Centurion family had some degree of system, as well as crew survivability (the bridgelayer launch mechanism was armoured in the travelling position, the Ark hydraulics were fully under armour, and there were some useful TTPs with the bridgelayer which didn't figure in the user handbook). But you can't lead with a Chieftain AVLB; there is a need for a really quick launch capability for the No 12 tank bridge.

To add *'highly recommended'* after this pacan of praise is probably superfluous, but just in case anybody has not got the message, it applies.

Sturmgeschütz III & IV 1942-1945
By Hilary Doyle and Tom Jentz (Osprey Publishing, £8.99, ISBN 1-84176-182-6)

Jagdpanzer 38 'Hetzer'
By Hilary Doyle and Tom Jentz (Osprey Publishing, £8.99, ISBN 1-84176 135-4)

The stories of the Sturmgeschütz (StuG) and Hetzer are closely linked. From its combat debut in 1940, the StuG III had proved itself in the infantry support role and when its L/24 75mm gun was replaced by the high velocity L/48, it also became a formidable tank-destroyer. The tactical problems posed by its limited traverse were offset by a low overall height (1.94m), which made it exceptionally inconspicuous, especially in hull-down positions. The basic design proved amenable to a whole range of alterations, notably the fitting of a 105mm howitzer instead of the 75mm gun, which proved so successful that 1,300 of these Sturmhaubitze were produced during the last three years of the war. (In the same period, a total of almost 8,500 StuGs were built). Protection and secondary armament were steadily improved right up to the end of the war, with the final production batches having 80mm frontal armour plus coaxial

and remote-control roof mounted machine guns, yet still weighing in at under 25 metric tons.

The operational effectiveness of the Stugs was never in doubt – comments such as "I would rather have one Sturmgeschutz-Abteilung than an entire Panzer Division" are apocryphal, but understandable, given the performance of such units. In August 1943, eleven Sturmgeschutz-Abteil-ungen claimed a total of 423 Russian AFVs destroyed for the loss of 18 StuGs.

The Hetzer grew out of the success of the StuG III/IV Following heavy bomb damage to the main Stug factory in Berlin in November 1943, plans were made for production to be transferred to Czech factories, which proved to be incapable of producing the standard design. Thoughts turned to the possibility of producing a smaller and lighter design utilising components of the Panzer 38(t), which went from design drawings to series production in less than four months. The result, popularly dubbed 'Hetzer', mounted the L/48 75mm and had 60mm frontal armour set at 60 degrees to the vertical, yet stood only 1.85m high and weighed 16 metric tons. Despite a cramped fighting compartment, the Hetzer was popular with its crews and highly effective. In one action a single Abteilung of 45 vehicles destroyed 57 Russian AFVs, including two JS 122s without loss. Unsurprisingly, production never kept pace with demand, but despite Allied bombing the factories kept going until the very last days of the war, turning out a total of roughly 2,800 vehicles.

These are excellent studies of AFVs are still valuable examples for today's armies. It is a sobering thought that almost 60 years on, despite (or perhaps because of) millions spent on research and technological development, it seems to be impossible to produce a *'21st Century Hetzer'*. Perhaps today's armies and their procurement organisations should study just what was achieved under the pressures of war.

Sniper
By Mark Spicer (Salamander Books, £20.00, ISBN 1 84065 229 2)

Books on sniping are almost as prolific as those on the Waffen-SS and of equally variable quality. This volume is unusual in that the author has 15 years practical experience as a sniper in the British Army and that first-hand knowledge shines through in every chapter.

This a very much a study of the 'nuts and bolts' of present day sniping with only a brief historical introduction-full chapters are devoted to the role of the sniper, selection and training, camouflage, shooting techniques and tactical deployment. The whole book is lavishly illustrated with excellent colour photographs and drawings which emphasise the crucial importance of attention to the minutiae of camouflage to the sniper's survival.

It is hard to find any significant criticism of this study, which shows a refreshing awareness of the variety of settings in which today's sniper may have to operate, including the special challenges posed by urban operations. Perhaps the only real point which could have received greater emphasis are the vulnerable targets provided by the ever-larger arrays of optics which festoon the latest AFVs. Perhaps MBT design teams should take note?

