



Ministry
of Defence

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Defence Equipment and Support
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Tel: 0117 913 0204



Your Reference:

Our Reference:
25062013-113350-005

Date:
6 September 2013

Dear [REDACTED],

Thank you for your email of 24 June requesting the following information:

1. In July 2004, the MoD announced that Thales UK had been selected as the preferred bidder for the Watchkeeper tactical unmanned air vehicle (TUAV) system. Can you provide the names of the committee and committee members who were involved in this decision?

Can you provide the minutes or other documentation of the meeting relating to this decision?

2. In August 2005, Thales UK was awarded the contract for the development, manufacture and initial support (DMIS) phases of the Watchkeeper programme. Can you provide the names of the committee and committee members who were involved in this decision?

Can you provide the minutes or other documentation of the meeting relating to this decision?

3. In April 2010, the UK MoD signed an initial three-year support contract with Thales UK for the Watchkeeper UAS Programme.

Can you provide the names of the committee and committee members who were involved in this decision?

Can you provide the minutes or other documentation of the meeting relating to this decision?

4. Which countries has the MoD or its representatives approached in relation to the selling or export of Watchkeeper Unmanned Aerial Vehicles?

5. Once the Watchkeeper programme is complete, will the MoD or UK Government continue to own the intellectual property rights for the Watchkeeper?

I am treating your correspondence as a request for information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

A search for the information has now been completed within the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and I can confirm that information in scope of your request is held.

A copy of the information that can be released is enclosed.

Some information held by the Department, falling within scope of your request, is exempt from release under sections 26(1) (defence), 40(2) (personal information) and 43(2) (commercial interests) of the Freedom of Information Act and is therefore withheld.

Sections 26(1) and 43(2) are qualified exemptions and, as such, it has been necessary to conduct a public interest test to decide whether the public interest in withholding the information outweighs the public interest in disclosure.

Section 26(1)(a) and (b) has been applied to some of the information because it contains details of the operational characteristics of unmanned air systems and its disclosure would prejudice the defence of the British Islands and the capability, effectiveness and security of our armed forces. The balance of public interest was found to lie in favour of withholding the information, given that, overall, the public interest is best served by not disclosing information that would be likely to provide an advantage to enemy forces and prejudice the capability, effectiveness and security of UK and allied forces, both on current operations and in the future.

Section 43(2) has been applied to some of the information because it contains judgements on the commercial and technical aspects of the tender responses provided by Northrop Grumman and Thales. For the majority of information, falling within this category, the public interest was found to lie in favour of disclosure; however, in a very limited number of cases, disclosure would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of Northrop Grumman, Thales and the MOD. Overall, the public interest is best served by not disclosing information that would be likely to prejudice the commercial interests of the MOD and important suppliers.

Section 40(2) has been applied to some of the information in order to protect personal information as governed by the Data Protection Act 1998. Section 40 is an absolute exemption and there is therefore no requirement to consider the public interest in making a decision to withhold the information. In some cases, personal information has been disclosed because the names of the individuals concerned is already in the public domain in connection with defence activities, or they are above 1* in grade, or in public facing roles.

It might be helpful if I explain how procurement decisions are made in the MOD. In general, tender documentation receives separate technical and commercial scrutiny before the convening of an overall tender assessment board. The minutes of this board, and the associated assessors' workshop, are the documents enclosed. Further decisions, such as the selection of the means of supporting equipment when in service or, in the case of Watchkeeper, confirmation that the preferred bidder will be awarded a contract, are made by means of written submissions and approvals, not by a committee. For this reason, the MOD holds no information that is within the scope of parts two and three of your request.

The MOD holds no information in respect of part four of your request. The MOD or its representatives have not approached any other country in relation to selling or exporting Watchkeeper.

In accordance with MOD policy, the MOD has not taken ownership of the intellectual property produced by its contractors as part of the Watchkeeper programme. The MOD has, however, secured rights to use this intellectual property in accordance with its usual practice and using standard defence procurement conditions. These rights may be exercised by MOD, or any other UK government department, and will continue following the completion of the programme. Any intellectual property created by MOD employees during the course of the Watchkeeper programme will continue to be owned by the MOD.

