

DFID-funded Emergency Food Security Project in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah Governorates of Yemen

End of Project Evaluation Report June 2013

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Acronyms

CFSS	Comprehensive Food Security Survey
CRM	Complaints and Response Mechanism
CSI	Coping Strategy Index
DFID	Department for International Development
ESN	Emergency Safety Net
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FGDs	Focus group discussions
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
HAP	Humanitarian Accountability Partnership
HEA	Household Economic Approach

HDDS	Household Dietary Diversity Score
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDIs	In-depth Interviews
I/NGOs	International Non-Governmental Organisations
KII	Key Informant Interviews
PDM	Post-Distribution Monitoring
SCI	Save the Children International
SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment for Relief and Transition
SWF	Social Welfare Fund
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

In September 2012 SCI launched a six-month emergency project (“the project”) funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to respond to the critical food security situation across Yemen following the political and economic turmoil in 2011. The project sought to improve household food security of rural populations, including marginalised and non-marginalised communities, through the provision of staple food vouchers in Taiz (to 10,000 households) and unconditional cash transfers in Lahj (to 4,000 households) southern governorates. In January 2013 the project was also launched in the northern governorate of Hajjah where unconditional cash transfers were distributed for three months (to 6,000 households). With the last transfer a cash grant for livelihoods support was also distributed to all beneficiaries in Lahj, and to beneficiaries in two districts in Taiz.

This report is the outcome of an independent end of project evaluation conducted between May and June 2013. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess to what degree the project has been successful in achieving its specific objective of improving household food security in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah, and to investigate relevance and appropriateness of the modalities of vouchers and cash in relation to the contexts in which they were used, effectiveness, cost-efficiency, wider impacts of the project, and coverage.

The methodology used for this evaluation was primarily qualitative, using a combination of primary data collected through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)/In-depth Interviews (IDIs) (44), Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) (27), and rapid interviews (11) during approximately three weeks of fieldwork in Yemen, and secondary data including qualitative and quantitative SCI project data, as well as other evaluations, project documents, researches collected through desk-based research.

Relevance and appropriateness

The findings of the Comprehensive Food Security Survey (CFSS) carried out by WFP in 2012 have provided the evidence-base and informed a number of aspects of project design, including the overall goal of the project of improving household food security and the decision-making around geographical targeting and choice of transfer modality.

The findings of the CFSS pointed to a correlation between rising food prices in 2011 and worsening household food security across Yemen, including in the governorates of Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah, with insecurity defined by reduced consumption of high-protein, high-nutrient foods and increased reliance on staple foods (WFP, 2012). The same survey also found that the primary cause of increased rates of food insecurity was linked to lack of economic access to food - and especially to fresh, nutritious food-, rather than availability of food in the market (*Ibid.*).

The evaluation found that the overall objective of the intervention was grounded on available evidence and that the basic conditions for implementing a cash-based response were in place. Despite the existence of different preferences, the findings also indicated that food vouchers and cash transfers were in line with local needs and beneficiaries’ preferences. Strong commitment to enabling beneficiaries to raise complaints regarding the

project and a fairly comprehensive monitoring system were also observed. A key consideration is that the very tight timeframe set by the donor for the project, from the narrow funding window for submitting proposals, to planning, designing and getting activities off the ground has had significant repercussions on a number of aspects, including on decision-making processes on project design and implementation.

The evaluation however finds that the relevance and appropriateness of the project was challenged by a number of factors including:

- The overall goal of the intervention of improving food security through a six-month (and in Hajjah three-month only) cash-based response is found to be too ambitious as meaningful improvements in food security can hardly be achieved through short-term, emergency-based responses.
- The decision to roll out project activities in areas where needs were not the greatest, that were not operationally known to SCI, and where no assessments were conducted was found to be not appropriate.
- A number of aspects related to transfer modalities and distribution were informed by assumptions and/or SCI's previous experience in other governorates, rather than by evidence. These include:
 - lack of inclusion of fresh foods among items redeemable through the vouchers, despite the overall project goal of increasing food security, also through dietary diversity;
 - the value of the transfer, set on the basis of calculations conducted for other interventions in other parts of the country, but which was not in line with local average household income;
 - distribution of one voucher book with three coupons for the total transfer value, as SCI had done for other voucher-based responses in other governorates, but which did not reflect beneficiaries' market behavior and local market dynamics.

Effectiveness

An assessment of whether the project was effective in meeting the stated objective of improving household food security, whether the intervention achieved the expected results for cash and vouchers against indicators in the logframe; and whether the response was timely was particularly challenging.

A key limitation of determining the effectiveness of the intervention relates to a number of weaknesses in the quantitative data, and particularly endline/baseline surveys. This has affected the ability to provide a conclusive answer on whether the monthly transfers have led to improvements in household food security.

Project results that were stipulated in the logframe were articulated around the project reaching 'the most vulnerable' (with cash in Lahj and Hajjah and voucher transfers in Taiz). The evaluation found a certain degree of ambiguity and 'preemption' when looking at the way project results were set, since in all governorates the number of beneficiaries targeted by the project was determined already at the project design stage. As such, it is difficult to see how this target population could indeed be 'the most vulnerable'. Baseline survey data also indicate that more than half of beneficiaries targeted by the project were not food insecure, which is a source of concern if the project sought to target 'the most vulnerable'.

As with timeliness, the evaluation has found that the short-term injection of resources has helped cash and voucher beneficiaries to acquire food and, thanks to the cash grant to also invest in small stock and repay food-related debts. While this support was widely welcomed, beneficiaries found it difficult to link it to the food crisis of 2011. Against this background therefore assessing the timeliness of the project is not straightforward.

A key conclusion in this regard is that short-term emergency interventions are unlikely to be an effective and appropriate response to food insecurity in this context. Livelihood-based responses supported by longer-term funding are needed to more strategically and effectively respond to the developmental challenges that confront poor rural Yemeni households.

A basic calculation to compare selected costs incurred by SCI to provide food vouchers with the costs of providing cash transfers shows that vouchers were more expensive to implement. That said other factors, which are less easy to quantify, should be taken into account for a meaningful indication of cost effectiveness of vouchers vs cash, including time and human resources needed to implement different activities, beneficiaries' time and transport costs, and crucially, the objectives of the project.

Gender dynamics

While project design was not explicitly informed by gender considerations, the evaluation nonetheless explored whether cash and voucher transfers had any effect on gender dynamics. The findings indicate that the temporary injection of resources led to decreased tensions and arguments between husbands and wives. The positive effect on intra-household relations was however limited to the duration of the project. The findings also revealed that women may have, to a certain degree, more control over food than cash. While women appeared to exert a high level of control over household food supply, they seemed to have less control over cash, which was mostly spent to buy food and other necessities by men. More analysis is needed to understand these dynamics.

Coverage

The findings of the evaluation pointed to a shift in the targeting approach: from project design which sought to work with existing beneficiaries' lists of the Government Social Welfare Fund (SWF) as a starting point for targeting, to a community-based approach used during project implementation, which entailed the establishment of local committees to identify and register project beneficiaries. Notwithstanding challenges and opportunities identified by the evaluation around the role and functioning of the local committees, reliance on community-based targeting despite the existence of a cash-based government social protection programme raises concerns around exit strategies, the legacy of the project, and, crucially, around coordination with existing government structures.

Lastly, the evaluation found widespread perceptions of project recipients being indeed amongst the most vulnerable in the community. There were however also constant mentions of exclusion errors: that very poor, vulnerable families and individuals who deserved assistance had not been included in the project. Possible drivers of these perceptions included communities' limited knowledge or understanding of targeting criteria,

and some criteria not being aligned with local understanding of need and vulnerability, also because communities were not involved in the identification of targeting criteria at the outset of the project. Community-level tensions were the most significant and widespread negative effects of project and were predominantly driven by general perceptions of exclusion errors.

A summary of key recommendations is provided below, while more specific recommendations can be found in the Recommendation section below and throughout the report.

Key recommendations

- Ensure that contextual assessments guide the design and implementation of project activities;
- Ensure that the choice of transfer modality, items redeemable by vouchers, and cost-efficiency considerations are tied to and in line with project objectives;
- Consider strengthening data collection and analysis;
- Invest in communication and awareness-raising efforts with programme beneficiaries and communities;
- Premise the establishment of committees and any new structures, bodies or entities on robust stakeholder analysis;
- Build a relationship with the SWF and enhance intra-agency coordination;
- Ensure that a cohesive approach of engagement with the SWF is developed, from country office to field offices.
- Further explore the appropriateness of implementing livestock-based livelihood support initiatives;
- If future initiatives targeting women include conditions, ensure that they are premised on the understanding of women's multiple daily tasks and responsibilities;
- Build upon the project experience to include marginalised communities, and consider integrating food security and livelihoods interventions with protection.
- Donor-funded initiatives should move away from short-term emergency interventions to longer-term responses, backed by longer-term funding mechanisms.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

Country context

Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world and the poorest in the Middle East. For decades Yemen has faced multiple challenges, including chronic poverty and inequity, malnutrition and food insecurity, illiteracy, high levels of unemployment and population growth, natural disasters, conflict and insecurity.

Yemen is highly reliant on food imports to satisfy domestic demand - over 91% of wheat and 100% of rice is imported-, making it especially vulnerable to food price volatility (World Bank, 2009g in Jones et al., 2009). Already in 2008-09, rising commodity prices, including food, as a result of the global financial crisis had triggered a marked inflation increase (from 8% in 2007 to 19% in 2008) and an alarming deterioration in food security (*Ibid.*; WFP, 2012).

In 2011, a series of destabilising events across the country – including sweeping mass demonstrations calling for regime change and reform in the wake of the Arab Spring, ongoing conflict between government forces and insurgents in the northwest and southern areas of the country, and the Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) gaining increasing influence - sparked renewed insecurity, drove rising commodity prices, and exacerbated chronic vulnerabilities particularly with regards to nutrition and food security (Bagash, 2012; WFP, 2012; UN-OCHA, 2012a).

A Comprehensive Food Security Survey (CFSS) conducted by WFP in 2012 found 44.5% of the country's population to be food insecure – a marked increase of more than 40% over the figure recorded by the same survey in 2009 (WFP, 2012). Until 2011, international humanitarian actors had concentrated their operations on conflict-afflicted northern Yemen. The findings of the WFP CFSS and subsequent nutrition surveys (SMART¹) conducted by UNICEF and the Ministry of Public Health and Population at governorate level, brought under the spotlight the critical food security situation across the country, which the 2012 Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) defined “a complex emergency affecting Yemen as a whole” (UN-OCHA, 2012a: 8).

Overview of study sites: Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah governorates²

Taiz is the country's most populous governorate, with an estimated population of 2,813,950 as of 2012 (WFP, 2012). The governorate's capital is Taiz City, the third largest city in Yemen after Sana'a and Aden. As a result of the proximity to the city of Aden, historical exposure to information and a tradition as a centre of education, the people of Taiz have a high level of education and society is quite politicised (Bagash et al., 2012).

The total population of Lahj governorate, located in the southeast areas of the country and bordering Taiz, is estimated at 858,777, with the overwhelming majority (91%) living in rural areas (WFP, 2012). In 2012, fighting between Yemeni government forces and insurgents in

¹ The nutrition surveys employed the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment for Relief and Transition (SMART) methodology.

² Food security data for each governorate is found in Table 2 in Section 2 below.

the neighbouring Abyan governorate resulted in the displacement of nearly 200,000 people, many of which fled to neighbouring Lahj governorate (OCHA, 2012). The Southern Separatist Movement or Al Hirak³ is very active in Lahj, with many communities also in the rural areas visited by the evaluation team, mobilized into the movement.

The governorate of Hajjah, located in the northeast of the country hosts an estimated total population of 1,795,456 people (WFP, 2012). In 2009 Hajjah received thousands of IDPs as a result of the 6th war in neighbouring Sa'ada, and in early 2012 another wave of people were displaced inside Hajjah Governorate as a result of conflict between Al Houthi forces and local tribes⁴.

1.2 Overview of SCI's project

Save the Children International (SCI) has been working in Yemen since 1963, mainly in child protection, child rights governance, education and health and nutrition. In September 2012, SCI launched a six-month emergency project ("the project") funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) to address food insecurity and poor nutrition in Taiz and Lahj governorates. In December 2012, DFID provided additional funding to respond to food insecurity in Hajjah through a three-month project, which started in February 2013.

In all three governorates the objective of the project was *"to improve household food security among food insecure and conflict-affected families"*. The four outputs or results expected of the project were:

- Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Taiz have received cash and vouchers to meet basic food needs
- Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Lahj and Hajjah have received cash assistance to meet basic food needs
- Household Economic Approach (HEA) framework applied to livelihoods zones⁵
- Vulnerable households receive cash grants / vouchers for livelihood assets

The six months project targeted rural communities, both marginalised (*mohamasheen*⁶) and non-marginalised- and provided beneficiaries with a transfer value of 10,700 YER (50 USD) per month per household through staple food vouchers in Taiz, and unconditional cash transfers in Lahj and Hajjah⁷. Vouchers could be exchanged with any food item⁸ available at selected vendors contracted by SCI, except for powdered milk and a limited quantity of soap⁹. To disburse cash to beneficiaries, SCI established a partnership with Al Karimi Bank

³ Al Hirak is a popular movement active in the southern governorates of Yemen since 2007; its main demand is secession from the Republic of Yemen and independence.

⁴ http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/New_idps_accessHajjah_2703122.pdf

⁵ As per discussions with SCI and as indicated in the TOR, the evaluation does not focus on this output.

⁶ The marginalised or in Arabic *mohamasheen* are an ethnic minority group, distinguished by their black African physical features and stature. Though Arabic-speaking Muslims, for centuries they have been considered 'servants' (*akhdam*) by mainstream Yemeni society. They are marginalised across social, economic, and political spaces, live clustered in rural villages or urban areas, and are at the very bottom of the societal ladder, mostly confined to menial jobs and begging, the latter especially for women and children (Bagash et al., 2012; Al-Naggar and Dyrhagen Husager, 2012).

⁷ In Hajjah the duration of the project was three months only.

⁸ Food vendors contracted by SCI did not stock vegetables and fruit but only staple food and non-food items. See Section 2 for more discussion.

⁹ For up to 700 YER (3.23 USD) per voucher

and its agents in Lahj, and with Post Offices in Hajjah. In Taiz and Lahj hygiene and nutrition awareness sessions and messages (e.g. flyers and banners) were also delivered to beneficiaries at distribution points.

At the project inception phase a buffer grant was set aside as contingency for potential rises in food prices during project implementation. As this did not happen, the buffer grant was used to provide beneficiary households in selected districts (see Table 1 below) with a cash grant of 27,800 YER (130 USD) in the last transfer distribution as livelihoods support.

Table 1: Overview of the project implemented in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah governorates

Governorate/ District	Modality of intervention	Transfer value	Value of last transfer distribution	Coverage	Project duration
Taiz Dimnet Khadir, Al Ma'afer, Al Mawasit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Food vouchers • Hygiene and nutrition awareness sessions • Cash grant of 130 USD for livelihoods support (Al Ma'afer, Al Mawasit) 	Face value of 50 USD per month	180 USD (50 + 130 USD)	10,000 HHs	Dec-Apr (5 transfers)
Lahj Al Milah, Radfan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unconditional Cash Transfers • Hygiene and nutrition awareness sessions • Cash grant of 130 USD for livelihoods support 	50 USD per month	180 USD (50 + 130 USD)	4,000 HHs	Dec-Apr (5 transfers)
Hajjah Aslam	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unconditional Cash Transfers 	50 USD per month	100 USD	6,000 HHs	Jan-Mar (3 transfers)

1.3 Aim and scope of the evaluation

The purpose of this end of project evaluation is to assess to what degree the project has been successful in achieving its specific objective of improving household food security and in achieving the expected results. This report explores in the following order relevance and appropriateness of the modalities of vouchers and cash in relation to the contexts in which they were used, effectiveness, cost-efficiency, wider impacts of the project, and coverage. The evaluation makes recommendations for future interventions for SCI, and the recommendations can also be useful for other I/NGOs working in Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) in Yemen. Throughout the evaluation the quality of the project against international standards such as the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) standards (HAP) and the Sphere Handbook (SPHERE, 2011) is considered. The evaluation gives particular focus to gender dynamics.

