WYG International

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Evaluation Report

Annexes

Call-down Title:
Mine Action Evaluation

Call-down Reference No:
PO 6119

Framework Agreement Title:
DFID Global Evaluation Framework Agreement (GEFA)

Framework Reference No:
PO 5859

May 2013

Submitted by a
Joint Venture Partnership
led by
WYG International Limited

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Annexes

ANNEX A:

Terms of Reference

Mine Action Evaluation - Terms of Reference December 2012

Type of contract: GEFA Global Evaluation Framework Agreement
Duration: 12 weeks
Location: UK desk based, plus travel to two mine action programme countries in **Africa** (likely Mozambique and either DRC or South Sudan) and two in **Asia** (Cambodia and Sri Lanka).

Purpose of the evaluation
1. The purpose of the Mine Action evaluation, in the final quarter of the 30 month programme, is:

- to examine whether the CHASE mine action programme delivered development benefits to mine affected communities, as laid out in the 2010 DFID Mine Action Strategy;

- to evaluate whether the centrally delivered CHASE programme is the most effective and sustainable mode of delivery to enable national mine action agencies to prioritise and deliver mine action programmes in their own countries, and;

- to assess whether the programme delivered value for money on behalf of the UK taxpayer.

DFID Mine Action Programme Context
2. DFID has been funding mine action and demining programmes for more than 20 years.

- The CHASE mine action programme is a £30m, 8 country programme over 30 months, 2011-2013. The Mine Action Programme design was based on DFID's Mine Action Strategy 2010-2013, "*Creating a Safer Environment: Clearing land mines and other explosive remnants of war*". A key feature of the mine action strategy is a new focus on the linkage between demining and development.

3. There are other mine action programmes with differing objectives and modalities for delivery:

- DFID Afghanistan is providing £11.2m over 5 years (2009-2013) to clear mines in Herat province, in order to prevent casualties among the civilian population, and to promote resettlement, reconstruction and stability by returning mine and ordinance contaminated land to productive use. The programme tracks numbers on area demined, targeted household beneficiaries, number of casualties caused by landmines, and maintains targets for increased livelihood opportunities.

4. DFID has also undertaken humanitarian mine action programming in Eastern and Western Libya. This rapid response facility, however, is not

linked to the CHASE mine action programme or to the DFID mine action strategy.

5. The main focus of the evaluation will be on the CHASE mine action programme. However, the evaluation will also review the other DFID mine action programmes' objectives, outputs and outcomes, modalities of delivery and synergy with DFID's Mine Action Strategy.

6. The evaluation is expected to draw lessons for the evolution of the Mine Action strategy, recommend changes and improvements to the delivery mechanisms including sustainability, accountability, value for money and the delivery of results, and inform next steps in programming. The larger global mine action community will be interested in the findings, particularly as they will address the links between development and mine action and therefore will be disseminated widely across the sector.

Evaluation Criteria

7. The evaluation criteria selected are based on the OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance. These criteria include relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability while identifying the programme's development contribution to improving the wellbeing and social and economic conditions of mine affected communities (impact)[1]. Value for money, another evaluation criterion here, refers not only to economy but the definition used for value for money in the Mine Action Strategy[i].

Background of the Mine Action Programme

8. The CHASE Mine Action programme provides funding to three service providers: Halo Trust, Mine Action Group (MAG) and United Nations Mine Action Team (UNMAT) which consists of three UN agencies: United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF). The eight programme countries include: Cambodia, DRC, Iraq, Lao, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and Vietnam.

9. Some of the Mine Action countries have DFID country offices; others are middle income countries with no DFID presence (Iraq, Cambodia and Laos). They represent a mix of "old" wars and stable governments (Cambodia, Mozambique) and more recent post conflict environments with less stable governments (Sri Lanka, South Sudan).

10. There are three key objectives to the Mine Action Programme:

- **Objective 1** - To release mine affected land to make a measureable contribution to the socio-economic development of mine affected communities;
- **Objective 2** - To help governments take full responsibility for their National Mine Action Programmes;

[1] The OECD DAC Criteria are used because they are helpful for shaping the evaluation questions. See End note 1 for definitions.

- **Objective 3** - To improve value for money in mine action.

11. The first objective links mine clearance and the release of mine affected land back to local communities, to make a **measureable contribution to the socio-economic development** of the local communities. Mine clearance takes up the lion's share of the programme budget [more than 60%]. In each community where mine clearance is undertaken, baseline socio-economic data was collected before or at the beginning of mine clearance, in order to measure the changes to community well-being and economic development from mine clearance. It is in this objective that the contribution of mine clearance to development is expected to be measured through evaluating the outputs and outcomes of the programme.

12. The second objective of the mine action programme is **sustainability.** Through strengthening government mechanisms and bodies to plan and prioritise and developing technical expertise, the intention of the strategy has been that national governments supervise and undertake their own mine action programming, to meet present and longer term needs. It is expected that national mine action bodies will coordinate with other sectors to enable mine action to contribute to improved national economic outcomes. Evaluation of the outcomes focused on sustainability will enable a long-term view on the future design of the programme in the de-mining sector.

13. Value for money was an important consideration in the Mine Action strategy. As per the strategy:

"Benefits were to be maximized by ensuring programme implementers:

- Prioritise clearance activities at country level to those areas where the humanitarian and socio-economic impact of mines is most severe;

- Increase access to resources such as water; improving opportunities for agriculture; and opening up access to transit routes to facilitate economic development;

- Develop plans to maximise usage of cleared land and associated livelihoods benefits;

- Leverage additional funding by creating opportunities for development actors to support follow-on work, e.g. food security and income generating projects;

- Create employment opportunities by hiring local staff for mine clearance, where appropriate and after suitable training has been provided"[2].

[2] See the Mine Action Strategy 2010-2013, "*Creating a Safer Environment: Clearing land mines and other explosive remnants of war"*

14. These activities are all focused on the linkages between development and mine clearance[3]. The flow chart in Figure 1 provides the logic model for mine action and development used in this programme.

Figure 1: **CHASE Mine Action Logic Model**



Existing Studies and available data

15. The evaluation will be able to draw on a considerable amount of project reporting, both bi-annual and annual reporting, to CHASE from the service providers, for each of the eight country programmes. These reports are complemented by logical framework matrices and in many cases theories of change. For each country programme there has been very detailed baseline socio-economic data on mine affected communities that may be used to measure change.

16. A workshop was held in late January 2012 with the project partners to prepare for the evaluation including contributing to the evaluation purpose and scope, key questions, timing and logistical considerations. A programme level log frame was designed, as was a theory of change, and using participatory methods, and possible evaluation questions and criteria identified and agreed with the partners. A report of the Workshop from January 2012 is attached.

17. A significant data resource is the meta-evaluation of Mine Action and Development commissioned by DFID and delivered in August 2012. The meta-evaluation analysed and synthesised 31 evaluations from the last ten

[3] See the Mine Action Meta Evaluation, August 2012.

years across 22 countries, and analysed a further 100 primary and secondary data sources. The meta-evaluation was designed to inform the design of the evaluation of the Mine Action Strategy, and it reports its findings in four specific areas: Mine Action and Development, Capacity Development, Value for Money, and Monitoring and Evaluation. An extensive bibliography and background sources are included.

18. Six key findings were identified by the meta-evaluation:

- There is a diverse field of stakeholders operating in complex situations, including donors/NGOs/private sector/national and local governments, as well as communities;
- The linkage between Mine Action and Development is not well articulated nor understood nor agreed. There is no overarching theory of change in this arena, which restricts ability to coordinate between actors. Mine clearance is necessary but not sufficient for development to take place;
- There are multiple funding streams from different donors. DFID is one of many donors;
- There are different understandings of evaluation criteria including value for money;
- Prioritisation at national and local levels is critical. Criteria for prioritisation of mine action needs to be transparent;
- Capacity development, including technical and managerial aspects within National Mine Action Agencies, is critical for country ownership.

The detailed findings articulated in the report provide direction to DFID for the evaluation process.

Evaluation Questions

19. Strategy:

- To what extent have the development objectives of the DFID Mine Action Strategy been delivered in the mine action programme results? (relevance)
- Is the DFID mine action strategy implemented in non-CHASE led mine action programmes (Libya and Afghanistan for example)? Are they coherent with the objectives of the Mine Action strategy? (coherence, relevance)
- Does the strategy provide a coherent evidence based framework for all of DFID's mine action work? (coherence)

20. Programme Outputs and Outcomes:

- What are the mine action programme's outputs and outcomes at community level? (effectiveness)
- What are the effects (impact) on women and girls in mine affected communities and on issues of gender?
- How do the different approaches to linking mine action and development by the implementers compare? (effectiveness)

- How has value for money been addressed and operationalized? What are the results? (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)
- Has the programme led to more ownership and capacity of national governments and national mine action agencies? What are the benefits or constraints found in the programme's support to national governments? (effectiveness, sustainability)

21. Delivery mechanisms:

- What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different ways that DFID manages mine action work? (country office led, humanitarian, development CHASE central programme)
- Do the programmes deliver what they say they will? Why and what difference does this make? (effectiveness and efficiency)
- To what extent is the oversight of programmes managed efficiently and effectively?
- Do the oversight arrangements of the various programmes (including anti-fraud and anti-corruption) represent value for money in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of management?
- What is the value for money embedded in the delivery mechanisms for the various delivery partners? (private sector, NGOs, UN)

The Work plan

22. Documentation provided by prospective evaluation providers will include a detailed plan for 12 weeks of evaluation activity:

- A very well defined methodology and data collection plan;
- Details of all key evaluation activities, including staffing roles, over the course of the evaluation;
- Specific plans for field level evaluation activities in four agreed countries in both Asia and Africa;
- A timetable for undertaking and completing each of the identified key evaluation activities;
- Details of who will be responsible for each identified key evaluation activity, including CVs;
- A communication plan and dissemination strategy;
- A detailed budget for the evaluation activities.

Approaches to be used - methodology

23. The evaluation team will need to work closely with the Mine Action programme service providers, and key stakeholders at every level (government officials, NGOs, community members - with particular attention to women and girls), and the Evaluation Steering Group (ESG) (outlined below).

24. The prospective evaluation providers will set out in detail their proposed methodologies as a summative evaluation. Based on the methodology provided by the prospective evaluators, the evaluation providers will consider the use of mixed methods, including the potential for a quantitative approach of measures of socio-economic change in target communities, based on

programme baselines. The evaluation is expected to collect socio-economic quantitative data (primary or secondary), determine changes in data over time using available baseline data, analyse and attribute the change (or use contribution) to the programme, judge the worth or merit of the programme in relation to socio-economic levels. The design will be discussed with, and agreed by, the ESG.

25. Prospective evaluation providers should outline how their proposed methods:

- Are consistent with OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, and with DFID's policy on evaluation
- Are participatory, involving beneficiaries, girls and women and excluded groups as well as implementing agents and government counterparts and ensure that beneficiary feedback is built into the evaluation programme.
- Do No Harm and are conflict sensitive

26. Logistics and procedures

- All duty of care, transport, and logistical support, office space and insurances will be the responsibility of the evaluation providers.
- The evaluators are expected to evaluate Mine Action programmes in 4 mine action countries, provisionally Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Mozambique and South Sudan. The choice of countries and the rationale for their selection will be discussed and agreed with the evaluators. They will be responsible for selecting and training local staff to assist in survey work.
- The prospective evaluators will identify ethical risks and present a plan for how these and their related issues will be mitigated and addressed.
- A planning meeting will be held with the DFID Evaluation Steering Group (ESG) and with the mine action implementers early in the contract.
- Opportunities for commenting on and agreeing the proposed work will done in the first month of the contract, and will be included in the interim report.

27. Requirements for the team skills and expertise:

- Demonstrated track record of quality evaluations in a country environment of emergence from conflict in data poor contexts;
- Extensive experience and understanding of mine action programmes in a number of country settings;
- Proven track record in conducting cost effective and value for money assessments;
- A range of competencies as appropriate to this evaluation, including a specialist with the demonstrated competencies to review and evaluate demining; a specialist with demonstrated competencies in community surveys; and a specialist with demonstrated competencies in reviewing and assessing organisational and institutional capacity building by national governments in post-conflict and donor assisted countries;
- Excellent team written and verbal communication skills.

- A gender balance reflected in the team membership;
- The team leader will have the competencies and a track record for good management of evaluations teams and evaluations.

28. Deliverables:
The evaluators will produce an interim report after the first month with detailed findings from the desk review. The final evaluation report, of no more than 30 pages, will be provided at the end of the 3 month contract, including an executive summary, and with additional appendices with findings. An important requirement of this report is that it reflects the global evidence base for what approaches are effective in the development and mine action area and therefore should be presented in a format which is appropriate for disseminating to a wide variety of audiences including beneficiaries and stakeholder.

Management, quality control and reporting
29. The team leader will be responsible for the quality of the evaluation conducted by their team. The contract will be managed by Jennifer Leith, DFID evaluation adviser, alongside the Programme Manager Richard Boden, and Deputy Programme Manager Duncan Cook. All three will be members of the Evaluation Steering Group, (ESG) with Jo Moir/Beth Arthy, Deputy Head of CHASE and representatives from other Government Departments. The ESG will steer the evaluation and provide direction for the evaluators.

30. The evaluation provider will report over 3 months on a monthly, milestone basis, which will trigger the release of monthly tranches of funds, based on the quality of the reporting and subject to agreement in the process and products delivered. The end of the first month of work will produce an interim report of findings from a desk review and an agreed plan for the following months.

Budget and schedule
31. The evaluation will be tendered in December and work will begin in February. The bids will provide a detailed plan for the first month and indicative overall plan and costs for the delivery of the evaluation.

32. The budget provided by the bid will cover fees and expenses of the evaluation team required to conduct the evaluation, including desk and documentary review, interviews, visits to four countries, and report writing. The evaluation will be expected to be delivered after three months, on 30 April 2013.

33. The ESG will assess full bids for the work and award the tender.

Duty of Care
34. The Supplier is responsible for the safety and well-being of their Personnel and Third Parties affected by their activities under this contract, including appropriate security arrangements. They will also be responsible for the provision of suitable security arrangements for their domestic and business property.

35. DFID will share available information with the Supplier on security status and developments in-country where appropriate.

36. The Supplier is responsible for ensuring appropriate safety and security briefings for all of their Personnel working under this contract and ensuring that their Personnel register and receive briefing as outlined above. Travel advice is also available on the FCO website and the Supplier must ensure they (and their Personnel) are up to date with the latest position.

37. This Procurement will require the Supplier to operate in conflict-affected areas and parts of it are highly insecure. Travel to many zones within the region will be subject to travel clearance from the UK government in advance. The security situation is volatile and subject to change at short notice. The Supplier should be comfortable working in such an environment and should be capable of deploying to any areas required within the region in order to deliver the Contract (subject to travel clearance being granted). The Supplier is responsible for ensuring that appropriate arrangements, processes and procedures are in place for their Personnel, taking into account the environment they will be working in and the level of risk involved in delivery of the Contract (such as working in dangerous, fragile and hostile environments etc.). The Supplier must ensure their Personnel receive the required level of training and safety in the field training prior to deployment.

38. Tenderers must develop their Tender on the basis of being fully responsible for Duty of Care in line with the details provided above and the initial risk assessment matrix developed by DFID (see Annex B of this ToR). They must confirm in their Tender that:
    - They fully accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care.
    - They understand the potential risks and have the knowledge and experience to develop an effective risk plan.
    - They have the capability to manage their Duty of Care responsibilities throughout the life of the contract.

39. If you are unwilling or unable to accept responsibility for Security and Duty of Care as detailed above, your Tender will be viewed as non-compliant and excluded from further evaluation.

40. Acceptance of responsibility must be supported with evidence of capability and DFID reserves the right to clarify any aspect of this evidence. In providing evidence Tenderers should consider the following questions:

    a) Have you completed an initial assessment of potential risks that demonstrates your knowledge and understanding, and are you satisfied that you understand the risk management implications (not solely relying on information provided by DFID)?
    b) Have you prepared an outline plan that you consider appropriate to manage these risks at this stage (or will you do so if you are awarded the contract) and are you confident/comfortable that you can implement this effectively?

c) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are appropriately trained (including specialist training where required) before they are deployed and will you ensure that on-going training is provided where necessary?
d) Have you an appropriate mechanism in place to monitor risk on a live / on-going basis (or will you put one in place if you are awarded the contract)?
e) Have you ensured or will you ensure that your staff are provided with and have access to suitable equipment and will you ensure that this is reviewed and provided on an on-going basis?
f) Have you appropriate systems in place to manage an emergency / incident if one arises?

Annex A

[i]End Note
The OECD DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance are:

Relevance

The extent to which the aid activity is suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.
In evaluating the relevance of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- To what extent are the objectives of the programme still valid?
- Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the overall goal and the attainment of its objectives?
- Are the activities and outputs of the programme consistent with the intended impacts and effects?

Effectiveness

A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.
In evaluating the effectiveness of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- To what extent were the objectives achieved / are likely to be achieved?
- What were the major factors influencing the achievement or non-achievement of the objectives?

Efficiency

Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been adopted.
When evaluating the efficiency of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- Were activities cost-efficient?
- Were objectives achieved on time?
- Was the programme or project implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?

Impact

The positive and negative changes produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. This involves the main impacts and effects resulting from the activity on the local social, economic, environmental and other development indicators. The examination should be concerned with both intended and unintended results and must also include the positive and negative impact of external factors, such as changes in terms of trade and financial conditions.
When evaluating the impact of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- What has happened as a result of the programme or project?
- What real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries?
- How many people have been affected?

Sustainability

Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

When evaluating the sustainability of a programme or a project, it is useful to consider the following questions:

- To what extent did the benefits of a programme or project continue after donor funding ceased?
- What were the major factors which influenced the achievement or non-achievement of sustainability of the programme or project?

ANNEX B

Risk Assessment Matrix

Project Title: Evaluation of CHASE's Global Mine Action Programme (2011-2013)

Locations: Cambodia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan, DRC and Mozambique

Date of Assessment: 23rd November 2012

Assessing Official: Richard Boden

	DFID Risk Score - Cambodia	**DFID Risk Score – Sri Lanka**	**DFID Risk Score – South Sudan**	**DFID Risk Score – DRC**	**DFID Risk Score – Mozambique**
FCO Travel Advice	3	2	3	4	2
Host Nation Travel Advice	Not available	Not available	Not Available	Not Available	Not available
Transportation	3	3	4	4	3
Security (SS)	1	3	4	3	4
Civil Unrest	2	3	3	2	2
Violence/Crime (SS)	2	2	4	5	3*
Terrorism (SS)	3	3	4	3	3
War	1	1	3	3	1
Hurricane	1	1	1	1	1
Earthquake	1	1	1	1	1
Flood	2	2	2	2	2**
Medical Services	3	2	4	4	3***
OVERALL RATING	**2**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**2**

* Rated as moderate. Most cases go unreported, and hence it is difficult to quantify the scale of the problem. Street crime is a risk in parts of Maputo and other cities. Car-jackings and house robberies are infrequent, but do occur.
** Serious flooding happens approximately every two to three years in four main areas: Maputo, Limpopo, Pungue and Zambezi. Flooding is normally restricted to river basins, and mostly affects rural areas.
*** Healthcare is very basic outside major cities (Maputo/Matola/Beira/Nampula). There are excellent services in neighbouring South Africa. Private insurance is necessary to access South African healthcare and air ambulance services

ANNEX B:

Literature Review

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1 Introduction

This review of literature addresses five core issues of concern that underpin the findings and conclusions of the evaluation and that will be important for DFID to take into account as it seeks to determine strategic orientation going forward:

- The benefits (and certain risks) of mine action for communities;
- The linkages between mine action and development;
- Institutional capacity development, especially of the national mine action authority and mine action centre;
- Monitoring and evaluation and measuring 'value for money';
- Global mine action and donor coordination;
- Rural economic development and security, and the importance to the national economy of renewing agricultural production.

DFID has insisted on the importance of the Theory of Change (TOC) process in its approach to development.[1] TOC requires careful identification of all of the conditions necessary to effect, or lead to, a specified outcome. It uses backwards mapping, requiring planners to think in backwards steps from the long-term goal to the intermediate and then early-term changes that would be required to cause the desired change. This creates a set of connected outcomes known as a 'pathway of change'. A 'pathway of change' graphically represents the change process as it is understood by planners and is the core around which the other elements of the theory are developed. There is, however, little evidence thus far that the TOC approach, over and above the logical approach to planning,[2] has permeated mine action.

Graph 1: Correlating themes from literature and DFID Theory of Change with evaluation purposes



[1] See, for example, Isabel Vogel for the UK Department of International Development, 'Review of the use of "Theory of Change" in international development, Review Report', April 2012.
[2] In development circles, it is increasingly understood that a good logframe should embed a theory of change. In particular, a theory of change helps explain the leap from outputs to impact in logframes.

2 Benefits to communities

As casualty rates from mines and explosive elements of war (ERW) have decreased steadily over the past decade,[3] the rather simplistic mantra of 'a mine cleared equals a life saved' is being heard a little less often as the purely humanitarian case for mine action has lessened dramatically[4] while the developmental case has become more prominent.[5] This changing reality has been duly reflected in DFID's strategy, the first objective of which is to 'release mine affected land to make a measureable contribution to the socio-economic development of mine affected communities.' Similarly, the UN Mine Action Team is 'of the view that the indicators of success in mine action include improved livelihoods, accelerated socio-economic development and contributions made to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.'[6] While safety and security remain at the forefront of mine action, prioritisation of clearance purely for casualty reduction purposes has logically been on the wane.

The focus has therefore increasingly been on clearing land for developmental use.[7] But which use and who benefits? In a study of mine action in Afghanistan, Paterson *et al*. cite two studies of the socio-economic benefits of clearance conducted in a comparable period and with similar estimates of the economic benefits of demining – roughly US$30 million in benefits for $25 million in costs. Yet, as they point out, the two studies came to seemingly contradictory conclusions as to the source of those benefits. One study concluded that almost 70% of total benefits stemmed from livestock production (largely from grazing land), with crops produced on agricultural land accounting for less than 5% of the benefits. The second study concluded the exact opposite was true, with the bulk of benefits coming from crop production and very little from livestock production.[8]

Based on these quite surprising findings, the authors ask whether priorities should be set mainly on the expected production value of each cleared area or through a more community-based approach. The former approach promises greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as well as being readily monitorable, but is dependent on multiple assumptions, notably that the beneficiary households possess the complementary inputs (e.g. seeds, draught animals, farming implements) to use the land in the expected way; that the affected communities are sufficiently connected with markets to sustain themselves without the need for complementary initiatives (e.g. road rehabilitation); and that they have access to a variety of land types to sustain both crop agriculture and livestock.[9] These are significant assumptions that are far from being well-founded in many affected communities; accordingly, the authors advocate a more focused approach based on local community realities. This latter approach appears to be more closely in tune with DFID's 'theory of change' approach.

Whatever approach is adopted, however, the issue of land rights still looms large. As the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has noted, land and property are often central in the build-up to conflict, in the strategies pursued by combatants and in post-conflict recovery.[10] For this reason, land ownership, land use,

[3] In December 2012, Landmine Monitor reported that a total of 4,286 new casualties from landmines and explosive remnants of war were recorded for calendar year 2011, equivalent to some 12 casualties per day. 'The annual incidence rate is about a third of what it was one decade ago, when there were at least 32 casualties per day.' Landmine Monitor, *Landmine Monitor Report 2012, Toward a Mine Free-World*, Geneva, December 2012, available at: http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2012&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=&pqs_section=.

[4] Consonant with the reduction in the humanitarian imperative, there has been a clear trend away from conducting mine risk education (apart from in emergency situations) and concentrating on ensuring better targeted survey and clearance to promote development. (Though see the Meta Evaluation for the controversial claim that MRE remains a key pillar of Mine Action: Sheelagh O'Reilly, Judith Friedman, Hatty Dinsmore, Rob Storr, & Ronnie MacPherson, 'Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report', IOD PARC, Sheffield, 31 July 2012, p. 19.) Further, earlier claims that community liaison (CL) would be the glue that holds mine action together are rarely made these days and of the main demining NGOs only MAG appears to conduct CL with any consistency. See, e.g., MAG, 'Community Liaison involves real communication between MAG and the people we work to assist', undated but accessed May 2013, http://www.maginternational.org/cl/#.UZm_RxZBvX4.

[5] Of course, not everything about mine action is necessarily positive for community development. There have, for example, been regular accusations that the presence of deminers flush with cash and working in or near communities has promoted localised prostitution.

[6] 'Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action, Note by the Secretary-General', UN doc. A/68/63/Add.1, 1 March 2013, para. 4.

[7] Note, though, HALO Trust's view that '[m]ine clearance assets are expensive and need to be targeted first to the communities where mines are already known to be killing and maiming people and their livestock. … [T]he notion that demining should only take place where development is planned, is not only absurd, but can be positively dangerous and result in some of the most impoverished mined-impacted [*sic*] communities left with no mine clearance for another generation or longer. The mines are fixed – so both the mine clearance operators and the development agencies need to go where the mines are harming people. … That is why HALO talks of linking development to demining, rather than demining to development.' The HALO Trust, 'Linking Development to Mine Action', undated but accessed on 8 May 2013 at: http://www.halotrust.org/about-us/policies/linking-development-mine-action.

[8] Ted Paterson, Barry Pound, and Abdul Qudous Ziaee, 'Landmines and Livelihoods in Afghanistan: Evaluating the Benefits of Mine Action', Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva, 2010, p. 1.

[9] *Ibid*.

[10] GICHD, 'Landmines and Land Rights in Conflict Affected Contexts', GICHD Policy Brief, Geneva, December 2010, http://www.gichd.org/publications/landmines-and-land-rights-in-conflict-affected-contexts-en.

and land use planning contexts 'matter'.[11] Cambodia, for instance, has been a fertile country for land grabs, sometimes by the military,[12] sometimes, it is alleged, by foreign or multinational corporations. As a consequence, they had to establish 'Land Use Planning Units' to try and restrain the practice.[13] 'Do no harm' should of course be the overriding policy, but given such difficult environments it is true to say that mine action organisations 'are not neutral' when it comes to land rights. Releasing land previously contaminated with landmines and ERW and making it accessible does change its status. 'This inevitably involves land rights issues, even if the intent is to avoid them.'[14]

The 'Meta Evaluation' commissioned by DFID agrees with this assertion, while acknowledging that this is a complex area where 'even mainstream development agencies struggle' especially 'where property regimes are unclear and contain elements that are codified in national law and predicated upon custom and practice at the grass-roots level'. It recommends that mine action organisations 'be increasingly open to the risks of contested land ownership, especially in areas of high production potential if suitable investments are made.'[15] Detailed practical advice is a little harder to find. As the GICHD observes, mine action operators 'should not become mediators'. The organisation suggests simply that clearance 'should stop if a dispute is discovered that threatens civilians or staff' and that the issue should be reported to local government and the national authority as well as to local NGOs or the UN 'as appropriate'.[16] This may address the problem in the short-term, but does not resolve the broader concern.

3 Linking mine action and development

The linkages between mine action and development have been given certain consideration in academic literature but have struggled to gain traction in practice. Thus, for example, the 'Meta-Evaluation' commissioned by DFID to examine 'wider understandings' around mine action and development concluded that linkages between mine action and development 'are not well articulated or understood and agreed'.[17] Similarly, the GICHD has asserted that mine action programmes 'often are not linked early and strongly enough with key development actors' despite 'extensive research documenting the need for greater coordination between mine action and development organisations'.[18]

The Meta-Evaluation rightly asserts that mine clearance 'is a clear precursor to development'.[19] This notion of mine action as facilitator of the conditions for development is the simplest of a number of models that could ensure that mine action contributes to development, by making areas safe for work for communities and those who would support them. It is incorporated into the IMAS (International Mine Action Standards) definition of mine action, which refers to mine action as creating an environment 'in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine and ERW contamination'.[20] And, as has been observed, it is 'highly unlikely that coherent economic investment from any source will take place in areas which are designated as unsafe for workers, development staff and local people.'[21]

But as is also acknowledged, social, economic, and political development do not take place automatically. Consonant with TOC logic, such development demands, among other things, concerted efforts with local people 'combined with a process of planned investment in infrastructure, capacity and development of input/output value chains'.[22] One way of achieving this is through ad hoc or sustained partnerships.[23] Mines Advisory Group (MAG)'s

[11] Sheelagh O'Reilly, Judith Friedman, Hatty Dinsmore, Rob Storr, & Ronnie MacPherson, 'Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report', IOD PARC, Sheffield, 31 July 2012, p. 26 (hereafter, 'The Meta Evaluation').
[12] See, e.g., GICHD, 'Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Cambodia', Geneva, March 2012, p. 16.
[13] See, e.g., Global Witness, 'International Finance Corporation and Deutsche Bank bankrolling Vietnamese land grabs in Cambodia and Laos', 13 May 2013, http://www.globalwitness.org/node/8359.
[14] GICHD, 'Landmines and Land Rights in Conflict Affected Contexts', Policy Brief, Geneva, December 2010.
[15] 'The Meta Evaluation', p. 26.
[16] GICHD, 'Land Rights and Mine Action: Frequently Asked Questions for Mine Action Organisations', Geneva, p. 4.
[17] Sheelagh O'Reilly, Judith Friedman, Hatty Dinsmore, Rob Storr, & Ronnie MacPherson, 'Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report', IOD PARC, Sheffield, 31 July 2012, p. xi (hereafter, 'The Meta Evaluation').
[18] GICHD, 'Linking Mine Action and Development', http://www.gichd.org/strategic-management/mine-action-security-and-development/linking-mine-action-and-development/; and see also GICHD, *Linking Mine Action and Development: Guidelines for Policy and Programme Development*, Geneva, January 2010.
[19] 'The Meta Evaluation', p. 16.
[20] IMAS 04.10: 'Glossary', Definition 3.172.
[21] 'The Meta Evaluation', p. 16. Of course, this ignores reality that local communities are well aware of the constraints imposed on them by contamination and often take action themselves to rid critical areas of such contamination. It is generally accepted that, at least in Cambodia, many more mines have been cleared by land owners or users, or by untrained individuals that they have hired to clear mines and ERW, than by professional mine action organisations.
[22] 'The Meta Evaluation', p. 17.
[23] With respect to specific efforts in this regard in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see, e.g., M. Carrier, 'Mine Action and Development: Why should we become MAD about it?', Handicap International, Sarajevo, 2011.

'development partnerships' in Cambodia, for example, go some way towards achieving this.[24] Further, the United Nations (UN) comes close to establishing the active promotion of development as the central aim of mine action when it refers to 'the integration of mine action into broader frameworks of international assistance and cooperation' as being 'necessary to accelerate progress on mine action specific objectives, as well as to ensure sustainable gains across the spectrum of humanitarian, human rights, peace and security and development responses.'[25]

But beyond mere cooperation and coordination with development actors is the far more challenging notion of 'integration' of mine action in development. DFID states that its mine action funding 'will be increasingly focused on … maximising the impact of demining on the socio-economic development of targeted populations'. DFID's strategy is 'underpinned' by four core principles, one of which is to require implementing organisations

> 'to support DFID's development goals and aid effectiveness principles, including closer integration of mine action in development programmes'...[26]

Already in 2004, World Vision Cambodia had outlined a number of ways in which integration could occur, such as through post-clearance development assistance (which they termed vertical integration); national level integration, where mine action planning is integrated into the National Poverty Reduction Strategy; and integrated community participation, with villages allocating land and labour for community use.[27] There is also the notion of internal integration of development thinking within a demining/mine action organisation to consider. This means that developmental concerns are set as primary criteria for planning demining interventions alongside (or even instead of) casualty reduction. This is achieved through community-level impact assessments prior to any decision about the deployment of demining assets, and then certain developmental objectives are explicitly set as the outcomes that are sought post-clearance.[28]

Indeed, one of DFID's four core principles for its mine action strategy calls for monitoring the impact of mine action through 'before and after' evaluations of mine-affected communities.[29] This task may demand that a demining organisation 'hire in' development expertise, something that MAG and Norwegian People's Aid, among other operators, have done.[30] The limits of such an approach, however, are that within an institution generally mine action technicians may see the extent of the organisation's development obligations as this expert's particular role and tasks.

4 Institutional capacity development

To ensure competent management of mine action, the objective of creating national capacities for coordination of a national mine action programme is at the forefront of most strategies to address mine and ERW contamination, including DFID's existing strategy. Behind this relatively clear and legitimate goal, however, lie a complex set of challenges and factors in seeking to create sophisticated, high-level coordination and management capacities.[31]

[24] In Cambodia, for example, MAG notes that longstanding collaborative relationships have continued for more than a decade with: Life With Dignity; Finn Church Aid; World Vision; CARE; and Church World Service and local partner Cambodian Family Economic Development Association. See, e.g., MAG, 'CAMBODIA: Development depends on demining', 12 December 2011, http://www.maginternational.org/news/cambodia-development-depends-on-demining-/. A partnership between HALO Trust and Help Age International in Mozambique, albeit somewhat limited, pursues similar objectives. HALO focuses on demining, freeing farmland for the local community, while Help Age International focuses on community development and provides seeds, farming equipment, micro-credit options, supports the creation of local bodies to engender community development, and fosters the exchange of experiences and information between communities.
[25] *The Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action 2013–2018*, New York, 2013, p. 25.
[26] *DFID Programme Strategy 2010–2013, Creating a safer environment: clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war*, p. 5.
[27] Gabriel Pictet, Ian Ramage, and Kate Richmon (Domrei Research and Consulting Phnom Penh, Cambodia), 'Integrating Demining with Development: The Way Forward', World Vision Cambodia, Phnom Penh, September 2004, pp. 9–10.
[28] As early as 2002, the 'Assistance to Mine Affected Communities' project at the Peace Research Institute-Oslo (PRIO) developed a training package intended to enable organizations to collect, analyse, and use key data to ensure long-term community development. The extent of implementation, however, appears to have been quite limited. 'Assistance to Mine Affected Communities Project', PRIO, http://www.prio.no/Projects/Project/?x=635; Ananda Millard, *Assessing Landmine Impact at the Community Level - A Training Manual*, PRIO, Oslo, 2002.
[29] *DFID Programme Strategy 2010–2013, Creating a safer environment: clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war*, p. 5.
[30] An alternative is to contract out such expertise, which could be done relatively cheaply.
[31] As DFID has noted, 'Capacity building is a complex notion – it involves individual and organisational learning which builds social capital and trust, develops knowledge, skills and attitudes and when successful creates an organisational culture which enables organisations to set objectives, achieve results, solve problems and create adaptive procedures which enable it to survive in the long term.' DFID, *DFID research strategy 2008-2013 Working Paper series: Capacity Building*, p. 3. The Working Paper cites an Australian report, 'Capacity Building Evaluation', of October 2006, which notes that the development community spends US$15 billion on capacity development but is unsure of the return on the investment. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)[32] describes, in straightforward terms, a national mine action authority as the overarching institution based around an inter-ministerial committee and tasked with managing mine action at a national level, with day-to-day coordination performed by a national mine action centre.[33] It does so, however, in terms only of the establishment of a mine action programme. The typical mine action programme lifecycle is not addressed in any detail in any of the IMAS, which has largely left States, UN agencies, and mine action operators to conduct capacity building through 'learning by doing'.

The task of building the capacity of these national institutions has largely — but not exclusively[34] — fallen to the UN. As defined in the UN's policy on mine action,[35] UN mine action activities are intended to promote national ownership, institution-building and capacity development. They have generally sought to build capacity using full-time or part-time technical advisors, whether through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), or, with respect to Mine Risk Education (MRE), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); skills transfer has been promoted through mentoring, short-term training courses, and exchange visits with other mine action programmes. According to the Inspectors of the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations (JIU), however, reporting in 2011:[36]

> 'Capacity-building has not received the strategic attention it deserves, and the related support activities appear to be ad hoc, consisting mainly of middle and senior management training, including missions to other mine action programmes, and the provision of offices and purchasing of vehicles. In many cases it does not appear that there is a joint United Nations strategy with a comprehensive and detailed capacity-building plan in place on how the United Nations will work with national authorities over a certain period of time in order to progressively transfer responsibility for mine action.'

The Inspectors concluded that the full potential of South-to-South and triangular cooperation remained to be explored.[37]

In its latest five-year strategy (2013–2018), one of the UN's strategic objectives is that the 'transfer of mine action functions to national actors is accelerated, with national capacity to fulfil mine action responsibilities increased'.[38] Activities to achieve this include the provision of technical advice, institutional support, capacity assessments, and capacity building to national authorities on mine action activities upon request. However, no detail of how such support is to be rendered is, set out in the Strategy. The 2005 UN inter-agency policy on mine action had devoted one paragraph to capacity development, stating merely that:

> 'The United Nations pursues capacity development and institution-building or strengthening as an integral part of its programme activities from the outset. This includes advising governments on the development of legislation, policies and of coordinating and operational institutions. The United Nations encourages mine action NGOs to contribute to this effort.'[39]

Research by DFID into capacity development has suggested that although donors recognise that local ownership is critical to successful development interventions, 'they often fail to invest in the local institutions that can do the ongoing research and analysis needed by policy makers.' This can be seen as a consistent challenge to national mine action programmes, given that good data and information are key to good planning.[40]

[32] See IMAS 02.10: Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme, First Edition, 1 August 2007, Section 6.
[33] As well as, in major programmes, or in large countries, regional (i.e. sub-national) mine action offices.
[34] In certain instances (e.g. Iraq, South Sudan), mine action NGOs or private companies have been engaged in building institutional capacity, particularly with respect to the relevant mine action centres.
[35] UN, 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', 6 June 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/437351e24.html.
[36] Enrique Roman-Morey and M. Mounir Zahran, 'Evaluation of the Scope, Organization, Effectiveness and Approach of the Work of the United Nations in Mine Action', UN Joint Inspection Unit, UN doc. JIU/REP/2011/11, Geneva, 2011, para. 121.
[37] *Ibid.*, para. 127; and see Joint Inspection Unit, 'South-South and triangular cooperation in the United Nations system', UN doc. JIU/REP/2011/3, 2011.
[38] Strategic Objective 3 in *The Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action 2013–2018*, UN, New York, March 2013.
[39] UN, 'Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy', 6 June 2005, para. 20.
[40] DFID, *DFID research strategy 2008-2013 Working Paper series: Capacity Building*, p. 9.

5 Monitoring and Evaluation and Measuring Value for Money

In general, mine action has struggled to quantify (as opposed to qualify)[41] the benefits of mine action to communities. Paterson *et al*., considering the case of Afghanistan, the world's largest and most expensive mine clearance programme, justly observe that 'the mine action sector has been adept in generating comforting figures on outputs: square meters cleared, landmines destroyed and the like. Such data are necessary and might be useful in advocacy campaigns ('every landmine cleared is a child's life saved'), but they provide little insight into when and how mine action actually enhances the wellbeing of people in mine-affected communities.'[42]

The GICHD accepts that there is 'no one-best-way to evaluate the worth of mine action programmes', although it claims that its 'Sustainable Livelihoods Approach' (SLA), based on work by DFID, has many advantages, particularly for survey and clearance operations leading to the release of safe land to communities. The SLA involves conducting

> 'in-depth socio-economic surveys and attempting to avoid the heavy reliance on one particular indicator – such as economic wealth or mine victims – which can distort the focus of mine action. If all the SLA assets are not fully understood the importance of clearance may be underestimated and, conversely, the impacts overestimated.'[43]

This level of assessment and analysis is, though, some way beyond the skills of most demining operators. It is thus little surprise that operators funded by DFID have largely continued to report in classic terms on the area of land they have cleared or otherwise released, the number of explosive devices cleared and destroyed, and the number and length of roads verified. HALO Trust's website is illustrative, reporting that the organisation has achieved *inter alia* the following:

- Over 1.4 million landmines destroyed;
- Over 11 million items of larger calibre ordnance destroyed;
- Over 206,000 cluster munitions destroyed;
- Over 9,900 minefields cleared;
- 31,413 hectares (77,623 acres) made safe from landmines;
- 143,799 hectares (355,334 acres) made safe from unexploded and abandoned ordnance;
- 14,374 kilometres (8,932 miles) of roads cleared.[44]

For its part, the UN has paid surprisingly little attention to ongoing monitoring of the effectiveness of mine action programmes that it supports. Data gathering on the performance of national mine action programmes in even the simplest terms, such as amount of land released, tracking casualty rates, and quantifying global contributions to mine action has been conducted almost exclusively by the non-governmental monitoring mechanism set up by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Landmine Monitor.[45] The lack of internally generated data is perceived to impede the UN's ability to set meaningful targets and to assess whether or not it has achieved them. Thus, the JIU Inspectors regretted in 2011 that:

> 'despite an increasing emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, a culture of monitoring and evaluation has not yet been sufficiently promoted. The Inspectors underline the importance of monitoring and evaluation, conducted both internally and externally. If monitoring and evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of

[41] Thus, for example, the UN Mine Action Team has noted, with justification, 'the overall successes of the mine action sector in decreasing the number of accidents related to mines and unexploded ordnance around the world; in reducing the fear that mines create in post-conflict populations and the constraints that they impose on them; and in all but halting mine use through the combined advocacy efforts of the United Nations, civil society and other partners.' 'Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action, Note by the Secretary-General', UN doc. A/68/63/Add.1, 1 March 2013, para. 4.
[42] Ted Paterson, Barry Pound, and Abdul Qudous Ziaee, 'Landmines and Livelihoods in Afghanistan: Evaluating the Benefits of Mine Action', Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Geneva, 2010, p. 1.
[43] GICHD, *Sourcebook on Socio-Economic Survey*, Geneva, December 2011, p. 13. The approach proposes that livelihood outcomes are based on five classes of livelihood assets: **human assets**: quantity and quality of human labour available (e.g. health, food security and diversity, ability to access education/send children to school regularly, time available to spend on income generating activities aside from subsistence farming, feeling positive); **social assets**: ability to increase social networks, f**ul** social and cultural obligations and gather information; **financial assets**: ability to purchase basic goods and services for house hold members and save small amounts; **physical assets**: access to basic infrastructure (schools, clinic, access road, market, wells) as well as tools; and **natural assets**: access to forest, farm land and water sources. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[44] HALO Trust, 'Welcome to The HALO Trust', http://www.halotrust.org/, undated but accessed 20 May 2013.
[45] See, e.g., http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/About-Us/What-is-the-Monitor; and Landmine Monitor, *Landmine Monitor Report 2012, Toward a Mine Free-World*, Geneva, December 2012, available at: http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2012&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=&pqs_section=.