If you are not satisfied with this response or you wish to complain about any aspect of the handling of your request, then you should contact me in the first instance. If informal resolution is not possible and you are still dissatisfied then you may apply for an independent internal review by contacting the Deputy Chief Information Officer, 2nd Floor, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, SW1A 2HB (e-mail CIO-FOI-IR@mod.uk). Please note that any request for an internal review must be made within 40 working days of the date on which the attempt to reach informal resolution has come to an end.

If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may take your complaint to the Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act. Please note that the Information Commissioner will not investigate your case until the MOD internal review process has been completed. Further details of the role and powers of the Information Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website, <http://www.ico.gov.uk>.

Yours sincerely,

Mike Gwyther

WATCHKEEPER DMIS ASSESSMENT REVIEW - ASSESSORS WORKSHOP 6 May
NH3, St 301 09:30-13:30

Attendance:

Chris Day	TUAVPM	OA lead assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAVQS	SCE assessor
Mike West	TUAVP2	Technical team leader
Martin Young	QinetiQ	lead assessor
Roger Braddick	Dstl Sensors	Dstl Lead assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAV C4I	Security assessor
Dennis Cox	TUAVP1	Time & management team leader
[REDACTED]	TUAVP3	Safety team assessor
Al Cartwright	TUAVP1d	ITEAP assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAVP1a	Systems engineering assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAVILS	ILS team leader
[REDACTED]	TUAVCM	Commercial/Cost lead assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAVCom1	
[REDACTED]	SEA Ltd	Independent assessment scrutineer
[REDACTED]	HQ DRA FD	C2 LoD lead assessor
Maj Robin Stone	HQ Land	C2 Training lead assessor
[REDACTED]	DRA/WIT	C2 assessment facilitator
Stephen Tazare	TUAVP1b	Assessment manager/facilitator

The objective of the workshop was to determine whether there was a consensus of opinion that the two proposals submitted were robust, and to establish whether there was clear discrimination to which all could agree.

- 1) **Introduction.** TUAVPM opened proceedings by emphasising the need for the workshop to review the evidence to date, discuss the concerns and issues and develop a consensus view. This could then be presented as an interim report, highlighting strengths and weaknesses, to the selection board.
- 2) **Strategy and programme to Main Gate.**
 - a) Should clear discrimination be apparent the strategy would be to issue a review note to the Investment Appraisal Board (IAB) during mid May. If this were to be practical it would be necessary to have the **team leader reports** completed as soon as possible.
 - b) Significant cost issues had been identified with both sets of DMIS proposals. As a result exploratory discussions have been conducted with the Primes and a meeting will be held at Larkhill on the 10th May to review their main cost drivers and variations, and to discuss potential capability trade offs.
 - c) Programme: The schedule for submission of the Business Case to the IAB remained 29 Sept 04 with Contract Award expected at the end of Jan 05.
 - d) Scoring: TUAVPM emphasised that with the traffic light scoring RED highlighted areas, which were either non compliant, significant PCT issues or areas where significant effort would be required to recover.

