

MAIB

MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BRANCH



ANNUAL REPORT 2011

Extract from The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005:

The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under these Regulations shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances.

It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.

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Chief Inspector's Report

There can be no doubt that 2011 was a challenging year for the MAIB. Like other parts of the public sector, the Branch has had to make a contribution towards dealing with the fiscal deficit. The budget was reduced by around 18% compared with its 2010 allocation, and as a consequence

- the number of inspectors employed was reduced from 16 to 12 and;
- the number of administrative staff was decreased

Ultimately, the overall headcount of the Branch has decreased from 39 to 33. However, the enthusiasm and commitment of my staff remains undiminished. They have worked tirelessly to adapt and improve our working practices to ensure the Branch can function to a high standard in spite of the very real pressures less funding and an increased workload have produced. I cannot adequately express my gratitude and respect for the way they have responded to the challenges faced by the Branch during this period.

Since January 2011, the MAIB has been operationally compliant with the requirements of Directive 2009/18/EU. The introduction of the Directive creates a core group of marine accidents that the Branch is obliged to investigate, although I have the discretion to investigate other accidents that I consider may produce lessons for future safety.

In my last annual report I observed that the Directive would result in an increased number of reports being published by the Branch. As predicted, the number of reports published in 2011 increased, by 71%, to 29 compared with 17 in 2010. However, perhaps a more accurate snapshot of the Branch's workload in 2011 is provided by the number of investigations that were commenced which will ultimately result in a published report: 43 compared with 23 in 2010. This output would have been unachievable, even before the reductions in our levels of resource and the Branch has introduced new, innovative working practices and a more comprehensive and capable case management system to provide better management and oversight of its caseload.

Change is always unsettling but the MAIB, although smaller, is well placed to maintain its international reputation for excellence in its field.

INVESTIGATIONS

There was a wide variety of accidents to merchant vessels investigated during 2011. For the second year in succession there were no UK registered ship losses and the number of accidents, as a ratio of the size of the fleet, was the lowest recorded by MAIB. The number of fatalities on UK registered vessels >100gt (5) has risen slightly compared with 2010, but is still low, and the number of injuries to crew is at its lowest ever level. A further 8 seafarers lost their lives on foreign registered vessels while operating in UK waters, including 6 from the Cook Islands registered bulk carrier *Swanland*, which sank in heavy weather off the north Wales coast in November.

The number of fishing vessels lost, 24, is the highest number recorded by the MAIB since 2005. 71% of these were <15m length overall (loa) vessels while the remainder were 15 -24m loa vessels. 8 fishermen lost their lives in 2011, compared with 5 in 2010. Again, the majority (7) lost their lives on vessels that were <15m loa. If the safety record of this sector

of the fishing industry is to improve, more focus is needed from all industry stakeholders on how to provide these fishermen with effective education and guidance on issues such as basic stability, watchkeeping, navigation and safe working practices. Additionally, the routine wearing of personal flotation devices when fishermen are working on the open deck would undoubtedly reduce the unnecessary loss of life that often occurs when someone goes overboard.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The format of this year's report on recommendations issued by the MAIB has been modified to present the information in a more logical format. 53 of the 57 recommendations issued in 2011 have been fully accepted. Actions relating to 36.8% of these remain to be implemented. None have been rejected, but 3 recommendations were partially accepted and one recommendation (to a foreign addressee) has not been responded to. The MAIB operates a closed loop follow-up process which keeps outstanding recommendations under constant review.

Of the 193 recommendations that had been fully accepted, but had not been implemented between 2004 and 2010, 88.1% were reported to be fully implemented at the time this report was published.

FINANCE

The annual report deals principally with the calendar year 2011. However, for ease of reference, the figures below are for the 2011/12 financial year, which ended on 31st March 2012. MAIB's funding from the Department for Transport is provided on this basis, and this complies with the Government's business planning programme.

£ 000s	2011/12 Budget	2011/12 Outturn
Costs – Pay	2578	2651
Costs – Non Pay	1054	976
Totals	3632	3627


Steve Clinch
Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents

PART 1

FULL INVESTIGATIONS AND

REPORT PUBLICATIONS

FULL INVESTIGATIONS LIST

Full Investigations started in 2011					
Date	Name Of Vessel	Type Of Vessel	Nationality	Size	Nature of Incident
Merchant Vessels					
7 Feb	<i>Tombarra</i>	Car carrier	UK	61 231 gt	Fatal accident while hoisting rescue boat, alongside in Bristol
11 Feb	<i>Boxford/Admiral Blake</i>	Container ship/ Beam trawler	Marshall Islands/UK	25 624 gt/ 19.3 m	Collision 29nm south of Start Point
15 Feb	<i>K-Wave</i>	Container ship	UK	7 170 gt	Grounding near Malaga, Spain
26 Feb	<i>SBS Typhoon</i>	Platform supply vessel	UK	2 465 gt	Contact with two moored vessels during trials in Aberdeen harbour
06 Mar	<i>Cosco Hong Kong/Ze Ling Yu Yun 135</i>	Container ship/Fish transportation vessel	UK/China	65 531 gt 39 m	Collision in East China Sea resulting in the loss of <i>Ze Ling Yu Yun 135</i> and all 11 crew
13 Mar	<i>Forth Guardsman</i>	Landing craft	UK	654 gt	Fatal accident during mooring operation south of Jura, west Scotland
16 Mar	<i>Clonlee</i>	Container ship	Isle of Man	3 999 gt	Electrical blackout followed by grounding at entrance to Humber
9 Apr	<i>Philipp/Lynn Marie</i>	Container ship/ Scallop dredger	Gibraltar UK	8 971 gt 17.1 m	Collision 6nm south of Isle of Man
15 May	<i>CMA CGM Platon</i>	Container ship	UK	17 594 gt	Heavy contact with Bevans Wharf on the River Thames at Northfleet
24 May	<i>Clipper Point</i>	Freight ro-ro	Cyprus	14 759 gt	Heavy contact with berth and two other moored vessels while manoeuvring in Heysham harbour
1 Jun	<i>Sun Clipper/Morfil</i>	Passenger vessel/RIB	UK/UK	98 gt 6.0 m	Collision near Blackfriars Bridge, River Thames, London
25 Jun	<i>Saffier</i>	General cargo ship	Netherlands	3 970 gt	Machinery failure leading to loss of control and heavy contact with a moored vessel at Immingham
15 Jul	<i>Fremantle Express</i>	Container ship	UK	23 540 gt	Fatal accident during mooring operation at Veracruz, Mexico
22 Jul	<i>Blue Note</i>	Dry cargo vessel	Antigua and Barbuda	3 845 gt	Derailment of hatch-lid gantry crane while alongside in Londonderry, Northern Ireland

Date	Name Of Vessel	Type Of Vessel	Nationality	Size	Nature of Incident
3 Aug	<i>Karin Schepers</i>	Container ship	Antigua and Barbuda	7 852 gt	Grounding just north of Land's End, Cornwall
3 Aug	<i>Ernest Bevin</i>	Ro-ro ferry	UK	1 194 gt	Fatal man overboard from Woolwich ferry, River Thames
9 Aug	<i>CSL Thames</i>	Bulk carrier	Malta	19 538 gt	Grounding in the Sound of Mull, west Scotland
12 Aug	<i>Chiefton</i>	Tug	UK	36.3 gt	Capsize while towing a barge at Greenwich Reach, River Thames, resulting in one fatality
23 Aug	<i>SD Nimble</i>	Tug	UK	319 gt	Serious injury to shore worker at Faslane, Scotland
5 Oct	<i>Moon Clipper</i>	Passenger vessel	UK	98 gt	Control failure resulting in heavy contact with Tower Millennium Pier, River Thames, London
22 Oct	<i>Pride of Calais</i>	Ro-ro ferry	UK	26 433 gt	Heavy contact with dockside fender in Calais, France
27 Oct	<i>Scot Pioneer</i>	General cargo vessel	UK	2 528 gt	Fatal accident to crewmember while alongside in Waterford, Republic of Ireland
21 Nov	<i>Cameron</i>	Mooring vessel	UK	507 gt	Serious injury to deck officer while operating in River Mersey
27 Nov	<i>Swanland</i>	General cargo vessel	Cook Islands	1 978 gt	Foundering in heavy weather in the Irish Sea with the loss of six lives
27 Nov	<i>Norcape</i>	Ro-ro ferry	Bahamas	14 087 gt	Grounding at the entrance to Troon Harbour
11 Dec	<i>Hyundai Discovery/ACX Hibiscus</i>	Container ship/Container ship	UK/Panama	64 054 gt 18 502 gt	Collision at the end of the traffic separation scheme to the east of Singapore - both vessels were seriously damaged
17 Dec	<i>Tempanos</i>	Container ship	Liberia	88 586 gt	Fatal accident while alongside in Felixstowe

Full investigations list

Fishing Vessels					
Date	Name Of Vessel	Type Of Vessel	Nationality	Size	Nature of Incident
3 Jan	<i>Karen</i>	Stern prawn trawler	UK	17.7 m	Grounding at the entrance to Ardglass Harbour, Northern Ireland
6 Jan	<i>Blue Angel</i>	Creeler	UK	7.8 m	Non-fatal manoverboard west of Gigha, west coast of Scotland
12 Jan	<i>Sapphire II/Silver Chord</i>	Prawn trawler/ Prawn trawler	UK/UK	16 m 14.2 m	Collision that resulted in the sinking of the <i>Sapphire II</i> off Stornoway, west Scotland
20 Jan	<i>Breadwinner</i>	Creeler/scallop dredger	UK	9.4 m	Loss of single-handed skipper who was dragged overboard while shooting creels off Shetland Isles
31 Jan	<i>Jack Abry II</i>	Stern trawler	France	36.3 m	Grounding on the Isle of Rum, west Scotland
11 Feb	<i>Admiral Blake/Boxford</i>	See Merchant Vessel section for details			
6 Mar	<i>Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135/Cosco Hong Kong</i>	See Merchant Vessel section for details			
24 Mar	<i>Our Boy Andrew</i>	Stern trawler	UK	9.55 m	Fatal accident to single-handed skipper in the English Channel, 9nm east of Eddystone Rock
9 Apr	<i>Lynn Marie/Philipp</i>	See Merchant Vessel section for details			
14 Jun	<i>About Time</i>	Potter	UK	11.2 m	Fatal manoverboard off Pembrokeshire coast
6 Aug	<i>Vellee</i>	Trawler	UK	18.7 m	Flooding and foundering in the Little Minch, west Scotland
25 Aug	<i>Starlight Rays</i>	Trawler	UK	23.7 m	Fatal accident to crewman while the vessel was on guardship duty, approximately 155nm north east of Aberdeen
7 Sep	<i>Golden Promise</i>	Scallop dredger	UK	16.5 m	Grounding on the island of Stroma, north Scotland
21 Nov	<i>Moyuna</i>	Scallop dredger	UK	14.3 m	Grounding at the entrance to Ardglass Harbour, Northern Ireland
20 Dec	<i>Heather Anne</i>	Ring netter	UK	11.0 m	Sinking off the south coast of Cornwall resulting in one fatality

Small Craft

Date	Name Of Vessel	Type Of Vessel	Nationality	Size	Nature of Incident
28 May	<i>Liquid Vortex</i>	Sailing yacht	UK	12.0 m	Serious injury to crew member as a result of accidental gybe during offshore race while crossing Lyme Bay
1 Jun	<i>Morfill/Sun Clipper</i>	See Merchant Vessel section for details			
17 Jun	<i>Lion</i>	Sailing yacht	UK	11.6 m	Fatal manoverboard in English Channel during offshore race 14.5 south of Selsey Bill.

