

Classical Swine Fever Disease Control Strategy for Great Britain

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Classical Swine Fever (CSF) Disease Control Strategy

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1 Background

1.1 Purpose of document

- 1.1.1 This document describes how an outbreak of Classical Swine Fever (CSF) in Great Britain (GB) would be managed. The primary purpose of this document is to set out the measures applied in the event of an outbreak of CSF and it summarises the wider framework aimed at preventing and limiting an incursion of CSF.
- 1.1.2 Since CSF could spread throughout GB and would not naturally be halted by regional or political boundaries the approach to managing a CSF outbreak seeks complementary, consistent and coordinated measures in all regions. This framework is endorsed by Defra, Scottish Government and the Welsh Assembly Government, although responsibility for management of an outbreak in respective regions falls to the respective Governments.
- 1.1.3 This control strategy was prepared in consultation between Defra, Scottish Government, and Welsh Assembly Government (hereafter referred to as Government), delivery agents, veterinary profession, and organisations representing pig producers and processors. We have sought to make this strategy both effective in achieving its disease control objectives and practical to operate on the ground.
- 1.1.4 We hope that by describing this framework all parties affected during an outbreak of CSF will be better placed to respond quickly and effectively to control the outbreak. Furthermore, we hope this strategy will enable affected parties to prepare to mitigate the likely impact of these control measures during a CSF outbreak.

1.2 Strategic fit

- 1.2.1 The strategy is consistent with key policy principles:
- The GB Animal Health and Welfare Strategy's principle that "prevention is better than cure".
 - With no human health implications but the potential of severe economic/ trade impacts on industry, responsibility and cost sharing principles require close working between Government and industry in developing control measures.
 - Adoption of Office International des Epizooties (OIE; the World Organisation for Animal Health) control measures, compliance with European Union (EU) law and international obligations to trading partners.
 - Takes account of ongoing obligations for the welfare of animals.
 - Takes account of wildlife management policies.
 - Supports the GB Government's exotic disease contingency plans ([Defra's Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases](#); the [Welsh Assembly Government Framework Response Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases](#) and [Scotland's Exotic Animal Disease Contingency Framework Plan](#)).
- 1.2.2 Government is required to ensure a response to CSF is consistent with EU

obligations and legislation and OIE disease control principles. These include responsibilities to mitigate the risk of spread to other member states or third countries. The response aims to quickly assess and close disease risk pathways to other pigs, either domestic or living in the wild.

1.3 Classical Swine Fever

1.3.1 CSF is a notifiable disease. This means any suspicion or occurrence of CSF must be notified to the authorities. CSF was eradicated from GB in 1966, with occasional outbreaks being contained and eradicated. The last outbreak occurred in the UK in 2000 when 16 farms were affected and around 75,000 pigs culled for disease control purposes with compensation of around £4.4 million paid for animals slaughtered.

1.3.2 CSF is primarily spread by direct contact between pigs and infected pigs or indirect contact between pigs and fomites contaminated with virus, such as vehicles, equipment, bedding, feed, waste, or people and their clothing. CSF virus can survive in meat and pig products for many months and can be passed through this route when infected product is ingested. There is no evidence it spreads through aerosol routes but could spread short distances via mechanical vectors.

1.3.3 When CSF first enters a herd, it can spread very rapidly. A high proportion of pigs may become ill with a high fever and many of them may die. CSF does not affect people.

1.3.4 The clinical signs of CSF are very similar to African Swine Fever (ASF) and the diseases can only be differentiated by diagnostic tests.

1.3.5 Information on the disease and its history is readily available from many sources and some useful links are included here:

- [Defra animal disease website](#)
- [OIE disease summary](#)

1.3.6 Operations at pig farms where CSF is identified will clearly be affected. Pigs at the premises will be culled and the farm will be unable to restock until a period has elapsed after cleansing and disinfection. The controls necessary to halt the spread of CSF (in order to reduce the overall size and duration of the outbreak) may severely affect the operations of pig farms in the vicinity. We hope this strategy document will allow farms to be better prepared to deal with the risk of operational and welfare pressures occurring during an outbreak.

2 Strategic control framework

2.1 Disease management principles

2.1.1 Managing exotic diseases is primarily about managing risk. By definition exotic diseases are not normally present in the country and therefore risks can be managed in two ways:

- reducing the likelihood of an outbreak of CSF by putting in place measures to prevent an incursion of CSF and to detect it if it should occur
- being prepared to reduce the impact of an incursion of CSF

2.1.2 Section 3 overviews the measures currently adopted to reduce the likelihood of an incursion of CSF into GB. This has been included to provide context for the primary purpose of this disease control strategy which is concerned with minimising the impact of any CSF incursion.

2.1.3 This section sets out the disease control principles and provides an overview of the key measures that will be taken. The remainder of the document sets out the control policies in more detail.

2.1.4 Whilst most elements of a control strategy will only come into force should CSF be detected, readiness to operate these measures and to minimise the consequential impacts of these measures needs to be prepared in advance. One aim of this document is to assist all parties in their contingency planning and preparation by clearly setting out the principles of disease control.

2.2 Disease control objective

2.2.1 If CSF is detected the key objective is to:

- contain and eradicate any incursion into domestic pigs

2.2.2 Since pigs living in the wild can play a role in the persistence of an outbreak of CSF, secondary objectives include:

- prevent the exchange of CSF virus between pigs living in the wild and domestic pigs
- contain and eradicate any incursion of CSF into pigs living in the wild

2.2.3 In delivering these objectives the disease control measures aim to:

- minimise the number of premises affected
- minimise the number of pigs slaughtered
- protect the welfare of healthy pigs
- minimise any impact on pig producers, meat processors and other related industries and to domestic and international trade in pigs and pig products
- minimise the impact on tourism, the environment and rural and wider economies

- support sustainability within industry
- minimise the burden on taxpayers
- comply with international obligations to control an outbreak of CSF

2.3 Approach to disease control

2.3.1 The approach to disease control is:

- early detection and rapid reporting and diagnosis to limit the extent of disease spread that can occur before disease controls are brought into force, thereby reducing the initial size of the outbreak and simplifying disease control
- containing disease at premises where it is detected, and eradicating it swiftly and effectively such that it cannot be re-introduced
- limiting risk of any further spread of disease from premises connected with or in the vicinity of the infected premises
- undertaking risk assessments based on an epidemiological assessment before easing restrictions and undertaking surveillance for signs of further disease before lifting restrictions
- complying with European Community (EC) obligations and Office International des Epizooties (OIE; the World Organisation for Animal Health) disease control codes

2.4 Outbreak dynamics and veterinary response

2.4.1 Incursion of exotic disease falls into fairly typical phases:

- a) Pre-detection phase: CSF has entered the country but not yet been detected. During this phase silent spread of CSF is a significant factor in the eventual size of an outbreak. Careful sourcing of pigs, and adopting effective movement standstills, quarantining, herd health vigilance, good record keeping and high standards of biosecurity greatly reduces the likelihood of a large outbreak. Given the similarity of CSF symptoms to other endemic diseases of pigs there is concern a mild form of CSF could go unnoticed for some months.
- b) Detection phase: disease will have recently been detected and at this time little will be known about how CSF entered the premises/ pigs, how long it has been present, where it came from and where else it might have moved. With great uncertainty the key at this time is to prevent the risk of further disease spread whilst epidemiological leads are followed up and the disease situation emerges in that area. Thus strict eradication and cleansing measures are imposed at the infected premises (IP), premises suspected of harbouring disease are quarantined, and other pig premises in the area are severely restricted in any activity that might spread undetected disease.
- c) Disease stability phase: After a period (generally at least 2 weeks) with no new cases being identified confidence increases that disease has been contained. Factors affecting confidence include whether tracings of things liable to have spread disease from the IP have been completed, the incubation period of disease, the type of diseases (mild or virulent strain for instance) etc. During this phase restrictions in the area may be eased incrementally, taking account of veterinary risk assessments, allowing limited but controlled activity to recommence. Each time a new case is identified, confidence falls and if there is no clear link to other cases confidence will

- d) Removal of area restrictions: Once IPs in the area have been culled out and preliminary cleansing and disinfection (C&D) completed, and so long as no new cases have been identified for a period (defined in legislation), veterinary surveillance at all pig premises in the area can commence to confirm that there are no further pockets of unidentified disease. On completion, subject to consideration of wider disease risks, an area may be considered disease free and, if appropriate, the zones and their restrictions may be lifted.
- e) GB Disease Freedom: Once all disease control zones have been lifted and other surveillance requirements to confirm the absence of disease from GB have been met, GB is able to declare itself free of disease. Government will then approach the EC to seek the lifting of any safeguard measures that may have been imposed to protect EC trade. The nature of the outbreak, including whether feral pigs were involved and whether vaccination was used, will affect how quickly disease freedom can be achieved.
- f) The aftermath: There can be a considerable tail of work after restrictions have been lifted to allow all day to day business to return to normal. Work will continue to demonstrate that the OIE requirements for international disease freedom have been met. Negotiations to re-establish third country markets will then be undertaken (by industry and Government). Industry will be working to re-build domestic and export trade opportunities. An epidemiology report into the outbreak will normally be completed and work to learn and embed lessons in terms of control policies and operational delivery (by delivery partners and industry sectors) will normally be undertaken. Often further work is needed to respond to EC missions, other reports and enquiries.

2.5 Overview of the disease control policy

- 2.5.1 Initial suspicion will primarily rely upon the vigilance of pig keepers and correct veterinary diagnosis against other similar diseases. The biology of the specific form of disease and type of pigs involved will affect the degree of clinical signs displayed. The inclusion of CSF in the differential diagnosis of diseases with similar symptoms is important to avoid CSF becoming established.
- 2.5.2 Once suspected, quick reporting through the disease report system will ensure a rapid response by government vets to attend the premises. New technology means laboratory test results are available within 24-48 hours. When disease is suspected the premises is placed under strict controls to prevent the onward spread of disease; these are lifted as soon as disease is negated.
- 2.5.3 The extent to which disease will have spread to other premises before disease is confirmed will depend on the day-to-day practices adopted on farm including the effectiveness of biosecurity measures, the volume of pig movements, mixing of pigs at markets and shows, observance of a standstill between pig movements, compliance with swill feed regulations, and many other factors. These measures are equally important whether or not CSF is known to be present in the country.
- 2.5.4 When disease is confirmed, the IP remains under strict controls to prevent the onward spread of disease. Disease is eradicated by culling all pigs at the

premises. CSF virus is persistent, therefore thorough cleansing and disinfection of the premises, vehicles, equipment and anything likely to have been contaminated with CSF will be undertaken. Items that cannot be cleansed and disinfected will be destroyed or disposed of appropriately.