> mine action programmes are seldom undertaken, this seriously weakens long-term impact and project effectiveness in all pillars. The Inspectors conclude therefore that UNMAS and all IACG-MA [Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action] members need to value increasingly the importance of evaluation and ongoing monitoring in their supported programmes, and should strive to promote a culture of monitoring and evaluation. Particular emphasis should be given to the development of an evaluation strategy and of appropriate monitoring mechanisms.'[46]

As a consequence, the JIU report recommended that in the context of the preparation of the UN's new mine action strategy, the UN Secretary-General 'should establish a global baseline of reliable data while building on ongoing efforts, which should facilitate the systematic monitoring of progress and the final evaluation of actual results achieved towards the strategic objectives.'[47] In response, the UN Mine Action Team stated that it 'support[ed] and welcome[d] this recommendation. They note that the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action has developed a monitoring and evaluation framework to strengthen the United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for the period 2011–2015, endorsed by the principals of the Coordination Group in December 2012.'[48]

In terms of Value for Money (VfM), the classic metric within mine action has been clearance costs per square metre. This gives a valuable figure for efficiency which is comparable across operators within the same operational context (although it is difficult to use fairly across countries and it clearly says nothing about effectiveness). Assessing the effectiveness of survey in a) identifying suspect land, and b) releasing it from suspicion is inherently even more challenging.

In terms of support mechanisms, much of DFID's support to mine action has been channelled through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), managed by the United Nations. The VTF was strongly criticised by the evaluation report of the UN Joint Inspection Unit of UN mine action, which stated that:

> 'The terms of reference of the VTF, as adopted in 1994, no longer reflect the reality on the ground and have not yet taken into account institutional changes or United Nations reform efforts in this area. There is dissatisfaction with the management of the Fund; key recipients and major stakeholders criticize its responsiveness, its transparency and associated overheads.'[49]

Of particular concern to DFID, the JIU noted that '[c]ritical voices consider that the survival of the VTF is not a result of the Fund's good performance and efficiency, but more a consequence of the lack of capacity of some donors to follow up on their contributions.'[50] It recommended that fees charged for the administration of the VTF be revised with a view to increasing both transparency and efficiency.[51]

In its response to the JIU report, the UN Mine Action Team made little effort to defend the VTF — indeed it explicitly acknowledged that 'in most cases, delays are a result of lengthy negotiations regarding refunds and overhead costs, as well as of the terms and conditions of agreements with organizations of the United Nations system, many of which have their own regulatory frameworks.'[52] Instead, it sought to divert attention to the need for assessment of other funding mechanisms operated by the UN to support mine action.

6 Global mine action and donor coordination

There is no global forum for mine action coordination. The IMAS represent generally agreed standards (although some are controversial, notably the recently amended Land Release IMAS)[53]. The IMAS definition of mine action is, though, generally accepted, including among donors, and sets out a baseline for what mine action is, and what it aims to achieve. It foresees five 'pillars': MRE; humanitarian demining, i.e. mine and ERW survey, mapping, marking and clearance; victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration; stockpile destruction; and advocacy

[46] E. Roman-Morey and M. Mounir Zahran, 'Evaluation of the Scope, Organization, Effectiveness and Approach of the Work of the United Nations in Mine Action', *op. cit.*, para. 139.
[47] *Ibid.*, Recommendation 3.
[48] 'Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action, Note by the Secretary-General', UN doc. A/68/63/Add.1, 1 March 2013, para. 10.
[49] E. Roman-Morey and M. Mounir Zahran, 'Evaluation of the Scope, Organization, Effectiveness and Approach of the Work of the United Nations in Mine Action', *op. cit.*, p. v.
[50] *Ibid.*, para. 150.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. vi.
[52] 'Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action, Note by the Secretary-General', UN doc. A/68/63/Add.1, 1 March 2013, para. 7.
[53] See Amended IMAS 07.11: 'Land Release'; Amended IMAS 08.10: 'Non-technical Survey'; and Amended IMAS 08.20: Technical Survey, available at: http://www.mineactionstandards.org/news/detail/article/1365492866-amended-land-release-imas-and-more/.

against the use of antipersonnel mines.[54] Nonetheless, the definition has not been updated since 2009, and is beginning to 'show its age'. The focus on 'humanitarian' demining is clearly outdated, and the definition reflects only the most basic model of interaction between mine action and development.

UNMAS is responsible for facilitating the coordination of UN mine action policy but its effectiveness in doing so was strongly contested by the JIU report, which asserted the need for 'stronger' coordination and asserting that UNMAS has struggled to assert its leadership role within the UN family.[55] It noted that UNDP, UNICEF, and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) (as implementing partner) 'now have considerable leverage', and concluded that 'the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation and coordination both at headquarters and in the field varies from case to case and is very much country dependent and personality driven. **The diversity of mine action-related activities and actors demands, overall, coordination and full adhesion to the principles of partnership.**'[56]

With respect to donors, the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), established in 1998, 'endeavours' to coordinate mine action programmes of the world's major donor states and 'increase donor support for mine action where it is most needed'.[57] Members of the UN Mine Action Team and the GICHD attend as observers. Chairmanship of the MASG rotates every two years; Australia was serving as the Chair for 2012 and 2013.[58] In 2011, donor countries contributed over US$465 million for mine action in 57 states and areas. The majority of funding came from just a few sources: contributions from the top four mine action donors — the US, Norway, Australia, and Japan, respectively — accounted for almost 60% of all donor funding. The UK was the eighth biggest donor.[59] The main recipients were Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq, followed by Sudan, Angola, and Lebanon. The new UN Strategy (2013–2018) sees sustained and predictable financial support from donors and in national budgets as an important enabling factor for mine action as well as for the successful implementation of its own strategy:

> 'Such support is necessary for emergency responses as well as for interventions designed to transfer responsibilities to sustainable national systems and institutions. External resources will also be critical to the effective and efficient implementation of this strategy's commitments to increase UN capacity and strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems.'

It is clear, though, that donor and UN strategies for mine action are far from copycats of each other. As is well known, DFID's focus is on releasing land for socio-economic development, building capacity in host governments, and securing VFM, with the additional proviso that support is concentrated on countries where its development assistance is targeted. It does not make adherence to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions a prerequisite for support.

US policy on support to mine action, coordinated through its Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) focuses on mine action as just one element in creating conditions conducive to 'peace, stability, and prosperity' by 'curbing the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war such as light automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades, and removing and destroying others, such as persistent landmines and abandoned stocks of munitions, that remain and pose hazards after the cessation of armed conflict.'[60] Not being a party itself to the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions means that the US has rarely felt comfortable promoting the treaties abroad.

The new UN multi-year strategy has four strategic objectives:

- Risks to individuals and the socio-economic impacts of mines and ERW, including cluster munitions, are reduced;
- Comprehensive support is provided by national and international actors to mine and ERW victims within broader responses to injury and disability;
- The transfer of mine action functions to national actors is accelerated, with national capacity to fulfil mine action responsibilities increased; and
- Mine action is promoted and integrated in multilateral instruments and frameworks as well as national plans and legislation.

[54] IMAS 04.10: 'Glossary', Definition 3.172.
[55] E. Roman-Morey and M. Mounir Zahran, 'Evaluation of the Scope, Organization, Effectiveness and Approach of the Work of the United Nations in Mine Action', *op. cit.*, p. iii.
[56] *Ibid.*, pp. iii–iv (original emphasis).
[57] 'The Mine Action Support Group (MASG)', E-Mine, http://www.mineaction.org/funding/masg.
[58] *Ibid*.
[59] *Landmine Monitor Report 2012*, pp. 48–49.
[60] US Department of State, 'Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA)', undated but accessed on 21 May 2013, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/.

Thus, no notion of value for money, or enhanced efficiency or effectiveness is included *per se* in the UN's strategic objectives, nor is promoting development, made a strategic objective, as should arguably have been the case.

7 Evidence on Rural Economic Development and Security

The countries included in DFID's CHASE mine action programme have predominantly rural economies and the majority of community beneficiaries of the land released from mine danger, be it fields, grazing land, roads or villages, are agriculturalists. Hence it is important to understand the part played by agriculture in the national economy of a developing country in the modern world, and the benefits that might arise from resuming agricultural production post-mine clearance. Is the agricultural economy a marginal economic backwater, essential only to the livelihoods of rural poor, or does it make a real economic contribution to national prosperity?

Some evidence follows which shows:

- The importance to the national economy of restoring productivity to previously devastated agricultural areas;
- The underlying importance of security, to which mine clearance makes a substantial contribution, in creating the conditions of community confidence and self sustained economic growth.

7.1 Role of Agriculture in Economic Development

Following the pattern of historic industrialisation and economic development in the West, it has long been thought that agricultural and wider rural regions play a passive role in economic modernisation, providing a mobile labour force and food, building supplies and raw materials for the towns and cities, where the main economic engines lie. This model was originally articulated by the Nobel Prize-winning Caribbean economist Sir Arthur Lewis[61]. He describes a steady flow of labourers moving from countryside to town, and then his noted 'Lewisian turning point' being reached, at which rural labour dries up and industrial wages in the towns start to rise. There was much discussion in 2008-09 about China having reached this point in its development, with rising wages starting to deter foreign direct investment [62].

In the Lewis model of development, the developing economy has two distinct sectors – a densely populated rural hinterland based on subsistence agriculture, and a much more productive industrial and service sector based in towns. Surplus rural labour, which has extremely low productivity anyway, is drawn to the population centres to support output growth being fuelled by investment. The model was further developed by Fei and Ranis [63] and formed the most widely accepted theory of developing Third World countries and regions in the 1960s and 1970s.

This model, while descriptive enough for many nations in that era, has its serious limitations in many current development situations. For instance, the assumption of plentiful surplus labour in agricultural areas is often not borne out in practice, even considering seasonal cycles of labour demand. Also, there is often no longer any guarantee of steady growth in employment opportunities in the cities and towns, especially when the labour-saving characteristics of much modern technology are considered.

This is well summarised by Todaro and Smith [64], who observe:

> "Today, development economists have come to realize that far from playing a passive, supporting role in the process of economic development, the agricultural sector in particular and the rural economy in general must play an indispensable part in any overall strategy of economic progress, especially for the low-income development countries."

As a result, this long-standing theory of rural region out-migration in support of urban development has been displaced by more sophisticated models based on real data from the modern world, particularly that of John W Mellor [65].

[61] W. Arthur Lewis, *Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour*, Manchester School 22, 1954.
[62] For instance, see Jim Wang and Xiaohan Zhong, *Has China's Lewisian Turning Point Arrived?: Theoretical Clarification and International Experience*, CCWE Working Paper no.30, September 2009.
[63] John C.H. Fei and Gus Ranis, *Development of the Labor Surplus Economy*, Homewood, IL, 1964.
[64] Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, *Economic Development*, Addison-Wesley, 2009, page 432.
[65] John W. Mellor, *Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization*, in *Development Strategies Reconsidered*, ed J P Lewis and V Kallab, 1986. Also the book he edited of the same title, *Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization,* publ. for the International Food Policy Research Institute, John Hopkins University Press, 1995.

Mellor is not simply a theorist, but has been working in Afghanistan with the USAID-financed Rebuilding Agricultural Markets Programme (RAMP) led by Chemonics, helping farmers to switch from cultivating poppies to marketable food products. The aim of the project is to reduce poverty and spur growth of the agriculture industry. There is known to be great potential for exports of high-quality fruits and nuts, helping the country return to the markets it dominated in the 1970s. The same potential exists throughout other parts of Asia and Africa.

Other sources stress a renewed recognition of the importance of agricultural development in national economic progress. Because the resources used by agriculture do not generally compete with other resources in the economy, strong agricultural growth "tends to be additive to growth in other sectors". In Kenya, it has been shown that the multipliers for agricultural growth are three times those for non-agricultural activity. Because of current efficiencies in international trade in agricultural produce, the agriculture sector in the developing world is capable of growing at rates 50% more than it was in the 1980s. Agricultural growth also creates markets for non-agricultural rural goods and services, and "is not only effective at alleviating rural poverty, but is more effective than industrial growth in reducing urban poverty." [66].

8 Security and Development

Some recent literature on international development has started to focus on the relationship between security and development, and the importance of security as a pre-requisite for effective economic progress. Clear links between violence and poverty have been established by the United Nations [67]. Most nations having the lowest score on the UN's Human Development Index have experienced conflict since 1990 and have low life expectancies, because conflict erodes food production, medical services, education and other facilities, and free movement in pursuit of economic activity.

Such nations are of course heavily affected by landmines, and mine action is without doubt a critical part of the path out of conflict-related poverty.

For example, a survey of more than 700 Afghans undertaken in early 2009 across 14 provinces found that 70% of respondents blamed poverty and unemployment as being overwhelmingly responsible for the conflict in the country[68].

Paul Collier, Professor of Economics at Oxford University, has made a special study of the causes of poverty in the least developed countries, especially but not exclusively in Africa. He identifies conflict and lack of security as major contributing factors to poverty. The average civil war costs around four times annual GDP [69], and a typical conflict lowers GDP by 15-10% from what would otherwise be expected, which tends to reinforce the conflict situation in a vicious cycle [70]. Detrimental to the generally small countries, but more favourable to larger countries such as Mozambique and South Sudan, is that the provision of security is subject to strong economies of scale.

Human security is a necessary pre-condition for lasting development, and creating secure areas, such as safe corridors, within which development can be undertaken more steadily and cumulatively, under reduced threat of disruption by terrorism or land mines, can be seen as a logical step towards wider regional development. Cleared, safe corridors also provide secure access routes for import and export of goods, services and people, in support of the recognised "spill-over" of economic benefits between towns and regions and towns.

John McKay notes that development studies are currently struggling to rise to the challenge of pointing the way for the development process, and "human security" is perhaps the required new mandate: "The ideas of *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear* are both noble and essential for our collective survival" [71].

[66] Roger D Norton, *Agricultural Development Policy: Concepts and Experiences*, FAO, John Wiley, 2004.
[67] *Human Development Report*, United Nations, 2005, Chapter 5.
[68] *The Cost of War: Afghan Experiences of Conflict 1978-2009*, Oxfam, November 2009.
[69] Paul Collier, *Africa: Geography and Growth*, TEN (quarterly journal), Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Fall 2006.
[70] Paul Collier, *African Growth: Why a 'Big Push'?*, Journal of African Economies, 2006.
[71] John McKay, *Security and Development in the Post-9/11 World*, in *International Development: Issues and Challenges*, edited D Kingsbury, J McKay, J Hunt el al, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

ANNEX C:

Country Mission Report - Cambodia

Table of Contents

1 Country Background and Project Context

1.1 Origins and Extent of Contamination

Contamination in Cambodia stems from the Vietnam War, when large quantities of bombs were dropped on north-eastern Cambodia in the attempt to interdict Vietnamese forces along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The bulk of the landmine contamination followed from the 1979 invasion by the Vietnamese to overthrow the Khmer Rouge - a protracted conflict that did not fully end until 1998. Large minefields are concentrated along the north-western borders, and the heaviest concentration of explosive remnants of war (ERW) is in the north-east, the extended conflicts resulted in contamination throughout much of the country.

1.2 National Authorities and Key Actors

Mine action began in Cambodia in 1992 under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). When the UNTAC mandate ended in late 1993, the mine action programme continued in the form of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) as the key national organisation and the largest operator.

Since 2000 national mine action policy and strategy in Cambodia has been overseen by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)[1]. The CMAA is an inter-governmental body of high-level officials chaired by the Prime Minister. In addition, many international NGOs have established operations. HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and Handicap International Belgium (HI-B) for example.

1.3 Support for Mine Action

Cambodia has a decentralised system for mine action where most of the funds for demining are in the hands of the operators[2] and along with Afghanistan, Cambodia is one of the largest recipients of international assistance[3].

On the national level the CMAA receives international assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a technical advisor, plus modest funding.[4] The largest recipient in Cambodia is CMAC which receives assistance, 20% of which is multi-lateral, 60%, bi-lateral and 20% from the Government of Cambodia.[5]

1.4 Legal Framework

Cambodia acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 25 March 1997[6] and signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in December 1997 and ratified it in July 1999.[7] They have not joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).[8]

1.5 Survey and Prioritisation

Cambodia, in its twenty years of mine action has undergone many different provincial and national level surveys employing varying techniques and methodologies. Even so, the precise extent of contamination is not known.

Through UNDP support and the Clearing for Results programme, the latest survey, a two-year Baseline Survey (BLS) project has estimated total mine and ERW contamination at 1,624km2.[9] The survey data has been fed into revised guidelines and criteria for work planning and prioritisation that seek to integrate clearance more closely with broader commune development plans. They specify that priority is given to clearing hazardous area polygons identified by the BLS and where there have been casualties in the past five years. This in turn feeds into the Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU) process.[10]

[1] Royal Decree No. 177 (September 2000) followed by Sub-Decree No. 76 (August 2001).
[2] The exception being the Clearance for Results Trust Fund managed by UNDP.
[3] In 2011 Cambodia received almost US$35.8 million for mine action from 13 donors. *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor,* 2012.
[4] Interview with Chum Bun Rong, Director General CMAA, April 5, 2013
[5] Interview with Heng Ratana, Director General CMAC, April 4, 2013
[6] UN Office for Disarmament website
[7] The Treaty entered into force in January 2000 and according to its provisions, Cambodia is obliged to locate all mined areas, then to clear all known mined areas by the end of 2009. As this was not possible, Cambodia has requested the States Parties to the APMBC for a 10 year extension.
[8] *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, 2012
[9] 89 out of 124 districts reporting
[10] *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, 2012

The MAPU process represents an important innovation in Cambodia's mine action programme. A three-tiered mechanism functioning under the CMAA aims to establish community preferences for demining. The MAPU work at the village and commune levels to solicit and categorise demining requirements and facilitate district workshops at which the demining preferences of the communes in the district are aggregated into a district preference ranking. These are then developed into a provincial mine action plan by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMAC).[11] Landmine/ERW casualties are seen by all groups as important criteria for setting priorities, and the Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS) provides very good data and analysis on casualties.

1.6 Assessing the Overall Performance of MA programmes

The MA situation in Cambodia can be summarised in a Radar diagram (Figure 1) using six reference criteria which are:

1. Marginal cost of mine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal;
2. Percentage of endangered population having received Mine Risk Education (MRE)/RRE;
3. Number of untreated victims or those in need of continued treatment from mine-induced wounds/trauma;
4. Advocacy and local MA ownership to gauge the country's authorities' commitment to direct and manage MA actions;
5. Percentage of stockpile destruction;
6. Percentage of area of country's danger zone cleared of mines.

The criteria have been assessed on a 1 to 5 scale for each of the six criteria, whereby "1" indicates a good position for the country, and "5" indicates a situation where the country needs critical attention. Hence, the smaller the area covered by the radar diagram, the better the position of the country, and the less support it presumably would need from public or donor funds.

The model is intended to illustrate an alternative and joined-up approach to measuring the impact of mine action and development. More systematic baselines, regular reporting and impact evaluations introduced through the CHASE MA Programme will make it possible to construct more informed representations of the likely contribution of MA to development in target countries. Parameters for such an assessment would include such criteria as extent of contamination, governance (capacity and human rights); commitment to inclusive development (e.g. pro-poor), demographics, proximity/remoteness.

Figure 1: Radar Diagram – Effectiveness of MA Programmes in Cambodia



[11] Therefore, districts cannot establish the final priorities; rather, they adopt preference rankings (i.e. wish lists). Interview with Som Mony, Deputy Director, MAPU Battambang, April 2, 2013.

2 Methodological Adaptation for Evaluation of MA in Country

2.1 Methodology for Community Impact Survey

The community impact survey was conducted using a qualitative methodology consisting of focus group discussions, key informant interviews, village mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines. The survey took place in Cambodia in a short time frame, between the 12th and 28th of March, 2013. It included a 3-day training of local surveyors and was carried out by four team members - one international team member and four national. The team was gender balanced (two females and two males), and the three national team members all spoke native Khmer and sufficient to good English.

The study included six communities that had been demined and one counterfactual; a community with no operations under the CHASE programme, and that has not had any operations from any other organisation for several years, and where significant contamination still existed. In almost all communities two focus groups were conducted, in sex homogenous groups. The data from the focus groups was complemented by individual key informant interviews with members of the community who played a key role at the community level, who had been part of the demining operation and/or who had been directly affected by either the landmines or the demining.

The sample of seven villages was taken from the provinces of Battambang and Pailin. The sample was identified through a standard set of criteria, used for the fieldwork conducted in each country and defined in the methodology (see Annex M): the guiding principle was selecting villages in the relevant areas which are as different as possible regarding characteristics considered significant in terms of level and type of development (environmental context, type of livelihoods, type of land contamination experienced, accessibility, services, etc[12]). In addition, a counterfactual study was conducted to examine the degree to which an area that was not demined experienced something different from what was visible in areas already demined. The data collection model used in the counterfactual was the same as that of other villages. Similarly, the data from the counterfactual was treated in the same manner as the other villages. Table 1 provides a list of the communities surveyed.

Table 1

Village	Commune	District	Province	Short Description
CHISANG	Treng	Ratanakmundul	Battambang	Highland for farming, highly de-forested not far from main road, but relatively far from district town (55Km), over 10km to markets, with common services (school, pagoda), and access to wells, over 5km to health service, with much land to be cleared still. World Vision worked there in the recent past (agricultural production: rice, corn, cassava, and bean).
PHLOV MEAS	Plovmeas	Ratanakmundol	Battambang	Highland for farming, relatively far from district town (65km), to small market and health places. Good access to school and water pump, less land to be cleared then Chisang. Military compound in the area. World Vision worked there in the recent past.
THNAL BAT	Steung Trang	Salakrau	Pailin	Highland for farming, and some low land for rice. Fertile land. Very close to markets and less than 20km from the provincial town, close to Thai border (agricultural production: cassava / corn / rice /beans), highly de-forested and developed.

[12] See Annex B16 for criteria for selecting sample villages

Village	Commune	District	Province	Short Description
THNAL KAENG	Ou Andoung	Salakrau	Pailin	Not far from provincial town, but little access to water, people go to work far; overall quite similar to Thnal Bat.
SUNG MUY	Sung	Samlot	Battambang	Easy to access, close to the border, good soil for cash crops such as pepper, the poor tend to own small plots or cultivate around the village; there is a farmer's organisation.
SEK SAK	Phlov Meas	Rathanak Mondul	Battambang	Quite far from district town, many cash crops including fruits (mango and longan), all services are less than 5km included post office. Chosen because they are piloting a different approach from MAG, called "Community Based Clearance", which supposedly aims at clearing all the contaminated land which exists in a village, but there is still much land to be cleared, people uncertain on MAG plans, and mechanical means were moved elsewhere.
SEREYVON	Andeuk Hep	Rathanak Mondul	Battambang	**Counterfactual** – high farmland and some low land for rice; less then 50km from district town, quite close to market, close to a school, large portion of farmland contaminated. Many organisations working in the community but very little development. The most fertile land has landmines on large portions; people go to work far from village, many sell labour outside.

The data collected was used to triangulate the findings presented below. All the findings noted below correspond to information which was gathered in group interviews and further substantiated by individual interviews. No data below corresponds to the views or opinions of a single respondent. While the findings below cannot be assumed to be representative of the whole country, they are believed to be indicative of what can be found in similar settings throughout Cambodia.

The main constraint experienced was the limited time allocated to the fieldwork exercise and the main difficulties consisted in correct attribution: humanitarian mine action in the country is a long existing activity and many national and international organisations are involved. On the receiving end people were sometimes confused about who was doing what, considering that different organisations work in same villages on different or contiguous tasks over time. Also, transformation in the local and regional economy happens at a relatively fast pace, and while long term demining is often said to be a precondition for this there are also other drivers at work - including international food supply chains and markets and private investors interests in natural resources. To try to counter these limitations, the team increased the number and types of informants surveyed in order to better understand the relative importance of mine action and in particular of demining in relation to maintaining and/or improving livelihoods for rural Cambodians. The survey was intended to be gender sensitive, and has captured some elements for a reading of gendered impact of contamination and demining, but to a very limited extent given the lack of time resources for a thorough gender analysis and lack of a preliminary gender assessment to evaluate against.

In order to optimise the time available and maintain the procedure for collection and transcription[13], the team[14] utilised a different approach in one village (Thnal Keng) in which only half a day was allocated for data collection and half a day for transcription. The interviews were conducted with an approach similar to that used by the research project "Time to listen"[15]. Instead of gathering people in one place at the beginning of the day, this method provides

[13] One day fully dedicated to data collection in one village, the next day fully dedicated to transcription, triangulation and initial data analysis.
[14] Sex balanced as far as national members, with prevalence of female if international consultants is considered.
[15] Collaborative Learning Projects, *Time to Listen: Hearing from People at the Receiving End of International Aid*, 2012; http://cdalisteningproject.wordpress.com/ (last visited 20 May 2013). The project has been developed over more than 5 years, and as the Local Capacity for Peace Project which resulted in the "Do no Harm" handbook, is led by Mary B. Anderson.

that the surveyors, after having informed local authorities, would seek to interview people at the places where they undertake their daily activities.

2.2 Methodology for Institutional Capacity Appraisal

The Institutional Capacity evaluation was grounded in an extensive documentation analysis, based mainly on government policy, programme reports and evaluations, the Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development (O'Reilly, Friedman, Dinsmore, Storr, & MacPherson, 2012) and a review of peer-reviewed articles related to institutional capacity building. A thematic guide for interviews was prepared by the evaluation team for the different stakeholder groups (DFID contractors, UNDP/UNMAS, the National Mine Action Authority, development partner NGOs/cluster coordinators, local administrators) identified by the evaluation team and in consultation with in-country operators. Eighteen interviews were undertaken. Identified key-informants were contacted by email, and interviewed at their work premises by the researchers, with notes maintained. Where time allowed the evaluators interviewed in a pair to corroborate findings. All interviews were undertaken in English and took approximately 45-60 minutes. The findings from interviews and the literature were grouped into themes to address the evaluation questions and the analysis integrated with the literature. In addition, a further ten interviews related to institutional capacity were undertaken in the context of the Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013. The aim was to reach data 'saturation', that is data collection is terminated when no new information is forthcoming (Patton, 2002). To an extent, qualitative data collection was also determined by resource and key informant availability. While not exhaustive, the review of the literature covered the most pertinent documents related to the evaluation questions. Contact was made and data gathered with a wide range of institutional interlocutors.

Table 2: Evaluation team approach

Stakeholder Group	Approach
National Government Institutions	Personal Interview; Data review, Operations centre visit, field visit(s)
United Nations	Personal interview, Data review, Geneva meeting.
MAG/HALO/INGOs	Personal Interview, Operations Centre visit, Training centre visit, field visit(s)
HMG, Bilaterals, IFI/MDBs	Personal Interview, teleconference, Embassy Visits, Country HQ visit/meeting
NGOs Civil Society/Affectees/Beneficiaries	Personal Interview, Field/Village visit(s), female interviewer/interviewees, survey questionnaire.

Key stakeholders in Cambodia are varied, and are set out in Box 1. Overall, whilst there are some overarching competition for resources, on the ground, inter-personal relationships between key actors seem to be working well and are positive.

Box 1: Key Mine Action Stakeholders in Cambodia[16]

Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA): MAG Cambodia works with the permission of the Royal Government of Cambodia under a three year MoU with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and annual accreditation with CMAA. This accreditation has just been renewed and runs until 08th March 2016.
MAG maintains a good relationship with CMAA and has a strong reputation for quality and compliance within the national authority.
Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC): CMAC was formed in 1992 and was initially the national authority. In 2000, the CMAA was formed and CMAC became an autonomous national clearance organisation. It is the largest clearance organisation in Cambodia with approximately 2,000 staff currently and conducts operations nationwide. MAG maintains a close but professional relationship with CMAC and currently sub contract their MDD teams from them.
Mine Action Planning Unit (MAPU): MAG work closely with the provincial MAPUs and attend the regular planning/tasking meetings.
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF): Now accredited by CMAA, RCAF conducts some humanitarian demining operations in Cambodia. MAG coordinates with them.
United Nations – UNDP: UNDP work with and support the CMAA through capacity building and the provision of a Project Advisor and TAs in the QA/QC department, PR/VA department, and socio-economic planning department.
MAG's Development partners: CARE; World Vision; Cambodian Family Economic Development Association (CFEDA) and Life With Dignity (LWD)
International HMA NGOs: Include Norwegian People's Aid, The Halo Trust, Golden West Foundation and Handicap International. MAG maintains a good operational working relationship with all of these organisations.
National HMA NGOs: There is currently one accredited national NGO operating in Cambodia; Cambodian Self Help Demining Group. This organisation was founded by Aki Ra and was accredited in 2009. They have one clearance team and conduct demining and EOD operations in the Siem Reap region.
Commercial companies operating in Cambodia: BACTEC

3 Evaluation Purpose 1: Community Impact of MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Community Impact Survey conducted in seven communities in Cambodia (including one counterfactual community).

3.1 Key findings

The DFID CHASE programme is contributing to the decontamination of a key resource – land, which is mainly farmland. The positive impact on the agricultural productivity of the Battambang and Pailin areas was confirmed by the communities which benefitted to some extent from the programme. Mostly cash crops (corn and cassava) are being cultivated in decontaminated and released land and most of the produce is being sold into the Thai market through local traders. The increase in available land is also said to be providing higher profit to traders and to agri-shops who are local retailers of agribusiness products. The people surveyed believed that the "middle class" and "rich families" are the ones who are benefitting most from this development. Poor households are seen to be receiving indirect benefit through increased opportunities for agricultural labour, closer to their homes. Labourers were also said to have benefitted from the demining of the land of "middle class" families because they see their exposure to risk of mine accidents diminish. The restart of agricultural production on de-mined land was even said to have accounted for increasing school attendance.

The most vulnerable people appear to be particularly sensitive to the timing of demining: small and very small land owners dealing with mine contamination problems do not have a long time buffer of reserves to use while waiting for the demining of their land. The result is often that they either attempt cultivation on contaminated land, or they decide to sell mined land for half its value price, or risk falling into a debt trap by taking accessible commercial loans which are only available at high interest rates.

MAG is believed to be operating at a recognised optimum standard of technical skills and MAG is also credited with providing livelihood opportunities and individual capacity building for a large number of deminers, including women, who make up one third of deminers. The pace of operations is quite sustained, as recognised by national MA institutional counterparts and by communities, who cite the comparative advantage of the toolkit approach used by MAG, compared to the approaches of other national MA organisations. This approach includes use in all tasks of mechanical ground preparation equipment, and the resulting performance is broadly appreciated.

Challenges appear to focus on the capacity of the demining operator to make optimal use of the Community Liaison (CL) component to help correct potential blindspots in the national prioritisation process, in order to

[16] MAG 2013 initial advice, Matt Thomas, Regional Programme Manager, UK HQ, Manchester.

ensure timely outreach to the most vulnerable, whose condition is highly time sensitive, and adequate pro-poor prioritisation: these are necessary elements to contribute to the achievement of the overall goal of the CHASE programme in Cambodia, which has levels of poverty as an indicator of performance.[17]

3.2 Efficient Mine Clearance

The large and varied mechanical fleet that MAG deploys for ground preparation makes its operations very efficient, dramatically reducing the time needed on every minefield where vegetation cutters and excavators can be used. MAG is considered very fast and very reliable, and the number of villages that they are succeeding in covering in this approach is very high (46 operations completed or ongoing under CHASE). The responsiveness of MAG to call out requests for destruction is praised less than the technical capacity of the organisation. The responsiveness to individual callouts for devices (LM and unexploded ordnance (UXOs)) was rated by several of the people interviewed in different villages higher in the past than currently. This observation is not directly linked to MAG performance because the referral system in place is mostly dependent on national capacity for responding to punctual requests from villagers. While in past years the CMAC was both managing the national coordination body and conducting technical demining, this organisation is now only conducting operations, since coordination functions are now conducted through public officers assigned to CMAA.

The efficiency in releasing mine fields is of course an important contribution to achieving the first DFID Mine Action Strategy objective. While essential to increasing productivity, mechanically aided demining scores high on efficiency (especially in combination with Value for Money, see below), but potentially reduces effectiveness if choices of tasks are made privileging accessibility of mechanical means and appropriateness of ground over other factors. Minefields which are more remote, less accessible or more uneven, and thus less suitable for demining by more efficient mechanical demining techniques, might in principle be on land used by less wealthy groups. The team observed some minefields in sampled villages left for later consideration because they were less accessible than others (separated by creeks or water beds) despite being currently used by vulnerable population. The MA operator pointed out that this can be attributed to national clearance priorities[18].

It is important that DFID clarifies the vision underpinning its strategy further, and if outreach to vulnerable groups is clearly identified as a guiding criterion, then the concept of efficiency as applied to demining operations should be adapted. Outreach to the poorest is sometimes more expensive and less 'efficient' that other targeting options, but can produce better 'value for money' if serving the poorest effectively is a goal.

3.3 Incidence of landmine accidents

From the national statistics on accidents it can be observed that progress in clearance runs parallel to the reduction of accidents. This statement is correct in the two areas of Pailin and Battambang, where the number of accidents has reduced.[19] Cambodia's high levels of contamination coupled with limited land resources meant that people were previously forced to plough land which was contaminated and risked accidents.

3.4 Focus of clearance prioritisation

The national prioritisation process in Cambodia targets agricultural land, which corresponds to an objective need, as the qualitative survey learnt from the inhabitants of contaminated villages[20]. In villages where people started to re-settle over 12 years ago farming land is still contaminated. Choosing to focus on privately-owned farming land was said to be an important enabler for the low and middle rank individual household's livelihoods to gain socio-economic benefits. The lack of farming land is and has indeed been pinpointed as an important factor in preventing small landowners having sufficient food and income to be able to send their children to school, including in cases where the school was reactivated on cleared land within the village or at a small distance away.

[17] From the Logical Framework of CHASE Cambodia: "Goal: To promote poverty reduction, human security and MDG achievement in Cambodia (with particular regards to development outcomes) by removing the impact of landmines and explosive remnant of war". The indicator used is: "Levels of poverty and vulnerability amongst communities in North West Cambodia".
[18] MAG clarifications – 20th June 2013
[19] In the province of Battambang, the total number of ERW and mine accidents in 2011 was 27, reduced to about 18% of the number of accidents in 2005 (140). In the intermediate years the number of accidents was: 2006:66; 2007:53; 2008:52; 2009:45; 2010: 34. In the smaller province of Pailin, the number of accidents reduced from 75 in 2005 to 16 in 2010 and 13 in 2011.
[20] However it does not correspond to the findings from the MAG baseline survey, which found that over 90% of interviewees (future beneficiaries, since MAG has developed CHASE funded activities in all the villages where the baseline has been conducted) identified forestry as the prevalent land use of contaminated areas (49.77%).

It appears clear from the data collected from the communities visited that the timing of demining is particularly crucial for vulnerable households. The coping strategies of households with sufficient plots of land to offset the loss of contaminated land are very different from those that can be adopted by households who only own small plots of contaminated land. Delaying the clearance of the latter for too long might result in erosion of livelihoods and in further impoverishment. For this reason, in order to harness mine action to enable inclusive development and poverty reduction, the prioritisation process and timely clearance for the most vulnerable is very important.

The Cambodia Mine Action Authority has a structured system in place with 11 steps for formalised prioritisation of an annual workplan. The first and strongest criteria for identifying priority communes is the incidence of accidents in the last three years. Presented as strongly participative, the steps in which the communities are involved correspond to:

- The technical baseline developed mostly by the CMMA and just recently completed for the whole country;
- The moment in which initiative is taken by individuals with contaminated land to inform the Village Head to produce a proposal;
- The meeting at village level with the owners of the land contained in the proposal in which the MA organisation discusses how to organise the workplan to clear different mine fields in the village over time.

The demining operator can influence the process most at communal meetings. In the commune level meetings the MAG staff are present, normally with a Community Liaison (CL) Officer. In these meetings development organisations participate as well, and their contribution is normally to propose their priority areas and type of interventions. Some of them have good knowledge of vulnerable people's needs in certain villages. Once the villages are chosen and retained in the MA operator's priority list, the community is "consulted", or an "investigation" is conducted. These expressions mostly denote the subsequent phase in which the MA operators will go and meet again with the village head and the owners of land which is to be demined, and will inspect the Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) and its accessibility.

Based on the information collected in the survey it appears that this process favours reclamation of land that does not belong to the most vulnerable groups of owners, who are also less well physically and politically connected. Internal power dynamics at village level for deciding which land to submit for clearance might (and does) influence the process of proposal presentation. The level of motivation or proactivity of the single Village Head is a crucial point, and considering literacy and overall transparency level in governance processes, it might be a critical one. Ease of accessibility to the village and to the minefields selected might become a deciding argument both for development and for MA operators, considering the impact on efficiency of logistic expenditures, especially in the case of mechanical demining.

The way in which the participation of the impacted communities is consented in the process does not seem to enable the equitable balancing of power - which tends to sideline the less vocal or powerful.

The possibility to advise the process and correct the shortcoming of the existing prioritisation process should be seen as a contribution to the development of national capacity in humanitarian mine action – accenting in the concept of 'humanitarian' the component of impartial and needs-based interventions. Conversations with MAG staff, including Community Liaison (CL) staff, showed that this is not happening to the potential extent.

3.4.1 Use of M&E data to prioritise clearance and measure impact

MAG performed a large baseline study, with significant deployment of personnel (15 staff) for about three months producing data that can be used as panel data for a final impact evaluation if appropriate resources are allocated[21]. However, the baseline does not seem to have been utilised at any stage of the planning and prioritisation process. Furthermore, it is not possible from the baseline to extract vulnerability profiles of households with contaminated land.

The choice of focus for mine clearance – agricultural land – while fully justified by the DFID strategy, was not reconciled with findings from the baseline survey: over 90% of interviewees (future beneficiaries, since MAG has developed CHASE funded activities in all the villages where the baseline has been conducted) identified forestry as the prevalent land use of contaminated areas (49.77%). From the community impact survey, conducted around 24 months after the baseline, these data are understandable considering that forestry has two different functions: it is utilised for collecting wood, hunting and gathering by the poorest and poor families; but it can also be seen as a potential for obtaining or reinforcing land ownership, or for attempting land transaction, since 'clearing' a portion of

[21] This evaluation did not have sufficient funds to embark on this.

forest from vegetation (by slash-and-burn techniques), normally with the preliminary consent of a village head, allows the person clearing the land to claim that portion of land.

The baseline review collected and presented data on sex and age in a disaggregated format, but did not provide any consequent gender analysis of the results that could be useful to programming and prioritisation processes.

MAG does not have a system that monitors livelihoods improvement or potential gaps to be filled to enable vulnerable people formerly affected by landmines to be able to use the cleared land. In recent months MAG decided to invest in strengthening M&E and in developing the Mine Action Impact Assessment (MIA) system, intended to develop quantitative evidence of the impact of demining on the livelihoods of individual beneficiaries. This initiative seems to have great potential to improve monitoring and the understanding of the effect of operations, in relation to socio-economic indicators.