- 3) **Supplier capability evaluation.** TUAVQS explained the process of SCE and outlined the results emphasising that the DPA require Prime contractors to ideally be at an "established" level (level 3). The net result is that for "process capability Thales and Elbit emerge as the stronger contender, however Thales were at Level 1 for Information Management and Level 2 in the areas of Acquisition, Supply, Project Assessment, Risk Management, Integration & Validation. In addition it was considered that the significant 'variability' of capability within the NG consortia raises significant risk. **Preferred option: THALES**
- 4) **Technical evaluation**
- a) **QinetiQ.** QinetiQ lead assessor briefed the workshop on the findings of the QinetiQ assessment team. Overall summary indicated that of the 70 criteria THALES had 4 red and 15 amber, whilst NG had 15 red and 36 amber. In addition THALES were seen as "best in class" for 44 of the criteria and NG for 6.
- i) It was considered that "...THALES propose a cautious system solution, using orthodox design and significant OTS components, making for reduced technical and programme risk." In addition THALES provide evidence of a "... measured system engineering process, giving confidence that the contractor's solution is viable". It was QinetiQ's opinion that THALES fully understand the system that they are proposing, the proposal followed a robust approach and that the shortfalls identified are recoverable.
- ii) By contrast NG "...propose a more challenging concept solution, offering a number of potential operational advantages." However there is significant concern on the coherency of their system engineering approach which was particularly pronounced with the SDD being "... descriptive, not definitive, making it very difficult to determine exactly what their solution consists of."
- iii) It was highlighted that amongst the Request For Clarification responses NG had provided additional information rather than merely providing clarification. It was emphasised that such data should be excluded and that the assessment must be based purely be on the tabled DMIS proposal together with clarifications where these seek to explain in wider terms the information contained therein.
- iv) **Preferred option: THALES**
- b) **Dstl.** Roger Braddick presented the Dstl interim report covering the areas of: Sensors; Positional Awareness; Data Links; Automatic Target Detection/Recognition (Operator Aids); Vulnerability & Survivability
- i) **SENSORS:** There is concern over NGC's understanding of SAR integration issues and their ability to overcome them. Whilst both primes have issues with SAR geo-location - variation of performance predictions. With the EO/IR sensors the NG small turret option, Wescam 11SST, is the weakest and has a shortfall on visual performance. With the Large turret there is concern over the additional developments (step stare and pointing accuracy uplift) that would be required for the Compass IV unit chosen by THALES.
- ii) **Positional Awareness:** To ensure target location accuracy - THALES proposal is to adopt map registration however concern that the time taken to collect three points

on both map and image would exceed the 10s target time. By contrast NGC have given less information in the final bid and state that the target location accuracy for will be achieved based on only one field test with no information for the EO/IR sensor. Lessons learnt from the CASOM project indicate potential [REDACTED] if adopting the THALES French developed GPS chips.

iii) **Data Links:** The NGC IOC datalink is marked as non-compliant as no relay capability will be provided. In addition it was noted that the Dstl SMEs had great difficulty in determining the actual datalink solution due to the structure and ambiguity of the proposal.

iv) **Automatic Target Detection/Recognition (Operator Aids).** [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is insufficient detailed information, however, on not only the algorithm performance requirements necessary to maintain sufficient imagery throughput, but also on the likely algorithm performance actually achievable. Those performance figures that are given are limited, presented in an ambiguous way and lack meaningful context

v) **Vulnerability & Survivability:** Summary of the main V&S issues:

(i) NG - Fire Scout has a significant IR signature, which has not been addressed. Ground Element - bid does not seem to recognise a need to face up to the issue of ground equipment attrition. [REDACTED]

(ii) THALES - demonstrates a good understanding of ground system signatures and vulnerability. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] has performed some credible assessments and has suggested some generic protection measures.

vi) In conclusion - there is a marked difference in approach with THALES attempting to address issues which NGC ignore. It is considered that THALES have adopted a robust approach and there is confidence that the amber issues identified are fixable. In contrast the NGC proposal takes a higher risk approach **Preferred option: THALES**

c) **Security:** TUAV C4I presented the security technical issues noting that the WATCHKEEPR project is piloting many issues and in particular that of foreign software. Aim of the process is to ensure that both proposed systems can be accredited and whilst

there are issues outstanding they are considered manageable and therefore there are no discriminators in this area

i) Preferred option: n/a

5) **Time & Management.** TUAVPI believed the only Red issue so far identified is NGCs ITEAP, which has substantial gaps to be developed during DMIS - this was considered unacceptable. The amber issues emphasise the gulf in quality with the documentation provided, noting that substantial negotiation would be required to resolve. Preferred option: **THALES**

a) **Safety.** Summary of the safety criteria is that for NGC there is 1 green and 17 Amber/Red; for THALES there are 10 green and 1 Amber/Red.

