

HQ NO 1 GP ODH TOLERABLE & ALARP STATEMENT – MID-AIR COLLISION WITH COOPERATING MILITARY AC (MAC-CPMIL)

Risk Reference TOR 06	Aircraft Type Tornado GR4	Risk Owner ODH	
		Risk Manager Tornado SCM	
Description of Safety Risk Mid Air Collision with cooperating military aircraft (MAC-CPMIL).			
Effect Collision leading to loss of 1 st party life.			
	OCCURRENCE LIKELIHOOD	OCCURRENCE SEVERITY	CLASSIFICATION
Unmitigated HRM	Remote	Catastrophic	HIGH
Mitigated HRM	Remote	Catastrophic	HIGH
BACKGROUND The air operating environment of Tornado GR4 poses an ever present possibility of MAC with another aircraft. The Defence Air Accident Taxonomy (DAAT) lists 4 aircraft-aircraft Accident Subsets under the Primary MAC Accident Set: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- MAC with cooperating military ac (MAC-CPMIL)- MAC with non-cooperating military ac (MAC-NCPMIL)- MAC with General Aviation ac (MAC-GA)- MAC with Commercial Air Traffic (MAC-CAT) This ALARP Statement refers exclusively to the Risk to Life (RtL) from MAC-CPMIL to Tornado GR4. There are similarities across the 4 Accident Subsets which are part of the air operating environment in which the Tornado GR4 flies: <ul style="list-style-type: none">- It is not possible to completely remove the risk of colliding with another aircraft regardless of the controls and mitigations put in place.- It is possible that the result of a collision could entail no loss of life; however, RtL is always present.- The spectrum of outcome varies widely and correspondingly it is necessary to consider the worst credible outcome along with a range of more likely outcomes.			
MID-AIR COLLISION: TORNADO – CPMIL			
Definition of MAC-CPMIL: MAC with cooperating military aircraft, for example during formation flying, affiliation training, air refuelling, Air Combat Training or other exercises where cooperation is intended. There have been 2 IDS accidents (ZA605 10 Dec 86, ZA397 01 Aug 94) and 3 ADV accidents (ZE166 and ZE862 10 Jan 96, ZE733 30 Oct 95) within the MAC-CPMIL accident subset. Where			

only one ac accident is reported on each date (e.g. ZA605 10 Dec 86) then other ac (ZA611 in this case) landed safely with no crew injuries.

Associated Hazard: There is an eCassandra Hazard linked to this risk:

H27 - Minimum Safe Separation Distance Breached with Other Aircraft. Minimum Safe Separation Distance Breached with Other Aircraft due to failure of Avionics or other aircraft systems. Includes formation and non-formation flying.

Worst Credible

It is assessed that the worst credible scenario for Tornado GR4 with regard to the MAC-CPMIL risk is a Mid Air Collision between 2 Tornados resulting in the loss of 3 of more GR4 aircrew: **CATASTROPHIC** severity.

It is assessed that the worst credible likelihood is **REMOTE** (worst credible likelihood of one or more times in 10 years).

This results in a **HIGH** RtL.

MITIGATION

Training

There is a comprehensive aircrew **flying training system** (FTS) that is constantly under review as well as being subject to frequent internal and external quality audits. In addition to teaching the 'see and avoid' principle and assessing candidates visual lookout scan on every sortie, the FTS seeks to develop good SA and airmanship and reduce accidents through a combination of rigorous training, high standards and graduating only those trainees who are deemed to be safe.

Given that aircrew arrive on the GR4 OCU correctly trained in general lookout techniques, Section 1 of the TGRF Handbook describes GR4 specific lookout procedures, including individual crew responsibilities and formation cross-cover.

There are thorough **briefings and operational work up sorties** dealing with the hazards specific to formation activities, be they involved with tactical or close phases of formation flight, or air refuelling.

Synthetic training is used to remind crews of the importance of lookout whilst in high intensity environments. The simulator instructor staff can generate other aircraft and this is done on an ad hoc basis when it is judged to be of positive learning benefit although the Tornado GR4 FMS has limitations in replicating the visual cues that would be picked up by crew lookout. In addition the simulator provides invaluable training in the use of aircraft systems, some of which are used as mitigation under the equipment section.

The TGRF has **SOPs for actions in the event of inadvertent IMC** (such as during a low level abort), emergency procedures in controlled airspace and the use of the aircraft's navigation and autopilot systems in order to achieve VMC at low level. It would be possible to reduce flight in more hazardous regimes, such as at low-level. However, the likely effect of reducing low-level

training would be two-fold:

- An unacceptable reduction in operational capability (such as the loss of ability to perform a show-of-force during operations).
- A potential increase in Rtl wrt CFIT as crews would become less practised at low-level flying¹.