PUBLICATIONS LIST**Reports of Full Investigations published in 2011**

Merchant Vessels			
Vessel Name (Report No)	Vessel Type	Accident Type	Accident Date
<i>TS Royalist (No 2/2011)</i>	Sail training vessel	Fatal accident to sea cadet while anchored in Stokes Bay, Solent	2 Mar 10
<i>Oscar Wilde (No 3/2011)</i>	Ro-ro ferry	Machinery space fire in Falmouth Bay	2 Feb 10
<i>Scottish Viking/ Homeland (No 4/2011)</i>	Ro-ro ferry/Prawn trawler	Collision 4.2nm off St Abb's Head, East Scotland resulting in one fatality	5 Aug 10
<i>Yeoman Bontrup (No 5/2011)</i>	Bulk carrier	Fire and explosion while alongside at Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, West Scotland	2 Jul 10
<i>Ever Excel (No 6/2011)</i>	Container ship	Fatal accident to chief engineer alongside in Kaohsiung, Taiwan	21 Apr 10
<i>Norman Arrow (No 7/2011)</i>	High speed ro-ro ferry	Two separate heavy contacts with quay in Portsmouth, and mooring dolphin in Le Havre, France	31 Mar 10 and 29 Aug 10
<i>Joanna (No 8/2011)</i>	General cargo ship	Fatal manoverboard of crewmember while alongside in Glasgow	13 Dec 10
<i>Antonis (No 10/2011)</i>	Bulk carrier	Heavy contact with swing bridge in Port of Liverpool resulting in damage to vessel and oil pollution	06 Feb 10

Publication list

Vessel Name (Report No)	Vessel Type	Accident Type	Accident Date
<i>SBS Typhoon</i> (No 13/2011)	Platform supply vessel	Contact with two moored vessels during trials in Aberdeen harbour	26 Feb 11
<i>Skandi Foul</i> a (No 15/2011)	Platform supply vessel	Contact with moored vessel in Aberdeen harbour	29 May 10
<i>Forth Guardsman</i> (No 16/2011)	Landing craft	Fatal accident during mooring operation south of Jura, west Scotland	13 Mar 11
<i>Boxford/Admiral Blake</i> (No 17/2010)	Container ship/Beam trawler	Collision 29nm south of Start Point	11 Feb 11
<i>K-Wave</i> (No 18/2011)	Container ship	Grounding near Malaga, Spain	15 Feb 11
<i>Philipp/Lynn Marie</i> (No 20/2011)	Container ship/Scallop dredger	Collision 6nm south of Isle of Man	9 Apr 11
<i>Commodore Clipper</i> (No 24/2011)	Ro-ro ferry	Fire on main vehicle deck while on passage between Jersey and Portsmouth	16 Jun 10
<i>CMA CGM Platon</i> (No 26/2011)	Container ship	Heavy contact with Bevans Wharf on the River Thames, Northfleet	15 May 11
<i>Cosco Hong Kong/Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135</i> (No 27/2011)	Container ship/Fish transportation vessel	Collision in East China Sea resulting in the loss of <i>Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135</i> and all 11 crew	6 Mar 11
<i>Queen Mary 2</i> (No 28/2011)	Passenger ship	Catastrophic failure of a capacitor in the aft harmonic filter room while approaching Barcelona	23 Sep 10
<i>Fremantle Express</i> (No 29/2011)	Container ship	Fatal accident during mooring operation at Veracruz, Mexico	15 Jul 10

Fishing Vessels

<i>Homeland/Scottish Viking</i> (No 4/2011)	See Merchant Vessels section for details		
<i>Karen</i> (No 9/2011)	Stern prawn trawler	Grounding at the entrance to Ardglass harbour, Northern Ireland	3 Jan 11
<i>Blue Angel</i> (No 12/2011)	Creeeler	Non-fatal manoverboard west of Gigha, west Scotland	6 Jan 11

Vessel Name (Report No)	Vessel Type	Accident Type	Accident Date
<i>Jack Abry II</i> (No 14/2011)	Stern trawler	Grounding on the Isle of Rum, west Scotland	31 Jan 11
<i>Admiral Blake/Boxford</i> (No 17/2011)	See Merchant Vessels section for details		
<i>Lynn Marie/Philipp</i> (No 20/2011)	See Merchant Vessels section for details		
<i>Sapphire II/Silver Chord</i> (No 21/2011)	Prawn trawler/Prawn trawler	Collision that resulted in the sinking of <i>Sapphire II</i> off Stornoway, west Scotland	12 Jan 11
<i>Discovery and Breadwinner</i> (*No 22/2011)	Creeeler/Scallop dredger	A joint report that deals with the losses of two single-handed skippers in separate accidents off Fraserburgh, and the Shetland Isles	9 Oct 10 and 20 Jan 11
<i>Our Boy Andrew</i> (No 23/2011)	Stern Trawler	Fatal accident to single-handed skipper in the English Channel, 9nm east of Eddystone Rock	24 Mar 11
<i>Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135/Cosco Hong Kong</i> (No 23/2011)	See Merchant Vessels section for details		
Small Craft			
<i>Delta 8.5m RIB</i> (No 1/2011)	RIB	Serious injury to passenger on River Thames, London	6 May 10
<i>Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident</i> (No 11/2011)	Powerboat towing an inflatable 'banana boat'	Fatal accident to 11-year old girl in West London	11 Sep 10
<i>Cardiff Bay Yacht Club RIBs</i> (No 19/2011)	RIBs	Collision between two RIBs resulting in injuries to three students	27 Oct 10
<i>Liquid Vortex</i> (No 25/2011)	Sailing yacht	Serious injury to crew member as a result of accidental gybe during offshore race while crossing Lyme Bay	28 May 11

* Investigation reports combined and published as a dual report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Responses to safety recommendations issued by the Marine Accident Investigation Branch.

This report is submitted to the Secretary of State for Transport in accordance with The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005, regulation 15(5).

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For details of abbreviations and acronyms used in this Section please refer to the Glossary on page 76.

BACKGROUND

Recommendations are a key element of MAIB investigations. They are made to promulgate the lessons from accidents and incidents investigated by the MAIB, with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of future accidents. The issue of a recommendation shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability.

Following a full investigation the MAIB will, normally, make a number of recommendations. These will be contained within the published report but will also be addressed to the individuals or senior executives of organisations concerned, in writing, by the Chief Inspector. Urgent safety recommendations may also be made in Safety Bulletins that can be published at any stage of an investigation.

Recommendations are made to a variety of addressees who may have been involved in, or have an interest in, the incident or accident. These may range from those organisations which have a wider role in the maritime community such as the Department for Transport (DfT), Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) or an international organisation, through to commercial operators and vessel owners/operators who may have specific issues to address on their vessels.

It is required by the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 that the person or organisation to whom a recommendation is addressed, consider the recommendation, and reply to the Chief Inspector within 28 days on the plans to implement the recommendation or, if it is not going to be implemented, an explanation as to why not. The Regulations also require the Chief Inspector “to inform the Secretary of State of those matters” annually, and to make the matters publicly available. This Annual Report to the Secretary of State for Transport fulfils this requirement.

RECOMMENDATION RESPONSE STATISTICS 2011

57 recommendations were issued in 2011. Of these the percentage of all recommendations that are either ***accepted*** or ***accepted yet to be implemented*** is 93.0 %.

Throughout the report recommendations are categorised under four broad headings according to the industry sector to which they apply, General Maritime, Commercial Shipping, Fishing Vessels or Leisure Vessels.

Focus	Total	Accepted – Action Implemented	Accepted – Action yet to be Implemented	Partially Accepted	Rejected	No Response Received
Commercial Shipping	28	13	13	2	-	-
Fishing Vessels	12	7	4	-	-	1
Leisure Vessels	8	6	2	-	-	-
General Maritime	9	7	2	-	-	-
Total	57	33	21	2	-	1

Details of all these recommendations are at Sections A-C.

RECOMMENDATION RESPONSE STATISTICS 2004 to 2010

The following table shows the equivalent status of recommendations issued in 2004 to 2010 as published in the MAIB's previous Recommendations Annual Reports.

Year	Total	Accepted Action Implemented	Accepted Action yet to be Implemented	Partially Accepted	Rejected	No Response Received
2010	50	36	14			
2009	117	74	29	7	-	7
2008	110	71	31	5	-	3
2007	136	109	23	1	1	2
2006	139	103	30	3	3	-
2005	140	122	14	1	1	2
2004	171	93	52	11	11	4

Of the 193 recommendations ***accepted – yet to be implemented*** (at time of publication of relevant annual report):

- 88.1% have now been ***fully implemented***
- 11.9% remain ***planned to be implemented***.

RECOMMENDATION METHODOLOGY

SECTION A : 2011 recommendation responses.

SECTION B : Recommendations to multiple recipients (not included in the statistics).

SECTION C : Recommendations brought forward from previous years.

SECTION D : Changes to previously reported recommendation.

Section A presents all the recommendations issued in 2011 in ascending numerical order. Each is accompanied by the vessel/accident type, level and industry focus of the recommendation. Where it is relevant MAIB has included a comment alongside the recommendation narrative.

Section D lists recommendations issued in previous years that remain open; they are presented in descending numerical order under the year they were issued. The actions being taken to meet these recommendations are ongoing so each one is accompanied by a target date for completion and a comment if needed.

KEY

Levels

The level of the recommendation refers to the type of action required by the recipient. There are three levels of recommendation:

Level 1 recommendations : These have the broadest importance, and may include the requirement for new legislation or changes in policy.

Level 2 recommendations : Addressed to industry bodies and organisations which may call for changes or reinforcement of best practice.

Level 3 recommendations : Those which are addressed to individual owners or companies which are specific to their vessel or company.

Focus

The Focus refers to the sector of industry that the recommendation was applied to:

C (Commercial Shipping) : Merchant vessels and small commercial craft.

FV (Fishing Vessel) : Registered fishing vessels holding a DEFRA fishing vessel licence.

L (Leisure) : Recreational vessels, whether operated commercially or privately owned.

G (General Maritime) : Recommendations that have wider application.

Colour coding

- Green** : The actions included in these recommendations have been fully accepted by the recipient, and the changes have been fully implemented.
- Amber** : These recommendations have been accepted by the recipient, but the actions needed to close the recommendation are outstanding. Where known, target dates for full implementation are given. Some amber recommendations have been partially accepted by the MAIB. Where this applies it is detailed next to the addressee. Both the addressee and the MAIB are given an opportunity to comment in the Annual Report.
- Red** : These recommendations have either been rejected by the addressee or no response has yet been received by the MAIB. In both cases the MAIB includes comments in the annual report and offers the opportunity to comment to the addressee. The status of these recommendations is shown next to the addressee.

