



**1Gp Headquarters Air Command  
SO1 Battlespace Management Safety Policy &  
Assurance**

L34, Building 47  
Royal Air Force  
HIGH WYCOMBE  
Buckinghamshire  
HP14 4UE

Tel: [REDACTED]

Fax: [REDACTED]

Email: [1GP-BMSPASO1@mod.uk](mailto:1GP-BMSPASO1@mod.uk)

RAF Lossiemouth (Stn Cdr)\*  
RAF Lossiemouth (OC Ops)\*

Reference: 20130717-Lossiemouth FOAR-R

Copy to – See Page 2

Date: 17 Jun 13

**BATTLESPACE MANAGEMENT (BM) AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT STANEVAL FORMAL  
OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE REPORT (FOAR) ON RAF LOSSIEMOUTH 24-27 JUN 13**

1. As part of the MOD's requirement to assure correct oversight of Defence ATM output, 1Gp HQ AIR BM Safety Policy & Assurance (SPA) conducted an ATM and TG9 Assurance visit to RAF Lossiemouth over the period 24-27 Jun 13. You will be aware that we have developed a theme of 'Continuous Improvement' (CI) with each SATCO and PFOM to ensure that they were supported in their need to adhere to the Assurance requirement – the baselines articulated in the Air Traffic Control Assurance Manual (ATMAM) give clear sight of policy in a variety of administrative and operational areas. The Formal Operational Assurance Report (FOAR) at Annex A was developed during the visit by ATM STANEVAL and followed on from the previous Interim Assurance Visit (IAV) from Apr 12; the draft findings were accepted by SATCO and the FOAR has subsequently been ratified by BM SPA staffs. SATCO will receive a more detailed Unit Action Record (UAR).
2. ATM STANEVAL found RAF Lossiemouth ATC to be in good order. It was apparent that SATCO and small group of key personnel are carrying the bulk of the work, with SATCO expressing considerable frustration with the lack of capable personnel at her disposal. It was acknowledged that manning were addressing this issue and that a number of experienced controllers were posted in to the Sqn over the next 4 months, and that, should all training go according to plan, the tower should be in a much healthier position when we return in 9-12 months time. A number of minor observations were made during the visit, with the bulk of the areas being addressed before the team had left the Unit. The comments regarding Airspace Issues were beyond the gift of SATCO to resolve, however the Unit were in consultation with DAP and Inverness Airport to reach a more mutually beneficial position.
3. TG9 STANEVAL found that the Unit had made considerable effort to address the issues raised in the previous report. However, the majority of observations made in this report could be attributed to insufficient executive oversight and lack of attention to detail. A small number of relatively junior members of TG9 appeared to carrying out tasks normally reserved for those of a more senior rank, and despite their best endeavours, errors were evidenced.
4. SATCO is encouraged to maintain a 2-way dialogue with BM SPA staffs<sup>1</sup> to ensure that the UAR maintains its accuracy and relevance as a living document. My staff will conduct a further assurance visit to RAF Lossiemouth in 9-12 months to discuss the UAR's progress and I will

<sup>1</sup> Main POC OC ATM STANEVAL: [REDACTED]

~~RESTRICTED STAFF~~

update you accordingly. If you have any queries regarding this report, please contact me or OC ATM STANEVAL (Sqn Ldr [REDACTED]) on [REDACTED].

<Electronically Signed>

[REDACTED]  
Wg Cdr  
for AOC 1 Gp

Annex:






A. ATM Assurance Performance Indicators – RAF Lossiemouth.


Copy to:

MAA (SO1 ATM Assurance)\*  
1Gp (AOBM, ATM Force Cdr, Dep ATM Force Cdr, SO1 STAR, SO2 BM ATM UK Ops)\*  
HQ AIR (RAF Flt Safety SO2 Promotion)\*  
RAF Lossiemouth (SATCO, PFOM)\*

**ATM ASSURANCE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS – RAF LOSSIEMOUTH**

Key:

-  Operating iaw the relevant policy
-  Several minor observations and/or omissions from the relevant policy but work in place to rectify
-  Non-compliant with the relevant policy, no rectification process in place and/or safety implications
-  Issue being staffed by HQ AIR
-  Issue being staffed by other MOD organisation (i.e. MAA/DIO etc)