- 2.5.5 At each IP, records will be inspected to identify the potential source of disease and anywhere it may have been spread before controls were put in place. Movement of pigs, vehicles, equipment, feed, bedding, waste and people to or from the premises may have spread disease. Such contact premises will be traced and inspected for any signs of disease. If necessary these will be placed under restrictions as a precaution against further spread.
- 2.5.6 Backward tracings are important in establishing how disease got to the infected premises and whether it came from other premises where disease has yet to be identified.
- 2.5.7 There is considered to be a higher risk of disease incursion to premises in proximity to the IP and therefore control zones (protection and surveillance zones) are declared around the IP to limit the risk of further spread in the vicinity and beyond. Premises in these zones are prohibited from moving pigs, other animals and things liable to spread disease from the premises, although derogations may be available.
- 2.5.8 It is recognised these controls will affect day-to-day business practice. Thus a phased approach is taken, reflecting the levels of certainty about the disease situation.
- 2.5.9 Where feral pigs are present in the area, additional controls may be needed. However, further control zones will only be declared where disease is strongly suspected or found in pigs living in the wild.
- 2.5.10 General information and guidance will be provided more widely to increase awareness of the need for vigilance to spot signs of disease and the need for good biosecurity.
- 2.5.11 Our policy is not to vaccinate against CSF, although this control measure is available should the disease situation require it.
- 2.5.12 Our policy is not to apply compartments (allowing easing of restrictions earlier in non-risk compartments). However, in an extended outbreak and where the disease is localised either geographically, or within a pyramid or sector this will be reviewed.
- 2.5.13 The control system is dependent on good epidemiological assessment of the emerging situation, both at the individual premises and building a countrywide picture of routes of spread and risks of further spread. Advice from experts will be sought. The ongoing assessment of risks underpins decision making.
- 2.5.14 This approach is consistent with EU and OIE obligations for controlling CSF.

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2.6 Decision Making – roles and organisational structures

- 2.6.1 This document sets-out the strategy and controls to deal with an outbreak of CSF. It does not set out management and decision-making processes. These are explained in Governments' exotic disease contingency plans (see Section 1.2.1). However, for the sake of clarity, Annex A outlines the key structures that will be put in place to facilitate decision making during an outbreak of CSF.

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3 Maintaining Disease Freedom and Surveillance

3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 CSF is exotic to the UK and it is important to understand the routes of disease incursion and, as appropriate, to put in place countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of incursion. Due to the nature of these routes, the risk of disease incursion cannot be eliminated and resources are targeted at the countermeasures that are most cost effective in reducing the risk of introduction.

3.1.2 This section summarises current measures to:

- prevent incursions of CSF into UK/GB
- minimise the likelihood of spread of CSF within GB prior to its detection
- detect an incursion early and activate disease contingency plans

3.2 International Surveillance

3.2.1 Defra monitors the international disease situation and prepares and publishes (on the Defra website) qualitative risk assessments. These assessments are used by Government to inform policy making and measures to prevent incursion to GB. These will be revised as the situation requires. The current international disease situation can be viewed online at <http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/monitoring/index.htm>.

3.2.2 When disease is not present in the country controls need to be proportionate to the risk. By monitoring the international situation the option to increase preventative controls can be considered, where there is an increased threat.

3.3 Trade / imports

3.3.1 It would not be proportionate or cost effective to check every animal regularly for disease. A system of surveillance is practiced which targets the highest risk routes of incursion and makes use of cost effective opportunities to check for continued disease freedom.

3.3.2 EU Member States are able to import and export animals and animal products to/ from other EU Member States and third countries. Animal and animal products imported into GB, or passing through it, must meet the conditions and pass veterinary checks under import and export regulations¹ for EU and third country trade. These include documentary, identity and physical examinations and samples may be taken for laboratory analysis. The risk from legal imports to GB is considered to be low².

3.3.3 The export of pigs, pig semen, ova or embryos from a feral pig infected area

¹ <http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/animaltrade/index.htm>

² Defra determines the risk from legal imports through international disease monitoring <http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/monitoring/index.htm>

is prohibited. The Commission also imposes additional controls³ on regions where there are sporadic outbreaks of CSF in the population of pigs living in the wild to reduce the risk of undetected disease spread.

- 3.3.4 The UK has enhanced import controls to protect against pigs, pork or pork products being imported illegally to reduce the risk of disease incursion by this route. However, there remains a threat from illegal activity. Imports from areas known to have CSF are restricted to pig products that have been adequately treated.
- 3.3.5 The legal import of livestock, other pig products including pig meat or uncooked pig meat products from countries or areas with disease will be banned if there is a significant increase in risk of disease incursion to GB.

3.4 Control of CSF pathogens

- 3.4.1 Movement of samples containing (or which might contain) CSF to laboratories is regulated and controlled under the Specified Animal Pathogens Order (SAPO) and Import of Animals Pathogens Order. Following the Callaghan review, the SAPO regime is under review and operational responsibility has passed to the Health and Safety Executive.
- 3.4.2 The use of CSF vaccine in UK is prohibited. As well as assisting with disease detection and control, this prohibition removes the legal use of vaccines which could accidentally introduce disease or cause other unwanted effects.

3.5 Controls to stop disease entering the domestic pig population

- 3.5.1 Should CSF enter GB, there may be a delay before it is detected. During this period there is a risk of rapid and uncontrolled spread into and around the farmed population. Good farming practice, in particular biosecurity (which also has benefits for limiting spread of endemic disease), helps reduce the likelihood of disease entering the farm and spreading to others. There are also a number of specific controls in force which help minimise this risk and these are outlined below.

3.5.2 Routes of undetected spread and relevant mitigating controls include:

- If a pig becomes infected, but disease is not yet detected, the risk of further disease spread is reduced by movement and stand-still controls⁴.
- Where pigs mix, or where vehicles or equipment come into contact with other pigs (such as at markets or slaughterhouses) cleansing and disinfection of vehicles minimises the risk of further spread of the disease.
- If the CSF virus enters GB undetected in a food product, the risk of it infecting pigs is reduced by the ban on feeding swill to pigs⁵.

³ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:302:0019:0025:EN:PDF>

⁴ Pigs (Records, Identification and Movement) Order 2007 (SI2007/642); the Pigs (Records Identification and Movement) (Scotland) Order 2008 as amended; the Pigs (Records, Identification and Movement) (Wales) Order 2008 & Disease Control (England) Order 2003 (SI2003/1729); Disease Control (Scotland) Order 2002; Disease Control (Wales) Order 2003 as amended.

⁵ Animal By-Products (England) Regulations 2005 and the Animal By-Products (Scotland)

- Pig keepers being precautionary in only sourcing animals from known and reliable sources, in particular taking care if considering sourcing from areas outside the UK where CSF is known to be present.
- Pig keepers implementing and operating good biosecurity practices at all times to reduce likelihood of disease entering premises or spreading rapidly within separate epidemiological units within the premises.
- Pig keepers being vigilant for signs of disease, recognising that several diseases have symptoms which could be similar to CSF, and reporting any suspicion early.

3.6 Pigs living in the wild

3.6.1 Feral pigs including wild boar are susceptible to CSF. When CSF is absent from the UK, wild boar management policy does not require the eradication of feral pigs. Local communities and individual landowners have primary responsibility for feral boar management, including population control. Where practical, Government will facilitate this regional management through the provision of advice and guidance. In order to assess the likelihood of feral pigs being involved during a CSF outbreak in a timely manner, information on the location of feral pig populations is collated as normal business practice and made available to experts at the start of any outbreak.

3.6.2 There are various potential routes for CSF to be introduced into feral pigs, including the consumption of infected pig products that have been illegally imported, but a veterinary risk assessment concluded that the most likely route of introduction is from infected domestic pigs⁶. Therefore the risk of introduction of CSF into feral pigs can be mitigated by maintaining and enforcing current disease control procedures and maximising biosecurity on domestic pig holdings.

3.6.3 Further information on feral pig controls is included within section 9.

3.7 Surveillance

3.7.1 Further surveillance for CSF is carried out to provide assurance of continued disease freedom in GB. This surveillance includes:

- samples submitted on suspicion of CSF in pigs
- sero-surveillance of boars entering Artificial Insemination (AI) Centres licensed for export of semen⁷
- scanning surveillance by examination of samples submitted to veterinary laboratories
- serological testing of certain animals for export

Regulations 2003.

⁶ Hartley, M (2009) Qualitative risk assessment of the role of the feral wild boar (*Sus scrofa*) in the likelihood of incursion and the impacts on effective disease control of selected exotic diseases in England. *European Journal Wildlife Research* DOI 10.1007/s10344-009-0334-8

⁷ Directive 90/429/EEC - Animal health requirements applicable to intra- Community trade in and imports of semen of domestic animals of the porcine species

- *ante-mortem* and post-mortem inspections of animals/ carcasses in abattoirs for signs of disease by Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) official veterinarians (OV)

3.8 Disease suspicion and reporting

- 3.8.1 Whilst general surveillance may identify disease, the primary method for detecting disease incursions onto farms early is through general animal husbandry best practice, through pig-keepers' observation of behaviours and signs in the herd, and as part of herd-health plan. Farmers may consult their veterinarians where they see clinical signs or changes in behaviour or other health indicators and vets will consider whether they should consider CSF in their diagnosis.
- 3.8.2 Should a pig keeper or veterinarian or anyone else (including MHS staff and laboratory workers) suspect CSF, or not be able to eliminate it from their diagnosis they should report suspicion or seek a consultation with a Defra vet. The actions undertaken on suspicion of CSF are described in the next section.

3.9 Raising stakeholder awareness

- 3.9.1 Biosecurity advice is made available to pig keepers by GB Governments including information on typical clinical signs of CSF (e.g. <http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/documents/csf-factsheet1.pdf> and <http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/documents/csf-factsheet2.pdf>).
- 3.9.2 GB Governments also undertake regular stakeholder awareness programmes to encourage vigilance in looking for exotic disease, including stands at markets and shows.
- 3.9.3 Private veterinary surgeons are also an important source of advice to pig keepers.

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4 Suspicion of disease in GB

4.1 Suspicion of CSF – general points

- 4.1.1 A standard and well understood procedure applies when any exotic notifiable disease is suspected in GB. This section summarises this process and highlights key factors for CSF.
- 4.1.2 CSF is a notifiable disease and anyone who suspects CSF in a pig or pig carcass must report it to their local Animal Health (AH) office. This is referred to as a “report case”. Additionally, any person who examines a sample taken from a pig or carcass and who suspects the pig/carcass is infected with CSF virus or who detects antibodies to, or antigens of, that virus must immediately notify their local AH office.
- 4.1.3 In some circumstances a private veterinarian may wish to seek further guidance from a Government vet (a “consultation case”). This consultation will either conclude CSF is not suspected or that it should be included as a possible diagnosis, in which case CSF is suspected (“report case”).
- 4.1.4 On receiving a report the duty vet will discuss the case with Defra Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit and arrange for an AH veterinary inspector (VI) to visit the premises. A Notifiable Disease Incident report form (ND1) is prepared and circulated to key units within Government and beyond, and this is updated as further information becomes available until disease is confirmed or negated.