SUMMARY TABLE FOR LEVEL 1, 2 AND 3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Focus	Total			Accepted Action Implemented			Accepted Action yet to be Implemented			Partially Accepted			Rejected			No Response Received		
				1	2	3	1	2	3				1	2	3	1	2	3
Level	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Commercial Shipping	4	12	12	-	6	7	2	6	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fishing Vessels	-	5	7	-	2	5	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Leisure Vessels	-	4	4	-	2	4	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
General Maritime	-	6	3	-	5	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	4	27	26	-	15	18	2	11	8	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-

Section A

2011 RECOMMENDATION RESPONSES

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
101	Delta 8.5m RIB	RIB Injury to passenger on the River Thames, London (Report 1/2011)	Made to: MCA The MCA is recommended to prioritise and resource the revision of MGN 280 to ensure the updated Code of Practice for Small Commercial vessels is published as early as possible. Target date for completion – March 2014.	Accepted, yet to be implemented	G 2
102	Delta 8.5m RIB	RIB Injury to passenger on the River Thames, London (Report 1/2011)	102a made to: RYA 102b made to: MCA MCA and RYA are recommended to jointly produce a Safety Alert in relation to this accident, issuing guidance on the safe operation of RIBs and other small commercially operated vessels when conducting high speed passages. The alert should highlight: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The risk of injury to the passengers and crew of such craft if they are not properly seated.• The requirement to comply with the MS Control of Vibration Regulations 2007 during all modes of operation.• The range of dedicated seating available which is designed to mitigate the effects of shock and whole body vibration impacts.	Accepted, fully implemented Accepted, fully implemented	G 2 G 2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
103	TS Royalist	Sail training vessel Fatal accident to sea cadet, while in Stokes Bay in the Solent. (Report 2/2011)	Made to: Marine Society and Sea Cadets Accepted, fully implemented	G	3
104	TS Royalist	Sail training vessel Fatal accident to sea cadet, while in Stokes Bay in the Solent. (Report 2/2011)	Made to: Royal Navy Accepted, yet to be implemented	G	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
105	Oscar Wilde	Ro-ro passenger ferry Machinery space fire, while in Falmouth Bay. (Report 3/2011)	<p>Made to: Bahamas Maritime Authority</p> <p>Make a submission to the IMO proposing appropriate amendments to the STCW to ensure training syllabi covering fire fighting procedures identify the hazards posed by all types of high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems.</p> <p>Bahamas Maritime Authority response: "STCW was significantly amended in 2010 and competence in the safe use of high-ex foam in fire-fighting is, in our view, addressed in Table A-VI/1-2 and Section B-VII of the Code. It is not considered appropriate to propose further amendments to STCW Code at this time as there is significant work underway to ensure that the 2010 amendments are properly implemented. Specific advice on the hazards associated with the use of high ex-foam would be addressed in the course of the revision of the IMO Model Courses on fire-fighting for which the IMO is actively planning. The Bahamas will seek to ensure that the issues raised by the investigation are included during the revision process but no firm date can be given for this action as commencement of the revision is outside its control"</p> <p>MAIB comment: MAIB accepts that this should, if properly pursued, achieve the necessary effect.</p>	Partially accepted	C
106	Oscar Wilde	Ro-ro passenger ferry Machinery space fire, while in Falmouth Bay. (Report 3/2011)	<p>Made to: Bahamas Maritime Authority</p> <p>Verify that Oscar Wilde complies with SOLAS requirements with regard to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The control of smoke spread and ventilation, and • Thermal and structural boundaries, and • Satisfy yourself that the vessel's hot foam distribution can be relied upon in an emergency situation, taking into account the changes to the service procedures implemented by the system's manufacturer 	Accepted, fully implemented	C

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
107	Oscar Wilde	Ro-ro passenger ferry Machinery space fire, while in Falmouth Bay. (Report 3/2011)	Made to: Lloyds Register of Shipping Issue a classification newsletter to your clients advising of the circumstances of the fuel system failure on Oscar Wilde providing guidance on how to establish if the correct type of diaphragm has been fitted to Samson type 41-73 back pressure regulating valves.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 3
108	Oscar Wilde	Ro-ro passenger ferry Machinery space fire, while in Falmouth Bay. (Report 3/2011)	Made to: Irish Ferries Ltd Fully implement the recommendations made by the manufacturers of the fixed fire-extinguishing systems on board Oscar Wilde.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 3
109	Yeoman Bontrup	Bulk carrier Fire and explosion on board Yeoman Bontrup at Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, western Scotland. (Report 5/2011)	Made to: Bahamas Maritime Authority The Bahamas Maritime Authority, supported by the MCA, is recommended to submit proposals to the IMO to: For self-unloading vessels: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Review and improve fire detection, containment and extinguishing standards for cargo handling areas.• Develop standards for conveyor belt fire resistance properties. Target completion date – Not available, work in progress.	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 1

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
110	<i>Yeoman Bontrup</i>	Bulk carrier Fire and explosion on board <i>Yeoman Bontrup</i> at Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, western Scotland. (Report 5/2011)	<p>Made to: Bahamas Maritime Authority</p> <p>The Bahamas Maritime Authority, supported by the MCA, is recommended to submit proposals to the IMO to establish standards for the use and control of radioactive isotopes on ships.</p> <p>BMA response: <i>Regarding the recommendation to submit to IMO a proposal to develop standards and guidelines on the control of radioactive isotopes, it has been decided that this should not be undertaken for the following reasons:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There are already requirements to catalogue all hazardous materials on board a ship as part of the normal risk assessment procedures; • The ISM Code (1.2.2.2 and 1.4.2) requires that a proper risk assessment should be undertaken for all identified risks and this should include radioactive sources; • IMO has a resolution specifically requiring that radioactive sources be recorded in the inventory of hazardous materials (MEPC.179(59)); • Guidance produced by the UK Health and Safety Executive on working with ionising radioactive sources is inappropriate for use as an IMO template for this purpose as it covers working with the materials; <p>MAIB comment: The MAIB is disappointed that the Bahamas Maritime Authority has not made submitted proposals to the IMO. However, the issue has been raised at IMO by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (DSC 16/58 refers).</p>	C	1

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
111	<i>Yeoman Bontrup</i>	Bulk carrier Fire and explosion on board <i>Yeoman Bontrup</i> at Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, western Scotland. (Report 5/2011)	Made to: MCA Improve its existing guidance on the stowage of ship's use chemicals. Target completion date – December 2013.	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 2
112	<i>Yeoman Bontrup</i>	Bulk carrier Fire and explosion on board <i>Yeoman Bontrup</i> at Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, western Scotland. (Report 5/2011)	Made to: V Ships In recognition of the high workload and routine nature of tasks on board self-unloading bulk carriers, establish a more robust regime of supervision and audit with particular reference to: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hotwork Procedures• Housekeeping discipline with regards to stowage of chemicals and oils.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 3
113	<i>Yeoman Bontrup</i>	Bulk carrier Fire and explosion on board <i>Yeoman Bontrup</i> at Glensanda Quarry, Loch Linnhe, western Scotland. (Report 5/2011)	Made to: V Ships With respect to <i>Yeoman Bontrup</i> and <i>Yeoman Bridge</i> , review the suitability of the engine room workshop/hydraulic pump space hinged, bolted door securing arrangements with regards to watertight integrity and operational fire containment requirements. Target completion date – January 2013	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
114	<i>Ever Excel</i>	Container vessel Fatal accident to the chief engineer in the lift shaft. (Report 6/2011)	Made to: Evergreen Marine (UK) Ltd In demonstrating its commitment at the highest management level to developing a robust, just safety culture throughout its fleet, Evergreen Marine (UK) Limited is recommended to: • Provide sufficient resources to drive continuous improvement of its SMS over the long term. • Assess all identified risks and establish appropriate safeguards. • Actively involve personnel at all levels both ashore and on board. • Promote effective communication and the reporting of near-misses, non-conformities and improvements to safety management procedures. • Evaluate improvements to the safety culture over the long term.	Accepted, fully implemented C	3
115	<i>Karen</i>	Fishing vessel Grounding at the entrance to Ardglass Harbour, Northern Ireland. (Report 9/2011)	Made to: Vessel owner Take the following actions to improve safety on board your vessels: • Ensure skippers and crew are familiar with the guidance contained in MGN 313 (F) - Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch on Fishing Vessels. • Ensure skippers and crew are qualified in accordance with MGN 411 (M+F) - Training and Certification Requirements for the Crew of Fishing Vessels and their Applicability to Small Commercial Vessels and Large Yachts. • Review the onboard written risk assessments for accuracy and relevance, and ensure that control measures are identified and implemented where appropriate. • Consider fitting watch alarms as recommended by MGN 313 (F).	Accepted, yet to be implemented FV	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
S116	<i>Tombarra</i> (Safety Bulletin SB1/2011)	Car carrier Fatal accident to crewman while hoisting rescue boat alongside in Bristol.	See section B: Recommendations to multiple recipients	C	3
S117	<i>Tombarra</i> (Safety Bulletin SB2/2011)	Car carrier Fatal accident to crewman while hoisting rescue boat alongside in Bristol.	See section B: Recommendations to multiple recipients	C	3
118	<i>Antonis</i>	Bulk carrier Contact with Langton-Alexandra swing bridge in Liverpool. (Report 10/2011)	Made to: Mersey Docks and Harbour Company Limited Expedite measures planned which are designed to improve the safety of vessels using the Langton-Alexandra passageway.	FV	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
119	Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident	Inflatable banana boat Fatal accident at Princes Club Water Sports Park in Bedfont, Middlesex. (Report 11/2011)	119a Made to: British Water-Ski and Wakeboard 119b Made to: National Water Safety Forum	Accepted, fully implemented Accepted, fully implemented	L L 2 2
			Work together to develop a system to provide guidance to operators and oversight of organised towed inflatable activities to give assurance to the public that proper safeguards are in place. The system should: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide guidance on the best practices for the safe operation of towed inflatable rides and the management systems required to control the associated risks. • Include a mechanism to ensure that those who operate towed inflatable rides meet the appropriate standards 		
120	Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident	Inflatable banana boat Fatal accident at Princes Club Water Sports Park in Bedfont, Middlesex. (Report 11/2011)	Made to: Health & Safety Executive	Accepted, yet to be implemented	L 2
			Include oversight of the activity of riding on towed inflatables into the arrangements that are currently being considered to replace the Adventure Activities Licensing Authority. Target date for completion – December 2012		