1.4 Methodology

The evaluation took place from May till June 2013, with fieldwork in Sana'a and in selected project sites in Taiz, Lahj, and Hajjah from 18th May till 6th June. The methodology used for

this evaluation was primarily qualitative, using a combination of primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) / In-depth Interviews (IDIs) (44), Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) (27), and rapid interviews (11). Secondary data was collected through desk-based research, and included SCI project documents (e.g. project narratives, interim reports, other evaluations) and quantitative data collected and analysed by SCI (e.g. monthly monitoring data, and endline and baseline surveys for Taiz and Lahj¹⁰). Surveys, evaluations, studies, reports etc. of other agencies working in FSL in Yemen were also reviewed (see Annex 5 for detailed methodology).

2. Relevance and appropriateness

To determine the relevance and appropriateness of the project, this section explores the rationale underpinning the overall goal of the intervention of improving household food security, the decision-making process around geographical targeting (governorate/district), and around transfer and distribution modalities, including transfer value. Beneficiaries' preferences of vouchers versus cash, and beneficiaries' participation, with particular reference on complaint mechanisms and monitoring activities are also investigated here.

2.1 Overall project objective: improving food security

According to a number of project documents (e.g. project proposals/narratives), and to all SCI staff interviewed for this evaluation, the overall objective of the intervention was to improve household food security through increased access to more food and to a more diverse diet¹¹. That said, this same objective does not appear in the logframe, which instead states the outcome of the project as *“people affected by conflict, disaster and economic decline are assisted and protected”* (see Annex 8). In the 'Indicator Performance Tracking Table' the overall project goal (for Hajjah for example) is yet different: *“purchase adequate food in local markets and reduce malnutrition amongst children as well as bring additional money to local traders and improve local economies”*.

Since discussions with SCI staff clearly indicated that the aim of the intervention was to enhance household food security, this evaluation takes this as the main objective and refers to it throughout the discussion. That said, the evaluation notes that **the objective of the intervention is not consistently defined across documents. For a number of reasons, including, crucially, the guidance of monitoring and evaluation activities, it is important that the overall objective of the intervention is clearly and uniquely defined.**

Discussions with SCI staff and a review of project documents revealed that the rationale for setting the goal of improving household food security was grounded on available, yet limited, secondary evidence, notably on the findings of the CFSS carried out by WFP in 2012. The survey found a correlation between rising food prices in 2011 and deterioration of dietary diversity nationwide, and especially in rural areas. In particular, food price increases were found to be most substantial for perishable items such as meat, eggs, milk, vegetables, and fruits because of the need for timely transport, which was compromised by escalating

¹⁰ Baseline and endline narrative reports were not received for Hajjah, and as such when reference is made on baseline/endline data throughout the evaluation report it refers to Taiz and/or Lahj only.

¹¹ The indicators used to measure food security status in the logframe, baseline/endline surveys were Food Consumption Score (FCS), Household Dietary Diversity (HDDS), as well as Coping Strategy Index (CSI).

fuel prices and volatile fuel availability (WFP, 2012). In turn, this triggered “a significant fall in the consumption of fruits, vegetables, pulses, meat, and dairy products” between 2009 and 2011 (WFP, 2012: 23).

As such, the WFP CFSS survey identified a situation of worsening household food insecurity across Yemen, with insecurity largely defined by reduced consumption of high-protein, high-nutrient foods and increased household reliance on staple foods. **While the overall objective of the evaluation is supported by available secondary evidence on worsening food insecurity in Yemen, the findings of the evaluation point to the following two key considerations.**

Firstly, a look at the CFSS methodology reveals that, in order to assess the state of household food insecurity in Yemen, the survey relied on two proxy indicators, namely the food consumption score (FCS) and the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) (see WFP, 2012: 16). It was beyond the scope of this evaluation to verify the robustness of WFP CFSS data collection and findings, but since the CFSS provided the evidence-base for setting the overall objective of the intervention (as well as other aspects of project design as discussed in the following sections), it is important to point to the intrinsic limitations of these indicators. FCS, CSI, and other food security indicators can only provide snapshots of household food consumption, as related to the diversity of diets or coping mechanisms with nutritional impacts. They do not, however, provide decision-makers with any information on other fundamental dimensions of food security, such as the extent to which households will be able to meet future needs, or just where an insecure household is along a nutrition insecurity continuum that runs from starvation to full nutrition security. Therefore, **the picture of the state of food security depicted by the CFSS was inevitably incomplete and the available, yet limited, secondary data should have been complemented by more in-depth qualitative and quantitative context-specific assessments to guide project design, targeting, and activities** (See section 2.2 for more discussion).

Secondly, if the overall goal of the project was to improve food security a key, overarching question remains of whether a six-months (and in Hajar three-months only) cash-based intervention was a relevant and appropriate response in this context. This will be discussed more in-depth in the sections below. A key observation here is that **the stated project objective is too ambitious, since meaningful improvements in food security with households enjoying both present *and* future access to food, cannot be achieved through short-term, emergency-based responses.**

2.2 Decision-making processes on geographical targeting and transfer modalities

Geographical targeting: governorates and districts

Review of project documentation as well as discussions with staff from SCI indicated that the decision-making process on which governorates and districts to target was informed by the following considerations¹²:

¹² Interviews with other international actors working in Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) indicated many similarities with SCI’s decision-making process, particularly around secondary data and feasibility considerations.

- **Available data on needs:** the findings of a) WFP CFSS, which presented a picture of the food security and nutrition needs across the country and, b) UNICEF SMART surveys, which focused on needs at governorate level.
- **Feasibility of operations:** including the operational environment (e.g. security risks and access, remoteness, availability of infrastructures such as banks, airports), presence of SCI (to facilitate scaling up of operations) and other agencies (to avoid duplication, findings from past monitoring, evaluations and assessments (to draw upon to guide design and implementation)).
- **Discussions with the donor:** discussions between SCI and DFID on where to target pointed to DFID’s inclination for SCI to expand its presence in-country and work in areas where I/NGOs’ presence was limited.
- **Time:** a leitmotif of interviews with SCI staff was the very tight timeframe within which SCI had to work for this project; from the narrow funding ‘window’ set by the donor for submission of project proposals, to the very short-time for design, planning and implementation of activities. When SCI and DFID discussed the availability of additional funding for Hajjah, SCI was reportedly given only a few days to put together a project proposal. As discussed below time is a factor that has profoundly affected a number of decisions related to this project.

Discussions with SCI indicated that considerations around scale of need were ultimately balanced with reflections around feasibility, or the actual ability of SCI to operate in given areas, and eventually a decision was made to target the governorates of Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah. In Hajjah SCI had offices and ongoing operations also in food security and nutrition; in Lahj SCI had operations (managed from the Aden office) but no office presence¹³; and in Taiz SCI had no operations or office presence¹⁴.

The findings of the evaluation indicate that the districts chosen were new areas of operations where SCI had not worked before. In some governorates, SCI targeted districts that were neighbouring others where operations were or had been recently ongoing (e.g. in Hajjah: the district of Mustabah – where SCI was implementing an ECHO-funded FLS and nutrition project, is neighbouring Aslam, where SCI implemented the project). A first reflection on the decision-making process above, corroborated by discussions with SCI staff and secondary data, is that considerations around the scale of needs were an influential, but not central factor in SCI’s thinking and decision-making process on where to target emergency assistance. A look at WFP CFSS data in Table 2 below for example shows that in the governorates of Al Bayda and Sana’a food insecurity was substantially higher than in the governorates chosen by SCI.

Table 2: Food insecurity prevalence and number in selected governorates

Governorate	Total Population	% Food Insecure			Number Food Insecure		
		Severe	Moderate	Total	Severe	Moderate	Total
Hajjah	1,795,456	31%	23%	53%	551,121	405,983	957,104
Taiz	2,813,950	22.4%	25.4%	47.8%	630,258	714,860	1,345,118
Lahj	858,777	23.5%	34.5%	58.0%	201,767	295,905	497,671

¹³ In October 2012 a new office was opened in Lahj to roll out project activities

¹⁴ Similarly to Lahj, in October 2012 a new office was opened in Taiz City to roll out project activities

Al Bayda	669,921	61.0%	15.5%	76.5%	408,454	104,166	512,620
Sana'a	1,052,409	45.4%	23.7%	69.1%	477,548	249,276	726,824

Source: WFP, 2012

The evaluation takes a pragmatic view and recognises that decisions about humanitarian response, including around geographical targeting, whether by agencies or donors, are in most contexts influenced by a wide range of factors, and how central the analysis of need is to the decision-making process and how it relates to other factors involved, ultimately varies. Yet, a fundamental source of concern with the outcome of the above decision-making process is that the districts chosen were not known - from an operational point of view - to SCI. Furthermore, as explained by project staff interviewed, because of time constraints no situational and need assessments (e.g. on needs, vulnerabilities and capacities, market dynamics, stakeholder analysis, etc.) were conducted in the selected districts to strategically guide the design of project activities and the targeting of assistance. In the absence of context-specific assessments at district level, assumptions were often made, for example that the situation of neighbouring districts would be similar, or that SCI's interventions that had been successful in other districts or governorates could be replicated in these areas. As the analysis in the following sections indicates however, the reality often indicated otherwise.

While there may be similarities on the ground and it is certainly a good idea to capitalise and draw on past experience, **assumptions and past experiences cannot be a replacement for context-specific assessments and evidence**. In light of the tight project timeframe, and the fact that the governorates/districts that were chosen did not have the greatest needs, (see Table 2), the **evaluation questions the appropriateness of choosing 'new' districts for response targeting**. Precisely because of tight time constraints an **alternative, possibly more realistic approach that could have been explored was scaling up and building on activities in governorates and districts where SCI had existing operations, particularly in food security and/or nutrition**.

The evaluation finds this aspect of project design to be not in line with minimum Sphere standards¹⁵.

Recommended action. Situational analysis and assessments should be context-specific and generate evidence that is then used to inform project design and implementation.

If time is a critical factor, explore the possibility of rolling out activities in areas that are known, thus at the very minimum building upon existing knowledge, presence, and operations.

Decision-making process on transfer modalities and transfer value

Vouchers, cash or in-kind food assistance?

¹⁵ "Effective humanitarian response must be based on a comprehensive, contextualised diagnosis (assessment, monitoring and evaluation), in order to analyse people's needs, vulnerabilities and capacities in each context" (SPHERE, 2011: 11).

Review of project documentation as well as discussions with staff from SCI indicated that the transfer modality choice was informed by secondary data (again WFP CFSS and UNICEF SMART surveys), consultations with other agencies working in FSL and SCI's own experience in-country. According to a SCI project staff, all these sources essentially indicated that food security in Yemen is highly dependent on market dynamics, and that rising food prices in 2011 had affected the ability of millions to access food (see also Section 1.1). Indeed, according to WFP CFSS survey "the primary cause of increased rates of food insecurity" was the lack of economic access to, rather availability of food in the market (WFP, 2012: 51). These considerations, together with concerns around the logistical and operational challenges related to setting up and implementing in-kind food transfers in a limited amount of time, led SCI to opt for a cash/voucher- rather than food-based response.

The evaluation agrees with the reasoning above and the choice of transfer modality, grounded on considerations and available evidence regarding market dynamics and issues of access and availability of food.

Discussions with SCI staff and review of project documents indicated that the decision-making process around where to implement food vouchers or cash transfers was influenced by the following context-specific factors:

- **Market access in Taiz:** because of previous experience with voucher-based responses in other governorates, SCI was inclined towards this transfer modality in both Taiz and Lahj. In Taiz, the idea of implementing a voucher-based response was supported by relatively good market access and a relatively stable and safe environment.
- **Insecurity in Lahj:** volatility and insecurity and consequent safety concerns for SCI staff and beneficiaries were key reasons driving the decision to distribute cash transfers instead of vouchers in Lahj which require less frequent monitoring and staff presence on the ground and are therefore seen as less visible than food voucher distributions.
- **Short project duration in Hajjah:** given the significant time constraints to roll out the project in Hajjah, SCI chose cash, which was seen as a transfer modality that could be rolled out quicker than vouchers.

Why staple food vouchers?

The evaluation also sought to understand why the intervention was not designed to have the vouchers redeemable for fresh foods. According to SCI project staff the inclusion of fresh foods was seen complex and time-consuming for two main reasons. Firstly, it needed to be premised on an analysis of the local supply chain of fresh food items. Conducting this analysis was considered challenging, especially in remote locations, and in view of the tight timeframe for design and implementation of the project. Secondly, donors' requirements on the process of tendering and contracting food vendors, including vendors' ability to prove registration and payment of commercial tax (*dariba tijaria*), limited the number and type of vendors that SCI could partner with. As several SCI staff explained, not all shop owners are registered to pay commercial taxes in Yemen, and less so small and/or mobile vendors who usually sell vegetables and fruits in rural areas. As such the shops that SCI contracted in Taiz and where vouchers could be redeemed were relatively big and registered to pay the commercial taxes, but stocked staple food and non-food items, and did not sell fresh foods.

The evaluation was not able to assess the effort that would have been required to include fresh foods – not only fruit and vegetables but also fresh meat for example- amongst items that could be redeemed by vouchers in Taiz. It also recognises that donor requirements of contracting food vendors were challenging, given local context and tight project timeframe. Nonetheless the evaluation observes a disconnect between the desire to promote dietary diversity in project documents (see Section 3.1) and the items available by the vouchers (staple foods).

Recommended action. Ensure that modalities of assistance, including items redeemable by vouchers, are explicitly tied to and aligned with project objectives (since it cannot be assumed that beneficiaries' behaviour will be in line with project objectives, in this case spending released income to consume more fresh food).

Value of the transfer

During the project proposal stage the value of vouchers and cash transfer was set at 10,700 YER (50 USD) per month. According to SCI staff interviewed and project documents (see Annex 4 Table 3 for SCI's food basket calculations), the transfer was intended to supplement household resources and cover 50% of the monthly household food basket for an average household of seven members. No food basket analysis was conducted in Taiz, Lahj or Hajjah at the time of project design, and food basket calculations and the value of the transfer were taken from previous or ongoing (at the time of project design) SCI's cash/voucher activities in other governorates.

Baseline (and endline) survey data provides information on the average household income in Lahj and Taiz, which can be usefully compared with the transfer value to understand whether the set value can be considered appropriate to meeting the stated objective of covering half of households' monthly food basket. According to baseline data, the average monthly household income in Lahj was 32,600 YER (151.70 USD) (endline data: 33,938 YER or 157.90 USD); in Taiz it was 13,540 YER (63 USD) (endline data: 11,017 YER or 51.26 USD). Provided that there are no errors in the above quantitative data around household income, there is clearly a significant difference between the average monthly income in Taiz vis-à-vis Lahj, with beneficiaries in Lahj earning on average more than double their counterparts in Taiz. As such, in Taiz the monthly transfer can be considered almost an additional income for the average family (50 vs 63 USD), while in Lahj it represented a third of the average income (50 vs 151.70 USD).

A similar, basic comparison between transfer value and average family income however does not seem to have been undertaken by project staff, as the transfer value has remained unchanged since the project proposal stage and has not been adjusted as a result of the above baseline survey findings (released in December 2012 and before the first transfer disbursement). There are a number of considerations that can be made on the appropriateness of the above process to determining the value of the transfer.

Firstly, and echoing the recommended action suggested above, **evidence rather than past experiences should guide response choices and modalities of interventions.** As the baseline findings indicate, there are marked differences between average income in Taiz vs Lahj, and other differences, such as food prices on which basket calculations are based for

instance, are to be expected. As such it is difficult to see how one calculation can be ‘safely’ replicated from one area to another so that it can effectively cover 50% of the household food basket. Secondly, **baseline surveys should be used not only as monitoring tools to observe the effects the cash and vouchers, but also to strategically inform, where possible, project design.** In this case the findings of the baseline surveys could have been used to adjust the value of the transfer, in Taiz for instance to possibly reduce it.

2.3 Beneficiaries’ preferences

The appropriateness of humanitarian responses, not only depends on the context and the objectives of the project, but also on other factors, including the preference of beneficiaries. Given time constraints for this evaluation, and the fact that the project chose cash and vouchers as transfer modalities, the investigation on beneficiaries’ preferences focused on vouchers vis-à-vis cash transfers. There is however clearly scope for more analysis around beneficiaries’ preferences of cash, vouchers, and in-kind food assistance.