The Samurai Recreated in Colour Photographs
by Mitsuo Kure and Ghislaine Kruit (Crowood Press, £12.95, ISBN 1-86126-335-X)

To most Westerners, the samurai represent a strange, alien military caste whose long history is virtually unknown. This study is an excellent starting-point for anyone trying to get to grips with this complex piece of military history as the book is built around a stunning collection of almost 200 superb colour photographs taken at a variety of festivals and re-enactment gatherings across Japan.

The authors have done a fine job of arranging this collection with highly informative captions and text to tell the story of the samurai from their origins in the 8th Century AD to the enforced Westernisation of Japan in the mid-19th Century. Whilst there are naturally plenty of photographs of commanders arrayed in their spectacular armour, there is also coverage of the ashigaru infantry who fought their battles to present a balanced summary of this long period. One of the fascinating elements of the story is the self-imposed isolation of Japan from the mid 17th Century which held military technology in a bizarre time-warp to the extent that in the 1850s, Japanese forces were still armed with matchlock muskets.

This is a remarkable book which is highly recommended to anyone with an interest in Japan and its colourful military history.

Video/DVD Reviews

The following videos are available from larger video retailers or direct from: DD Video, FREEPOST CS640, Tarvin, Chester, CH3 8YZ. (Phone 0845 855 2539, e-mail sales@dd-video.co.uk).

The Third Reich in Colour
(Colour, 210 mins., £19.99, Code No. DD.3896-also available on DVD, Code No. DD.3897)

In the last couple of years there has been a flood of videos and DVDs utilizing recently unearthed colour film of the 1930s and 40s. This set is the latest addition to the genre and exhibits most of the usual strengths and weaknesses of such compilations. The ravages of war and the last half century or so have taken their toll of the limited amount of period material so it is hardly surprising that these videos are something of a patchwork of often very short film clips. Whilst these have great immediacy and impact, they would have benefited from more logical editing, so that coverage was either in chronological order, or else arranged by subject, giving discrete sections devoted to the political background and the pre-war Reich, personalities and the war itself.

Nonetheless, these videos do contain some quite remarkable material, including film of the 1940 French campaign, mountain warfare in the Caucasus and rear-guard actions by German troops falling back on Berlin in the last weeks of the war.

This is not a conventional military history documentary. Much of the material covers the pre-war period, but intelligently selected extracts could be invaluable in a wide variety of Second World War studies and battlefield tours.

Panzer Strike
(B&W, 124mins., £16.99, Code No. DD.3788)

This is another remarkable compilation, consisting of two German films which have been largely forgotten since the war years, and a modern film biography. The first covers the Blitzkrieg in France 1940 and is introduced by Guderian. Although Dr Goebbels clearly had a hand in the script and the animated campaign maps are crude to modern eyes, there is much fascinating material, including some lessons for today – not just in the spectacular Panzer actions, but in the sheer speed of German operations, eg

assault river crossings – and the value of light close support artillery (the le IG 18 75mm infantry gun), which could readily be ferried across in inflatable assault boats. This film is strongly recommended as a training aid; it could hardly be bettered as an illustration of what is meant by the concepts of fighting power and tempo – and it speaks for itself, being mercifully free of the didactic clutter accompanying training films.

The second item on the video is a training film dating from the winter of 1941/42 which covers infantry anti-tank tactics on the Eastern Front. This was a period in which German infantry had to resort to desperate measures as the 37mm Pak 36 was useless against the T-34s and KVs. Only the 50mm Pak 38 firing APCR and the various 88mm flak guns were truly effective against the newer Russian tanks, and very few infantry units had their protection. The film takes great pains to emphasise the weak spots of the T-34, KV-1 and KV-2 and illustrates how infantry can attack them with demolition charges, Molotov Cocktails and time fuzed anti-tank mines jammed under the turret overhang. Whilst it is very easy to dismiss this as an historical curiosity of purely academic interest, it might be worth envisaging what a determined infantry enemy (on a passport to paradise?) using just these sort of weapons could do modern MBT operating without close infantry support.