b) Preferred option: **THALES**

6) **ILS.**

a) **NGC.** Concern that of 37 RFCs 10 have declared that the 'bid statement was in error'. Whilst of 29 criteria, 18 are Red of which the lack of operational support is considered a Main Gate showstopper. Other areas of concern included lack of progress on HFI despite prompting; lack of operational stock until 2015; and the battlefield transportation and handling of Firescout and Ranger.

b) **NGC WLC** - The CLS packages advised by NG for both its options are both ambiguous and unclear on what actual support is supplied, therefore little confidence can be drawn from the figures supplied.

c) 

d) **THALES.** 6 amber issues identified - of which 2 where the result of Op Usage Calculation Error, whilst the rest green. Other concerns are the adoption of a non-standard generator; and the proposed 450 drops container.

e) Preferred option: **THALES**

7) **Commercial and Cost issues**

a) TUAVCM opened the review of the commercial and cost issues by stating that both bids are unaffordable as submitted.

b) NGC have challenged the MoD Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) terms and conditions and removed significant rights. This would require substantial negotiation to resolve.

c) UK work balance. Whilst THALES are proposing that 78% of work will be conducted the UK, NGC propose 62%

- d) Export potential. DESO opinion on the export potential is that the THALES joint venture, UAV Systems Ltd, could be worth up to £400m in exports over 10 years. However they were unable to identify a figure for NGC as exports would be subject to US approval.
- e) Soft Issues Bid Evaluation Tool (SIBET). Results of the SIBET assessment show that the THALES is more robust than NGC
- f) Preferred option: **THALES**

8) **Operational Assessment & technical review**

- a) Chris Day provided a summary of the COEIA results to date as follows:
 - i) There is clear discrimination against the NGC FireScout platform due to its thermal signature resulting in a doubling of its vulnerability in comparison to the fixed wing alternatives. Dstl have been tasked to review the effect of thermal signature suppression on the OA however it is disconcerting that NGC themselves have not suggested this approach.
 - ii) The THALES option is the cheapest in terms of Whole Life Cost, partly due to the superior endurance of their platforms resulting in scenarios where 3-4 Fire Scout missions would need to be flown as compared to 1 450 mission.
 - iii) Air Vehicle numbers. Concern that neither solution offers sufficient A/V numbers to cover attrition.
 - iv) Preferred option: **THALES**
- b) A brief technical review of the proposed systems raised the following issues:
 - i) **NGC**
 - (i) **Firescout - Baseline**
 - (a) Still under development TRL/SRL issues
 - (b) Poor Performance in hot and high environments.
 - (c) Absolute ceiling vs operational ceiling
 - (d) Limited endurance
 - (e) TLE - No evidence of achieving KUR
 - (f) Wind limitations with ref. to Def Stan 00-35
 - (g) Rotor Blade erosion issue still extant no data offered
 - (h) Launch with Forward motion unproven.
 - (i) 4 Blade Rotor configuration unproven
 - (j) R&M data unproven
 - (k) TLE with SAR <25 metres
 - (l) [REDACTED]
 - (m) High risk de-icing solution
 - (n) Discrepancies between Installed ECU power vs uninstalled ECU power quoted
 - (o) Power savings by new rotor upgrade?
 - (p) Unable to meet C1 temperature limits
 - (q) Thermal Signature from Efflux is an issue (V& S study)
 - (r) Processing growth capacity currently at 70% - limits growth.
 - (s) [REDACTED]
 - (t) ATI maturity