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
Aircrew Comment	ATC Service Provision	N/A		Aircrew comment was received from members of both 202 Sqn D Flt and XV(R) Sqn. Aircrew were generally complimentary about the quality of the service they received from ATC. They remained cognisant of the experience/dilutions problems within the tower, but both stated that the proactive use of both ATC and Sqn Liaison Officers had continued to add considerable benefit to ATC/Sqn interaction and Flight Safety. Both Sqns commented that controlling at Lossiemouth was not always 'slick' or 'standard'; it was agreed that this was down to inexperience. Both sqns also stated that they felt the experienced controllers seemed to spend excessive time 'instructing' and not 'hands-on' controlling. The aircrew were generally content with all local procedures. Special praise was made by 202 Sqn regarding the priority afforded to them upon adopting 'Rescue' callsigns. Both Sqns were confident that ATC operating within an 'honest' and 'just' culture. It was also felt that all incidents, regardless of severity or culpability were reported.

~~RESTRICTED STAFF~~

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Airspace Issues	N/A		No concerns were raised regarding military driven limitations. XV(R) Sqn raised concerns over increasing limitations of manoeuvre in Class G caused by civilian airliners coming out of the airway structure. It was felt that this was having an impact on their ability to deliver training efficiently. They also raised concerns over the amount of Airspace Inverness Airport had been granted as a local avoid. This avoid was calculated as being 4 times the airspace officially delegated to Aberdeen, yet they had approx one quarter of the movements. Again this was viewed as having a direct impact on training delivery, particularly wrt to access to Tain Range, and transits around the Invergordon area. The Str are engaging with Inverness to reduce the delegated airspace.
Currency	Currency Management			An accurate currency spreadsheet was maintained with the logging of live or synthetic PAR/SRAs. Local orders stated that the individual was responsible for keeping the tracker up to date however executive oversight was maintained with the Sup regularly managing the tracker on a day to day basis. All controllers were in date. An accurate PK currency list was maintained however 3 controllers were out of date, 2 of which were dispensated. There was no evidence of controllers conducting unusual traffic currency. It was recommended that the Unit formalised its use of ATA to ensure unusual traffic currency was maintained as per ATM FO and recorded. ATMFO however did not give a currency timeframe, therefore did not advise on how often they should be practice the procedures; this had been raised to ATM FLC for consideration wrt future updates of ATMFO.

~~RESTRICTED STAFF~~

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
Training	Training Management			<p>Clearly written TORs were in place for all members of the trg team and had been signed accordingly by the incumbent and SATCO. SATCO had appropriate oversight of the trg system through attendance of the monthly trg mtgs. The Trg Team was well-balanced with the appropriate number of UIs and screens trained for both the live and synthetic environments. All members of the team were qualified to UTC1 standard. All UIs held a DPG of at least B+ for their BMD performance; however, one had only achieved a DPG of B in the TC(PA) discipline. Although this complied to policy this was contrary to a local order that stated that UIs were to achieve a DPG of B+ in both the BMD and controlling discipline. Screens had achieved the requisite DPG of B. The monthly trg mtgs clearly recorded RoDs whilst the weekly mtgs discussed the short term trg goals. The unit provided evidence that the UIs and screens were promulgated in the ATC OB and other prominent locations around the Sqn. In addition a trg plan along with trg priorities was clearly displayed within the Sqn. Quarterly trg reports were submitted correctly iaw with ATMFO. However, there was no evidence of [REDACTED] having any FTPAs even though she was in trg. There was no policy statement in ATMFO that precludes FTPAs for the unit executive. All other FTPAs had been submitted correctly.</p>

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Training Implementation			<p>There was evidence of a robust pre-arrival system which ensured that an effective arrivals package was dispatched in good time which contained all of the essential information required at ref. A comprehensive induction programme was conducted by the UTO/DUTO and again was compliant with the ref. The Groundschool package was built with detail upon the induction programme. Detailed PowerPoint presentations for each of the controlling disciplines together with sound lesson notes ensured that the trainee controller was well-policed to undertake live trg. First tourist personnel were well aware of when they would undertake their PK examinations. Most met with policy in that they were done within 18 months of completing JATCC or within one month of their last endorsement whichever is the sooner. However, 2 controllers that had originally had a dispensation to extend their trg period were also dispensated to have their PK moved to the end of that trg. SO2 Trg had subsequently removed all dispensations for these controllers and had devolved the trg "risk" to SATCO. SATCO did not hold any endorsements but held a dispensation from HQ Air until 30 Sep 13 to achieve the requirements laid down in ATMFO. Not all 1st tourist controllers had endorsed within the 18 month timescale with one holding a dispensation from SO2 Trg until 12 Jul 13. However, SO2 Trg had devolved the trg "risk" for 2 controllers to SATCO and therefore no valid dispensation was in place. Trg reports were well-written and there was clear distinction between live and synthetic trg. It was recommended that scores of a +1/-1 were given a comment to reflect the reasoning behind the score.</p>