Equipment²

Current technical mitigations are based on systems used primarily for alternative purposes other than for bespoke aircraft-aircraft spatial positioning and avoidance.

The **IFF** is a very reliable system³ with excellent Built-In Test Equipment (BITE). In addition to its routine operation with ATC SSR, use of mode C will enable a TCAS equipped ac to generate TA/RA and take avoiding action when necessary. Crews comply with the MAA Manual of Military Air Traffic Management⁴ and No 1 Gp ASOs/UKLFHB⁵. Ac are not routinely flown if the IFF is known to be U/S.

Use of the **communications** suite to aid SA and to deconflict.

Use of ac **RADAR**⁶. The RADAR is not designed as an A-A system. It may be used to gain SA on other airspace users when it is serviceable, when it is not being used for Air-Ground operations, and when it is not being used to interrogate a specific volume of airspace for other tactical training. Use in A-A mode at low-level is limited with crews placing priority on lookout as opposed to heads-in activity.

The **FLIR** is an aid to navigation, although the thermal cues have the ability to alert crews of the possibility of other traffic if sensed by the equipment. However, when operating overland, multiple thermal cues are often generated which are associated with ground hotspots.

Anti-collision lights.

Use of **TACAN** in the Air to Air mode to provide very rudimentary separation data between 2 equipped cooperating military aircraft or formations.

RHWR, when fitted and serviceable, can be used to provide an azimuth only warning of other RADAR equipped aircraft in the vicinity.

¹ For example Tornado ECR 46+47, Switzerland, 12 Apr 07 or Tornado F3 ZE982. Scottish Highlands, 2 Jul 09.

² It is worth noting that equipment mitigations are rarely mandatory items in order for a flight to proceed. As such, these can at best be considered to be aids to deconfliction. Including all of these items on a "minimum equipment check-list" would likely lead to an unacceptably high number of sorties lost due to equipment unserviceabilities.

³ IFF fault arising data received from BAES (20130218-IFF-U.PPT)

⁴ MMATM Ch 35 para 25 states "All pilots of military aircraft are required to transpond in Mode 3/A Code 7000 and, where equipped, with Mode C at all times [except when flying in CAS, when using a different squawk allocated by ATC agency, when conducting special operations, when remaining within the aerodrome traffic pattern below 3000 ft agl, when recovering an ac with a u/s transponder and when code 7001 is required]."

⁵ 1G395.200.1 states "aircraft entering or flying within the UKLFS are to have serviceable transponders" and UKLFHB 01.03.06 states "except for aircraft conducting authorised operational missions, aircraft should not enter the UKLFS without a serviceable IFF/SSR transponder."

⁶ Regardless of mode utilised, the EV3 provides limited SA on airborne traffic within the forward hemisphere of the aircraft (60° either side of the aircraft datum). It is least effective for A-A in high-clutter environments such as low level.

Tactical use of the RHWR reduces the ability to sense every RADAR as the equipment prioritises its search on specified threat systems.

A **Tactical Information Exchange Capability** (TIEC - data-link) should be available on Tornado with an IOC of Apr 13 and a 90% fleet embodiment by Nov 13. Based on the current status of the program, the Tor Desk attaches 50% risk with the accuracy of these dates. This will provide enhanced SA of other ac on the link.

Further technical mitigation of this risk requires a Collision Warning System (CWS) for the Tornado GR4. Full fleet embodiment of CWS would further reduce the risk Likelihood (i.e. more improbable). CWS on Tornado has passed Main Gate and is 'on contract'; IOC is currently Oct/Nov 14.

In addition, there is constant assessment of potential new technology e.g. PFLARM and in future ADS-B (Automatic Detection Surveillance - Broadcast) by Tornado staffs.

Personnel

As a **two-crew cockpit**, the Tornado aircrew can employ the 'see and avoid' concept more effectively than a single seat FJ ac.

Medical Employment Standards (MES) are rigorously monitored to ensure that crews meet the required eyesight and colour perception standards. Where necessary corrective spectacles or lenses are issued. Crews are also subject to anthropometric requirements as laid down in the RTS and AP1269. Gp ensures that the maintenance of medical standards through biannual attendance of the Air Medical Standards Steering Group.

The Royal Air Force employs a **rigorous selection process** which is under regular review.

Further personnel DLODs are covered through training (above) and through the governance of doctrine & concepts (below).

Infrastructure

Air Traffic Control and RADAR services – Whilst also covered in part through training, doctrine and concepts, the structure of UK airspace, RADAR services (such as Lower Airspace RADAR Service – LARS), Initial Contact Frequencies (ICF) etc are clearly laid out in publications such as the UKLFHB and the British Isles and North Atlantic (BINA) Supplement and are an integral part of all aircrew training and routine GR4 operation. This comprehensive structure provides the opportunity to receive some form of Traffic or Deconfliction Service in most intermediate or transiting flight regimes. There has also been a review of PSR and SSR planned maintenance activity to ensure deconfliction from periods of fg activity.