Feedback from beneficiaries of MAG operations in Cambodia is at present not used to adjust programming and priorities, the prioritisation system being quite rigid and centralised, and the direct conversation with beneficiaries or impacted populations being very limited.

In order for MA clearance outcomes to contribute to poverty reduction[22], improvement of current monitoring modalities is essential. The new DFID CHASE strategy could benefit from making explicit reference to the need for improvements to current M&E systems of demining operators, and to the need to collect feedback at given times from affected and 'treated' communities. Information on the needs of the vulnerable population (e.g. to start farming on cleared land) could be used by mine action operators to prioritise mine clearance, and could be used by other relief and development actors operating in country, or by local government agencies where appropriate, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of MA in meeting expected development outcomes and livelihoods improvement.

3.4.2 Community participation in clearance prioritisation

The work of Community Liaison (CL), as it is defined in the guidelines and currently budgeted in the CHASE country project, does not allow a facilitation of fully participatory processes[23] for the prioritisation of land to be cleared, especially if outreach and involvement of the most vulnerable is the target.

In the CL Standard Operating Procedures there is not a clear reference to the need to produce baseline data that unpacks the wealth structure of the community and relates the appraisal of how land is distributed/accessed to prioritisation of land. Although in the prioritisation criteria "status of beneficiary" is mentioned as one element[24] to consider, there seems not to be a codified process behind this to build in nuanced local knowledge, which requires triangulation, outreach and time consuming interpersonal work at the village level. In one case in which the evaluation team had the time to fully develop total triangulation for assessing the current capacity of CL to read wealth and power structures in the communities, the understanding of the evaluation team proved to be very different from the narrative of the involved CL staff. The choice to demine Thnal Bat and to prioritise the large plot of land referred to as "Yim Saroy" (from the name of the majority owner) was judged by the evaluation team as not being justified by the argument that it served very poor households, which the CL staff firmly hold being the case. In Thnal Bat, MAG has ongoing operations, organised into two tasks for a total of over 100 hectares. MAG has already released land in the past in the same village, including a pond on communal land in 2004.

In Cambodia's MA prioritisation process, MAG CL hold meetings at communal level and then perform an 'investigation' in the village, to assess the status of beneficiaries for the current Suspected Hazardous Area (SHA) polygons in the villages that MAG itself has chosen. Discordant understanding between the CL and the survey team of the situation in villages suggests that the amount of time and human resources that MAG can currently dedicate to the process is too limited. With an average coverage of 27 villages by a single team of two CL field officers, the availability of time for actual fieldwork and communication with people in each village is very scarce. This is reflected by the uncertainty of some beneficiaries on the boundaries of the demined area, which they believe to be smaller than the area actually cleared.

As explained by MAG coordinating CL staff, before finalising the decision on which minefield within a village is going to be cleared first, a community meeting is held and a plan decided. Community meetings alone, involving the village chief and farmers with contaminated land (mostly men, as women in villages have consistently remarked) of different

[22] As stated in the overall goal of the project in the Logical Framework, see note 4.
[23] As indicated in milestones of Output 1 of the Logical Framework
[24] MAG criteria for prioritisation for the Community Liaison: 1) history of accidents; 2) proximity to residential areas; 3) beneficiary status; 4) level of fear; 5) land use; 6) accessibility of the area / security

economic classes and conflicting interests, are not the appropriate participatory setting for ensuring inclusive targeting, since these meetings might not provide the opportunity to obtain missing information or spontaneous consensus on privileging the demining of the land of the poorest first. People interviewed in the sampled villages, and particularly women, reported a low level of involvement in the decision process for everyone, and they all agreed that women are practically not involved in the process.

The CL national coordinator highlighted the opportunity costs for the poor to participate in the existing participatory processes. Many would work for daily pay and live or survive from that, therefore they cannot afford to miss a day of pay for participation in the meeting. Therefore, without a budget line to compensate labour missed, participation of the poor and poorest is not possible. The lack of a socio-economic focused approach to priority setting that actively engages affected communities has been a challenge to ensuring that the DFID CHASE objectives are met.

3.5 Socio-Economic Outputs and Outcomes

In Cambodia approximately 100,000 direct and indirect beneficiaries of land released for development - including the safe access/development/use of public services, shelter and settlements, collection of natural resources and small/medium/large scale infrastructure - have been recorded[25].

Overall, the impact of clearing farming land does bring direct or cascading benefits to all people living or working in areas affected by landmines. Cultivation always restarts on land released, and typically cash crops like corn and cassava are cultivated to be sold (only sporadically consumed, in the case of cassava), mainly on the international market through Thailand.

Nevertheless, villagers of different ranks provided consistent narratives that the opportunities opened by the demining interventions are not the same for everyone.

When observed at intra-community level, the impact greatly varies according to individual / household economic status. In this region of Cambodia, the very poor households in villages have hardly any land, even for housing. The very poor normally benefit from demining through having more labour opportunities closer to their home as a result of increased agricultural production on land owned by other people – although the increasing use of more mechanical means, owned by the wealthiest but rented for the day - are a threat to their employability which they are aware of. For middle ranks families (who made up between 50% and 60% of villages visited, as per the estimation developed with the wealth rank exercise), who normally succeed in having food all year round, having land demined can make a big impact if they have enough capital to start cropping. While the cycle of cassava is less dependent on external inputs (cassava branches need to be purchased the first year but then can be recycled), seeds for corn proceed from the agro-business industry, which in the areas visited is represented mostly by one single company, which also control the purchase of the final products. The cost of these seeds is growing, and they also need to be accompanied by fertilizer and pesticides, also increasing in price over time. Therefore, it is essential for middle rank farmers to be able to access to un-expensive (typically not for profit) credit, which is not largely available, being more often provided by commercial banks or by agro-traders directly. These farmers would therefore tend to enter into a vulnerable balance of obtaining loans for production with little household gain at the end of the cycle (also due to lack of small scale water management infrastructure). Some aid schemes, including those proposed by World Vision, set up saving groups which guarantee lower rates (and also disburse lower loans) and common mechanisms to buy inputs at better prices, but their existence is very limited, as in general organised collective bodies are limited in the country. The rate of loans, combined with the lack of small local sustainable irrigation facilities[26], the growing price of inputs and the lowering prices offered for the crops (also connected with the increase of the offer in the area, as more fields are regained to agriculture) are a potential poverty trap which has caught many households, as consistently heard in all villages with the exception of Sung Muy, where crops cultivated are particular and rare – such as pepper. Some households attempt to escape the trap by selling their land either before it is cleared (if they cannot sustain themselves any longer) or as soon as it is clear, when it becomes worth double its original value.[27] Therefore, even demining the land of those in the middle rank or towards the poor end of the range, in deprived post war economies cannot be a shifting intervention *per se*. Accurate understanding of ongoing dynamics needs to inform timely enabling interventions, to help small farmers capitalise on the opportunity demining provides – if they are able to preserve ownership of their land until the time of clearance.

[25] MAG programme brief delivered to Evaluation Team, Phnom Penh, April 2, 2013.
[26] In the area some NGOs, including CARE and World Vision, have provided support for wells and/or small irrigation, but the coverage is not sufficient. Large infrastructures are currently being designed and debated, to be realised with international loans or concessions to private international investors or foreign governments, but they show a potential for significantly negative impact on livelihoods of millions of small farmers and on the entire ecosystem of the Mekong river, being intended primarily to provide water to the Northern area for large cultivations/plantations.
[27] Price ranges were found to be: 500USD to 2500USD per ha of contaminated land, 2500 to 5000 USD per ha of cleared land.

This argument leads to consideration of the importance of the right level of aggregation (household, not at village or district level) for a socio-economic approach useful in prioritisation for demining. For the households in the middle and lower ranks, timing is crucial: as observed in North and West Cambodia, in general in post conflict settings oil-based (and mineral-based) economies grow at a very high rate, which in turn impacts on the type of agriculture that can be conducted and on the training and opportunity costs of farming. If a large proportion of an individual's land is mined for an extensive period of time following conflict, that individual will miss out on being part of the restarting economy at the time when the oil, mineral and agricultural economies are growing quickly. Therefore, in countries with a very high level of dependence on agriculture there might be a case for strictly prioritising the land of small and medium farmers for demining – possibly even at the same prioritisation level as the demining of land for public services. The decision to postpone de-mining of the land of the poorest might erode all capital and coping strategies available to them and lead to them miss the immediate post conflict economic opportunity window. To deliver the expected impact of poverty reduction appropriate assistance for fostering individual capabilities, assets and opportunities is necessary and in a timely fashion, to allow livelihoods to improve and benefit in a sustainable manner from newly demined land.

From the comparison of interviews held in villages with ongoing or completed operations against those collected in the counterfactual village, it emerged that a key factor to obtain increase in school attendance is stabilisation in livelihoods – appropriate means for income which are sufficient to guarantee food security of the household and sufficient cash for basic school material requirements. Demining schools and paths to access them, and even rehabilitating and having them fully functioning will not enable children to attend school if households do not have access to means of production. On the other hand, if access to farmland in a rural village is sufficient for the existing population, and environmental conditions are favourable, poorer families can derive some benefit as labourer in situ and school attendance increases. The focus on farmland that the CHASE programme had in the current funding cycle can therefore be considered as an element that has trigged – in combination with other factors - higher school attendance in many villages. In the counterfactual sample it was also reported that many households migrated due to difficulties in making a livelihood with contaminated land.

There seems to be consistency between the use declared at the time of the agreement between individual owners and MAG and the actual land use after demining. What might be changing is the owner or the user who can *de facto* use that land once released: small owners on the lowest end of the economical status range, normally already fatigued with loans and debts, tend to sell their recently demined land to repay debts. The land is either sold to local wealthier families (who often are also the ones lending money) or to traders in nearby towns.

Although MAG is progressing fast and professionally in contributing to the clearance process, many mined fields in villages where MAG has worked and released plots of lands are being utilised for farming; and since mines are in the ground people can only use manual ploughs to farm, because tractors or cow-hoes are not safe to use. Even if utilised, the productivity of the mined land cultivated is therefore very low.

3.5.1 Linkages with development organisations

The households who could access some aid scheme related to agricultural production have reported a much more effective use of land for the improvement of their livelihoods and standards of living. Some organisations (such as World Vision) have been providing agricultural support, including extension training, wells and pumps, non-for-profit saving and loan schemes connected to agricultural cycles. The team did not find evidence that these interventions exist for all villages where MAG has conducted CHASE operations; they are only seldom present, existing as a result of independent and not strictly coordinated planning processes. The understanding of the survey team is that aid for development might be received by people whose land was recently demined, because some development agency had the village (and therefore those beneficiaries) in their existing plans, but there does not seem to be in place a process for the timely request of development assistance for all agencies on recently cleared land. A procedure for informing local development actors of newly released land as part of the demining process does not exist.

Coordination meetings and the annual meetings at commune level for preparing mine action workplans do not seem to be an effective mechanism for thoroughly sharing information among NGOs and civil society to propose coordinated interventions through local governance. Another opportunity used for coordination is the public land handover ceremony to which locally active development actors are invited. In general it was observed that a time lag exists between interventions and gaps in area of coverage exist between MA organisations and other development actors. More effective coordination could be achieved through timely coordination and more intentional synchronisation of interventions. The coordination effort could become more effective if anticipated at the baseline assessment stage rather than in the land handover phase.

Coordination with other development actors has been established by MAG with a formal MOU at central level with LWI. The geographical overlap (at provincial level) of World Vision interventions with MAG operations has so far offset the lack of intentional coordinated planning at communal and village levels. Local organisations were not involved in partnership with MAG for MRE or other activities, although World Vision (as villagers recalled) had provided MRE activities for many years. Overall, at field level, it has not been possible to observe clear effects of intentional synergies between the MA operator and other development organisations. Cleared areas utilised by other actors for building or restoring public services are connected with past operations. Some small scale water management interventions and facilitation for creation of farmers' organisations were undertaken in previous years (World Vision schemes and Governmental led initiatives funded by CIDA) and the team could observe the continuing effects of these projects, but they were existing only in a few of the villages covered by CHASE operations, and the programmes seemed not to have been intentionally articulated in conjunction with mine action.

Support to households who are - or after demining could resume to be – small farmers requires timely involvement of development actors, to provide them sufficient support to start agricultural investments without being caught in exploitative for-profit dynamics that for non resilient households can bring a worsening instead of an improvement of livelihoods. Support can be given through extension services and accounting/marketing training, access to not for profit credit, creation of local sustainable infrastructure for irrigation and improvements in access to markets.

3.5.2 Mine Action as a source of income for communities

About one third of MAG's staff are women; this includes female deminers who are equally paid as men. Not all of them can return home every day, but teams are organised in such ways that they work in the areas where they live, and are not sent so far from their village that they cannot return every week. Proximity of the workplace to one's house is a key factor in allowing interest for the job to be expressed by women. It was remarked by several observers in villages where MAG staff are based that female deminers are subject to additional household duties compared to male deminers. Having women performing the same job as men, and being equally paid, allowed the people to recognise unequal distribution of household work.

Many community members have pointed to the capacity of MAG to prioritise poor families when hiring.

3.5.3 Impact of Mine Action on gender

The CHASE operations were not conducted in a particularly gender sensitive way. Besides HR policies, which do aim at more inclusive recruitment of staff of both sexes, there does not seem to be attention or awareness on differences and inequalities existing in society which the MA operations could unintentionally reinforce. The evaluation team did not have sufficient time to develop a fully gender sensitive community impact survey, or to thoroughly assess how landmine contamination and gender patterns were related. A few general observations can nevertheless be shared based on findings.

Women's interviews solidly confirmed that when territory was contaminated, much household-care related work to be performed outside the house were under the responsibilities of men in the family (such as fetching water or collecting firewood), mostly due to the greater distance to be covered to find alternative sources. After clearance those tasks once again became the responsibility of women who would also, unlike men, have to increase their share of farming work due to the previously mined land becoming safe to farm. All women pointed at an increased workload for them when the land had been demined. The improvement in freedom of movement and in personal security given the reduced threats posed by landmines turned out to be a factor conducive to the re-establishment of an unbalanced division of household labour.

Ownership of land, and of contaminated land, is possible and frequent for women of all ages, both married and widowed, due to the conjoint ownership existing in the area surveyed (North – West Cambodia), and reinforced by the current land registration process. From the wealth ranking exercise in communities, it emerges that widows exist in all wealth groups, although to a minor extent among the wealthiest. The survey team also observed many widows among direct beneficiaries, who even if in middle wealth groups experienced more vulnerable livelihoods then other similarly ranked households, being less resilient to shocks. Women who are married to men with multiple wives are the ones for whom demining might be less directly relevant, as they often do not own any land.

There is a clear disparity between the understanding of men and women in the community on dynamics for prioritisation and current and future plan in demining. Women are generally sidelined in the collection of information for prioritisation, the circulation of news on demining planning, and the communication of the approximate length of

time needed for the operation to be completed. They have been found to be generally more uncertain about which land has been demined, even if they were direct beneficiaries, since they could not observe the operations, and they sometimes reported not having had an official handover.

3.6 Impact of Mine Risk Education (MRE)

The CL teams conduct MRE sessions when a new operation is open on a minefield. Activities include video shows, explanations and posters, and the dissemination of stickers. The number of accidents related to handling landmines or UXOs appears to be diminishing in both Battambang (from 76 in 2005 to 8 in 2012) and Pailin, although it remains the main cause of accidents – and the persons who are involved in these accidents have received MRE sensitisation. Even though the incidence of accidents has reduced, the use of landmines and UXO for selling scrap metal or for fishing is still quite frequent, but it might not be appropriate to consider this as a failure of the MRE programme. Rather, this signals a lack of livelihoods opportunities, and there is much work to do in the destruction of landmine and UXO stock and found remains.

3.7 Deforestation Issues

The survey found that some farming activities would start for the first time after land has been demined. Although in principle possible to demine forested land without cutting down tall trees, due to the nature of land registration governmental initiatives, people are pushed to interpret that land titles will only be given if land appears clear (from vegetation) and cultivated. This coupled with growing populations has been an additional driver of deforestation. Therefore, deforestation cannot be attributed to demining itself, but rather to land registration guidelines and growing populations. At the local level, this activity has been an opportunity for some who have no or very little land to earn some money by deforesting, reclaiming, and selling land even before demining has been conducted.

Although demining is not *per se* causing deforestation in the West of Cambodia, MAG is aware that different dynamics could occur in the East of the country, where currently no MA operations are conducted but where the next CHASE intervention in Cambodia could be designed. The Government recently established a regional mine action office to initiate the work, in a quite different environment, in terms of contamination (mostly UXOs and cluster due to past US bombing in the Vietnam war), land use (highly forested), natural resources (large deposits of gold and other highly precious minerals) and stakeholders (mostly international mining companies and foreign governments interested in the areas, populated scarcely and mostly by indigenous communities lightly served by national government services). MAG is planning to participate in the demining effort but has cautiously started explorative work in MRE (in partnership with CARE which is well established in the area) through non DFID funding – as a measure to provide additional value for money to the future proposal which shall be submitted under the next phase of CHASE.

4 Evaluation Purpose 2: Institutional Capacity Developed through the MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Institutional Capacity Appraisal conducted in Cambodia.

4.1 Key Findings

The extent to which demining operators such as HALO or MAG have contributed to developing skilled deminers is uncontested. In contrast, expecting them to build institutional capacity at the national level, especially with the CMAA, does not play to their strengths and is arguably a significant distraction from their core business. MAG attempted to contribute to this objective by contracting GICHD to provide workshops for the CMAA. This suited none of the stakeholders to any great extent.

Of course, while an MA operator cannot, indeed should not, be expected to provide ongoing technical assistance to develop a centralised capacity for MA management, they do have a role to play in improving prioritisation criteria by feeding back community-level information and adapting procedures to supporting livelihood needs. Thus, a more effective approach could be to encourage HALO or MAG to advocate for better procedures within CMAA support to, or oversight of, MA operations.

CHASE requested a socio-economic baseline to be completed for each project, a requirement addressed by the demining organisations but elaborated in significantly different ways. Moreover, the connection to the workplan

subsequently prepared is unclear. DFID could usefully provide greater clarity on the type of livelihoods assessment it wishes to see, in particular regarding the interaction between socio-economic data aggregated across households and contamination.

4.2 Development Partners in Cambodia[28]

Japan is by far the most significant bilateral donor in Cambodia. The data set out in Figure 2 provides a summary of resource inputs from the top ten development partner's contributions and also GICHD inputs and outputs are listed in Box 2.

Figure 2: Development partner inputs in Cambodia

Cambodia

Receipts	2009	2010	2011
Net ODA (USD million)	721	734	792
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	65%	68%	62%
Net ODA / GNI	7.3%	6.9%	6.4%
Net Private flows (USD million)	244	252	124

For reference	2009	2010	2011
Population (million)	14.0	14.1	14.3
GNI per capita (Atlas USD)	700	750	830

Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2010-11 average)		(USD m)
1	Japan	141
2	AsDB Special Funds	99
3	United States	81
4	Australia	63
5	Global Fund	60
6	Korea	50
7	Germany	45
8	IDA	42
9	EU Institutions	40
10	France	27



Sources: OECD - DAC, World Bank; www.oecd.org/dac/stats

[28] OECD DAC 2013, Aid Flow by recipient - Cambodia http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/KHM.gif

Box 2: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining – Cambodia inputs[29]

The GICHD provides support to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) and other mine action actors in Cambodia in the field of programme management and operations. The Minister attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-Chair of CMAA, H.E. Prak Sokhonn is a member of the Council of Foundation and H.E. Heng Rattana, Director General of CMAC, is a member of the Advisory Board. H.E. Sophakmonkol Prum, Deputy Secretary General of CMAA, is a member of the International Mine Action Standards Review Board.

Management Consulting

- Advice on the formulation of and implementation support for the National Mine Action Strategy;
- Organisation of workshop on landmines and land rights in conflict affected contexts;
- Technical assistance on the development of a programme-based approach;
- South-East Regional Workshop for Linking Mine Action and Development (LMAD) practitioners;
- Field research for 'Role of Community Liaison in Mine Action';
- Participation in mid-term review of AusAID-funded integrated mine action and development programmes;
- Evaluation of EC-funded mine action programmes;[30]
- Evaluation of CMAC Demining Unit 6;
- Technical assistance on land rights to mine action organisations;
- Installation of and training on IMSMA[NG];
- Assistance in developing the Cambodian mine detection dog capacity programme, including the establishment of accreditation procedures;
- Efficiency assessment of survey and clearance operations;
- Workshop about methods of creating and using surrogate mines;
- Support with advice on land release, Cambodia being one of the GICHD's target countries for land release outreach activities;
- Support to the implementation of land release models for areas suspected to contain submunitions;
- Assistance in developing mine action plans and techniques;
- Provision of mechanical demining training;
- Strengthening test and licensing systems for animal detection systems;
- Cambodia was a case study for 'A Guide to Land Release: non-technical methods';
- Cambodia was one of the case studies for the Contracting Study;
- Advice on national land release policy/standards.

The Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board Council for the Development of Cambodia, ODA Database, records information on donor projects against a variety of parameters.[31] In 2013 there were 72 UN Agency projects listed: the majority with United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); four with international financial institutions; 48 with the EU, mostly from France and Germany (none from the UK); and 98 with other bilateral donors, mostly Canada and Japan.

4.3 National Mine Action Capacity

Mine clearance was started along the Cambodia-Vietnam border in 1979 by the company of women soldiers of the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Army, with thousands of hectares of land cleared and thousands of mines/ERW destroyed to provide safe resettlement and agricultural land despite the lack of substantial financial, technical and modern equipment support. The inception of official humanitarian mine clearance (UN and NGOs) in Cambodia dates back to 1992.

MRE started in 1993 to focus on providing mine awareness messages to returnees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) settling in affected areas as conflict ended. By 1998, demining activities had significantly expanded, with the presence of four demining operators: the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), HALO, MAG, and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF). Cambodia signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) in 1997 and became a State Party to the convention on 1st January 2000.

[29] GICHD 2013, http://www.gichd.org/country-and-area-pages/cambodia/.
[30] EC/GICHD 2008, Cambodia Mission Report, Patterson, T & Vanna, M, 43pp.
[31] 2012 CDC, http://cdc.khmer.biz/Reports/reports_by_updated.asp?status=0.

4.3.1 Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority

In September 2000, the Cambodian Government (RGC) established the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), chaired by Prime Minister Hun Sen. The CMAA has the responsibility to regulate, coordinate and monitor mine action activities throughout Cambodia. While landmine and ERW survivors' assistance activities were initially coordinated and monitored by the CMAA, they are now the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSVY). Realising the need to include community needs/requirements in the prioritisation of demining tasks (and perhaps concerned by allegations of land grabbing), Cambodia established Land Use Planning Units (LUPUs) in 1999 and Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs) in 2004.

Cambodia has achieved major progress in demining since 1992. Between 1992 and 2009, some 53,000 hectares of mined areas were cleared nationwide for housing, farming and other infrastructure with the destruction of 860,159 anti-personnel mines, 19,952 anti-vehicle mines and 1,907,621 ERWs. The number of casualties has been reduced from 4,320 in 1996 to 244 in 2009. This result was achieved with technical, material and financial support from the Cambodian government and the international community.

4.3.2 CMAC

The CMAA took over the coordination and regulation of mine action from the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) in September 2000 following widespread donor concerns about financial probity. CMAC has continued to operate, and remain the largest implementing agency for mine/UXO clearance.

4.4 Landmines and ERW – a Continuing Challenge

Despite these significant achievements, landmines and ERW remain a challenge in people's lives and for national development. Therefore, the RGC set a ninth millennium development goal on demining and victim assistance, and mine action is also a priority focus in the Rectangular Strategy Phase II and an important input to the National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP). In December 2009, Cambodia as a signatory to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention since 2000 was granted a ten-year extension of its mine clearance dealing by States Parties to the APMBC[32].

For the purpose of the Extension Request, Cambodia will be required for demining operations over the next ten years to clear some 648.8 square kilometres of mine affected land and to release 1,097.8 square kilometres of suspected land through baseline survey and technical survey. In order to achieve this plan, Cambodia will require USD 455 million. In addition to the mine problem, the magnitude of the ERW problem resulting from the artillery shelling, rocket launching and air bombing is huge. Information received from the US Department of State reveals that from just 1965-1975, more than 2.75 million tons of bombs were dropped on Cambodia. To address this ERW problem, Cambodia needs financial support in addition to support required for mine clearance.

To reach the Cambodia Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs), Rectangular Strategy Phase II, NSDP and its obligations under the APMBC, the CMAA, demining operators and other relevant partners have prepared the National Mine Action Strategy (NMAS) through to 2019. The NMAS is said to be in-line with other national strategies, such as the NSDP update 2009-2013 and the next NSDP 2014-2018.

The NMAS consists of four goals as set out below:

Goal 1: Reduce Mine/ERW casualties and other negative impacts

- Allocate demining assets to the most impacted areas;
- Provide effective mine/ERW risk education.

Goal 2: Contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction

- Support local development priorities in communities affected by mine/ERW Support national and sub-national development priorities;
- Support mine/ERW survivors and their families to receive adequate medical care, physical rehabilitation and livelihood assistance;
- Support land administration processes to secure rights of intended beneficiaries on demined land.

[32] KoC 2010, National Mine Action Strategy 2010-2019, 26pp, www.cmaa.gov.kh.

Goal 3: Ensure sustainable national capacities to address residual mine/ERW contamination

- Review the institutional framework to address the residual mine/ERW threat;
- Identify and address capacity gaps;
- Maintain a sustainable national capacity.

Goal 4: Promote stability and regional and international disarmament

- Support the APMBC;
- Support signing Protocol V of the Convention on Certain Convention Weapons - (CCW) Support border demarcation;
- Support demining work in the framework of the peacekeeping missions of the United Nations;
- Exchange of expertise at national, regional and international levels.

To achieve the NMAS, Cambodia is required to undertake the following implementation measures:

(i) Complete a baseline survey for 122 districts which are affected by mines/ERW by 2012;
(ii) Undertake measures to reduce suspected land based on the baseline data;
(iii) Mainstream mine action plan with the sub-national plan by prioritising minefields based on the baseline information and requirements of the local communities for casualty reduction and development in order to allocate mine clearance resources accurately;
(iv) Strengthen capacities and coordination in important areas such as the preparation of mine action coordination plan, gender mainstreaming, information management and quality assurance;
(v) Participate in efforts to maintain international and regional stability through partaking in enforcement of international conventions and treaties where Cambodia is a State Party;
(vi) Mitigate casualty and provide assistance to victims of mines/ERW; and
(vii) Maintain sustainable national capacities.

To monitor achievements and progress in the implementation of the NMAS, the CMAA is planning to establish mechanisms to measure progress against the goals, indicators and targets as well as implementation measures as set forth in the strategy. The first review is due to be conducted in 2013 and the provision of information is to be consistent with the NSDP, with a final review in 2019. All relevant mine action agencies are required to provide data and progress reports to the CMAA.

4.5 DFID Country Programme Engagement

DFID's programme dates back to the 1990s, with an office presence since 2000. A comprehensive evaluation of the programme in 2009 endorsed the decision to close the office (but not the entire programme) in 2011.[33] When DFID originally decided to open an office to support its programme, there was a ten-year commitment with a limited portfolio centred on health and rural livelihoods and a focus on working through multilaterals. At the start of the period covered by the evaluation this position was reaffirmed, with the programme focused on partnerships through multilaterals and bilaterals and an intention to work entirely through these partners by 2011. The concept of 'partnership' was evaluated as being a modality for exit, *not* a vision; the evaluation asserts that there does not appear to have been a clear strategy for the whole period of engagement or a clearly defined purpose to be achieved before closure.

The 2005 CAP was based on a comprehensive analysis shared with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank and the UN that was highly relevant to the context. There was no explicit purpose statement in the CAP but the overarching objective included 'improving development effectiveness', 'support to off-track MDGs through government-led programmes' and 'improving the development system's focus on the poor and excluded'. This emphasis on development effectiveness, the MDGs and reducing poverty was based on a clear pro-poor governance narrative but was not clearly linked to the commitment to closure within ten years.

The CAP included four objectives:

- Contribute to rapid increases in the impact of development resources in Cambodia bySupporting government efforts to improve public financial management and accountability;
- Stronger accountability of government to its citizens;
- Applying best practice in donor assistance to Cambodia;
- Responsive, accountable and effective local government for all people, especially the poor and socially excluded;

[33] DFID 2009, Evaluation Report EV703, Cambodia, 126pp.

- Support government and civil society to strengthen the livelihoods of poor people; and
- Increased access to health services and information.

These objectives were relevant to the context, but ambitious given the resources (US$25 million in 2007, increasing to US$40 million by 2011[34]). Interventions focused on supply-side governance and service delivery, with inadequate attention paid to wider citizen accountability and civil society strengthening. There was also evidence of a series of contested narratives underpinning the strategies being pursued: before the CAP – sustainable livelihoods and poverty; during the CAP – governance, aid effectiveness and budget support; for the future (and the present) – fragile states and state building.

Poverty and social exclusion continue to be amongst the most significant aspects of Cambodia's fragility. The role of government is constrained and limited – livelihood gains are not state/commune bound – but leadership, regulation and enabling frameworks are essential. Private sector, NGOs, civil society and individual enterprise are possible entry points. Fear reinforces social exclusion and is present at all levels.[35]

DFID/CHASE resources

CHASE resource allocation to MAG in Cambodia is £3,838,764, of which £3,248.856 has been spent to date. The three-year resource allocation from DFID to UN MA activities for 2010-2013 is shown in the table below.

Table 3: DFID-CHASE United Nations Mine Action Expenditure 2010-2013[36]

		YEAR 1		YEAR 2		YEAR 3			
	Description	GBP	USD	GBP	USD	GBP	Year 3.1 USD	Year 3.2 USD	Total GBP
						Total			
UNMAS	Afghanistan UNMAS OPS	£104,736	$162,131	£209,472	$335,553	£209,472	$268,878	$67,622	£523,680
	Standing mine action capacity for rapid response UNMAS OPS	£104,736	$162,131	£209,472	$335,553	£209,472	$268,878	$67,622	£523,680
	Policy and advocacy support UNMAS	£104,736	$162,131	£209,472	$335,553	£209,470	$268,876	$67,621	£523,678
	Secretariat and technical support to the Mine Action Support Group UNMAS OPS	£0	$0	£53,333	$85,434	£53,333	$68,458	$17,217	£106,666
	Sub-Total UNMAS	£314,208	$486,394	£681,749	$1,092,094	£681,747	$875,091	$220,081	£1,677,705
UNDP	Cambodia UNDP	£100,000	$154,800	£100,000	$160,190	£76,858	$98,655	$24,811	£276,858
	Colombia UNDP	£76,858	$118,976	£100,000	$160,190	£100,000	$128,360	$32,282	£276,858
	Ethiopia UNDP	£100,000	$154,800	£100,000	$160,190	£76,858	$98,655	$24,811	£276,858
	Iraq UNDP	£76,858	$118,976	£100,000	$160,190	£100,000	$128,360	$32,282	£276,858
	Lao PDR UNDP	£100,000	$154,800	£100,000	$160,190	£76,858	$98,655	$24,811	£276,858
	Mozambique UNDP	£76,858	$118,976	£100,000	$160,190	£100,000	$128,360	$32,282	£276,858
	Sub-Total UNDP	£530,574	$821,329	£600,000	$961,140	£530,574	$681,045	171,280	£1,661,148
UNICEF	Democratic Republic of the Congo UNICEF	£47,100	$72,911	£47,100	$75,449	£47,100	$60,458	$15,205	£141,300
	Iraq UNICEF	£69,080	$106,936	£69,080	$110,659	£69,080	$88,671	$22,300	£207,240
	Nepal UNICEF	£56,520	$87,493	£56,520	$90,539	£56,520	$72,549	$18,246	£169,560
	Sudan UNICEF	£87,920	$136,100	£87,920	$140,839	£87,920	$112,854	$28,382	£263,760
	Institutional development for Mine Action UNICEF	£28,491	$44,104	£116,027	$185,864	£116,027	$148,932	$37,456	£260,545
	Quality assurance in mine action response UNICEF	£23,871	$36,952	£144,607	$231,646	£144,607	$185,618	$46,682	£313,085
	Coordination, knowledge, and advocacy for international action UNICEF	£26,491	$41,008	£139,583	$223,598	£139,583	$179,169	$45,060	£305,657
	Sub-Total UNICEF	£339,473	$525,505	£660,837	$1,058,595	£660,837	$848,251	213,331	£1,661,147
	Grand total	**£1,184,255**	**$1,833,228**	**£1,942,586**	**$3,111,829**	**£1,873,158**	**$2,404,387**	**$604,692.00**	**£5,000,000**

4.6 MAG Capacity in Cambodia

MAG's programme office is located in Phnom Penh and there is also a regional office in Battambang. MAG currently deploys ten Mine Action Teams (MATs), eight Community Liaison (CL) teams, two Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, two Mine Detection Dog (MDD) teams, three Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS) Research and Development (R&D) teams, three Mechanical Operational Field Evaluations (OFEs), one Ground

[34] UK-RGC 2007 Development Partnership Talks, 25 April, Minutes of Meeting, http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/Donor_Development_Cooperation_Programmes/UK/Cam_UK_Dev_Par_Tal_25_April_2007/Minutes.htm
[35] DFID 2009, *ibid*
[36] DFID-CHASE Reporting

Preparation team and two Baseline Survey teams on operations in Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Pailin and Pursat provinces. MAG maintains a good relationship with the national authority and has a reputation for quality.

Technical delivery is mainly good within the programme and operations are generally compliant with plans, with contractual targets being met in most instances. An instance where targets were not being met is being addressed by the programme as a matter of priority.[37]

DFID funding continues through to late 2013 along with multi-year funding from Finn Church Aid and Life With Dignity (FCA/LWD) funding. The programme is said to maintain an excellent working relationship with the British Ambassador[38]. The future of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA) funding for the programme is much more uncertain following recent reductions in favour of HALO and the introduction of competitive tendering within WRA, which may affect Cambodia. Therefore, there is a climate of medium to long-term funding uncertainty beyond the current DFID grant period.

Generally, the programme is running well and, where there are areas of concern or that need attention, the programme management team are aware of them and believe that they have plans in place to address and rectify these issues.

4.7 DFID MA Performance & Influence – MAG

The MAG 2012 Annual Report for MA in Cambodia provided a useful (self) assessment of progress against objectives and milestones, and allowed the evaluation team to take a view on whether or not their meetings with key stakeholders and field visits endorsed or disputed claims.[39] In the main, the evaluation team was satisfied that the 2012 Annual Report was a fair assessment of progress and performance.

4.8 Conclusions

4.8.1 National and Strategic

Overall, Cambodia is making substantial progress in Mine Action. It has a detailed policy framework, has enacted enabling legislation, set up a functioning and authoritative NMAA, and has in place institutional arrangements to monitor and channel donor funds, and set priorities. The CMAA has some potential institutional tensions with respect to competition for resources and access to Ministerial/Prime Ministerial attention concerning its operational precursor, CMAC.

Cambodia hosted the 11th Meeting of States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in November 2011, demonstrating the Government's ability to play a leading role in mine action and to showcase Cambodia's experiences on de-mining. After the meeting Cambodia received financial pledges to clear mined areas for development.

5 Evaluation Purpose 3: Socio-Economic Benefit Analysis of MA Programme

5.1 Key Findings

5.1.1 Western Cambodia

DFID-funded mine action is clearing land for substantial economic and social benefits in Western Cambodia. Mine action by contractor MAG is making safe agricultural land and forests contaminated by landmines left over from the 35-year-old conflicts. The area is experiencing rapid population growth which is steadily restoring the demographic imbalance left by the Khmer Rouge atrocities. As a result, forests are being cleared for agriculture, and formerly abandoned fields, dangerously contaminated by landmines, are coming under pressure to resume cultivation.

[37] MAG IDET 2012, Confidential Jan-Feb Mission Report, Loughran, C & Guest, N, 20pp.
[38] FCO publications; Personal communication; teleconference with Deputy High Commissioner.
[39] MAG 2012 (August) DFID Support for Mine Action in Cambodia (MAG & Halo Trust), Annual Report, 25pp

The following case study is based on the clearance of a minefield which was preventing agriculture for farmers in Pailin Province western Cambodia. It is then used as the basis for grossing up to assess the wider benefits from the clearance of all agricultural land undertaken by MAG within the DFID contract.

5.1.2 Phnom Koy village

In December 2010, a widowed woman farmer came across landmines in areas where they were planning to re-start agriculture. The abandoned area had been partly covered by fast-growing jungle. Having experienced the injurious consequences of landmines in their community, they were deterred from cultivating what would otherwise have been excellent farmland close to a source of irrigation water.

They alerted the village chief and the mine action authorities and MAG undertook a survey to determine the size of the dangerous area, which had previously been unreported. This confirmed the danger was real and MAG delineated the area and put it on an emergency task list, designated Phnom Koy 5 Minefield. During the subsequent clearance in 2011, MAG located and destroyed 39 anti-personnel mines and five pieces of unexploded ordnance.

An economic case study of mine clearance benefits was undertaken by the evaluation team in Phnom Koy village.

A de-mining investment of US$30,000 (£19,346) resulted in the clearing of 3.5 hectares for four farming families (28 individual beneficiaries) to work safely on crops of maize and cassava. They now benefit from the crop by personal consumption and from earning revenue by selling produce to Thailand. Cassava and maize are popular crops in Battambang, Pailin and Banteay Meanchey provinces, due to their proximity to the Thailand where there is a strong market for cross-border trade.

Treated as sub-project within the MAG programme in Pailin Province, this expenditure yields a positive Net Present Value of approximately US$ 129,000 (£85,000) (the NPV method takes into the account payback of the expenditure, so these are net benefit figures). The positive NPV of 4.4 times the initial DFID investment would appear to make this a worthwhile investment from an economic benefits perspective, quite apart from the health and community safety benefits.

5.2 Grossing Up from the Case Study

An approach to grossing up these case study results to the scale of the current MAG programme in Cambodia, which has a budget of £3.8 million, was devised and carried out.

Land use statistics for land cleared by MAG de-mining in this area of Cambodia show that 83% of land clearance to date under the current DFID contract is for agricultural use. Using that percentage to apply to the total land cleared in the current MAG contract already spent to date (taking 83% of approximately 190.9 hectares), results in, pro rata, an NPV of £3.84 million for the benefits on agricultural land cleared to date.

This only relates to the 83% of land cleared for agriculture, of course. Additional benefits (unquantified) have accrued from clearance targeted at re-settlement (7%), infrastructure such as roads (5%), safe access to schools etc (3%) water access and so on.

5.3 Notes

The above assumes that the costs of de-mining land intended for agricultural use is not greater than the costs of de-mining land for other uses. In the absence of sufficiently detailed information, this seems an appropriately cautious assumption. Former agricultural land is more likely to have been mined to deter the passage of enemies, and more accessible for undisturbed covert mine emplacement activities, than urbanised areas.

The farm in this case study shows a 1:2.5 ratio between cassava and maize, which is common but not universal. Sometimes the ratio is 1:1, which would serve to increase farm income because the return per hectare on cassava exceeds that of maize. Hence the NPV figures derived from the grossing up is likely to be conservative.

Although this grossing up is from a small sample, and the 3.5 hectares represent just 1.83% of the total land cleared by MAG in western Cambodia, it is more meaningfully 3.9% of the agricultural land cleared. Conservative assumptions have been made at each stage to reduce the possibility of upward bias (e.g. no compensation in the grossing up for this farm's lower-than-average planting of the higher value crop).

Phnom Koy village DFID Mine Action Assistance 2013

Discounted Additional Costs and Benefits **Discount Rate** **3.5%**

Economic Cost Benefit Analysis

Currency units: US $		**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**	**2017**	**2018**	**2019**	**2020**	**2021**	
	Year 0	**Year 1**	**Year 2**	**Year 3**	**Year 4**	**Year 5**	**Year 6**	**Year 7**	**Year 8**	**Year 9**	**Year 10**	**PV**
Costs												
De-mining service	30 375	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	30 375
Cassava input costs	0	643	643	643	643	643	643	643	643	643	643	6 430
Maize input costs	0	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	391	3 252
Residual value	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total Costs	30 375	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	40 057
Benefits												
Farm revenues – cassava	0	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	3 333	27 719
Farm revenue – maize	0	3 125	6 250	6 250	6 250	6 250	6 250	6 250	6 250	6 250	6 250	48 959
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Another	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total revenues	0	6 458	9 583	9 583	9 583	9 583	9 583	9 583	9 583	9 583	9 583	76 679
Economic Multipliers (0.4)		2 583	3 833	3 833	3 833	3 833	3 833	3 833	3 833	3 833	3 833	30 671
Overall												
Total Costs	30 375	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	1 034	40 057
Total Benefits	0	9 041	13 416	13 416	13 416	13 416	13 416	13 416	13 416	13 416	13 416	107 350
Net Benefits (Costs)	**30 375**	**8 007**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**12 382**	**129 126**

NPV (US$) **129,126**

i.e. Net Present Value = *US$* *129 126* *Rate* *£1 = US$ 1.52*
£ *84 951*

1. Farmer and families' own labour not costed, as they would also be employment benefits and would approx. cancel out
i.e. Farmers' personal income is covered by the farm revenues.
2. Land values have also been improved by mine clearance, but not estimated. This could be inserted as a benefit in Year 10 if available.
3. The 10 year period is chosen in order to cover agricultural variability, and several cycles of good and bad years, failed monsoon etc.