Table 3 below collates responses from the FGDs and IDIs during which beneficiaries’ preferences was discussed¹⁶.

Table 3: Beneficiaries’ preferences food vouchers vs cash transfers

Governorate and modality of intervention	Beneficiaries’ preference		FGDs/IDIs during which preference was discussed
	Food vouchers	Cash Transfers	
Taiz (food vouchers)	10	2	12
Lahj (cash transfers)	6	5	11
Hajjah (cash transfers)	0	6	6

The widespread preference of beneficiaries in Taiz towards food vouchers can probably be explained in part by satisfaction with the functioning and benefits of the project (see Section 3), and in part by the natural bias of beneficiaries towards the last type of assistance that they received. What this evaluation found interesting however, was the preference among cash transfer beneficiaries in Lahj for food vouchers, notwithstanding satisfaction with the functioning and benefits of cash assistance as well.

When asked why they preferred vouchers, beneficiaries in Taiz and in Lahj provided similar explanations. The expression “*cash flies*” was frequently used to describe how, unlike food, cash is easily and quickly spent on a myriad of needs, including health, education, debt repayment, social and familial obligations, transport. In Lahj there were also mentions, particularly by men, that each time they went to the market place to purchase food for the household they ended up spending money. During a FGD discussion with men beneficiaries in Radfan, Lahj one man noted:

¹⁶ It is important to recognise that ‘preference’ is a challenging issue to understand. For example, there is a tendency for respondents to express preference for the type of assistance that has been received, and replies can often reflect thoughts both on the value of the transfer as well as the modality (see Levine and Bailey, 2013).

“when you have money in your pocket you use it here and there and you don’t know where the money went. When I go to the market and I have cash I will buy water and food for myself, and if I see a friend I may also invite him. And if I have money and my friend is need, won’t I hand him out few hundred ryals?”

By contrast, food was widely seen as an asset and interestingly, a communal asset for the household, since its use was ultimately more predictable than cash and it benefited all household members. A marginalised woman in Al Ma’afer, Taiz explained:

“if you have food you store it in the house, it’s there, and everyone benefits from it. But if you have cash and you have a sick child you’ll take him to the doctor and in the end he’ll be the only one benefiting from that money.”

A number of considerations can be made on the basis of the findings above.

Beneficiaries’ preferences are context-specific and ultimately linked to several factors including people’s different experiences of poverty and vulnerability, different livelihoods options, market behaviour, extent of debt, and so on. For instance, Hajjah and Lahj are quite dissimilar contexts in many regards, and this could be part of the reason why different preferences were expressed. Beneficiaries’ ultimately found both transfers acceptable, but **as with any other form of assistance, for responses to be better aligned with beneficiaries’ preferences and needs, they should be informed by a good understanding of the context.**

Secondly, the findings of this evaluation have pointed to acute and widespread vulnerabilities, and especially among marginalised communities. As the quote above illustrates, the most vulnerable appear to be confronted with incredibly difficult trade-offs when meeting the most basic needs. This may explain preferences for food vouchers, which they consider as the type of assistance that more reliably guarantees their families access to the most basic need – food.

Lastly, it is important to note that beneficiaries also expressed preferences for assistance beyond cash and voucher transfers. Where possible, suggestions for future programming were collected as a way of concluding FGDs and IDIs, and in response several respondents proposed livelihoods projects, especially around water and agricultural management or rehabilitation. Interestingly, a number of respondents indicated communal aspirations and added that the “*whole community*” would benefit from such projects, unlike cash and voucher assistance which in the end only benefited specific households and left out others. The desire for longer-term support to livelihoods underscores that food security – meaning access to food not only in the present and but also in the future – is unlikely to be achieved through temporary interventions to increase access to food.

Despite the existence of different preferences, the evaluation found both food vouchers and cash transfers to be in line with local needs and priorities.

***Recommended action:* In consultation with communities and alongside cash or voucher assistance for the most vulnerable, further explore the possibility of implementing projects, such as agriculture or water rehabilitation, that can enhance the livelihoods and food security for the whole community.**

2.4 Cash and voucher distribution mechanisms

Cash transfers

In Lahj and Hajjah cash transfers were distributed to beneficiaries via Al Karimi Bank (and its agents), and Post Offices. As also confirmed by Post-Distribution Monitoring (PDM) data, there were no accounts of tensions or safety concerns at payment points. There were widespread mentions that banks and post offices were crowded, but beneficiaries, bank and post office staff, and committee members interviewed in Lahj and Hajjah all concurred that cash distributions were well-organised.

Transport costs: Interviews with beneficiaries revealed that the majority found payment points to be located close to their home and many said they were at walking distance. Indeed, in Hajjah specific efforts were made to bring payment points closer to beneficiaries and minimize transport costs, including an agreement with Post Office branches to set up mobile payment points to disburse cash transfers at village level (e.g. at schools). PDM enquiries captured distance (but not transport fees) to travel to payment point and, in line with the findings of the evaluation, only a small percentage of beneficiaries (around 10% in Hajjah, and 15% in Lahj) said it took them more than two hours to get to the bank or post office.

Some however, did mention that they sustained transport costs to collect cash transfers, ranging from 500 to 1,000 YER (2.30 to 4.61 USD). The farthest beneficiaries lived from the payment point the longer it took to reach and, in turn, the more money was spent in transport.

Food vouchers

Vouchers were distributed by SCI at selected local points at village level (e.g. schools), and could be redeemed at food vendors contracted by SCI within five days from distribution. Data collected by this evaluation and confirmed by PDM data, indicates that voucher recipients spent relatively little waiting time, half an hour or less, at distribution points. The process of exchanging vouchers at vendors was also widely perceived as working well and there were no accounts of tensions or safety concerns during distribution and voucher exchange.

Transport costs: Voucher recipients also sustained transport costs. Fieldwork findings however point to higher transport costs sustained by voucher beneficiaries to access assistance than by cash beneficiaries. The higher costs were linked to the fact that in order to obtain food, voucher beneficiaries had first to travel to the distribution point, and then to the selected food vendor, with the two sites often not close to each other. In Al Sahiha village in Taiz, which is the farthest village targeted by the project, a number of beneficiaries for example quantified the transport costs that they sustained every month in order to obtain food at 2,000 YER (9.23 USD) per household, which is nearly 20% of the face value of the voucher (10,700 YER or 50 USD).

In an attempt to minimize transport costs and time, beneficiaries in Al Ma'afer district explained that, following the first/second distribution they organised themselves to hire a truck, travelled from the village as a group to the distribution point, then went together to a selected food vendor to exchange their vouchers for food items, and returned to the village.

Number of vouchers: With each distribution, beneficiaries received one voucher book with three coupons¹⁷ for the total value of the transfer. According to a SCI staff interviewed in Taiz, this model was replicated from a food voucher programme that SCI had implemented in the Sa'ada governorate. As highlighted above however, voucher recipients organised themselves to travel together to collect vouchers, shop, and return to the village. Most had no interest, time or money to visit different vendors, who were not necessarily located next to each other and who ultimately also offered similar food items, in terms of type and quality. Furthermore, beneficiaries were purchasing staple food, i.e. several kilos of flour, sugar, litres of oil etc., meaning that it was simply not practical to shop around while carrying heavy weight.

While in some contexts providing beneficiaries with several coupons may be appropriate and may give them more flexibility and choice, it did not seem an appropriate distribution modality for Taiz as it did not reflect beneficiaries' behaviour and local market dynamics.

Recommended action: During the design phase and through on-going monitoring activities, assess the costs (transport and others) that beneficiaries may incur when collecting assistance, and ensure that such costs are part of transfer value calculations, adjusting the transfer value during implementation, if necessary.

With future programming in mind, assess beneficiaries' behaviour and market dynamics, and determine the number of vouchers and any other relevant distribution modality accordingly.

2.5 Beneficiaries' participation: complaint mechanism and monitoring

Involving communities and beneficiaries in humanitarian responses is essential to “providing assistance in ways that best meet their needs” (SPHERE, 2011: 23). Participation should be mainstreamed in all project phases from planning and design to monitoring and evaluation to enhance programme relevance, ownership, accountability, as well as effectiveness by providing channels for complaint and on-going feedback from beneficiaries. Accordingly, this section discusses the complaint mechanism and the monitoring system that were set up for the project¹⁸.

Complaint and response mechanism

The complaint and response mechanism (CRM) that SCI devised in Taiz and Lahj sought to provide beneficiaries with three channels through which to raise complaints and feedback. According to SCI project staff this system was explicitly designed to enable beneficiaries' access to at least one channel:

1. *For beneficiaries who could read and could afford the cost of a phone call:* Flyers in Arabic were handed out at distribution and payment sites, which included a mobile phone number for complaints (manned by a SCI staff).
2. *For beneficiaries who could write:* Complaint boxes were placed at payment/distribution points as well as at food shops in Taiz.

¹⁷ Two for a value of 5,000 YER (23.10 USD) each, and one for 700 YER (3.23 USD).

¹⁸ See Section 5.2 for a discussion on participation of beneficiaries' participation in the determination of targeting criteria.

3. *For beneficiaries who could not read, write, or afford the cost of a phone call:* A complaint/help desk manned by SCI staff was placed at distribution/payment sites. This channel also served to address complaints and issues related to transfer distribution on the spot. Furthermore, follow up face to face visits to beneficiaries were also conducted (see Box 1).

Given the three months project duration in Hajjah, no complaint box or complaint/help desk was put in place, but a phone line for beneficiaries' to raise complaints was activated. For future interventions SCI is also planning to roll out a newly piloted integrated CRM Accountability Tool.

Until February 2013 the three channels above were manned by SCI personnel who had other project-related tasks and responsibilities (e.g project assistants, M&E officers). Only towards the end of the project (end of February 2013) SCI recruited an accountability assistant to be in charge of the CRM in Taiz and Lahj. The final complaint report produced by the accountability assistant (covering the months of March and April), shows that a total of 240 complaints were received and that **the overwhelming majority (230) were actually from non-beneficiaries who were requesting to be included in the project.** On the one hand this finding indicates, as also highlighted above, that there were no major issues related to project implementation (e.g around distribution, availability of items to be redeemed with vouchers, waiting time at distribution and payment points etc.). On the other hand however, CRM data points to issues that may have to do with coverage, inclusion/exclusion errors, and information sharing about selection criteria. These are discussed in-depth in Section 3.3 and Section 5. When asked as part of the research process for this evaluation about the existence of complaints mechanisms, respondents in all sites were in general aware of the different complaint channels, and the majority knew of the existence of complaint/help desk and mobile numbers. This finding echoes the data of (some)¹⁹ PDM exercises. In Taiz for example, the PDM of the second distribution recorded that almost 80% of beneficiaries surveyed were aware of the existence of a complaint mechanism.

The qualitative work for this evaluation also probed beneficiaries about their experiences with the complaint system for this project. Very few respondents mentioned having raised a complaint either by phone or at the desk, and again this is an indication that the implementation of the project ran smoothly. Those who did, expressed their satisfaction with the way the complaint was handled, as the example in Box 1 shows. It is worth noting however that respondents' first reaction to questions around complaints was often along the lines of *"we are happy with the project, we have no complaints"*. While this does indicate a good degree of satisfaction, it can also denote a certain degree of bias and recipients' fear that expressing dissatisfaction or voicing discontent may lead to future withdrawal of assistance.

Box 1: Example of a complaint raising procedure

During an IDI, Ahmed, a married man from a marginalised community in the Al Mahwa village in Al Milah district, Lahj explained that he called SCI's mobile number for complaints

¹⁹ Not all PDM have collected and/or analysed data around beneficiaries' awareness of the existence of a complaint mechanism; see section below for more discussion on the monitoring system.

following the first cash transfer distribution, as the bank employee had found a discrepancy in the bank system between his national ID number and his SCI's beneficiary card number, and had advised him to call SCI to rectify the problem. Ahmed was happy with the complaint handling procedure. He added that the person who answered the phone was polite, took his details, and told him that a SCI project staff would come to the village the next day. The next day a SCI staff went to the village, visited him and rectified the problem.

The evaluation observed strong commitment to enabling beneficiaries to raise complaints and feedback regarding the project. Available findings point to good capacity to managing and redressing complaints with no indication of safety concerns. This aspect of the implementation is found to meet quality standards of HAP²⁰ and of Sphere Minimum Standards.

Monitoring of the project

The evaluation found a **fairly comprehensive monitoring system** put in place by SCI for this project, using different data collection methods, covering price trends, use of food vouchers and commodities exchanged, and issues related to the process of distribution and access to the transfers, captured through PDM exercises. **The monitoring system appears to have allowed the quick detection of problems and the evaluation observed that corrective actions were taken as a result**, as the two examples below show.

In Taiz, shop monitors were deployed at food vendors to do spot-check to identify possible problems with vouchers exchanges. Their presence enabled the identification of cases (albeit reportedly these cases were only a few) where vendors sold beneficiaries items of inferior quality or for a higher price. As a result, SCI promptly issued a warning to vendors and in one case a contract (between SCI and the vendor) was ended. Another example was found in Lahj where, according to a SCI staff interviewed, during the first transfer payment because of lack of organisation and crowdedness, beneficiaries waited several hours to collect the cash transfer. Starting from the second distribution round however SCI involved male committee members to help keeping queues in order, and as confirmed by SCI staff and bank/post officers interviewed, a system was also put in place at payment point for beneficiaries to collect cash over two to three days, so as to reduce crowdedness and pressure on bank/post office staff.

While the above are clearly positive issues and denote an effective monitoring system and good capacity to detect problems and take corrective actions, there specific issues related to data collection and analysis, of PDM in particular, that require attention.

A look at PDM data collected in all sites indicates that data on a number of areas related to cash and voucher distribution and access was collected and recorded (in long excel sheets), but not all of it was then analysed and/or converted in a more accessible format, such as tables, graphs or charts²¹, to facilitate reading and understanding of on-going dynamics, and crucially to help trigger corrective action when needed. For instance information on “time spent on transport to and from the payment point” or “control over cash has caused conflict

²⁰ HAP – Accountability Principle number 6 “Enable beneficiaries ... to make complaints and to seek redress in safety”.

²¹ See for example a useful graphs produced in Figure 1 and 2 in Annex 1

within my household” was collected and recorded but no related analysis or at the very minimum presentation in a more accessible and easier to read format is available. In addition, some PDM records include important qualitative data for monitoring and evaluation purposes; one example is a column labelled “why” and includes reasons why beneficiaries “Prefer food rather than cash” or “Prefer vouchers rather than cash”. Unfortunately however, this qualitative data has been recorded in Arabic, and has been not analysed or translated. Overall, weaknesses related to data analysis, including lack of systematic and timely processing of collected data, raise questions of whether some issues that may have needed corrective action may have been missed out as a result.

Recommended action: As time is spent both by beneficiaries to provide information and by SCI to collect it and enter it in the monitoring system, with issues of efficiency and effectiveness in mind ensure that all data, both qualitative and quantitative, is recorded and analysed in English.

3. Effectiveness

Assessing effectiveness involves determining the extent to which the objectives stipulated in project design (e.g. logframe) are met. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness. To do so, this section explores whether the project achieved the overall objective of improving household food security; whether the project achieved the expected results for cash and vouchers against indicators in the logframe; and whether project activities took place in a timely manner. What people purchased with vouchers and cash is also explored, as are considerations on the cost-effectiveness of cash vs vouchers.

3.1 Improvements in food security

To assess whether the project has led to improvements in household food security, the evaluation uses two indicators for food security that were used by SCI in the project logframe and baseline/endline data, the Food Consumption Score (FCS) and the Household Dietary Diversity (HDDS). The findings from fieldwork discussions on changes in household diet, number of meals, and related discussions on food security are also drawn up to triangulate quantitative findings. It is also important to note the following limitations:

- The evaluation did not receive the baseline and endline survey narrative/reports for Hajjah and therefore Hajjah has not been included in this discussion.
- It was beyond the scope of the evaluation to verify the robustness of endline and baseline survey data²². Nonetheless, a look at the data set raises questions and doubts about the accuracy of data collection and analysis.²³ For example, according to baseline narrative/reports, data on the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) was collected incorrectly in both Taiz and Lahj, and as such it was not included in the analysis. For the same reason and also because this means that a comparison between baseline and endline is not possible, changes in coping strategies will not be discussed here. Similarly, baseline narrative/reports in Taiz and Lahj data indicate that, while at first glance consumption of

²² And indeed of other SCI’s quantitative data, such as PDM.