4.2 Actions at premises where disease is suspected

- 4.2.1 Upon notification that there is a suspect swine fever case, AH will orally inform the person reporting the suspect animal/ carcass that further investigation is necessary. This person will also be told that no pigs, carcasses or anything suspected of being infected or contaminated with CSF virus should be moved off the premises in order to minimise the risk of disease spread. On arrival at the premises, the VI will serve the occupier with a written restriction notice (EXD1) designating the premises as a suspect premises.
- 4.2.2 If the VI determines, through further investigation, that the presence of CSF on the premises is not suspected (i.e. disease can be negated on clinical grounds), these controls will be removed.
- 4.2.3 If the VI cannot rule out the suspicion of swine fever being present on the premises on clinical grounds, samples will be taken and submitted for laboratory analysis.
- 4.2.4 No pigs, carcasses or anything suspected of being infected or contaminated with CSF will be allowed to move off the premises. However, the restrictions may in some cases be modified such that the movement on and off the premises of people, vehicles, equipment, or other animals (not pigs) or things that might spread disease may be licensed.

- 4.2.5 Whilst results are awaited, epidemiological investigations will continue to establish how long disease may have been present, the likely source and whether disease originated at these premises or from another.
- 4.2.6 The VI will also consider plans to deal with culling in case disease is confirmed. They will liaise with the AH office to start preparing the necessary logistics for handling a cull.
- 4.2.7 Animals, vehicles and other things that may have brought disease to the premises or taken disease out of the premises will be traced and investigations undertaken at these contact premises. These contact premises may be placed under restrictions.
- 4.2.8 The test results will either negate or confirm infection. If negated all CSF restrictions are lifted. If CSF is confirmed, the infected premises will remain under restrictions (see next section).
- 4.2.9 If CSF is already confirmed in the country, premises with suspect cases will be handled as described earlier. These premises will be visited and prioritised following an epidemiological assessment. A suspect premises will be required to retain and make available to officials information of further instances of disease, deaths or changes in the livestock in order to assess the requirement and regularity of further visits and re-testing.
- 4.2.10 Note, if disease is confirmed on common land the same restrictions apply as if the common were a pig premises.
- 4.3 Diagnostic investigation**
- 4.3.1 A series of virological and serological tests are undertaken at the National Reference Laboratory for this disease (and simultaneously for African Swine Fever (ASF) for report cases). Samples will be sent to the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) and the Institute of Animal Health (IAH) to undertake tests for CSF and ASF virus, respectively. Initial tests results are usually available within 24 hours but some tests take several days to complete. Further detailed tests are undertaken when a virus is isolated and these may help identify the origin of the virus.
- 4.3.2 On occasions an investigation may start as a result of an unexpected result in pre-export testing or pre-entry testing of boars at Artificial Insemination centres. AH will investigate these in exactly the same way as they would for a clinical suspect case.
- 4.3.3 Laboratories finding evidence of the use of vaccine against CSF following analysis of samples must immediately notify their local AH office.
- 4.4 Epidemiological assessment**
- 4.4.1 An epidemiological assessment will be conducted by the VI to try to begin to determine the:

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- possible origin of the infection
- period during which CSF may have been present on the premises
- movement of potentially infected animals, carcasses or items from the premises
- other premises that might, possibly, be infected
- possibility that pigs living in the wild may have been involved in the spread of the virus

4.4.2 The VI will continue this inquiry until these facts have been established so far as is possible or the possibility of disease has been discounted.

4.5 Slaughter on suspicion – suspect premises

4.5.1 If CSF is already confirmed in the country, and the epidemiology or clinical signs are such that disease is highly likely at the suspect premises, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) may decide that pigs on the premises should be slaughtered on suspicion of CSF instead of waiting for disease to be confirmed. This early cull has the advantage of minimising the level of virus build up and thus reduces likelihood of further spread. Samples will be taken to establish the extent of disease (if any) that was present. There are two scenarios:

- slaughter of animals with clinical signs highly suggestive of CSF
- slaughter of dangerous contacts considered to have had a high risk of exposure to CSF virus

4.5.2 In the first scenario, restrictions will be lifted immediately if test results are negative.

4.6 Dangerous contacts

4.6.1 Investigations at an infected premises (IP) may identify movements that had taken place before disease restrictions had been imposed that are likely to have spread (or been the source of) disease (see Section 6.7 for further details). These linked premises are termed dangerous contacts.

4.6.2 Evidence from previous outbreaks of CSF in England⁸ and worldwide⁹ is that the outbreaks may be prolonged as a result of spread of disease from an infected premises to pig farms in close proximity. Taking account of the epidemiological situation, premises close to an IP may be considered to be dangerous contact premises.

4.6.3 Where the veterinary inspector considers the risk of exposure to virus to be high and taking account of epidemiological evidence, pigs at the dangerous contact premises may be slaughtered on suspicion. Samples will be taken from the culled pigs for laboratory analysis.

⁸ Sharpe K, Gibbens J, Morris H & Drew T (2001) Epidemiology of the 2000 CSF outbreak in East Anglia: preliminary findings. *Veterinary Record* 148(3), 91

⁹ Elbers ARW et al. (1999) The classical swine fever epidemic 1997-1998 in the Netherlands: descriptive epidemiology. *Preventative Veterinary Medicine* 42, 157-184

4.7 Optional controls in the area around a suspect premises

4.7.1 A temporary control zone (TCZ) may be declared around a suspect premises, before disease is confirmed. This will restrict movements and other activity as necessary as a precautionary measure designed to minimise the risk of the spread of undetected disease until the full nature of the situation is determined. This control can prevent sudden movement of pigs from the area by keepers prior to any future protection zone or surveillance zone (see 7.1) being imposed. The policy for declaring a TCZ is:

- If CSF is not known to be present in the country a TCZ would not ordinarily be declared. However, this would be reviewed once the VI has visited and assessed the situation.
- The policy for CSF is not to declare a national control zone on suspicion of the 1st case in GB. However, this will need to be assessed against the specific disease conditions at the time.
- Where CSF is already in the country and the suspect premises is already within a protection zone (PZ) or surveillance zone (SZ) then no TCZ will be declared.
- Where CSF is already in the country and the suspect premises is not within a PZ/SZ then it is likely a TCZ will be declared around the suspect premises (probably after the initial visit by the VI).
- The extent of the zone will depend on the relevant information at the time but is likely to be, as a minimum, the size of an SZ (10km).
- Test results from the samples taken from a suspect premises are normally available within 48 hours. If the results are negative, the TCZ will be lifted. If disease is confirmed, a PZ/SZ will be declared.

4.7.2 Where a TCZ or investigation zone for pigs living in the wild is established in England, Scotland or Wales and it extends beyond the border with one of the other GB countries, the appropriate Minister may, if it is considered necessary, declare the relevant portion of the TCZ in their country.

4.8 Suspicion of CSF in pigs living in the wild

4.8.1 See Section 9.4 for information on when CSF would be suspected in feral pigs and information on what control measures would be taken.

4.9 Special cases – establishments and animal gatherings

4.9.1 Since pigs are not resident at establishments (slaughterhouses, knackers yards, game handling establishments) or other temporary gatherings (markets, shows, collection centres) special procedures apply where disease is suspected. It would be likely (but not certain) that the suspect animals arrived at the location already infected. The establishment/ premises will be restricted and further movements prohibited whilst investigations take place, including tracing and investigating the source of animals and tracing any that have already left. Restrictions will be served at source and destination premises, as the AH VI considers necessary.

- 4.9.2 At a slaughterhouse, pigs already present will be slaughtered quickly and the meat and by-product detained whilst investigations are undertaken. Indeed no meat shall leave the premises until the MHS Official Veterinarian (OV) or AH VI have reviewed the handling and storage with the Food Business Operator and confirmed that meat to be moved is not at risk of being contaminated with CSF virus. Meat that has come from suspect pigs, or may have come into contact with such meat, will be detained pending the outcome of the investigation. If CSF is confirmed this meat will be disposed of as by-product. The Food Business Operator is advised to maintain the meat in suitable conditions to ensure that the meat remains fit for human consumption if disease is negated and the meat is released for sale.
- 4.9.3 If disease is suspected at a gathering, it is treated like any other suspect premises, and animal gatherings will have contingency plans in place in order to care for animals during this time. Approximately 48 hours is needed to allow a preliminary assessment of the disease situation and to obtain initial test results.
- 4.9.4 Movement of other species of animal that are present at the gathering will be licensed immediately following appropriate Cleansing and Disinfection (C&D) measures. The destination premises may be restricted if pigs are present.

4.10 Suspicion of CSF during transportation

- 4.10.1 Where disease is suspected in transport (such as a roadside inspection of a livestock vehicle) the vehicle and pigs will be placed under restrictions. The vehicle is unlikely to be the disease source and therefore the vehicle's route(s) will be traced and the source and contact premises will be placed under restrictions.
- 4.10.2 This scenario is unusual and unlikely. The pigs will be moved to an appropriate location where they will (if appropriate) be detained until test results are received, or culled on suspicion. If disease is confirmed by test results, the vehicle (and receiving premises) will be cleansed and disinfected as directed by a VI.

4.11 Outcome of investigation

- 4.11.1 There are two possible outcomes:
- i. Disease is confirmed by the CVO on the basis of laboratory tests and this would be expected within 24 to 36 hours of laboratory samples being received (see next section);
 - ii. Disease is not confirmed. If based on a clinical assessment this will be very quick. If reliant on the results of laboratory tests this can take up to a week for all tests to be completed to confirm they are all negative.
- 4.11.2 AH will be making an assessment of other notifiable diseases of pigs at the same time and if necessary samples will be submitted for those diseases too, in particular ASF which is clinically indistinguishable from CSF.

- 4.11.3 If suspicion of disease is strong and its presence cannot be ruled out on clinical grounds an amber teleconference may be held. Its purpose is to appraise all concerned of the situation and risk assessment, and to plan future action and communication accordingly. For further detail please refer to GB Governments' Exotic Disease Contingency Plans (see 1.2.1) which detail the mobilisation of teams, the disease control policy groups that will be set up and the communications taking place at this time.
- 4.11.4 If CSF is negated, AH will notify the premises' occupier and the restrictions for CSF will be lifted, although other measures may continue at the premises to deal with any other disease found or suspected.

4.12 Communication

- 4.12.1 Since the time from initial report to confirming disease is quite short (normally within 48 hours) the policy is not to publicise the investigation. Many investigations prove negative and unnecessary publicity can prove disruptive to the premises.
- 4.12.2 Therefore, it is not usual practice to make public statements about premises that are under investigation for suspect disease. However, general communications to stakeholders may be necessary in certain circumstances e.g. to raise awareness about the international disease situation, the general disease status and the need for increased vigilance and biosecurity. These communications will be made using existing and appropriate government and industry channels. Biosecurity advice is made available to those in control of pigs. This includes information on typical signs of disease.
- 4.12.3 Minimal communication with other local premises is undertaken as necessary during suspect stages to manage the disease risk. As the likely epidemiology of the disease emerges, other premises in the vicinity may be contacted or the surrounding area could be placed under restrictions (see Temporary Control Zones, paragraph 4.7) if considered necessary to prevent disease spread. Notices and signs may be required at the suspect premises (or wider area if a TCZ is declared).