ANNEX D:

Country Mission Report – Mozambique

Table of Content

1 Country Background and Project Context

1.1 Origins and Extent of Contamination

Landmines in Mozambique are a legacy of almost thirty years of armed conflict, starting with the fight for independence against the Portuguese (1964-1974), and continuing with the civil war between the two major parties FRELIMO (Frente para Libertação de Moçambique) and RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) (1977-1992).

1.2 National Authorities and Key Actors

The Mine Action sector in Mozambique was established following the General Peace Agreement in 1992, and was kick-started by the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). In 1993, Norwegian People's Aid began working in the three central provinces (Sofala, Manica, Tete). In 1994, HALO Trust, DFID's current partner, began working in the northern provinces of Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

From October 1994, a UNDP project, the Accelerated Demining Project (ADP) was launched to develop indigenous capacity and employ 400 deminers in the three southern provinces (Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane). Additionally there are numerous commercial mine clearance and quality assurance contractors operating in Mozambique, many of which are Mozambican registered companies. The Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM) play a limited role in the area of mine clearance but a crucial role in stockpile destruction. The latter was accomplished in February 2002.

In 1995, the National Demining Commission (CND) was established to define and implement Mine Action policies, strategies and structures. In 1999 the CND was replaced by the National Demining Institute (IND) with a mandate to establish coordination, supervision and management mechanisms, in close cooperation with all other relevant organisations and agencies.

1.3 Support for Mine Action

At the June 2011 meeting of the inter-sessional Standing Committees, Mozambique stated it required $20 million to meet its extended Article 5 deadline of March 2014[1] and as recently as 2010 Mozambique received $12,039,042 for mine clearance operations from eight donor states and the UNDP[2],while Mozambique contributed US$669,544 from its own national budgets.[3] Despite significant increases in funding, newly identified mined areas have somewhat offset the increase in funding.[4]

1.4 Legal Framework

The Government of Mozambique was in the first cohort of States to sign the APMBC (in December 1997), and to ratify it in March 1998. It has been active in the Ottawa process, and hosted the first Meeting of the States Parties in 1999. Mozambique has also ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), but has not joined the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)[5].

1.5 Survey and Prioritisation

The Mine Action sector in Mozambique has suffered from the outset from the lack of *'a thorough assessment of the scope of the contamination problem'.*[6] Resolving this issue – in part in order to provide an evidence base for the 2008 Article 5 extension request - was key to turning the MA situation in Mozambique around, and to re-generate donor interest. The HALO Trust baseline survey provided an opportunity to do just this and resulted in more accurate alignment. In 2012 the IND requested an international technical advisor from NPA, who was supported by UNDP, to

[1] http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2020 - _ftn3
[2] Japan, US, UK, Belgium, Norway, Canada, Italy and France.
[3] A decrease of almost $1 million from 2009, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2020 - _ftn2
[4] According to HALO Trust, *"The Article 5 Extension Request was backed largely by the evidence presented in the 2007 Baseline Assessment. However, the number of additional minefields being revealed during the on-going [mine-free district assessment] process and the extent of the Mozambique/Zimbabwe border minefields is of growing concern. Without significantly greater funding there will not be enough demining assets deployed in order to meet the deadline." – Landmine and Cluster Munitions Report, 2012.*
[5] *Ibid.*
[6] Page ii, *A Review of Mine Action in Mozambique,* GICHD, October 2005.

reconcile data in the IMSMA database with the data from the operators. As a result of progress achieved in 2012, discrepancies in data between IND and the Operators are now minimal[7].

1.6 Assessing the Overall Performance of MA programmes

The MA situation in Mozambique[8] can be summarised in a Radar diagram (Diagram 1) using six reference criteria which are:

1. Marginal cost of mine/UXO removal.
2. Percentage of endangered population having received MRE/RRE.
3. Number of untreated victims or those in need of continued treatment from mine-induced wounds/trauma.
4. Advocacy and local MA ownership to gauge the Mozambican authorities' commitment to direct and manage MA actions.
5. Percentage of stockpile destruction.
6. Percentage of area of country's danger zone cleared of mines.

The criteria have been tentatively assessed on a 1 to 5 scale for each of the six criteria, whereby "1" indicates a good position for the country, and "5" indicates a situation where the country needs critical attention. Hence, the smaller the area covered by the radar diagram, the better the position of the country, and the less support it presumably would need from public or donor funds.

The model is intended to illustrate an alternative and joined-up approach to measuring the impact of mine action and development. More systematic baselines, regular reporting and impact evaluations introduced through the CHASE MA Programme will make it possible to construct more informed representations of the likely contribution of MA to development in target countries. Parameters for such an assessment would include such criteria as the extent of contamination, governance (capacity and human rights); commitment to inclusive development (e.g. pro-poor development strategies), demographics, proximity/remoteness.

Diagram 1: Radar Diagram – Effectiveness of MA programmes in Mozambique



2 Methodological Adaptation for Evaluation of MA in Country

2.1 Methodology for Community Impact Survey

The community impact survey was conducted using a qualitative methodology consisting of focus group discussions, key informant interviews, village mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines. The survey was conducted in

[7] Clarified by UNDP Mozambique, 20 June 2013. IND Statement, NPA and UNDP progress reports for 2012 and 2013.
[8] Since 1993.

Mozambique between the 13th and 21st of April, 2013 in Manica province. It included a 2-day training of local surveyors and was carried out by four team members - one international team member and three national. The team was gender balanced (2 females and 2 males), the whole team was fluent in Portuguese and the three national team members also spoke all local languages encountered fluently.

The study included five communities that had been demined and one counterfactual (i.e. a community which is still mined). In all communities two focus groups were conducted, one with women and one with men. The data from the focus groups was complemented by individual key informant interviews with members of the community who played a key role at the community level, had been part of the demining operation and/or had been directly affected by either the landmines or the demining. In addition to the data collected at the village level, interviews with the District Administration, District Police, District Hospital Acting Director and the Director of the District Office for Economic Development were also conducted. The survey was intended to be gender sensitive, and has captured some elements for a reading of gendered impact of contamination and demining, but to a very limited extent given the lack of time resources for a thorough gender analysis and lack of a preliminary gender assessment to evaluate against.

The sample was identified through a standard set of criteria, used for the fieldwork conducted in each country and defined in the methodology (see Annex M): the guiding principle was selecting villages in the relevant areas which are as different as possible regarding characteristics considered significant in terms of level and type of development (environmental context, type of livelihoods, type of land contamination experienced, accessibility, services, etc[1]). The data collection model used in the counterfactual was the same as that of other villages. Similarly, the data from the counterfactual was treated in the same manner as the other villages. All the villages sampled were in a single province and all, but the counterfactual, were in a single district. Table 1 provides a list of the communities surveyed. The communities for the survey were identified in collaboration with HALO Trust. Prior to the community survey a HALO trust representative came into contact with the village leaders in each of the communities in order to seek their support for the mission.

Table 1

Village	Administration Post	District	Province	Short Description
GOI-GOI	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica	Has an estimated population of 2,230 inhabitants according to data provided by local authorities (Head of Village). The community centre is along the main road linking Espungeberra, the district capital, and Chimoio, the provincial capital. Most families live from subsistence farming, but the area also counts with extensive forests that allow wood harvesting. The Community of Goi-Goi has a school, water supply, and a health post, but the latter has yet to become operational. The village population relies on a single general store, but also has a market with basic goods (i.e. fruits, vegetables, bread and clothing). The government has, over the years, sporadically been involved in projects to support farming by conducting trainings on new techniques, assist with new irrigation channels. Agriculture is primarily for home consumption, but also used as a means to generate supplementary income.
MANGALA	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica	Has an estimated population of 1791 inhabitants according to data provided by local authorities (Village Chief). The population lives in largely dispersed areas and primarily on subsistence farming, but they also have access to the extensive forested areas. The community is 6km from the district capital and does not have a health post, has limited water sources (a single water pump). The community has no shops or markets, which means that all goods need to be brought from the district capital. The community has a single primary school. The Government has engaged community members in limited agricultural and irrigation projects. The most notable development effort has been the creation of a local association, which currently has 21 members, that come together to sell vegetables in the district capital or to merchants that frequent the village. The proceeds go to the members, but a portion is used by the founding organisation to support orphan children and people living with HIV/AIDS.

Village	Administration Post	District	Province	Short Description
MAPUNGUANA	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica	Has an estimated population of 3,500 inhabitants according to data provided by local authorities (Head of Village). The community relies primarily on a subsistence economy. The community has a school and a single water pump which are located in the village centre, but it should be noted that most of the households are dispersed. The community does not have a heath post or market of any kind. The closest health facility is in the district capital some 8 km away. Families also rely on surplus agricultural products to generate cash income. The Government has been known to introduce short-term agricultural or irrigation projects, but none were in place at the time of the visit.
MUCHAIACHAIO	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica	Has an estimated population of 1080 according to the data provided by the local authorities (Village Leader). Households in the community are much dispersed and there is no formal shop, or health post. The community relies primarily on farming as a means of subsistence and sells surplus produce to generate income. The community must go to the district capital to gain access to medical care, a more formal market etc.
MUTUADZA	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica	The village leader was not clear on the number of inhabitants at the time of the village visit. The village houses are very dispersed from one another. The village has a school and a mill, but villagers must go to the district capital to the market and hospital. The distance to the district capital is some 6km by foot or some 40 minutes drive, but no one in the community has a vehicle. The population relies primarily on subsistence farming and the sale of coal as a way to generate additional income. All goods for sale must be transported to the district capital.
ZONA MUGORIONDO	Machipanda	Manica	Manica	**Counterfactual -** Mugoriondo neighbourhood has an estimated population of 2,446 inhabitants living mainly from subsistence farming. The village is located in a border area between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The community has a few basic social services such as a health care centre (4km away), primary and secondary schools (2km away) and a water pump and marker (1km away). The national highway that links the Provincial capital with the official border crossing into Zimbabwe is 5 km away. The village has historically depended on a combination of subsistence farming, migratory labour and trafficking of goods. The mines are along the border with Zimbabwe and affect both those who wish to cross the border informally as well as those who are in need of farmland.

The data collected was used to triangulate the findings presented below. All the findings noted below correspond to information which was gathered in group interviews and further substantiated by individual interviews. No data below corresponds to the views or opinions of a single respondent. While the findings below cannot be assumed to be representative of the whole country, they are believed to be indicative of what can be found in other similar rural settings throughout Mozambique.

2.2 Methodology for Institutional Capacity Appraisal

The Institutional Capacity evaluation was grounded in an extensive documentation analysis, based mainly on government policy, programme reports and evaluations, the Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development (O'Reilly, Friedman, Dinsmore, Storr, & MacPherson, 2012) and a review of peer-reviewed articles related to institutional capacity building. A thematic guide for interviews was prepared by the evaluation team for the different stakeholder groups (DFID contractors, UNDP/UNMAS, the National Mine Action Authority, development partner NGOs/cluster coordinators, local administrators) identified by the evaluation team and in consultation with in-country operators. Forty interviews were undertaken. All interviews were undertaken in English and took approximately 45-60 minutes. The findings from interviews and the literature were grouped into themes to address the evaluation questions and the analysis integrated with the literature. In addition, a further ten interviews related to institutional capacity were undertaken in the context of the Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013. The aim was to reach data 'saturation', that is data collection is terminated when no new information is forthcoming (Patton, 2002). To an extent, qualitative data collection was also determined

by resource and key informant availability. While not exhaustive, the review of the literature covered the most pertinent documents related to the evaluation questions. Contact was made and data gathered with a wide range of institutional interlocutors.

Key stakeholders in Mozambique are varied, and are set out in Box 1.

Box 1: Key Mine Action Stakeholders Interviewed in Mozambique

- Alberto Augusto, Director, IND
- Alicia Herbert, Head of Office, DFID Mozambique
- Cormac Quinn, Results & Programme Manager, DFID Mozambique
- Dr Maria Angela Ismael Manjate Janace, Moamna District Administrator, Maputo Province
- Basilio Alcinar Quichine, Sub-District Administrator, Songo District, Tete Province
- Amelia Tembe, Chief of Post, Bella Vista Administration Post, Matatuninie District, Maputo Province
- Donald MacDonald, Regional Support Manager, G4S Ordnance Management Africa
- Calvin Ruysen, Desk Officer, Desk Officer, Southern Africa, HALO Trust
- Geraldo Pedro Jamal, Survey Officer, HALO Mozambique
- Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Mozambique
- Jamie Monteith, Maputo Location Manager, HALO Mozambique
- Joaquim Mutatiua, Provincial Operations Manager for Maputo Province, HALO Mozambique
- Laercio Lourenco Mavale, Manual Team Supervisor, HALO Mozambique
- Vicky Hawker, Projects Officer, HALO Mozambique
- Tom Griffiths, Chimoio Location Manager, HALO Trust
- Dr Xavier Agostinho Chavana, Head of Operational Planning Division, Ministry of Planning & Development, Maputo
- Humberto Nunes Pavela, Chef des Linhas de Transmissao, Electricidade de Mocambique (EDM), Matola
- Lucas Rafael Macamo, Princicpal des Linhas de Transmissao, EDM, Matola
- Arnaldo Agostinho Manjate, Caminhos de Ferro de Mozambique (CFM), Maputo
- Meque Mandlate, Permanent Way Inspector, CFM, Maputo
- Muniro Usse, Permanent Way Engineer, CFM, Maputo
- Eng. Ortigio L. Nhanombe, Deputy Director of Electrical Energy, Ministry of Energy, Maputo
- Ambrosio Adolfo Sitoe, National Director, Directorate of Studies & Projects, Ministry of Transports & Communications, Maputo
- Julia Filipe Vasconcelos, Technical Planner, Directorate of Studies & Projects, Ministry of Transport & Communications, Maputo
- Lucia Simao, Programme Analyst for Mine Action & Small Arms, UNDP
- Ilaria Carnevali, Deputy Country Director, UNDP
- Pedro Joia Ilisses Gundana, Maintenance Services Support Director, HCB, Cahora Bassa Dam
- Meeting with members of Kalawe & Nhanchenge Community, Cahora Bassa Dam, Songo, Tete
- Hans Riser, Chief Technical Adviser, IND, UNDP
- Carlos Javier Rodriguez, Planning and Monitoring Officer, UNICEF
- Janet Duffield, Country Director, Helpage International
- Gisla Dewey, National Director, World Vision
- Rosa Costa, Director, Kyeema
- Ana Zandamela, Veterinarian, Kyeema

3 Evaluation Purpose 1: Community Impact of MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Community Impact Survey conducted in six communities in Mozambique (including one counterfactual community).

3.1 Key findings

The DFID CHASE programme has contributed to the improvement of security of the people living in formerly mine contaminated areas. Demining has also been instrumental in enabling the increase in perception of security and in so doing, has increased the chance that merchants and developers are willing to frequent formerly mined villages. Furthermore, the demining has had implications for the improved quality of life of individuals who farmed safe land that was farther away because they have now regained access to land that is closer to their homesteads and hence more convenient.

One key aspect that has emerged from the community survey is the ***urgent need for clear information exchange that enables district offices and communities to have clear and factual information regarding the state of demining in their area.***

A second issue that was demonstrated when examining the counterfactual is that ***the degree of land mine impact of any given mine field on a community may change over time.*** Landmine impact may become more severe as conditions change. In the case of the counterfactual community visited in Mozambique, a growing population has meant more demand for agricultural land and this in turn has meant that people have started to cultivate in dangerous areas. This finding suggests that if a demining operation does not have immediate impact this does not mean it will never have impact. To the contrary it may very well be the case that over time the demined area comes to play a crucial role in the community's development.

The HALO Trust is operating at a recognised optimum standard of technical skills and in accordance with national standards. Its technical competence and performance is well regarded by national and international agencies.

3.2 Reduced incidence of landmine accidents

The mined area (counterfactual) is along the border with Zimbabwe and is one of the informal routes between the two countries. The focus groups reported 12 mine-related accidents over the last two years. This number far exceeds the low single digit numbers of accidents reported in all other villages visited which accounted for the total number of accidents, not only those of the last two years. Indeed, in three communities no accident had ever been reported. In one community there were two accidents with three victims in total, one of whom survived and in another village there was one accident with one victim who died immediately. As pertains to accident reduction, it would be more accurate to say that demining reduced the already limited potential for accidents. Firstly, the areas were not very heavily mined and secondly, mined areas were largely known.

3.3 Centrally led prioritisation based on an unclear rationale

In Mozambique prioritisation and tasking is carried out centrally by the National Mine Action Authority[9]. None of the five villages visited were involved in priority setting. The criteria and data used for prioritisation could not be established.

Prioritisation of demining tasks has taken many forms over the years. Currently all priorities and tasking is carried out, and led by the National Authority, according to the demining operator. District authorities interviewed during the community survey - including the District Administration, the Police and the District Office on Economic Development - all confirmed that they were not, in any way, involved in priority setting. The District Administration and Police did note that they were in a position to notify Provincial Offices if new landmines were identified, but were not involved in the removal prioritisation. Similarly, none of the five villages visited where demining had taken place reported having been involved in priority setting. It is important to stress, however, that within each of the villages a single mined area was identified, therefore, prioritisation between areas within the same village was not an issue that arose.

[9] Since 2008, the IND has assigned operators to areas of operations and a set list of tasks. Within these Tasks the demining operators can set their own priorities as to which tasks they will clear first. Tasks considered a greater threat to civilian populations are always prioritised. However, when the Art.5 deadline is less than 24 months away all demining tasks are a priority. Clarification – UNDP – June 2013.

It is also important to stress that the rationale behind clearance of one area as opposed to another (i.e. reasons for prioritisation) were not known to the District Office, the Police, the District Office for Economic Development, or the demining agency. In short, while the demining agency was aware of why a certain area was required to be cleared it was unable to explain why the areas had been prioritised ahead of other areas, the counter factual visited for example.[10]

Overall, in terms of prioritisation, all evidence collected from the community survey suggested that decisions regarding priority setting are made centrally by the National Mine Action Authority and the NMEE rationale for prioritising is unclear. While HALO has conducted an extensive survey of communities which included a thorough survey, HALO staff noted in discussions with the team that this data had been minimally used and not for priority setting purposes since priority setting was not an area that they felt able to influence. The degree to which data from surveys or any other data collection mechanism has been used by the NMAA in order to identify priorities could not be established.

3.4 Socio-economic outputs and outcomes

The direct beneficiaries of the demining varied little from one community to another. When the mined land had clear owners, once demined, it was returned to their previous owners. In two communities visited, and in the counterfactual, the land did not have known owners. In one case the land was allocated to communal use and trees have been planted to create a community forest. In the second community where the mined land did not have an "owner", the land is currently used by many community members to harvest vegetables for household consumption. The land released has, in all villages visited, been utilised for the intended purpose; be it the return to its rightful owner for cultivation purposes or returned to the community for collective use. There was no evidence amongst visited communities that land had been expropriated post-clearance.

It is noteworthy to highlight that for the most part land allocation in rural Mozambique is the domain of the local leadership, who manage the allocation at no cost to village members. Land once allocated is kept by the family and inherited from one generation to the next.

The degree of impact of the landmines was relatively low in all five communities visited compared to the counterfactual. An examination of the interviews and focus groups conducted suggests that in all areas visited the landmines were a hindrance to livelihoods and a threat to security, but could be avoided. In the counter factual community, the community members interviewed, as well as the focus groups and informal discussions with the border police, all confirmed that community members are starting to plough around known mines and that people regularly traffic through the mined area.

In four of the five other communities visited, some areas had been recently identified as suspected areas by community members. Indeed, in all five cases, the suspected newly identified contaminated areas had not been reported to the police or any other authority. In all cases the community survey itself served as a mechanism to report the recently identified threats. None of the areas where mines had been recently identified were in active use. In some cases, the mine or UXO identified was a single device and hence, work was conducted around it. This was the case in Mutwadza village, for example. However, in the counterfactual community, people were using mined land. The counterfactual, however, unlike other areas surveyed had mined areas that were far larger than any of the others and land was more limited. Land scarcity, a product of an ever growing population and the mountains in the area as well as the border, limit the land available for agriculture and grazing. These are the factors that have pushed people to utilise mined areas. In Machipanda–Zona Mugoriondo, the counterfactual, the community also reported consistently in group and individual interviews, that people with fewer economic means are those that must cultivate in the landmined areas. While Mozambique stipulates that land in rural areas is granted free of charge, the pressure for land in Zona Mugoriondo has led to the purchase and sale of land. In short, it has meant that wealthier families in the area or adjacent communities have bought acres of land from lower income families and forced the latter to work in known mined areas.

Rural Mozambique generally, and the five communities visited during the community survey in particular, are characterised by being composed of family units that rely primarily on subsistence farming and the sale of a limited amount of products such as coal, grain or surplus cultivation to secure cash and be able to purchase basic household goods. Four of the five communities visited did not have either a health post or market at the community

[10] UNDP note that this area was not prioritised since it is on the border with Zimbabwe. Agreement on safe access is currently being considered by both Governments. Clarification – UNDP – June 2013.

level. In these four communities the possibilities for development are limited at best, although all group interviews mentioned ways through which demining could promote or at least remove the main blockages to development. These conditions are listed below:

1. **Increased security:** All communities visited stressed that the removal of landmines had increased their own sense of safety and security. However, far more important was in terms of development. In two cases communities noted that having had a demining team in the village improved the perception of security of external actors. The focus group participants, both males and females, and all individual interviewees concurred that being a "demined village" had contributed to a growth in the number of individual merchants and company representatives that frequented the villages in search for products. They stressed that wood harvesting, for example, which had not been directly affected by landmines at all had been negatively impacted by the perception of threat at the village level. In short, firms wishing to harvest wood appear to stay away from communities that have landmines even if said landmines do not affect the area or resource being exploited.

2. **Development and subsistence farming:** In three cases, the area mined was farmland that was closer to roads or the mill than the areas which had been used as an alternative. Therefore, families whose land had been mined now had greater ability to farm in closer proximity to the road where they can more easily sell surplus, or closer to the mill where they would grind the corn. In short, having access to land that is more convenient enabled the individual families to increase their production and hence, generate more income. However, this progress should be seen in context and its limitations understood. Subsistence farmers in Mozambique generally do not have large development plans. None of the respondents interviewed in any of the five villages who participated in either group interviews or individual interviews, had long-term development plans. Mostly they spoke of the ability to have limited amounts of cash to better respond to emergencies and/or increase the families purchasing ability in limited ways. Ultimately, the infrastructure is not available to be able to allow for more large scale development. The markets become quickly saturated with the goods they can sell and hence, increasing production drastically is of limited use without a broader development infrastructure. In the other two villages, where land was common or the owner was no longer known (i.e., no one claimed the area after the war), the area is used communally. In one case it is expected that the land will provide communal gain through the harvesting of wood, but it is too early to say what type of changes this will bring in terms of community development. In the second case, Goi Goi, the area is partially used for agricultural production of community members who want to harvest the land. The proximity of the land to the main road in Goi Goi is a clear asset.

3. **Other community resources:** With only one exception, the communities visited did not have a health post, or market. Goi Goi, the only village with a market, was by far the most developed of all the communities visited. It had a well established market as well as a school. Most importantly it was along the main road linking the district capital, Espungeberra, to the main North-South Highway (M1) which runs along the whole of Mozambique and is tied to all major artery roads, and to the provincial capital Chimoio. Goi-Goi has the opportunity for further development because of its geographical location. The lack of transport to a market or a local market, as was the case in all other villages visited, means that increased production does not automatically translate into development opportunities. There is a clear need for further development enabling factors.

4. **Mine action operations contribution to development:** As noted earlier, HALO Trust hires local staff for the duration of operations. The number of people they hire is normally quite low, but the income does have an impact in the households that benefit directly. In addition, the presence of the deminers can also have direct economic impact on some community members. Deminers have a cash income and want to purchase limited goods such as soft drinks, beer, cell phone credit and the like. This generates a demand that otherwise does not exist. What was common however in all, except one, village visited where former demining employees or people whose business had increased during the demining were interviewed (a total of 3 respondents) was that the income generated during the demining operation did not lead to the sustainable development of their families. Respondents interviewed noted that they had lacked a plan to ensure that the cash income they were able to secure during the demining operation was used in a way that secured a more sustainable long-term income. In each case they lamented how their own inabilities to understand how to utilise or invest their additional cash income had led to the lack of a sustainable gain. In one case a shop owner who had a small but well established shop at the time of demining said that the additional income during the demining had enabled him to increase his stock. More importantly he had expanded his shop because the demining had enabled him to increase the amount of corn meal he sold because farmers increased their production. The increase in production was not so much tied to the use of demined land, but rather to the increase in external

buyers who frequented the village because they had heard that the village was now mine free and hence more secure.

This phenomenon was noted earlier in the discussion of increased security. In one village visited the mines were in a common area which has not been transformed into a community forest, as noted earlier in this report. However, it's too early to know how the income from wood harvesting will impact the general population and the extent to which it will generate development. No other examples, amongst the villages visited, were able to shed light on the difference between collective and private land mined and the implications. It is important to stress, however, that the security issue is one that has the biggest implication for the whole community, both in terms of community safety, but also in terms of perception from those who may frequent the village as noted earlier in this section.

Turning our attention to the examination of the counterfactual, the community chosen in Mozambique was one where coincidentally the international team member had conducted an in-depth impact assessment in 2001.[11] A review of her earlier data, which is published, and the data gathered through the visit conducted in connection with this evaluation showed that the levels of impact change in character over time. In the counterfactual, the study in 2001 showed that while the area had a heavily mined area in close proximity to the village, the only people severely affected were those involved in black marketeering (i.e., trafficking between Mozambique and Zimbabwe with goods for sale). At the time, in 2001 there was no indication that the mined land would be needed for agricultural purposes. The community had substantial agricultural land alternatives. Although the potential for accidents was high, most of the traffickers claimed to know their way around through the minefield. Clearly the region was a threat to local security and potentially a zone that could claim a large number of victims. But overall, the threat appeared under control.[12] Today, however, conditions have changed. The amount of black market traffic has reduced substantially, it was claimed, because border controls are more stringent. The number of accidents has been high and the threat of injury increases steadily as people venture more and more into mine contaminated areas. The population has grown over the last 12 years and this, the population claim, has had a devastating effect in terms of the need for the land which is mined. In the absence of alternatives, people have started to venture into the mined area to cultivate. This has caused an increase in the number of accidents over the last years. The dynamic nature of landmine impact overtime is an interesting observation which has emerged from this community profile because it suggests that even in situations where impact is low at a given point in time, this may not remain so indefinitely; and also that areas which are demined where the impact of demining appears low may actually show high levels of impact at a later date.

5. **The hindrances to development:** In rural Mozambique there are a number of enablers to development that were lacking in all the demined villages visited. Mainly active markets that would enable the trade of large quantity surplus - transport to markets, and the like. To this end demining may not have 'facilitated' development as such, but has served to enable development to take place at a later date.

Overall, the degree to which the demining operation contributed to poverty reduction is limited since the impact of the demining has primarily affected few families and all had access to agricultural land prior to demining. Moreover, all five communities visited confirmed in both the female and male focus groups that the communities are economically homogenous and that vulnerable groups exist, such as ill or handicapped people, widows, etc.; but that their vulnerability is mainly tied to their social networks as they are able to have access to land and secure food through said farming.

3.4.1 Linkages with development organisations

HALO Trust did not have any coordinated projects with other development actors in the five villages visited. They do however have experience of coordinated work with several international agencies in Mozambique.[13]. One project had been executed in Tete Province. The coordinated work in question is a joint HALO Trust-HelpAge International task where HALO Trust provides the demining and HelpAge International supports the development of the community with agricultural support (i.e., seeds, farming equipment, micro credit type options), support the creation

[11] Millard, Ananda and Kristian Harpviken. "Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique." *PRIO Report* 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO 2001.
[12] Millard, Ananda and Kristian Harpviken. "Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique." *PRIO Report* 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO 2001.
[13] HALO also work with World Vision and WFP – Clarification – The HALO Trust – July 2013.

and local bodies to engender community development, and fosters the exchange of experiences and information between communities.[14]

3.4.2 3.4.2 Impact of mine action on gender

Regarding gender specifically, widows are considered to be more vulnerable than married women. Most household decisions are made by men. Cultivation is carried out by women, the burning of coal by men, and the sale of products by women. This division of labour meant that women had less contact with the demining operation, but the impact of the clearing of landmines affects them still.

More importantly, in the Mozambican context of the villages visited for this evaluation, it is important to note that the demining operation was in no way able to influence local gender structures. This was true of all cases including the counterfactual case study. The landmines did not in affect one gender more than another. The division of labour between the sexes and the 'whole family' approach to ensuring the families livelihood has meant that a threat to the security of the family meant that alternatives had to be found (i.e., farming further away from their homestead), and this had general implications on production levels and overall income. The effect, therefore, was not one that was more strongly felt by one gender over another. Similarly, the limited number of individuals employed at the village level were generally assigned by the village itself, and followed gender structures that were acceptable to the village.

It is important to underscore that while there are grave gender inequities in Mozambican society, it is hard to identify ways by which the demining operations could effectively influence gender structures. The employment of female deminers, for example, which was not done here, should not be understood as a way to change deeply rooted gender structures. While in some circumstances it may help to support equity between the genders, this is not always the case. Clearly, employing women has a value in terms of financial equity more broadly but its value in terms of re-shaping deeply-rooted gender structures should not be overemphasised, and such employment structures should not raise false expectations.

3.4.3 Lack of M&E data to measure impact

There is currently no system for monitoring and evaluating the impact of the landmine clearance in Mozambique.[15] No actor interviewed during the process of the community survey data collection knew of any system to evaluate the degree to which the demining activities had influenced the development of specific communities. It would be beneficial to introduce a monitoring system to evaluate the degree to which demining activities have socio-economic impact.

3.5 Limited Mine Risk Education (MRE)

None of the communities visited had had very strong Mine Risk Education. Indeed, there was no report of any clear activities beyond a limited amount of information on what to do or not to do when facing a potential landmine, which was included in the briefing from HALO Trust. These activities however, cannot be understood as solid MRE. Firstly, these activities did not target the whole vulnerable population but rather they targeted the village leader and any other community member that was present at the time.

Communication between HALO, the operator, and local communities appeared amicable. However, there were instances where information had not been clearly understood by the community. HALO relies largely on the village leader as the key interlocutor between them and the community. However in some cases, relying on the village leader alone has meant that information has not been fully disseminated and/or understood. For example, in one area, the general population had not realised that demining had ended and that the task was, according to existing information held by the operator, fully accomplished. The village community thought that the demining agency would return.

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3.6 Community Liaison could be improved

HALO Trust's approach to communication and coordination varies depending on the actor or stakeholder. In the case of communities HALO Trust staff, both management and field staff, confirmed that they have discussions with

[14] HelpAge International in Mozambique. Final Report: Improving household incomes through local project initiatives. June - December 2012. HelpAge International. Monthly Report. March-April 2012; HelpAge International. Improving household incomes through local project initiatives Project Proposal. Mozambique, 13 July 2012.
[15] HALO plan to carry out post clearance community assessments as part of the project – Clarification – the HALO Trust – July 2013.

the village leader and sometimes members of the community, who may choose to participate in the meeting prior to the commencement of the demining. These meetings aim to establish a dialogue with the village leader and to respond to any concern the village leader may have regarding the operation. Broadly, the meetings could be described as planning sessions which may conclude with HALO Trust contracting a number of local community members at the request of the village leadership. Positions such as guards, assistant cooks, cleaners and so forth are positions that are regularly filled locally. The people who fill the positions are often identified by the village leader with or without the input from other community members. HALO Trust staff, both management and field staff, noted that in some cases the community proposes individuals to be contracted and that these proposals are generally followed as a sign of good will on part of HALO Trust.

Cooperation with governmental actors locally, such as the Police and Administration corresponding to villages visited, was amicable but informal, according to the Police and District Administration Secretary interviewed. HALO, the aforementioned respondents noted, informed them of the activities they undertook locally on an informal basis. Both offices noted that they had little, if any, influence on how demining was prioritised and stressed their need for more thorough information regarding clearance activities. They stressed that they had no systematic knowledge regarding cleared and returned land. Moreover, the Police and Administration outlined different information flow processes pertaining to landmine identification, and notification between their respective offices and the organisation tasked with demining. However, they both concurred that demining activities were tasked at the provincial or central government level and did not include either of their respective offices in any way. They added that they did not have any information from the central government outlining all the landmine contamination and clearances that had taken place. This, both the Administration and the Police proposed, was a clear shortcoming since when asked - for example by merchants, local community members or even NGOs coming to work in the area - they were unable to provide the data. They expressed frustration at the situation but also noted that information they received from HALO Trust was not data that had been sanctioned by the central government and hence, they could not use it. Both offices added that they had no system to record information they received from HALO and hence, any data collected regarding tasks conducted and or completed was utilised in good faith but not recorded officially. It therefore, did not come to form part of official data.

3.7 Conclusions on the Community Impact Survey Findings

The DFID HALO Log Frame for Mozambique places promotion of poverty reduction at the front and centre of the activities that they conduct. While this is very much in-line with the strategic goals and objectives of DFID CHASE, MA Programme, the five villages visited appear not to make a solid case for how the indicators are met. First, accident potential was limited as is illustrated by the reduced number of accidents. Second, none of the villages stressed food security as a concern but rather the convenience in terms of land use (i.e., farming closer rather than further from their homesteads). Third, the communities visited consistently stressed that their economic level was not severely impacted by the presence of landmines or demining. Overall the log frame does not accurately represent what can be achieved in the Mozambican context (i.e., well-identified indicators); however this does not mean that demining does not have an impact. To the contrary, the counterfactual case examined shows clearly that some places in Mozambique still require demining.

Development in Mozambique is reliant on multiple factors. Landmines can, and were, shown to prevent development. The villages where merchants are more likely to frequent now that the village is understood as mine-free would be one example. Further steps are needed to ensure sustainable development. This would suggest that future iterations of the Log Frame examine in more detail the type of indicator that would better fit the socio-economic conditions of rural Mozambique.

4 Evaluation Purpose 2: Institutional Capacity Developed through MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Institutional Capacity Appraisal conducted in Mozambique.

4.1 Key Findings

Mozambique has a mine action plan that accords with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) and relates to national development frameworks. Mozambique has national standards for mine action, and mine action is integrated as part of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). Mozambique mine action authorities have demonstrated increased capacity to plan, manage, coordinate and monitor MA efforts.

The Theory of Change for the current DFID CHASE MA Programme was developed retrospectively (Jones & O'Reilly, 2012) and thus is not linked to the contracts of the implementers. According to this ToC, the output of institutional capacity building interventions would be an efficient and effective National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) which assuming political will existed, would result in appropriate policies in place and integrated with national development plans and budgets.[16] The expectation is that this would result in Mine Ban Treaty compliance which in turn would contribute to improved quality of life for mine-affected communities.

Expected activities to achieve the outcomes in the ToC are similar to those undertaken by the implementing partners and include: training courses and exposure visits, mentoring and support provided to enable NMAAs to undertake their regulatory and coordination of the market role. Log Frames were developed by HALO and these were used to assess progress in institutional capacity building. (See discussion in Section 4.4.4 of the main report).

4.1.1 Political will to facilitate Mine Action in country

The evaluation found evidence of political will to implement a mine action programme. The Republic of Mozambique signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and 1998 respectively.[17] They were however not able to meet the ten-year deadline and made an article 5 extension request that is due to expire on 1 March 2014[18]. Thus far, however, despite difficulties fulfilling the clearance obligations the country has submitted transparency reports in compliance with the treaty. Mozambique has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and there has been no reported use of landmines since the end of the conflict[19]. The biggest challenge to complete demining before the 2014 deadline is reported to be the minefields along the Mozambique-Zimbabwe Border. A joint country approach to demining the border is being considered.[20]

Mozambique signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 14 March 2011. The convention entered into force for Mozambique on 1 September 2011[21]. Between 2008 and October 2012, demining resulted in the clearance and release of 867 hazard areas equivalent to 26.1 million square meters and the destruction of 20,500 landmines and 6,300 UXOs.[22] According to our interviews with IND and the UNDP, the Government funds civil servant salaries, but non-civil servant salaries of people working in the IND are covered by the UNDP. It is also anticipated by IND that the Government will take over the costs of the maintaining the residual capacity that will be required to manage any residual risk following Mozambique's expected declaration of being mine free in 2014.

4.1.2 Creation of a supervisory body

The Institute of National Demining (IND) was established by Government Decree in July 1999.[23] The IND has a mandate to coordinate, supervise and manage the cost-effective execution of a national mine action plan. It is a semi-autonomous institution which is required to report directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The IND has prepared a National Mine Action Plan [24]the ultimate aim of which is to enable the Government to declare Mozambique antipersonnel mine free, in compliance with article 5.1 of the Mine Ban Convention, no later than 1 March 2014[25]. Aside from Article 5.1 compliance the objectives of the plan are to reduce the number of new landmine victims and release areas for productive use, in support of socio-economic development and in support of the full implementation of the Mine Ban Convention by all States Parties.

Provincial demining commissions have been created and include the Directorate of Planning and Finance, the Provincial Police Command and the army. Other sectors are represented on the commissions depending on the province. The Inhambane commission, for example, includes representatives from the tourist industry, and in Tête the mineral resources sector is represented on the commission[26]. It was not possible however within the time constraints of this evaluation to observe the Provincial demining commissions at work.

[16] Jones & O'Reilly, 2012.
[17] Landmine Monitor Report. Mozambique Mine Ban Policy. http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/2022 last updated 2 November 2011
[18] Landmime Monitor, 2013.
[19] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 2011
[20] Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, 2012.
[21] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 2011
[22] Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, 2012.
[23] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, 2011.
[24] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2008
[25] The current extension request may be extended beyond 1 March 2014 to address the border minefields. Clarification HALO July 2013
[26] GICHD, 2012.

4.1.3 Integration of Mine Action into development plans

The Mozambique Action Plan for the Reduction of Poverty for 2010-2014[27] recognises the impact of landmines on poverty reduction and development. Indeed the plan includes mine action as one of eight main crosscutting issues that affect developmental potential and poverty reduction in the country. A UNDAF outcome also commits UNDP to continue to work with the IND to clear all landmines by 2014, in accordance with its Article 5 commitments and work with other groups under the PARP.[28] The UNDAF also recognises demining as a cross-cutting issue. Mine action is also included in the Government Programme to Achieve the Objectives of the PARP 2011-2014.[29] The National Mine Action Strategic Plan includes reference to ensuring that operations respond to national development priorities[30]. Despite the inclusion of mine action into the aforementioned national plans, NGO representatives and UNICEF suggested during interviews conducted for this evaluation that there was limited, if any, evidence of Mine Action being practically mainstreamed into development. Furthermore, we found no clear evidence of synergies with DFID in-country programmes including the wealth creation projects. The MA market is mix of not-for–profit and for-profit actors and often larger infrastructure projects include a budget for survey and clearance (GICHD, 2012).

4.1.4 Creation of technical capabilities to plan and manage Mine Action (including training)

A 2005 review found that the humanitarian impact of mines had been greatly reduced. The review observed that one of the biggest challenges for Mozambique in clearing the country of landmines would be having an accurate understanding of the extent of the contamination. Since then, the 2007-2008 Baseline Assessment reduced the country's suspected hazardous area by half and provided sufficient information for Mozambique's detailed request for the aforementioned Article 5 extension.[31]

According to GICHD, and verified in interviews with the IND, HALO and UNDP, the Baseline Assessment allowed the IND to develop the national mine action plan for 2008 to 2014.[32] Since the Baseline Assessment the IND was reported to have improved coordination, tasking and contracting of commercial contracts was reported to have improved. In terms of the IND QA teams it was reported they lack confidence especially in challenging strong operators. HALO were reported by the IND and UNDP to be a powerful NGO with a strong funding base, also noted in the GICHD report, which sometimes made it harder for the IND to coordinate them.