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
121	Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident	Inflatable banana boat Fatal accident at Princes Club Water Sports Park in Bedfont, Middlesex. (Report 11/2011)	Made to: MCA Take appropriate action to improve the safety of towed inflatable rides by: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Considering the British Water Ski and Wakeboard Club Driver's Award as a standard for commercially operating boats towing inflatables, and including it in the list of suitable alternative qualifications to the Boatmaster's license.• At its next review, amending the 'Inland Waters Small Passenger Boat Code', Annex 5, so that the guidance is relevant to boats operating on inland waters and not just beachcraft. Target date for completion - December 2015	Accepted, yet to be implemented L	2
122	Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident	Inflatable banana boat Fatal accident at Princes Club Water Sports Park in Bedfont, Middlesex. (Report 11/2011)	Made to: Princes Club Review its safety management system such that: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• There is a review of all risk assessments.• An induction programme, which includes guidance on the club's operating procedures and best practice, is developed for new drivers.• A system of auditing its drivers' practices is introduced.	Accepted, fully implemented L	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
123	Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident	Inflatable banana boat Fatal accident at Princes Club Water Sports Park in Bedfont, Middlesex. (Report 11/2011)11)	<p>Made to: Bibby Consulting and Support</p> <p>Review the service provided to clients to ensure that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If it is identified that a client is not following a safety management system provided by Bibby Consulting and Support, as intended, that there is a formal system to inform and advise that client on the corrective actions required. • The limitations of any inspections carried out by its consultants are made clear to the client and, in particular, that the inspection may not necessarily reflect the standard of the entire operation. • Either proper, technical advice is sought when assessing specialised activities, or that the limitations of the service are made clear to the client. 	Accepted, fully implemented	G 3
124	Princes Club Water Sports Park Fatal Accident	Inflatable banana boat Fatal accident at Princes Club Water Sports Park in Bedfont, Middlesex. (Report 11/2011)	<p>Made to: London Borough of Hounslow Council</p> <p>Take appropriate action to improve the safety of inland waterways activities by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use the 1907 Public Health Act to introduce a licensing scheme for commercial operators of towed inflatable rides. Licences should be issued when the council is satisfied that boat drivers hold an appropriate MCA approved qualification and the activity is being operated in line with the guidelines set out in the 'Inland Waterways Small Passenger Boat Code'. • Promulgating the lessons learned from this accident through the national Environmental Health Officers' network. 	Accepted, fully implemented	G 2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
125	<i>Blue Angel</i>	Fishing vessel Manoverboard, west of Gigha. (Report 12/2011)	Made to: Vessel owner Improve the creel self-shooting system used on board Blue Angel to ensure the crew are safely separated from the back rope during shooting operations.	Accepted, fully implemented	FV 3
126	<i>Jack Abby II</i>	Fishing vessel Grounding on the Isle of Rum. (Report 14/2011)	Made to: Scapêche SA Enhance the safety management of its vessels by: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Providing specific operational instructions and guidance with respect to: the management of hours of work and rest, taking into account travelling time when changing crew; watchkeeping best practice, including passage planning and the appropriate use of navigational equipment, watch alarms and lookouts; and the conduct and frequency of drills.• Increasing onboard oversight to ensure compliance with its instructions and guidance, risk assessments, and statutory regulations. Target date for completion – Not available, work in progress.	Accepted, yet to be implemented	FV 3
127	<i>CMA CGM Platon</i>	Container vessel Contact with Bevans Wharf, River Thames. (Report 26/2011)	Made to: Port of London Authority Include in its procedures a requirement for vessels departing Northfleet Hope Container Terminal to retain the use of a tug until they have fully entered the stream when a strong tidal counter-flow is present off the berth.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
128	<i>Boxford/Admiral Blake</i>	Container vessel and fishing vessel Collision 29nm south of Start Point. (Report 17/2011)	Made to: Alfa Ship Managers Pte Ltd • Promulgate the lessons learned from this accident to its fleet and ensure that: Ships' watchkeepers maintain an effective radar and visual lookout at all times commensurate with the prevailing conditions and circumstances. • The location and extent of crew changes are carefully considered to minimise the likely impact on masters' workloads.	Accepted, fully implemented C	3
129	<i>Boxford/Admiral Blake</i>	Container vessel and fishing vessel Collision 29nm south of Start Point. (Report 17/2011)	Made to: Interfish Ltd Encourage its vessels to transmit on AIS at all times, but particularly when fishing in or near fishing shipping lanes.	Accepted, fully implemented FV	3
130	Cardiff Bay Yacht Club RIBs	RIB Collision resulting in injuries to 3 students. (Report 19/2011)	Made to: Cardiff Bay Yacht Club Review its safety management system to ensure that: • Effective risk assessments are carried out for all activities hosted by the club. • Lessons from previous accidents, and RYA guidance where appropriate, are disseminated. • Its boats are maintained to a high standard. • Procedures are introduced to ensure the competence and experience of drivers of club boats is appropriate for all events. • The guidance and regulations issued by the Cardiff Harbour Authority are followed and complied with at all times. • The recommended maximum capacity of its boats, as marked on the builder's plate, is not exceeded, and that guidance is provided on the use of its boats for the carriage of persons in excess of the available seating.	Accepted, fully implemented L	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
131	Cardiff Bay Yacht Club RIBs	RIB Collision resulting in injuries to 3 students. (Report 19/2011)	Made to: Cardiff Harbour Authority Confirm the appointment of a designated person, as required by the Port Marine Safety Code.	Accepted, fully implemented	G 2
132	Cardiff Bay Yacht Club RIBs	RIB Collision resulting in injuries to 3 students. (Report 19/2011)	Made to: Cardiff Harbour Authority Take measures to raise the profile of its role as the statutory harbour authority with its stakeholders.	Accepted, fully implemented	G 2
133	<i>Sapphire II</i> <i>Silver Chord</i>	Fishing vessels Collision resulting in the foundering of <i>Sapphire II</i> off Stromness, Scotland. (Report 21/2011)	Made to: MCA Ensure, when introducing regulation to implement the requirements of International Labour Organization Convention 188, that both vessel design and the ability or otherwise to keep a proper and effective lookout from the working deck, are identified as key factors for determining that a fishing vessel is sufficiently manned for her safe navigation and operation.	Fully accepted, fully implemented	FV 2

MAIB comment:

Current government policy on the transposition of European Directives into UK law has reduced the potential to use ILO 188 as a vehicle to ensure that all fishing vessels are sufficiently manned for their safe navigation and operation. The MCA's alternative proposal of taking the issue forward through the Fishing Industry Safety Group Sub-Group action plans does however represent a viable alternative. As progress in this arena will be harder to quantify, MAIB considers that the inclusion of both watchkeeping and single handed operation on the Safety Communications Sub-Group action plans constitutes completion of this recommendation.

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
134	<i>Sapphire II/Silver Chord</i>	Fishing vessels Collision resulting in the foundering of <i>Sapphire II</i> off Stornoway, Scotland. (Report 21/2011)	Made to: MCA Ensure its surveyors verify during survey and/or inspection that the field of visibility from fishing vessel wheelhouses complies with the criteria laid down in MGN 314 (F) and, where necessary, owners are directed to take action to ensure that adequate visibility is afforded. Target date for completion - June 2012	Accepted, yet to be implemented FV	2
135	<i>Sapphire II/Silver Chord</i>	Fishing vessels Collision resulting in the foundering of <i>Sapphire II</i> off Stornoway, Scotland. (Report 21/2011)	Made to: Owner/Skipper of <i>Silver Chord</i> Improve the safe operation of your vessel by: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Keeping the wheelhouse manned at all times when at sea• Familiarising yourself with the guidance available regarding keeping a safe navigational watch on board fishing vessels.	Accepted, fully implemented FV	3
136	<i>Sapphire II/Silver Chord</i>	Fishing vessels Collision resulting in the foundering of <i>Sapphire II</i> off Stornoway, Scotland. (Report 21/2011)	Made to: Owner/Skipper of <i>Sapphire II</i> Carefully consider the risks associated with single-handed fishing operations before undertaking this activity on board any vessel you own or skipper in the future. Particular attention should be given to maintaining a safe navigational watch at all times.	Accepted, fully implemented FV	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
137	<i>Lynn Marie/ Philipp</i>	Fishing vessel and container feeder vessel Collision, 6nm south of Isle of Man. (Report 20/2011)	Made to: Vega Reederei GmbH & Co KG Take measures to ensure its bridge watchkeepers are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fully familiar with the requirements of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea; • Provided with training and guidance such that the operation of navigation and anti-collision aids fitted to its vessels is understood and the equipment properly utilised; • Cognizant of their responsibilities under UNCLOS 1982, Section 98. 	L	3
138	<i>Discovery/ Breadwinner</i>	Fishing vessels Loss of skippers of both vessels during single-handed fishing operations (Report 22/2011)	Made to: MCA Accepted, yet to be implemented Extend the current guidance published in the Fishermen's Safety Guide to cover the additional safety considerations needed for single-handed operations. This should, as a minimum, include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The additional workload that single-handed operation imposes on the individual. • Advice on how to mitigate the additional hazards of operating fishing equipment single-handedly, including: guarding of dangerous machinery; positioning of operating controls; the need for working areas to be safely separated from hazards such as revolving drums and back ropes; and the provision of emergency stops. • Additional measures that can be taken to deal with emergency situations, such as: use of automated MOB alarm systems including remote engine shut-off where appropriate; positioning of emergency equipment so that it is easily accessible; the wearing of appropriate personal protective equipment such as personal flotation devices and/or safety harnesses, and the carrying of rescue knives or similar cutting tools. 	Fv	2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
139	<i>Discovery/Breadwinner</i>	Fishing vessels Loss of skippers of both vessels during single-handed fishing operations. (Report 22/2011)	Made to: MCA Through its chairmanship of FISG, work with the wider fishing sector to ensure that means are established to engage with and educate fishermen in the methods of recognising and mitigating the occupational hazards of professional fishing.	Fully accepted, fully implemented FV	2

MCA response:
The MCA accepts this recommendation because it falls within the remit of FISG which includes:

- Development of initiatives and work streams to address the most significant causes of loss of life and vessel accidents; and
- Fishing industry organisations represented on FISG are involved at the earliest opportunity in any proposals to introduce new, or revise existing, safety standards or initiatives.

As such, a remit is already established to identify means to engage with, and educate fishermen. This is because FISG and its associated sub-groups are already working with the fishing sector and reviews MAIB accident reports on a regular basis.

MAIB comment:

The purpose and meaning of the recommendation was explained before the report was published. MCA by virtue of its leadership of FISG has a pivotal role in ensuring that focus is provided on the need to engage and educate fishermen, with particular emphasis on the need to improve awareness of occupational hazards. The current agenda for the group has not been amended to provide such focus, and therefore MAIB cannot consider the response from MCA to indicate that this recommendation has been accepted.

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
140	Commodore Clipper	Ro-ro passenger ferry Fire on main vehicle deck while on passage to Portsmouth. (Report 24/2011)	<p>Made to: MCA</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>Work with its stakeholders to produce industry guidelines for maritime emergency responders to consider when providing fire-fighting or other emergency support to ships in UK waters. The guidelines should include, inter alia:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Best practice command and control principles • Information gathering and liaison on scene • Safety of passengers and crew • Ship specific risks and considerations with particular emphasis on issues associated with passenger ro-ro vessels and vessels carrying hazardous cargoes • Factors to be considered in deciding whether to bring a vessel into port/ alongside. • Specialised equipment and other resources. <p>Target completion date – Feb 2013</p>	C	2
141	Commodore Clipper	Ro-ro passenger ferry Fire on main vehicle deck while on passage to Portsmouth. (Report 24/2011)	<p>Made to: Port Marine Safety Code Steering Group</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>Provide advice in the guide to good practice on port marine operations regarding:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The need for ports to identify and list capabilities and limitations of the facilities they can offer to support vessels requiring emergency assistance once they are alongside. • How support from cargo handling equipment and other port infrastructure might be provided to the principal vessel types that are trading in a port, in order to assist in dealing with an emergency on board a vessel that is alongside. <p>Target date for completion – June 2012</p>	C	2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
142	Commodore Clipper	Ro-ro passenger ferry Fire on main vehicle deck while on passage to Portsmouth. (Report 24/2011)	Made to: Det Norske Veritas Improve the standard of electrical fault protection on systems designed to provide electrical power to road freight units stored on vehicle deck, special category and ro-ro spaces. Such protection should include: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Residual current detection to reduce the risk of electric shock<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Short circuit and overload detection• Phase imbalance detection	Accepted, fully implemented	C 2
143	Commodore Clipper	Ro-ro passenger ferry Fire on main vehicle deck while on passage to Portsmouth. (Report 24/2011)	Made to: Bahamas Maritime Authority Make a submission to the IMO to consider a requirement for all existing ro-ro passenger vessels to be fitted with, or have ready access to, means of determining the effect of damage or entrained water from fire fighting on the vessel's stability.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 2
144	Commodore Clipper	Ro-ro passenger ferry Fire on main vehicle deck while on passage to Portsmouth. (Report 24/2011)	Made to: Bahamas Maritime Authority Develop a joint paper with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency for submission to the IMO to consider a requirement for all vessels, whose principal means of access is via a single ramp to a vehicle, special category or ro-ro space, to assess how an alternative means of pedestrian access to shore could be provided in an emergency.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 1