5 Confirmation of the first case of CSF in GB

5.1 Confirming CSF

- 5.1.1 The first case of CSF in GB will be confirmed by the relevant CVO after laboratory confirmation of the presence of CSF virus, following an amber teleconference.
- 5.1.2 This initiates a series of activities to prepare a legal base to control the outbreak, to mobilise resources and to comply with international obligations.
- 5.1.3 The relevant contingency plans will be invoked and the National Disease Emergency Control Centre and Local Disease Control Centre(s) will be set up in line with these plans, as will disease control policy groups.
- 5.1.4 On confirmation of CSF in the domestic population, a number of actions must take place, including declaring disease control zones, notification of disease to others, maintaining restrictions already in place in and around the infected premises, and taking measures to control and eradicate the disease.

5.2 International notification obligations

- 5.2.1 Within 24hrs of confirming CSF, the CVO UK will notify the OIE that CSF is present in the country. The CVO will also notify the European Commission of the presence of CSF.
- 5.2.2 An assessment needs to be made as to whether or not pigs living in the wild could be infected. The OIE, Commission and Member States must be kept informed of further outbreaks of CSF and be updated with progress on the outbreak by the submission of regular reports.

5.3 Trade and safeguard measures

- 5.3.1 Export health certificates for pig and pig by-products will be withdrawn and importing countries will be notified.
- 5.3.2 In a CSF outbreak the UK may seek, or have imposed, an EU safeguard measure. This will impose additional controls on the export to the EU of live animals, or other related products from certain areas and may place additional restrictions on areas of UK which are outside of existing control zones (see 7.1). These will depend on the disease situation and their content cannot be predicted with any certainty.

5.4 Disease control measures

- 5.4.1 Please see Section 6 for details on the control measures on an infected premises. Control zones (protection and surveillance zones) will be declared around the infected premises in line with EC obligations and to limit the risk of local spread. The size of these zones and control measures in the zones are described in Section 7.1.

5.5 Controls outside protection and surveillance zones

- 5.5.1 Legislation does not require any specific controls outside of the declared control zones. However, other measures may be applied to areas outside control zones if deemed necessary by Ministers.
- 5.5.2 General advice will be issued to stakeholders to increase vigilance for disease and to report suspicion. It is likely that there will be increased surveillance as a result of this increased awareness. There are no plans for increased random or targeted surveillance beyond that required for following tracings and in protection and surveillance zones to provide evidence of disease freedom.

5.6 Cross-border zones

- 5.6.1 Where disease is confirmed and control zones are established in England, Scotland or Wales, the appropriate Minister will establish control zones within their Administration as appropriate.

5.7 Pigs living in the wild

- 5.7.1 If CSF is confirmed in pigs living in the wild, a Feral Pig Infected Area (FPIA) will be declared. The control measures taken when CSF is confirmed in feral pigs is described in Sections 9.5 and 9.7.

5.8 Communications and raising stakeholder awareness

- 5.8.1 During an outbreak, information must be provided for all pig keepers, veterinary practitioners and other stakeholders, particularly within the protection and surveillance zones. The key information provided will vary during the course of the outbreak, but key elements will include:
- clinical signs of CSF
 - action to take if the disease is suspected
 - the current disease situation
 - current control measures in place
 - legislative and licensing procedures that must be complied with
- 5.8.2 Livestock owners must be made aware of their responsibilities and the requirements to supply information from premises within zones, for example, recording existing animals, illness, deaths and births.
- 5.8.3 Owners must be made aware of the results of CSF tests performed on their pigs and the implications of those results.
- 5.8.4 Livestock owners outside zones must also be made aware of their responsibilities, kept informed of the disease situation, told how restrictions may impact on them and be provided with information about the disease,

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biosecurity and the need for increased vigilance.

- 5.8.5 The general public will be kept informed about the disease, the outbreak and the control measures being implemented. The public will be re-assured that CSF does not infect humans and has no public health implications. This information should be disseminated in partnership with the Department of Health. Advice about food safety should be delivered by the Food Standards Agency.

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6 Controls at infected premises

6.1 Definition of an infected premises

6.1.1 For disease control purposes premises means any place. An infected premises (IP) is a place where disease has been confirmed and an infected premises notice served.

6.1.2 The IP Restriction Notice will make it clear what constitutes the IP in each case (this takes into account factors such as the presence of highways). Separate Notices will be served on each premises if epidemiological advice indicates a link with other premises, even if the premises are in the same ownership.

6.1.3 Note, if disease is confirmed on common land, the common would be treated as an IP and the same restrictions would be applied as for farmed pig premises. This may extend to restrictions on in-by land.

6.2 Overview of controls at an IP

6.2.1 Actions at premises where disease is confirmed are, in summary:

- The IP will be placed under restrictions prohibiting the movement of things (animals, vehicles and other fomites) liable to transmit disease on and off the premises;.
- In order to eradicate CSF, pigs at the IP will be culled and resultant risk material disposed of safely and the owner will be compensated for animals slaughtered;.
- Semen, ova and embryos at the premises will be destroyed.
- Any other things at the premises likely to harbour disease will be disposed of or cleansed and disinfected.
- Preliminary cleansing and disinfection (C&D) is completed once culling is completed and carcasses removed.
- Secondary C&D is completed as directed by Animal Health.
- Further epidemiological investigations will take place to establish how long disease has been present, the likely source and whether disease originated at the premises or whether disease originated from elsewhere.
- Animals, vehicles and other fomites that may have brought disease to the premises or taken disease out of the premises will be traced and investigations undertaken at the contact premises. These contact premises may be placed under restrictions.
- Once all cleansing is complete and other conditions are met, restrictions at the premises may be eased.
- If intending to restock, the premises will remain under restrictions until it has been through repopulation and testing procedures (as described in 6.12).

6.3 Movement and access controls at IP

6.3.1 Where CSF is confirmed pigs, carcasses or *anything* suspected of being infected with CSF must not be moved.

- 6.3.2 Once assessed by an Animal Health veterinary inspector (VI), the movement of people, vehicles, equipment or other animals (excluding pigs) on and off the premises may be licensed.
- 6.3.3 Footpaths will be closed on IPs. They may in some circumstances be closed around an IP if veterinary risk assessment determines this to be appropriate.
- 6.3.4 Upon entry and prior to leaving the premises any vehicles allowed to move will require cleansing and disinfection.

6.4 Slaughter of pigs at an IP

6.4.1 Where disease is found on a premises:

- all pigs on the IP will be culled, whether or not they currently show signs of disease, as soon as possible
- culling is usually undertaken by licensed slaughter-men under the supervision of a veterinary surgeon
- pigs on dangerous contact premises will be killed where the risk of exposure to the disease is high
- carcasses will be destroyed under official supervision (incineration being the first choice; rendering is the next option with other disposal routes available subject to public health, environmental and land use/planning considerations)

6.5 Destruction of semen, ova and embryos

- 6.5.1 Semen, ova and embryos of pigs collected from the premises during the period between the probable introduction of disease on to the premises and the taking of official measures shall be traced and destroyed under official supervision in such a way as to avoid the risk of spread of virus.

6.6 Cleansing and disinfection (C&D)

- 6.6.1 C&D of premises, vehicles, equipment and anything likely to have been contaminated with CSF will be carried out under the supervision of a VI and in accordance with his instructions. Disinfection must be carried out with a disinfectant approved for use in GB¹⁰.
- 6.6.2 Vehicles on the premises will need to be unloaded and/or cleansed and disinfected (this may be under the supervision of a VI). Vehicles on the premises will remain there until they have completed full C&D and been licensed to move off the premises by Animal Health.
- 6.6.3 Any equipment, bedding etc from the IP will either be destroyed under official supervision or have full C&D. Parts of the premises that cannot be cleansed and disinfected will remain under restriction for an extended period, until notified by the VI.

¹⁰ Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectant) (England) Order 2007, Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectant) (Scotland) Order 2008, Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectant) (Wales) Order 2007

- 6.6.4 There will be some items that cannot be cleansed, disinfected and re-used, for example contaminated feed, farm waste products and slurry. In this case the items will have to be destroyed or disposed of appropriately. For instance, manure and used bedding should be stacked, sprayed with disinfectant and left for at least 42 days or destroyed by burning or burying. Slurry from an IP should be stored for at least 42 days after the last addition of infective material. A reduced storage period may be allowed if an official veterinarian has given instructions to treat the slurry in some way first. Slurry from an IP should not be used for spreading.
- 6.6.5 Primary C&D is undertaken and funded by Government. This involves a full cleansing and spray down with approved disinfectant of the areas in which infected animals have been and the areas used for culling.
- 6.6.6 Owners are responsible for undertaking and paying for secondary C&D, irrespective of whether or not they intend to restock the premises.

6.7 Tracing of dangerous contacts

- 6.7.1 The movement of pigs, other animals, people, vehicles and other fomites on or off the premises prior to the first identified case will be traced. The period under review will be prescribed by epidemiological evidence. Backward tracings are intended to identify the likely course of disease and forward tracings to identify where it may have been transmitted.
- 6.7.2 The extent of the investigation on the contact premises (to which pigs are traced and identified as having originated from the farm of origin) will be assessed using a risk-based approach. The following actions may be taken:
- The contact premises will be placed under restrictions and monitored for a specified period of time.
 - Traced pigs will be clinically examined (and others inspected or examined);
 - Samples from traced pigs will be submitted for CSF testing.
 - The clinical and movement records of the traced animals will be reviewed;
 - Subsequent re-testing should take place if epidemiological evidence suggests that this is appropriate.
 - Movement restrictions will be put in place as appropriate.
 - Semen, ova and embryos that have moved during the period disease may have been present will be traced (and may be destroyed as appropriate).
- 6.7.3 If considered to be a high risk, the pigs at the premises can be culled out as a consequence of being dangerous contacts (as described in section 4.6).

6.8 Tracing of meat from animals slaughtered in risk period

- 6.8.1 The CSF virus remains active for months in pig meat products and is a source of spread in pigs. Where pigs were moved from the IP to slaughter in a risk period (prior to disease restrictions being imposed) and therefore may have been diseased, the meat from these pigs will be traced, withdrawn and disposed of. Animal products potentially infected with CSF shall be disposed of as category 2 animal by-product.

6.8.2 The food business operator and MHS official veterinarian will be notified by Animal Health that the slaughterhouse has received pigs from an IP and the products from these pigs must be withdrawn and disposed of. The food business operator is responsible for disposing of the carcass/meat and if it has left the premises notifying the recipient they have similar responsibilities to dispose of the meat or notify other premises if the meat has moved. Records must be kept for inspection. Current guidance is that meat must be withdrawn as far as retail shelves but not from end consumers.

6.8.3 Compensation is not payable for products withdrawn under these animal products legislation¹¹.

6.9 Control measures at establishments

6.9.1 Where disease is confirmed at a slaughterhouse, knackers yard or game handling establishment, special measures will apply. Any pigs will be slaughtered without delay and the meat detained and kept separate from other meat. All meat at the premises will temporarily be detained until the veterinary inspector has assessed the risk of the meat being contaminated with CSF. Where there is no disease risk meat may be released otherwise it will be detained pending test results. Where disease is confirmed the FBO will be required to dispose of the affected meat as category 2 animal by-product. The veterinary inspector will direct what actions are needed, including C&D.

6.9.2 Unless the establishment turned out to be the disease source it is likely restrictions will be lifted quickly and the establishment will be allowed to recommence operations (although restrictions cannot be lifted until 24 hours after C&D is completed).

