

# Releasing the Adaptive Power of Human Systems

35 years of Picking Up the Pieces After Explosions of Autonomy

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TRANSPORTATION

More: [Google](#) [Self-Driving Car](#) [Auto Industry](#) [Snow](#)

## The Enemy Of The Google Car Is – Snow!



MATTHEW DEBORD




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THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY



Autonomy is *powerful* -  
just don't stand nearby when it goes off

Autonomy is **not** a solution

"A little more technology will be enough, this time" (1984)

Opposition or Substitution of people and machines is a parlour game

Autonomy contributes to **Transformation**

Coordinating joint activity over new ranges and scales

Creates gaps between responsibility and authority

New forms of data overload, ...

Autonomy extends **Human Reach**

perception, action, speed, persistence, size, scale

| Autonomy, | **Complexity**


Underuse results from coping with complexity

S&T: Complex Adaptive Systems & Engineering Resilience

# Automation Surprises

Research Findings

Technology Events



- Complex Networks
- Resilience
- Human Expertise

- Connectivity
- Sensors
- Autonomy

*A little more technology will be enough...*

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## Key Questions to Seize Opportunity


What do we *know* now (or almost know) about harnessing the power of autonomy?

What *hobbles* putting this knowledge to use?

What is *different* about this explosion of autonomy?

How can we *harness* the power of new forms of autonomy?

# Automation Surprises



*A little more technology will be enough...*

**Timeline 1**

## **Ironies of Automation\***

LISANNE BAINBRIDGE†

**Key Words**—Control engineering computer applications; man-machine systems; on-line operation; process control; system failure and recovery.

NASA Contractor Report 177528

## **Human Factors of Advanced Technology ("Glass Cockpit") Transport Aircraft**

Earl L. Wiener

University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida

## **Human interaction with an "intelligent" machine**

E. M. ROTH, K. B. BENNETT AND D. D. WOODS

*Westinghouse Research and Development Center, Pittsburgh, PA 15235, U.S.A.*

## **How in the World Did We Ever Get into That Mode? Mode Error and Awareness in Supervisory Control**

Ladine B. Sarter

Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Ohio State University

David D. Woods

Cognitive Systems Engineering Laboratory, Ohio State University

## **THE PROBLEM OF AUTOMATION: INAPPROPRIATE FEEDBACK AND INTERACTION, NOT OVER-AUTOMATION**

Donald A. Norman

University of California, San Diego

NASA Technical Memorandum 104738

*26*

## **Making Intelligent Systems Team Players: Case Studies and Design Issues**


**Volume 1: Human-Computer Interaction Design**

Jane T. Malin

Debra L. Schreckenghost

David D. Woods, Scott S. Potter, Leila Johannesen, Matthew Holloway

Kenneth D. Forbus



## Automation-Human Coordination Breakdowns

**interface** *n* An arbitrary line of demarcation set up in order to apportion the blame for malfunctions.

Kelly-Bootle, 1995

### **Practitioners' View:** Coping with Complexity

- What's it doing?
- Why is it doing that?
- What will it do next?
- How did we get into this mode?
- How do I stop it from doing that?
- Why won't it let me do what I need?
- Stop interrupting me when I am busiest?
- How did I get here? How do I get back?

### **Developers' View:** Human Error

- System performed as designed.
- Erratic human behavior.
- We are very good generally.
- We are well-intended.
- We are better than previously.
- We only provided what the customer asked for.
- Other parts of the system haven't kept up with us.
- Our next version will be better (not that anything was wrong with previous models)
- If we fixed that we would introduce new issues/problems/errors.

### **First Law Of Cooperative Systems:**

→ It's not cooperation, if either you do it all or I do it all.

→ Cooperative problem solving occurs when the agents coordinate activity in the process of solving the problem.


Global Hawk UAV, 98-2003, 19991206, FSPM 1201A



Photo #3

# Why didn't they stop the automation?

Global Hawk UAV, 98-2003, 19991206, FSPM 1201A



IMPACT SITE

Global Hawk UAV, 98-2003, 19991206, FSPM 1201A



Photo #1

AERIAL VIEW OF AIRCRAFT



## Literal Minded machines


- can't tell if their model of the world is the world they are in; human role to align or repair the context gap.
- The automation did the right thing [given its model of the world] when it was in a different world!
- People failed to close the context gap.

Missing side effects

Cross checks

### **Norbert's Contrast** (Wiener, 1950)

Artificial agents are literal minded and disconnected from the world, while human agents are context sensitive and have a stake in outcomes.



Multiple Cycles of Automation Surprise



## Designer's claims contrasted with real operational experience

### Putative benefit

better results,  
same system (substitution)

frees up resources: 1.  
offloads work

frees up resources: 2.  
focus user attention  
on the right answer

less knowledge/training

autonomous machine

same feedback

generic flexibility

reduce human error

### Real complexity

transforms practice, the roles of people change

create new kinds of cognitive work, often at the wrong times

more threads to track; harder to remain aware of and  
integrate all of the activity and changes

new knowledge/skill demands, more practice

team play with people is critical to success

new levels and types of feedback are needed to  
support peoples' new roles


rigid; explosion of features, options and modes create  
new demands, types of errors, and paths towards failure

brittle machines; human-machine coordination breakdowns

# Automation Surprises

Research Findings


Technology Events



*A little more technology will be enough...*

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# Automation Surprises



**Timeline 2**

*A little more technology will be enough...*


# Defense Science Board Task Force on Autonomy

put **Mission**, not platform, first  
software intensive, moving target network


- coordinate across multi-role, multi-echelon network
- dynamics of pacing, tempo, synchronization
- respect/navigate multiple trade-offs

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Mission-oriented




War without  
soldiers



Amsterdam plane crash

- ~ cycles of Automation Surprise  
"A Little More Technology Will be Enough, This Time"
- ~ Autonomous capabilities of platforms will grow and reverberate  
Seize opportunities these changes create, via systems approaches
- ~ Systems Approaches: Joint Systems, Complex Networks,  
Critical Software Services, & still Human Systems

War without  
soldiers



Amsterdam plane crash

Systems Approaches:

- *Joint Systems*: people/sensors/machines as a distributed cognitive work system; literal minded automation; coordination, extended reach/perception
- *Complex Adaptive Networks*: co-adaptive, inevitable surprise, brittleness, resilience, polycentric, cascades
- *Critical Software Services*: moving target, life cycle, reuse
- *Human Systems*: problem holders, stakeholders, double binds, responsibility



## Key Questions to Seize Opportunity

What do we *know* now (or almost know) about harnessing the power of autonomy?

### **Coordination & Synchronization**

What *hobbles* putting this knowledge to use?

### **Substitution Myths**

What is *different* about this explosion of autonomy?

### **Scale, Reach, Adaptiveness**

How can we *harness* the power of new forms of autonomy?

### **Overcome Brittleness / Expand Resilience & Adaptive Capacities**