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
145	Cosco Hong Kong/Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135	Container vessel and fish transportation vessel	Made to: Fisheries Department of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Peoples Republic of China Issue guidance to its fishing industry which: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Highlights the dangers of lashing down liferafts at sea.• Encourages owners and skippers of fishing industry vessels that are engaged in single handed operations, of which operate at long distances from the shore, to fit an EPIRB.	No response received FV	2
146	Cosco Hong Kong/Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135	Container vessel and fish transportation vessel	Made to: Cosco Maritime (UK) Ltd Develop in-house procedures and controls designed to provide senior managers with assurance that the company's vessels are being navigated competently to an acceptable standard. These may include inter alia: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• At sea auditing• The periodic review / assessment of VDR data.• The provision of specific instruction to ships' masters on the importance of conducting dynamic risk assessments such that, where required, voyage plans are amended, speed is reduced and/or bridge manning is increased to mitigate the effect of risks that may be identified during the voyage.	Accepted, yet to be implemented C	3
147	Cosco Hong Kong/Zhe Ling Yu Yun 135	Container vessel and fish transportation vessel	Target completion date – Not available, work in progress. Made to: China Ocean Shipping Company Monitor and evaluate the effects of the actions taken by Cosmar that are aimed at improving the competency of its bridge watchkeepers with a view to adopting similar measures throughout its ship-managing subsidiaries. Target date for completion – Not available, work in progress.	Accepted, yet to be implemented C	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and addressee	Focus	Level
148	<i>Liquid Vortex</i>	Sailing yacht Serious injury to crew member. (Report 25/2011)	Made to: Hot Liquid Sailing Ltd Establish a robust safety management system to ensure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The risks to its vessels and crews engaged in commercial operations are identified and thoroughly assessed. • Comprehensive operational procedures and guidance are developed to mitigate such risks. • Management oversight to ensure compliance with its procedures, once these are established. 	Fully accepted, fully implemented L	3
149	<i>Queen Mary 2</i>	Passenger ship Catastrophic failure of a capacitor in the aft harmonic filter room approaching Barcelona. (Report 28/2011)	Made to: Lloyd's Register Improve the standards of protection that are required against harmonic distortion and component failure in vessels operating high voltage networks, to ensure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a requirement in all new-build vessels that may be affected by harmonic distortion of current and voltage that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In the event that all harmonic mitigation systems fail, information is provided on board to describe the maximum extent of harmonic distortion that can be expected. - Guidance is provided so that crew can take effective action to keep power and propulsion equipment operating (at an appropriate power output) if harmonic mitigation equipment degrades or fails. • On-line monitoring of harmonic distortion of voltage is required for new build vessels and, for existing vessels, there is periodic monitoring to detect change or degradation of harmonic distortion levels. • Specific requirements are developed to detect and mitigate against the failure of high-energy storage devices such as capacitors. 	Accepted, fully implemented C	2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
150	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship	Made to: Lloyd's Register Review the requirements for the enclosure of high voltage systems to ensure that the degree of protection is consistent for all equipment where crew intervention could be required and the hazard from arc-flash exists. (Report 28/2011)	Accepted, fully implemented	C 2
151	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship	Made to: Lloyd's Register Introduce a specific requirement ensuring that where the failure of equipment or machinery may lead to serious damage to the vessel, or injury to personnel, its protection system must be of a 'fail safe' type.	Accepted, fully implemented	C 2
152	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship	Made to: Lloyd's Register Catastrophic failure of a capacitor in the aft harmonic filter room approaching Barcelona. (Report 28/2011)	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
153	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship	Made to: MCA Using this report and the accompanying safety flyer as a basis, publish a marine guidance notice to raise awareness of the potential hazards of excessive harmonic distortion of current and voltage. Target date for completion – August 2012	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 2
154	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship	Made to: MCA Review and update the Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen (COSWP) to provide more detailed information on the hazards associated with high voltage equipment, including arc-flash. Target date for completion – December 2013	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 2
155	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship	Made to: Carnival UK Improve the standards of protection against the effects of harmonic distortion and component failure by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Instigating a programme of modelling or other appropriate means to develop safe vessel operating parameters and procedures to be used in the event of harmonic filter failure. • Ensuring that <i>RMS Queen Mary 2</i>'s maintenance system identifies all critical high voltage system protection devices, and contains procedures for periodic checks to confirm that they function correctly. • Implementing a method of identifying and analysing unexpectedly high rates of component failures in harmonic filter equipment and other high voltage systems. Target date for completion – September 2012.	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C 3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
156	Queen Mary 2	Passenger ship Catastrophic failure of a capacitor in the aft harmonic filter room approaching Barcelona. (Report 28/2011)	Made to: Carnival UK Review the machinery alarm systems fitted to <i>RMS Queen Mary 2</i> in order to identify those alarms which indicate failure conditions that could significantly affect the safety of the vessel. In doing so, action should be taken to prioritise such alarms above others that relate to the more general operation of the ship, so that operators can more readily recognise complex system failures and respond appropriately. Target date for completion – September 2012.	Accepted, yet to be implemented C	3
157	Fremantle Express	Container ship. Fatality during mooring operations in Veracruz, Mexico. (Report 29/2011)	Made to: Anglo Eastern Ship Management Ltd Develop in-house controls to verify: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Measures it has introduced to improve the safety of mooring operations on board its vessels have been implemented.• A sufficient number of experienced crew are routinely allocated to each mooring station during berthing/unberthing operations.	Accepted, fully implemented C	3

SECTION B

RECOMMENDATIONS TO MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS

Lists the small number of recommendations that have been addressed to multiple recipients. As a result, it has not been possible to track responses under the closed-loop system. Such multiple addressee recommendations are now being avoided wherever possible, so as to make the closed-loop system as effective as possible.

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
S116M	Tombarra	Car carrier Fatal accident to crewman. (Safety Bulletin 1/2011)	Made to: Multiple - Owners of ships using rescue boats or fast rescue craft built with integral polyurethane foam-filled compartments Owners of ships using rescue boats or fast rescue craft built with integral polyurethane foam-filled compartments should: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the case of Watercraft WHFRB 6.50, follow the advice issued by the manufacturer, or urgently contact the manufacturer if a product awareness notice has not been received.• Be alert to the possibility of boats being heavier than designed and arrange for the boats to be weighed, or boat manufacturers contacted for advice, where doubt exists.• Inspect boats' hulls and exposed decks for possible holes, cracks or fittings through which water could penetrate.• Ensure that drain plugs fitted to the hull are regularly opened.• Monitor boat performance for unusual characteristics that could be attributed to an increase in weight, e.g. that it does not feel 'heavy' or 'sluggish' when manoeuvring.	C	3
S117M	Tombarra	Car carrier Fatal accident to crewman. (Safety Bulletin 1/2011)	Made to: Multiple - Owners and operators of vessels equipped with boat davit systems Owners and operators of vessels equipped with boat davits should: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• In the case of vessels fitted with the Schat-Harding SA 1.5 and SA 1.75 davits, follow the advice contained in the Product Advisory Note (PAN) recently issued by the manufacturer or urgently contact Schat-Harding1 if a PAN has not been received.• Ensure that all devices (inductive or mechanical) fitted to boat davit systems to prevent overload are tested on each occasion before a boat is hoisted and that such devices are not relied upon during operation.• Follow manufacturers' recommendations regarding the maintenance and periodic testing, examination and replacement of safety devices, seeking clarification from manufacturers where ambiguity exists.• Verify the effectiveness of watertight seals on electrical equipment fitted to boat davit systems on weatherdecks.	C	3

SECTION C

RECOMMENDATIONS BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PREVIOUS YEARS

Lists the ongoing outstanding recommendations shown as **accepted – yet to be implemented** in previous reports.

2010

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2010/136c	<i>Llanddwyn Island</i>	Workboat Fatality onboard a workboat at Roscoff, France. (Report 14/2010)	Made to: UKHMA Promulgate to their members the need to ensure that workboats engaged in towing operations are skippered by suitably qualified and experienced personnel who hold, as a minimum, either a boatmaster's licence or a commercially endorsed RYA Yachtmaster's offshore certificate, and have completed the appropriate MCA/NWA/BTA Towing Endorsement when they become available. Target date for completion – Cannot promulgate until MCA/NWA/BTA Towing Endorsement is available.	C	2
2010/135	<i>Llanddwyn Island</i>	Workboat Fatality onboard a workboat at Roscoff, France. (Report 14/2010)	Made to: MCA Expedite the introduction of the MCA/NWA/BTA towing endorsement, and encourage crew intending to work on towing vessels to complete the endorsement when it becomes available. Target date for completion – Not available, work is ongoing	C	2
2010/133	<i>Cormorant</i>	Floating sheerleg Lifting equipment failure at 102 berth Southampton. (Report 15/2010)	Made to: Netherlands Transport and Water Management Inspectorate Satisfy itself that Multiruship B.V. has fully complied with MAIB recommendation 2010/132 and identified all key shipboard operations, applied safe systems of work, and is examining and testing all 'non- cargo' lifting appliances in accordance with Netherlands' regulations. Target date for completion – Unknown, update requested.	C	2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2010/123	<i>Olivia Jean</i>	Fishing vessel	Made to: MCA Accepted, yet to be implemented	FV	2
		Injury to fisherman 17nm SSE of Beachy Head in the English Channel. (Report 10/2010)	<p>Consider the findings of this investigation when assisting the Department for Transport to address MAIB recommendation 2010/112, including the need to improve fishing vessel standards and occupational safety by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reviewing the application of LOLER, PUWER, risk assessment and working time regulations on board fishing vessels to ensure that they are suitable for the task of improving safety and reducing accidents; and • Providing clear and robust guidance to its surveyors and the fishing industry at large. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring accurate records are maintained such that surveyors are provided with the information required to survey fishing vessels effectively. • Improving its recording of accidents on vessels' SIAS records to identify trends and act upon them. <p>Target date for completion – April 2015</p>	C	3

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2010/120	<i>Bro Arthur</i>	Oil and Chemical tanker	<p>Made to: ICS</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>Include guidance on the following in the respective International Chamber of Shipping publications during their next periodic review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TSGC - Management of contractors and sub-contractors with emphasis on the master's and other officers' and crew members' related health and safety responsibilities. • TSGC and ISGOTT - The need for the provision of lightweight, portable casualty recovery equipment suitable for recovery from deep cargo tanks and for the crew to be fully trained in its use. <p>Target date for completion – January 2013</p>	C	2
2010/119	<i>Bro Arthur</i>	Oil and Chemical tanker	<p>Made to: MCA</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>Provide additional guidance on the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management of contractors and sub-contractors with emphasis on the master's and other officers' and crew members' related health and safety responsibilities. • The need for the provision of lightweight, portable casualty recovery equipment suitable for recovery from deep cargo tanks, and for the crew to be fully trained in its use. <p>Target date for completion – June 2012</p>	C	2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2010/112	<i>Korenblom/Osprey III/Optik</i>	Fishing vessels Fatal manoverboard accidents. (Report 6/2010)	<p>Made to: DfT</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>DfT response: The Government recognises the safety risks associated with the fishing industry. The MCA will develop an action plan and strategy for improving safety. The strategy will need to be proportionate and appropriate to the risk, with specific consideration of the current economic climate and Better Regulation initiative. The MCA will discuss and seek the support of the DfT and MAIB as appropriate.</p> <p>Target date for completion – Not available, work is ongoing</p>	FV	1

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2009/183	Jo Eik	Chemical tanker	Made to: ICS Accepted, yet to be implemented	C	2
		Two crew casualties from release of cargo vapours. (Report 24/2009)	<p>Include the following safety issues identified in this report in the next periodic review and amendment of the Tanker Safety Guide Chemicals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Emphasise the need for the cargo specific MSDS to be held on board as supplied by the shipper. • That the cargo specific MSDS is promulgated to receivers (terminal or transhipment ships/barges) either directly from the ship or via the ship operator or agent so that risk control measures are based on accurate information. • That areas of the deck which fall into the IMO's definition of an Enclosed Space are identified, and that appropriate control measures are in place following risk assessment. <p>Target date for completion – December 2012</p>		
2009/174	Vallermosa	Product tanker	Made to: MCA Accepted, yet to be implemented	G	2
		Investigation into the contacts made by the tanker <i>Vallermosa</i> , with the tankers <i>Navion Fennia</i> and <i>BW Orinoco</i> at the Fawley Terminal. (Report 23/2009)	<p>Disseminate to the shipping industry specific detailed information on the expected levels of support which should be provided by bridge teams when a pilot is embarked.</p> <p>Target date for completion – June 2012</p>		

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2009/161	Ville de Mars	Container vessel Fatality of crewman in a ballast tank. (Report 20/2009)	Made to: CMA CGM With the help of human factors experts, conduct a study to try and identify ways of developing a positive safety culture and reducing complacency on board its ships, and to share the results of this study with others via the MCA's Human Element Advisory Group. Target date for completion – December 2012	Accepted, yet to be implemented C	3
2009/158	Maggie Ann	Fishing vessel Manoverboard accident in Cardigan Bay on 12 February 2009 resulting in one fatality. (Report 19/2009)	Made to: MCA As part of its efforts to realise improved safety within the fishing industry: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Expedite its current work on the use of personal flotation devices and personal locator beacons in the UK fishing industry (MAIB Recommendation 2008/173 refers).• Ensure emergency drills, including manoverboard drills, plus instruction and guidance on how to conduct risk assessment and improve safety awareness are undertaken to a consistent standard by surveyors and inspectors of fishing vessels throughout the UK.• Incorporate guidance into its revision of MGN 265 (F) designed to preclude the need for scallop fishermen to lean outboard of the bulwark during tipping operations.	Accepted, yet to be implemented Fv	2