6.9.3 Since the establishment is unlikely to be the disease source, whilst investigations are undertaken, restriction notices may be served upon premises which were the source of the animals or may have directly or indirectly had contact with the animals or vehicle.

6.10 Control measures at animal gatherings

6.10.1 Where disease is confirmed at a market, show or other animal gathering, the gathering premises will be placed under restrictions. If the premises is assessed to be suitable, culling of pigs will take place at the gathering.

6.10.2 Non-swine species may be licensed off the premises by a VI, subject to appropriate biosecurity protocols, including C&D of vehicles at the destination premises. If pigs are present or kept at the destination premises the premises may be placed under restrictions for a period to ensure disease is not introduced.

6.10.3 Since the gathering is unlikely to be the disease source, all pig movements will be traced back to identify the source. Source premises may be placed

¹¹ The Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) (England) Regulations 2008 (as amended), The Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) (Scotland) Order 2008 (as amended), The Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) (Wales) Regulations 2008 (as amended)

under restrictions pending the outcome of investigations.

6.11 Compensation

6.11.1 In accordance with Schedule 3 of the Animal Health Act compensation for an animal infected with CSF will be at half its value immediately prior to infection. For pigs slaughtered in order to control CSF the compensation will be the value of the animal immediately prior to slaughter.

6.11.2 Premises culled out as a dangerous contact premises would normally be eligible for compensation for animals slaughtered. AH maintains a list of approved valuers. Only approved valuers may value animals slaughtered for the control of CSF.

6.11.3 Compensation is not available for consequential losses. Compensation is not payable for meat disposed of under the Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) Regulations 2008.

6.12 Repopulation of premises

6.12.1 Pigs may be reintroduced on to premises no sooner than 30 days after the satisfactory completion of secondary C&D.

6.12.2 For open air holdings, the reintroduction of pigs will start with sentinel pigs that should have tested negative for CSF antibodies (or come from premises not subjected to restrictions because of CSF) and be re-tested (serology tested) at a defined period (depending on circumstances) after being placed on the premises. If the second tests prove negative for CSF antibodies restrictions will be lifted and full repopulation may commence.

6.12.3 For holdings where the pigs are kept indoors, the reintroduction should start with sentinel pigs or total repopulation can take place, provided that:

- all pigs arrive within 20 days (and come from holdings not subjected to any restrictions related to CSF)
- pigs are serology tested for CSF at least 40 days after the last pigs arrived

6.12.4 If more than six months have elapsed since the completion of necessary C&D, and epidemiological evidence supports it, the premises may be repopulated without testing, subject to authorisation. However, since disease freedom requires full C&D of a pig premises (see Section 11.1 for further details) it is unlikely any premises will be authorised to repopulate without completing C&D due to the countrywide implications for trade.

6.13 Communications

6.13.1 Once disease is confirmed, steps are taken locally to ensure that everyone in and around an infected premises is made aware of the restrictions and requirements in force there. This may include displaying notices and signs as necessary.

6.13.2 General information will be made available to pig keepers explaining what happens if disease is confirmed on their holding.

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7 Measures in Disease Control Zones

7.1 Disease control zone definitions

- 7.1.1 Where disease is confirmed at an infected premises (IP), there is an increased risk of disease spreading to pig premises in the vicinity. Therefore, protection and surveillance zones (PZ & SZ) are declared around the IP in line with EU obligations. The aim of these zones is to reduce the likelihood of onward spread of disease.
- 7.1.2 The PZ will be a minimum radius of 3km around the IP and the SZ will be a minimum radius of 10km from the IP.
- 7.1.3 Where new IPs are detected within an existing PZ/ SZ, the zones will be reshaped and extended as necessary to comply with the minimum size requirements as set out in legislation. They may be sized larger than the minimum size where this improves disease control or improves practical control on the ground.
- 7.1.4 If an IP is detected in a geographically distinct area a new PZ/SZ will be declared.

National Movement Ban

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Imposition of a ban on movements of pigs across GB is not proposed for CSF. The nature of CSF suggests a short lived ban adds little benefit in terms of disease control. The practical impacts on industry of a longer ban, and the complexities of determining when the ban should be lifted, argue against any other national movement ban at the start of an outbreak of CSF.

- 7.1.5 It is possible to envisage a situation where normal disease control zones fail to halt spread and further control measures may be needed. In these circumstances, EC may discuss with the GB government the need for additional safeguards to protect wider trade. Such a measure may prohibit export of pigs and/ or pig products from an area outside the PZ/SZ.
- 7.1.6 Appropriate controls to halt further spread may be achieved through temporary movement restrictions over a wider area. In this restricted zone the movement of pigs and/or pig products would be controlled but low risk movements could be licensed. The restricted zone would remain in place until a veterinary risk assessment determines that it is no longer required.
- 7.1.7 The same effect could be achieved by extending the surveillance zone. However, this zone cannot then be lifted (or shrunk) until surveillance of all premises in the extended zone has been completed. The most appropriate approach will be determined by the specific outbreak circumstances.
- 7.1.8 The focus of this section is on controls in the PZ and SZ. Other types of control zones (and related measures) are covered in other sections of this strategy, in particular:

- section 4.7 covers temporary control zones on suspicion of disease
- section 9.5 and 9.7 covers Feral Pig Control zones, where disease is suspected or confirmed in feral pigs
- section 10.3 covers vaccination zones

7.2 Movement prohibitions and derogations in control zones

7.2.1 CSF legislation requires controls on the movement of certain animals, genetic material, animal products, meat and fomites (an inanimate object which may transmit disease). The aim of these movement restrictions is to prevent the spread of infection. Section 2 of this document described typical phases of an outbreak.

7.2.2 During the early phase of an outbreak (described as detection phase in Section 2.4) very tight controls are necessary to prevent spread of, as yet undetected disease. Generally no derogations from these controls will be allowed in this phase. Whilst new infected premises continue to be identified in the area (and potentially elsewhere in the country) the veterinary situation will remain uncertain.

7.2.3 Over time the disease situation stabilises and confidence in the situation in that area increases (described as the Disease Stability Phase in Section 2.4). Once in the disease stability phase and taking account of a number of factors, including the epidemiological situation in the area and nationally, and progress with tracings and other measures, a decision may be taken centrally that some control measures in the area may be eased. The EC Directive is quite restrictive in what movements may be allowed and the earliest time at which restrictions may be eased.

7.2.4 This easing is in the form of derogations from the movement restrictions, either a Specific Licence issued to authorise a specific movement (normally via the local disease control centre), or a General Licence allowing all movements of a certain type. Licences may include conditions with which the licensee must comply.

7.2.5 There is no clear cut stage when there is a move from Detection to Stability phase and further disease cases may require a move back to the more restrictive Detection phase.

7.2.6 For many of these derogations, EC law sets out minimum periods for allowing movements. Generally this means, even if the Disease Stability phase was reached earlier, no movements will be authorised in the protection zone before 30 days have elapsed since preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the IP, or 21 days in the surveillance zone.

7.2.7 The following paragraphs consider the prohibitions that apply to various scenarios and include comment on the derogations that may become available. Section 11.1 describes what conditions need to be met in order to lift the control zones

7.3 Movement restrictions and licences – live pigs

7.3.1 Pigs cannot be moved off or onto premises in the PZ or SZ.

7.3.2 Derogations may become available during the Disease Stability phase for movement of pigs off premises in the PZ or SZ:

- for immediate slaughter
- to another premises within the same zone, if welfare problems cannot be alleviated by management or husbandry practices at the premises
- for culling and movement of the carcase to a rendering plant for processing
- pigs may be licensed from outside the control zones onto premises within zones. However, any increase in the numbers of the susceptible pigs in a control zone is undesirable and would only be authorised in very exceptional circumstances

7.3.3 Generally these derogations will not be available unless:

- 30 days have elapsed since cleansing and disinfection at the infected premises (21 days if premises is located in the SZ)
- a premises has been in a PZ or SZ for more than 30 days because of further outbreaks in the zone, and welfare problems at the premises cannot be alleviated by management or husbandry practices
- a serious welfare situation has arisen at a premises as a result of a situation that could not be reasonably anticipated (force majeure), such as serious flooding then in exceptional circumstances a special licensed movement may be granted prior to these time periods

7.3.4 Pigs may be moved within a premises as long as they do not cross a public or private road. No derogation for such movement is required.

7.3.5 Movements across roads are prohibited, even where the land belongs to the same pig holding. However, it is recognised this will present practical difficulties to some pig holdings, therefore, before the above time periods have elapsed, and taking account of the local disease situation (and as necessary following a risk assessment by official vets) we may consider the following:

- a derogation to allow the movement of pigs directly across a public or private road that divides two contiguous pieces of land that belong to the same pig holding;
- on a case-by-case basis a derogation to allow the movement of pigs *along* a road between two pieces of contiguous land of the same pig holding.

7.3.6 Movement along a road between two pieces of non-contiguous land is not permitted. However, exceptionally on a case-by-case basis where the movement is local, between non-contiguous land belonging to the same holding and does not pass any other pig premises a move of this nature may be considered but is likely to require a specific risk assessment by an official vet.

7.3.7 All movement derogations will require a licence which will be subject to conditions and in all instances pigs must be transported by vehicle and effective biosecurity practice adopted.

7.4 Movement restrictions and licences – other (non-porcine) animals

7.4.1 Non-porcine animals are prohibited from leaving premises in the PZ/SZ where pigs are also kept. Movements may be licensed during all phases of the outbreak but will be subjected to conditions to ensure the movement does not spread CSF.

7.5 Movement restrictions and licences – genetic material

7.5.1 Movement of semen, ova or embryos off premises in the PZ or SZ is prohibited. There are no powers to license such movements.

7.5.2 There are no prohibitions on the movement of genetic material onto a pig premises in the zone.

7.6 Movement restrictions and licences – carcasses, pig products and waste

7.6.1 Movement of dead stock off pig premises in a PZ/SZ is prohibited but may be licensed in the Disease Stability phase, provided they are clean carcasses.

7.6.2 Manure and slurry and other pig waste cannot be moved off a pig premises but may be licensed for transport for disposal. The transport vehicle must be leak proof and the destination must be approved for handling the waste.

7.6.3 Muck spreading will be prohibited.

7.7 Movement restrictions and licences – vehicles

7.7.1 Trucks and vehicles that have carried live pigs are prohibited from leaving premises in the PZ/SZ unless they have undergone cleansing and disinfection (C&D). In the PZ, C&D must be inspected and authorised by a Veterinary Inspector (VI).

7.7.2 Such vehicles can continue to be used within the premises.

7.8 Movement restrictions and licences – feed

7.8.1 Feed should not be moved off a pig holding, unless the feed mill is a separate epidemiological unit. This will be determined by a VI.

7.8.2 Transportation of feed in the PZ/SZ is not prohibited but deliveries should avoid entry to pig premises. Best practice C&D should be employed both on entry and exit. Deliveries should be scheduled to high health status premises before other premises.

7.9 Biosecurity at pig premises

7.9.1 The movement control measures on pigs, vehicles and other material likely to

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spread CSF significantly reduce the risk of disease entering or leaving premises in the zones. Good practice within the premises should continue to be employed. As usual good personal biosecurity should be maintained.