²³ Improving data handling and analysis was one of the findings of a recent (unpublished) external evaluation of an ECHO-funded SCI’s FSL project in Hajjah and Lahj. The evaluation noted several mistakes in the records, both obvious errors as well as general inconsistencies in the data.

vegetables in both sites appears to be high (see Figure 1 and 2 in Annex 3), in reality the bulk of data collected referred to green chili peppers, a common condiment for *asida* or wheat porridge²⁴. Given the poor nutritional value of chili peppers, the vegetable column of Figure 1 and 2 in Annex 3 should be much lower and near to zero, as also confirmed by two SCI's staff who were involved in baseline surveys. A question remains whether the endline data could suffer from the same error. Vegetables are therefore not considered in the analysis below. Lastly, the endline and baseline FCS Tables in Taiz (see Table 1 and 2 in Annex 3 – “% of Total column”) are suspiciously identical; again this raises questions around accuracy and robustness of data.

- As highlighted in Section 2.1, food security indicators, such as FCS and HDDS provide snapshots of household food consumption, specifically related to the diversity of diets. These indicators however, can be affected by factors other than assistance, and do not provide any information on important dimensions of food security, for example the extent to which households will be able to meet future needs.

With the above limitations in mind, the comparison of baseline and endline data on HDDS and FCS is discussed below.

The comparison of baseline and endline data on dietary diversity in Lahj (Figure 1 of Annex 3) seems to point to a slight increase in the consumption of some staple foods (wheat, oil), as well as a slight increase in the consumption of food groups that are rich in protein and micronutrients and are therefore relevant for dietary diversity, these are fish, meat/poultry, and beans. What appears to be a sizable change in FCS can also be noticed from baseline to endline (Table 1 of Annex 3), where 20% of households have moved from ‘poor’ to ‘borderline’ thresholds.

The comparison of baseline and endline data on dietary diversity in Taiz (Figure 2 of Annex 3) seems to indicate an increase (more pronounced than in Lahj) of staple foods: wheat and, more substantially oil, sugar, tea/ coffee. However, there seems to be minimal indication of increases in consumption of foods groups that are rich in protein and micronutrients and which could suggest a more diverse diet: a very slight increase can be observed only around meat and beans. No change in FCS can be observed from baseline to endline (Table 1 of Annex 3).

Turning to the findings emerging from the qualitative work for this evaluation, IDIs and FGDs in Lahj and Taiz (as well as Hajjah) widely pointed to greater household access to a variety of foods throughout the duration of the project. The day of the transfer was frequently described as a “*happy day*” and in the words of a FHH beneficiary in Taiz, “*we were celebrating as if it was Eid*”²⁵. A number of positive impacts on children were also frequently mentioned, including children being “*happy and excited*” to see food available in the house, decreased fighting among siblings over food, mothers observing their children in better health and a decreased incidence of illnesses. An unambiguous message coming from fieldwork discussions in all locations was that the project had a positive, albeit temporary, effect on households’ dietary diversity and welfare. Both cash and voucher beneficiaries

²⁴ *Asida* or wheat porridge, often garnished with green chilies, is widely consumed among Yemen rural communities.

²⁵ Islamic festival or celebration.

said they purchased and consume more vegetables, fruit, meat and poultry, and fish during the project than they did before the start or after the end of the project.

The qualitative findings also suggest changes in the quantities of food consumed, which appeared to be more pronounced among marginalised than non-marginalised groups. The former, frequently said that they consumed only one meal a day before (and after) the project, but thanks to the injection of resources during the project they reported eating twice, sometimes three times a day. Non-marginalised communities started with a better baseline than marginalised communities, as in average respondents said that they usually consumed two meals a day. In some areas there were mentions of increased number of meals (e.g from two to three), but in other areas e.g. in Radfan District in Lahj there were no reported changes in the number of meals.

Given that quantitative results are somewhat at odds with qualitative results, and in light of the limitations on available quantitative data outlined above, the evaluation finds it difficult to provide a definitive answer on whether there were improvements in food security, and specifically dietary diversity during the duration of the project, and to understand whether and how the transfer modality (cash vs food vouchers) played a role in this regard. One tentative suggestion that could be drawn is that ensuring that vouchers could be used for the purchase of fresh foods could perhaps have had a more tangible effect on dietary diversity in Taiz.

3.2 Use of food vouchers and cash transfers

Use of food vouchers

The voucher system in Taiz was quite flexible in that it allowed recipients to purchase virtually any item on offer at food shops. Using SCI's PDM data - which tracked beneficiaries' purchases at vendors and calculated the median quantity for each of the food types purchased - it is possible to narrow down the four food items²⁶ that were mostly purchased with food vouchers. These were, in the following order wheat, sugar, oil and tea. This expenditure pattern was confirmed by the qualitative findings of this evaluation, and echoes the findings outlined in Section 3.1 above. While beneficiaries found it difficult to accurately recall or provide an exact ranking of the food types that they purchased in a given distribution, the overwhelming majority nonetheless consistently mentioned the above staple food.

Use of cash transfers

As is always the case when asking beneficiaries how they used cash, it not possible to separate out the use of cash provided by agencies from other sources of income or savings. Since SCI's PDM system tracked how cash transfers were used, it is possible to provide an indicative breakdown of the most relevant categories of cash expenditures. In both Lahj and Hajjah PDM data constantly indicates that **food was an expenditure priority, followed by medical expenses, and repayment of debts** (see Annex 1, Figure 1 and 2).

²⁶ According to SCI monitoring data, beneficiaries purchased between 12-14 food types during each distribution, including wheat, rice, sugar, ghee, eggs, tuna, beans, etc.

This expenditure pattern is in line with the findings of this evaluation. The overwhelming majority of beneficiaries also mentioned the above expenditure categories, with food almost invariably been the first one mentioned. That said it is important to note that similarly to discussions with food vouchers' beneficiaries, during fieldwork discussions it was challenging to obtain an accurate ranking of expenditures from participants.

The evaluation, also confirmed by available PDM data, **found no indication of sale of vouchers or food items in Taiz, or of beneficiaries unable to access certain commodities through vouchers and cash transfers.** Availability and price trends of a wide range of fresh and staple food items (e.g wheat, sugar, oil, tea, eggs, chicken etc.), livestock (female goats and sheep, and cows), and fuel (e.g. kerosene, diesel) were also monitored on a monthly basis by SCI in each governorate. As also highlighted in Section 1.2²⁷ the monitoring data did not register substantial price changes during the short duration of the project. For example a look at the price trends monitoring data in Taiz shows that the price of 1kg of wheat – as highlighted above the food item that recipients mostly purchased through vouchers – remained at 150 YER (0.70 USD) in December, January, March and April, and slightly increased to 160 YER (0.73 USD) in February.

3.3 Project results for cash and vouchers transfers

The discussion now turns to explore whether the project achieved the expected results or outputs for cash and vouchers against indicators set in the logframe. These were:

- Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Taiz have received cash and vouchers to meet basic food needs;
- Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Lahj and Hajjah have received cash assistance to meet basic food needs;
- Vulnerable households receive cash grants / vouchers for livelihood assets.

Given the emphasis of the stipulated results above on reaching the “most vulnerable”, this section explores whether project activities have reached the most vulnerable households. It does so by discussing the real coverage of the intervention versus planned coverage, and whether the project can be considered at an appropriate scale, considering the number of people in need.

Real versus planned coverage

A look at project documents reveals that the number of households that the project set out to target with a specific transfer modality (cash or voucher) had been determined already during project proposal. The project narrative document for Taiz and Lahj states that the project “will provide vouchers to 10,000 households”, and “cash transfers to 4,000 households” in Taiz and Lahj respectively. Similarly, the project narrative for Hajjah states that “cash transfers will be provided to 4,000 households”.

A look at the project logframe in Annex 8 and the data in Table 4 below, collated from project documents and which SCI project staff in Taiz, Lahj, and Hajjah have also helped to

²⁷ At the project inception phase a buffer grant was set aside as contingency for potential rises in food prices during project implementation, but since this did not happen, the buffer grant was used to provide cash grants for livelihood support to beneficiaries in Lahj and Taiz.

put together, indeed confirms that, especially in Taiz and Lahj, the exact number of beneficiaries that the project had planned to target was eventually targeted in each governorate

Table 4: Total number of households and people targeted during each distribution round in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah

Site	December		January		February		March		April	
	HHs	People	HHs	People	HHs	People	HHs	People	HHs	People
Taiz	10,000	59,382	10,000	59,382	10,000	59,382	10,000	59,382	10,000	59,382
Lahj	4,000	19,829	4,000	19,829	4,000	19,829	4,000	19,829	4,000	19,829
Hajjah			6,000	39,082	6,009	40,323	5,999	40,377		

As discussed more in-depth in Section 5.1 below, SCI project staff interviewed explained that the initial lists of potential project recipients, created through the community-based mechanism (local committees) that were used in each governorate to select and target beneficiaries, were vetted and finalised by SCI to ensure that shortlisted households met SCI’s targeting criteria and that potential inclusion/exclusion errors were captured. In all locations the vetting process led to the creation of a final list of beneficiaries that was much shorter than the initial list, and crucially as the data in Table 4 shows, that matched exactly the targets indicated in the project proposals. The interim report in Hajjah for instance clearly states that the initial list of 8,114 households was reduced to 6,000 and that “some households were excluded because they did not meet the agreed selection criteria”.

During discussions with SCI staff there were frequent mentions that, in order to avoid confrontation with communities around exclusion issues, SCI staff were answering communities’ questions around inclusion by saying that the project could only assist a set or fixed number of people. A look at the CRM database confirms this. As highlighted in Section 2.5 above, the overwhelming majority of complaints were raised by non-beneficiaries who were asking to be included in the project. In the ‘description of resolution’ column of the CRM database, the sentence “we have certain number of beneficiaries, we cannot include more” is recorded as the standard answer that was given to non-beneficiaries. Indeed, this also resonates with the explanations that many respondents, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, were putting forward during FGDs and IDIs when asked what they thought reasons for exclusions were; sentences such as “*the beneficiary list was capped*” were frequently mentioned (see Section 5.2).

The planned coverage for this project was, clearly, very much in line with real coverage and on paper the project seems to have met its objectives²⁸. That said the evaluation finds a certain degree of ambiguity and ‘preemption’ when looking at the way project results were set. Unless SCI knew the exact number of the most vulnerable people in each governorate (and who those were) - a clearly a highly unlikely scenario, it is difficult to see how cash and voucher transfers managed to have targeted the “most vulnerable” if we consider that the number of beneficiary households had already been determined during the design phase. There are also serious concerns around the effectiveness of the vetting process itself. As the discussion above has highlighted, in all three governorates this process

²⁸ Coverage and whether the project reached the most in need are also strictly linked to issues related to beneficiaries’ selection and targeting. These are discussed in Section 5 below.

has essentially meant shortening – though it remains unclear how exactly- the initial list to reach essentially the exact number of households that the project had set out to target.

Recommended action: In line with recommended actions in Section 2, ensure that assessment of needs, vulnerabilities and capacity guide and inform response design, also around who “are the most vulnerable”, what are their characteristics, and how many are they.

Invest in communication and awareness-raising efforts with programme beneficiaries and communities. For those who are deemed ineligible, provide clear information on the reasons for exclusion.

Was the project at an appropriate scale, considering the number of people in need?

As the stipulated project results emphasised targeting ‘the most vulnerable’, it is important to also understand whether the targeted population was actually the most food insecure, since the overall goal of the project was precisely to improve food security, and whether any conclusions can be consequently drawn around targeting and scale of needs.

To determine whether the targeted population was the most food insecure (or “the most vulnerable”), available baseline survey data on FCS²⁹ in Taiz and Lahj are a useful starting point. The data indicates that 53% of surveyed households in Lahj and 56% in Taiz, hence the majority in both governorates, were in the ‘acceptable’ threshold, i.e. generally food secure (see Annex 3). The distribution of food insecurity in the baseline surveys in Taiz and Lahj (see Annex 3 Table 1 and 2) is also not too far off from that of the WFP CFSS (see Table 2 above). The total percentage of food insecure according to baseline results in Taiz is 44% (and 47.8% according to WFP CFSS), and in Lahj 48% (and 58% according to WFP CFSS). The above findings therefore **suggest that reaching the “most vulnerable” has not worked out in practice.**

Lastly, the discussion turns to exploring the number of food insecure people that the project targeted versus the scale of need³⁰.

The WFP CFSS estimated that 47.8% of the total population of Taiz (2,813,950 people) in 2012 were food insecure, that is 1,345,118 people (WFP, 2012 see also Table 2 above). Considering that in Taiz the project targeted approximately 60,000 people (59,382 as per Table 4), of which, as discussed above, 56% were not food insecure, it can be deducted that only around 33,600 food insecure people were actually reached by the project. That is less than 2.5% of the estimated food insecure population of Taiz. Similar calculations indicate that in Lahj the project reached a little less than 2% of the food insecure population.

²⁹ FCS measures consumption diversity and frequency and has standardized thresholds for ‘poor’, ‘borderline’ and ‘adequate’ or ‘acceptable’ food consumption.

³⁰ Notwithstanding the issues highlighted in Section 2.1 in relation to the robustness of WFP CFSS findings, to discuss scale of need, and in particular food needs across the country, the evaluation takes the WFP CFSS as reference point, mainly because it has also been used by the project as secondary evidence

In light of the above, and also considering the very short duration of the project, it is difficult to conclude that the project was at an appropriate scale, considering the number of people in need. This also raises questions around the overall efficiency and value for money of short-term emergency interventions to respond to the scale of food security needs in Yemen. This is also discussed in Section 5.1 below. A point that is made throughout this report is that the challenges of responding to food insecurity in Yemen are huge and the predicament of the rural populations in Yemen is essentially a development challenge. Short-term, emergency responses as the one that is the focus of this evaluation are simply not geared to respond to very significant and widespread needs of the rural poor.

3.4 Timeliness

The analysis of timeliness is an important aspect of the criterion of effectiveness to understand whether people's needs were met in a timely fashion, and whether project activities were delivered in a timely manner. Since in this context the discussion around timely implementation of the project and the factors that eventually delayed it are strictly linked to targeting, this aspect will be explored in Section 5.1.

Here, the discussion focuses on whether people's needs were met in a timely fashion. To do this, and in light of the fact that the project was an emergency food security intervention, it is important to first understand the timing and nature of the food security emergency, by drawing on secondary sources and key stakeholders' perspectives.

As highlighted in Section 1.1, the findings of the WFP CFSS, released in June 2012, and of the UNICEF SMART surveys drew attention to the critical food security and nutrition situation nationwide. These findings also brought about a significant shift in the focus of the international community; from being largely concentrated on conflict-affected populations in northern Yemen, to expanding to virtually the whole country to respond to the needs of both conflict and non-conflict affected populations. In turn, starting from 2011-12 the number of humanitarian actors increased, as have donor-funded emergency initiatives, including SCI's project.

Interestingly however, interviews with humanitarian and donor agencies highlighted contrasting views on whether in 2011 and throughout 2012 when several emergency responses were rolled out the country was enveloped by a humanitarian emergency at all. A number of key informants stressed that the problems facing rural Yemeni households are fundamentally a development challenge, and that the findings of the surveys highlighted long-standing, chronic needs. There was a general consensus that the prevailing poverty situation had been exacerbated by the events of 2011, but some questioned whether the intensity and scale of needs ultimately warranted the urgency and nature of FSL emergency initiatives at the time.

During community-level discussions, when asked about the effects of the political crisis of 2011 on their lives, some participants were simply struggling to remember, while others pointed to a worsening situation, including around food security. When asked about project activities and whether they provided timely help, there was an unequivocal message that the project had provided an important, albeit temporary, financial support which helped

recipients meeting food but also other essential needs (see also Section 3.1). What was less clear however was whether cash and voucher transfers helped families to deal specifically with the food security shocks brought about by the events of 2011. The overwhelming majority of respondents in all locations, even those who did indicate that their situation had worsened in 2011, were eager to stress that their experiences of vulnerability and poverty were long-standing. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries interviewed almost invariably mentioned a wide range of essentially developmental challenges around water, health, education, and indeed food. The needs that people indicated as most pressing varied depending on their context-specific situation; for instance marginalised communities often mentioned health-related issues and food as top priorities, while most of the people interviewed in Hajjah complained of water scarcity and water-related needs.