The final film in this set is a modern biography of von Manstein, which gives a good account of the career of a commander who was arguably the greatest general of the Second World War, in a well-crafted mixture of archive film and interviews with surviving members of his staff.

This is a video set which merits close attention, from both the general interest and professional points of view. It has some shortcomings, notably in the sometimes eccentric and inaccurate translations of the two wartime German films, but these do not detract from its very real value.

Hitler's Henchmen-The Commanders
(Colour/B&W, 180 mins., £16.99, Code No. DD.4722)

This video set is a fascinating collection of biographies of four contrasting characters-Rommel, Udet, Doenitz and Keitel who played very different roles in the fortunes of Hitler's Reich. In some respects, the choice of subjects is surprising-it is stretching a definition to describe Udet as a commander! However, all the films are well-structured combinations of archive film and interviews with the surprisingly large numbers of surviving acquaintances, family members and staff who give vivid accounts of their impressions of these very disparate men.

These are primarily film biographies rather than military history documentaries, but they do contain some material which could be very useful in presentations on many Second World War topics and some battlefield tours. (One example which comes to mind is an extract from a 1944 German newsreel of Rommel giving a pep-talk to one of the garrisons of the Atlantic Wall, which would fit very well into the preparation for a Normandy battlefield tour).

Reissues – Short Reports

Penguin Classic Military Histories

Nelson and his Captains
Ludovic Kennedy *(£4.99, ISBN 0-141-39090-5)*

This has been around since 1951, long enough in fact to receive a positive endorsement from C S Forester on first publication. It has a particular relevance today, which can be read off against the short excerpt from *The Rules of the Game* contained in this issue of *BAR*. This relevance lies in the fact that Nelson instilled in his band of brothers not just an immense personal regard, but a concise and effective body of doctrine. Their enthusiastic acceptance of Nelsonian doctrine was not dependent on intellectual analysis but on this regard for their leader – though it helped that the precepts worked. The book is therefore much more than a study of individuals -- it is a study of command and an effective command system, which should be examined in contrast to the mechanistic system in place in the 1914–18 Grand Fleet.

Haig's Command
Denis Winter *(£5.99, ISBN 0-141-39097-X)*

Haig's Command was published in 1991 and received mixed reviews, though its extreme anti-Haig stance attracted strong support in some quarters from people who may by now be regretting the fact. The book not only consistently denigrates Haig's performance as military commander, but adds a quiverful of allegations as to his probity as an individual, including comprehensive fasification of records, misapplication of funds, and homosexual inclinations.

The review published in *BAR* 99 was a long way short of adulatory. In particular, our reviewer zeroed in on Winter's dismissal of the British official records as tainted, and on the difficulties involved in producing any truly objective assessment of the Field Marshal. John Hussey makes a great many telling points, particularly as regards selective use of records and of putting the worst possible slant on interpretation, in a review article in *Stand To!* No 36, Winter 1992. The most considered, lengthy, and authoritative putting-down of Winter's efforts, however, is that by Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson in the Australian War Memorial *Journal* No 23, October 1993. Their start point, and this is as good a summary of the work as could be asked for, is that it is not an examination of Haig's command, but *'a book about Haig's personality and about Haig as a military and political operator'.*

Decision in Normandy
Carlo d'Este *(£5.99 ISBN 0-141-39056-5)*

All the Penguin Classics reviewed here represent excellent value for money but in sheer tonnage terms this one has to be singled out. We reviewed Carlo d'Este's book in BAR 78; it fully justifies the accolade of *'classic'*, being proper, objective history.

The conduct of the Normandy campaign has generated so much heat, strife and dissension whether at the time or in innumerable retrospectives, that it is difficult for anyone to approach it without some measure of partisan feeling. D'Este is at pains to separate myth from reality,, with particular reference to Montgomery's performance. He cuts to the heart of the matter by another separation -- Montgomery the professional soldier from Montgomery the flawed human being. The Montgomery problem remains, however, the extent to which his exasperating human failings militated against the successful prosecution of the war. The more publicised area is in relationships with the Americans, but in addition the number of British officers who could not stand Montgomery, from Tedder downwards, was legion. The other aspect of the problem is the extent to which his need to be right all the time actually influenced the conduct of his own battles.