- 7.9.2 Outdoor pigs are at greater risk of exposure to disease incursion from wildlife (including feral pigs in some areas), public access and other fomites making physical contact with outdoor pigs should be in place. Whilst pigs infected with CSF do not produce an aerial plume of virus, infected outdoor pigs would still pose a risk of onward transmission of disease in the same way disease may get in. Thus during an outbreak of disease, outdoor units are encouraged to upgrade their biosecurity and access controls and to seek to separate their pigs from wildlife threats.

7.10 Control of Establishments (slaughterhouse and meat processors)

- 7.10.1 Pigs originating outside the PZ/SZ and slaughtered at a slaughterhouse outside the PZ/SZ will not be subject to any additional controls. There is no requirement for the slaughterhouse to be designated or for the meat to be controlled or (heat) treated. The normal practice of allowing C&D of vehicles away from the slaughterhouse may be suspended if the disease situation justifies this.

- 7.10.2 The movement of pigs from outside the PZ/SZ to a slaughterhouse located within the zones may be licensed from early in the outbreak (including during the Detection phase) as the movement is from a low risk disease area to a slaughterhouse for immediate slaughter. Slaughterhouse operating within a control zone must be designated, and if located within the PZ approval of the EC Standing Veterinary Committee¹² will be sought. However, there are no controls on meat produced from pigs originating from outside the zones. The normal practice of allowing C&D of vehicles away from the slaughterhouse will be suspended in these circumstances.

- 7.10.3 It will be a condition of the movement licence for pigs coming from inside the zones for slaughter that the slaughterhouse must be designated to receive such animals. There is no requirement to control premises receiving carcasses or meat from animals originating outside the PZ/SZ but slaughtered within the PZ/SZ.

- 7.10.4 Once pigs originating from within the PZ/SZ are allowed to slaughter they must go to a slaughterhouse designated to slaughter animals from the PZ/SZ. Ideally the slaughterhouse will be located within the PZ/SZ, but regardless of location it must be designated. This is controlled under animal products legislation (see 6.8.3) and will also be a movement licence condition.

- 7.10.5 Where slaughterhouses requiring designation (either located within a PZ or SZ to process pigs originating from outside the zones, or any slaughterhouse wishing to handle pigs originating from within the PZ/SZ), they must have certain capabilities, such as suitable C&D capacity. The Meat Hygiene

¹² The EC Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health (SCoFCAH). This may change under the Lisbon Treaty.

Service will undertake inspection of the establishment and make recommendations on whether the establishment should be designated.

7.10.6 Meat produced from pigs originating from the PZ/SZ (regardless of where they were slaughtered) is “Restricted Meat”. Such meat receives a special mark and cannot be sold fresh. It must be treated at a designated treatment centre and prior to treatment only handled at designated premises.

7.10.7 Once the PZ/SZ are lifted, pigs from those areas become free to be slaughtered in the same way as any other pig from outside a PZ/SZ and meat from pigs slaughtered after zones are lifted can be traded freely. However, meat from animals slaughtered from the PZ/SZ prior to the zones lifting remains restricted and must continue to be handled at designated premises and must be (heat) treated.

7.10.8 Note, in some circumstances the European Commission may take additional safeguard measures that apply to pigs, pork and pork products produced within the GB/UK or a region of the UK. Should this happen, additional measures, such as special marking and trade restrictions may be imposed. Where a special stamp is proposed to indicate meat is restricted to the domestic market, it is likely a round stamp will be adopted. These requirements will be communicated at the time the Commission take such safeguard measures.

7.11 Control of animal gatherings

7.11.1 No gatherings will be allowed in the PZ or SZ to have pigs present. Gatherings of other species may be allowed subject to appropriate biosecurity and being separated from any pig premises such that there is no risk of disease spread.

7.11.2 If at the time a PZ/SZ is declared, a market, show or other gathering has pigs present, movements on and off that premises will be prohibited. During this time the gathering is treated like any other premises, and animal gatherings have contingency plans in place in order to care for animals during this time.

7.11.3 Non-swine animals at the gathering will be allowed to leave the gathering fairly quickly, subject to appropriate C&D measures. If the animals return to a farm where pigs are present, the pigs at the premises may be placed under 20 day stand-still restrictions and their health monitored for signs of CSF.

7.11.4 Approximately 48 hours is needed to allow a preliminary assessment of the disease situation. Subject to veterinary risk considerations and licensing by a VI, pigs may then be licensed to leave the gathering and move to the farm of origin, farm of a new owner, or to slaughter as requested by the pig keeper/owner. On arrival at the receiving premises, all pigs will be put under a 20 day standstill and placed under observation for signs of CSF.

7.12 Surveillance and epidemiological investigations

7.12.1 Within the PZ and SZ, surveillance will be undertaken to assess the extent of

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lateral spread from the IP. The methodology will be determined taking into account consideration of existing epidemiological evidence available. If surveillance identifies further suspect premises confirmed they will be handled as described in Section 4.

7.12.2 Surveillance will be assisted by use of data from various sources on the location of registered pig keepers. However, this will be supplemented by foot patrols to identify any other pig keepers in the area.

7.12.3 Similarly, data on feral pig populations will be considered and as necessary supplemented by visits by feral pig experts.

7.12.4 Virological and serological surveillance may be carried out for epidemiological purposes and to support declaring previously infected areas free from disease.

7.12.5 Veterinary visits of all premises with pigs in the area will take place, to provide advice, to check for disease, and after a certain period to ensure the premises has remained disease free prior to lifting of control zones.

7.12.6 Such data will also be of value to disease modellers and experts to provide advice to veterinary and policy teams. The National Emergency Epidemiological Group (NEEG) will use the evidence obtained from all sources to assess:

- the possible origin of the infection
- the period during which CSF may have been present on the premises prior to detection
- the risk of disease dispersal through movement of pigs, personnel, vehicles, carcasses, meat, or any other material which may have transported virus from the premises
- the risk of other premises that might be infected

7.12.7 The role of NEEG will also include:

- the provision of epidemiological advice and assessment on the determinants, level and distribution of the disease to the National Experts Group and other groups and the UK Chief Veterinary Officer to inform decisions on disease control and prevention measures including vaccination and surveillance
- to deliver epidemiological modelling
- to design surveillance plans and analysis of these surveillance outcomes

7.13 Communications

7.13.1 A communication programme will be delivered to inform keepers/owners of susceptible animals, veterinarians and other stakeholders of:

- the disease situation
- measures being implemented
- advice on clinical signs of disease

7.14 Impact of controls

- 7.14.1 The restrictions set out in this will impact on day-to-day farm business operations. These measures are necessary to reduce the risk of disease spread and therefore reduce the overall size and duration of an outbreak. These controls are set out here to allow government, delivery agents, pig producers and processors and related sectors to prepare contingency plans in advance of any outbreak of CSF. Such action can help alleviate the overall impact on businesses and will help manage expectations.
- 7.14.2 It is recognised that, due to the nature and structure of pig production systems in GB, movement restrictions will have different impacts depending on the structure and set-up of different operations. Controls may affect the businesses ability to move pigs in and out of farrowing, to move weaned pigs to growing accommodation or to move finished pigs to slaughter.
- 7.14.3 This strategy is not intended to directly address such impacts. However, Government and industry are committed to working through mitigating and contingency actions that might alleviate some of the pressures during an outbreak. Pig producers and processors are encouraged to put in place appropriate contingency plans. Government will be working with its delivery agents to ensure they are adequately prepared to respond effectively.

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8 Breeds at risk and other specialist pigs

8.1 Defining breeds at risk and other specialist pigs

8.1.1 CSF disease controls could have a direct impact on the survival of various pig breeds at risk (i.e. numerically rare pigs). Diverse genetic resources are important for maintaining an efficient and sustainable farming industry, and they allow the development of breeds to cope with new demands e.g. climate change. In addition, the UK government has international obligations to conserve agricultural diversity. Pigs bred for scientific, research, display or educational purposes (such as zoos or wildlife parks) are similarly important resources. For ease of reference, these pigs will be referred to as “breeds at risk or other specialist pigs”.

8.1.2 Pig breeds at risk have been defined in the UK Country Report on Farm Animal Genetic Resources published in 2002 and this list is kept up-to-date by relevant experts. During an outbreak, a proposal to exempt a breed not on the current list may be referred to experts such as the National Standing Committee on Farm Animal Genetics for advice.

8.2 Responsibilities when CSF is not present

8.2.1 It is essential that the keepers of breeds at risk or other specialist pigs adopt effective biosecurity and hygiene at all times in order to minimise the risk of incursion of any animal disease (be it endemic or exotic).

8.3 General measures during a CSF outbreak

8.3.1 EC law allows Member States to consider derogating from culling of breeds at risk and the other categories of specialist pigs defined in point 8.1.1 provided that disease control is not jeopardised. As detailed below, such exemptions will be considered in exceptional circumstances on a case-by-case basis and will place obligations on the pig keeper to put in place specified mitigating measures to minimise any disease risks the exemption creates.

8.3.2 It is the responsibility of the pig keeper to notify the veterinary inspector if breeds at risk (or other specialist animals) are present on a suspect or contact premises.

Information on the FMD Breeds at Risk Register¹³ will also be available to Animal Health and therefore keepers of pig breeds at risk are advised to register their premises on this database.

8.3.3 It is important to note that any exemption from culling applies only to pigs eligible for special measures on the premises; other pigs on the same premises would not be exempt from culling.

¹³ <http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodfarm/farmanimal/diseases/atoz/fmd/about/riskreg.htm>

8.4 Premises in control zones

- 8.4.1 The movement controls described in Section 7 will apply to breeds at risk and other specialist pigs (i.e. no special measures apply). It is therefore important for owners of such pigs to develop appropriate contingency plans.

8.5 Dangerous contact premises

- 8.5.1 Section 4.6 describes how some premises may be identified as dangerous contacts due to epidemiological links (i.e. tracings of pig movements or proximity to an infected premises). Where the risk of exposure of pigs to CSF is considered to be high, pigs may be pre-emptively culled in order to limit the risk of further disease spread.
- 8.5.2 Breeds at risk and other specialist pigs may be exempted from the cull of animals on such dangerous contact premises where it does not undermine disease control aims. However, suitable isolation facilities must be available on farm to house pigs spared from any cull, and strict biosecurity protocols must be followed to ensure that disease control is not jeopardised. The measures put in place need to be appropriate to prevent any spread of CSF virus (either entering or leaving the isolation facilities).
- 8.5.3 The decision to spare any pig from culling would be taken by the relevant Minister, informed by veterinary risk assessment and other expert advice.
- 8.5.4 When a decision is taken to spare animals on a premises, the veterinary inspector will send a notice to the occupier of the premises on which they are kept detailing the biosecurity arrangements that the occupier must follow to minimise the risk of spread of disease. Any non-compliance with conditions could lead to an immediate withdrawal of the exemption and the culling of pigs.
- 8.5.5 The spared pigs will be required to be regularly inspected and tested for CSF before, during and after completion of the isolation period to determine the disease status of the pigs through-out.
- 8.5.6 Measures will be lifted following veterinary risk assessment on a case-by-case basis. If at any stage CSF is confirmed at the premises, it will become an Infected Premises (IP). The procedures in section 6 will apply unless exemptions in section 8.7 are agreed.