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2009/141	<i>Abigail H</i>	Grab hopper dredger Flooding and foundering Port of Heysham. (Report 15/2009)	Made to: MCA Introduce a mandatory requirement, for all vessels greater than 24m length and less than 500 gross tonnes, for the fitting of bilge alarms in engine rooms and other substantial compartments that could threaten the vessel's buoyancy and stability if flooded. These, and any other emergency alarms should sound in all accommodation spaces when the central control station is unmanned. In addition to functioning in the vessel's normal operational modes, alarms should be capable of operating when main power supplies are shut down, and be able to wake sleeping crew in sufficient time for them to react appropriately. Target date for completion – July 2012	Accepted, yet to be implemented	G
2009/126a	<i>Celtic Pioneer</i>	RIB Injury to a passenger on board the RIB <i>Celtic Pioneer</i> , in the Bristol Channel. (Report 11/2009)	Made to: MCA Review and revise the deck manning and qualification requirements of the harmonised SCV Code taking into account the speed of craft and the type of activity intended in addition to the distance from shore and environmental conditions. Target date for completion – April 2014	Accepted, yet to be implemented	C

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2009/128a	Celtic Pioneer	RIB	<p>Made to: LACORS</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>When available, promulgate the approved code of practice for thrill-type boat operators, and strongly encourage local authorities within the United Kingdom to require operators to adhere to the code as a condition of licensing.</p> <p>Target date for completion – Will promulgate when new code of practice is available (2009/126a)</p>	G	3
	2009/128b		<p>Made to: Institute of Licensing</p> <p>Accepted, yet to be implemented</p> <p>When available, promulgate the approved code of practice for thrill-type boat operators, and strongly encourage local authorities within the United Kingdom to require operators to adhere to the code as a condition of licensing.</p> <p>Target date for completion – Will promulgate when new code of practice is available (2009/126a)</p>	G	3

2008

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2008/130	<i>MSC Napoli</i>	Container ship Structural failure while in the English Channel. (Report 9/2008)	Made to: IACS Research and review the technological aids available which would assist masters to measure hull stresses in port and at sea. Target date for completion – Not available, work is ongoing.	C	2
2008/128	<i>MSC Napoli</i>	Container ship Structural failure while in the English Channel. (Report 9/2008)	Made to: IACS Review the contents of UR S11 (Longitudinal Strength Standard) to ensure: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Hull girder strength and buckling checks are carried out at all critical sections along the entire length of the hull.• An evaluation of the suitability of current UR S11 design wave bending moment criteria for vessels with low block coefficient is undertaken.• Member societies use common methodologies when complying with the requirements of this rule. Target date for completion – Not available, work is ongoing.	C	1

2007

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2007/144	<i>Thunder</i>	General cargo vessel Grounding at the approaches to the Dee Estuary. (Report 12/2007)	Made to: DfT In considering his decisions on the Harbour Revision Orders submitted by the Environment Agency and Mostyn Docks Limited, take into account the need to clarify the status of the Mostyn Outer Channel, such that the responsible authority has the necessary powers to ensure the safety of navigation in the channel. Predicted implementation date/decision to be made in 2012.	Accepted, yet to be implemented C	1
2007/119	<i>Danielle</i>	Scallop dredger Major injuries sustained by a deckhand on board, 17 miles south-south-east of Falmouth. (Report 5/2007)	Made to: MCA Amplify and expand on current advice contained in MSN 1768 (M&F) such that fishermen are reminded: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Medical scale requirements provide the minimum levels of medical stores only. Additional stores may be provided at the skipper's owner's discretion. Such advice should also specify the need for skippers to consider the level of additional medical stores carried on individual vessels as part of the statutory risk assessment process.	Accepted, yet to be implemented FV	2

2006

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2006/203	<i>Emerald Star</i>	Fishing vessel Contact with Chevron Texaco No.6 berth at Milford Haven. (Report 23/2006)	Made to: MHPA Consider the implementation of an upper speed limit for all reporting vessels navigating between the seaward and landward terminals. Target date for completion – Unknown, update requested.	FV	2
2006/133	<i>Carrie Kate and Kets</i>	Powerboats Collision between Carrie Kate and Kets resulting in one fatality near Castle Point, St Mawes, Cornwall. (Report 6/2006)	Made to: DfT Work closely with the RYA, MCA and other relevant stakeholders to realise the urgent introduction of national regulations to establish limits on the amount of alcohol which may be consumed by operators of leisure vessels. Target date for completion – The DfT will work with the RYA, MCA and RNLI in 2012/2013 to jointly educate leisure mariners of the potential dangers that alcohol consumption poses; it remains the Government's intention to introduce legislation.	L	1

SECTION D

CHANGES TO PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RECOMMENDATIONS

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2009/153a	Riverdance	Ro-ro cargo ship	Made to: DfT	Partially accepted	C 1
2009/153b		Grounding, and subsequent loss of vessel on Shell Flats - Cleveleys Beach, Lancashire. (Report 18/2009)	<p>Conduct an urgent study into stability and operational issues which impinge on the safety of ro-ro vessels operating from UK ports. In particular, the study should identify how the stowage plan should be produced and implemented, how masters can establish the stability of their vessel before sailing, and under varying conditions of service, the securing of trailers, and the securing of cargo within trailers to prevent their movement whilst at sea.</p> <p>DfT response: Partially accepted – In recognition of the need to minimise costs, and focusing on matters of critical importance to maritime safety, the DfT consulted industry, the MCA, MAIB and other stakeholders to promote the safe operation of ro-ro vessels, culminating in a number of events, meetings and information exchanges where best operational practice was shared. These events focused in issues affecting stability such as cargo stowage, weighbridges, historic incidents, lashing and the human element.</p> <p>MAIB comment: MAIB considers that the actions taken have achieved the intent of the recommendation given that the recommended study cannot be commissioned at this time.</p>	Partially accepted	C 1

Case	Investigation	Vessel/Accident type	Narrative and Addressee	Focus	Level
2010/134	<i>Llanddwyn Island</i>	Workboat Fatality onboard a workboat at Roscoff, France. (Report 14/2010)	Made to MCA Revise the requirements for the commercial endorsement of RYA certificates to include training in basic fire-fighting, safety awareness and risk assessment.	Partially accepted C	2

MCA response:
To implement this recommendation, the MCA has been working with the RYA who have now implemented an online style of tuition and assessment covering all major topics such as duty of care, handling of passengers, risk assessment etc. This course is now compulsory for new and revalidating RYA Commercial Endorsement holders.

MAIB comment:

The introduction of the RYA's Professional Practices and Responsibilities on-line course represents a significant step forward in preparing professional skippers for their commercial responsibilities. However, MAIB considers that an on-line course alone cannot provide adequate training in basic fire-fighting.

PART 3 STATISTICS

STATISTICS

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For details of reporting requirements and terms used in this section please see Annex - Statistics Coverage on page 76.

UK vessel accidents involving loss of life

Table 1 - UK Vessel Accidents Involving Loss of Life

Date	Name of Vessel	Type of Vessel	Location	Accident	Deaths
Merchant Vessels 100gt and over ①					
7 Feb	<i>Tombarra</i>	Car carrier	Alongside in Bristol	A rescue boat fell unexpectedly as it was being hoisted in Royal Portbury docks. One crewman died and three others were hospitalised.	1
13 Mar	<i>Forth Guardsman</i>	Landing craft	South of Jura, West Scotland	Fatal injuries incurred during mooring operation.	1
27 Jun	<i>Waverley</i>	Passenger ship	Hunterston Channel, Firth of Clyde	A passenger fell down the vessel's main companionway incurring fatal head injuries.	1
15 Jul	<i>Fremantle Express</i>	Container ship	Alongside in Veracruz, Mexico	Fatal injuries incurred during mooring operation.	1
3 Aug	<i>Ernest Bevin</i>	Ro-ro ferry	River Thames at Woolwich	Manoverboard from Woolwich ferry during unmooring operations.	1
27 Oct	<i>Scot Pioneer</i>	General cargo vessel	Alongside at Belview Port, Waterford, Republic of Ireland	Fall into void space at the forward end of the cargo hold.	1
Merchant Vessels under 100gt ①					
12 Aug	<i>Chiefton</i>	Tug	Greenwich Reach, River Thames	Capsize and foundering following collision with the crane barge she was towing resulting in the loss of one crewmember.	1
Fishing Vessels ①					
20 Jan	<i>Breadwinner</i>	Creeler	5½nm east of Score Head, Bressay, Shetland.	Single-handed skipper dragged overboard while shooting creels.	1
24 Mar	<i>Our Boy Andrew</i>	Stern trawler	9nm east of Eddystone Rocks, English Channel	Fatal injuries sustained by single-handed skipper while hauling nets.	1
8 Apr	<i>Guide Us</i>	Prawn trawler	Alongside in Stornoway, West Scotland	The deceased slipped and fell overboard.	1
5 May	<i>Tender to Murray V</i>	Small rowing tender to fishing vessel	Tongue Bay, North Scotland	The tender capsized as the skipper and a crewman were trying to gain access to <i>Murray V</i> . Although the crewman was rescued the skipper died.	1
14 Jun	<i>About Time</i>	Potter	In the approaches to Milford Haven	Manoverboard while off duty as the vessel was returning to port.	1
27 Jun	<i>Kathleen</i>	Creeler	Shetland	Suspected manoverboard from single-handed vessel.	1

UK vessel accidents involving loss of life

Date	Name of Vessel	Type of Vessel	Location	Accident	Deaths
25 Aug	<i>Starlight Rays</i>	Trawler operating as guard vessel	126nm north-north-east from Aberdeen	Carbon monoxide poisoning while operating petrol-driven pump to remove oily water in fish hold.	1
20 Dec	<i>Heather Anne</i>	Ring netter	Gerrans Bay, off the south coast of Cornwall	Sinking resulting in one fatality.	1
Pleasure Craft (Non-Commercial) ②					
2 Jan	-	Small tender	River Thames at Pharoah's Island, Shepperton	Capsize while transporting guests from small island to the mainland resulting in one drowning.	1
30 Jan	<i>Yarmouth Navigator</i>	Historical wooden military support vessel	Plymouth	The drowning took place when the skipper went back on board to retrieve navigational equipment as the vessel was sinking while alongside.	1
5 Feb	<i>Waterwave</i>	Sailing yacht	Approaching Povoa de Varzim, Portugal	The yacht was knocked down by breaking swell close to the harbour entrance. All three crew went overboard but only the skipper survived.	2
16 Feb	-	Canoe	River Tyne at Riding Mill near Hexham	Canoeist drowned after getting into difficulties on weir.	1
20 Feb	<i>Sarinda</i>	Motor yacht	Liverpool	Fell into water and drowned while gaining access.	1
6 Apr	-	Canoe	Ullswater, Lake District	Drowning following capsizing in poor conditions.	1
25 Apr	<i>Broadland Mars</i>	Motor cruiser	Norfolk Broads	Fell into water and drowned while gaining access.	1
30 Apr	-	Small wooden open boat	Loch Etive, West Scotland	The boat had five people on board and foundered in poor conditions. One man was lost with the others able to swim ashore.	1
26 May	Tender to <i>Isla Rose</i>	Open tender	Kyles of Bute, West Scotland	Owner drowned having left the shore for his yacht. The circumstances remain unknown.	1
17 Jun	<i>Lion</i>	Sailing yacht	English Channel	Owner drowned after falling overboard while still tethered to yacht.	1
20 Jun	Tender to <i>Beano</i>	Open tender	Southend-on-Sea	Capsize while attempting to fit tarpaulin to yacht from tender. The owner drowned.	1
23 Jun	-	Open angling boat	Between Banff and Whitehills, East Scotland	Boat flooded and capsized. There were three on board, one of whom drowned.	1
1 Jul	-	RIB	Chichester Harbour	The boat was performing tight turns when a crewmember fell over the side and received fatal head injuries from the propeller.	1
2 Jul	<i>Island Star</i>	RIB		Single-handed RIB driver found dead in the water. The RIB was found empty with the engine raised, suggesting that he may have been inspecting the propeller.	1