- (u) Airworthiness pedigree
 - (v) Emergency recovery
 - (w) Demanding maintenance schedule
 - (x) Level of REME Support
 - (y) Fuel demands of system (Bowser)
- (ii) **Firescout - Alternate**
- (a) Limited to the current design of the Fire Scout RQ-4B. No additional design changes to are anticipated nor quoted.
 - (b) The Fire Scout will retain operational utility at the operationally significant environmental conditions. It is only at the extreme environmental conditions that performance will be impacted
 - (c) Beyond Line of site communication is available for voice only. There will be no beyond-line-of-sight capability for imagery.
- (iii) **Firescout Alternate option non compliance's**
- (a) The system shall not provide facilities to predict datalink line-of-sight coverage for missions.
 - (b) The system shall not provide facilities to revise communications plans depending on datalink line-of-sight coverage for missions.
 - (c) The system shall not provide facilities to revise communications plans depending on datalink performance for missions.
 - (d) The system shall not provide automated facilities to optimise the control and monitoring of all system datalinks.
 - (e) The system shall not provide facilities for rehearsing missions shall include sensor footprint prediction displays taking account of LOS with terrain and platform/sensor attitude.
 - (f) The system shall not utilise, where available, terrain, culture/obstruction, aeronautical, tactical/intelligence and Met data, together with system ODM for assisting in selection of launch and recovery sites.
 - (g) The system shall not provide facilities to fuse information on own force dispositions with information stripped electronically from the ATO and ACO
 - (h) The system shall not provide facilities to use fused information on own force dispositions for airspace deconfliction.
 - (i) The deployable system shall not provide facilities to collect imagery for planned periods without a datalink between the Air Vehicle and its controlling GCS subsystem.
 - (j) The system shall not provide facilities to alert Operators to targets detected within the sensor search area.
 - (k) The system shall not provide facilities to change the default units of measurement within the system.
 - (l) The deployable system shall not be able to operate without performance degradation in climatic conditions A1, M1, M2 and M3 as defined by Def Stan 00-35.
 - (m) The deployable system shall not comply with STANAG 4586 Appendix B1.
 - (n) All primary imagery products of the system shall comply with STANAG 7023 Edition 4. Only MPEG formats will be provided.
 - (o) The deployable system shall not provide for hardware and software insertion such that physical elements and functions may be inserted or extracted, without forcing unintentional changes to other physical elements and

functions, to enable scalability, replacement and upgrade of system hardware and software.

- (iv) **Ranger**
 - (a) Range limited 100kms
 - (b) Short endurance
 - (c) Limited Growth Potential
 - (d) TLE - No evidence of achieving KUR
 - (e) Data link issues with antenna coverage
 - (f) No erosion protection on Propeller
 - (g) Icing solution subject to further trade studies
 - (h) No icing solution for EO/IR sensor identified
 - (i) Max temperature limit (A2) unproven, calculations assumed no contribution from avionics?
 - (j) No Heavy fuel engine
 - (k) [REDACTED]
 - (l) ATOLS Microwave Radar Auto Land for Precision Landing in Rain or Fog not proven
 - (m) Launcher requires development for launches at 2000m. (currently 1800m)

- (v) **Ranger upgrades & engineering**
 - (a) Avionics replacement
 - (b) TCDL Integration
 - (c) ATOLS Integration
 - (d) Software replacement
 - (e) Wescam LTD sensor integration
 - (f) Airworthiness pedigree

- (vi) **Sensors**
 - (a) Annex P: CDS 11 – Sensor Mix Study Report
 - (b) No clear definition of payload C2 controls
 - (c) No data on plug and play interface. (Not offered on option)
 - (d) All Weather with the Lynx SAR/GMTI radar; operates in up to 2mm/hr of rain

- (vii) **Comms Relay**
 - (a) [REDACTED]
 - (b) No BLOS at IOC being offered/
 - (c) No relay capability offered on option
 - (d) Limited range between collector and relay vehicle (10 - 25 kms)
 - (e) Relay antenna on FS limited to a small forward arc coverage

- (viii) **Ground Element**
 - (a) Not Stanag 4586 compliant
 - (b) No clear definition of HIS
 - (c) Health monitoring very basic- training intensive
 - (d) Data comms to Attack Aircraft propose IDM for all aircraft including aircraft that have no IDM facilities
 - (e) Remoting subsystems from vehicle- only option offered is to dismount box-body from vehicle.