The IND also expressed a wish for greater in-country engagement with DFID including to be involved in the process of negotiating proposals. According to the IND, UNDP and the 2012 GICHD report, there are now formal procedures in place to enable the declaration of district mine-free status. While the quality of the database was reported to have improved, both UNDP and IND, including operations staff, reported that the Information Management System for the Mine Action (IMSMA) database still contains inaccuracies. A similar finding was reported by GICHD[33]. UNDP and the IND questioned the utility of such a specialised database in the context of transitioning out of the IND to the public service. Norwegian People's Aid is assisting with resolving this issue. A target of the 2008-2014 Plan is to prepare for residual mine and UXO contamination[34]. According to UNDP and the IND, there are many questions yet to be resolved around the transition including which public sector agency will coordinate and verify suspect areas, ensure compliance with national and international demining standards, educate people of residual threats and manage information.[35] After demining is concluded it is anticipated that for-profit demining companies and Army and Police capacities will address residual explosive remnants of war.[36] Key in preparing for the transition however is ensuring that the database is accurate and up-to-date, and that there is capacity to maintain it.

[27] IMF, 2011
[28] UN, 2011.
[29] IMF, 2011
[30] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2008.
[31] GICHD, 2012
[32] GICHD, 2012
[33] GICHD 2012
[34] (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2008).
[35] Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, 2012
[36] (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, 2012).

5 Evaluation Purpose 3: Socio-Economic Benefit Analysis of MA Programme

5.1 Key Findings

It has been difficult for the Mine Action Programme in Mozambique to demonstrate concrete links with economic development. HALO has attempted to collaborate with some NGOs to support post-clearance economic activity, although securing funds has proven to be a challenge.

5.1.1 The Economic Context

Mozambique has a fast-growing economy which is currently attracting a great deal of international investor attention for its vast unexploited reserves of coal, hydro-electric power, metals and minerals. These, coupled with natural gas reserves discovered last year, are potentially the source of considerable national revenue and employment.

Despite these valuable resources, the economy remains largely based on agriculture, but with accelerating production of industrial output, food produce, chemicals, aluminium, oil and tourism.

The national economic growth rate has been 7% in recent years, spurred by economic reforms including a successful privatisation policy. Continued future growth depends on planned major foreign investment projects, substantial transport infrastructure improvements, and the re-establishment of the agriculture sector.

Approximately 80% of the population are working in agriculture, with the majority of them engaged in small-scale subsistence farming. In addition, a small number of commercial farms export produce such as fish, prawns, cotton, sugar, timber, tobacco and cashew nuts. The Mozambique Government has made food production a national priority. Mozambique's agricultural sector overall accounts for 22% of GDP and is the largest single driver of national economic growth. Despite this, more than 90% of Mozambique's arable land currently remains uncultivated.[37]

5.1.2 Mine Action Context

The above economic background highlights two facets to the economic consequences arising from mine action activities in Mozambique – viz., agricultural expansion and the facilitation of infrastructure for the exploitation of resources. These are two levels of economic impact which operate at quite different scales, but both have real potential to create economic opportunity and employment for the marginalised poor.

In an earlier phase of mine action, HALO cleared all mines and UXO that they identified in the four Northern Provinces and completed extensive surveys of villages to confirm the absence of suspected areas, before refocusing their operations in the Southern and Central regions of Mozambique. Despite their exhaustive surveys, local government identified additional mine suspected areas to the IND in 2008. In 2012, the last of these known suspected areas was cleared by commercial deminers meaning that all known minefields have been cleared and handed back to the local communities in a safe condition, and all villages have been visited and interviewed to confirm that there are no known mined areas remain[38].. This means that all known minefields have been cleared and handed back to the associated local communities in a safe condition, and all villages have been visited and interviewed for their knowledge of local mines danger, to confirm there are no identifiable mined areas left.

Under the current CHASE MA Programme, MA operator HALO is extending this approach to a further three provinces – Maputo in the south, and Tete and Manica in the northwest. The earlier clearance of the four northern provinces offers an indication of the nature and scale of the benefits that can be expected from the provinces currently being worked on with DFID funding.

5.1.3 Mine Action in Support of Agriculture

The baseline study undertaken by HALO at the start of its Mozambique programme found that 63% of mine-affected communities have residents living within 50 metres of a mined area, and 54% of them cultivate agricultural land which is separated from a minefield by a distance of under 10 metres.

[37] Some of this is sourced from the Canadian International Development Agency, (http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/mozambique-e)
[38] Clarified by UNDP Mozambique, 20 June 2013.

Beneficiaries are using the cleared land mainly for rain-fed agriculture to produce maize. As of the end of July 2012, there had been 37 parcels of mine-cleared land handed over to communities.

In 2011, HALO worked with Help Age International to construct seven wells and install filters in mine clearance areas in Tete province, with the help of US Embassy and State Department funding. Fifteen hygiene activists were also trained. Due to no fault of HALO, the wells were constructed to a sub-standard level and dried up in the dry season, when most needed.

HALO worked with the World Food Programme in a 'cash-for-work' project to re-build damaged roads. With HelpAge International, HALO also helped to facilitate a range of other activities in communities impacted by landmines – training on veterinary services, tree planting, and distribution of over 500 goats to vulnerable people identified by village committees.

Additional plans for small-scale assistance to capitalise on mine-cleared land include seed distribution, provision of oxen, ploughs, small scale industries and financial credit.

So far, HALO has managed to leverage additional funding, including most recently, U$10,000 from the US State Department to complement its de-mining efforts and ensure follow-on benefits. They are also seeking additional partners.

5.1.4 Mine Action in Support of Critical Infrastructure

Minerals extracted from mines in the north of Mozambique cannot currently be taken efficiently to ports for export or to processing centres, for lack of adequate transport corridors (rail and road), and in other parts of the country railways are languishing due to mine contamination.

HALO has been working on clearing eight minefields from the Salamanga railway, south of Maputo. The last of these minefields will be cleared by commercial demining operators in 2013.[39] The Salamanga branch line is 54 kilometres long and extends from Boane district to Salamanga in the south of Mozambique, and links up to the existing Maputo-Goba line. In late 2011, with plans for completion of de-mining in sight, the Mozambican railroad company Portos e Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique announced its intention to spend US$8 million on repairing the line. The restoration work to increase the capacity of the Salamanga Railway has been planned since at least 2008.

Work on restoring the branch line will enable it to convey trains carrying limestone to the Cimentos de Moçambique cement plant and to another plant currently under construction in Salamanga. Once completed, the line will have a capacity of around 600,000 tons of cargo per year.

It is not currently possible to estimate the economic impact of such a development without detailed information on rail traffic and freight volumes. However it is clear that substantial economic activity will be enabled by the repaired railway, and that the DFID-funded mine clearance has levered the US$8 million planned investment.

The railway company in interview with the evaluator explained that the problem is not simply mines and UXO on rail tracks, which ordinarily might be expected to be fairly visible. Rather, the permanent way has become overgrown and disguises mines. Further, even when cleared, the railway company needs frequent access over wide areas of land on either side of the railway line, in order to deal with de-railing of railway trucks, flash-flood erosion of the permanent route, and other mishaps around the railway line, which are a fairly frequent occurrence.

HALO is also currently clearing the Maputo to South Africa electricity transmission line. The towers on this line require frequent repair and occasional replacement, and were mined around the bases to deter sabotage during the civil war. The expansion of the city of Maputo has brought shanty suburbs out into formerly somewhat remote rural locations, and people are living around these pylons, grazing their animals and cultivating patches of ground. The process by HALO of 'tilling' land to some depth to locate and remove mines leaves a clear surface of freshly dug soil which is often immediately planted by locals for subsistence cropping.

Furthermore, for lack of a domestic transmission network, Mozambique is currently disadvantageously selling home-generated power in the north of the country to South Africa, and buying it back across the border in the south to serve the Maputo area.

[39] Clarified by UNDP Mozambique, 20 June 2013.

Investment in the necessary infrastructure projects has been stalled, and investors deterred, by the uncertainty of extensive land mines remaining in key provinces. These mines may have had little previous impact due to their remoteness, but as the country rapidly develops, formerly neglected areas are assuming national economic significance. HALO's programme is clearing mines from power lines, railways, a large hydroelectric dam and other vital sites, and is a critical part of Mozambique's national economic development plan.

It is not possible to readily quantity the economic impact of specialist and complex engineering and economic development infrastructure projects such as these. However, in extensive interviews with government Ministries, agencies and companies in Maputo during the field visits, senior officials strenuously insisted on the vital importance of mine clearance, even in remote areas, for creating the investor confidence necessary to attract international backers to these projects.

ANNEX E:

Country Mission Report – Sri Lanka

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1 Country Background and Project Context

1.1 Origin and extent of the Contamination

In May 2009, more than two decades of armed conflict between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), came to an end.

Landmines were used to varying degrees by both sides at different stages of the conflict and continue to present an obstacle to the safe return of displaced families. Mines also block access to paddy fields, fishing jetties, grazing land and community infrastructure in villages throughout the North[1]. Most mines are of the anti-personnel type, sometimes laid in dense, patterned mine belts, but there is also widespread nuisance mine-laying in residential areas. In addition, unexploded and abandoned ordnance presents a threat across the North.

1.2 National Authorities and Key Actors

The national mine action programme operates under the leadership of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), chaired by the Ministry of Economic Development. It is comprised of Secretary level representation from stake holding Ministries, the Tamil Relief Organisation, donor community, demining NGOs, UNICEF and UNDP. It is responsible for policy oversight and co-ordination, advice and direction on operations including on National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), Quality Assurance, Mine Risk Education and Victims Assistance[2]. The work is further supported at the district level by the two Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs). Based in Jaffna and Vavuniya, they oversee the quality management of mine action activities, including survey, clearance, MRE and data collection activities. At the time of the evaluation, there was an emerging plan to move the Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs) from the Ministry of Economic Development to Ministry of Defence. These offices will be reporting to NMAC which will remain within the Ministry of Economic Development.

The Sri Lanka National Mine Action Center (SLNMAC) is the operational body that executes the policies of the NSCMA and is the focal point for coordinating mine action activities including developing strategic plans, setting priorities and information management[3].

The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Fondation Suisse de Deminage (FSD) and DASH are the only MA agencies that operate in Sri Lanka at the moment along with local group, Delvon Assistance for Social Harmony (DASH) and the Sri Lanka Army - Humanitarian Demining Unit (SLA/HDU). Furthermore, FSD will leave Sri Lanka in September 2013 and DDG will cease all operations by December 2013, leaving HALO, MAG and DASH (outwith SLA HDU) as the only MA agencies operating in country[4].

1.3 Support for Mine Action

Sri Lanka receives significant levels of international assistance for mine action[5]. UNDP and UNICEF have supported the establishment of the National Mine Action Centre with $3 million from the UN Peace Building Fund.[6] UNDP also supports mine action through a Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Colombo and staff placed at the SLNMAC's Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs), while UNICEF does so through the provision of technical assistance to Sri Lanka's MRE programme.[7]

1.4 Legal framework

Sri Lanka acceded to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 24 September 2004[8], but has not signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)[9] nor have they joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).[10]

[1] Interview with Bartholomew Digby, HALO Trust Programme Manager, April 10, 2013.
[2] As a sub-committee of the National Co-coordinating Committee on Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation (NCCR), the NSCMA also provides linkages to other rehabilitation, development and resettlement initiatives
[3] *National Strategy for Mine Action*, September 2010.
[4] Clarification – HALO – June 2013
[5] In 2011, international contributions from seven states, the European Commission (EC), UNDP, and UNICEF towards mine action totalled US$24.6 million - *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, 2012.
[6] NMAC, "Progress Report on Mine Action Programme," Colombo, February 2012.
[7] Though Sri Lanka has not formally reported on its financial contributions to its mine action programme, the Sri Lankan Army has been engaged in demining at a cost reported to be LKR5.4 billion (approximately US$40 million). *Ibid.*
[8] UN Office for Disarmament website

1.5 Survey and Prioritisation

Surveys have been conducted, primarily by NGOs, and numerous mine records were released by the Sri Lankan Army. Currently the northern districts that are the main focus of mine action operations and ongoing Non-Technical Survey (NTS) continue to reduce/cancel large areas (MAG reporting cancelation of 86.31km², FSD of 44.6km² and HALO Trust 148km²).[11]

In accordance with the government resettlement and development plans, priority for clearance is given to village areas that facilitate IDP resettlement. As people return to these areas attention is also given to clearance in support of restoring livelihoods. The RMAO supports local government authorities, specifically the District Steering Committee for Mine Action (DSCMA) in the development of priorities and work plans. Upon approval by the SLNMAC and the Sri Lankan Army, tasks are distributed to operators for operational planning.[12]

1.6 Assessing the Overall Performance of MA programmes

The MA situation in Sri Lanka can be indicatively summarised in a Radar diagram (Diagram 1) using six reference criteria which are:

1. Marginal cost of mine/UXO removal
2. Percentage of endangered population having received MRE/RRE
3. Number of untreated victims or those in need of continued treatment from mine-induced wounds/trauma
4. Advocacy and local MA ownership to gauge the country's authorities' commitment to direct and manage MA actions
5. Percentage of stockpile destruction
6. Percentage of area of country's danger zone cleared of mines.

The criteria have been tentatively assessed on a 1 to 5 scale for each of the six criteria, whereby "1" indicates a good position for the country, and "5" indicates a situation where the country needs critical attention. Hence, the smaller the area covered by the radar diagram, the better the position of the country, and the less support it presumably would need from public or donor funds.

The model is intended to illustrate an alternative and joined-up approach to measuring the impact of mine action and development. More systematic baselines, regular reporting and impact evaluations introduced through the CHASE MA Programme will make it possible to construct more informed representations of the likely contribution of MA to development in target countries. Parameters for such an assessment would include such criteria as extent of contamination, governance (capacity and human rights); commitment to inclusive development (e.g. pro-poor), demographics, proximity/remoteness.

Diagram 1: Radar Diagram – Effectiveness of MA Programmes in Sri Lanka



[9] *Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor*, 2012
[10] Ibid
[11] Ibid
[12] *Jaffna Regional Mine Action Work plan,* 2013

2 Methodological Adaptation for Evaluation of MA in Country

2.1 Methodology for Community Impact Survey

The community impact survey was conducted using a qualitative methodology consisting of focus group discussions, key informant interviews, village mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines. The survey took place in Sri Lanka over a short time frame[13], from the 3rd to 17th of April 2013 (with a few days of suspension for the Sri Lankan New Year celebration). It included a shortened 2-day training of local surveyors and was carried out by a team of one international and four (for a few days, then three) national members. The team was not gender-balanced (initially 3 males and 1 female; the only female had to leave at the early stages for health reasons); all the three national male team members spoke native Tamil, but only one had a good command of English.

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In all communities two focus groups were conducted with sex homogenous groups, one with women and one with men. The data from the focus groups was complemented by individual key informant interviews with a varied range of respondents at community level and at district or provincial level. Key informants included direct beneficiaries, farmers, fishermen, deminers, mine action officers, those displaced in welfare centres, university researchers, development officer connected with the central ministry, doctors, traditional birth attendant, school teacher and leaders and members of community based organisations including women-led rural development societies, rural development societies, and farmer and fisheries societies. Since access to land and land rights are very sensitive issues in Sri Lanka, people interviewed often requested anonymity, due to the high presence of the Military army (allegedly sometimes undercover) and to the widespread experience of land expropriation.

The study sampled three communities that had been demined and one counterfactual. All of the communities were in the Northern Province of Sri Lanka, Districts of Jaffna and Kilinochchi. The sample was identified through a standard set of criteria which was used for the fieldwork conducted in each country and defined in the methodology (see Annex M). The guiding principle was selecting villages in the relevant areas which are as different as possible regarding characteristics considered significant in terms of level and type of development (environmental context, type of livelihoods, type of land contamination experienced, accessibility, services, etc[14]). In the communities selected CHASE MA Programme funded project implementation is still ongoing, and so villages were selected at an advanced level of implementation on the basis that they would provide the best conditions for impacts to be manifest.

In addition, a counterfactual study was conducted to examine the degree to which an area that was not demined experienced something different from what was visible in areas already demined. The village of Kadduvan was chosen as counterfactual; although it is difficult to isolate a place where no demining was performed, the village selected is a place where large areas are still contaminated and also non accessible to the population, being under the control of the military and not open for resettlement. The data collection model used in the counterfactual was the same as that of other villages. Similarly, the data from the counterfactual was treated in the same manner as the other villages.

As part of the survey in the counterfactual, the team organised a visit to a ‘welfare centre’ in the surrounding area where many people of Kadduvan were relocated. The visit was not initially planned and normally not allowed by the military, and so the team took advantage of the opportunity and continued afterwards with interviews to beneficiaries in the surrounding area of Valalay where resettlement and demining are on-going. A further village (Mugamalay, in Kilinochchi) was visited for additional interviews with beneficiaries of the temporary shelter scheme[15] implemented by ZOA. Therefore, in total, visits to 6 villages took place including one in the area of the counterfactual.

Table 1 provides a list of the communities surveyed.

[13] Fifteen days for training, data collection and data transcription, with alternate days (except in one case) dedicated to data collection, and to data transcription with preliminary analysis.
[14] See Annex M16 for criteria for selecting sample villages
[15] The meeting was not initially planned; when the international consultant went there for an arranged meeting with the field officers of one of the implementers, many beneficiaries had been called to be interviewed. In that occasion, no person of the team was there who could speak tamil, so another meeting was proposed with those who wanted to tell about their experience as recipient of the shelter and toilet scheme. A few people related to the same family returned at the established appointment and provided details on what they felt was an unfair distribution and internal targeting, including assignment of shelter to families who emigrated abroad but who could secure their land by receiving aid.

Table 1

Village	Division	District	Characteristics
NAGARKOVIL	Maruthankerny	Jaffna	Several waves of people were displaced from this village over time, after the Tsunami in 2004, and then in 2007- 2008. On the coast, fishery is the main livelihood, the ground is not suitable to farm; there are large areas with no vegetation cover, and minefields reach the water. There are very minimal market / selling opportunities for fish, no premises to preserve or to process post-catch, no public transportation reaching out. The military bund is still visible. When the demining operation started no people settled in the area. Minefields are very close to temporary shelters and clearance is ongoing close to areas with vegetation. Returnees are also receiving shelter from HALO through ZOA.
VANNERIKULAM	Karachchi	Kilinochchi	People were displaced from this area in 2008. The area has good vegetation and fertile land, farms and house gardens; there is some contamination left bordering Mullaitivu, there are large basins of water in the area with the water system not reactivated yet. Roads are being rehabilitated. There are many recipients of funds for permanent housing. Only a few families rely on fishing. The demining process is ongoing. Military bunds limit access to the farming lands.
MALAYALAPURAM	Karachchi	Kilnochi	Most of the populations are Tamil. People were displaced in 2008. Located close to the main road (A9), population mostly relies on agriculture and unskilled labour for livelihoods.
KADDUVAN	Tellippalai	Jaffna	**Counterfactual -** People were displaced during 1990s and started to resettle after 2010. It was a high security zone for a long time. Agriculture is the main livelihood. Very few people relocated, a section of the land is in a high security area controlled by the military (very close to the village). The soil is highly fertile soil. Large areas are still mined. People from Kadduvan North (and from the bordering villages of Mayility, and Palaly) are still in the Maruthanamadam Sapavathipillai welfare centre from 1990 – recently reclassified as non IDPs. The area is under high influence of military occupancy. Part of Kadduvan is not permitted yet for resettlement.

The data collected was used to triangulate the findings presented below. All the findings noted below correspond to information which was gathered in group interviews and further substantiated by individual interviews. No data below corresponds to the views or opinions of a single respondent. While the findings below cannot be assumed to be representative of the whole country, they are believed to be indicative of what can be found in similar settings throughout Sri Lanka. The findings were generated through the tools and approaches associated with participative community survey and belong to the evaluation team and the authors of the report. They do not necessarily represent the views of the client, DFID, or its implementing agencies in Sri Lanka.

Constraints to the survey implementation included:

- Limited resources and time were the main constraints encountered to rapidly select, train and deploy a national team of surveyors with the needed linguistic skills (Tamil and English).
- The small national team of four members identified for the survey was initially composed of one female out of three staff, and at points in the survey implementation the team missed female representation completely (four members only for the training and the two initial field days, then, due to health issues, only three male surveyors). These difficulties only allowed for a small sample of villages to be considered and for a number of Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) more limited than in other countries[16].
- It is not long since operations were completed, and many are still ongoing, which makes impact evaluation problematic and not definitive;
- The limited command of English for over half of the survey team, which complicated translations and transcript, and had to be mitigated by long discussions within the team after the actual interview time. Identifying surveyors fluent in both Tamil and English and willing to perform field work in the Northern Province proved difficult.

[16] See for example Cambodia country case.

- The heavy presence of the Military was a major constraint to optimal performance. Clearances to work were necessary and were obtained through the good offices of HALO. This influenced the local team of surveyors who were somewhat intimidated by the military presence.

2.2 Methodology for Institutional Capacity Appraisal

The Institutional Capacity evaluation was grounded in an extensive documentation analysis, based mainly on government policy, programme reports and evaluations, the Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development[17] and a review of peer-reviewed articles related to institutional capacity building. A thematic guide for interviews was prepared by the evaluation team for the different stakeholder groups (DFID contractors, UNDP/UNMAS, the National Mine Action Authority, development partner NGOs/cluster coordinators, local administrators) identified by the evaluation team and in consultation with in-country operators. Eleven interviews were undertaken. All interviews were undertaken in English and took approximately 45-60 minutes. The findings from interviews and the literature were grouped into themes to address the evaluation questions and the analysis integrated with the literature. In addition, a further ten interviews related to institutional capacity were undertaken in the context of the Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013. The aim was to reach data 'saturation', that is data collection is terminated when no new information is forthcoming (Patton, 2002). To an extent, qualitative data collection was also determined by resource and key informant availability. While not exhaustive, the review of the literature covered the most pertinent documents related to the evaluation questions. Contact was made and data gathered with a wide range of institutional interlocutors.

Key stakeholders in Sri Lanka are set out in Box 1.

Box 1: Key Mine Action Stakeholders Interviewed in Sri Lanka[18]

- N.B.M. (Monty) Ranathunge, Director of National Mine Action Centre and Director of Rural Development
- Ministry of the Economic Development, Colombo.
- MR Mahinda Wickramasingha, Assistant Director, Planning & De-Mining Operation, National Mine Action Centre, Colombo.
- Varatharajah Murugathas ('Thas'), Mine Action Officer, District Mine Action Office (UNDP-funded), Jaffna.
- Milhar Muhammed – Programme Officer - UNICEF
- Mrs Rubawathi Ketheeswaran, District Secretary and Government Agent, Kilinochchi District.
- Mr. Sathiyaseelan, Divisional Secretary, Pachchilappelli Division, Kilinochchi.
- Valon Kumnova, Desk Officer for Somalia and Sri Lanka, The HALO Trust
- Bartholomew Digby, Programme Manager Sri Lanka, The HALO Trust
- Camille Wallen, Programme Officer Sri Lanka, The HALO Trust
- Guido de Vries, ZOA, Programme Manager
- Lakshi Abeyasekera , Sewalanka, Director of special projects

3 Evaluation Purpose 1: Community Impact of MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Community Impact Survey conducted in four communities in Sri Lanka (including one counterfactual community).

3.1 Key findings

The operations funded by DFID CHASE and implemented by HALO are providing an essential contribution to the resettlement process in the Northern Province, both Jaffna and Kilinochchi Districts, releasing both housing and farming land for the families who have been displaced during the last war or for longer. There are several schemes supported by a range of international donors and implemented by the government of Sri Lanka, which provide temporary shelters and permanent housing to people to support resettlement. The main focus is on demining land for resettlement and for farming, according to the priorities and directions of the central Government which decides the areas which can be open for resettlement. Activities on demined land restart immediately after they have been cleared, being used for example for shelter, permanent housing, agriculture or as a basis for fishing. Cleared land is not left unutilised. CHASE demining operations are generally considered important and well

[17] O'Reilly, Friedman, Dinsmore, Storr, & MacPherson, 2012
[18] MAG 2013 initial advice, Matt Thomas, Regional Programme Manager, UK HQ, Manchester

regarded by the beneficiary population, although there are differences in those perceptions depending on environmental contexts and household profile.

Officially, IDP camps have been said to be closed with occupants now resettled. However, this is not the case. UNHCR lists 24 Grama Niladari (GN) secretariats not open for returnees, and, in Jaffna alone, local organisations have identified 2,700 families in 13 IDP camps (named "welfare centres"). During the recent war, and immediately after, there was extensive support provided to these IDPs, but the Government has 'declassified' and changed their status to 'not displaced'. While the Government denies the existence of IDPs (and has provided them with new ID cards no longer showing the status of IDP), the Ministry of Resettlement is providing official statistics of people still living in welfare centres. There are 4,205 people from 1,195 families listed as IDPs who live in 37 open welfare centres in the district of Jaffna while 17,749 people lives as IDPs with their relatives and friends.[19] Those families do not have permission to go back to their land, which in some cases had been seized for security reasons during the conflict. At present, economic activity is being undertaken on such land, as observed along the main road leading to the Northern Province (restaurant bar and shops) and as reported by several informants (farming activities, and according to some informants allegedly also tourist facilities on some coastal areas). According to many sources this land is not contaminated with landmines or UXOs.

The target District of the community impact survey remains densely contaminated with landmines and UXOs. The level of performance (quality of demining, time of completion) and the capacity (number of staff, equipment and level of funding) of the HALO Trust is rated highest in the country. This is recognised and appreciated by national counterparts, both the National Mine Action Office and the Army, which is active in all the areas that are being reopened after the conflict.

Reduction in potential accidents is important in an area where population movements are very fluid and where maintaining marking signs has proved to be not feasible. National statistics show a reduction in accidents since 2011 in all the three provinces where HALO is working.

Working as a deminer for HALO is a very good and relatively accessible source of income for communities. Deminers work as much as possible in their home area, increasing the likelihood that women would apply for demining jobs. HALO has a current workforce of over 1,000 staff with the capacity to upscale. HALO Management is proud of strictly following merit-based promotion, an approach which has allowed promotion of women and socially excluded staff.

HALO has allocated £421,000[20] of the CHASE country budget to the building of temporary shelters and livelihoods assistance to ensure they are able to connect their clearance work to development progress. This initiative illustrates the will of HALO to interpret the priorities and vision of the donor with flexibility. It has also ***proved to have some immediate impact*** for those populations who have been able to resettle in areas which were only partially demined (e.g. where the land has been cleared for housing, but there is on-going clearance on other parts of the land) and for those living in difficult environments such as a high security zone (for example, fishermen villages on the limited available coast).

Nevertheless the comparative advantage of having a MA organisation indirectly implementing these types of intervention is hard to prove. Lack of experience in monitoring interventions different from demining or in developing gender sensitive programming was identified as an issue by the MA organisation itself. The Evaluation team sampled three cases, implemented by two different local organisations. Two of those cases – from the same NGO - lacked the minimal technical adaptation of a standard shelter to the actual environment necessary to make it usable. There was little awareness and no strategy to mitigate or correct intra-village tensions which arose out of inaccurate and insufficient targeting. The third case, however, proved to be a thoughtful livelihood intervention to complement resettlement efforts with minimal budget and good results for households with already existing good farming skills.

Coordination among different actors and providers of aid schemes for resettlement is conducted by the government at its different levels. With regard to CHASE funded MA areas, the UN coordination agency (OCHA) is currently only supporting Kilinochchi interventions. In that region, a new caseload of refugees is attracting all available funds, while resettlement in Jaffna is less monitored and is considered completed by the government. The

[19] This is reported on 5th March 2013 by the Ministry of Resettlement. See http://www.resettlementmin.gov.lk/idps-jaffna (last accessed: 20 May 2013). Beside Government direction to change the status formally, it has to be considered that the agencies as well have decided in past times to reduce support to IDPs progressively to attempt to avoid the full crystallisation of the situation (information from survey team).
[20] HALO clarification – June 2013

situation on the ground though does not seem to correspond to what is declared by the government. IDP camps are still numerous and present very hard conditions for the people housed there. The Government of Sri Lanka does not allow assistance to IDP camps other than Governmental services[21]. Both UNICEF and UNDP have insufficient funds to continue their work, while UNHCR in Jaffna has shrunk to a minimum level that does not cover existing needs or performance of direct interventions.

3.2 Efficient mine clearance

The target district for the community impact survey remains densely contaminated with landmines and UXOs. The level of performance (quality of demining, time of completion), as stated earlier, the capacity (number of staff, equipment and level of funding) and professionalism of the MA organisation is rated highest in the country, recognised and appreciated by national counterparts, both the National Mine Action Office and the Army. The HALO Trust has a large staffing capacity (over 1,000 staff) and a significant fleet of mechanical means for mine clearance and ground preparation. All comments from direct beneficiaries and from beneficiary communities have been very positive on reliability. In some cases (Nagarkovil) people complained about the length of the operations. However overall communities would praise their work and compare very favourably with other international NGOs. Some of these were considered unreliable for not having completed their assigned tasks (for example, in Vannerikulam, and in the division of Tellipalai). HALO was called to intervene in areas that were partially demined by other organisations which were unable to finish the planned minefields clearance (Nagarkovil, Valalay). Interviewees have described the reporting process for new mines as going through the village head (Grama Niladhari), or through the Army, or more rarely through HALO. HALO was described as being responsive to the call outs. In Sri Lanka the Government does not allow MA organisations to retain and directly use explosives; procedures provide that the army regularly provides the needed explosive. However, the MA organisation pays for the explosive.

3.3 Impact on incidence of landmine accidents

Reduction in potential accidents is important in an area where population movements are very fluid and where maintaining marking signs has proved to be difficult. National statistics show a reduction in accidents since 2011 in all three provinces where HALO is working. The available data from the Regional Mine Action Unit on mine accidents reveals how the most recent outburst of conflict (2007-2009) brought an increase in numbers of UXOs accidents in Jaffna and Kilinochchi. The data also shows a reduction in those accidents from 2011, when CHASE operations began, suggesting that marking, demining and MRE operations have been effective in reducing the number of UXO victims. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, HALO's survey and indication of the safe areas enabled many thousands of IDPs to resettle. CHASE funding enhanced the intervention and sped up the clearance of the remaining areas for resettlement. This has been important since families were starting to re-establish in their home areas sometimes even before the designated plot for housing was cleared, settling with temporary shelters to ensure their land was considered for clearance and their land claims were respected..

3.4 Focus of clearance prioritisation

The operations conducted under CHASE have focused on clearing housing land, and have addressed the basic need of enabling resettlement in designated areas and for the people that the government has identified. In Sri Lanka some 70,000 IDPs have resettled[22] and 114 temporary housing shelters have been constructed[23] on land cleared through DFID sponsorship.

HALO is an important partner for the GoSL in defining accurate technical baselines of suspected or contaminated areas. This information is used for planning clearance. However, HALO has no decision-making powers as to which areas shall be cleared first and reopened for resettlement. This influences the relevance of tasks chosen, thus compromising the capacity of HALO to target the most vulnerable first in an inclusive manner. At the level of interaction with institutions, the MA operator has very little leverage to advocate for resettlement of those families who are still in the camps and who come in from areas, both mined and not mined, that the military are keeping under their control.

[21] Clarified by UNICEF Sri Lanka, 20th June 2013.
[22] In the Vanni only, *DFID Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka, HALO Trust Interim Eighteen Month Report, June 1-November 30, 2012*
[23] Interview with Bartholomew Digby, HALO Programme Manager, Kilinochi, April 11, 2013.

The MA operator is restricted in its ability to influence and advocate resettlement. However, improved circulation of information on assessed needs, planned clearance, and observed gaps could facilitate coordination within the aid community and possibly also help to reduce instances of usurpation of land rights by improving transparency.

As the housing land is liberated for resettlement, communities push for farming land to be decontaminated. In the villages visited, the pace of operations had been fast enough to liberate farming land as well, although in some places (for example, Malayalapuram), land belonging to many families is still contaminated. Governmental authorities are starting to ask HALO to demine more agricultural infrastructures as the resettlement priorities decrease (for example, Vannerikulam).

Not all non-contaminated land is accessible to the population, in some cases the population cannot reclaim property, as it is now classified as a high security zone and controlled by the military, as is the case in the counterfactual village Kadduvan.

The government announced that IDPs in Jaffna were all resettled, but this does not correspond to the reality observed in the field mission. The evaluation team visited a welfare centre - the Maruthanamadam Sapavathipillai – and conducted interviews with camp spokespersons and a development volunteer. There is also information from UNHCR, and from local organisations working to alleviate conditions of people in the 13 welfare centres. There seems to be a correspondence between communities who were not granted permission to resettle and large areas of land still kept by the army and classified as high security zone.

The operations conducted under the CHASE MA Programme are very relevant and responsive to needs. However, given the complexities of current governance and ethnically connected power patterns, there is little space for the MA operator to serve those people who are considered (by themselves, by UNHCR and by local NGOs providing basic services) to be the most vulnerable. These are notably people who, despite being displaced, have been declassified and filed as already resettled. It is difficult for MA operators to prioritise land to clear according to assessed needs, because the conditions of the most vulnerable partially depends on political circumstances and partially on the attitude of the military.

Thus, the nature of the current governance of mine action in Sri Lanka and the prioritisation process hampers the possibility for the DFID CHASE MA programme to target intervention to cover the most vulnerable. These include the people in the welfare camps whom the Government is, for now, not willing to resettle. As recovery progresses, prioritisation becomes more complex as other factors affect the demand for clearance. For example, in order to access grants for permanent housing, people need to supply a certificate of clearance of the land.[24] This has led to local level (district) and the national level sometimes producing conflicting decisions. The MA organisation has attempted to mediate, including by redefining the detailed workplan to address these types of situations. More effective coordination between national and international development stakeholders with MA actors could simplify and reduce these situations and avoid conflicting policies and workplans.

3.4.1 Use of M&E data to prioritise clearance and measure impact

HALO developed - as required by the CHASE programme - a baseline assessment for comparison with post-clearance information once implementation is completed. It was performed[25] as a quantitative and qualitative survey on 3,776 households[26]. The surveyed areas included those where an intervention funded by DFID was likely. The baseline provides a profile of the type and distribution of livelihoods in the surveyed areas and level of income. It provides socio economic parameters to enable an assessment of the impact. The baseline has been used for programming decisions in relation to mine action activities and also the complementary interventions which HALO has opted to conduct through sub-financing relief and recovery interventions. It is reported that the decision that HALO took to target and support the Nagarkovil population not only through mine clearance but also through a separate scheme providing temporary shelters, was informed by the assessed gap in distribution and donor coverage.

[24] The Certificate is provided collectively to a village (Grama Niladhari). Therefore it might be withhold until all minefields in a village are not cleared, which causes tension and worries to lose the requirements for accessing the grant.
[25] The baseline was carried out with the involvement of 30 staff (across HALO, ZOA and Swiss Foundation for Mine Action) and it took 4 months to complete (July to October 2011). Since this community impact survey was conducted with much less resources (4 national staff for part of the time, 3 for the rest) and much more limited amount of time (17 days including local travel and training) only a qualitative approach has been taken, and is therefore not conducted through collection of panel data proceeding from the baseline."
[26] Since this community impact survey was conducted with less resources and much more limited amount of time only a qualitative approach has been taken, therefore is not conducted with panel data on the baseline.

The baseline, however, does not seem to have played a role in deciding specifically which villages or which minefields in each chosen village are targeted through the CHASE funds. The initial prioritisation was conducted centrally at governmental level and by the National Mine Action Centre. Operational prioritisation seems to be a combination of directions from local authorities and of logical-operational considerations. The Baseline is to a large extent a focused socio-economic assessment, however is does not offer a full connection between landmine contamination data and socioeconomic livelihoods profiles. This could be indirectly due to the top down approach to prioritisation existing in the country. The earlier decisions on tasks to fund were decided centrally according to different criteria. These do not take into account detailed assessments connecting socioeconomic profiles and landmine contamination.

3.4.2 Community participation in clearance prioritisation

The Evaluation Team did not observe active participation from people, civil society organisations, community based organisations and civil society leaders in the selection process of the land to be demined in any of the villages visited. None of these actors said they were consulted during the process, and overall people had very little information on demining plans[27]. In villages with Village Mine Action Committees, these committees will communicate identified priority areas to the District Secretariat/Government Agent (GA) who will eventually decide areas of demining.

The process of prioritisation is not yet conducted through a national plan closely aligned to a timeline –a workplan, as explained by the Regional Officer of the national mine action authority supported by UNDP. Instead, District level committees, including staff from the District Planning Department, Health Section and Department of Housing, meet and identify the priorities of areas listed in the technical baseline. Once that is done, the MA centre suggests which MA organisation should consider which areas, according to their technical and staffing capacity.

The biggest challenge for MA operators in enabling communities to resume livelihood safely and securely seems to partially reside in the current prioritisation system. The Tamil population is extensively exposed to the threat of sudden and unjustified expropriation and land-grabbing. Commercial businesses are being developed in a very visible fashion, along main roads, and farming business as well including on demined land[28]. Interviewees cite the large number of soldiers and the restricted budget allocated to the Military as the main reasons behind this behaviour. There is also a suspicion that was consistently voiced by a number of key informants in the North that the Government wishes to interrupt Tamil ethnic continuity in the region.

This feeling was evident from interviewees in relation to a range of issues, including choices of which land will be demined first. In Nagarkovil, for example, the community has for many months requested that local authorities and HALO release a portion of land by the beach which would allow the fishermen better access to the sea and faster connection to places to market their catch. Instead, according to the community, local authorities have directed HALO to prioritise a minefield in common / governmental land. They argue that it is close to houses and unsafe for the people who have resettled there. Interviewees in the village perceive this decision as an undeclared plan of the government to open a resettlement of Sinhalese people not belonging to the area, and possibly to reserve for them the best access to the sea, further compromising their only livelihood opportunity. HALO, which has taken on demining operations in the area from DDG, points to seasonal factors and the increased threat of flooding affecting choice of area for demining.

HALO continues to demine this common land, keeping correct relationships with local institutions at the various levels and does not intervene in the decision making process. They do not seem to be aware of the specific fears and perceived threat expressed by the community. HALO perceives itself as a neutral actor who can operate in the Sri Lankan context only by building solid trust relationships with the authorities. So far it has avoided advocacy work or activity to protect land rights to avoid compromising this status.

[27] We are told by UNICEF Sri Lanka that in villages with Village Mine Action Committees, the committees will communicate the identified priority areas to the GA who will eventually decide areas of demining (UNICEF Sri Lanka, 20th June 2013).
[28] In Mullaitivu Province, the Army demined a large portion of land, obtained a certificate of clearance from Regional MA center and then re-fenced and put up mine alert sign to protect the area and develop a large farm.

3.5 Socio-Economic outputs and outcomes

More broadly, the socio-economic impact of clearance has been felt both in terms of agricultural production and in terms of returnees. IDPs who had been forced to stay in camps for different reasons including landmine contamination have started to return to their villages of origin – even before completion of demining.

Clearance and the release of land for resettlement have been crucial in generating micro-level development to improve the living conditions of resettled refugees. The opportunity for households to go back to their land and have either temporary shelters or even permanent houses rebuilt[29], has meant people interviewed have been able to regain dignity, agency, vital space, and physical security. Several interviewees in different villages spoke of women particularly experiencing a sense of physical security on leaving overcrowded IDPs camps due to widespread sexual violence. Clearance of farmland is naturally felt by the beneficiary as the necessary next step needed to re-build their livelihoods.

Beneficiaries interviewed consistently stated that the benefit of the clearance operations is facilitating resettlement; in the following communities it was possible to obtain information on the number of returnees. Table 2 demonstrates the increase in the numbers of people resettled between the baseline assessment and our assessment.

Table 2

	No. of families present at the time of the baseline	From survey assessment
Nagarkovil	162	232
Vannerikulam	470	475
Kadduvan	-	180
Maruthanamadam Sapavathipillai welfare centre[30]	253	-
Mayulapuram	538	571

The number of people resettled *per se* does not, however, indicate the level of effectiveness of the demining operations, for a number of reasons:

- Demining operations (with the exception of Nagarkovil) had started while people were already resettling. Some families arrived and settled in a temporary area while waiting for their land to be demined, in order to secure their own plot and prevent it being claimed by another family – and so the figures will include those families.
- Local authorities prefer to have people arriving only after clearance is completed. However, with the increase of people returning, more minefield and UXOs were found, and the technical baseline was correspondingly updated to show that clearance was not completed.
- Not all families are willing to return to their land once permission is granted and the land demined. Many stories were heard in all villages of families who migrated abroad. These were generally much wealthier than those who remained and often providers of remittances or, as in the case of Nagarkovil, funds to develop public schools and services. Wealthier former residents were reluctant to return to isolated areas and difficult living conditions. This has been a factor contributing to the creation of populations with large numbers of poor families in such environments and was particularly true in a village with difficult environmental conditions such as Nagarkovil. The almost totality of families depend on fishery, the ground is sandy and unfit for farming, and the weather makes living in temporary shelters particularly harsh.