Date	Name of Vessel	Type of Vessel	Location	Accident	Deaths
3 Jul	<i>Flying Squad Heathrow</i>	Speedboat	Solent	While travelling at high speed one of the passengers was thrown from the forward end of the boat and received fatal head injuries.	1
20 Jul	<i>Grecian Girl</i>	Motor cruiser	Norfolk Broads	Crewmember was pulled into water during mooring operation and drowned.	1
31 Jul	-	Canoe	River Thames, Richmond	Competitor in race drowned after capsized.	1
15 Aug	-	Wanderer class sailing dinghy	North Kent Coast	Capsize resulting in the mast becoming stuck in the mud. The two crew decided to try to swim to shore but one drowned in the attempt.	1
11 Sep	-	Rowing boat	Wicken Fen nature reserve, Cambridgeshire	The accident took place as the two men were trying to help injured birds in a reed bed. One fell over the side and the other went in to assist but both drowned.	2
11 Sep	-	Canoe	River Eamont, near Penrith, Cumbria	Instructor drowned following capsized.	1
20 Sep	-	Canoe	Off Luskentyre beach, Lewis, Outer Hebrides	Canoeist drowned following capsized.	1
27 Sep	-	Canoe	Langstone Harbour, Hampshire	Canoeist found dead in water, separated from canoe.	1
8 Oct	-	Small angling vessel	Off Tarbert, Lewis, Outer Hebrides	Man overboard – single-handed angler.	1
9 Oct	-	Canoe	Firth of Forth	Canoeist drowned following capsized.	1
23 Oct	<i>Hussoling</i>	Soling class keelboat	Salcombe Harbour	Man overboard resulting from being hit by boom while racing.	1

① See definitions in Annex

② Not all accidents involving pleasure craft (as defined in Annex) and recreational craft hired on a bareboat basis are required to be reported to the MAIB. While we would encourage all such accidents/incidents to be reported, we do not consider this to be a definitive or comprehensive register of waterborne fatal accidents.

UK merchant vessels >= 100gt^①

Table 3 – Merchant Vessel Losses: 1998-2011

	Number lost	UK fleet size	gt lost
1998	1	1072	3476
1999	-	1035	-
2000	1	1050	12778
2001	1	1047	11217
2002	1	1210	671
2003	-	1343	-
2004	2	1406	832
2005	6	1443	1579
2006	-	1480	-
2007	5	1518	54 304
2008	2	1578	645
2009	1	1564	274
2010	-	1520	-
2011	-	1521	-

Table 4 - Merchant Vessels in Accidents: 1998-2011

	Vessels	UK fleet size	Accidents/1 000 vessels
1998	220	1072	205
1999	159	1035	154
2000	139	1050	132
2001	139	1047	133
2002	129	1210	107
2003	145	1343	108
2004	144	1406	102
2005	196	1443	136
2006	130	1480	88
2007	116	1518	76
2008	131	1578	83
2009	127	1564	81
2010	141	1520	93
2011	115	1521	76

^① See definitions in Annex

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

Table 5 - Merchant Vessels in Accidents by Nature of Accident and Vessel Category

	Dry cargo	Passenger	Tanker/ combination carrier	Other commercial	Total
Cargo Handling Failure	1	-	-	-	1
Collision	8	3	3	6	20
Contact	10	6	-	8	24
Escape of harmful substance	-	1	-	-	1
Fire/Explosion	3	5	-	5	13
Flooding/Foundering	-	1	-	2	3
Grounding	10	1	-	7	18
Heavy Weather	1	1	-	1	3
Hull Failure	-	-	-	1	1
Machinery Failure	3	10	3	5	21
Person Overboard	2	3	-	5	10
Total	38	31	6	40	115

Table 6 - Merchant Vessels in Accidents by Nature of Accident: 1998-2011

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Capsize/Listing	-	1	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
Cargo Handling Failure	2	1	8	2	1	3	1	1	2	1	4	3	2	1
Collision	23	10	25	16	18	12	16	37	25	14	21	24	28	20
Contact	24	18	14	13	25	37	29	34	20	29	27	31	38	24
Escape of Harmful Substance	28	15	4	11	-	-	4	2	1	2	1	-	-	1
Fire/Explosion	23	18	18	20	26	21	22	19	6	8	8	3	6	13
Flooding/Foundering	3	3	2	4	1	3	3	6	4	2	4	4	3	3
Grounding	20	16	7	20	14	13	15	27	21	11	26	19	24	18
Heavy Weather	4	2	5	1	4	3	4	1	5	4	4	4	3	3
Machinery Failure	56	48	50	41	28	41	42	51	31	36	23	24	25	21
Person Overboard	9	11	5	10	10	9	5	13	12	7	11	10	7	10
Other	28	16	1	-	2	3	1	4	3	-	2	5	5	1
Total	220	159	139	139	129	145	144	196	130	116	131	127	141	115

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

Table 7 - Deaths and Injuries of MV Crew by Place

Place	Number of people
Accommodation space - crew	22
Accommodation space - passengers	5
Cargo or other tank space	4
Engine room	17
External stairway/ladder/gangway	6
External working deck/shelter	23
Galley	8
Hotel service areas	13
Internal stairway/ladder	11
Mooring deck	8
Overside/aloft	6
Ro-ro vehicle deck/ramp	9
Ship's boat	2
Store space	4
Workshop	2
Other external deck	13
Other internal deck/space	11
Other machinery space	6
Other	15
Total	185

Table 8 - Deaths and Injuries of MV Crew by Rank

Rank/specialism	Number of people
Master/Skipper	4
Chief Engineer	1
Officer, Deck	16
Officer, Electrical	6
Officer, Engineering	17
Rating	13
Rating, Deck	50
Rating, Engineering	21
Rating, General Purpose	12
Other Crew	45
Total	185

Table 9 - Deaths and Injuries of MV Crew by Injury

Main injury	Number of crew
Amputation of hand/fingers/toe	2
Bruising	21
Burns/shock (electrical)	1
Burns/scalds (non electrical)	5
Chemical poisoning/burns from contact or inhalation	3
Concussion/unconsciousness due to head injury	3
Crush injury	13
Cuts/wound/lacerations	24
Death - confirmed	5
Dislocations	3
Eye injuries	4
Fracture - of the skull/spine/pelvis/major bone in arm or leg	25
Fracture - other	24
Hypothermia	6
Strains - other strains/sprains/torn muscles/ligaments	26
Strains - strained back	15
Other	5
Total	185

Table 10 - Deaths and Injuries to Merchant Vessel Crew: 1998-2011

	Crew injured	Of which resulted in death
1998	330	2
1999	289	4
2000	302	3
2001	297	3
2002	304	5
2003	289	3
2004	310	4
2005	246	2
2006	233	3
2007	243	12
2008	224	5
2009	199	6
2010	223	3
2011	185	5*

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

Table 11 - Deaths and Injuries to Passengers by Injury

Main injury	Number of passengers
Bruising	4
Concussion/unconsciousness due to head injury	3
Crush injury	1
Cuts/wound/lacerations	4
Death - confirmed	1
Dislocations	5
Fracture - of the skull/spine/pelvis/major bone in arm or leg	50
Fracture - other	34
Strains - other strains/sprains/torn muscles/ligaments	4
Other	3
Total	109

Table 12 - Deaths and Injuries to Passengers: 1998-2010

	Number of passengers	Of which resulting in death
1998	120	2
1999	78	1
2000	140	1
2001	139	1
2002	133	-
2003	186	-
2004	147	-
2005	110	1
2006	114	1
2007	106	-
2008	170	2
2009	115	1
2010	92	2
2011	109	1*

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

UK merchant vessels <100gt^①

Table 13 - UK Flagged Merchant Vessels Under 100gt - Losses

Date	Name of vessel	Type of vessel	Loa metres	Nature of accident
16 Jan	Liquid Fusion	Charter yacht	11	Grounding
17 Apr	Landing craft	Un-coded workboat	7	Foundering
20 Apr	Droma Buidhe	Passenger tender	5	Capsize
30 Apr	Loch Etive	Angling	4	Foundering
* 12 Jun	Venus Explorer	Dive support	21	Fire
16 Jun	Disco	Commercial sailing vessel	7	Foundering
26 Jul	North Coast Explorer	RHIB	11	Machinery failure
* 12 Aug	Chiefton	Tug (port service)	19	Capsize
7 Dec	Laura Dawn	Angling	11	Grounding

* Constructive Total Loss

Table 14 - UK Flagged Merchant Vessels Under 100gt - by Nature of Accident and Vessel Category

	Passenger				Other commercial									Overall Total
	Ferry	HSC catamaran	Other passenger vessel	Total	Associated with offshore industry	Barge	Port service	Small commercial motor vessel	Small commercial sailing vessel	Survey/research	Workboat	Other/Unknown	Total	
Capsize/Listing	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	1	-	-	-	5	5
Collision	3	1	2	6	-	-	-	5	51	1	-	5	62	68
Contact	1	-	4	5	1	1	2	6	12	-	1	-	23	28
Fire/Explosion	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	1	1	1	7	7
Flooding/Foundering	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	2	1	1	-	7	7
Grounding	1	-	4	5	-	-	1	8	14	2	-	3	28	33
Machinery Failure	2	-	7	9	-	-	3	16	14	1	1	8	43	52
Person Overboard	1	-	-	1	-	-	2	2	4	-	-	1	9	10
Total	8	1	17	26	3	1	12	42	98	6	4	18	184	210
Injured ③	14	-	11	25	2	1	7	8	42	1	3	9	73	98
Deaths ③	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	2	-	-	-	7	7

① See definitions in Annex

③ These rows include accidental injuries and deaths on vessels where the vessel itself was not involved in an accident. These figures include crew, other workers (non-crew) and passengers.

UK fishing vessels^①

There were 5974 UK registered fishing vessels at the end of 2011. During 2011, 299 accidents involving these vessels were reported to the MAIB. Figures in the following tables are accidents and injuries involving UK registered vessels that were reported to the MAIB in 2011.

24 fishing vessels were reported lost (0.4% of the total fleet) and there were 8 fatalities to crew.