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Training Development			<p>There was an excellent trend analysis tool in place that captured events from the trg, stds and safety management pillars. Trends were identified and commented upon within the spreadsheet. However, there was no coherent action tracker that captured the chain of events that would see an item through to conclusion. It was recommended to the UTO that an action tracker was created to provide thorough evidence of what actions were taken, and by whom, to ensure that items were identified and seen through to a proper conclusion. All trg objectives were robust and relevant to the Unit task; they were reviewed regularly amend amended if necessary. The synthetic/live trg balance fell well within the requisite 70/30% split. The ATA manager ensured that all synthetic exercise material was relevant and detailed enough to provide adequate trg scenarios. BMD and QT proficiency was honed by the UTO through the creation of a BMD and QT workshop; this was a required programme to ab-initio members of the trg team. In addition, practice also took the form of new team members delivering a dummy LK to a member of staff under stds team mentoring.</p>
Synthetic	ATC Simulation			<p>The Unit still utilised ATA 3 with and delivery of ATA 4 was to take place in Jul 13. The equipment functioned correctly. The equipment was used solely ATA trg exercises and currency.</p>
	Aircrew Simulator/Air Experience Flights			<p>Newly arrived staff were undertaking an air related experience within 3 months of arrival. Most controllers were inside 12 months currency; 2 controllers were outside of 12 months. The Unit had ample opportunity to undertake an air related experience; 1st tourists were able to visit XV(R) Sqn where they could take part in aircrew briefing and debriefing, ac famil and capabilities. 202 Sqn were also proactive and ensured that pax trips were available on a regular basis.</p>

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
Standards	Standards Management			All ToRs were issued as per ATMFO with Executive oversight maintained. The size of the stds team was appropriate to the size of the Unit. There was a fragile succession plan for team members due to postings and OOA detachments this year. The size of the stds team was appropriate to the size of the Unit. There was no formalised process to indicate that all members have been given training before undertaking a stds role. A bespoke process was now being introduced by the UStanO. It was recommended that this process be formalised and LTOS were used. Standards meetings were being conducted on a monthly basis with invites to all pillar Execs. It had been recommended in the last meeting that a comprehensive action planner was incorporated to track any RoDs from start to completion. The UStanO maintained an accurate standards check plan which was kept on MOSS and accessible. There was also a monthly list kept in the ACR with an email sent to the individual.
	Standards Implementation			There was evidence that the Unit adhered to the ATMAS with endorsements lapsed/suspended when appropriate. GTOs were generally not kept up to date or logged on ATMPD with examples of major holes in some areas for a large proportion of personnel. It was recommended that the Unit create a system of ensuring that all GTOs were signed off prior to endorsement for particular disciplines and entered onto ATMPD. F5993s were administered and inputted correctly with sufficient detail provided. The UStanO had an effective tracker in place. A robust system was in place to ensure that controllers were checked every 6 months including a major discipline plus PA/SRA. The Unit had also ensured that live PA/SRA were included annually on checks. A spreadsheet was in place that showed every score from a stds check, in particular all DPGs of -1. The scores were backed up with comprehensive comments. The Stds team acted on all results of the trend analysis. Stds bulletins were published and were thorough.
	Standards Development			A comprehensive trend analysis tool was in place that captured trends across the trg, stds and SMS pillars. However, this was standalone and there was no action tracker in place to provide an audit trail of when trends were actioned or seen through to completion. All BMD checks were in date were and a simple yet effective tracker was in place to ensure they remained so.