(f) Spectrum Management (Only looking at high level comms planning.)

ii) **THALES**

(i) **WK 180**

- (a) Acoustic Signature
- (b) Maturity of - Platform, Launch system & Airbag
- (c) Airworthiness Pedigree

(ii) **WK 450**

- (a) Acoustic Signature
- (b) Requirement for a runway
- (c) Launch and recovery in snow /ice conditions
- (d) Comms Relay Antenna coverage
- (e) ATOLS integration
- (f) Maturity of Ramp launcher

(iii) **Other issues:**

- (a) Security accreditation
- (b) Maturity of ATOLS system
- (c) Icing technology integration
- (d) Servicing for the powerplant at 62.5 and the 125 scheduled maintenance operations are conducted within the Regt whilst the Contractor carries out the more complex 250-hour engine overhaul.

c) In conclusion it was determined that the NGC option carried significant technical risks and that preferred option: **THALES**

9) **WDDE & requirements management**

- a) [REDACTED] (SEA) provided an overview of the Watchkeeper Doors Data Environment (WDDE) and reported that THALES had provided a compliant WDDE, though the ITEAP module requires development. The NGC WDDE was considered non-compliant as they had failed to populate the SDD and TSD, only providing headings, had linked to headings only and where using cross references for traceability.
- b) URD/SRD. THALES have included the latest KUR changes in the WDDE URD & SRD modules. In contrast NGC have failed to fully incorporate.

10) **CIWG - sub working group reports**

a) **OCA.**

- i) HQ DRA FD opened the review of the sub working group reports by considering the Operational Capability Assessment. As a general comment he noted that during OCA the primes were not clear on the configuration of the systems for the IOC and FOC solutions.
- ii) OCA - NGC. There was concern that the proposed system demonstrated by NGC appeared to be stovepiped with a lack of consideration for integration. Ranger, whilst appearing to be low technical risk, is limited by a lack of growth. Fire Scout whilst very capable carries substantial technical risk - it was also of interest that the benefits of FireScout in an urban operations had not been fully considered. Maj [REDACTED] considered it curious that NGC have adopted a dual A/V mix using A/Vs of similar

performance. The integration of a single GCS to control the dual platforms was lacking as was the progress in the development of the Ground Element integration from the design review to OCA.

- iii) OCA - THALES. In contrast THALES demonstrated a holistic capability and have suggested A/Vs with long endurance, however solution is airstrip centric. High risk issues identified as: Automatic Take Off and Landing (ATOL); 180 air bag development; airworthiness - particularly for the 180 platform and the 450 ramp launcher.

b) Concepts & Doctrines

i) General

- (i) As a general comment covering the sub-working group reports, customer 2 considered both bids disappointing due to lack of detail and as such was unable to agree a preference.
- (ii) Assessment was marked on the delivery of capability at FOC, but 32 Regt expressed concern over the implications of the incremental introduction of WK and the resultant mix of build standards.
- (iii) Management of the IRL was not well covered by either of the consortia. This is seen as a major shortcoming of their respective CONUSES.

ii) NGC.

- (i) The wider communications issue, mostly surrounding the use of BOWMAN, was not well covered. This is particularly surprising given the presence of GD within their consortium.
- (ii) The management of the IRL was a particular weakness (lack of any detail).

iii) THALES.

- (i) The lack of establishment of the Int Cell was a major short-coming and shades the whole submission.
- (ii) There were a number of fundamentally inaccurate/wrong assumptions in the communications field.
- (iii) The assessment team had reservations about the employment of the BCPs. In particular, it was felt that they are too heavily slaved to the L&R elements. This would mean that they would be limited in how they could perform their other functions (best case) to unworkable (worst case, where the L&R section is deployed some considerable distance away in the "rear areas").
- (iv) It was considered that the desire to drive down the costs (less manpower and (mis)use of the BCPs) had a detrimental effect on the robustness of the structure of the unit and therefore the coherency of the CONUSE.