Demining has changed the living conditions of people who were returning by liberating land for temporary shelter, for restarting agricultural production and even for building permanent homes. The level of improvement in livelihoods was found to depend on a variety of environmental and political factors, including the amount, geographical position and quality of the land owned (which directly affects the amount of produce available to harvest/catch and then sell) and the quality of the local infrastructure (which affects ability to transport and sell goods as well as the price of materials and goods). At present, in the areas that have been cleared for resettlement and are being cleared for farming, all those conditions depend on factors only minimally connected to landmine contamination. They are related instead to the level of geographical segregation of villages, the type of land and soil, the ownership or the possibility to access to means of production, and last but not least to gender patterns. In fishing communities, female

[29] With the support of existing aid schemes from international donors.
[30] The community survey team visited the welfare centre when working in counterfactual village to complement findings. This was not part of the initial workplan.

single headed households are comparatively more vulnerable than in farming settings. They have fewer livelihood options and generally have to stay with a family-related male headed household to ensure a means of living.

In successful cases encountered, farmers with good previously acquired agricultural knowledge have received support in the form of appropriate agricultural inputs (release of farming land, then cash crop seeds such as onions or sugar, and a sturdy water pump and drip irrigation tape) and/or in the form of support in the sale of harvest. Factors to enable success in building a livelihood were the release of farming land, but also people's individual capital (both human and financial) and the timely distribution of relevant resources, fit to the environment and to market requests. Land which has been treated by demining is easier to develop because the recent trees/jungle, bushes and weeds are also eliminated. This represents a significant added value in the resettlement process, particularly for labour-constrained households. Clearing a small plot of land (less than an acre) can cost as much as the money granted through governmental / international schemes for permanent housing. Through contracts to national implementers, ZOA and Sawalanke, HALO has also distributed emergency shelters, built toilets; and livelihoods kits for farmers and fishermen have been distributed in some of the areas targeted.

Among the factors which can inhibit development are harsh environmental conditions unfavourable to farming, but also poor administration, including policies not conducive to protecting small and local business and also unpunished seizure of land which creates generalised fear and discourages investment..

Fishing communities received cash support (included from UNHCR, around 40.000SLR) for buying boats. In Nagarkovil, HALO also provided distribution of livelihood packages through local NGOs. According to the fishermen interviewed, it was not enough to restart their livelihoods and in most cases they also had to ask for loans. Access to credit is quite widespread.

People in farming villages (e.g. Vannerikulam, Malayalapuram) find the presence of the military bund which is not removed during demining to be an obstacle to full resumption of agriculture, creating impediments to water systems and to mechanical means to operate. The evaluation team recurrently heard requests from farmers, village heads, and even a medical superintendent for the use of mechanical means to help to prepare fields. Although not pursued due to the high operating cost of the machines, both the beneficiary side and HALO management recognised that this type of extension to MA core work has the potential to create immediate benefits through the use of released land.

An additional element to illustrate the limits of the impact that demining *per se*, can be shown through the description (by a researcher from the University of Jaffna) of a sense of hopelessness growing in medium-sized farmers. This informant[31] reported that farmers feel their business opportunities and the potential returns on further investment are jeopardised even if they manage to produce surplus in the areas where they are resettled. They refer to the fast growing farming business of the military and by policies of the Government aimed at increasing access to the North for food produced from other parts of the island or from outside borders, which can be sold at cheaper prices.

3.5.1 Linkages with development organisations

HALO recognised the DFID aim to obtain development impact from the mine action operations, and has complemented its mine clearance programme with a temporary shelter and livelihoods assistance initiative. This measure has implemented in areas which HALO recognised as isolated and ill-covered in terms of humanitarian assistance. The action involved diverting around one fifth (£421,000) of the budget to non MA activities through contracting three different local NGOs. The shelters provided complete coverage of population in need. This group of people was only partially served by other organisations. The implementation did respect the same standards of other organisations, which were centrally decided by the government (temporary shelter: tin foil as roof, basement in cement, wall in straw carpet, door in metal). However, the problem was that those standards were simply not appropriate for all settings without customisation, and certainly unfit for coastal areas, on sand and with no forest. Beneficiaries in Nagarkovil were very vocal in complaining about the bad design of the shelter (although they did not blame HALO or the local implementer, ZOA). While in another village (Mugamalai, in Kilinochchi) - visited only to assess the impact of the shelter scheme - beneficiaries complained of unfair targeting which was entrusted to a local civil society leader who favoured families (some of those abroad) and friends. Although HALO correctly recognised the need to support very poor households, programme managers were focused on monitoring outputs and were less able to intervene in correcting or improving the actual implementation process.

[31] Informant from University of Jaffna did not wish to be named.

In general, it seems that coordination was effective among MA stakeholders, but less so with the rest of the humanitarian community. The decision to subcontract ZOA and SAWALANKA to channel support to (some) beneficiaries of demining also seems to suggest that the organisation is aware that it is not in a position to deal with planning processes of the wider development sector.

3.5.2 Mine Action as source of income for communities

HALO has been prioritising the employment of people who were resettling in the areas where operations were or had to be conducted. It has also, to the extent that operations allowed, attempted to keep the staff close to their homes, which is a necessary to ensure women are able to work as deminers. The turn-over in deminers is – according to HALO – quite sustained, but this is not considered an efficiency problem or an indicator of issues with HR practices. Conversations with former deminers confirm that the reason they left HALO was to find a more solid and permanent livelihood activity, such as farming or fishing. HALO management underlined the value of the training received, which develops professional skills and can contribute to self-development and improve their employability.

HALO has mainly interpreted the need to consider gender as an HR topic. Women recruited are about one third of the total number of deminers, they enjoy the same economic treatment as men, and there are some women experiencing career progress. Female deminers are not employed systematically in all worksites. In Vannerikulam, where at the time of the survey no women were present in the team composition, women indicated their interest in working for HALO, but were constrained by the requirement to travel. In fact, HALO, when establishing that worksite, did not have a workplan large enough to justify a residential team focused on tasks in that area. There is a possibility the workplan will increase in capacity in the near future, and HALO considered this change as an opportunity to increase women's presence in demining staff.

The evaluation team did not hear of private deminers offering services to clear land. Stories were recurrently shared of people entering minefields to source scrap metal to sell in the black market (selling scrap metal was reported to be illegal, but buying it is not).

3.5.3 Impact of Mine Action on gender

HALO recognises the need to pursue gender equality, paying attention to the principle incorporated in the strategy; but it understands "doing gender" as having females in its workforce, and in allowing female staff equal opportunities in terms of economic benefits and career evolution. There was no evidence that the UN gender mainstreaming strategy was known or utilised by the MA operator. During technical training, staff are not exposed to training modules on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) guidelines. The operator did not perform a gender analysis in the baseline, nor did they employ resources to understand during operations how gender patterns interact with socioeconomic conditions and with contamination, besides considering and adjusting the opportunity cost for women to access demining jobs.

We actively sought to assess gender implications of land contamination and of demining during the survey, but some internal organisational issues reduced the effectiveness of this work.[32]

Three main findings emerged from interviews and conversations:

- Women are hired as deminers by HALO. This job opportunity, well paid and in a respected role, is very attractive. Sometimes women feel they cannot apply because they are not in a position to leave their family and travel as often is required in this job. HALO has tried to maximise situations in which worksite and homestead are in same village, but this is not always possible. The opportunity costs for women with a family are still high for this type of job: the internal resistance to afford a family reorganisation and heavy gendered expectations prevent women from even applying for the positions. On the other side, men also feel more inclined when they marry to leave this type of job, mostly for the perceived risk involved.
- Women interviewees told of a sense of major relief and a significant improvement in personal security on leaving IDP camps and welfare centres, as well as the relief of leaving behind overcrowded situations. As clearing contaminated land for housing and farming allows people to leave welfare centres, it can be said that an indirect effect of clearance is the reduction of risk of sexual violence suffered by women in overcrowded camps, with inadequate and insufficient sanitary facilities and insecure housing solutions However, several informants spoke of female-headed households (or women who have a husband or a brother disappeared or

[32] The only female Tamil speaker fell sick after few days and at the very beginning of field work. There was not enough time nor resource to replace her with someone with appropriate background and for training the person on the survey method.

captive in the conflict) in the survey areas being particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment and blackmailing by soldiers. Some women pointed to sexual violence from non family members being higher in the stressful conditions experienced in the camps, but there is not enough information to confirm that domestic violence decreased. Health personnel identified alcoholism as a very widespread problem in the camps.

- As demining opens up formerly inaccessible areas, infrastructures are rebuilt or created, as roads, railroads, water basins, and public buildings are reconstructed. Construction companies hire workers who move along with worksites, creating a temporary increase in populations in small centres. Women in neighbouring communities (e.g. Vannerikulam) and other female informants have referred to this situation as creating greater insecurity and an increasing occurrence of both rape and prostitution.

A specific aspect of concern, which emerged from the community survey work conducted in Sri Lanka, is tied to gender based violence and security more generally. Several informants claimed that the IDP camps were rife with violence which targeted women and girls more than their male counterparts. These experiences of violence are not related to landmine contamination *per se*. However, the reports indicate that the violence reduces when the women and girls are able to move back to their homes. This suggests that effective demining contributes to a reduction in violence for returnees. MA Operators have the possibility of visiting and entering many more areas – included those inaccessible to others for security reasons. It is important that they incorporate gender sensitivity in their baseline and assessments, to feed into the rest of humanitarian and development community information on gender issues.

The accounts generated through the community impact survey highlighted the violation of the rights of women and girls, including their sexual abuse at the hands of the soldiers. This is a particularly problematic finding as the armed forces intend to take over all mine action activities in future. Such reports warrant further investigation.[33]

3.6 Impact of Mine Risk Education (MRE)

National regulations restrict the organisations conducting mine risk education (MRE) which has instead to be undertaken only by accredited local NGOs. UNICEF is a member of MRE accreditation board of the NMAC[34]. UNICEF supports the Government of Sri Lanka to carry out MRE campaigns in particular by training local partners in the provision of MRE, both through a network of NGOs and through the inclusion of MRE in the national curriculum. In consultation with UNICEF, HALO contracted Sarvodaya for community liaison activities only while UNICEF is supporting another NGO for MRE activities in areas where HALO is operating. Sarvodaya has several branches who are working as independent entities. UNICEF has contracts with the other branches of Sarvodaya other than the one that is contracted by HALO. Another organisation, SOND, also operates in many of the same villages as SARVODAYA using other donors' funds. SARVODAYA is also supported by UNICEF. This diversity of actors and donors makes attribution of results of MRE activities uncertain[35].

MRE is offered to the people who could resettle in recently cleared areas or areas currently being demined. The reduction in casualties over the last two years related to UXO accidents seems to signal effectiveness of the MRE initiatives. Interviewees also referred to numerous MRE activities conducted in villages where HALO is operating - people recall the activities and the core messages.

3.7 Mine Action coordination and communication

HALO has been participating in coordination mechanisms, mostly at district level. Coordination with the Regional Mine Action Office is estimated to be very good by the national officers, and the exchange of information with the Military authorities seems to be smooth and timely, and based on the trust that HALO has gained on the ground. In general, it seems that coordination was effective with the MA stakeholders, but less so with the rest of the humanitarian community. The solution to subcontract ZOA and SAWALANKA to channel support to some beneficiaries of demining seems to prove the awareness of the HALO that it is not in a position to adequately, timely and effectively interact with other development actors to reach the same objective. This might partially be due to the

[33] During the preparation of this report, other documents and research from international CSOs became available on the relationship between Military and the Tamil population, particularly women. Those studies were partially realized during the same period in which the data for this evaluation were being collected:
- International Civil Society Action (ICAN), *Elusive Peace, Pervasive Violence: Sri Lankan Women Struggle for Justice and Peace*, Spring 2013 http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Slanka-final.pdf
- Amnesty International, *Sri Lanka's Assault on Dissent*, 2013 http://www.amnesty.org.au/images/uploads/news/4081_sri_lanka_april2013.pdf

[34] Clarification from UNICEF – June 2013

[35] Based on the level of contamination and wider geographical coverage, UNICEF assigned 2 MRE agencies respectively in Killinochchi and Jaffna districts. However geographical coverage was clearly defined among these 2 MRE agencies and there is no possibilities for overlapping

poor communication capacity that MA organisations traditionally have, and in particular, that HALO has so far expressed. Aware of its limitation and also of the potential benefit to overcome those limits, HALO Sri Lanka has recently enlarged the professional profiles of its staff to incorporate expertise on communication and reporting.

4 Evaluation Purpose 2: Institutional Capacity Developed through the MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Institutional Capacity Appraisal conducted in Sri Lanka.

4.1 Key Findings

Interviews with the NGO ZOA who work closely with HALO clearly indicated 'over-positive' reporting by the GoSL in terms of demining achievements. HALO has been able to work directly with the Sri Lankan military, and the general view is that while national capability is adequate, there still remains a need to increase the number of people dedicated to MA in order to cover all identified operational needs.

The military is not well placed to impartially arbitrate over IDP land title disputes, some with multiple claims, and support that assists the GoSL to resolve such claims may be an area worth exploring in the future. Unconfirmed claims suggest that the USA had offered to help with land cadastrals (US$5 million), but that the offer was declined by GoSL.

The North is lagging well behind other areas developmentally, so focus on this region should be a pro-poor priority. Therefore, a wider engagement with government, outside of a limited number of specialised agencies, is likely to be required to fully maximise institutional capacity building.

4.2 Political will to facilitate mine action in country

The GoSL has certainly agreed to facilitate MA in the country. The evaluation team's interview with the Deputy British High Commissioner confirmed that in a sometimes strained bilateral relationship, this area remained one of positive dialogue and strong influencing potential. The current CHASE tranche of support to HALO was announced in 2011 by visiting UK Foreign Office Minister Alistair Burt in a meeting with the Sri Lankan Minister for Economic Development, Hon. Basil Rajapakse at the Presidential Secretariat.[36] A visit by FCO South Asia Director Neil Crompton in early 2013 reconfirmed the GoSL's appreciation of that support.

However, interviews with the NGO ZOA who work closely with HALO confirmed a sense of over positive reporting by the GoSL in terms of achievements, possibly through a desire to project Sri Lanka widely as a fully functioning state. HALO has been able to work directly with the Sri Lankan military, and the general view is that while national capability is adequate, there still remains a need to increase the number of people to cover the full operational needs that have been identified. Where GoSL national agencies, especially military demining units, are implementing programmes, technical operations are generally competent. Serious concerns are raised, however, with regard to evidence of bias in the apportionment of development benefit post-clearance. Particularly vocal objections are expressed through the Tamilnet website.[37]

There is currently no legislation to address ERW and anti-personnel mines. The Government of Sri Lanka is using Emergency Regulations No. 34 amended in the Gazette Extraordinary No. 1651/24 of 2 May 2010 as an interim measure to address this issue. It is important to take action to bring proper legislation as part of the General Law to address ERW and all types of landmines.

The scope of mine action in Sri Lanka theoretically encompasses all five mine action pillars, including advocacy in support of a ban on anti-personnel landmines and other relevant instruments of law that address the problems of landmines and ERW; particularly by promoting full compliance of and accession to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention and by ratifying the Convention for the Rights of Persons with Disability.

[36] https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-minister-announces-3-million-funding-towards-demining-in-sri-lanka.
[37] http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=79&artid=36175, 'Sinhala military takes over UN demining following Geneva resolution'.

4.3 Creation of a supervisory body

A National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka was published in September 2010 and falls under the ambit of the Ministry of Economic Development.[38] The Director of the Sri Lanka National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) reports to the Additional Secretary of Regional Development.

4.3.1 The National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA)

The NSCMA provides policy and oversight to the mine action programme, oversees and approves the work of the NMAC and manage linkages within the government, mine action community and donors. The NSCMA is not an executive institution and it does not have staff or a budget. Its members serve as a Board of Directors to oversee mine action in Sri Lanka and to manage the NMAC.

The NSCMA is chaired by the Additional Secretary of Regional Development. A deputy chair position exists. The composition of the Authority includes key Government Ministries and Departments which have a stake in mine action including Resettlement, Disaster Relief, Education, Health, Agriculture, Social Services and Foreign Affairs.

A balance has been sought between the Authority having enough members to be representative of variety of interests, but not being so large that it cannot function. The director of the NMAC functions as the Secretary during NSCMA meetings.

4.3.2 Sri Lanka National Mine Action Centre (NMAC)

The NMAC is the operational body that executes the policies of the NSCMA and is the focal point for coordinating all mine action activities on the ground.

The NMAC currently consists of a main office in Colombo, located within the Ministry of Economic Development, which has eight staff, including a Project Director, a Senior Mine Action Officer, and several support staff. The RMAOs in Jaffna and Vavuniya are still staffed by UNDP personnel, with the exception of a QA Officer in Vavuniya. A sub-office with UNDP staffing currently exists in Mannar and preparations are made to open a sub-office in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. A RMAO in the East of Sri Lanka based in Batticaloa was established in December 2010.

Key structures and responsibilities set out by Statute include the following:

- Management.
- Operations for planning and tasking.
- Mine risk education and victim assistance.
- Quality management.
- Information management and technology.
- Administration - personnel, logistics, and finance.
- Public information

The Government of Sri Lanka in 2002 asked UNICEF to act as the coordinating body for MRE in Sri Lanka. An MRE standard and a policy have been developed jointly with the Government and NGO stakeholders. MRE activities are coordinated at national and at district level with the existing mine action bodies.

4.4 Integration of mine action into development plans

The 2013 UNDP Human Development Report ranks Sri Lanka in the lower quartile of “High Human Development” countries at 92, with a HDI of 0.715 and Life Expectancy at Birth of 75.1 (Compared with Norway (1) 0.955, 81.3yrs; and UK (26) 0.875, 80.3 years)[39]. Therefore, the GoSL potentially has the fiscal flexibility to decide to allocate sufficient resource to MA to maintain its national institutions and activities.

[38] NSMA 2010, The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka, Ministry of Economic Development, 29pp.
[39] UNDP 2013, Human Development Report 2013, The Rise of the South, 216pp, http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2013GlobalHDR/English/HDR2013%20Report%20English.pdf

The latest 2013 budget speech by the Prime Minister was ambitious in many respects, and expeditious completion of demining operations, although not explicit, must be an implicit requirement to permit planned development programmes in affected areas.

The fact that the GoSL has expressed an aspiration to cease requiring external inputs to demining by the end of 2013 is also testimony to that determination, although NGO (and FCO) observers are concerned about the reduction in transparency and external scrutiny that would then occur.

4.5 Creation of technical capabilities to plan and manage MA (including training)

In Sri Lanka, the attitude to international assistance is not completely positive, hence external support efforts have a reduced ability to have an impact. The Government of Sri Lanka has made it clear for foreign embassies that national Military Demining Capability is now sufficient to complete the demining task without international assistance from 2014 onwards, although explicit allocations for demining in the most recent national budget were subsumed within general development, military and health allocations[40]. However for now support to Sri Lanka continues. UNDP's Support to Sri Lanka has been designed to strengthen national capacities to manage, implement and coordinate mine action activities in support of the National Mine Action Programme. The specific aim of the "Project" is to provide mine action coordination support and technical management capacity to the National Mine Action Programme, Government Agents and local Mine Action Focal Points in the mine-affected districts, to achieve the goal of creating a 'mine-free' environment in support of resettlement and development in Sri Lanka. The project is directly implemented through a Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Colombo, and staff placed at the NMAC's Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs) and its sub offices. In addition, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has provided support in a number of areas including Information management, IMAS, MRE and briefings on international law. UNICEF is the principal partner in providing technical assistance to Sri Lanka's MRE programme. In addition, Mines Advisory Group provides technical assistance in partnership with UNICEF to build capacity of MRE and Community Liaison implementing partners.

The GICHD has provided support to the NMAC in a number of areas, as outlined in Box 2 below:

Box 2

GICHD Support to GoSL NMAC - SRI LANKA[1]

The GICHD provides support to the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) in the field of programme management, operations and standards.

Management Consulting
- Support on information management

Operations
- Information briefings on the instruments of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) covering landmines and ERW
- Assistance in MRE

Standards
- Assistance in the development of National Mine Risk Education Standards

4.6 Mine Action international Assistance in Sri Lanka

Mine Action support is recognised by the World Bank Team in Sri Lanka as having been of considerable assistance as a prerequisite to enabling access to land and assets. Calculations of indicative potential benefits are set out in Box 3 below.

Box 3

World Bank Country Programme Outputs facilitated by Mine Clearance[#]
North East Local Services Improvement Project (NELSIP)

Rural and village roads (km)	303
Drainage systems (km)	16
Rural water supply schemes	2

[40] 2012 GoSL Prime Minister's National Budget Speech, 9 November.

- Playgrounds, markets and nurseries 21
- Rural electrification (km) 16

Emergency Northern Recovery Project (ENREP)

- 6,965 ha farm cleared and 369 km defence bunds removed for people's use.
- 9,603 households received seeds for first cultivation after return. 72,010 coconut seedlings were distributed from a nursery rehabilitated under the project.
- Rehabilitation of 92 irrigation schemes totalling 13,456 hectares completed. Another 27 schemes are ongoing.
- 501 km rural roads completed and works for another 162 km ongoing
- As none of the drinking water supply schemes have been commissioned, no impact yet. But once the schemes are commissioned, about 51,000 people would benefit.
- 421 public buildings have been rehabilitated. This includes 52 MPCS buildings, 48 fertiliser/paddy stores, 135 schools, 31 hospital/clinics 18 agrarian services centres, and another miscellaneous 167 government office buildings.

Re-awakening Project (RaP)

- The project has reached 1,039 villages and assisted 180,139 beneficiaries through 24,288 small groups, and 1520 Village Development Organisations as well as 781 Women Rural Development Societies since inception.
- 90,088 families have started new income generation activities or increase the scale of existing activity with low interest loans, from the village revolving fund provided by the project. Rebuilding business and investment in post war environment is taking shape.
- 3,203 community infrastructure and social services subprojects have been completed and maintained by the communities to improve their quality of life. Another 1,093 subprojects are nearing completion.
- 1,791 km of rural roads rehabilitated.
- 2,143 youths employed after receiving skills development training provided through community skill development fund.
- Number of participatory and transparent CBOs (FOs, RDSs and WRDSs) and VDOs of the poor revived/formed and satisfactorily engaged in subproject implementation and O&M at village level is 1,520 (target 600).
- Building and empowering institutions of the poor through social mobilisation is progressing well. The membership of small groups and village development organisations has increased and more families are showing an interest to join these collective forums.
- The project has assisted 31,449 ex-combatants to start their own livelihood activities.
- The project, through its effective livelihood activities, has been able to assist 68% of the VDO members to obtain financing for livelihood development.
- Increase of farm area due to increased supply of water resulting from irrigation rehabilitation has reached 31,150 ha, benefitting 40,646 households
- The project has initiated 108 cluster level subprojects, of which 6 are in operation, bringing together a number of VDOs in an inter-enterprise linkage that addressed constraints along the value chain and also increased their income.
- 10 Private-Public-Community Partnerships have been realised in the project area.
- Communities are facilitated to set up bank linkages have been established in more than 60 villages.
- 30 high quality products are being sold at domestic and international markets.

Data calculated by World Bank Office, Colombo following Evaluation meeting 10 April 2013.

The HALO Trust began working in Sri Lanka in 2002 and currently employs over 1,000 staff recruited from mine-affected areas in the Northern Province. Between 2002 and 2008, HALO focused its efforts in Jaffna but following the end of the war in 2009 HALO expanded its activities into Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu District to assist with the return of IDPs. Clearance is carried out by 95 manual demining teams using metal detectors and 6 mechanical demining teams using armoured front loaders and excavators. To date, the HALO Trust has removed over 100,000 anti-personnel mines from over 4.5 million square metres of minefield.[41] During the evaluation visit, one of the HALO Trust national staff was unfortunately killed whilst undertaking demining operations, starkly highlighting the continuing reality of the threat that remains. In 2012, priority for the mine clearance was given for resettlement and development activities undertaken in the Northern and Eastern provinces (HALO/SLNMAC website). The 18 month report (see Table 2 Section 3.2.2 of the Evaluation Report) list 16,459 mines/UXO removed and 109 hectares of land cleared in the context of the CHASE MA Programme[42].

[41] The HALO Trust 2013, GoSL SLNMAC website, http://slnmac.gov.lk/HALO-trust
[42] The HALO Trust – CHASE MA Programme - 18 month report - June 2011-November 2012

4.7 MA operators understanding of the DFID MA strategy

Understanding the strategy and reconnecting operations to it was very important for HALO international staff in country. Overall, it was difficult for them to develop an understanding that they could consider would satisfy the strategy. HALO saw the main node as being the requirement to provide evidence of development. They identified the possible lack of follow-up support to MA beneficiaries as the main obstacle to clear development outcomes . For this reason HALO decided to divert CHASE resources from MA to emergency shelter and livelihoods support schemes, in order to provide the most needy of their beneficiaries (who were not covered by other funds and schemes) with essential recovery aid. HALO regretted a lack of responsiveness from CHASE central management while they were trying to understand whether their proposed approach, although new and non orthodox as far as traditional MA response is concerned, was acceptable and satisfied what the donor was envisioning. HALO in-country senior management expressed great appreciation for the CHASE scheme being multiannual, which provided enough buffer to flexibly adapt available resources to the operations, and allowed responsiveness to changing external conditions, i.e. shifting priorities in areas and land use, as the Government granted more IDPs the permission to resettle, or to adjust to seasonal weather constraints.

5 Socio-Economic Benefit Analysis of MA Programme

5.1 Key Findings

DFID-funded mine action is paving the way for very substantial economic and social benefits in northern Sri Lanka. Mine action conducted by HALO is clearing land for human re-settlement into areas devastated by war, mostly facilitating their return to their former villages, from which they had been evicted by the civil war.

The findings of the following case study are used as the basis for grossing up to assess the wider benefits from the clearance of all agricultural land undertaken by HALO within the DFID contract.

5.1.1 Re-settlement in Three Districts

This case study is based on the clearance of minefields in three Districts of northern Sri Lankan by The HALO Trust. This work has supported the return of refugees and enabled the resumption of agriculture and coastal fishing, supported by labouring and other occupations. It also released transport infrastructure for repair, use and further development.

From June 2011 to end November 2012 a total of 47,804 individuals were re-settled mostly from the Manik Farm refugee camp into the three northern Districts of Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. This represents 14,629 families resettled, with an average family size of 3.3 persons.

Because so many people are being re-settled into their original villages, with surrounding farmland also cleared of mines, the HALO de-mining work is supporting the quick resumption of self-sufficient agriculture and fishing. It also enables fuel gathering in formerly dangerous areas, and provides access to fresh water for people and their animals.

The clearing of roads, a railway and other infrastructure for public use is rapidly transforming access into the area from the rest of the country.

Land use post-mine clearance, in approximate order of significance, is:

- Agriculture
- Roads & infrastructure
- Housing
- Fuel Collection
- Fishing
- Access to fresh water.

During the contract period to date, the primary occupations of the more than 47,000 beneficiaries are farmers (39%), labourers (31%), fishermen (9%) and 15% others. Most of them have resumed economic activity, having previously been unemployed in camps and receiving food aid from the Sri Lankan government and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM).

5.1.2 Grossing Up Benefits

We have made a preliminary estimate of the value of economic activity generated by this re-settlement and subsequent employment. Average annual income levels for the relevant occupations (farming, fishing, labouring) vary from LK Rupees 126,000 to LKR 200,000 (£656 to £1,042). We assume conservatively that each average family of 3.3 persons has just one family member who is currently earning. Applying the numbers of families whose main source of income is in the respective occupations, to the appropriate annual income, yields a collective annual income generated on cleared land of £11.1 million (see Table 3 of Northern Sri Lanka Incomes below).

It should be stressed that this is almost all net additional income to the local economy, because the vast majority of the re-settled people were not allowed to leave the camp to seek jobs and survived on aid donations.

That may be compared with a total DFID investment to date in mine action in northern Sri Lanka of £1.95 million. The family incomes represent an annual sum of about 5.7 times the DFID investment, and would appear to make this a worthwhile investment from an economic benefits perspective, quite apart from the health and community safety benefits.

Table 3

Northern Sri Lanka			Incomes Calculation				
Occupation	Re-settled popn. (%)	Re-settled popn. (nos)	Re-settled familes (nos)	Earnings per annum (LKR)	Earnings per annum (GB £)	Total earnings per annum (GB £)	
Agriculture	39.2	18,739	5,735	150,000	781.50	4,481,565	
Fishing	9.4	4,494	1,375	200,000	1,042.00	1,432,881	
Labouring	30.6	14,628	4,476	126,000	656.46	2,938,626	
Other	15.4	7,362	2,253	150,000	781.50	1,760,615	
Unknown *	5.4	2,581	790	126,000	656.46	518,581	
Totals	**100.0**	**47,804**	**14,629**			**11,132,268**	**
* Unknown due to survey inconsistency - 1 small Division dropped from Kilinochchi, 2 from Mullaitivu.							
Unlikely to be much different from District averages.							
** Almost entirely net addtional income to local economy; earners were previously unemployed IDPs in camp.							
Assume conservatively that each family of average 3.3 people has 1 family head who is earning.							
Sri Lanka Rupee (LKR) conversions :			LKR 1,000 =	GB £ 5.21	LKR 1 = GB £	0.00521	

The consequent rise in agricultural output has already substantially reduced imports of food, especially rice from India, thereby stemming leakages from the local economy and the national balance of payments.

Once the land has been cleared of mines by HALO, a wide range of over 30 government agencies and NGOs is entering the area with specific development plans and additional budgets. These include the US$ 270 million Indian Housing Project, the FAO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, Care International, the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils, US Aid, the Government of Sri Lanka, Sewalanka Foundation and many others. These additional donor funds are released in a planned way to take advantage of the return to the community of DFID-funded cleared land.

ANNEX F:

Country Mission Report – South Sudan

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1 Country Background and Project Context

1.1 Origin and extent of the Contamination

South Sudan's landmine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem stems from the Second World War, and more acutely from the two phases of the civil war between North and South, 1955-1972 and 1983-2004. The Government of Sudan (GOS)'s Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA/M) and other non-state armed actors, used landmines and generated other ERW throughout these periods. The war was brought to an end with the signing of the Agreement on a Permanent Ceasefire in December 2004, and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005. In July 2011, South Sudan formally became the world's 196th state, after an interim period of six years which had seen democratic elections (in 2009) and a referendum on independence (January 2011).

All ten states of South Sudan have a significant problem with landmines/ERW, impacting not only existing community safety, but also affecting the safe return and resettlement of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The landmine/ERW problem also has impacts on the transport infrastructure (road and railway reconstruction/construction), socio-economic development rehabilitation and reconstruction, and the development and humanitarian initiatives of the international community, as well as the 'self-development' and post-conflict normalisation and stabilisation of mine-affected communities.

1.2 National Authorities and Key Actors in Mine Action and Clearance

The first systematic mine action intervention, the Sudan Landmine Information and Response Initiative (SLIRI), took place in 2001. This was to initiate systematic data gathering in order to facilitate mine action planning.

Early in 2002, the GoS and UN agreed that the UN should establish an emergency mine action programme, and in 2003 two national bodies were formed: the National Mine Action Office in Khartoum, and the New Sudan Mine Action Directorate in Nairobi. In 2004, the GoS, SPLM and UN signed the first versions of the *Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework and the Sudan National Mine Action Policy Framework*.

In 2006, the South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) was established by Presidential decree, to co-ordinate and plan mine action. The SSDA has now been replaced/renamed as the South Sudan Mine Action Authority.

In June 2011, with the establishment of South Sudan as an independent state, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) redistributed its responsibilities between the UN mine action offices in the north and south. In September 2011, UNMAO was reconstituted as the UN Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (UNMACC), under the auspices of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). The following year UNMACC aligned its name to its UN entity name and became known as UNMAS[1]. UNMAS is tasked by UN Resolution to support the Government of South Sudan in both conducting demining and institution strengthening.[2]

Like every other accredited organisation in South Sudan, DFID's partner MAG operates under a coordination framework overseen first by the UNMAO, and since 2011 by the UN Mine Action Service.

1.3 Support for Mine Action

Following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), donor money flowed freely into South Sudan, primarily through the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO)'s assessed budget, and this produced a significant expansion in mine action operations, becoming the second largest (after Afghanistan) in 2011, with an annual budget of US$ 70 million.

The assessed budget is controlled by the UN Mine Action Service[3], and the vast majority of work is contracted to a small group of commercial operators. Mine Action NGOs such as MAG and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) operate with their own budgets from donors - including from DFID CHASE. The UNMAS Programme Manager

[1] UNMAS clarification – June 2013
[2] As the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor report makes clear, "*from 2005 UNMAO (and since July 2011, UNMACC) have managed most of the key mine action planning and coordination functions, including the accreditation of mine action organisations, the development of national mine action standards, the establishment of a quality management system, and the management of the national database.*"
[3] DFID CHASE funds are not allocated to UNMAS S. Sudan

complemented MAG and other international NGOs operating in the MA sector in South Sudan for high quality work. He commented that DFID should make compliance with national priorities a condition of support[4]. No cost comparison with commercial operators was conducted during the field visits.

1.4 Legal Framework

Sudan signed the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) on 4th December 1997. The Convention was ratified in October 2003, and entered into force on 1st April 2004. The SPLM/A signed the Geneva Call's *Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban of Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action* in 2001. South Sudan became the 158th state party to the APMBC on 11th November 2011. South Sudan has not signed the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) nor have they joined the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM).[5]

1.5 Survey and Prioritisation

Locating the problem, let alone its impact has been hampered by weaknesses in survey processes and information management. In 2006, priority was given to the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) which was implemented by the Survey Action Centre, with MAG as its local partner. As such, the LIS presented an important set of initial indicators of where priority communities were located. That being said however, Landmine Impact Surveys are not a technical instrument designed to define hazardous areas prior to clearance. They seek to indicate rough areas where perceived threats create socio-economic blockages, or areas where there have been reports of accidents. It therefore provides a time-bound indicator of the locations of communities most under pressure, but it is not a technical resource. Consequently, plans are underway to commission a new survey in the second and third quarters of 2013 in the Bahr El Ghazal states..

During the early days of Mine Action in South Sudan, the tasking of mine action operators (many of them commercial organisations) was dominated by the UN Mission, and there were different approaches to priority setting between local authorities and operators.[6] Tasks were designed to assess and clear roads, as well as sites required by the UN Mission, and other actors, such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[7]

As it stands, the lack of an evidence base and systems to identify high impact sites means in practice that a DFID partner such as MAG (which seeks to identify high impact sites through its own Community Liaison) has, within the broad area allocated to it by UNMACC, effective freedom to suggest its own priorities and new tasks are only identified, surveyed, and entered into the database, on an *ad hoc* basis.

1.6 Assessing the Overall Performance of MA programmes

The MA situation in South Sudan can tentatively be summarised in a Radar diagram (Diagram 1) using six reference criteria which are:

1. Marginal cost of mine/UXO removal;
2. Percentage of endangered population having received MRE/RRE;
3. Number of untreated victims or those in need of continued treatment from mine-induced wounds/trauma;
4. Advocacy and local MA ownership to gauge the country's authorities' commitment to direct and manage MA actions;
5. Percentage of stockpile destruction
6. Percentage of area of country's danger zone cleared of mines.

The criteria have been tentatively assessed on a 1 to 5 scale for each of the six criteria, whereby "1" indicates a good position for the country, and "5" indicates a situation where the country needs critical attention. Hence, the smaller the area covered by the radar diagram, the better the position of the country, and the less support it presumably would need from public or donor funds.

[4] Interview with UNMAS Programme Manager for South Sudan – Geneva – April 2013
[5] Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor Report, 2012
[6] *Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project* (Feb 2008), Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Refer to pp 21/22 'Priority Setting' of the report.
[7] Based on the evaluator's interview with Steve Robinson in South Sudan (2005-06)At the time UNHCR's Mine Action Focal Point.

The model is intended to illustrate an alternative and joined-up approach to measuring the impact of mine action and development. More systematic baselines, regular reporting and impact evaluations introduced through the CHASE MA Programme will make it possible to construct more informed representations of the likely contribution of MA to development in target countries. Parameters for such an assessment would include such criteria as extent of contamination, governance (capacity and human rights); commitment to inclusive development (e.g. pro-poor), demographics, proximity/remoteness.

Diagram 1: Radar Diagram – Effectiveness of MA Programmes in South Sudan



2 Methodological Adaptation for Evaluation of MA in Country

2.1 Methodology for Community Impact Survey

The community impact survey was conducted using a qualitative methodology consisting of focus group discussions, key informant interviews, village mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines. The survey was conducted in South Sudan between the 18th and 23rd March, 2013, in Eastern Equatoria Province. It included a 3-day training of local surveyors and was carried out by four team members - one international team member and three national. The team comprised both genders and the three national team members (2 females and 1 male) also spoke all local languages encountered fluently.

The study included three communities that had been demined and one counterfactual (i.e. a community which is still mined). In all communities two focus group discussions of 6-10 participants were conducted, one with women and one with men.

The data from the focus groups was complemented by individual key informant interviews with members of the community who played a key role at the community level, who had been part of the demining operation and/or who had been directly affected by either the landmines or the demining:

- In Gotkwar: male village leader, female teacher/women's organisation representative, male business man, male MRE focal point;
- In Isaloro: male village leader, female direct beneficiary, male direct beneficiary;
- In At Hiliu (Borewajak): male village leader, male MRE focal point/health worker, male pastor, female women's organisation representative, MAG cook.

Other key informants included MAG community liaison manager, MAG community liaison staff, MAG deminer, Torit county South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) chief administrator, headmistress of primary school in Torit.

The survey was intended to be gender sensitive, and has captured some elements for a reading of gendered impact of contamination and demining, but to a very limited extent given the lack of time resources for a thorough gender analysis and lack of a preliminary gender assessment to evaluate against.

The sample was identified through a standard set of criteria, used for the fieldwork conducted in each country and defined in the methodology (see Annex M). The guiding principle was selecting villages in the relevant areas which are as different as possible regarding characteristics considered significant in terms of level and type of development (environmental context, type of livelihoods, type of land contamination experienced, accessibility, services, etc). In addition, a counterfactual study was conducted to examine the degree to which an area that was not demined experienced something different from what was visible in areas already demined. The data collection model used in the counterfactual was the same as that of other villages. Similarly, the data from the counterfactual was treated in the same manner as the other villages. All the villages sampled were in a single province. Table 1 provides a list of the communities surveyed. The sample was identified with the help of local leaders to include the views of people who directly or indirectly benefited from the decontaminated land. Prior to the survey, the MAG Community Liaison Manager called the village head to arrange and gain permission for the survey. Permission was not sought from the Country administration as MAG has permission to work in the area. A member of the research team explained the objectives of the survey and invited participants into the study.

The South Sudanese uprising started in Torit County and for most of the war Torit was occupied by the North Sudanese. As such the area is highly contaminated and most of the villages were abandoned during the war. The population is mostly pastoral, relying on rain-fed agriculture with a relatively undeveloped, subsistence economy. Changing seasons mean that cattle migration is common and can result in conflict patterns. There has been limited development of infrastructure and schools. In a UNDP community consultation on Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Project the presence of mines was ranked as the sixth most pressing security issue[8].

Magwi County is close to the Ugandan border and suffered from repeated Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks during the war. Proximity to the Ugandan border means that many of the inhabitants spent the war years in Uganda. There has been limited development of key infrastructure including health, water and sanitation and schools. In UNDP community consultation on Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Project the presence of mines was ranked as the ninth out of ten most pressing security issues.

Table 1

Village	Commune	District	Province	Short Description
GOTWAR	Pajok	Gotkwar	Eastern Equatoria	Gotkwar village is about four hours' drive in a four-wheel drive vehicle from Torit and about one hour from Magwi County district town. The village was abandoned during the conflict and all the inhabitants were reported to have spent most of the war in Uganda. Indeed many of our participants reported having been born and grown up in Uganda and did not speak Juba Arabic. The village consisted of about 400 people of the Acholi tribe. The main livelihood activities are small trade, rain-fed agriculture, charcoal and brick-making and gathering and selling grass for the roves. The cleared land was in the centre of the village and led down to the river. It belonged to a single owner. Part of this land was given to a community based organisation and used for a variety of community activities, the remainder will shortly be used by community members for maize. In the male and female Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and the interview with a private school teacher it was reported that there were no government or NGO supported projects in the village, although one NGO had supported the building of latrines. The community self-organised a women's' group, a youth group and a farmers group. During the rainy season the village was reported by almost all respondents to be cut off from Magwi County district town.