In conclusion therefore, the temporary and short-term injection of resources has helped beneficiaries to acquire food or other basic necessities and services, but beneficiaries found it difficult to link this support to the food crisis of 2011. Against this background assessing the timeliness of the project is not straightforward. What it can be said however, is that **the needs of the rural communities visited by the evaluation appeared to be largely developmental in nature and arising from chronic social and economic challenges, which should not be addressed through short-term interventions.** Indeed, interviews with international donors and agencies in Sana'a have pointed to yet another shift in the international community strategic engagement in FSL; with funding and modalities of response moving away from a largely emergency mode to be more focused on a long-term livelihoods-based approach.

3.5 Cost-effectiveness

This section briefly examines the cost-effectiveness of cash and food vouchers. To do this, it compares selected costs incurred by SCI to provide food vouchers with the costs of providing cash transfers, since the third alternative or option of providing in-kind food assistance was ruled out, as highlighted in Section 2.1, and as such there are no available project costs of this transfer modality that can be usefully compared.

A basic calculation of essential costs to deliver food vouchers vis-à-vis cash transfers, presented in Table 1 in Annex 4 (extrapolated from Table 2 in Annex 4, showing project expenditures), shows that the cost per beneficiary household of food vouchers (13 USD) is almost double that of cash transfers (7.6 USD). This is unsurprising as food voucher programmes are known to be more costly, administratively burdensome, and requiring more time to plan than cash transfer distributions, because of the systems that need to be put in place with food vendors, and the administrative costs involved, such as printing costs. During discussions with SCI it was not possible to obtain quantifiable data of staff time associated with each transfer modality. That said, there were frequent mentions by SCI staff interviewed that the process of identifying and contracting food vendors in Taiz had been complex and time-consuming, as discussed in-depth in Section 2.2, and cash transfer activities were widely perceived to be less burdensome and quicker to get off the ground. Indeed, this is the reason why, given the particular stringent time constraints in Hajjah, SCI opted for cash instead of voucher transfers (see Section 2.1).

Another consideration around cost-effectiveness relates to the cost incurred to beneficiaries to collect the transfer which, as discussed in Section 2.3, has been found to be higher for

voucher beneficiaries than for cash beneficiaries. It is clear therefore that **in addition to the financial costs incurred by SCI to deliver cash or voucher transfers, other, less easily quantifiable costs including time, human resources needed to implement different activities, beneficiaries' time and transport costs, should be taken into account for a meaningful calculation of cost-effectiveness.**

What is also **key to keep in mind here is that the assessment of which transfer modality will deliver assistance in the most efficient manner is a consideration that needs to be taken during the project design stage and *in connection* with the overall objective of the project. In other words, if the project is expected to run into additional costs because a given modality is expected to (and ideally will) lead to bigger gains and benefits to beneficiaries, then the additional costs are clearly worth it.**

4. Wider impacts

The primary objective of the intervention was to address food insecurity. However, the choice of modality however, can have additional benefits or costs, intended and unintended, positive and negative. To capture the wider impacts of the project the discussion in this section focuses on how beneficiaries have used cash and vouchers beyond food needs, how beneficiaries have used the cash grant for livelihood support, and gender dynamics.

4.1 Use of transfers beyond food needs

Savings: A limited number of FGDs and IDIs indicated that cash transfer beneficiaries in Lahj (4) and Hajjah (2) set aside some 2,000-4,000 YER³¹ (9.26-18.53 USD) from their monthly transfer to purchase goats. Livestock purchases were widely seen as savings and some defined them "*emergency cash*" to cover potential future health expenditures since small stock can be easily sold and converted into cash. By the end of the project some said that they owned 4-5 goats.

Repayment of debts: An unambiguous finding of the evaluation was that virtually everyone in the community, both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries had debts, which were mostly food related. It is not surprising therefore that, as PDM data also found (see Figure 1 and 2 in Annex 1), cash recipients widely prioritised repayment of debts at local shops when they received the transfer. Some voucher beneficiaries also said that during the project with part of their food needs covered, they had been able to free up cash from other sources (e.g. remittances, work) to repay debts. As discussed below, repayment of debts is also a category that features prominently in the use of the cash grant distributed with the last transfer.

Fieldwork discussions in Hajjah and Lahj indicated that the cash transfer acted as a collateral or guarantee for food vendors who knew that beneficiaries had a cash source and therefore felt more confident to sell on credit. In Hajjah there were reports both by beneficiaries and shop owners that the amount of credit given to each SCI beneficiary was 10,700 YER (50 USD), the exact value of the transfer. In order to access credit, recipients in Hajjah gave shop owners their SCI's beneficiary card, which was retained as a guarantee. This echoes the

³¹ Depending on market price and animal weight

findings of a recent SWF study which found the practice of shop owners retaining SWF beneficiary cards, selling food and other necessities on credit, and being paid once beneficiaries receive the transfer quite widespread (Bagash et al., 2012). There were no reports of negative effects arising from this practice, and there was a general sense that it enabled SCI's beneficiaries to afford basic food items they would not be able to pay for otherwise. That said, and as also found by the SWF study, this practice has the potential for a negative impact, as shop owners know when beneficiaries receive the transfer and inevitably pressure them to pay up, even when the money is required to cover expenses (Bagash et al., 2012).

Sharing: Both cash and food voucher beneficiaries said that part of the transfer was shared with non-beneficiaries, and especially with relatives and neighbours. The overwhelming majority explained that what was shared was food, and especially cooked food, but not cash. The amount of food that was shared seemed to be rather small and sporadic in its delivery; a number of respondents quantified it as *“a small plate of cooked food once in a while”*. Furthermore, during two FGDs with women in Hajjah, participants were also quick to add that in the past sharing was more common and substantial, but today, with most people struggling to make ends meet *“everyone is thinking for himself and his family”*. Rather than following systematic sharing norms or supporting traditional social support mechanisms, sharing seemed to be mostly *ad hoc*, and ultimately dependent on the willingness and actual ability of beneficiaries to give away some food.

Qat expenditure: Reports of qat³² expenditure among cash and voucher beneficiaries – a widespread concern of agencies interviewed working in FSL in Yemen- were negligible (one man during a FGD in Hajjah with beneficiaries, and one man during an IDI in Lahj). This seems to be also confirmed by available PDM data (see for example Annex 1). The evaluation conducted two interviews with qat sellers (one in Hajjah and one in Taiz) and both sellers stated that their customers are not the poor and those who receive assistance (e.g. through the project or the government Social Welfare Fund (SWF)), but people who have a reliable income. Truck drivers (passing by the area), government officials, civil servants, shop keepers were mentioned among their clients. In the words of the qat seller interviewed in Taiz, *“the poor don't have money to buy milk for their children, where would they find money to buy qat?”*.

The above anecdotal findings echo the extensive literature on cash transfers which finds no empirical evidence to support concerns that cash transfers lead to a notable increase in anti-social spending or behaviour (e.g. on alcohol) (Harvey, 2007; Harvey and Bailey, 2011). That said and in light of the pervasiveness of qat consumption in Yemen however, further analysis is clearly needed to understand qat expenditures and use patterns.

4.2 Use and benefits of the cash grant for livelihood support

The cash grant for livelihood support distributed to 8,300 households in Taiz and Lahj was very well received and some referred to it as a *“big help”*. There seemed to be general understanding among respondents that the grant was provided for livelihood support, and

³² Qat is a plant native to the Horn of Africa and the Middle East and is widely chewed as a stimulant.

especially for purchasing goats. This may also be linked to suggestions reportedly made by SCI staff to beneficiaries to invest the last transfer in small stock.

As the cash grant was distributed together with the last transfer, it was very challenging to get beneficiaries to separate the two during IDIs and FGDs discussions. As such and unless otherwise indicated, the findings presented in this section refer to the last transfer as a whole, thus including both the cash transfer (for 10,700 YER - 50 USD) and the grant (for 28,000 YER - 130 USD).

How people used the last transfer varied and as beneficiaries themselves often suggested, the use was, predictably, largely dependent on the nature and scale of households needs at the time of distribution. Again, it was often difficult to obtain an accurate ranking or breakdown of expenses from respondents. However, a few examples from marginalised and non-marginalised beneficiary households in Taiz – which were very similar to the ones collected in Lahj – have been collated in Table 5 below and provide a good basis for discussion of the last transfer expenditures.

Table 5: Examples of household beneficiary expenditures of the last transfer (38,700 YER)

Non-marginalised respondents	Marginalised respondents
18,000 debt repayment 10,000 two goats 10,000 food 700 health expenses	15,000 food 12,000 three goats 11,700 health expenses
19,000 food 9,850 debt repayment 9,850 one oven	16,300 two goats 13,700 health expenses 8,700 food
18,700 food 10,000 two goats 10,000 debt repayment	Three respondents used the entire grant on health expenses

The examples above reveal that the majority of respondents purchased food and goats in variable quantities. The comparison of expenditure patterns seem to point to marginalised households having spent a larger share of the transfer on health-related costs than their counterparts in non-marginalised communities. While this requires further investigation, it may be indicative of particularly acute health needs among marginalised groups, likely to be arising from their highly precarious living conditions. Indeed, prevalence of illnesses including malaria, bilharzia, diarrhoea, typhoid fever was constantly indicated during FGDs and IDIs with marginalised groups as key vulnerabilities.

Investments in small stock are also an indication that some benefits of the project will continue to meet beneficiaries’ needs after the project has ended.

Recommended action: In consultation with communities, further explore the appropriateness of implementing livestock-based livelihood support initiatives.

4.3 Gender

Around half of the project beneficiaries were female: out of the total number of beneficiaries targeted in Taiz (59,382), 29,657 were women and girls, and out of the total number of beneficiaries in Hajjah (39,082³³), 20,139 were women and girls. While gender is a topic of interest for SCI project design was not explicitly informed by gender considerations. The evaluation nonetheless explored whether cash and voucher transfers had any effect on gender relationships at community and household levels.

Intra-household relations

The vast majority of beneficiaries, men and women from marginalised and non-marginalised communities pointed to increased feelings of well-being at the individual level as assistance had provided temporary respite from their daily struggle to survive. Expressions such as being “*more relaxed*” and “*less worried*” were often used to describe how they felt during the life of the project.

These individual-level effects spilled into intra-household relations. An example frequently used by married men and women related to wives often putting pressure on their husbands to find a job and provide for the family; husbands in turn become angry and frustrated, and tensions, fighting, and arguments most often ensue. In all the localities visited the transfers had positively impacted on these dynamics and most respondents indicated that arguments between husbands and wives had substantially decreased and widely linked this to the injection of resources.

While these effects are positive, their temporary nature was also evident; all respondents concurred that, with the end of the project intra-household tensions and conflict resumed, exactly in the same way as before the start of the project.

Control of cash and of food at household level

The findings of FGDs and IDIs indicate that women may have, to a certain degree, more control over food than cash. As discussed in Section 2.2 above, an important reason indicated by beneficiaries in Lahj and Taiz for their preferences for food vouchers over cash is that “*cash flies*” (i.e. is spent on many different needs) while food is stored in the house and benefits all family members. Yet, a key question in this regard is: who collects and controls the “*cash that flies*” and who collects and controls the “*food that stays*”?

Collection of transfers: Discussions with beneficiaries in Taiz, Lahj, and Hajjah indicated that collection of cash or vouchers from payment or distribution points was largely a male responsibility, and it was mostly men, rather than women, who exchanged vouchers at food shops. When asked, women (and men) in all locations constantly indicated that their husbands or male relatives went to collect the transfers because they are busy with many tasks and responsibilities – including fetching water, working, looking after small stock and donkeys, housekeeping, child caring. Furthermore, an additional layer of gender obstacles that was highlighted in Lahj related to stringent cultural norms that limit women’s freedom of movement. As going to the market was considered “*shameful*” and inappropriate for women, shopping for food and other household items (and indeed collecting the cash transfer from the local bank which was located in a busy market area) was in most cases done by men.

³³ As of January 2013

It is important to note that cash transfers and food vouchers were paid/distributed to the head of a household accepted as SCI beneficiary; in male-headed households to the man, and in female-headed households to women.

Control of transfers: All respondents interviewed in Taiz indicated that when men returned home with food exchanged through vouchers, food was stored in the house, not sold, and ultimately consumed by all family members (see Section 2.2). Women appeared to exert a high level of control over household food supply, as they are ultimately responsible for food preparation and for deciding the quantity and types of food items to purchase, either through vouchers or cash.

The findings in Lahj and Hajjah however, seem to indicate a different level of control of women over cash. During FGDs and IDIs the majority of men³⁴ (also confirmed by women) interviewed, stated that when they collected the cash transfer they gave it to their wives who would then gain full control over its use (as with food). However, caution is needed when interpreting these statements. As discussed above, going to the market was in all contexts and in Lahj in particular, ultimately a male responsibility. Thus, it is difficult to see how women can exercise full control over cash without actually going to the market, and also considering the various expenses that, when probed, men reported having incurred during trips to the market³⁵ (and for which women are unlikely to have been consulted). In addition, some caution was also recommended by key informants and SCI staff when interpreting the above findings from FGDs and IDIs, and the general message was that in the Yemeni society it is usually men who in most households retain control over cash.

It is important to note that the issues discussed above were not linked to occurrences of misuse of cash resources by men, and were not reported as a source of intra-household conflict. That said, gender dynamics are clearly a core issue around control of cash versus food within the household and the potential for intra-household conflict around resource control is clearly a possibility. Further investigation is needed to understand these dynamics.

Recommended action: Through qualitative enquiries at the outset of the project and during monitoring, further investigate issues related to collection and control of cash and vouchers at the household level. The investigation should also focus on understanding the appropriateness and no doubt implications of alternative distribution modalities whereby for example cash and vouchers are distributed to women, instead of men.

Ensure that project design is informed by gender considerations. In light of the burdensome workload of women and girls, future interventions that consider cash for work or other conditions should be informed by a practical understanding of women's daily tasks and responsibilities to ensure that initiatives do not end up putting extra pressure on female beneficiaries.

³⁴ Only two male respondents in Lahj stated that they kept the cash, but consulted their wives in relation to food purchases.

³⁵ As observed in Section 2.2 when further probed, men highlighted the various expenses that they incurred when they went to the market, including handing out money to friends in need, or inviting them for lunch.

5. Coverage

The analysis of the criterion of coverage for this evaluation analyses the targeting process adopted by the project, discusses inclusion and exclusion errors, and the impact on community-level relations.

5.1. Targeting process

Project design: using Social Welfare Fund (SWF) as the starting point for targeting

The project set out to work with existing beneficiaries' lists of the Government Social Welfare Fund (SWF) (see box 4 below) as a starting point for targeting. In particular the design of the project in Taiz and Lahj envisaged taking the list of SWF beneficiaries classified in A and B categories and filter it through SCI's own targeting criteria³⁶ to determine SCI's own list of project beneficiaries.

Box 4: Social Welfare Fund's (SWF) targeting mechanism

The SWF is Yemen's flagship unconditional cash transfer programme and integral part of the national Social Safety Net³⁷. SWF beneficiaries are classified into six categories, ranging from the most to the least vulnerable:

- A: income below 70% of the regional poverty line;
- B: income between 70% and 100% of the regional poverty line;
- C: income close to the regional poverty line (up to 24% above it);
- D: income approximately 25-55% above the regional poverty line;
- E-F: income substantially above the poverty line (55% or more) - should not receive transfers.

Source: Bagash et al., 2012

Interviews with INGOs and donors indicated that, similarly to SCI's approach outlined above, SWF beneficiary lists have been used as a starting point for targeting cash and voucher initiatives post-2011. Other agencies did not report experiencing delays in receiving the lists from SWF (as discussed below for SCI). However, rather than a consistent approach to linking up with SWF and use its lists, the findings of the evaluation have pointed to different objectives and modalities of engagement with SWF, and to a different use of lists for targeting assistance on the ground. For instance, while SCI set out to target SWF beneficiaries belonging to A and B categories, Oxfam GB "sought to assist *all* officially listed beneficiaries on SWF 2008 lists" (Frize, 2013: 2 emphasis added).