8.6 Suspicion of CSF

- 8.6.1 If CSF is already confirmed in the country, and the clinical signs are such that disease is highly likely at the suspect premises, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) may decide that pigs on the premises should be slaughtered on suspicion of CSF instead of waiting for disease to be confirmed. Where the CVO is made aware of the presence of breeds at risk or other specialist animals at such a premises it is likely these pigs will be spared from being slaughtered on suspicion of CSF but the premises would remain under strict biosecurity restrictions whilst laboratory results are awaited.

8.7 Confirmation of CSF

8.7.1 EC law requires pigs at an IP to be culled quickly. However, in exceptional circumstances, breeds at risk or other specialist pigs may be exempted from such culling, provided disease control is not jeopardised. Isolation facilities will need to be available on farm to house pigs spared from any cull, and strict biosecurity protocols must be followed to ensure that disease control is not jeopardised.

8.7.2 The decision to spare a pig from culling on an IP would be taken by the relevant Minister. The decision will take into account a variety of factors including a veterinary risk assessment, expert advice (e.g. on farm animal genetic resources) and wider risks and impacts such as trade impacts and the need to extend the time that disease control measures remain in place and delays to lifting control zones. The Commission would be immediately notified of such a decision and would review the situation with the EC Standing Veterinary Committee¹⁴. The Commission may impose additional safeguards on GB or an area of GB.

8.7.3 Pigs spared from the cull will be required to be regularly inspected and tested before, during and after completion of the period of isolation to determine the disease status of the pigs through-out.

8.7.4 A decision to spare pigs at an IP will only be taken in exceptional circumstances. It is highly unlikely pigs infected with the CSF would be spared from culling.

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¹⁴ The EC Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health (SCoFCAH). This may change under the Lisbon Treaty.

9 Pigs living in the wild

9.1 General points on CSF and feral pigs

- 9.1.1 Wild boar and other feral pigs are susceptible to CSF and therefore could potentially have a role in disease spread. Once CSF is in feral pigs there is a risk of dispersal of disease over wider areas and introduction from feral pigs into other domestic pig premises. Under EC law, the UK is obliged to eradicate any incursion of CSF into feral pigs and until this is complete there are likely to be trade implications. Once CSF has entered feral pigs, demonstrating disease freedom in these wild populations is inherently more difficult than at a closed pig premises.
- 9.1.2 The wild boar situation in GB varies significantly from the rest of Europe in terms of population size, land management practices and natural environments. In GB there are only small populations of feral pigs (the largest is estimated at 200 animals, the other feral pig populations are smaller¹⁵). The rest of Europe has much larger populations of feral pigs and there is a risk of spread of disease along very large corridors of forest containing feral pigs. In addition, the rest of Europe has a significantly larger hunting industry compared to that in GB.
- 9.1.3 A qualitative veterinary risk assessment on the likelihood and impacts of transmission of CSF between free-ranging wild boar and domestic pigs concluded that, whilst there are various potential routes for CSF to be introduced into feral pigs, including the consumption of infected pork products that have been illegally imported, the most likely route of introduction is from infected domestic pigs¹⁶. Therefore, the risk of introduction into feral pigs can be mitigated by maintaining and enforcing current disease control procedures and maximising biosecurity on domestic pig holdings.
- 9.1.4 The keeping of wild boar is covered by the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976 and therefore a licence is required from the local authority that will set out the conditions necessary to ensure the animals are kept securely. The release of wild boar is not condoned by Government and would be a breach of the licence conditions. Furthermore, wild boar will be added to Schedule 9 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (to come into force on 6th April 2010). This will make it illegal to release or to allow wild boar to escape into the wild.
- 9.1.5 When CSF is absent from the UK, wild boar management policy does not require the eradication of feral pigs. Local communities and individual landowners have primary responsibility for feral wild boar management, including population control. Where practical, Government will facilitate this regional management through the provision of advice and guidance.

¹⁵ Defra Wild Boar Action Plan (2008) available from:

<http://www.naturalengland.org.uk/ourwork/regulation/wildlife/species/wildboar.aspx#status>

¹⁶ Hartley, M (2009) Qualitative risk assessment of the role of the feral wild boar (*Sus scrofa*) in the likelihood of incursion and the impacts on effective disease control of selected exotic diseases in England. *European Journal Wildlife Research* DOI 10.1007/s10344-009-0334-8

9.1.6 In order to assess the likelihood of feral pigs being involved in an outbreak, information on the location of feral pig populations is collated as normal business practice and made available to experts at the start of any outbreak.

9.2 Presence of feral pigs in protection or surveillance zones

9.2.1 Regardless of whether or not disease is suspected in feral pigs, whenever there is an incursion of CSF into domestic pigs, epidemiologists will quickly require information on the presence or otherwise of feral pigs in and around protection and surveillance zones to assess their potential role in the specific incursion and/ or to model potential spread.

9.2.2 The veterinary officer's inspection of the infected premises will include an assessment of whether there is any sign of feral pigs being involved in the disease incursion.

9.2.3 Relevant bodies (e.g. Natural England (NE) for England, Science and Advice for Scottish Agriculture (SASA) for Scotland) will be immediately consulted to advise if wild boar population data indicate that feral pigs are present within the protection and surveillance zones. A field inspection may also be undertaken to provide additional evidence on the presence/ absence of wild boar in domestic pig control zones.

9.2.4 If feral pigs are determined to be present within the protection or surveillance zones, an emergency meeting of the Feral Pig Expert Group would be convened immediately to:

- agree necessary actions to improve information on the wild boar population numbers, density and distribution
- to start to consider the likely size of a Feral Pig Investigation Zone in case CSF were to be suspected in feral pigs

9.2.5 Passive surveillance of feral pigs (i.e. testing of feral pigs found dead or shot) and other monitoring as necessary will be carried out in domestic pig protection and surveillance zones.

9.2.6 Ordinarily the size of the domestic pig protection or surveillance zones would not be defined by the presence of feral pig populations. However, if further infected premises are identified in the area with no clear link and epidemiologists cannot rule out feral pigs involvement in spread, expert advice will be sought on whether the shape or size of the protection and surveillance zones should be changed to take account of the feral pig population.

9.2.7 Experts advise that the indiscriminate killing or taking of feral pigs without appropriate controls will risk both the dispersal of feral pigs (risking the spread of undetected disease) and carcasses not being presented for examination. Therefore the killing or taking of wild boar would be prohibited in surveillance and protection zones but allowed under licence on pig farm premises to prevent an incursion by feral pigs.

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9.3 Detecting CSF in feral pigs

9.3.1 Under the current surveillance programmes for wildlife, any unusual mortality or disease observed in feral pigs would be investigated in consultation with the relevant administration within GB (see below for details). Also the Meat Hygiene Service inspects carcasses of shot feral pigs presented at game handling establishments and any suspect cases would be followed up through the normal “report cases” system. No further disease surveillance in feral pig populations is intended when CSF is absent from the UK.

9.4 Suspicion of CSF in feral pigs

9.4.1 The following scenarios are considered:

9.4.2 CSF is not present in domestic pigs in GB but unusual mortality or signs of disease are observed in feral pigs;

9.4.3 CSF is present in domestic pigs in GB in the area.

9.4.4 Scenario a) - CSF is not present in domestic pigs in GB but unusual mortality or signs of disease are observed in feral pigs. Unusual mortality or disease was observed in feral pigs, would be investigated in consultation with the relevant administration within GB. However, the most likely route of introduction of CSF into feral pigs is considered to be via domestic pigs and therefore vigilance in domestic populations is considered the most appropriate route to identify the first case of CSF in GB.

9.4.5 Scenario b) - CSF is present in domestic pigs in GB. CSF would be suspected in feral pigs in or around a protection or surveillance zone if:

- feral pigs or fresh evidence of feral pigs were seen on an infected premises during the period a veterinary inspector suspects disease may have been present or introduced
- there was other strong epidemiological evidence

9.5 A Feral Pig Investigation Zone

9.5.1 On officially suspecting CSF in feral pigs, a Feral Pig Investigation Zone (FPIZ) would be declared by the relevant Minister (or nominated officer but not a local veterinary inspector).

9.5.2 The size of a FPIZ has to be considered on a case-by-case basis and will be determined through expert advice. Key factors in determining the size and boundaries of a FPIZ will be the feral pig population size and distribution as well as the surrounding habitat and geographical barriers.

9.5.3 All feral pigs shot or found dead within the FPIZ must be presented for testing.

9.5.4 It is unlikely sufficient carcasses will be found naturally to confirm whether disease is present or absent. Therefore, in order to move more rapidly from this uncertain stage, feral pigs will be tracked and killed by experts employed by Government delivery agents and then carcasses tested for CSF in order to

collect evidence of disease presence/ absence and to prevent any potential spread of undetected disease.

- 9.5.5 However, the taking or killing of feral pigs would otherwise be prohibited, except under licence on pig farm premises to prevent an incursion onto the premises by feral pigs (which could risk the introduction of disease). All feral pig carcasses must be presented for testing.
- 9.5.6 In certain circumstances, it may be considered proportionate to introduce similar controls on premises in a FPIZ as in a Feral Pig Infected Area (see paragraph 9.7 for full details of these controls) to reduce the risk of disease spreading to domestic pigs. Such a decision would depend on the epidemiological situation and would be based on expert advice.
- 9.5.7 The FPIZ will not be lifted until disease has been confirmed or negated in feral pigs. Disease will be negated based on epidemiological and expert advice taking into account the size of the feral population and its local structure, and the number of samples taken. On lifting of a FPIZ, expert advice will determine whether passive surveillance of feral pigs should continue in the area for a specified length of time.

9.6 Confirmation of CSF in feral pigs

- 9.6.1 The relevant Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) will confirm disease in feral pigs after laboratory confirmation of the presence of CSF virus and following a teleconference between GB CVOs. This will occur when feral pig samples result in positive laboratory test results for CSF virus and the CVO believes that CSF has entered and is circulating in the feral pig population. On confirming disease in feral pigs a Feral Pig Infected Area (FPIA) will be declared. The size of a FPIA will need to be determined based on expert advice and the local circumstances (see point 9.5.2 above).
- 9.6.2 A disease eradication plan will be developed. This may require further investigation on the ground and contribution from experts. However, it will be drawn up quickly with the intention of submitting it to the EC well within the EC requirement of 90 days from confirmation of the first case of CSF.
- 9.6.3 Disease eradication policy is to, as far as practical avoid dispersing disease beyond its current location. In order to eradicate disease and in-line with policy on domestic pig holdings, the policy is to cull feral pigs to eliminate disease using expert trappers/ hunters employed by Government delivery agents. Experts will advise on the most appropriate disease eradication methods for the particular location and feral population. However, vaccination will not lead to rapid eradication and given the long term trade impacts vaccination is not a method of choice.
- 9.6.4 The risk of incursion from feral to domestic pigs should be minimised. All premises with domestic pigs will be required to take full and appropriate precautions to prevent incursion of disease into the premises.
- 9.6.5 In order to reduce the risk of disease dispersal via feral pigs, the taking or

killing of feral pigs would be prohibited except on farm premises to protect stock from a feral pig incursion or killing by expert trappers/ hunters. Each carcass should be examined and tested for notifiable diseases by trained personnel (under veterinary supervision) and also retained whilst testing is undertaken so infected carcasses are not released. Infected carcasses will be rendered.