[8] UNDP, 2012, COMMUNITY CONSULTATION REPORT Eastern Equatoria State South Sudan, South Sudan Bureau for Community Security and Small Arms Control South Sudan Peace and Reconciliation Commission/UNDP

Village	Commune	District	Province	Short Description
AT HILIU (BOREWAJAK)	Himadongo	Torit County	Eastern Equatoria	At Hiliu (Borewajak) village is situated along the main road from Torit town about 30 minutes' drive from Torit town. The village is separated into two parts by a river which has a walking bridge crossing. A vehicle bridge crossing was destroyed during the war and has not been repaired. The cleared area was agricultural land which borders the river. The land was reported to belong to a single owner but it was stated in both the male and female FGDs that the land could be used by anyone who requested permission from the landowner and without payment. As elsewhere in the area, livelihood activities revolve around the seasonal weather patterns. In the wet season the main activity is agriculture. The village is surrounded by mountains. The village has a small clinic and a pastor but no school or market. There are no government or NGO supported projects in the village.
ISALORO	Imurok	Torit County	Eastern Equatoria	Isaloro lies along Torit - Magwi road, about seven miles from Torit and was reported to have about 1,500 inhabitants who are mostly farmers, crops when harvested are used mainly for home consumption with any surplus taken to the market at Torit town. The community does not have a school or primary health clinic. There is one water bore-hole provided in 2005 which serves the whole village. During the war the village was largely abandoned as it served as a military garrison by both the North Sudanese and the South Sudanese forces at various times in the conflict with people moving back in 2007.
LOSITO	Bur	Torit County	Eastern Equatoria	**Counterfactual -** Losito village is situated about 12 miles from Torit town. The village is inhabited by 400 people who are mainly small scale, subsistence farmers. Livelihood activities revolve around the seasonal weather patterns. In the wet season the main activity is agriculture and in the dry season cutting grass for roves and wood for repairing houses and firewood. The main crops are maize, sorghum, cassava, sweet potatoes and some vegetables mainly for home consumption. The village is surrounded by mountains which prior to the conflict (as reported in the FGDs and interview with the village head) to be used for quarrying. Due to landmine contamination is no longer used for this purpose. The village possesses limited infrastructure and does not have a clinic, school, church or market. There are no government or NGO supported projects in the village.

The data collected was used to triangulate the findings presented below. All the findings noted below correspond to information which was gathered in group interviews and further substantiated by individual interviews. No data below corresponds to the views or opinions of a single respondent. While the findings below cannot be assumed to be representative of the whole country, they are believed to be indicative of what can be found in similar settings throughout South Sudan.

As with all evaluations, our evaluation has some limitations. A limitation of the community survey is that the tools used to collect the baseline were different to those used to undertake the baseline assessment meaning that a direct pre and post clearance evaluation could not be conducted. A further limitation is that of the three tasks completed with DFID CHASE MA Programme funding, one had just been completed and had not been handed over to the community and was not therefore available for use at the time of the survey. The remaining two sites had only recently been completed. Thus only immediate outcome data was available and it was not possible to discern longer term impacts. Finally, the interviews were undertaken in local Arabic and then translated to English. Inevitably in this process some information has been edited.

2.2 Methodology for Institutional Capacity Appraisal

The Institutional Capacity evaluation was grounded in an extensive documentation analysis, based mainly on government policy, programme reports and evaluations, the Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development (O'Reilly, Friedman, Dinsmore, Storr, & MacPherson, 2012) and a review of peer-reviewed articles related to institutional capacity building. A thematic guide for interviews was prepared by the evaluation team for the different stakeholder groups (DFID contractors, UNDP/UNMAS, the National Mine Action Authority, development partner NGOs/cluster coordinators, local administrators) identified by the evaluation team and in consultation with in-country operators. Twenty interviews were undertaken. All interviews were undertaken in English and took approximately 45-60 minutes. The findings from interviews and the literature were grouped into themes to address the evaluation

questions and the analysis integrated with the literature. In addition, a further ten interviews related to institutional capacity were undertaken in the context of the Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013. The aim was to reach data 'saturation', that is data collection is terminated when no new information is forthcoming (Patton, 2002). To an extent, qualitative data collection was also determined by resource and key informant availability. While not exhaustive, the review of the literature covered the most pertinent documents related to the evaluation questions. Contact was made and data gathered with a wide range of institutional interlocutors.

Key stakeholders in South Sudan are varied, and are set out in Box 1.

Box 1: Key Mine Action Stakeholders Interviewed in South Sudan[9]

- Jurkuch Barack Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority;,
- Emmanuel Ohide, Chief of Admin SSRRC;
- Mike Rashid Fulla Director for Operations, National Mine Action Authority
- Malek MRE Officer, National Mine Action Authority;
- Emily Akalu, Global Impact Advisor, Mines Advisory Group
- Edin Muric, Technical Operations Manager, Mines Advisory Group
- Irina Ulmasova, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group;
- Jamie Eyre, Regional Operations Manager, Mines Advisory Group;
- John Sorbo, Project Manager, NPA Capacity Development Project (SSMAA);
- Sharmala Naidoo, Advisor Mine Action, Security and Development, GICHD;
- Asa Massleberg, Capacity Development Advisor, GICHD;
- Rebecca Roberts, Head of Armed Violence Reduction, DDG/DRC South Sudan;
- Hannah Bryce, Country Director, DCA;
- Lance Malin, Programme Manager UNMAS;
- John Dingley, Deputy Programme Manager and Capacity Development Advisor, UNMAS;
- Sasha Logie, Programme Officer, UNMAS;
- Peter Trotter, UNHCR, Protection Cluster Coordinator;
- William K. Kollie, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF;
- Mariyaselvam Mariyampillai, Sub-Cluster Child Protection, UNICEF;
- Diana Surur, Protection Officer, MRE, UNICEF;
- Francesca Marzatico, Programme Manager, Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA);
- Lisa Monaghan, NGO Protection Cluster Coordinator, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC);
- Hamish Falconer, DFID CO;
- Justin Otim, Redeem Primary School.

3 Evaluation Purpose 1: Community Impact of MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Community Impact Survey conducted in four communities in South Sudan (including one counterfactual community).

3.1 Key Findings

The CHASE DFID funding is contributing to releasing land in communities which have returned to their villages following the CPA. Most of the villagers interviewed had spent much of the war years in Uganda or Khartoum. In one village people had built their houses on the cleared land, bringing them closer to the road and passing trade and the agricultural land was being prepared for maize. In another village bricks were being made on the cleared land which would later be used for crops once the rainy season began. Another area was cleared close to the river where women and children go to collect water. All of the areas cleared were very close to the village and so the removal of

[9] MAG 2013 initial advice, Matt Thomas, Regional Programme Manager, UK HQ, Manchester.

landmines not only reduced likelihood of exposure but will reduce the amount of time spent walking to land or water further away. In this way the choice of land to be cleared is relevant to community needs and Objective 1.

However, several factors were found to mediate impact of land release, including:

- Household access to assets (seeds, tool, materials, labour skills, social networks);
- Weather;
- Access to pro-poor markets.

Furthermore, the areas which were cleared were all reported as belonging to individual owners who would give permission for others to use the land. There were no reported conflicts over this but it unclear how this will play out in the future, especially as a market for land develops.

The DFID CHASE programme is contributing to the decontamination of agricultural land close to the village centre and where there have been previous landmine related injuries and areas for housing. It has not been possible to confirm the impact on agricultural productivity at the time of the survey, as none of the agricultural land was under cultivation at the time of the survey. For impact to be observed it is realistic to wait at least one agrarian cycle. The reason for lack of agricultural productivity at the time of this survey is that in one village (At Hiliu (Borewajak) the land had not been handed over and in the two other villages (Gotkwar and Isaloro) clearance had been completed in the dry season and since the community rely on rain-fed farming, production had not begun. In each village in the male and female FGDs it was asserted that the plan was to use the land for agriculture, to grow maize, sorghum, cassava and sweet potatoes once the rainy season started. It is anticipated that the produce will be used to supplement home consumption with surplus being sold on to passing traders and in the market in Torit. The cleared land also gave better access to water for drinking and bathing although it should be noted this remains an unsafe water source (river water).

The DFID CHASE programme is most benefitting families **with better access to assets** - such as seed, tools and equipment. Based on the wealth ranking by FGD participants, richer families were reported in At Hiliu (Borewajak) to be those who worked in the small trade or as public servants. Middle class families[10] were those who worked the land and poorer families those who rely on foraging and have limited labour and have not benefited from a dowry. It was also agreed by the participants in the male FGD and in the interview with the Pastor that people on the other side of the river which did not have road access to cleared areas were the poorest and were not benefitting from the clearance. Land on the other side of the river was also contaminated and blocked access to fertile land and water for this poorer section of the community.

In Isaloro similar indicators were used by participants for the wealth ranking although the community did not feel any of the families in their community were rich. 20% were estimated to be in the middle class. As such, middle class families with access to the relatively small capital investments of tools, seeds and labour and sufficient resources (mud bricks, labour, thatching) to build their own houses are those who are most likely to benefit from the clearance.

In Gotkwar fewer disparities were reported and the village was visibly better off and more organised than the other three villages. Most of the families were described as middle class and middle class families would be the ones to benefit most. In each case the land use, or proposed land use where it had not yet been returned to productive use, was as stated in the pre-clearance impact assessment. Further, in each village the land which was cleared was in very close proximity to residential areas. Decontamination has reduced the risk of exposure to landmines. Prior to demining in each village, alternative land and water sources which were further from the village were used. Clearance opens up new possibilities and can decrease time in collecting water – a particular benefit for women. Proximity to the village also makes the land more accessible to women who typically did not go far out of the immediate village environs, as illustrated in the female FGD community maps which showed a much more limited view of the village. At the moment there is no market for land in these villages.

In Losito (counterfactual), in the wealth ranking, participants reported that there were no 'rich' families. Middle class families were perceived to constitute only 5% of the population. These families were reported to cultivate crops, own some livestock, have houses with thatched roofs and be able to send their children to school. The remaining 95% were reported to be chronically food insecure. It was not possible to verify these perceptions due to a lack of formal recording or maintenance of a village book. If the land was cleared additional income would be available to the middle class families through the quarrying of stone.

[10] Middle class is not a recognised sociological term in South Sudan.

In all of the villages visited in the FGDs (male and female) people reported being aware of the mined area prior to clearance - usually because they had been witness to an accident to a person or animal. Participants reported that following an accident people avoid the area moving their livelihood activities elsewhere and marking the areas, typically with stones.

MAG is operating at a recognised optimum standard of technical skills and in accordance with national standards. The pace of operations is quite sustained thanks to the toolkit approach and the use in all tasks of mechanical ground preparation equipment, and is appreciated by beneficiaries.

The extent to which the most vulnerable households are included in prioritisation processes, or the extent to which a through gender analysis is undertaken and used to inform decision-making and prioritisation, was unclear. In one village it was mentioned that the poorest households lived on the other side of the river and did not know why they had been excluded or their land had not been cleared. As the Community Liaison (CL) Manger reported there are also higher opportunity costs for the poor if they participate in participatory processes. It should be noted however that MAG staff did not interpret the DFID strategy as being particularly pro-poor and so, their prioritisation process focussed primarily on proposed land use, proximity to where people were living and accidents. It is also worth noting that each task has to be approved by UNMAS although it was reported by operators and UNMAS itself that there was no clear and transparent task prioritisation process.

3.2 Efficient Mine Clearance

The toolbox approach taken by MAG to clearance would seem to make its operations efficient and MAG is achieving its CHASE MA Programme objectives. Time efficiency is an important element in achieving the DFID CHASE Objective 1.

3.3 Unknown impact on incidence of landmine accidents

A lack of an accurate surveillance system makes it impossible to state the extent to which clearance has reduced injuries. Data at the population rather than specific community level is needed. In the villages visited in this evaluation, people typically stopped using the land once there had been an accident and it is this which is more likely to be a factor in there being no additional injuries.

3.4 Prioritisation focused on socio-economic development

The development objectives of the DFID Mine Action Strategy focus on the release of mine affected land to make a measureable contribution to the socio-economic development of mine affected communities. In South Sudan 743,349m^2 of priority land cleared by MAG[11] is close to villages and involves agricultural and livestock rearing areas, and has enabled livelihoods to be carried out with reduced risk and greater confidence and comprehensiveness. This has opened access for communities to vital services and there are over 64,000 beneficiaries to date.[12]

The focus on land which is close to residential areas and which communities have a plan to use is relevant to the Objective 1. From the interviews with programme beneficiaries, it also corresponds to community needs and improved access to basic livelihood assets. This was evidenced by some of the land already being in use despite clearance finishing relatively recently to the evaluation taking place. In one site land use had not yet commenced as clearance was just being competed but previously the land had been used for growing crops and quarrying and there were plans to return to these uses once the clearance was complete. In another, while there was some small scale industry such as making bricks in progress, the community were waiting for the rains to start before using the land for agricultural purposes. In interviews respondents stated that they had been involved in the selection of land to be cleared, though in one village some discontent was reported that land where poorer households lived had not been cleared. The areas which were cleared were all reported as belonging to individual owners who would give permission for others to use the land. There were no reported conflicts over this but it unclear how this will play out in the future, especially as a market for land develops. There are no systems in place to deal with land disputes. There was also a request for further clearance of agricultural land where some households would like to move to as the land is more fertile. In Gotkwar, while there was general agreement on the first priority for clearance, many people (including business people) said they had also identified another area as a priority because it was along the main trade road to Uganda.

[11] For the period June 2011-November 2012 -*DFID Support for Mine Action in Sudan & South Sudan MAG Annual Report*
[12] *Ibid – note these figures are for South and North Sudan – See MAG 18 Month Report.*

In the villages visited there were no other organisations working and communities felt that mine clearance could induce other agencies to come and work in their community. Development is not defined in the DFID strategy and the strategy does not say that it is pro-poor; therefore given there are a multitude of definitions of development, different interpretations of the links between mine action and development were understood. The MA operator's prioritisation process focussed primarily on proposed land use, proximity to where people were living and accidents.

3.4.1 Use of M&E data to prioritise clearance and measure impact

MAG had undertaken a baseline survey in each of the villages visited and this will be used for post clearance impact assessment. The MAG post clearance impact is yet to be completed due to the limited amount of time since the land was handed over. Post clearance survey will be timed to take account of seasonal factors. The choice of the focus – agricultural land and housing for residential areas - was justified by DFID strategy, and reconciled with findings from the baseline survey. The extent to which the baseline was used in the prioritisation process, however, or how it was used to justify decisions, was less clear. If used with qualitative data to identify other factors the baseline should provide a tool which can be used to obtain a subjective measure of impact. There can also be a considerable time delay between the initial survey and clearance. In one instance for example it was reported that the survey team came in 2007 and clearance commenced in 2012.

In recent months, MAG has invested in strengthening monitoring and evaluation and has developed a Mine Action Impact Assessment (MAIA) system, intended to develop quantitative evidence of the impact on the livelihoods of individual beneficiaries of demining. This initiative seems to have the potential to improve monitoring and understanding. The MAIA addresses socio-economic outcomes and impact from land clearance and strengthens the link between demining and development.

3.4.2 Participatory processes with authorisation from UNMAS

MAG's prioritisation process proceeds from the impact survey through the Community Liaison (CL) process whose objective is to identify which tasks are priorities for communities. MAG works in accordance with UNMAS/NMAA/DFID priorities: the MAG CL teams engage in prioritisation at the local level once the geographical region has been determined as a priority based on broad criteria as outlined in the NMAA strategy. At the local level, MAG CL staff hold FGDs (male and female) and individual household interviews to generate a task list in accordance with felt need of a community within the geographical boundary. Information gathered is recorded on an impact assessment form. Suspected hazardous area polygons are produced and investigated. The final selection is based on a mix of the impact assessment, technical assessment, resources, access, seasonality and permission from UNMAS as each site has to be approved by UNMAS. No national or local demining authorities are involved in the prioritisation process. There is no decentralised process of prioritisation, nor are development agencies engaged in the process in the villages included in the DFID CHASE MA Programme. No development agencies are working in the area. The CL Manager in the area surveyed reported that the opportunity costs for the most vulnerable are high in attending community meetings and typically the middle level families attend. The process tends to benefit middle class families as these have the resources to invest in attending community prioritisation meetings and the necessary investments to use the land post clearance. Within the villages, understanding of the prioritisation process was mainly limited to participation in the impact assessment process. Additionally, there did not seem to be an understanding of the likely time lag between the initial survey and clearance.

3.5 Socio-economic outputs and outcomes

In South Sudan the outcome of the demining is harder to measure at this point. The number of CHASE tasks that have been undertaken thus far by MAG are limited and the land handing over process has been recent or not yet completed. For this reason, a MAG Impact assessment had not yet taken place in the villages visited. Communities noted that the land clearance would have an impact on their livelihood, particularly the families whose farm land had been cleared. In one case, the ability to mine stone was also highlighted as an economic development opportunity that would emerge once the mine field was cleared. The mining of stone was expected to provide an additional income generation source. In Isaloro, it is anticipated that the impact of clearing farming land and areas for houses closer to the road will bring direct or cascading benefit to all people living or working in areas affected by landmines. However the areas visited in South Sudan were at the time of the evaluation dependent on rain fed irrigation and therefore it will only be possible to confirm that the land is used productively for agriculture once a whole production cycle has passed.

Overall the impact of clearance does bring direct and indirect benefits to the community including a sense of pride that at last someone is interested in their welfare. The land was either being used or about to be used to advance

livelihoods. In contrast in the counterfactual community visited, as a result of landmine contamination people couldn't access land for quarrying, which they would ideally undertake as a dry season livelihood activity. Instead they cut grass for thatch and wood, which provided them with less income than would be gained from quarrying. The extent to which different households benefit depends on household characteristics, aspirations, knowledge and access to other livelihood assets as well as broader issues such as access to roads and pro-poor markets.

Until the land is returned to productive use, it is not possible to comment on the extent to which demining contributes to a levelling or increasing of intra-village disparities, but this does not seem to be a specific objective of the programme. Intra village, the disparities were between richer and poorer from same ethnic group. Local prioritisation, as evident in At Hiliu (Borewajak), see above, unless premised on principles of equity or pro-poor, can accentuate differences in outcome. Given the poorest do not have adequate investments (mainly labour, seeds and tools) to use the land it is possible that it will increase disparities between the middle and poor classes and possibly level some of the disparities between the wealthy and middle income groups. Additional inputs are required to sustainably improve living standards in the villages visited – including access to potable water, sanitation, education, health and pro-poor markets. In the villages visited the lack of these basic services were not reported to be due to demining, but to lack of government investment. The issue of inter-ethnic divisions did not arise during the surveys.

Coordination with other development actors was not reported to have been established in the four villages included in the DFID CHASE villages and does not appear to be a key part of the UNMAS prioritisation process, although MAG key informants and others interviewed as part of the institutional capacity building appraisal, including UNMAS, said there was no clearly defined criteria for prioritisation. This may be partly explained by Mine Action being under the Protection Cluster rather than linked to development. (See institutional appraisal below). The only local organisation which benefited from the clearance was the CBO in Gotkwar - the only village where a CBO was reported to be. As mentioned previously this village was also visibly better off than the other three villages. No government activities were reported in any of the villages visited.

3.5.1 Impact of mine action on gender

In South Sudan, the data on questions related to women and girls were not conclusive due to the fact that the community impact survey in South Sudan was conducted shortly after the land had been demined and handed over to the community, and was therefore not yet returned to its full productive use. Impact of demining in demined communities compared to the counterfactual could therefore not be fully determined. However, findings suggested that household activities such as water collection endangered women specifically, and since the demined areas bordered rivers where water was collected, demining ensured safer water collection by women[13]. Furthermore women in South Sudan tend not to leave the village's environs and hence the fact that the demining took place in the immediate confines of the village, enabling women to access agricultural land, also had an impact. It is unclear, however, whether men took up activities on behalf of women in South Sudan when land was mined.[14] MAG did not employ any female deminers. It should be noted however that the deminers are essentially seconded from the SPLA.

3.6 Awareness raised through Mine Risk Education (MRE)

CL teams conduct MRE sessions when a new operation is open on a minefield using a variety of posters. The limited effectiveness of information-giving promotion activities in contributing to sustained behavioural change is well documented and most respondents have gained knowledge about mines in their village from previous injuries occurring in the contaminated area. In each village there is a MRE focal point who reported they provide some MRE on an as needed basis, although the survey team was not able to confirm this through observation. The survey team did not systematically test perceptions of the value of MRE among respondents. In the villages visited, both the male and female FGDs were able to identify cleared areas on the community map and the team were physically taken to each cleared area and walked around the boundaries by key informants. Women had slightly less knowledge of the process but nevertheless were generally aware of the area which had been cleared. Land which remained mined was reported not to be used and in the community mapping process there was general agreement on the areas which were mined.

While the evaluator was there, additional reports of mines and UXO were reported by other agencies suggesting that agencies knew where to report occurrences.

[13] It should be noted, however, that the water being accessed was not potable.
[14] See page 12, Annex D, South Sudan Country Mission Report

4 Evaluation Purpose 2 : Institutional Capacity Developed through MA Programme

The findings below are a summary and synthesis of findings from the Institutional Capacity Appraisal conducted in South Sudan.

4.1 Key Findings

In summary, it can be said that this programme has led to more ownership and capacity of national governments and national mine action agencies.

There is no overarching TOC for Mine Action which can be used to develop effective TOC narratives for individual countries and form a basis for evaluating interventions and exploring the links between mine action, institutional capacity building and development (O'Reilly et al., 2012). The TOC for the current DFID CHASE MA Programme was developed retrospectively (Jones & O'Reilly, 2012) and thus is not linked to the contracts of the implementers. According to this TOC, the output of institutional capacity building interventions would be efficient and effective National Mine Action Authorities (NMAA) which, assuming political will existed, would result in appropriate policies in place and integrated with national development plans and budgets (Jones & O'Reilly, 2012). The expectation is that this would result in Mine Ban Treaty compliance which in turn would contribute to improved quality of life for mine affected communities.

Expected activities to achieve these outcomes in the TOC are similar to the ones undertaken by the implementing partners and include: training courses and exposure visits, and mentoring and support to enable NMAAs to undertake their regulatory and market coordination role.

Logframes were developed by MAG and these were used to assess progress on institutional capacity building. It was noted that initially the majority of the MAG Sudan funding was going to Sudan and subsequently was redirected to South Sudan. MAG had sub-contracted the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) to deliver capacity building and training for national institutions. UNMAS have the formal mandate for capacity building. (see institutional capacity assessment below).

4.2 Political will to implement measures to facilitate mine action in country

The evaluation found evidence of political will to implement a Mine Action programme.

4.2.1 Financial commitments

The National Budget includes allocation for the NMAA - in 2011/12 - 28.4 million SSPs were budgeted for the NMAA, of which 24.1 million was donor funded, and 4.2 million was Government of Republic of South Sudan (GORSS) funded. In 2012/13 the budget is 18.2 million SSPs, of which 15.9 million SSPs donor funded and 2.3 million government funded. The South Sudan Government funds 100% of NMAA salaries within a defined salary structure. The 2012/13 budget for salaries is 1,928,751 SSPs. Since 2012 and at the time of the evaluation, due to austerity measures, the GORSS was reported by UNMAS and the NMAA to be only funding staff salaries, with UNMAS covering operational costs including per diems and travel for quality assurance.

4.2.2 Creation of a Mine Action supervisory body

The Sudanese authorities set up a national mine action authority by decree in December 2005. The Government of Southern Sudan established the Southern Sudan Demining Authority in June 2006 (Office of the President South Sudan Mine Action Authority, 2012). The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), with the assistance of Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and funded by the DFID CHASE programme has developed South Sudan's National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012 - 2016 which has been endorsed by the Office of the President (Office of the President South Sudan Mine Action Authority, 2012). In addition the NMAA has developed a plan to transition to national ownership (South Sudan Demining Authority, 2011, 2013). The transition plan and commitment to transferring to national ownership is also contained in the Strategy. A number of actors reported that other indicators of political will to have a Mine Action programme include ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty (Landmine Monitor, 2013). South Sudan's initial Article 7 report for the Mine Ban Treaty was due by 5th

January 2012. According to UNMAS, the agency assisted the NMAA in compiling the report and submitted in November 2012[15].

4.2.3 Mine Action Integrated into national development plans

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan includes reference to ensuring that operations respond to the national development priorities (Office of the President South Sudan Mine Action Authority, 2012). The South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 includes under the pillar of 'Conflict Prevention and Security' that the Mine Action authority will work to free the country from the impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war by conducting and coordinating mine action to support the safety of citizens and socio-economic development. Its targets for 2013 included almost 1,306 hazards prioritised for socio-economic value including roads, land for agriculture, resettlement and grazing, to reduce accident risk through provision of safe behaviour messages to 480,000 IDP and community members. Integrating Mine Action with development is also seen as important in the Transition Plan although the capacity of the NMAA to interact with development institutions is gauged as weak - based on a zero to four scale it registers as one in terms of capacity in this field.

While Mine Action is integrated into the National Mine Action Strategic Plan and the South Sudan Development Plan, key informant interviews suggested that there was limited evidence of Mine Action being mainstreamed into development in reality. For example, both UNMAS and the NMAA reported that it had been difficult to engage other ministries in coordination and planning meetings, as evidenced by the attendance register, which suggested that Mine Action coordination meetings are attended only by Mine Action agencies. MAG also reported it did not work with any development partners and at Torit County level the local South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) Chief Administrator reported that Mine Action was not integrated into overall development. This was further confirmed by there being no development agencies working in the three villages where MAG had worked with DFID CHASE funding.

Further, despite being seen as a cross-cutting issue in the Cluster approach, Mine Action is under the Protection Cluster. UNMAS participates in the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) humanitarian coordination mechanism the Inter-Sector Working Group, as the Cluster Lead for the Mine Action Sub-Cluster, as well as in the Humanitarian Country Team[16].. Requests by the evaluator for meetings with the leads of the Food Security and Livelihood Cluster were unanswered during the period. The role and capacity of UNMAS in supporting integration of the MA sector into the wider development process is raised in the main report.

Given this cluster provides people with food assistance and productive livelihood support in areas where people have returned and have access to land for cultivation, this would seem an appropriate forum for further reengagement. The WFP livelihoods analysis 2011/12, however, says – landmines pose a hazard to expansion of agriculture and it is worthwhile to maximise land productivity in existing safe areas considering that demining large areas for agriculture will take a long time to materialise (page 45).

The Education Strategy (2012-17) - says 'Emergency life-skills, such as landmine education, are particularly critical in South Sudan (page 29) and UNICEF was able to provide MRE materials. UNICEF also reported that three Community Based Organisations (CBOs) had been accredited to undertake MRE. The accreditation documents were not verified by the evaluator. Requests were made to UNMAS but these documents were not available. UNDP stopped its capacity development support to the NMAA (GICHD, 2012). DFID CHASE does not support UNDP activity in South Sudan.

4.3 Creation of technical capabilities to plan and manage Mine Action (including training)

Following UNDP's decision to stop its capacity development support to the NMAA, UNMAS initiated a transition team in 2010 to implement the transition plan (GICHD, 2012 interviews with UNMAS, NPA, GICHD, NMMA, UNICEF). While DFID funding did not support UNMAS in South Sudan, UNMAS has the mandate to develop institutional capacity and developed a team to support the transition plan comprising representatives from NPA, UNMAS and UNICEF (GICHD, 2012 per comm interviews with UNMAS, NPA, GICHD, NMMA, UNICEF). At the time of the evaluation, this team was reported to meet irregularly and did not have a shared consolidated workplan with clear measurable objectives (GICHD, 2012 per comm interviews with UNMAS, NPA, GICHD, NMMA, UNICEF). According to a GICHD report in 2012 (GICHD, 2012) coordination from the lead agency UNMAS was poor and no

[15] UNMAS clarification – June 2013
[16] UNMAS clarification – June 2013

informants suggested otherwise. The GICHD report (GICHD, 2012) questions UNMAS' commitment to institutional capacity building in South Sudan and one evaluation report has questioned whether UNMAS personnel have the necessary skills and aptitudes to train and mentor national counterparts (Paterson, T, et al, 2007, cited in GICHD, 2012)[17].

Since 2011, the NMAA has hosted monthly and quarterly mine action coordination meetings, with support from UNMAS. According to UNMAS, NMAA and Mine Action operators, most of the coordination is undertaken by UNMAS and all sites are approved by UNMAS. The Transition Plan rates the capacity of the NMAA to coordinate based on the capacity of the NMAA to do this, on a zero to four scale, as three, that is the NMAA chairs coordination meetings for all Mine Action stakeholders, although there is no inter-Ministerial coordination forum. That the NMAA chairs coordination meetings was verified by meeting minutes and in interviews with Mine Action stakeholders.

According to interviews with the NMAA and UNMAS there have been increased joint operations with UNMAS in quality assurance and accreditation purposes. There has been much criticism of UNMAS for not collocating with the NMAA staff so they can provide on-going mentoring (GICHD, 2012). At the time of the evaluation apart from a few national staff, UNMAS staff, including the capacity building coordinator, continued to work from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) compound and were extending their office space at UNMISS. In interviews with UNMAS and NMAA staff the reason given for this was lack on a regular supply of electricity and suitable facilities. UNMAS is working to upgrade the building, installing, among other essentials, a water input and sewage and the improvement of hygiene, a reliable electricity supply and internet. Once completed UNMAS will undertake a feasibility study to assess for further collocation[18].

Since 2010 Norwegian People's Aid[19] has provided institutional capacity building, primarily through provision of equipment, training in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), management training for quality assurance, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) levels one and two training, and manual demining training. UNMAS has also worked with the NMAA to strengthen QA and accreditation capacity. The DFID CHASE capacity building activities undertaken by MAG and GICHD have complemented this activity. In South Sudan these have resulted in one position of Community Liaison Manager being "nationalised" and was verified by the evaluator. One member of staff was promoted to the role of Technical Field Manager, previously filled by international experts and was transferred to work in the MAG Somalia programme. One National TFM manages two technical teams. The NMAA attended meetings with external bodies, facilitated by MAG/GICHD and verified through MAG and GICHD reports and interviews. MAG attended the monthly Technical and MRE coordination meetings held by the NMAA.

The GoRSS has made progress against a number of indicators related to commitment to funding, creating a supportive legislative environment, developing a strategy and commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty. There were, however, unconfirmed reports of landmine use which need to be verified. There is also some evidence at the institutional level of landmine clearance being integrated into broader development policies. Over the course of the DFID CHASE funding the Transition Plan T6 and T7 reviews suggest that ownership and capacity of the national mine action agencies has increased. It should be noted, however, that the baseline and the assessment are subjective and based on qualitative descriptors.

From the point of view of the MA operator, national capacity needs to be defined in terms of the core business of each DFID CHASE contractor. The MAG programme mainly contributes to building an efficient and disciplined demining team although some of the deminers were employed from the DFID CHASE villages. Arguably developing skilled deminers could, in future, provide a qualified workforce for national institutions, if they have the financial capacity to retain them. To a certain extent, MA skills can be arguably reused beyond the specific technical field of application, increasing employability of former staff. While MA organisation cannot provide continuous technical assistance to set up centralised capacity for MA management or procedure for prioritisation, they can contribute to ensuring community voice is included in the process.

The contractors have delivered what they said they would in terms of outputs. The underpinning casual inferences are that these activities would contribute to building national institutional capacity and that building knowledge and skills will lead to improved performance which will result in effective national capacity. The promotion of national MAG staff to positions previously filled by international experts indicates there has been effective national capacity building at this level. Interviews with MAG staff suggested this was successful firstly by selecting people with management potential and then providing training and opportunities for these people to gain experience. Interviews

[17] Capacity Development through transferring mine action functions to national actors is a key objective under the UN Mine Action Strategy for 2013/18 and UNMAS South Sudan is fully committed to meeting this objective. UNMAS clarification – June 2013.
[18] Drawn from UNMAS clarification – June 2013
[19] NPA Mine Action Capacity Development Project – SSMAA, 2011

with UNMAS and MAG confirmed the importance of getting the right person for the right job. The Transition Plan indicates some improvements in knowledge and skills and most informants agreed that they had seen improvement in the NMAA's ability to chair and organise coordination meetings with Mine Action partners. It also suggests that institutional capacity building is a slow process requiring on-going support and feedback loops to make a difference. This is supported by the findings of the literature review.



The extent to which knowledge and skills have been applied in the NMAA is partly reflected by improvements seen in the transition Plan review T7 from the earlier T6 review. The extent however to which this results in enhanced knowledge and skills and improved performance is hampered by lack of on-going mentoring and feedback loops. While this is done in terms of technical skills by NPA, there is little capacity for continuous and systematic support for applying knowledge and skills from the GICHD interventions. DFID's ability to influence and advocate for increased UNMAT support to the NMAA is constrained by the fact that the CHASE programme does not fund UNMAS or UNDP. Recommendations in this regards are raised in the main body of the report. The fragility of the South Sudanese state which is also reflected to an extent in the NMAA is a broader mediating factor. As a result, effectiveness and efficiency is not maximised.

Further, while the ultimate goal is an effective NMAA, respondents found it difficult to articulate what an effective NMAA would look like other than in broad terms of regulation and coordination and how the NMAA needs to link to the wider economic development planning within a country. This makes it difficult to determine what is needed in the longer term. A similar finding was observed in the meta-evaluation. Key informant interviews suggested the focus of capacity building was on the technical aspects of coordination as seen in the NPA activities with limited attention on developing crucial management and leadership skills including relational resources, and capacity for mobilisation. This needs to be addressed in the TOC for South Sudan in future programming.

Developing institutional capacity requires going beyond readily quantifiable measures of short-term outputs, for example number of trainings/workshops, policies produced etc. These can be indicators of immediate project activity, but they do provide relevant information about long-term impact on the institutional capacity or micro and macro level development objectives. Effective institutional capacity building is a slow process, requires all partners to work in an integrated way, needs to focus on the different dimensions of institutional capacity and must work within national structures rather than parallel ones.

The separate locations of UNMAS and the NMAA, while understandable in terms of 'getting the job done', can, as Barder (2009) and Ikpe (2007) have observed, make it more difficult to provide sustained capacity building and may have the perverse effect of undermining the capacity of the state to fulfil its obligations. In health, Lewis (2006) has observed that returns on health investments may fail to materialise if institutional capacity building is not addressed. Rather than building up parallel organisations, Cammack et al. (2006) call for working through government institutions as much as possible. Where alignment with the host government's plans and procedures is not possible, they recommend considering 'shadow systems alignment', whereby delivery is compatible with existing or future state structures. UNMAS has taken this shadow systems alignment approach to Mine Action in South Sudan. Many respondents felt however, that to move the NMAA forward, a more integrated approach is now required and this evaluation suggests that indicators of political will are evident. The weakness of the NMAA is a reflection of the weakness of the state itself and it is unrealistic to expect the NMAA to take on its role without sustained support. The lack of DFID in-country liaison makes engagement with the state more problematic and makes compliance with the Paris Declaration and Busan Partnership for Aid Effectiveness more difficult. A recommendation to this effect is made in the main body of the report.

Institutional capacity building is an important component for developing the capacity of national governments to manage their own programmes with limited external assistance. For this to be strategic and evaluable, in the next

DFID CHASE mine action funding, sufficient time and resource needs to be given to articulating logical framework and TOC based on a synthesis of the peer reviewed literature on institutional capacity building in weak and fragile states and consultation with key stakeholders. Understanding the different pathways to institutional capacity building through developing national capacity is critical in maximising investments and understanding what works in what contexts (O'Reilly et al., 2012).

As O'Reilly et al (2012) have noted, a TOC for Mine Action and Development could operate at both the global level and inform TOC processes and narratives for different contexts between and within countries, part of this should include developing a more refined TOC to better understand the pathways to developing an effective and efficient national authority and to allow a testing of hypothesis of what works. Such a tool could have a positive effect not only for Mine Action but also for other DFID sectoral institutional capacity building interventions in fragile states. This could enhance DFID's position as a knowledge hub in this area of supporting fragile states.

5 Evaluation Purpose 3: Socio-Economic Benefit Analysis of MA Programme

5.1 Key Findings

Part way through the MA programme, in July 2011, South Sudan achieved independence from the remainder of the country and became a separate state. The focus of this evaluation is the new nation of South Sudan. However, the MA operator MAG is required to report also on its continuing activities north of the new border in the residual nation of Sudan, and to date has produced integral reports covering both nations in one document.

In practice, most of the MA activity and most of the risk areas being addressed by the DFID-funded programme are in South Sudan, in three provinces, compared with only one province in Sudan, where work was temporarily suspended for part of the programme period. In mid 2012, there were 704 designated mine contaminated hazardous areas in South Sudan, compared with 285 such areas in Sudan.

In South Sudan these hazardous areas are restricting access to land required for settlement, livelihoods and development activities. Following the creation of the new nation, there has been continued sporadic war and disruption to economic life, which has resulted in sizeable migrations of population, with 116,000 moving into South Sudan in 2012. These returnees and displaced people impose a great strain on infrastructure, such as water supplies, dirt roads and housing, and government institutions in the country are weak.

Local economic and social conditions in South Sudan are at a much more basic level than the three other countries visited by the evaluation team. Many social and economic indicators are extremely low by world standards. For instance, it has the highest maternal mortality and female illiteracy rates in the world. Food aid is still required in places and economic opportunity is low. Agricultural land is still frequently prepared by hand plough, and the produce of patchy small holdings makes a big contribution to nutrition. Hence even small local improvements in basic access to safe land can bring noticeable benefits to people's quality of life and economic prospects.

Mine action is contributing to lifting the constraints on access to land, by clearing about 100 hectares to date. As an example, a completed de-mining operation and mine risk education in Imurok County in the state of Eastern Equatoria has permitted safe community access to land for agriculture and income generation.

Development outcomes may be summarised as follows:

- Lessened vulnerability of local populations and safe access to homes, tracks, savannah, forests, etc;
- Increased income, livelihoods and subsistence opportunities from access to land, water, trees etc;
- Access to infrastructure for community development, such as schools, health centres, government services and development bodies;
- Assisting safer and fuller access of humanitarian NGOs' staff into and through mine risk areas.

At end July 2012 (the latest report made available, covering three states in South Sudan and one state in Sudan), the programme had released almost 986,000 square metres of land back to mine-affected communities, against a target of 1.5 million square metres (completion rate 66%). The main work has been on two large tasks in Eastern Equatoria (South Sudan) which are close to villages and in areas used for livestock husbandry.

Mine risk education has been delivered to more than 63,000 individuals, which is 85% of the milestone target.

ANNEX G:

Findings for the Evaluation Questions

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1 Framework for Gathering Evidence Based Materials

This annex focuses on responding to the three primary evaluation questions directly linked to the objectives of the CHASE programme, as well as the targeted questions which focus on Strategy, Programme Outputs and Outcomes and Delivery mechanism.

2 Strategy

Question 1: To what extent have the development objectives of the DFID Mine Action Strategy been delivered in the mine action programme results? (Relevance)

In the countries of study, evidence suggests that the key development objective of the strategy **"***To release mine affected land to make a measurable contribution to the socio-economic development of mine affected communities"* has been delivered in some cases while in other cases, the demining stands to enable more widely felt socio-economic development but has yet to do so. In South Sudan, the demining has recently ended and hence the development impact remains unclear, while in Mozambique broader development is directly tied to other factors (i.e., transport to market, or other opportunities to sell surplus produce); and therefore, demining can only enable but not achieve development objectives. In Cambodia, where the lack of accessible land is more felt than in most of Mozambique, the impact of demining on individual families and communities was clear; with families being better positioned to secure their own livelihoods. The Sri Lanka context makes measuring development impact difficult. The demining has enabled IDPs to return to their original homes. This can have clear implications in terms of long term stability and development, but these manifestations of development require more time to materialise.

Within the broader development objectives other specific elements such as inclusion (i.e. gender, age and class) are areas where MA Operators (HALO and MAG) did not perform particularly well. In most cases the degree of community inclusion and participation in decision making was minimal. This is not only tied to the approach taken by the MA Operators, but also a product of how priority setting is established at country level. In most cases the operators had limited say on how priorities were identified, hence by the time the operator arrived at the location of the task, little was open to discussion. However, it should be noted that both HALO and MAG engaged with communities in the dissemination of information about the planning and implementation of their operations. MAG has a more formalised system to engage with communities which includes Community Liaison Staff, a post that HALO does not have. It is noteworthy that the community surveys showed that at the village level there was no clear benefit of one institutional approach versus another.

Poverty-reduction, another clear strategic objective, is tied to the timeliness of the intervention as well as to appropriate targeting (i.e. prioritisation). As noted above, this is one area where MA Operators have played a limited role. The finding from the case studies consistently suggest that in order to ensure that CHASE funded activities target poverty reduction, a more solid engagement between CHASE and the organisation or authority responsible for priority setting would be required.