This is a well documented, well written, scholarly book. Strongly recommended for everyone's bookshelf, even if you may take issue with some of d'Este's judgements.

The Falklands War 1982
Martin Middlebrook *(£5.99 ISBN 0-141-39055-7)*

Although Middlebrook's account of the conflict from the Argentine side, *The Fight for the 'Malvinas'* was reviewed in BAR, this excellent account of Britain's last solo war did not appear to make it. The book was first published in 1985, was reissued in a revised edition in 1987, and has been further updated for this series.

Like all Middlebrook's histories, this contains much first-hand material. It is low-key in style and not overly judgemental of the operations – the major exception to this being with regard to 5 Bde's opportunist advance in the south and the consequences of the ad hoc arrangements for its support. He reserves most of his acid for the MOD's unwillingness to be open about what went wrong (eg blue on blue incidents) and for the corrosive effects of inter-Service rivalry.

At twenty years' distance, the balanced judgement on the Falklands ought to be not that things went wrong, but that in a most challenging situation, and despite the problems, operations were carried through to a successful conclusion. This book provides as concise and balanced account of Op CORPORATE as one could wish for.

Other Publishers

To Win a War
John Terraine: *(Cassell Military Paperbacks £6.99, ISBN 0-304-35321-3)*

It is a nice coincidence that this new edition of John Terraine's 1978 classic has appeared for review in the same issue as Gary Sheffield's *Forgotten Victory*. Reviewed in *BAR* 61, it remains a definitive text for the events of 1918. This edition is very well produced, particularly the photographs.

Terraine has two major points to make. The first is that the German armies of 1918 were defeated in the field, not stabbed in the back and surrendered while still in good order. The second is the extent of the British contribution to that victory, and that of FM Haig.

The battles of 1918 have been covered in detail by a great many books since *To Win a War* first appeared – and not a few owe a lot to John Terraine's efforts here. Not many, however, contain as thorough an account of the Armistice negotiations as does this. Still recommended.

1745 – A Military History of the Last Jacobite Rising
Stuart Reid *(Spellmount, £12.99, ISBN 1-86227-130-5)*

This was reviewed in BAR 113, and my comments have been recycled back at me on the rear cover of the paperback edition: *'A racy, pacy account... informative and highly enjoyable. It is also a fascinating military social document... strongly recommended'.*

I see no reason to change this opinion five years on!

Battalion
Alastair Borthwick *(Bâton Wicks, £12.99, ISBN 1-898573-35-2)*

Writing in BAR 122, Sydney Jary bewailed the fact that when the shooting stopped in May 1945, nobody thought of recording what had happened to 4 SOM LI between Normandy and Bremen – immediately, while memories were fresh. 5 SEAFORTHS' CO had the same idea and did something about it, tasking Alastair Borthwick, who had served with the Battalion from the Canal Zone, with writing a history of its war. Originally published as *Sans Peur* in 1946, and as *Battalion* in 1994, this is the result. BAR reviewed the book, in glowing terms, in issue 108. One of the battalion's actions, that at Groin immediately following the Rhine crossing, is available on video (C1902 – *A Battalion in Battle*).

And there is very little to add to that, except to say that this is one of the classic accounts of the infantry war. It is copiously illustrated, many of the photographs being from battalion sources rather than the IWM archive. The maps are excellent, being very simple and very clear.

There are still many lessons to be learned from books as good as this one. *'Realities of war'* includes practicalities like load on the man, as well as the psychological issues which tend to be given prominence in today's discussions.

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CD-ROM Format for British Army Review and Army Doctrine and Training News

British Army Review issues up to and including No 125, and Army Doctrine and Training News up to issue No 14, will shortly be available on CD-ROM.

We intend to give details of coding, demands and issue procedures in Section 3B of ADTN 16, Winter 2001–02, to be issued in January 2002.