Discussions with SCI project staff highlighted the difficulties and delays faced in obtaining a response from SWF agencies at governorate and national levels. Reportedly, one month after submitting the request, SCI eventually received the lists from SWF. This delay however, affected the timely start of the targeting process and in turn the start of project activities.

³⁶ SCI targeting criteria were: presence of illness and/or disability in the household, child-headed households, female-headed households, households with dependants with no income.

³⁷ Yemen's Social Safety Net comprises the country's social assistance programmes, which in addition to the SWF include, the Social Fund for Development (SFD), the Public Works Project (PWP), the Agricultural and Fisheries Production Promotion Fund, and others (Bagash et al., 2012).

In Lahj the SWF list was, in the words of a SCI staff “*not useful and messy*” as it contained SWF beneficiaries’ names without the corresponding category or beneficiary’s residence. As such SCI decided not to use the SWF as the basis for targeting in Lahj; in Taiz SCI decided to only use the SWF waiting list as a starting point for targeting³⁸. Given the difficulties and delays experienced above, a decision was taken not to request SWF lists in Hajjah.

Project implementation: using a community-based targeting approach

The functioning and aim of following community-based targeting approach adopted in all three governorates is described below.

- After establishing an initial contact with the *sheikh* or village leader to gain access to the community, SCI formed so-called local committees in each village, elected by communities³⁹.
- In principle comprising 4-5 community members including men, women and children, the main role of committee members was to compile an initial list of beneficiaries on the basis of both their knowledge of the community and SCI’s targeting criteria, which had been explained during a training session.
- The initial list of beneficiaries was then vetted and finalised by SCI to ensure that people shortlisted met SCI targeting criteria. In all locations, the vetting process entailed shortening the initial list (see Section 3.3 for more discussion).

SCI project staff interviewed in Lahj, Taiz and Hajjah pointed to a logic reasoning behind the shift in the targeting approach from using SWF lists to a community-based mechanism. Beyond the delays mentioned above, SCI staff were clearly suspicious of and reluctant to work with SWF lists, which widely perceived as “*corrupted*” and plagued by inclusion bias largely arising from elite capture. The establishment of the local committees was therefore seen as a way to involve communities in targeting while limiting the role of local power-holders who, according to a project document, are “*affected by local clan politics and tribal affiliations*” (SCI, 2012). Issues of corruption and patronage around SWF assistance have also been confirmed by other studies (see for example Bagash et al., 2012), but as discussed below, the community-based approach adopted by SCI has not been immune by interference of local power-holders.

Role and functioning of local committees: challenges and opportunities

Turning now to the role and functioning of local committees, this section discusses some of the challenges and opportunities found by this evaluation.

Challenges

Committee membership composition: In most of the locations visited by the evaluation team, committee members were male community leaders, including sheikhs, imam, and teachers. There seem to be number of reasons of why this happened.

- A requirement for inclusion in committees was the ability to read and write to be able to compile a list of potential beneficiaries.

³⁸ That is people who have been found eligible by the SWF targeting mechanism but who are on a waiting list to receive assistance.

³⁹ See “Role and functioning of local committees: constraints and opportunities section” below for more discussion.

- The election of committees by local communities -as initially envisaged by SCI only took place in some villages in Taiz. In all other locations the evaluation found committees having been appointed by local sheikhs, who in some cases also appointed themselves as committee members. Discussions with SCI staff pointed to time constraints as limiting SCI's ability to organise community meeting for elections to eventually take place. In Lahj, because of the highly volatile context SCI decided not to hold public gatherings, and therefore the route of committee appointment by sheikhs, rather than election by community, was taken.
- The evaluation found limited examples of inclusion of women and children in committees, and the few that were mentioned by communities and SCI project staff were in Taiz. Again, SCI staff interviewed reported having little time, if any, to sensitise and influence gate-keepers on the importance of including women and children. It may not be a coincidence that the inclusion of women and children was more possible in Taiz, than in Hajjah or Lahj, where the society has a generally a high level of education as mentioned in Section 1.2 above, and a reputation for being less conservative.

The establishment of local committees was perhaps too an ambitious task for a project of such short duration. It is difficult to see how the project could have managed to meaningfully include women and children in conservative environment as Yemen, and challenge power and vested interests in such a short time span.

Recommended action: The establishment of structures, bodies or entities that seek to challenge the existing status quo needs to be informed by a robust analysis of the existing situation, and of interests and power relations (precisely because a core element of such structures is to confront existing power structures), e.g. stakeholder analysis.

Capacity of committees: The training provided by SCI to committees was mainly focused on how to carry out the initial identification of potential beneficiaries. However, FGDs and IDIs with committee members in all sites clearly indicated that their tasks and responsibilities went much further. They were for instance the first port of call for complaints and questions about non-inclusion from non-beneficiaries. They however did not receive any complaint management training and their capacity to handle grievances was in general found to be limited, and ultimately dependant on their very own skills. It was clear that many felt a huge pressure from community members around inclusion.

Another issue often raised during fieldwork discussions was the burdensome and costly process of registering potential beneficiaries. Villages are often spread out across vast and remote areas, and to reach potential beneficiaries committees travelled relatively far (depending on the area) either on foot or using transport, and/or called some households by phone. As such, most committee members sustained transport and communication costs, in addition to their own time.

Recommended action: If a decision is taken to establish local committees, invest in training and capacity-building of their members, including complaint management. Consider providing committees with a minimal allowance and/or forms of compensation to cover for time and expenses incurred.

Opportunities

Inclusion of marginalised communities: As the SWF is demand-based, households' application for requesting assistance has to be made and endorsed by community leaders or *sheikhs*. A key vulnerability of marginalised communities is lack of adequate political rights and political representation, and exclusion from the tribal system: the powerful political structure that makes up Yemeni society (Al-Naggar, S. and G. Dyrhagen Husager, 2012; IRIN, 2005). Adding to their sense of exclusion, marginalised groups are rarely targeted by government programmes, such as the SWF, as they may be unaware of the programme, lack the knowledge or indeed the means to be registered, such as been known by influential sheikhs (Bagash et al., 2012).

The inclusion of representatives from marginalised communities in the committees established by SCI has given visibility to these groups and has allowed the inclusion of marginalised groups in the project. During fieldwork discussions with marginalised communities, their inclusion - in the words of some "*exactly as the Qabileh*" [non-marginalised or "tribal people" in Arabic] -, was widely perceived as a key positive feature of the intervention. Interestingly, some FGD participants in different locations used very similar sentences as a way of concluding the discussion, along the lines of "*we are the marginalised (mohamashen), keep remembering us, don't forget us*".

Recommended action: Build upon the project experience to ensure that future interventions also prioritise inclusion of marginalised communities. Given their acute protection needs consider exploring how future food security and livelihoods interventions can also integrate protection concerns.

Women as committee members: As the discussion above has highlighted, the inclusion of women and children in committees was possible in some locations in Taiz. Because of time constraints the evaluation team only managed to reach one village where a woman was part of the local committee. While further analysis is clearly needed on the positive and negative impacts of women and children inclusion in committee structures, as Box 5 below shows, anecdotal evidence in Taiz indicates that, where possible, the inclusion of women can have positive effects, at individual and community levels.

Box 5: Positive effects of women's participation in local committees: positive effects

Hidiah is a 22 year old divorced woman who was a committee member in the Warazan village in Dimnet Khadir –Taiz. In her own words, "*being part of the project was a change in my life. I saw the appreciation of my community for the support that I brought. I've also heard that some fathers have appreciated me and the work that I've done thanks to my education, and are now encouraging their daughters to study*". During a FGD in the same village women beneficiaries mentioned that they appreciated the fact that Hidiah's "*helped bringing assistance to the community because she could read and write*". They added that she was now seen as a "*role model*".

Recommended action: Ground the inclusion of women and children in committees in a more robust understanding of the context, and as part of the stakeholder analysis (see above)

Coordination with SWF and other agencies

Before discussing inclusion and exclusion errors it is worth reflecting on the implications of the shift in the targeting approach: from targeting on the basis of SWF lists to a community-based mechanism.

Reliance on community-based targeting despite the existence of a cash-based government social protection programme, raises concerns around exit strategies, the legacy of the project, and coordination with existing government structures. As noted in the Sphere Handbook⁴⁰ “[c]oordination with stakeholders, including government welfare and social protection programmes providing cash transfers, is essential for targeting” (SPHERE, 2011: 203). Similarly, literature and best practice on engagement in fragile states and particularly around basic service delivery also indicates that, with issues of capacity-building and strengthening state-citizen accountability relationship in mind, interventions should be designed in ways that parallel, and can be linked, with existing government systems (OECD/OCDE 2006: 6 in Pavanello and Darcy, 2008).

Furthermore, the discussion so far has also pointed to the very significant food security needs of the communities that were the focus of this evaluation. Indeed, the project was not of small scale (it targeted 20,000 households in total), and yet - notwithstanding the weaknesses highlighted above around beneficiaries’ selection and targeting, in Taiz and Lahj it merely reached around 2% of the estimated food insecure population. A key consideration in this regard is that overall efficiency and value for money of short-term emergency interventions, as the one that is the focus of this evaluation, are challenged by the sheer number of people in need, as highlighted by the WFP CFSS. These needs are first and foremost the responsibility of the Government of Yemen. The humanitarian community can assist and support the government in addressing the wide array of vulnerabilities of rural populations, including around food security, but substitution and working alongside, government services and structures is not likely to be effective in the long-term.

There is no doubt that **building a relationship and engaging with existing government structures and systems, such as the SWF**, is a gradual and incremental process, fraught with challenges also arising from issues of corruption, weak governance, bureaucracy and red tape, and so on. For the reasons highlighted above however, it should nonetheless remain **an important step of engagement in food security and livelihoods work in the country.**

This aspect of the implementation, the targeting approach- is found to lagging behind the achievement of Sphere core standard⁴¹.

Recommended action: With future long-term FSL programming and surge capacity in case of another emergency in mind, build a relationship with the SWF both in Sana’a and at governorate level.

Hold a workshop with project staff at field level to openly discuss concerns, opportunities and challenges of working with SWF and ensure that the strategic approach of engagement with SWF is aligned between country and field offices.

⁴⁰ Food security – cash and voucher transfers standard 1: Access to available goods and services

⁴¹ Ibid.

As highlighted above, other donor-supported cash and voucher programmes, implemented by a rapidly growing number of INGOs working in food security and livelihoods have sought to link up with SWF and its mechanisms. The Cash and Voucher Working Group (CVWG), activated in Sana'a post-2011 and led by Oxfam, is an existing platform for collaboration and learning, for coordinating cash-based responses, and for consolidating, harmonizing and promoting cash delivery mechanisms across agencies (Oxfam, 2013). SWF representatives are also part of the CVWG, as well as a World Bank⁴² official. SCI is part of the CVWG, but in the absence of a dedicated food security and livelihoods advisor its attendance has not been consistent.

This evaluation finds the relatively new establishment of the CVWG a positive and encouraging indication that steps to strengthen collaboration, learning, and alignment among agencies and with existing government social protection programmes are taking place. The number of humanitarian actors in Yemen, including western and national NGOs, and actors from the Gulf and Middle East region, is also rapidly growing. **At this juncture it is important that a more collective and cohesive response is developed, and that intra-agency coordination and modes of engagement with the SWF, under the CVWG umbrella, are strengthened. Greater coordination efforts, ideally led by donors, grounded on increased sharing of information and analysis will be essential in ensuring a more strategic and therefore more effective mode of engagement on FSL in Yemen.**

In practice, there are many activities that could be considered in this regard. For example there is scope for the CVWG to better define areas of engagement with the SWF; from use of the SWF lists, to involvement of SWF social workers and other staff in programming, to linking up so-called local committees with SWF targeting structures, and feeding back inclusion and exclusion errors that NGOs find during verification exercises.

Recommended action: Through the recruitment of a food security and livelihoods advisor, ensure active and regular participation in the CVWG. Coordination with other agencies working in food security, learning and exchanging lessons on cash-based responses, including around targeting and linking up with the SWF, should be a key priority.

5.2. Exclusion and inclusion and errors and community-level tensions

The discussion now turns to explore evidence of mis-targeting of the project, by focusing on exclusion and inclusion errors. A quantitative assessment of the share of eligible beneficiaries who did not receive cash and voucher assistance (exclusion error) and the share of beneficiaries who were incorrectly included (inclusion error) was beyond the scope of this evaluation. Furthermore, there is no available data (quantitative or qualitative) on the effectiveness of project targeting. As such, this section draws on beneficiaries' and communities' perceptions of mis-targeting collected through the qualitative work and investigates the drivers of such perceptions and the effects, on intra-community tensions in particular.

⁴² For years the World Bank has been providing funding and technical assistance to the SWF

Exclusion and inclusion errors

The evaluation found widespread perceptions of project recipients being indeed amongst the most vulnerable in the community. Fieldwork discussions however, also highlighted pervasive views and constant mentions that very poor, vulnerable families and individuals who deserved assistance had not been included in the project (exclusion error). By contrast, perceptions of inclusion errors were less frequent and less heated, possibly precisely because the majority perceived that the largest share of people targeted by the project were indeed vulnerable and deserved to be included. Analysis of qualitative material points to the following possible drivers of these perceptions.

Limited knowledge or understanding of targeting criteria. Communities were either struggling to articulate potential causes for exclusion and inclusion – indeed many simply said they did not know why- or were putting forward explanations that were more indicative of perceptions of random selection of beneficiaries’, rather than what should be a systematized process of targeting on the basis of well-defined criteria. Expressions such as “*is a matter of luck*” or “*is like winning a lottery*” were commonly used to articulate possible reasons for exclusion or inclusion in the project.

Confusion around the vetting process. As discussed above the vetting process carried out by SCI entailed shortening the initial list compiled by committee. As highlighted in Section 3.3 this process was problematic. From communities’ point of view this process was either unclear or unknown, and was surrounded by confusion and doubts that were a breeding ground for speculation and suspicion. For instance non-beneficiaries frequently complained that their name had been “*dropped*” or “*cancelled*” from the initial list, and blamed this outcome on SCI, to committee members, or to “*a computer*” that had deleted some names. In several occasions the sentence “*the beneficiary list was capped*” was also used to explain exclusion and some were under impression that they arrived somehow ‘late’ to the registration process. (see Section 3.3 for more discussion).

Recommended action: Invest in communication and awareness-raising efforts with programme beneficiaries and wider communities. For those who are deemed ineligible, provide clear information on the reasons for exclusion.

For future interventions using the SWF lists as a starting point for targeting may also prove a useful entry point and basis for communication to communities about targeting, as the SWF is a well-known entity at community level.

(Two) Targeting criteria not aligned with local understanding of need and vulnerability.

Fieldwork discussions revealed that communities in the three governorates disagreed with the exclusion of the following groups from targeting:

- *Single persons:* The project only included households with children, and excluded single persons. However, single persons, particularly elderly women and men, but also divorced women or widows living by themselves were widely considered as vulnerable groups as they lacked familial financial and psychological support.

- *SWF beneficiaries*: Targeting criteria in Lahj and Taiz⁴³ did not include SWF beneficiaries. However, SWF beneficiary households were widely considered poor and vulnerable. Respondents (SWF beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but also committee members and local traders) constantly mentioned that receiving financial support from the SWF did not translate in being better off, largely because the transfer amount is very small and disbursed every three to four months only.

Interestingly, the two vulnerability criteria highlighted by communities are in line with the findings of other studies. The WFP CFSS found that “smaller households” and “families depending on support and agricultural wage labourers” (for the latter specifically “support receivers, including those dependent on family or the social welfare fund”) are among the population groups with the highest rates of food insecurity (WFP, 2012: 27). A recent assessment of the SWF found that a SWF beneficiary household with six persons receives a transfer amount in local currency equivalent to 56USD per quarter, which is 19USD per month, which is a mere 0.6USD per day. The study concluded that the size of the transfer is insufficient to meet essential needs and that its transformational effect on household poverty is very limited or negligible (Bagash et al., 2012).

When asked whether they had been consulted on the above criteria or had participated in any discussion around identification of project targeting criteria community members widely affirmed that they had not. A look at the project description document also seems to support this finding, whereby “...beneficiaries meet *predefined* criteria include [*sic*] women headed households, child headed household...” (emphasis added).