- 9.6.6 The meat from feral pigs from a FPIA that are confirmed free of CSF by testing, would be controlled, specially marked and treated (heat treated) prior to being allowed to enter the food chain.

9.7 Control Measures in a Feral Pig Infected Area

- 9.7.1 The following measures should be applied to premises in a FPIA to prevent disease incursion or spread in domestic pigs:

- Prevention of contact between feral and domestic pigs. All the pigs on the premises should be restricted to their living quarters or to some other part of the premises where they can be isolated from feral pigs and feral pigs should be prevented from gaining access to any material that might come into contact with the pigs on the premises.
- Restriction of pig movements - pigs should not be moved on to or off a premises unless this is licensed by a veterinary inspector;
- Appropriate means of disinfection should be provided and used at the entrances and exits of those parts of the holding in which pigs are being kept and of the holding itself.
- No carcass or any part of a feral pig should be brought on to a premises in the FPIA. In addition, no material or equipment which could have been in contact with a feral pig in the infected area should be brought on to a premises.
- In addition, the occupier of a premises must ensure that a census of pigs on the holding is kept up-to-date and provided when requested by a veterinary inspector (the first census may be based on an estimate for outdoor pig holdings).

- 9.7.2 Other controls in a FPIA will be:

- No pig, semen, ovum or embryo should be moved from the infected area except under licence (and under no circumstances would these be exported to other Member States).
- Any person who comes into contact with a feral pig in the infected area should take steps to ensure that he/she does not spread the disease.
- Any person who finds the carcass of a feral pig should immediately inform officials so that the carcass can be sampled and tested for CSF.

- 9.7.3 The FPIA would be lifted after disease eradication is completed but monitoring will continue in the area for at least 12 months commencing no earlier than 12 months after the last case of CSF in feral pigs in order to support disease freedom (see Section 11.4).

10 Vaccination

10.1 Legal obligations

10.1.1 Article 19 of EU Directive 2001/89/EC states that vaccination may be used to control disease where epidemiological data suggests CSF is likely to spread. If emergency vaccination is being considered, an emergency vaccination plan must be submitted to, and agreed by, the European Commission. A person may only administer CSF vaccine to a pig if authorised to do so by the relevant Minister.

10.2 Use of vaccination

10.2.1 Vaccination is not a routine control measure and is unlikely to be considered as an appropriate control measure in the initial stages, or during a controlled outbreak.

10.2.2 The use of vaccination may be considered during a prolonged epidemic, where there is a dramatic increase in the number of premises where disease is being confirmed each day, or in areas of very high pig density. Its most likely application is to reduce the risk of infection and spread prior to culling of pigs.

10.2.3 It is unlikely vaccination would ever be an appropriate control method in the small GB feral pig populations. However, in the exceptional circumstances that the existing policy is unsuccessful in controlling disease in pigs living in the wild (feral pigs) vaccination may be considered.

10.2.4 We will consider the case for (against) vaccination of breeds at risk on a case-by-case basis but only as part of an emergency vaccination plan.

10.2.5 Vaccine would be sourced from the EU bank.

10.3 Controls if vaccination is used

10.3.1 Vaccination zones would be put in place and some restrictions would apply primarily to control the application of vaccine and the movement of pigs out of the zone and to slaughter. Export restrictions would also apply to vaccinated pigs.

10.3.2 Meat from vaccinated pigs must be treated (cooked) and this may limit the market for meat from vaccinated pigs. It is therefore likely vaccination-to-live will only have commercial application for breeding pigs.

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11 Gaining disease freedom

11.1 Removal of the zones

11.1.1 Zones will remain in place until they are amended or repealed by Declaratory Order on behalf of the relevant Minister. This will require demonstration of disease freedom based on epidemiological evidence.

11.1.2 Protection zones will not be ended until:

- all necessary cleansing and disinfection (C&D) has been carried out at all infected premises in the zone to the satisfaction of a veterinary inspector
- pigs on all holdings have undergone clinical and laboratory examinations carried out in accordance with the diagnostic manual in order to detect the possible presence of CSF virus
- examinations in a protection zone should not take place until at least 30 days after the satisfactory completion of preliminary C&D on infected premises to which the zone relates

11.1.3 Surveillance zones will not be ended until:

- all necessary C&D has been carried out at all infected premises in the zone to the satisfaction of a veterinary inspector
- pigs on all holdings have undergone clinical and, where the inspector considers it necessary, laboratory examinations carried out in accordance with the diagnostic manual in order to detect the possible presence of CSF virus
- examinations in the surveillance zone should not take place until at least 20 days after the satisfactory completion of preliminary C&D on infected premises to which the zone relates

11.1.4 It is likely zones will remain in place for at least 2 months even for the smallest outbreaks and considerably longer if ongoing sporadic cases continue to appear in the area.

11.2 Trade

11.2.1 Trade within the EU is regulated and the restrictions only apply to pigs or pig products which come from the areas under restrictions. These restrictions lapse when the area restrictions are withdrawn subject to compliance with EC law.

11.2.2 Where safeguard measures have been imposed by the EC, evidence will be provided to the Commission to seek removal of these safeguards once the area restrictions have been lifted.

11.3 Attaining international CSF-free status

11.3.1 Countries may declare themselves free of CSF when they comply with the required measures. There is no requirement or specific procedure for

¹⁷ of disease freedom from CSF virus. The relevant epidemiological information must be provided to importing countries as proof of the disease situation. The data provided must conform to the standard measures contained in the *Terrestrial Animal Health Code*, which is recognised by the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) of the World Trade Organization.

11.4 Pigs living in the wild

11.4.1 If disease is found in pigs living in the wild, then special measures and monitoring must continue for at least 12 months from at least 12 months after the last confirmed case. The detailed arrangements for lifting zones and of continuing measures will be set out in an eradication plan submitted to and agreed by the Commission at the time of outbreak. If GB populations of feral pigs are too small to achieve the required level of testing, an alternative approach will be agreed via the EC Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health (SCoFCAH) to gain disease freedom.

11.4.2 The taking and killing of feral pigs may continue to be controlled for the duration of this surveillance to ensure that the remaining population does not move from the area and to ensure that all carcasses are submitted for testing.

11.4.3 If there is no evidence of pigs living in the wild around the infected premises or suspicion of them being implicated in the disease outbreak, there should be no requirement to demonstrate wildlife freedom.

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¹⁷ http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_statut.htm?e1d6

12 Glossary/ Acronyms

ADPG - Animal Disease Policy Group

AH - Animal Health

AI - Artificial insemination

ASF - African Swine Fever

C&D - Cleansing and disinfection

CSF - Classical Swine Fever

CVO - Chief Veterinary Officer

DCVO - Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer

EC/ EU - European Community/ European Union

Feral pigs- free-ranging wild boar, feral domestic pigs or feral hybrid pigs

Fomites - any object or material capable of carrying infectious agents such as CSF virus. For example, vehicles, equipment, feed stuffs, clothing, footwear etc. May also include scavenging animals, vermin etc.

FPIA - Feral pig infected area – legally an Infected Area declared as a result of disease in feral pigs

FPIZ - Feral pig investigation zone – declared where disease is suspected in feral pigs

GB - Great Britain

GIS - Geographical Information Systems

IA - Infected area

IP - Infected premises

MHS - Meat Hygiene Service

MS - Member States

NEEG - National Emergency Epidemiological Group

NDCC - National Disease Control Centre

OIE - Office International des Epizooties (World Organisation for Animal Health)

OV – MHS Official Veterinarian

Primary case - The case that introduces the disease into the population described

PZ - Protection Zone

Relevant Minister – Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers, or Welsh Ministers

SCoFAH - EC Standing Committee on Food Chain and Animal Health. This may change under the Lisbon Treaty.

SP - Suspect premises

SZ - Surveillance zone

TCZ - Temporary Control Zone

UK - United Kingdom

VI - Veterinary Inspector

VLA - Veterinary Laboratories Agency

VRA - Veterinary Risk Assessment

WTO - World Trade Organisation

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A Annex A - Organisational structures and roles

A.1 Introduction

A.1.1 During an outbreak of CSF, a number of structures are put in place to coordinate and support the disease control response.

A.1.2 These structures in GB are outlined in detail in the relevant Contingency Plan for Exotic Animal Diseases (i.e. for England - the [Framework Response Plan](#), the Welsh Assembly Government's [Framework Response Plan](#) for Exotic Animal Diseases 2009 and Scotland's Exotic Animal Disease [Contingency Framework Plan](#)).

A.1.3 In summary upon confirmation of disease the response is managed at three levels of command:

- strategic
- tactical
- operational

A.2 Strategic

A.2.1 At the strategic level, decisions are taken concerning the policies upon which the disease control operation will be based. This will also ensure that the response complies with our domestic and international legal obligations; all those concerned across government are appropriately engaged and provide direction to the tactical level response.

A.2.2 At a strategic level the response is overseen by Government Committees¹⁸, meetings of which provide a forum to review strategies in a wider Government context and to deal with operational strategy issues which affect other Government Departments. On confirming disease a decision will be taken on whether it is an appropriate and proportionate response to the outbreak to convene a meeting of the relevant Committee.

A.2.3 Strategic decisions will be taken by the relevant Minister or Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), delegated as appropriate. Their decisions will be based on advice from experts, vets, policy, delivery agents and core group. As necessary, key UK wide policies will be submitted for approval by the Animal disease policy group (ADPG).

A.3 Tactical

A.3.1 The tactical level response is coordinated by the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC), which is part of the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC). It ensures that strategic advice is translated into practical instructions for those carrying out the operational response. The JCC provides both an advisory and coordination function for those controlling the disease at local level.

¹⁸ In England, the Civil Contingencies Committee (CCC), Scotland, the Cabinet Sub Committee – Scottish Resilience Room (CSC-SGORR), and Wales Welsh Civil Contingencies Committee (WCCC)

A.4 Operational

A.4.1 The Local Disease Control Centre(s) (LDCC(s)) coordinate and implement the disease control operation following tactical level advice and guidance as set out in contingency plans and operational instructions. The LDCCs also report to the JCC about the progress of the disease control operation.

A.5 Specific to CSF

A.5.1 In developing the CSF Disease Control Strategy, a GB Pig Core Group has been established. This group will facilitate joint working between Industry and Government during an outbreak of CSF or other exotic notifiable disease of pigs. The detailed arrangements for engaging with industry in Scotland and Wales may vary.

A.5.2 A CSF experts group will be established during an outbreak of CSF to provide expert advice on the disease and control measures.

A.5.3 Furthermore a Feral Boar Expert Group has been established to provide expert advice on feral boar distribution, prevalence, behaviour, ecology and management. This Group will be convened immediately once CSF is suspected/ confirmed in feral pigs or if feral pigs are known to be present in a domestic pig surveillance/ protection zone.

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