**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
Safety Management System (SMS)	SMS Achievement			Accurate and appropriate TORs were held on the Unit for all pers in the SMS Team. The [REDACTED] had not completed the essential trg as laid down in the BM SMM and had not booked the cses to complete this, it was recommended to the Unit that this be addressed as a matter of urgency. Although assured SM meetings took place monthly it was unfortunate that the records of decisions from these had been lost in the move to MOSS, therefore providing no auditable trail. Documentation and interface management was well controlled and understood.
	SMS Assurance			While a suitable SS had been undertaken in the previous year 15 SA had been started but not completed; and while these may have been for action with other depts no record of when or how these depts had been informed of the requirements for their comments was maintained. A sound RR was managed along with reporting and investigation processes; leading to fair and just corrective action, where appropriate. A very easy to use TA tool was employed by the FSO(BM) to highlight trends which were shown to the other Unit execs.
	SMS Promotion			While the Sqn arrivals forms were often missing signatures all Sqn pers interviewed confirmed they had received the SMS brf on arrival. CI was ongoing and evidenced through DASORs, investigations and TA which were all utilised. An effective tracker was utilised to identify pers that required HF trg. A sound safety culture was uncovered through interview as nearly all pers were aware who the SMS core staff were and how to complete a DASOR, all felt encouraged to do this and were aware of Just Culture.
Incident Response	Reaction	N/A		A practice crash was initiated to test the actions and reactions of ATC, the Fire Section and the Medics. The VCR team assimilated the Crash message quickly, taking Crash Action within 16 seconds. The ownership of radios, frequencies, surfaces etc was quickly and clearly issued, with good communications demonstrated between the VCR team. However, the Supervisor was not informed about the incident until approx 5 mins had passed. The Crash Crews responded quickly to the crash message; they were mobile in less than 1 minute, and arrived at their location in just under 3 minutes. The Medics initial reaction time was quick. However, due to taxing aircraft they elected to enter the runway, despite only requesting to cross, and took a rather circuitous route to the 'ejectee' arriving on scene over 5 minutes after the initial call.

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Control	N/A		When the Supervisor was eventually informed of the practice crash he arrived in the VCR almost immediately; by this point the practice was almost over. He did however take control of the post practice actions, and personally de-briefed the Medics as to their mistakes, and corrective actions required. The Crew Cdr provided effective control over the assets at his disposal. His instructions were clear and concise at all times.
<b>Orders and Procedures</b>	Documentation			A comprehensive document library was held in ATC, including a appropriately equipped Duty Aircrew position, with no significant discrepancies found; however there were a number of duplications of orders across Stn Order books. It was recommended that these orders be reviewed and left in the most appropriate document. Apart from a lack of HF recording the F8000s are maintained iaw policy. SATCO compiled and dispatched her F120 iaw policy, with evidence of good use of the Watch Log by the ATC Supervisor; all entries were appropriate with good use made of the left hand page, with evidence of good oversight by SATCO. WTD compliant rosters were issued well in advance, with a sensible spread of shifts to all personnel; however, there was no evidence of oversight by SATCO as she was not signing the rosters. The FMet 2309 was compiled iaw policy; it was recommended that once the FMet 2309 was checked by the controller that it be returned to the FOA position to complete the assurance circle. A robust WIP Briefing pack was held in the VCR; all Contractors were briefed on essential elements, utilising an appropriate checklist. It was recommended that contractors receive an Airfield Crash Map following the brief to assist with orientation.
<b>Local Order Book</b>	Local Order Book			A comprehensive LOB was held in ATC, with appropriate duplicates held, however the Release of Airfield Fire and Crash Assets order was under review with reference to the DFRMO Order in the Local Order Book (see ATMFO 200.485). This order was under development. A robust Red/Green T-Card was in place demonstrating that all staff were aware on document amendments and also monthly signing of orders. The Unit operated 12 LoA/MoUs, all of which were in date with signed originals available, and the Unit RVC was promulgated in the ACR iaw orders. The Unit had decided that they would operate non-SSR ops iaw extant MMATM Chp 35.7. This was largely due to the problems they had with tree infringements around the SSR. This risk had been fully Safety Cased and was held at DDH. The Unit have now elected to start a SA into SSR-Alone Ops; this was currently at Unit level.

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Administration			The Unit had removed the PIDAT Order following an email from the RLO stating that the PIDAT requirement had no place in Statute, that the BUPA contract had been cancelled, and therefore that PIDAT orders were no longer required. The Unit are awaiting further guidance from FLC. <i>Note from OC ATM Staneval dated 18 Jul 13 – Guidance has now been provided.</i>
Manning Personnel	Staff Levels			ATC was established for SATCO + 26 (holding SATCO + 25) and PFOM + 22 (holding PFOM + 21). The Unit were supposed to be established for SATCO + 27, however manning had 'ATM Manning' had taken a JPAN for one FS as a saving. No record of this agreement can be found. SATCO was investigating this with SO2 ATM Manpower, but this had not yet been resolved. No Unit personnel had carried over more than 15 days leave entitlement.
	ATC Execs			The SATCO was in post with another 18-24 months remaining. [REDACTED] SATCO did not have any other suitable flt lts to step into the role. This is a Blue Flash as there are no stated qualifications in Force Orders in order to make this an Amber Flash (required [REDACTED] qualifications). The Unit was operating under one LEO, who was shortly to [REDACTED]. She was also the UStanO, which was recommended against in ATMFO 300.135.2a. Succession planning was in place, however due to limited availability of suitable personnel, this situation was unlikely to improve in the short term. The UTO was suitably qualified and remaining in place for the foreseeable future.
Airfield Management	Safeguarding			The unit were currently reviewing all required waivers with the MAA. DIO had been requested, as SMEs, to advise SATCO on what all non-compliance issues on the airfield. SATCO enjoyed a good relationship with DIO and was invited to attend all siting boards. [REDACTED] was booked onto the recent CAA Aerodrome Operators Cse, but had to cancel due to a MAA Audit. She hoped to be allocated to the next cse. There was evidence that the Unit were operating the UHF ADC frequency beyond the published limits. The ADC Freq is capped at 4000', yet Lossie operate ac on that frequency from 10000' inbound.