***Recommended action:* In line with HAP principles and Sphere standards⁴⁴ and with issues of local ownership, accountability and transparency in mind conduct informed consultations with local communities in the determination of targeting criteria during the design phase.**

Community-level tensions

Injections of resources, which almost always leave out certain people, have the potential to create tensions in communities, and the attractiveness of cash and vouchers often accentuates this problem. The evaluation observed that community-level tensions, ranging from respondents expressing feelings of disappointment and frustration, to overt display of anger, at times ensued by confrontations during fieldwork discussions, were particularly pronounced and were the most significant and widespread negative effects of project. Tensions and conflict were predominantly driven by general perceptions of exclusion errors and were noted between:

- beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; mostly because of envy from the latter group and as discussed above lack of understanding of reasons for inclusion and exclusions. Tensions and feelings of resentment and disappointment were observed virtually everywhere.

⁴³ In Taiz only SWF beneficiaries on the waiting list were included, but during fieldwork discussion it was clear that communities were either not aware or did not understand this criteria.

⁴⁴ See HAP Principle 4, Participation in programmes, “[m]eaningfully involve beneficiaries in project planning, implementation, evaluation and reporting”, and the Sphere Handbook according to which, “to ensure the appropriateness and quality of any response, the participation of disaster-affected people...should be maximised” (p 86).

- non-beneficiaries and committee members, largely arising from confusion or dissatisfaction around the process of vetting and shortening initial lists. It is important to note that in some areas, even if committee members were local power holders no tensions were observed and communities reported being satisfied with the role of committees in registration. One explanation may be that conflict was more pronounced in areas where tensions between leaders and the community was already an issue before the start of the project.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

Overall, the findings of the evaluation have highlighted that the DFID-funded SCI's Emergency Food Security Project in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah was recognised by beneficiaries as an important, albeit temporary, source of financial support, which has provided temporary respite from the daily struggle to survive.

As highlighted throughout, the analysis has been challenged by the problems faced with the quantitative data sets of baseline and endline surveys, and as such care should be exercised when considering the findings of this evaluation.

As argued in the sections above there are a number of important features in the design and implementation of the project that the evaluation has found to have worked well and some are also in line with international technical standards such as Sphere and HAP. These include: the appropriateness of the overall project objective of the project; the appropriateness of the choice to provide cash/vouchers; efforts to involve communities in the targeting process; and a relatively responsive monitoring mechanism and complaint system.

That said, the findings of the evaluation have highlighted a number of areas that require attentive reflection and corrective action to strengthen future initiatives. Some of these were also found to be lagging behind Sphere standards and HAP principles. These include: lack of context-specific analysis to inform and guide project design and implementation; lack of involvement of communities in the definition of targeting criteria; the misalignment of some project design elements with the overall project objective; poor coordination with stakeholders, including government welfare and social protection programmes and other agencies.

Answering whether the project was appropriate, relevant and effective is not straightforward. A key, overarching question remains around the value of rolling out an emergency, short-term cash-based response to improving food security in a context, such as the rural areas of Yemen that were the focus of the evaluation, where food and other needs are more linked to long-term development challenges than to shock-driven humanitarian vulnerabilities. Indeed, the evaluation supports the shift that seems to be underway within the international community's strategic engagement in FSL in Yemen, and which sees a move from a largely emergency mode of response to a livelihoods-based approach supported by longer-term funding mechanisms.

Recommendations

On project design:

- Ensure that the objective of the intervention is consistently defined across documents;
- Ensure that situational analysis and assessments (on needs, vulnerability and capacity, market, including gender considerations) are context-specific and guide the design and implementation of project activities;
- Assess beneficiaries' behaviour and market dynamics, and determine the number of vouchers and any other relevant distribution modalities accordingly;
- If time is a critical factor, explore the possibility of rolling out activities in areas that are known, thus at the very minimum building upon existing knowledge, presence, and operations;
- Ensure that the choice of transfer modality, items redeemable by vouchers, and cost-efficiency considerations are tied to and in line with project objectives;
- Involve communities from the outset and in the identification of targeting criteria;
- Assess the costs (transport and others) that beneficiaries may incur when collecting assistance, and ensure that such costs are part of transfer value calculations, adjusting the transfer value during implementation, if necessary;
Further investigate issues related to collection and control of cash and vouchers at the household level, and particularly on the appropriateness and implications of alternative distribution modalities (e.g. where cash and vouchers are distributed to women, instead of men).

On project implementation:

- Consider strengthening data collection and analysis, paying particular attention to PDM, baseline and endline surveys;
- Invest in communication and awareness-raising efforts with programme beneficiaries and communities. For those who are deemed ineligible, provide clear information on the reasons for exclusion;
- Premise the establishment of committees and any new structures, bodies or entities on robust stakeholder analysis;
- If committees are established, invest in training and capacity-building, including in complaint-management;
- Consider providing committee members with a minimal allowance and/or forms of compensation to cover for time and expenses that they will sustain;
- Build a relationship with the SWF and enhance intra-agency coordination using the CVWG as a platform;
- Through recruitment of a food security and livelihoods advisor, ensure active and regular participation in the CVWG;
- Prioritise coordination with other agencies working in food security, learning and exchanging lessons on cash-based responses, including around targeting and linking up with the SWF;
- Ensure that a cohesive approach of engagement with the SWF is developed, from country office to field offices.

For future initiatives:

- Using SWF lists as a starting point for targeting may be a useful entry point and basis for communication to communities about targeting, as the SWF is a well-known entity at community level;
- Given the propensity of communities to invest in small stock, further explore the appropriateness of implementing livestock-based livelihood support initiatives;
- In consultation with communities, further explore the possibility of implementing projects at the village level that can enhance the livelihoods of the community;
- If future initiatives targeting women include conditions, ensure that they are premised on the understanding of women’s multiple daily tasks and responsibilities;
- Build upon the project experience to include marginalised communities, and consider integrating food security and livelihoods interventions with protection;
- Donor-funded initiatives should move away from short-term emergency interventions to longer-term responses, backed by longer-term funding mechanisms to support the food security and livelihoods of marginalised and non-marginalised rural communities.

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Annex 1 Median quantity of the four food items that were most purchased by beneficiaries in Taiz during December-February distributions

	Wheat (including wheat flour and grain) - in kg	Sugar - in kg	Oil - in litres	Tea - in grams
1 st distribution	36	10	4	106
2 nd distribution	42	9	3.4	53
3 rd distribution	48	4	3	61

Figure 1: Use of Cash Transfer in Hajjah - PDM March 2013






Figure 2: Use of Cash Transfer Lahj - PDM March 2013



Annex 2 Map of Yemen



Source WFP, 201

Annex 3

Figure 1: Baseline and endline dietary diversity in Lahj




Figure 2: Baseline and endline dietary diversity in Taiz (FV)




Table 1: Baseline and endline Food Consumption Score (FCS) in Lahj (CT)

Baseline

Clusters	Avg. Score	% of Total	Food Groups								
			bread	oil	milk	beans	meat/fish	veg	fruit	potato	sugar
poor	18	23%	7	5.4	0	0	0	2	0	1	6.7
borderline	29	25%	7	7	0.5	0.7	1	2.8	0	2.3	7
acceptable	58	53%	7	6.7	3.7	2	1	4.8	1.3	4.4	6.9

Endline

Clusters	Avg. Score	% of Total	Food Groups								
			Bread/cereals	oil	Milk	beans	meat/fish	veg	fruit	potato	sugar
Poor	20	1.5%	7	5	0	0	0	1.3	0	0	5
borderline	32	47%	7	6.9	0.5	0.5	1.3	2.8	0.2	2.2	6.9
acceptable	63	51.5%	7	6.9	3.3	3	3.4	3.9	0.9	3.5	6.9

Table 2: Baseline and endline Food Consumption Score (FCS) in Taiz (CT)

Baseline

			Food Groups – avg. consumption score per food group								
FSL profiles	Nb	% of	bread	tubers	veg	beans	meat/	fruit	milk	oil	sugar
		Total					fish				
0-21 Poor	125	25%	7	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	6
21.5-35 Borderline	95	19%	7	1	4	0	1	0	1	4	6
> 35 Acceptable	281	56%	7	2	5	0	5	0	3	5	7

Endline

			Food Groups – avg. consumption score per food group								
FSL profiles	Nb	% of	bread	tubers	veg	beans	meat/	fruit	milk	oil	sugar
		Total					fish				
0-21 Poor	125	25%	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	6
21.5-35 Borderline	95	19%	7	1	2	0	1	0	0.4	7	7
> 35 Acceptable	281	56%	7	2	4	2	2	0	3	6	7

Annex 4

Table 1: Cost per beneficiary household: food vouchers versus cash transfers

Food vouchers in Taiz		
Selected project costs	USD	No. of beneficiary HHs
Beneficiary ID Cards printing	5,000	
Voucher printing	50,000	
Vendors money transfer fee	75,000	
<i>Total</i>	130,000	10,000
Cost per beneficiary	13	

Cash transfers in Hajjah		
Selected project costs	USD	No. of beneficiary HHs
Beneficiary ID Cards printing	600	
Bank transfer fee	45,000	
<i>Total</i>	45,600	6,000
Cost per beneficiary	7,6	

Table 2: SCI's project expenditures in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah

		USD	GBP
	<i>FOOD VOUCHER TAIZ</i>		
42395	Program Start-up Meeting	2,000	1,290
42396	M & E/Project Management training	3,000	1,935
42397	Complaint and Response Mechanism	3,000	1,935
42398	ID Cards printing	5,000	3,225
42399	Voucher printing	50,000	32,250
42400	Cash Vouchers	2,500,000	1,612,503
42401	Vendors money transfer fee	75,000	48,375
42402	Media Visits & Content Development**	2,000	1,290
42403	Incentive to local partners staff	24,000	15,480
42404	Nutrition training materials	2,500	1,613
42405	Nutrition ToT training workshop	4,000	2,580
42406	Buffer to \$50 voucher for last 3 months	450,000	290,250
	<i>CASH TRANSFER LAHJ</i>		
42407	Conditional Cash transfer	1,000,000	645,001
42408	Cash transfer cost	18,692	12,056
42409	ID Cards printing	8,000	5,160
42410	Nutrition training materials	2,500	1,613
42411	Nutrition ToT training workshop	4,000	2,580
42412	Incentive to local partners staff	7,200	4,644
42413	Complaint and Response Mechanism	1,000	645
42414	Buffer to \$50 cash for last 3 months	180,000	116,100
	<i>CASH TRANSFERS HAJJAH</i>		
A3.1	Program Start-up Meeting	1,000.00	630
A3.2	ID Cards printing	600.00	378
A3.3	Cash transfers	900,000.00	566,658
A3.4	Bank transfer fee	45,000.00	28,333
A3.5	Shelter	6,000.00	3,778
A3.8	Baseline Survey	5,000.00	3,148
A3.9	Monitoring Surveys	5,000.00	3,148
A3.10	Evaluation Survey	3,000.00	1,889
A3.11	Complaint and Response Mechanism	1,500.00	944
A3.12	Media Visits & Content Development	2,000.00	1,259

Table 3: Food basket calculation

Food basket items	Price in local currency	gm/per/day	Energy	qty kg/person/month	qty kg/per family/month	Cost of food basket (riyal)	Cost of food basket (US\$)
Flour	120	300	1,575	9	54	6,480	30
Rice	200	120	1,575	3.6	21.6	4,320	20
Beans (canned)	400	50	168	1.5	9	3,600	17
Oil	400	25	266	0.75	4.5	1,800	8

Milk/bi-products	1,200	15	23	0.45	2.7	3,240	15
Sugar	200	15	60	0.45	2.7	540	3
Fresh food (eggs, vegetables, chicken)	1,500	0	0	0	0	1,500	7
Total		525	3,667	16	110	21,480	100

Annex 5 Methodology and sample

Desk research: The consultant reviewed project-related documents (such as baseline and endline surveys, project proposals, monitoring data, donor reports). Other documents, studies, evaluations from agencies undertaking similar activities in Yemen were also reviewed.

Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)/ In-depth Interviews (IDIs): FGDs and IDIs were a primary form of data collection. FGDs were formed on the basis of multiple categories: male/female; marginalized/non-marginalized; beneficiary/non-beneficiary. IDIs sought to capture more in-depth, individual level experiences and perceptions. Rapid interviews were also carried out with local traders and bank/post office staff in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah. To conduct FGDs and IDIs the evaluation team used semi-structured guides developed by the consultant. A total of 44 FGDs/IDIs and 11 rapid interviews were conducted (see Table below).

Research tools used in the three governorates: type and number

Rapid interviews	
Interviews with food vendors	6
Interviews with bank/post office staff	3
Interviews with qat sellers	2
Total	11
FGDs/IDIs	
FGD/IDI with committee members	9
FGDs/IDIs with men beneficiaries	8
FGDs/IDIs with women beneficiaries	9
FGD with FHH beneficiaries	1
FGDs/IDIs with men non-beneficiaries	3
IDI with women non-beneficiaries	1
FGDs with children beneficiaries	1
FGDs/IDIs with men beneficiaries marginalised	4
FGDs/IDIs with women beneficiaries marginalised	5
FGDs/IDIs with women non-beneficiaries marginalised	2
FGDs/IDIs with men non-beneficiaries marginalised	1
Total	44

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs): Using semi-structured guides developed by the consultant, a total of 27 KIIs were held with I/NGOs, UN agencies, as well as government officials (SWF and SFD) implementing cash and voucher-based activities. KIIs with SCI's project managers, officers and advisors were also conducted (see Annex 6 for a list and breakdown per organization of KIIs).

The findings of the evaluation presented in this report were the result of triangulation of primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative data, methods used and analysis.

Limitations of methodology

The evaluation methodology was faced with a number of limitations.

Firstly, the amount of time that was spent in each governorate was limited. Limited resources, ongoing security concerns, and the time it took to travel from Sana'a to each governorate, districts and eventually villages, meant that approximately only three full working days were spent in each governorate. Secondly, during some FGDs, and especially FGDs with women, it was difficult to keep participants 'on track' and focused on the discussion. In many occasions FGDs that started with around 8 people, ended up with more than 20 (in addition to numerous children) as the presence of the evaluation team in the villages always attracted a good deal of attention by communities who were also clearly hoping that the purpose of the visit was registration of beneficiaries. Often the team spent a good deal of time to reiterate the purpose of the visit and to try and put some order into FGD settings. In some occasions this limited the amount of time that could actually be used for the discussion.

Secondly, while qualitative data collection was most appropriate to obtain in-depth information in a short period of time, by its nature, qualitative research methods involve only a sample focused on a relatively small number of beneficiaries and other community members (e.g traders, shop keepers, committee members, etc.). As such, the findings of this evaluation are not statistically representative of fieldwork sites' beneficiaries. Furthermore, qualitative data collection did not always provide quantifiable data, for example on staff time and other overheads associated with cash transfers vs food vouchers modalities. At times, beneficiaries found it difficult to accurately recall or provide an exact ranking of the food types that they purchased in a given distribution. Nonetheless, given certain questions asked during this evaluation and triangulation with available quantitative data, it was possible to produce insights on a number of key dynamics.

Thirdly, the analysis has been challenged by the problems faced with the poor quality of quantitative data sets of baseline and endline surveys and monitoring data, and as such care should be exercised when considering the findings of this evaluation. No baseline and endline narrative report was received for Hajjah and as such when reference throughout the report is made on baseline/endline data it refers to Taiz and/or Lahj only.