Airfield facilities are always subject to review and improvement. Such improvements have recently included upgrades to the Watchman RADAR system as well as modernisation or replacement of existing ATC Tower facilities at some airfields.

Doctrine & Concepts

The following are inherent within the **Tornado GR4 concept and design philosophy for collision avoidance**:

- 'See and avoid' principle.

- The 2 crew concept. Crew lookout responsibilities are procedurally outlined within TGRF SOPs.

Regulations, Orders, and SOPs including, but not necessarily limited to:

- Air Navigation Order (ANO).
- Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Publications (MRPs).
- 1 Gp Air Staff Orders (GASOs).
- Air Training Instructions (ATIs).
- UK Military Low Flying Handbook (UK MLFHB).
- ATP 56(B).
- Aircraft Document Set (ADS).
- Tornado GR Force Handbook and SOPs (TGRF Handbook and SOPs).
- Unit level Flying Order Books (FOBs).

These regulate and provide guidance for, for example:

- Methods of air navigational procedures, de-confliction and avoidance,
- Types and availability of radar services
- Use of tactics, procedures and equipment
- Mandatory briefing items, authorisation, supervision and qualifications
- Human Factors and performance limitations
- Debriefing, reporting and recording requirements.

The RAF Flt Safety led [Mid Air Collision Campaign Plan](#) details numerous mitigations that have been identified as a result of the RAF FS Mid-Air Collision Risk Analysis and Feedback paper dated 1 Oct 12 and the HQ No 1 Gp Airprox Deep Dive paper dated 9 Oct 12. The full campaign plan is hyperlinked above and mitigations/ongoing work/future considerations are grouped under the headings Prevent, Detect, Avoid. Some examples are listed below.

Prevent

- CADS planning deconfliction tool.
- A review of the suitability of AWR current sizes (ongoing).
- Mandate that ATSOCAS responsibilities, rules and regulations are checked as part of IRTs, annual handling checks and Standards Visits.

Detect

- Embodiment of CWS on Tornado (ongoing).
- Refresher trg carried out on basic principles of eye physiology and lookout techniques.
- Commence a Lookout Study (ongoing by No 22 Gp).
- Project MARSHALL.

Avoid

- Proposal for better TI phraseology (ongoing – with MAA for consideration).
- Air Awareness trg for air traffic controllers.

Organisation

The MAA and Air Cmd, No 1 Gp and Stn **Air Safety organisations** provide policy, guidance, ensurance and assurance.

No 1 Gp employs a tiered system of fg authorisation and

supervision from the AOC (through GASOs) via the Stn Cdr and DCF to each sortie supervisor. Supervision of flying is carried out, for example through the use of:

- Reference and monitoring of crews' experience, currency and qualification (used from the scheduling stage through to the sortie execution stage).
- Individual mission plan scrutiny, by formation supervisors and independent sqn authorisers, during both the planning and airborne phases of a sortie.

Project GUARDIAN will enhance the capability afforded to link equipped platforms (such as Tornado GR4 notwithstanding equipment timelines highlighted under the equipment section).

Regional Airspace User Working Groups, for example the East Anglian Airspace User Working Group (involving RAF Marham, Wyton, Mildenhall, Lakenheath, Cambridge Airport, Norwich Airport, and the Wash AWRs), aid the communication, cooperation and coordination of procedures and operations amongst local airfields.

The Royal Air Force has standing representation in the form of permanent membership, in both voting and advisory roles, of the UK Airprox Board. Additionally the RAF has membership, through IFS, of the UK Flight Safety Committee, GASCo and relationship with the LAA and BGA. There is regular liaison between the RAF and CAA through the Directorate of Airspace Policy, DAATM and other routine engagement.

Information

There is a well established and robust system for the **promulgation of NOTAMs, CANPs, PINs, Royal Flights and Late Warnings** to military aircraft, both prior to take-off and during flight via guard or formation radio frequencies. Additionally, the Defence Aerodrome Manual (introduced with RA 1026) provides a source of information on stn based ATC and radar services that are available.

CADS is in used by both Tornado MOBS and the majority of Defence users of the UK LFS. Efforts continue to use CADS to provide information of military activity to civil emergency air assets and other GA airspace users. The LFBC will aim to input relevant airspace usage by other users when notified.

The MAA has implemented an occurrence reporting and analysing system - **ASIMS**. The use of ASIMS coupled with the **promotion of a just culture** is helping to increase **reporting and awareness** of air safety issues, such as Airprox events.

The MAA, Air Cmd and No 1 Gp, and each stn, have organisations **promoting Air Safety**. In addition, the **UK Airprox Board** provides monthly updates.