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	DIO Biennial Survey			SATCO held a copy of the latest Biennial Survey (Aug 11). In addition she was awaiting the new report following a survey which took place in Mar 13. All recommended works were tracked through DIO and Turners, as well as being a standing agenda item in the SATCO's Quarterly Airfield Works Mtgs.
	Pavements and Ground Maintenance			SATCO completed weekly Airfield Inspections iaw policy which were recorded in the Watch Log; the Unit also maintained a separate tracker of all recording findings. SATCO held a copy of the latest MHS (dated Apr 13) and had completed a Gross Error Check. Routine RFM runs were being carried out, but the findings not recorded in the correct format. Print-outs of the runs were not being kept, and there was not evidence of 6-monthly baseline runs being run or recorded. It was recommended that baseline runs be carried out on all runways, in wet and dry conditions and printed for reference. It was also recommended that all RFM runs be printed and kept as an official record of the run, and to observe possible trends or deterioration in runway friction. SATCO held copies of both the latest runway friction report from DIO, and a local pooling plan. The unit adhered to the LGP, except where shorter grass was required due to other JSPs (Nav Aids, ESA).
	AGL			SATCO completed weekly Airfield Lighting iaw policy; these were recorded in the Watch Log, as well as a separate tracker of all findings. There was no evidence to suggest that the AGL was not operated iaw policy. A brilliancy guide was held in a portable Perspex sheet. However, it was recommended that this be relocated to a permanent position next to the lighting panel, to ensure instant access. PAPIs were inspected daily by the airfield inspector, and weekly by SATCO. There was evidence that airfield lighting inspections were being carried out prior to night flying, and that RVR procedures were being conducted and recorded iaw policy.
	BCU			██████ had not completed the AHVLA BCU Cse, but was booked to attend in Nov 13. BCU was conducted by Safeskys, having recently taken over from AWM Ltd. The majority of staff had remained in place; SATCO had no concerns over their performance. SATCO held a copy of the latest FERA Report, with the next inspection scheduled for Jul 13; all actions following these reports were tracked and actioned accordingly.

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Vehicles			Robust Airfield Driving Regulations had been drawn up by SATCO. These were available on the Stn Moss Site, in ATC and in MT. In addition the requirement for ADPs was articulated during Stn Arrivals. ATC maintained an ADP database which detailed all ADPs issued - available by name, section or expiry date. There was evidence that this was not being properly maintained. A percentage of ATC staff were checked, and while they were in date for their ADP, the database showed 6 personnel as being out of date. Breaches of Airfield Driving Discipline were dealt with robustly and consistently. Airfield signage was appropriate, in good condition and compliant with ref.
TG9 Documentation				A small Flight Planning section that complied to Stanag 3052. With the exception of major exercises (Joint Warrior, CQWI) this section appeared to be under-utilised by visiting aircrews which had impacted upon the morale of the Flt Pln personnel.
TG9 Trg	Training Management			PFOM had executive oversight of the TG9 Training & Standards processes at RAF Lossiemouth with the day-to-day administration delegated to his SNCOs IC and JNCO Training & Standards. He chaired regular Training & Standards meetings and signed the Stn Ops and Sqn Ops Weekly Training & Standards reports. PFOM was reliant on the correct completion of the Station-wide currency tracker for oversight of all sections, however, this tracker was out-of-date with evidence of incorrect dates inputted and incomplete data. Due to this, and the development areas highlighted in this report, PFOM did not have complete oversight of the TG9 Training & Standards processes. There was a general lack of attention to detail and knowledge in the implementation of ATM Force Orders Sect 500 policy which resulted in inconsistent results across the Unit. However, there was evidence of recent hard work to apply ATM policy with certain junior individuals in ATC carrying a large proportion of the workload. All Sections had an appropriate Training Team composition that had been qualified through TMT1, FOA Unit Trainers' Course or local OJTIT training. All personnel had been issued with TOR.