iv) Preferred option: n/a

c) Structures & People

- i) **NGC**
 - (i) It was felt that insufficient Unit Bulk Refuelling Equipment (UBREs) are included in the establishment tables to sustain Firescout.
 - (ii) Lack of REME element in establishment tables.
 - ii) **THALES** - Anomalies in the vehicle establishment with regards vehicle types and scaling.
 - iii) Preferred option: **n/a**
- d) **Training**
- i) **General.** The summary of scores are: NG 5 red and 11 amber; THALES 7 amber and 9 green
 - ii) **NGC**
 - (i) NGC do not fully understand the training issues.
 - (ii) The declared NGC IO of 2007 does not map to existing training timelines.
 - (iii) Training plan lacks both detail and clear statements of work.
 - (iv) Training needs analysis is immature
 - (v) No consideration within the schedule for the requirement to train CTE personnel (CAST, CATT etc) with the integrated WK solution
 - (vi) Overall the NGC was considered RED due to the lack of detail.
 - iii) **THALES**
 - (i) Proposal included good TNA and Human Factors analysis. Plans were detailed and demonstrated a good understanding of the infrastructure.
 - (ii) Concerns flagged on the tight timescales and lack of imbedded training until Equipment State 2.
 - (iii) Considered that the THALES solution provides confidence. preferred option: **THALES**
- 11) **Conclusions.** The workshop concurred that the NGC proposal contains substantial technical, cost and programme risk to such an extent that it can no longer be considered as robust. In addition there is clear discrimination favouring THALES across all areas of the assessment. It is recommended that these findings be reported to the WATCHKEEPER Selection Board (WSB)

WATCHKEEPER SELECTION BOARD
6 May NH3, Yew 101 14:15 - 16:00

Attendance:

Chris Day	TUAVPM	OA lead assessor
Lt Col Tony Potter	TUAVRM	
Mike West	TUAVP2	Technical team leader
Dennis Cox	TUAVP1	Time & management team leader
[REDACTED]	TUAVP3	Safety team assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAVILS	ILS team leader
[REDACTED]	TUAVCB	Commercial/Cost lead assessor
[REDACTED]	TUAVBM	
Maj Robin Stone	HQ DRA FD	C2 LoD lead assessor
[REDACTED]	HQ Land	C2 Training lead assessor
[REDACTED]	DRA/WIT	C2 assessment facilitator
Stephen Tazare	TUAVP1b	Assessment manager/facilitator

- The WATCHKEEPER Selection Board was called to endorse the conclusions of the WATCHKEEPER Assessment Review Workshop.
- Whilst the consensus view agreed that the THALES proposal represented the lowest overall risk in delivering WATCHKEEPER in terms of performance, cost (WLC) and time (to FOC) Maj [REDACTED] highlighted concerns on the ability of both contractors to deliver the IOC. Concerns were also raised over WLC risks.
- Following review the status of the proposals was agreed as per attached table:

	Northrop				THALES	
	Baseline		Alternate		Baseline	
Performance						
KURs	Red	Yellow	Red	Red	Green	Yellow
Time						
2006	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Yellow
IOC (2006)	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
FOC (2011)	Yellow	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
Cost						
EP	NOT AFFORDABLE		NOT AFFORDABLE		NOT AFFORDABLE	
STP	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
WLC	Red	Red	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow

- It is therefore the WSB's conclusions that whilst the DMIS proposals as submitted are not suitable for either the Main Gate Business Case or as a contract, the THALES baseline provides a solid basis for contract negotiations. The NGC proposals, however, are not sufficiently robust, pending RFC responses, and do not provide a credible solution on which to negotiate. The WSB therefore recommends that the IPT enters into negotiation

with THALES to resolve outstanding issues and directs that a Review Note be prepared and issued to the IAB to this effect.

WATCHKEEPER SELECTION BOARD	
Chairman	TUAV _TL
	TUAV RM
	TUAV P1
	TUAV CB
	TUAV BM
	TUAV ILS
	Customer 1 Rep
	Customer 2 Rep
	DTI

REVIEW PANEL	
Chairman	TUAVPM
	TUAV BM
	CSG DC-AB
	EC(ISTAR)Recce2
	Customer 2

RISK PANEL	
Chairman	TUAVP1B
	TUAVP3
	DSTL
	TUAVP1

ASSESSMENT MANAGER
TUAV P1

ASSESSMENT CO-ORDINATOR
TUAV P1B