The TGRF often conducts **Occurrence Safety Investigations (OSI)** following notable airprox incidents to determine the cause of the airprox and identify lessons that may be applied in the future. The results of OSI are widely broadcast across the TGRF.

Logistics

Airworthiness of equipment for Tornado GR4 is actively managed and the CAMO and platform PT are actively involved in the safety case and AS related equipment matters.

TOLERABLE AND ALARP JUSTIFICATION

Overall platform Risk is considered to be unacceptable if any 1st Party has a greater than 1 in a 1000 risk of death (RoD) per annum⁷ (see Figure 1).

The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) conducted a Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) at the request of Capability Deep Target Attack (Cap DTA) on behalf of the ODH to assess the risk associated with Tornado GR4 and mid-air collisions⁸. The figures below are taken from this CBA.

The CBA assessed that the per annum risk of a Tornado GR4 (without CWS) having a mid-air collision with *all types* is 1 in 1166. Broken down further, **the per annum risk of a Tornado GR4 (without CWS) having a mid-air collision with another military aircraft is 1 in 10969⁹**. As the CBA did not differentiate between MAC-CPMIL and MAC-NCPMIL, the per annum MAC-CPMIL risk of collision will be less than 1 in 10969.




Figure 1: Tolerability of Risk to Life per Annum.

Not all Tornado collisions have resulted in 100% crew fatalities (some aircraft have landed safely and a number of crews have successfully ejected)¹⁰.

Of 23 Tornados (including GR4, GR1 and F3) involved in mid air collision accidents (including NCPMIL, CPMIL and GA) since 1984 there were 14 Tornado crew deaths.

This gives the historic rate of 14/23 = 0.61 crew deaths per Tornado mid air collision.

Incorporating this rate into the CBA per annum risk of collision stated above, the annual **RoD per annum to Tornado crews from a mid air collision with other military aircraft could be stated as 1 in 17981, with a worst case annual risk equalling the per annum risk of collision, 1 in 10969. Both of these calculations fall within the Tolerable region.**

The RtL for continuing Tornado GR4 operations is therefore assessed as **TOLERABLE**.

The CBA, whilst acknowledging that results are sensitive to risk modelling and assumptions made, concluded that the case to fit CWS on Tornado GR4 was marginal and that even with the application

⁷ MAA RA 1210 Annex A

⁸ The CBA was completed prior to the 3 Jul 12 accident. In addition, the model used was based on OSDs of 2018 and 2021, and for 2 different flying hour profiles for each OSD.

⁹ The CBA states a Probability of Collision Event per Flight Hour (without CWS) between GR4 and another military aircraft of 4.30E-07. Assuming 212 hrs of flying per crew per annum, this calculates as a per annum risk of collision with military aircraft of 1 in 10969.

¹⁰ Stated by HoC DTA in the Tornado Collision Warning System Review Note dated 9 Jan 12.

of worst case casualty values, it could be deemed reasonable to accept that *"the cost-benefit case to fit Tornado CWS on an individual risk to life basis is not compelling"*¹¹. However, due to societal concern, highlighted through the Tornado GR4 CWS business case¹², it has been decided that **CWS is to be fitted to Tornado GR4**.

In addition to the quantitative assessment that the CBA provides and the evidence of good practice highlighted under 'Mitigations', the ODH's qualitative judgement referred to within the Tornado

Collision Warning System Review Note stated *"the RtL of continuing Tornado GR4 operations without a CWS is, therefore, considered to be Tolerable and ALARP"*¹³.

The MAC-CPMIL risk for Tornado GR4 is assessed as **ALARP**.

ODH Chief Air Engineer Comments:

The MG approval for CWS and subsequent success in agreeing a contract provide a programme baseline for a design approved technical enhancement that should mitigate societal concern in a finite timescale. In addition, there is ongoing work to identify potential ways of accelerating CWS implementation under EA. In sum, all that can be done technically to reduce exposure to residual risk is being done. I therefore agree that the risk can be considered as tolerable and ALARP.

Name

[Redacted]

Rank

Gp Capt

Post

No 1 Gp CAE

Date: 10 Sep 13

ODH Senior Operator Comments:

The quantitative assessment provided by the CBA, backed by evidence of good practise to mitigate the risk supports the claim the risk is ALARP. The Tactical Information Exchange Capability will enhance situational awareness in some circumstances of co-operating aircraft at times when visual contact is lost. CWS will provide further mitigation in many circumstances and the evidence is clear that the cost of further reduction through equipment upgrades is grossly disproportionate to the benefits of the risk reduction. I recommend agreement that this RtL is Tolerable and ALARP

Name

D J Waddington

Rank

Air Cdre

Post

Tornado Senior Operator

Date: 10 Sep 13

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

ALARP Statement:

I agree with the reasoning detailed above and confirm that this hazard is both Tolerable and ALARP.

S D Atha
AVM
ODH

Date: 31 Oct 13