Table 15 - Fishing Vessel Total Losses

	Date	Name of vessel	Age	gt	Nature of accident
Under 15m length overall (loa)					
	12 Jan	<i>Sapphire II</i>	39	29.7	Collision
	20 Jan	<i>Breadwinner</i>	19	15.3	Person overboard
	24 Feb	<i>Silver Rock</i>	13	7.9	Foundering
	11 Apr	<i>Norvik</i>	41	3.9	Contact
	20 May	<i>Rowella</i>	33	9.5	Foundering
*	25 May	<i>Reegan May</i>	15	1.5	Capsize
	4 Jun	<i>Little Pearl</i>	31	1.3	Foundering
	14 Jun	<i>Maggie S</i>	22	11.2	Foundering
	13 Jul	<i>Carisa</i>	51	1.5	Grounding
	22 Jul	<i>Starlight</i>	29	2.0	Grounding
	25 Aug	<i>Migrant</i>	46	2.0	Foundering
	9 Sep	<i>Miranda Faye</i>	24	3.9	Capsize
	26 Sep	<i>Islander</i>	48	5.0	Capsize
	8 Oct	<i>Boy Bailey</i>	23	8.8	Capsize
	22 Nov	<i>Progress</i>	24	10.4	Capsize
	15 Dec	<i>Independent</i>	38	9.4	Fire
	20 Dec	<i>Heather Anne</i>	40	11.7	Foundering
15m length overall - under 24m registered length (reg)					
	10 Mar	<i>Ben My Chree</i>	46	55	Foundering
	17 Mar	<i>Reliant</i>	11	145	Grounding
	24 Apr	<i>Strathelliot</i>	37	123	Foundering
*	8 May	<i>Quiet Waters</i>	30	169	Grounding
	22 May	<i>Beryl</i>	15	169	Foundering
	6 Aug	<i>Vellee</i>	30	103	Foundering
*	7 Sep	<i>Golden Promise</i>	14	127	Grounding

* Constructive Total Loss

① See definitions in Annex

Table 16 - Fishing Vessel Losses: 1998-2011

	Under 15m loa	15m loa to <24m reg	24m reg and over	Total lost	UK registered	% Lost
1998	12	5	4	21	7605	0.28
1999	17	10	6	33	7460	0.44
2000	15	18	7	40	7194	0.56
2001	16	17	1	34	7200	0.47
2002	7	6	5	18	7046	0.26
2003	16	8	4	28	6731	0.42
2004	16	9	-	25	6693	0.37
2005	20	11	3	34	6314	0.54
2006	11	7	1	19	6346	0.30
2007	16	5	-	21	6330	0.33
2008	14	4	3	21	6763	0.31
2009	11	4	-	15	6222	0.24
2010	11	3	-	14	5902	0.24
2011	17	7	-	24	5974	0.40

Table 17 - Fishing Vessels in Accidents

Nature of accident	Number of vessels involved	Incident rate per 1000 vessels at risk (to one decimal place)
Capsize/Listing	8	1.3
Collision	11	1.8
Contact	4	0.7
Fire/Explosion	15	2.5
Flooding/Foundering	25	4.2
Grounding	25	4.4
Heavy Weather Damage	1	0.2
Machinery Failure	195	32.7
Person Overboard	15	2.5
Total	299	50.1

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

Table 18 - Fishing Vessels in Accidents by Nature of Accident: 1998-2011

Nature of accident	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Capsize/Listing	11	15	4	3	5	4	2	6	5	3	2	2	6	8
Collision	20	15	25	17	15	17	12	23	12	18	17	10	15	11
Contact	-	7	2	6	1	7	3	2	3	4	2	6	4	4
Fire/Explosion	11	15	16	10	13	13	19	16	15	9	11	7	10	15
Flooding/Foundering	62	54	59	46	40	50	40	54	34	32	34	31	25	25
Grounding	40	31	40	29	26	38	29	20	24	24	28	26	16	25
Heavy Weather Damage	2	4	4	-	2	1	2	3	1	5	-	3	1	1
Machinery Failure	247	232	174	212	181	221	202	232	240	213	156	140	183	195
Missing Vessel	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
Person overboard	8	8	11	12	6	7	6	11	14	8	7	13	9	15
Other	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	3	-
Total	403	381	337	335	289	360	317	368	349	317	257	238	272	299

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

Table 19 - Fishing Vessels in Accidents - by Nature of Accident

Nature of accident	Number of vessels involved	Incident rate per 1000 vessels at risk (to one decimal place)
Under 15m length overall (loa) - vessels at risk: 5332		
Capsize/Listing	8	1.5
Collision	5	0.9
Contact	3	0.6
Fire/Explosion	6	1.1
Flooding/Foundering	18	3.4
Grounding	14	2.6
Heavy Weather Damage	1	0.2
Machinery Failure	156	29.2
Person Overboard	12	2.2
	223	41.8
15m loa - 24m registered length (reg) - vessels at risk: 482		
Collision	4	8.3
Contact	1	2.0
Fire/Explosion	8	16.6
Flooding/Foundering	7	14.5
Grounding	9	18.7
Machinery Failure	31	64.3
Person Overboard	3	6.2
	63	130.7
24m reg and over - vessels at risk: 160		
Collision	2	12.5
Fire/Explosion	1	6.2
Grounding	2	12.5
Machinery Failure	8	50.0
	13	81.2
Fleet total	299	50.1

Table 20 - Deaths and Injuries to Fishing Vessel Crew by Injury

Main injury	Number of Crew
Amputation of hand/fingers/toes	10
Burns/scalds - other	1
Chemical poisoning/burns	4
Concussion/unconsciousness due to head injury	1
Crush injury	4
Cuts/wounds/lacerations	6
Death - confirmed	6
Death - presumed	2
Dislocations	1
Fracture - of the skull/spine/pelvis/major bone in arm or leg	7
Fracture - other	7
Hypothermia	3
Strains	2
Unknown	4
Total	58

**Table 21 - Deaths and Injuries to Fishing Vessel Crew by Vessel Length
(of which, deaths shown in brackets) 1998-2011**

	Under 15m loa		15m loa - under 24m reg		24m reg and over		Total	
			1998	30 (12)	34	-	51 (14)	115 (26)
1999	16	(4)	28	(2)	37	(3)	81	(9)
2000	20	(4)	42	(9)	43	(19)	105	(32)
2001	11	(2)	42	(3)	34	(5)	87	(10)
2002	12	(3)	24	(4)	19	(1)	55	(8)
2003	27	(8)	25	(2)	18	(1)	70	(11)
2004	27	(9)	20	(1)	23	-	70	(10)
2005	20	(3)	27	(3)	15	(3)	62	(9)
2006	21	(6)	30	(8)	18	(2)	69	(16)
2007	25	(4)	24	(3)	15	(1)	64	(8)
2008	19	(3)	22	(4)	19	(1)	60	(8)
2009	32	(5)	30	(7)	13	(1)	75	(13)
2010	22	(4)	10	-	13	(1)	45	(5)
2011	20	(7)	27	(1)	11	-	58	(8)

Note: Historical data may contain revisions

Non-UK commercial vessels^①

Table 22 - Non-UK Commercial Vessels Total Losses in UK Waters

Date	Name of vessel	Type of vessel	Nationality	Age	gt	loa metres	Nature of accident
27 Nov	<i>Swanland</i>	Dry cargo	Cook Islands	34	1 978	81	Hull failure
3 Feb	<i>Barge 2703</i>	Dry cargo	France	-	3 000	77	Foundering
31 Jan	<i>Jack Abry II</i>	Fishing vessel	France	6	840	46	Grounding

Table 23 - Non-UK Vessels in UK Waters - by Nature of Accident and Vessel Category

	Dry cargo	Passenger	Passenger cargo	Tanker/combination carrier	Fishing vessel	Other commercial	Total
Cargo Handling Failure	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Collision	1	-	-	6	-	5	12
Contact	17	2	2	6	3	9	39
Escape of Harmful Substance	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Fire/Explosion	2	1	-	-	1	1	5
Flooding/Foundering	1	-	-	1	-	-	2
Grounding	23	2	-	2	3	1	31
Hull Failure	1	-	-	-	-	-	1
Machinery Failure	15	3	-	2	8	2	30
Person Overboard	1	-	-	2	-	1	4
Total	62	8	2	20	15	19	126
Injuries ③	16	10	-	4	3	15	48
Deaths ③	8	-	-	-	-	-	8

① See definitions in Annex

③ These rows include accidental injuries and deaths on vessels where the vessel itself was not involved in an accident. These figures include crew, other workers (non-crew) and passengers.

Non-UK flagged vessels are not required to report accidents to the MAIB unless they are within a UK port/harbour or within UK 12 mile territorial waters and carrying passengers to or from a UK port. However, the MAIB will record details of, and may investigate, significant accidents of which we are notified by bodies such as the Coastguard.

ANNEX

STATISTICS COVERAGE

Reporting Requirements

United Kingdom ships are required by the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005 to report accidents to ships and accidents to persons to MAIB.

Non-UK flagged vessels are not required to report accidents to the MAIB unless they are within a UK port/harbour or within UK 12 mile territorial waters and carrying passengers to or from a UK port. However, the MAIB will record details of, and may investigate, significant accidents of which we are notified by bodies such as the Coastguard.

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency, harbour authorities and inland waterway authorities also have a duty to report accidents to MAIB.

For full details of reporting requirements please refer to the Regulations which are available at:
www.maib.gov.uk/resources/index.cfm

In addition to the above, MAIB monitors news and other information sources for relevant accidents.

Data is presented by the year the incident was reported to MAIB. Historic data tables contain information from 1998; since that time the reporting requirements have changed in 1999 and 2005. Significant changes include:

1999 - Requirement for most types of incident previously reportable by Merchant Ships of 100gt or more as "Dangerous Occurrences" to be reported as accidents by all vessels except pleasure vessels.

2005 – Introduction of requirement for recreational craft on bareboat hire and various small vessels of less than eight metres to report a limited range of accidents: Death, Major Injury, Capsize (of a power-driven craft), Fire, Explosion or Pollution causing significant harm to the environment.

Vessel Definitions

UK merchant vessels >=100gt	Merchant vessels on the UK register with a gross tonnage of 100gt or more
UK merchant vessels <100gt	Merchant vessels on the UK register with a gross tonnage of less than 100gt. Includes pleasure craft of all types being operated commercially (charter/hire, operated by schools and other training establishments etc).
UK pleasure craft (non-commercial)	Privately owned and operated pleasure vessels of all types.
UK non-commercial vessels	Non-commercial vessels (other than pleasure craft), Navy vessels (when involved in collisions with non-Navy vessels), RNLI lifeboats, non-RNLI lifeboats, public service vessels (police, fire, ambulance).
UK fishing vessels	Commercial fishing vessels registered with the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency's Register of Shipping and Seamen.
Non-UK vessels in UK waters	Non-UK vessels involved in an accident or incident in UK territorial waters (12 mile limit)

Meaning of “Injury”

- any fracture, other than to a finger, thumb or toe;
- any loss of a limb or part of a limb;
- dislocation of the shoulder, hip, knee or spine;
- loss of sight, whether temporary or permanent;
- penetrating injury to the eye; or
- any other injury-
 - (i) leading to hypothermia or to unconsciousness,
 - (ii) requiring resuscitation, or
 - (iii) requiring admittance to a hospital or other medical facility as an in-patient for more than 24 hours.

And any other injury, to a person employed or carried in a ship which occurs on board or during access which results in incapacity for more than three consecutive days excluding the day of the accident, or as a result of which the person concerned is put ashore and the ship sails without that person, unless the incapacity is known or advised to be of three consecutive days or less, excluding the day of the accident.

Meaning of “Hazardous Incident”

Hazardous Incidents are any events, other than accidents, associated with the operation of a ship which involve circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIS	-	Automatic Identification System
BMA	-	Bahamas Maritime Authority
BTA	-	British Tugowners Association
COSWP	-	Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen
DfT	-	Department for Transport
EPIRB	-	Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
EU	-	European Union
FISG	-	Fishing Industry Safety Group
FSS Code	-	International Code for Fire Safety Systems
gt	-	gross tonnes
IACS	-	International Association of Classification Societies
ILO	-	International Labour Organization
IMO	-	International Maritime Organization
ISGOTT	-	International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals
LACORS	-	Local Authority Coordinators of Regulatory Services
loa	-	length overall
LOLER	-	Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations
m	-	metre
MCA	-	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MEPC	-	Marine Environment Protection Committee
MGN	-	Marine Guidance Note
MHPA	-	Milford Haven Port Authority

MOB	-	Manoverboard
MSDS	-	Material Safety Data Sheet
MSN	-	Merchant Shipping Notice
MSSC	-	Marine Society and Sea Cadets
nm	-	nautical mile
NWA	-	National Workboat Association
PAN	-	Product Advisory Note
PUWER	-	Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations (1998)
reg	-	registered length
RIB	-	Rigid Inflatable Boat
RNLI	-	Royal National Lifeboat Institution
Ro-ro	-	Roll on, Roll off
RYA	-	Royal Yachting Association
SCV	-	Small Commercial Vessel Code
SIAS	-	Ship Inspections and Surveys
SMS	-	Safety Management System
SOLAS	-	Safety of Life At Sea
STCW	-	Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping
TSGC	-	Tanker Safety Guide (Chemicals)
UKHMA	-	UK Harbour Masters Association
UNCLOS	-	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982
UR	-	Unified Requirements
VDR	-	Voyage Data Recorder