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Training Implementation			A comprehensive Arrival Booklet had been produced and all personnel had carried out a Health & Safety induction within respective Sections. All ATC personnel carried out Pistol Pyro training, however a check of the Pistol Pyro Tracker highlighted that an individual had operated in the VCR and Runway Caravan for 2 months post-OOA without a valid Pyro licence. An equipment check of the TRC was carried out iaw the MMATM. Sufficient stocks of Pistol Pyro cartridges were held and ALDIS lamps were serviceable with spare bulbs in place. The TRC was deficient of the Airfield Crash Map and the TRC-mounted windsock. There was no evidence in the Trg syllabus or the CoC that a familiarisation brief of all station based Aircraft had been achieved, only GR4 and not Sea-king. A comprehensive Local Knowledge Question Bank had been produced for use across the Station that contained a relevant number of questions with answers, however, the references to source documents were inconsistent. Some questions were specifically referenced, some were referenced to out-of-date documents (JSP552) and some were not referenced at all.
	Training Development			The Training Objective for Kinloss RLG did not contain a gear check for aircraft on finals or the need to scrutinise aircraft for defects. It was recommended that these key flight-safety checks were added, with an appropriate entry added into the Training Guide. References for RLG Kinloss were the RAF Kinloss FOB which was actually an annex to the RAF Lossiemouth FOB. Documentation was reviewed on a 6-monthly basis, with the last and next review dates listed except XV (R) Sqn Master Syllabus, which had no dates. The Kinloss RLG Training Objectives had lapsed its review date in May 13 with no evidence of subsequent review.

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
TG9 Standards	Standards Management			<p>PFOM had executive oversight of the TG9 Training &amp; Standards processes at RAF Lossiemouth with the day-to-day administration delegated to his SNCOs IC and JNCO T&amp;S. He chaired regular Training &amp; Standards meetings and signed the Stn Ops Weekly Training reports and Training &amp; Standards reports. PFOM was reliant on the correct completion of the Station-wide currency tracker for oversight of the other sections, however, this tracker was out-of-date with evidence of incorrect dates inputted and incomplete data. Due to this, and the development areas highlighted in this report, PFOM did not have complete oversight of the TG9 Training &amp; Standards processes. Standards and Currency checks were promulgated through the Station Tracker, but this was largely inaccurate with dates not corresponding to the actual dates of checks contained within the Training folders and some data omitted (DOC, PCC &amp; Flying Sqns Professional Knowledge test and ATC Pistol Pyro). It was recommended a full review of the tracker was carried out to ensure all data reflects the training folders.</p>
	Standards Implementation			<p>RAF Lossiemouth had embraced the new attribute based Stds form with narratives and scores of a satisfactory standard. There were inconsistencies with the correct version of the report form template, therefore it was recommended a single source document was utilised to ensure consistency across the Unit. Checks of Training Files highlighted some lapsed currencies with Standards Checks being conducted outside of the mandated currency period including key Trg &amp; Stds personnel. There was evidence from Standards Report forms that no-notice gear checks for runway controllers were undertaken during the routine 6-monthly Standards Check. The Stn Standards and Currency Tracker incorrectly listed the Post Validation Check for First Tourists carried out after 1 month and Multi Tourists carried out at 2 months. All personnel should have a Post Validation Standards Check between 5 and 28 working days after Validation. Monthly Standards Bulletins were published across the Station to highlight prevalent trends. However there was no evidence of a process to analyse data captured from Training Reports, Standards Reports and LK/PK examinations.</p>

**RESTRICTED STAFF**

Focus Area	Performance Area	IAR Apr 12 Standard	FOAR Jun 13 Standard	FOAR Comment
	Standards Development			ATC, Stn Ops, PCC utilised a red/grn T-Card system with PFOM utilising a CI tracker to implement and record changes to TG9 Training & Standards processes. 617 Sqn and XV(R) utilised a handover sheet to record Change Implementation across the shift. It was recommended that an Op/Admin info folder process was implemented for data capture and audit trail purposes. All personnel completed a Post-Training Questionnaire; however there was no evidence of Change Implementation as a result of specific and relevant feedback.