Annex 6 List of Key Informants

#	Name	Organisation	Place	Title
1	Mohammed Addum	SCI	Sana'a	FSL Manager
2	Casey Harrity	SCI	Sana'a	Director of Program Development and Quality
3	Jerry Farrell	SCI	Sana'a	Country Director
4	Claire Donohue	SCI	Taiz	Field Manager Taiz Office
5	Karl Frey	SCI	Taiz	Food Security and Livelihood Specialist

6	FSL project staff	SCI	Taiz	Project officers, project assistants, M&E officers
7	Katie Dimmer	SCI	Lahj	Field Manager Aden Office
8	FSL project staff	SCI	Lahj	Programme officer, Project officers, project assistants, M&E officers
9	Sami Sallam	SCI	Hajjah	FSL Project officer
10	Hussein Abbas	SCI	Hajjah	FSL Programme officer
	NGOs/UN agencies			
11	Martin Varnie	MercyCorps	Taiz	FSL Programme Manager
12	?	IMC	Taiz	
13	?	Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW)	Lahj	
14		WFP	Lahj	
15	ADRA	Fadul Bashir	Lahj	FSL Project Manager
16	ADRA	Farya Minhas	Lahj	Operations/Program Manager
17	Oxfam GB	Stella ?	Hajjah	FSL Programme Manager
18	UNICEF	Horia Aleryani	Hajjah	Programme Officer
19	WFP	Abdulaziz Noman	Hajjah	Programme Officer
20	ACTED	Hanalia Ferhan	Sana'a	FSL Programme Manager
21	Oxfam GB	Colette Fearon	Sana'a	Country Director
22	MercyCorps	Ali Eltayeb	Sana'a	Country Director
	Donors			
23	USAID	David Steele	Sana'a	Senior Humanitarian Advisor
24	DFID	Helen McElhinney	Sana'a	Humanitarian Advisor
25	ECHO	Daniela D'Urso	Sana'a	Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
	Government agencies			
26	SWF	Abdul Karim Salah	Sana'a	Director General of Policy
27	SFD		Taiz	Governorate Director

Annex 7 Terms of Reference

End of Project Evaluation for DFID-funded Emergency Food Security Project in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah Governorates of Yemen

SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

This is an external end of project evaluation to assess if the project met its objectives. It will focus on the relevance and appropriateness of the modalities of vouchers and cash in relation to the specific contexts in which they were used. The lessons learned through this evaluation will be applied by SCI to inform future strategies and programme design in Yemen. The findings will also be shared more widely through SCI networks and with peer agencies in Yemen.

Specifically the purpose of this evaluation is to:

- (a) Assess the extent to which the project met its objectives as stated in the logframe, and assess the technical design and strength of the project;

- (b) Analyse the appropriateness and impact of voucher programming in Taiz and cash programming in, Lahj and Hajjah
- (c) Highlight lessons learned and recommend improvements for SCI's future programme design in Yemen.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

A selection of the OECD-DAC criteria will be used to guide the evaluation questions.

- Impact
- Effectiveness
- Relevance/Appropriateness
- Efficiency
- Coverage

The evaluation should also consider the quality of the interventions against international technical standards such as SPHERE and HAP. It should consider the extent to which gender equity issues have been considered in planning and implementation and if/how humanitarian principles have been applied.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

A baseline survey was conducted in December 2012 against a 5% sample of the 10,000 households receiving vouchers in Taiz (in DimnetKhadir, Al Ma'afer and Al Mawasit districts) and a 5% sample of the 4,000 households receiving cash in Lahj (in Al Milah and Radfan). A baseline survey was also conducted in Hajjah in February 2013 also using a 5% sample. Data was collected through a household questionnaire focusing on indicators related to: source of income; monthly income; levels of debt; access to food; food consumption; diet diversity; and asset ownership. An endline survey will be conducted in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah in April-May 2013 and the results will be made available by mid-May for consideration in the final evaluation.

The evaluation questions below are structured according to the OECD-DAC criteria.

Impact (Outcome)

- In comparison with the baseline data, is any improvement seen in the quantity and quality (diet diversification) of food consumed in the three governorates?
- In what ways did beneficiaries use cash grants (e.g. types of commodities purchased / assets purchased / debt repayment)?
- Was the size of the cash grant sufficient to protect livelihoods assets?
- What was the impact, if any, of cash and vouchers on gender relationships (at community and intra-household levels)?
- From the community perspective what was the outcome of the distribution of agricultural inputs in the final stage of the project?

Effectiveness & Efficiency

- Did we meet our targets for cash and voucher as set out against indicators in the project logframe?
- Did we implement the voucher distributions and cash transfers in a timely manner?
- What factors limited the timeliness of implementation and did other actors experience the same delays? What was the impact of any delays?
- What is the relationship between cost and beneficiary reach for both cash grants and vouchers? How did this effect the scale of our response in the three governorates?
- Is there any evidence of misappropriation or other risky activities which could contribute to conflict within the community or within the household?

Relevance/Appropriateness

- To what extent were the interventions selected, the locations targeted, and the timing of the programme relevant to the needs?
- Did the quality of implementation meet minimum international standards?
- To what extent/is there any indication that (some of) the benefits of the project will continue to meet needs after the project ends?
- To what extent did the modalities and models of distribution fit with the context?
- Did the baseline assessments and ongoing market monitoring lead to actions to mitigate negative effects of the provision of voucher and cash?
- Were there any commodities that beneficiaries could not access?
- Did the voucher and cash activities cause any unintended harm to individual beneficiaries, households, and the community (e.g. transport costs, excessive waiting, conflict /tensions In the community, and/or intra-household)?
- What are beneficiaries' views, perceptions and experiences of feedback mechanisms and participation in this project?

Coverage

- How have we decided who to target (geographically and at HH level) - how relevant / robust were our targeting criteria for cash and vouchers? Are we reaching the most vulnerable people?
- What was the real coverage of the programme versus planned coverage?
- Is there any evidence of mis-targeting and if so, what was the cause and impact of this?
- Was the project at an appropriate scale, considering the number of people in need?

EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

This is an external evaluation and therefore the methodology will be determined by the consultant, with approval from the SCI commissioning manager. However the consultant must follow evaluation guidance as set out in the SCI Evaluation Handbook, for example ensuring meaningful participation of children in the evaluation.

Suggested methodologies are as follows:

- Desk review utilizing existing project documentation, key documents and reports, qualitative and quantitative monitoring data collected by the project;
- Opening and closing workshops with relevant SCI staff;
- Review of surveys / needs assessments (SCI and other agencies) and the HEA surveys conducted as part of this project; review of regular monitoring reports, review of price monitoring reports, post distribution monitoring reports;
- Key informant interviews (KII) with other NGOs, UN and stakeholders, KII with national actors, KII with field stakeholders (including traders);
- Interviews and discussions with programme staff, local partners to capture a comprehensive analysis of the project design, approaches, strategies, activities and progress;
- Household surveys using baseline tools⁴⁵ and the same baseline sample of 5% in all 3 governates.

EVALUATION TEAM

⁴⁵ SCI conducted a baseline study at the beginning of the project which included HH interviews with questions on: DIETARY DIVERSITY, FOOD CONSUMPTION, COPING STRATEGIES, INCOME AND EXPENDITURE.

The evaluation will be led by an international consultant with budget allowing for a team of 2 enumerators to conduct data collection for the survey.

The following qualifications and skills are expected:

- Technical expertise in evaluating cash transfer programmes, an advantage if in chronic emergency contexts;
- Previous experience of M&E in cash and voucher programming, including conducting end of project evaluations for large-scale projects;
- Very strong written and spoken communication and facilitation skills;
- Fluency in English essential, fluency in Arabic (preferred) an advantage;

Roles and responsibilities

The following is expected of the consultant:

- Review documentation before arrival
- Provide draft methodology and inception report / evaluation plan to the commissioning manager – edit the methodology based on commissioning manager’s feedback
- Responsible for data collection, including training and supervising enumerators
- Carry out fieldwork in an ethical manner and in line with SCI values
- Responsible for drafting and finalizing report and providing on time
- Facilitate opening and closing workshops (at country and area level – TBC)
- Follow SCI security protocols while working in Yemen

The Commissioning Manager for this evaluation is the MEAL Manager who will be responsible for providing pre-reading, arranging logistics for travel and appointments, and managing the consultancy. A steering committee will be established consisting of representatives from the SC UK FSL technical team, a DFID technical advisor and potentially other CaLP members. The steering committee will be responsible for reviewing and signing off the methodology, data collection tools, inception report and draft final report.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS

The outputs will be as follows:

- Final inception report, methodology and data collection tools
- Draft report
- Final report (data set for quantitative and qualitative data attached if relevant)
- Debrief with programme and management staff
- Opening and Closing Workshops

The report should be clear and concise, with an executive summary not to exceed five pages and a main text not to exceed 30 pages. The findings section should be structured against the OECD DAC criteria and evaluation questions as outline in the ToR Annexes should include the TORs, a timeline of the response, a list of individuals interviewed, a bibliography, a description of methods employed, a summary of survey results (if appropriate) and any other relevant materials.

TIMEFRAME

This evaluation should start from mid-May 2013 for 5 weeks (15 May – 30 June preferred). The exact timeline can be confirmed with the consultant depending on the methodology and in consideration of project activities (final distributions in Hajjah (last week of March), Taiz (2nd week of April), Lahj (3rd week of April). However it is expected that the evaluation will include at least 3 weeks for in-country data collection, 3-4 days before arrival

for pre-reading and methodology preparation and 9 days for report writing. On receipt of comments of the draft report, the report should be finalized within 1 week.

DISSEMINATION

The evaluation findings and report will be shared with internal and external stakeholders both in Yemen and internationally. It will also be published on the DFID website. The Consultant shall also provide such assistance and advice to Save the Children and relevant Affiliates which is ancillary to and commensurate with the above, as is requested by Save the Children.

Annex 8 Project Logframe

PROJECT NAME					
Emergency food security in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah governorates of Yemen					
IMPACT		Impact Indicator 1		Baseline 2011	Milestone 1
Contribute to improved lives of vulnerable and conflict-affected people		Crude Mortality Rate	Planned	<9/1000/year	
			Achieved		
			Source		
			Baseline: UN Consolidated Appeals Process 2012 Target: UN Consolidated Appeals Process 2013		
OUTCOME		Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
People affected by conflict, disaster and economic decline are assisted and protected		Average household food consumption score	Planned	46	N/A
			Achieved		
			Source		
			Impact assessment report		
		Outcome Indicator 2		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
		Average dietary diversity index score	Planned	6	N/A
			Achieved		
			Source		
			Impact assessment report		
		Outcome Indicator 3		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
		Percentage decrease in households relying on negative coping mechanisms	Planned	17%	N/A
			Achieved		
			Source		
			Impact assessment report		
		Outcome Indicator 4		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
		Percentage of targeted households able to meet minimum food needs at the end of the project period	Planned	N/A	N/A
			Achieved		
			Source		
			Post-distribution monitoring and food basket monitoring assessment report		
INPUTS (£)		DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)
		5,033,192			
INPUTS (HR)		DFID (FTEs)			

	15% of one Humanitarian Advisor and one Deputy Programme Manager
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Note: targets for outcome indicators may need to be adjusted once baseline data has been collected

OUTPUT 1	Output Indicator 1.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	
Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Taiz have received cash and vouchers to meet basic food needs	# of households enrolled in voucher activities	Planned	0	10,000	
		Achieved		10,000 households registered – 5,700 Dimnet Khadir, 2,300 Ma'afar and 2,000 Al Mawasit	
		Source			
	Beneficiary registration records				
	Output Indicator 1.2			Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
	%age of distributed vouchers redeemed	Planned		N/A	95%
		Achieved			The first round began on the 19th Dec. in Dimnet Khadir. 5,686 HHs received their vouchers. At the time of the Dec report the redemption of vouchers was continuing and 50% had so far redeemed their vouchers.
		Source			
	Voucher redemption records, distribution records				
	Output Indicator 1.3			Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
# of Households receiving final cash transfer	Planned		N/A	0	
	Achieved				
	Source				
Beneficiary registration records					
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)					
40%					
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)	
	2,725,806				
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)				
OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	
Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Lahj and Hajjah have received cash assistance to meet basic food needs	# of households enrolled in cash transfer programme	Planned	0	10,000	
		Achieved		4,000 HHs have been registered Al Milah and Radfan districts of Lahj. 6,000 HHs have been registered in Aslam district of Hajjah.	
		Source			

		Beneficiary registration records		
Output Indicator 2.2			Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
% of transfers used to cover food needs		Planned	80%	75%
		Achieved		For the reporting period no transfers were completed
		Source		
		Post-distribution monitoring and evaluation reports		
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	40%			
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)
	2,262,253			
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)			
Output Indicator 3.1			Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
HEA framework applied to livelihoods zones		Planned	0	1
		Achieved		This activity has not yet started. Off track as international staff have not been granted visas during this time.
		Source		
		HEA report		
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	10%			
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)
	45,150			
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)			
Output Indicator 4.1			Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)
Vulnerable households receive cash grants / vouchers for livelihood assets		Planned		
		Achieved		As planned, this activity has not yet started.
		Source		
		Cash disbursement distribution reports		
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)	10%			
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)
	675,941			
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)			



PROJECT NAME	Emergency food security in Taiz, Lahj and Hajjah governorates of Yemen				
IMPACT	Impact Indicator 1		Baseline 2011	Milestone 1	Target 2013
	Contribute to improved lives of vulnerable and conflict-affected people	Crude Mortality Rate	Planned	<9/1000/year	<9/1000/year
			Achieved		
				Source	
			Baseline: UN Consolidated Appeals Process 2012 Target: UN Consolidated Appeals Process 2013		
OUTCOME	Outcome Indicator 1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
	People affected by conflict disaster and economic decline are assisted and protected	Average household food consumption score	Planned	46	N/A
			Achieved		
				Source	
				Impact assessment report	
	Outcome Indicator 2		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
	Average dietary diversity index score	Average dietary diversity index score	Planned	6	N/A
			Achieved		
				Source	
				Impact assessment report	
	Outcome Indicator 3		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
	Percentage decrease in households relying on negative coping mechanisms	Percentage decrease in households relying on negative coping mechanisms	Planned	17%	N/A
			Achieved		50%
			Source		
			Impact assessment report		
Outcome Indicator 4		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)	
Percentage of targeted households able to meet minimum food needs at the end of the project period	Percentage of targeted households able to meet minimum food needs at the end of the project period	Planned	N/A	N/A	
		Achieved		75%	
			Source		
			Post-distribution monitoring and food basket monitoring reports; Impact assessment report		
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)	DFID SHARE (%)
	5,033,192				100%
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)				
	15% of one Humanitarian Adviser and one Deputy Programme Manager				
Note: targets for outcome indicators may need to be adjusted once baseline data has been collected					
OUTPUT 1	Output Indicator 1.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
	Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Taiz have received cash and vouchers to meet basic food needs	# of households enrolled in voucher activities	Planned	0	10,000
			Achieved		10,000 households registered – 5,700 Dimnet Khadir, 2,300 Ma'afar and 2,000 Al
				Source	
				Beneficiary registration records	
	Output Indicator 1.2		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
%age of distributed vouchers redeemed	%age of distributed vouchers redeemed	Planned	N/A	95%	
		Achieved		The first round began on the 19th Dec. in Dimnet Khadir. 5,686 HHs received their vouchers. At the time of the Dec report the redemption of vouchers was continuing and 50% had so far redeemed their vouchers.	
			Source		
			Voucher redemption records, distribution records		
Output Indicator 1.3		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)	
# of Households receiving final cash transfer	# of Households receiving final cash transfer	Planned	N/A	0	
		Achieved		4314	
			Source		
			Beneficiary registration records		
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)					
	40%				
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)	DFID SHARE (%)
	2,725,806				100%
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)				
OUTPUT 2	Output Indicator 2.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
	Most vulnerable households in selected districts of Lahj and Hajjah have received cash assistance to meet basic food needs	# of households enrolled in cash transfer programme	Planned	0	10,000
			Achieved		4,000 HHs have been registered Al Milah and Radfan districts of Lahj, 6,000 HHs have been registered in Aslam district of Hajjah.
				Source	
				Beneficiary registration records	
	Output Indicator 2.2		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
% of transfers used to cover food needs	% of transfers used to cover food needs	Planned	80%	75%	
		Achieved		75% for 5 months in Lahj and 3 months in Hajjah	
			Source		
			Post-distribution monitoring and evaluation reports		
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)					
	40%				
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)	DFID SHARE (%)
	2,262,253				100%
INPUTS (HR)	DFID (FTEs)				
OUTPUT 3	Output Indicator 3.1		Baseline	Milestone 1 (31 Dec 2012)	Target (31 May 2013)
	HEA framework applied to livelihoods zones	Number of livelihoods zones where HEA is applied	Planned	0	1
			Achieved		2 zones
			Source		
			HEA report		
IMPACT WEIGHTING (%)					
	10%				
INPUTS (£)	DFID (£)		Govt (£)	Other (£)	DFID SHARE (%)
	45,450				100%