All case studies consistently showed that in order to ensure long term development objectives are met mine action must be clearly embedded in the broader national development framework. We found some examples of coordinated efforts between demining operators and organisations involved in small scale development activities though approaches are varied.[1]

Where operators have excelled at implementing, the strategy has been in aspects that are more traditionally understood as mine action activities: reduction of accidents and release of land, and evidence from all four country case studies bear witness to the volume of land released. In just the first 18 months of the programme a total of almost 100km^2 of land have been cleared or released through various means.[2]

This is not only a significant reduction in potential hazard, but also in potential blockage to socio-economic opportunity. This can be seen in **Sri Lanka** where some 70,000 IDPs have resettled[3] and 114 temporary housing shelters constructed[4] on CHASE cleared land. In **Cambodia** approximately 100,000 direct and indirect beneficiaries

[1] MAG in Cambodia has formal MOU's with CARE, CFEDA and LWD for example, HALO has operational agreements, but not formal MOUs with Sarvodaya and Sewalanka in Sri Lanka and Helpage in Mozambique. Bothe modalities constitute a good level of coordination and cooperation. Sri Lanka
[2] See summarised clearance statistics in this report for more detail.
[3] In the Vanni only, *DFID Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka, HALO Trust Interim Eighteen Month Report, June 1-November 30, 2012*
[4] Interview with Bartholomew Digby, HALO Programme Manager, Kilinochi, April 11, 2013.

of land released for development - including the safe access/development/use of public services, shelter and settlements, collection of natural resources and small/medium/large scale infrastructure - have been recorded[5]. In **Mozambique,**[6] both the Maputo power line and Cahora Bassa Dam clearance projects provide electricity for domestic consumption and export, and is a major revenue earner for the country.[7] While the clearance has not affected electricity provision, it is expected that the demining will facilitate maintenance of both the dam and the power line. Moreover, the demining of Cahora Bassa Dam also has implications for the subsistence farmers living in the region as the mined area is agricultural land. In **South Sudan** 743,349m^2 of priority land cleared by MAG[8] is close to villages and involves agricultural and livestock rearing areas, and has enabled livelihoods to be carried out with reduced risk and greater confidence and comprehensiveness.

Question 2: Is the DFID mine action strategy implemented in non-CHASE mine action programmes (Libya and Afghanistan for example)? Are they coherent with the objectives of the Mine Action strategy? (Coherence, relevance)

The DFID CHASE mine action strategy is specifically designed to promote mine action as an enabler of development and aims at "*including closer integration of mine action in development programmes and progress towards nationally owned strategies and defined end states".*[9]

In preparation for framing and programming the next generation of the Mine Action Strategy, the CHASE team has specified the need to look at a number of DFID funded mine action programmes in non-CHASE countries and explore essential differences in design, purpose and their coherence with the objectives of the existing strategy. The team undertook a "remote" review of the implementation of non-CHASE DFID funded mine action programmes in both Libya and Afghanistan through a review of reports/proposals and face to face interviews with representatives of mine action operators as well as with officials from UNMAS in both countries.

The political, security and emergency operational mine action context in the immediate post conflict Libya was marked essentially by lack of a clear central governing authority and emergency focused response activities[10].

The UK government has funded mine action operations in Libya both through MAG[11] and the UNMAS[12]. In 2011, as the uprising was giving way to regime change, MAG undertook an initial survey of need. This was presented to the DFID office in Benghazi with a proposal to provide MAG services to address a significant problem of ERW and stockpiles of munitions which threatened the safety and well-being of communities and local people. The offer was forwarded to DFID London before a short start-up project was approved for the period. A further, mainly clearance, project was approved and ran from October 2011 to March 2012. During much of the time, the team worked under the protection of the defence forces. Development was not considered as an outcome. Nor indeed was developing national competence and capacity at a time in the country's history where government structures are in the words of one of the UNMAS team "evolving".

The short term nature of the funding sets the Libya operation apart from the actions financed under the CHASE programme, which are multi-annual. From the perspective of an implementing agency short term support, while offering critically necessary funding at the appropriate times, can bring with it, as political and media attention diminishes, a backlash as operators find grants drying up leaving mine action teams with assets but little wherewithal to put them to use.

The question for CHASE must be whether the UK government's mine action intervention in Libya needs to be fully in line and coherent with the CHASE Mine Action Strategy? Or does the Strategy itself need to broaden its aims to accommodate emergency humanitarian mine action? It can be said that the Programme already has, through its funding to UNMAS via the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), been contributing to "rapid response" and in recent months facilitated deployment of UNMAS to crisis hit countries such as Mali[13]. As the legacy of the conflict recedes, it is inevitable that development concerns and priorities will require the specialist input of longer term mine action linked to development. In such circumstances, it will be possible for countries like Libya and Syria emerging from

[5] MAG programme brief delivered to Evaluation Team, Phnom Penh, April 2, 2013.
[6] The Baseline Assessment found that 97% of households in mine-affected communities reported receiving no external development assistance in the previous year - *DFID Support for Mine Action in Mozambique Annual Report*, HALO Trust January 2012.
[7] *Ibid*
[8] For the period June 2011-November 2012 -*DFID Support for Mine Action in Sudan & South Sudan MAG Annual Report*
[9] *DFID Programme Strategy 2010 – 2013, Creating a safer environment: clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war.*
[10] MAG proposal to DFID: *Emergency Clearance and Destruction of Explosive Remnants of War in Libya,* September, 2011.
[11] Interview with MAG/Libya team and management – MAG Headquarters, Manchester, 22nd March 2012
[12] Interview with UNMAS Programme Manager – Geneva
[13] Interview with UNMAS – (NY) _Geneva April 10-12 2013

destructive war burdened by unexploded ordnance (UXO) but shifting priorities to socio-economic development, inclusion and growth, to be considered for longer term involvement in the CHASE Programme based on the principles and priorities of the Mine Action Strategy.

Afghanistan is a somewhat different case, although also a non-CHASE country. Mine action activities date back to 1988[14], the mine action context not only facilitates mine action in general, it specifically attempts to link mine action to national development strategies, as evidenced by the creation of a 9th Millennium Development Goal (MDG).[15] Following on from this, DFID (non-CHASE) supported the HALO Trust programme in the western region (2008-2013). A new multi-year programme (2013-2018) has now been agreed.

The HALO programme document, which resulted from extensive consultation with United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)/ United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (UNMACCA)[16] is on the face of it aligned with the CHASE Strategy.[17] The programme highlights promoting the interests of the poorest and most vulnerable by returning contaminated land to productive use, reducing the number of victims, and destroying ammunition that potentially could be sold or used against governments and/or international forces as the main programme goals,[18] all of which fit well into the Strategy. These are strategic objectives that not only pre-date the current CHASE Strategy, but are acknowledged to have *de facto* informed it: *"The accumulated experience gained over the last 15 years, and the lessons learned, have been incorporated in this new strategy"*.[19]

The involvement and lead position of the DFID Country-Office in negotiating the Herat Programme, which is funded through the DFID-Afghanistan livelihoods plan, will allow DFID to better link support to monitoring and evaluation and exercise greater quality oversight. There is a real opportunity for CHASE to explore with this Country Office how it might in other circumstances integrate the mine action agenda more coherently into the country development plans. In this situation, the net effect of the decision of the DFID Country Office to support the mine action work of HALO has provided additional funds for mine action. There are lessons to learn within CHASE in terms of how to ensure that policy coherence does not suffer and new more joined-up approaches to in-country oversight can evolve.

Question 3: Does the strategy provide a coherent evidence-based framework for all of DFID's mine action work? (Coherence)

The Strategy has three distinct objectives: release of mine affected land for socio-economic development; help governments take full responsibility for MA; and Value for Money (VFM).

This Evaluation explains that VfM is a measure of performance but having it as an objective has raised awareness of the need to make best use of limited resources. An improved VFM culture is beginning to emerge. Subsequent MA programmes might like to consider offering guidance on VFM issues that are not already embedded in, for example, contractor and UN processes such as competitive tendering. Areas to consider further could include drawing in different parts of the UN that exist in the host country and have a particular specialism in socio-economic development, but are not necessarily written into the programme.

It should not be overlooked that the first objective of releasing mine affected land has been achieved and in a reasonably coherent manner, varying only to reflect local conditions. For example, priority setting experiences varied from country to country, as the community surveys indicate (Annex C - F). Releasing land back to communities allows economic and social activities to recommence and, importantly, provides a sense of security to those in the area where mine and UXO are thought to be. The full social impact of feeling safe cannot be measured.

At the time CHASE entered into contractual arrangements with MAG and HALO, the transition ideas for connecting MA with development were still being formulated. There was an urgency to move forward from the strategy to individual country programming and the procurement which followed. There is a sense that this might have resulted in development and institutional capacity building being "bolted onto" MA rather than thinking through more thoroughly how these aspects might be better embedded into the Programme. The scale and ambition of the Mine Action Strategy – and the multi-stakeholder environment within which it takes shape, justify further planning for the

[14] *Operation Salaam,* IRC Country Report, July 1 – December 31, 1989
[15] *Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development Final Report*
[16] Interview with UNMAS – Afghanistan – Geneva – 11th April 2013
[17] DFID *Support To The HALO Trust For Mine/UXO Clearance In Western Region Of Afghanistan -12 Month Final Report 1st March 2011 – 29th February 2012*
[18] Interview with Tim Porter – HALO Afghanistan – Dumfries – 21 March 2013.
[19] *DFID Programme Strategy 2010 – 2013: Creating a safer environment: clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war.*

different critical components of the strategy. This would allow for better specification of requirements and performance monitoring frameworks for delivery of the various elements.

The two mine action operators are quite specific in what they do and how they measure success – area of land handed back, number of explosive devises removed and destroyed etc. The assumption made is that once this is done, communities will reoccupy the land and recommence livelihood activities. MAG and HALO assume rightly that other actors like the host government, UN agencies and NGOs, will provide development assistance and support to victims.

In carrying out their work, MAG and HALO necessarily train operatives in the full range of MA work from planning, health and safety, physical removal and destruction to final verification and hand-over. They interact with Mine Action Authorities, who often take on staff from these contractors and benefit from training activities the contractors provide.

The next MA programme could allow time for transition activities to be planned and included, where specialist assistance such as that which the UN system might provide in partnership with host government departments, can be coordinated with the release of previously mine affected land.

Similarly, entities like Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) should better integrate their work into the programme and become more accountable, demand driven and targeting the skills needs of beneficiary institutions. Asking Contractors like MAG or HALO to take responsibility for ensuring these other aspects of MA are delivered is not appropriate because they lack the necessary expertise and mandate.

Any follow–on programme should consider how other specialisms can be embedded into the MA process to help communities and governments maximise the benefits provided by contractors like MAG/HALO.

This will bring with it a VFM issue because the new programme should be better balanced. In the cases of UN and GICHD engagement, CHASE should differentiate between costs that are already covered (e.g. establishment costs that will not change and are covered by, for example, central funding) and the extra costs of mobilising to carry out the work.

The management of future programmes would be improved if host governments and partners engaged in the programme had more frequent contact with CHASE – perhaps each location receiving one visit per year plus a programme launch workshop. If CHASE was able to achieve this, it would also help when considering the effectiveness of the International MA system from a beneficiary standpoint.

Finally, it will be important to continue to develop an overall theory of change (TOC) and logical framework within which will sit the various country programmes. The TOC exercise will help elaborate all of the steps that are to be taken in order to move from one level of the logframe up to the next.

3 Programme Outputs and Outcomes

Question 4: What are the mine action programme's outputs and outcomes at community level? (Effectiveness)

An overview of achievement against the logframe of the basic demining metrics collected by the mine action operators, in eight countries, taken from Country Reports submitted to DFID by the operators covering the initial 18 months can be found in the main report. The section both outlines direct outputs and introduces some of the key questions that must be asked when examining outcomes. Here we delve into the issue further.

Undeniably, the number of mines removed and/or people provided with mine risk education (MRE) are clear and decisive outputs, but the outcomes of these types of activity require further attention and contextualisation. First, beyond accounting for the number of mines removed, the density of landmines or UXO relative to the size of the dangerous area or suspected area are important factors. Very small and densely mined areas may yield a high number of landmines, but constitute a limited hindrance to livelihoods of the local population, while large areas with few mines, but where the land is not in use as a preventative measure, may have far more impact on a family and/ or community. Similarly the location of the mined areas relative to where people live and access basic resources (i.e., water, agricultural land, grazing land, etc.), is also an important factor in determining the outcome of demining. In short, while the numeric data clearly gives reasons for mine action to continue, and the legal obligations outlined in the Landmine Ban Treaty demand it, from a development perspective the picture is not so clear cut. These concepts

are not new and have been amply discussed in different publications going back over a decade.[20] Similarly the conduct of MRE does not guarantee its effectiveness. The degree of effectiveness of MRE is tied to a number of factors, which include the appropriateness and clarity of the message as well as the degree to which the population are able to desist from using the contaminated area/resource, on the basis of the advice received.

Our examination of four very different countries, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and Mozambique, reveals that the outcome in each country varies. First in Cambodia the number of accidents has decreased in both Pailin and Battanbang provinces, which were visited during the Community Survey. This decrease can be attributed to greater availability of decontaminated land. Cambodia's high levels of contamination coupled with limited land resources has meant that people were forced to plough land which was contaminated and so exposed themselves to the risk of accidents. The increase in safe available land has also translated into increased production of surplus crops for sale. In Cambodia demining has been taking place for more than a decade, but still there are some areas with high levels of contamination. The impact of the landmines is felt by families and communities, with the poorest families being least resilient to the impact of landmines. Poorer families most often only had contaminated land, which led to chronic debt as they tried to access basic resources by other means. The debt itself led many families to sell their land at a low price due to the contamination. This dynamic has enabled investors, who can afford to purchase assets based on longer term investment models, to acquire land at low prices.

The lack of a socio-economic focused approach to priority setting that actively engaged affected communities has been a challenge to ensuring that the CHASE objectives are met. On the other hand, the ability to provide even a few families with direct income from the demining operators can be a notable asset to the most vulnerable.

In Sri Lanka the impact of clearance has been felt both in terms of agricultural production and in terms of returnees. IDPs had been forced to stay in camps for a number of reasons including landmine contamination but have started to return to their villages of origin – even before completion of demining. This in turn has implications for the ability of communities to re-establish a sense of post-conflict normality, and to reduce their exposure to the negative conditions that were experienced in temporary settlements such as limited resources, and high levels of gender based, including sexual, violence. In addition to regaining freedom to leave IDP "camps", respondents in Sri Lanka were able to access other forms of support once they returned to their villages. This support included housing and livelihood support schemes. Demining, together with these other forms of support, has enabled families to return to subsistence farming and limited additional income-generating activities.

In South Sudan the outcome of the demining is harder to measure at this point. The number of CHASE activities that have been undertaken thus far by MAG are limited and the land hand-over process has only recently begun. Communities noted that the land clearance would have an impact on their livelihoods, particularly for those families whose farm land had been cleared and perhaps also families that borrowed cleared land at no cost, since it would free prime farm land for use. In one case the ability to quarry stone was also highlighted as an impact that would emerge once the land mines were cleared. However in South Sudan none of the areas were yet in use, as farming is dependent on rain-fed irrigation and hence it will only be possible to confirm that the land is used productively once a whole production cycle has passed. In South Sudan the demined area has also served to facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs by making areas safer for return. One issue of concern in the South Sudan is the degree to which the most vulnerable actually gain a direct benefit from demining. This is largely because their engagement in decision-making and even access to community information is very limited. The data from the community survey in South Sudan showed that the most vulnerable groups do not tend to engage with their own communities because all their energies are given to securing survival livelihoods.

In Mozambique, demining had clear implications for the individuals and families whose land was demined, and in a couple of instances, on the community as a whole, because the land was communally owned. However the land cleared was relatively small and does not constitute the only land use option they have. The removal of landmines therefore increases the sense of security in the area, facilitates farming and will in future enable the harvesting of wood and charcoal at the community level (i.e. in the communal area). The removal of landmines also increased the likelihood that merchants will frequent the village and hence, given the absence of transport or local markets, enable the community to sell their produce locally. This last point was the clearest indication of development recorded in

[20] Millard, Ananda and Kristian Karpviken. 2000. "Reassessing the Impact of Humanitarian Mine Action: Illustrations from Mozambique." *PRIO Report* 1/2000. Oslo: PRIO.
Millard, Ananda and Kristian Karpviken. 2001. "Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique." *PRIO Report* 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO.
Millard, Ananda, Kjellman, Kjell E., Kristian Berg Harpviken, and Bernt Skara. 2003. 'Measures for Mines: Approaches to Impact Assessment in Humanitarian Mine Action.' Third *World Quarterly*. Volume 25, Number 5.
Littlejohn, Gary; & Roberts, Rebecca (2005) Maximising the Impact: Tailoring Mine Action to Development Needs. Oslo : PRIO.

Mozambique amongst the five villages visited. However, it was also notable that the counterfactual had, over the last 12 years,[21] experienced an ever increasing need for the resources blocked by the presence of landmines.

Overall, the findings suggest that the community level outcomes vary depending on the need for the resource lost, who the resources belongs to, and what can be achieved by accessing the resource. Linked to this is the presence of other factors which can enable development. Being able to produce surplus crops, for example, is insufficient to support development in the absence of the ability to sell the produce.

The prioritisation process in place in the communities surveyed was generally neither participatory nor inclusive of communities. At most, communities were informed of what was to take place in their villages and were engaged in the planning of the operations in logistical terms (i.e. location for the demining camp, access to water for the demining teams etc.).

Question 5: What are the effects (impact) on women and girls in mine affected communities and on issues of gender?

It is important to recognise that landmines impact women and girls differently. Specifically, the threat results from the type of activity that they are responsible for undertaking and how that activity is hindered by the presence of landmines.

In Cambodia the contamination of land and the increased risk in accessing natural resources seems to have led to the reshuffling of the division of tasks at the household level: the longer distances required to fetch water or fuel and the higher risk to carry out these activities meant that men were more likely to take up this activity. Once demining had rendered areas safe again women resumed these activities. Communities also noted that demining has led to a return to the traditional task distribution between men and women, but at the same time drastically reducing the travel time required to secure resources.

According to communities interviewed, contracting women as deminers plays a symbolic role in challenging gender structures. These contracts are also an important mechanism to secure income for the deminers and their families. It was noted, however, that women who work outside the home are still expected to fulfil their household duties, which places a heavier burden on women than on men.

A specific aspect of concern, which was clear from the work conducted in Sri Lanka, was linked to gender-based violence and security more generally. It was claimed that the IDP camps were rife with violence which targeted women and girls more than their male counterparts. These experiences of violence were not related to landmines *per se*, but the claim that the violence that women and girls are subjected to reduces when they are able to move back to their homes in de-mined areas. This suggests that demining can contribute to the reduction of violence experienced by women and girls in mine affected areas. The Sri Lanka case also highlighted the violation of the rights of women and girls, including sexual abuse at the hands of the military. This is a particularly problematic finding as the armed forces intend to take over all mine action activities in future and this would effectively mean that the possibility for military staff to abuse women and girls in mine affected communities will multiply.

In South Sudan, the data on questions related to women and girls was not conclusive, but suggested that, much like Cambodia, household activities such as fuel and water collection, endangered women more than men. Moreover, women in South Sudan tend not to leave the village's environs and hence being able to access agricultural land also had an impact on them. It is unclear, however, if men took up activities on behalf of women in mine affected areas of South Sudan. In Mozambique there was no clear indication that landmines posed a greater threat to women and girls than men. Earlier studies in Mozambique have suggested that female landmine victims were at greater risk of social exclusion (i.e. not being able to marry) due to their disability,[22] but this was not something that was reported in any of the villages visited.

In terms of the mine action activities more generally, women are sometimes hired by the demining organisations as deminers or to fulfil other duties. In Cambodia and in Sri Lanka, women constitute approximately one quarter of the demining workforce. However, there are very few examples of women in supervisory positions. However, both MAG and HALO have developed work plans that minimise the time staff spent travelling outside their villages of

[21] A documented study of the same area was conducted in 2001. Millard, Ananda and Kristian Karpviken. 2001. "Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique." *PRIO Report* 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO.
[22] This type of dynamic was reported during extensive field research done on behalf of the Mine Affected Communities Project (PRIO) in Mozambique 1999-2002. Some of the published material can be found at www.prio.no.

origin, in order to increase the possibility for women to work. In Mozambique the number of women hired by HALO Trust has been low. At the village level they often contract assistants for cooking or cleaning, and these are mostly women. The impact that these contracts have is limited to the direct economic benefit derived by the individual hired and does not have an impact on the community as a whole.

Second, in terms of gender equality issues more broadly, the role that mine action has played is minimal. While the contracting of female staff can have a clear impact on the individual women that have been hired, this does not have an overarching impact on the gender constructs locally nor should it be expected to. As noted earlier in Cambodia, the contracting of women played a symbolic role in terms of gender structures, however, it was also noted that women continued carrying out their gendered household tasks alongside their outside jobs. This suggests that there is little sustainable impact on gender dynamics.

One factor that is noteworthy, is the degree to which landmines may directly affect men (i.e. risk of bodily injury or death) more often because men take responsibility for tasks that would normally be considered women's work as a way to minimise the risk women face. While this reduces the direct risk to women, this must also be seen in the context of them potentially becoming widowed and the resulting hardship that would result.

Question 6: How do the different approaches to linking mine action and development by the implementers compare? (Effectiveness)

By implementers, it is understood that this refers only to MAG and HALO, since the United Nations Mine Action Teams (UNMATs) role relates more to Objective 2.[23]

Budget Items by Operator	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £	% Spend
HALO			
Not spec.- bridging fund	1,500,000	1,500,000	*100%*
Sri Lanka	3,000,000	1,950,578	*65%*
Mozambique	2,500,000	1,938,481	*78%*
Total HALO	**7,000,000**	**5,389,059**	***77%***
MAG			
Not spec.- bridging fund	1,500,000	1,500,000	*100%*
Vietnam	2,500,000	2,016,382	*81%*
Cambodia	3,838,764	3,248,856	*85%*
Laos	2,500,000	2,119,755	*85%*
Iraq	2,600,000	506,454	*19%*
Sudan	2,500,000	2,080,241	*83%*
D R Congo	2,500,000	2,041,142	*82%*
Total MAG	**17,938,764**	**13,512,830**	***75%***
TOTAL HALO & MAG	**24,938,764**	**18,901,889**	***76%***
UNMAS			
Afghanistan OPS	523,680	523,680	*100%*
Rapid response	523,680	523,680	*100%*
Policy & advocacy support	523,678	523,678	*100%*
Support to MASG	106,666	106,666	*100%*
Total UNMAS	**1,677,705**	**1,677,705**	***100%***
UNDP			
Cambodia UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Colombia UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Ethiopia UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Iraq UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Laos UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Mozambique UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Total UNDP	**1,661,148**	**1,661,148**	***100%***
UNICEF	1,661,147	1,661,147	*100%*
DR Congo UNICEF	141,300	141,300	*100%*

[23] This said, the UN's role in either direct coordination, or supporting national co-ordination, deeply affects the ability of implementers like MAG and HALO to effectively link mine action and development, since coordination decisions around prioritisation, tasking and information and database management, will deeply affect the ability of field implementers to work on sites where the impact of mine action resources is maximised in terms of efficiency.

Budget Items by Operator	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £	% Spend
Iraq UNICEF	207,240	207,240	*100%*
Nepal UNICEF	169,560	169,560	*100%*
Sudan UNICEF	263,760	263,760	*100%*
Institutional development Mine Action	260,545	260,545	*100%*
QA in mine action response	313,085	313,085	*100%*
Coordination, knowledge, advocacy	305,657	305,657	*100%*
Total UNICEF	**1,661,147**	**1,661,147**	***100%***
TOTAL UN	**5,000,000**	**5,000,000**	***100%***
IOD PARC			
Meta Evaluation	**60,000**	**60,000**	***100%***
CHASE TOTAL	**29,998,764**	**23,961,889**	**80%**

Budget Items by Operator	% Spend	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £
HALO	***23.3%***	7,000,000	5,389,059
MAG	***59.8%***	17,938,764	13,512,830
UNMAS	***5.6%***	1,677,705	1,677,705
UNDP	***5.5%***	1,661,148	1,661,148
UNICEF	***5.5%***	1,661,147	1,661,147
IOD PARC	***0.2%***	60,000	60,000
CHASE TOTAL	**100%**	**29,998,764**	**23,961,889**

MAG and HALO believe that mine action's biggest impact is as an enabler of development and that demining does create the space for development. [24] It is also important to highlight that both operators stressed their wish to better respond to development issues and linkages. Having said that (and as has been noted in the main report) both institutions continue to focus their reporting on indicators such as amount of land cleared and landmines or UXO removed. An examination of the CHASE country logframes identified the focus both institutions place on poverty reduction and attainment of the MDGs. However, there was no collection of data to seek to measure progress against these objectives.

MAG has been particularly vocal about the need to focus more attention on building a dialogue with communities. Indeed MAG uses the "Community Liaison" (CL) approach as a key to build bridges between themselves and communities. The CL approach aims to collect community data, share information with communities and evaluate/monitor impact. In addition the CL approach also assists with the delivery of Mine Risk Education.[25] HALO Trust has opted for a more technical approach to demining with far less formalised emphasis on interaction with villages or development questions. HALO Trust does not have an equivalent to a CL system or office. However the CL approach, or lack thereof, should not be over-emphasised. Indeed the community surveys conducted for this evaluation (Annex C-F) showed little visible distinction between how MAG and HALO interact with communities on the ground. This is an interesting finding worthy of further exploration, since it might be expected that a CL approach would produce a more discernible impact.

[24] Referred to as big 'D' and small "d" development by HALO.
[25] See: http://www.maginternational.org/about/community-liaison/#.UZyqmZVfSVM



The community surveys also showed that there was generally limited interaction with communities. The degree to which it takes place, however limited, is also heavily influenced by its context, making comparison difficult.[26] For example, in emergency contexts[27], the response by mine action operators is often primarily humanitarian which by its nature tends to reduce engagement with communities. When operating in post-conflict reconstruction environments where communities are transitioning from an emergency to development phase[28] the need and the response by mine action operators may blend humanitarian and development imperatives.[29] Still there is little evidence that this blending leads to a clear, decisive and consistent approach to mine action that envisages mine removal as a part of development once countries are firmly in a development phase. But there are some examples of HALO Trust and MAG working in conjunction with development actors. For example in Mozambique, HALO has made agreements with external agencies[30] as did MAG in Cambodia,[31] where developmental partners worked in communities that had benefited from mine action funded by CHASE.[32] In Sri Lanka HALO has agreements with development partners (though not formal Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs)), and also took the highly unusual step of directly funding follow-on development work through third party agencies[33] from its operational budget.[34] In the villages visited In South Sudan, there were no other organisations working and there is no evidence that MAG sought to facilitate other organisations working in these villages. Overall the evidence suggest that while there are clear examples of both MAG and HALO working alongside development organisations and doing so successfully, this approach is not standardised or regarded as a pre-requisite to conducting demining. Indeed some of the data suggested that it was development actors who approach the mine action operators rather than the other way around. Moreover, cases where demining operators divert their own funding into development activities which they need to oversee seems to be based on a misunderstanding of how development actors and mine action operators activities should interact. Demining operators are specialists at what they do and should not be directly involved in development activities. There was no evidence suggesting that involving mine action operators directly in development activities was a cost effective or efficient way of working.

The 2011 UNMAS annual report outlines the position taken by the United Nations in relation to mine action and development. In the words of Ban Ki-moon, the United Nations Secretary General[35]: "Mine action programmes make a valuable contribution to … development initiatives…" This view is shared by UNDP[36]. However, a review of the 2011 UNMAS annual report does not mention any initiative that would support a coordinated effort between development work and mine action activities. On the contrary the reporting is primarily focused on funding spent and on a numeric calculation of what was achieved (e.g. of people who received MRE). One year earlier, however, UNMAS did report that some of its activities had led to development impacts by "…facilitating road construction, and the revitalisation of local economies." However, the details of how this was accomplished are not reported.

DFID funding (as noted in the main report) is through the VTF channelled to UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. However it is unclear from the UNMAS reporting what is actually delivered with the funds, how much of it reaches beneficiaries, and how funded initiatives are tied to development efforts. There was no data clearly showing that

[26] The one constant "commonality across countries and operators are the baseline assessments conducted as per DFID requirement, to determine scope and extend or contamination and nature of impact See country baseline assessments.
[27] Libya, parts of Iraq, DRC for example
[28] E.g. Mozambique, Cambodia and most of S. Sudan and Sri Lanka
[29] Emily Akalu, Email to Evaluation Team, 12th April 2013
[30] i.e. Helpage International and World Vision International
[31] LWD, World Vision, CARE for example
[32] From field visits to Mozambique with HALO, April 2013
[33] HALO sub-contracted the development organisation ZOA to provide semi-permanent shelters directly on cleared land. 114 at an approximate cost of £300,000.
[34] HALO stated that this interpretation was discussed and endorsed by DFID. Meetings with Bartholomew Digby, HALO Programme Manager, Kilinochi, April 11, 2013 and HALO Trust HQ staff, Carronbridge, Dumfries, Scotland, 17th April 2013.
[35] http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2011/11/27/landmines-thwart-development-progress-says-undp-administrator-.html

demining activities were tied to development activities or that agencies worked jointly to pursue development objectives. Much like with the mine action operators, the discourse clearly supports engagement between mine action and development efforts. Yet, the evidence would suggest that much more can be done to encourage and facilitate closer working practices between the national and local authorities working in the development and mine action sectors. Well-designed programmes, based on a sound business case, theory of change and logframe – agreed with implementing bodies such as the constituent bodies of UNMAT – will make it more straightforward to measure and monitor that rate of progression.

Overall the lack of a clear and consistent link between demining operators, administrators and development actors has meant that in some cases demining has not achieved its full potential and failed to maximise its impact following the completion of demining operations. At best the approach taken by both operators in terms of working with development actors can be said to be ad hoc. However, the fact that it has successfully occurred at all, as the examples above show, demonstrates that both operators are able and willing to engage with development actors. This is a first step towards an approach to work that must become more common place in order to secure the CHASE strategic objectives.

Question 7: How has value for money been addressed and operationalised? What are the results? (Relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)

Concerning VFM in operational matters (inputs, activities, outputs), the mine action contractors were observed during the evaluation field trips to keep detailed operational records of expenditure, staff operations, equipment, activities undertaken and outputs achieved (teams deployed, areas cleared, mines and UXO destroyed, people receiving mine risk education, liaison meetings, etc.). They will often cost-effectively purchase second-hand vehicles for general transport and import previously-used specialist mine clearing equipment from other countries of operation. Staff are procured at competitive local pay rates which can be kept low by the addition of extra incentives such as training, clothing, footwear etc. However, the operators do have to remain cognisant of conditions in the local labour market[37]. Mozambique is probably the highest wage cost location for HALO at the moment, especially in the Maputo area, due to salary inflation as a result of new international companies continually entering this fast-growing market.

Operators are, in some cases although not consistently, calculating a running cost per square metre of land cleared of mines, and also similar clearance measures incorporating the more superficial and less cost-intensive battle area clearance. For instance, HALO Sri Lanka quotes £1.58 as the cost to clear a square metre of minefield, dropping to 81 pence per square metre when battle area clearance is added, over the period 1st June 2011 to 30th November 2012[38].

As noted elsewhere, there are serious limitations to the usefulness of such calculations, although they are worth having as a record of activity. The extraction costs of mines vary greatly depending upon the method of detection, nature of terrain, weather, vegetation cover, the original pattern of emplacement, subsequent natural events (landslip, river wash, tsunami, animal activity etc.). This makes historic extraction rates a poor indicator of future extraction rates. Once a minefield clearance is started, if a clear emplacement pattern emerges, then future unit extraction costs come down considerably. In other situations, once the early 'easy wins' are extracted, the remaining random mines are progressively harder and more expensive to locate and remove.

Regarding outcomes, for Mine Risk Education (MRE) it is certainly the case that there is a large amount of repeat attendance at MRE sessions, and hence double-counting of this class of beneficiary. These sessions can often be regarded locally as 'entertainment' in rural areas where there is little in the way of events or shows. Repeat attendance is not discouraged since messages are being reinforced, but programme managers should be aware of this when reviewing these figures[39].

The economic development benefit achieved subsequently on cleared land has more recently come into focus as an objective of the programme. Hence the operators have to varying degrees been recording numbers of beneficiaries, nature of post-clearance land use, occupations of users of cleared land, and so on. More could be done in this area, for instance to distinguish between different type of beneficiaries and the nature of the benefit they experience; six-monthly reports to DFID currently are variable and not to a standard template to facilitate inter-country comparisons. For instance, the 63-page Halo report on its excellent work in Mozambique up to July 2012 headlines nine results, but none specifically on beneficiaries – one on area cleared, six on types of explosive devices found, one on

[37] Field visit observations – Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Mozambique and South Sudan
[38] The HALO Trust report for Sri Lanka June 2011-Nov 2012
[39] Findings from Community Survey – Mozambique – Annex D

accidents and one on villages visited[40]. The MAG Annual Report on Sudan, where again good work is done, states that 25,630 people have benefitted from their mine action activities, without specifics[41].

The deployment of other development resources after the land has been handed back to the community, in terms of the activities and budgets of other NGOs which help to expedite the communities to re-establish themselves, are also now being recorded in some cases. This greatly enhances the sustainability of the benefits realised by releasing land through mine clearance. Such data collection is also very useful in terms of illustrating the leverage achieved by the DFID programme, and ought to be expanded, albeit without deflecting mine action from its main mission to remove mines.

Such evidence helps to clarify the case that mine action creates opportunity space, upon which other actors can promote sustainable development. Some examples of the results of post-clearance development are given elsewhere in this report, and show re-settlement of abandoned areas and land returned to active use for agriculture, fisheries and other activities. These and similar well established local economic activities, which had been suspended due to landmine contamination, are highly viable and sustainable in the longer term.

Question 8: Has the programme led to more ownership and capacity of national governments and national mine action agencies? What are the benefits or constraints found in the programme's support to national governments? (Effectiveness, sustainability)

The Programme is designed to help governments take full responsibility for their national mine action programmes. To start with the 2010 baseline, this showed that none of the focus countries had full national MA management. Moreover, of the four countries visited in the course of the evaluation, only the UNDP offices in Mozambique and Cambodia are supported through CHASE and none of the UNICEF offices included in the CHASE-UNMAT programme were located in the field visit countries. Additionally, CHASE has not been the only contributor to efforts aiming to strengthen national ownership and build capacity at national institutions and agencies. Therefore isolating and evaluating the contribution by CHASE is difficult. In view of this constraint we have chosen to also examine questions that arise in relation to strengthening national ownership and building national capacity more broadly and include the experiences from other countries as a way to inform our findings.

In Cambodia, with a two-decade long national effort, with the prospect of an additional decade of mine clearance being required, it would be difficult for CHASE to do more than claim a positive supporting role to the process of ownership and institutional capacity building. The same can be said of Mozambique where support to the National Authority has been a long term effort. It is also noteworthy that while both capacity and degrees of ownership have improved in both Cambodia and Mozambique, the need for continued support remains.

In Cambodia, MAG and the UNDP have provided the national authority with Technical Advisors, who are credited with having supported Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) and Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) to undertake policy development, budgeting, resource raising and implementation. Overall, the CMAA has been active and proactive in driving the MA agenda, and this is further evidenced by the CMAA website[42]. A host of features are regularly updated, including technical training, awareness raising, and gender-sensitisation. However the degree of national ownership has not extended to institutional funding. Currently 20% of CMAA budget comes from multilateral sources (primarily UNDP), 60% from bilaterals and 15-20% from the KoC itself. Additionally interviews with other CMAA staff indicate some staff salary restrictions and promotion progress delays (compared with line Ministries) are constraints to both recruitment and retention.

In Mozambique, the UNDP capacity-building project includes provision of a Senior Technical Advisor who works under the line management of the IND director. The main priorities of the UNDP capacity building project are Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) training, information management and quality assurance. These priorities were determined through informal consultation with stakeholders rather than a systematic needs assessment[43]. Most of the capacity building occurs through practical experience and short courses. The UNDP project has included hiring staff outside of the public service system to manage Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). These project staff are paid above civil service salaries and are unlikely to transfer to the civil service once the project ends[44].While the National Authority has made great progress in taking on aspects such as priority setting and quality assurance, the robustness of the institution as such is unclear as are the existence of enduring mechanisms that will

[40] The HALO Trust report for Sri Lanka June 2011-Nov 2012
[41] MAG Annual Report on Sudan
[42] www.cmaa.gov.kh
[43] UNDP
[44] UNDP/IND

be able to ensure that capacity support, such as information management, can be taken up by the national authority at a later date.

In Sri Lanka, a rather different and more recent legacy of war remains and the attitude to international assistance is not completely positive. Hence external support efforts have a reduced ability to have an impact. The Government of Sri Lanka has made it clear to foreign embassies that national Military Demining Capability is now sufficient to complete the demining task without international assistance from 2014 onwards, although explicit allocations for demining in the most recent national budget were subsumed within general development, military and health allocations[45]. However for now support to Sri Lanka continues. UNDP's Support to Sri Lanka has been designed to strengthen national capacities to manage, implement and coordinate mine action activities in support of the National Mine Action Programme. The specific aim of the "Project" is to provide mine action coordination support and technical management capacity to the National Mine Action Programme, Government Agents and local Mine Action Focal Points in the mine-affected districts, to achieve the goal of creating a mine free environment in support of resettlement and development in Sri Lanka. The project is directly implemented through a Project Management Unit (PMU) based in Colombo, and staff placed at the NMAC's Regional Mine Action Offices (RMAOs) and its sub offices. In addition the GICHD has provided support in a number of areas including Information management, IMAS, MRE and briefings on international law. UNICEF is the principal partner in providing technical assistance to Sri Lanka's MRE programme. In addition, the Mines Advisory Group provides technical assistance in partnership with UNICEF to build capacity of MRE and Community Liaison implementing partners.

In South Sudan UNMAS has the mandate to develop institutional capacity. To achieve this they formed a team to support the transition plan comprising representatives from NPA, UNMAS and UNICEF.[46] Although at the time of the evaluation the team was reported to meet regularly, it did not have a shared consolidated work plan with clear measurable objectives.[47] A couple of factors appear to have been key in contributing to limited success in supporting national ownership and institution building, first the coordination provided by UNMAS was noted as weak[48] and secondly the degree to which UNMAS staff had appropriate and adequate skills and expertise to train and mentor national counterparts was questioned.[49]

DFID CHASE support for capacity building to the Mine Action Coordination Centre Afghanistan (MACCA)[50] is credited as being vital to the functioning of effective coordination and oversight of mine action operations in that country[51]. The critical coordination, accreditation, quality standards and investigative role of MACCA was stressed also by the HALO Trust[52]. MACCA works closely with the Department of Mine Clearance in the Afghan administration. There has been a growing emphasis there on the need to link mine action with development as evidenced by the fact that the MACCA has undertaken a series of Landmines and Livelihoods survey and, with support from the GICHD, now has the capability to undertake additional surveys without the involvement of international experts.[53] [54]

The on-going need for capacity in certain areas, particularly in countries with a long history of mine action, calls into question the degree to which capacity building efforts thus far have been effective. It appears that at times technical support has been provided, but has not clearly built in a mechanism to ensure that the knowledge is transferred to the national institution in a manner that can ensure sustained capacity and ownership. This question arises in countries like Mozambique where technical support has been provided consistently for many years and appears to be needed still. In South Sudan, for example, where the technical support is not in the same building as the national authority, the limited contact between the support and the recipient institution would suggest that the ability to ensure sustained transfer of capacity is reduced.

Moreover it could be expected that long term programmes, such as those in Cambodia and Mozambique, would have in-house technical knowledge to call on. Broader aspects that relate to institution building and basic good governance appear to be issues of key importance in relation to mine action authorities (i.e. transparency in priority setting, accountability in reporting, etc.) which have thus far been neglected. Mine action operators are not well

[45] 2012 GoSL Prime Minister's National Budget Speech, 9 November.
[46] (GICHD, 2012 per comm interviews with UNMAS, NPA, GICHD, NMMA, UNICEF).
[47] GICHD, 2012 per comm interviews with UNMAS, NPA, GICHD, NMMA, UNICEF)
[48] (GICHD, 2012) and interviews with key informants including UNMAS, NPA, DDG, UNICEF and NMAA
[49] Paterson, T, et al cited in GICHD, 2012. This view was supported by all respondents with the exception of UNMAS.
[50] Funded through the Voluntary Trust Fund (UNMAS) from the DFID CHASE Mine Action Programme
[51] Interview with UNMAS Programme Manager Afghanistan and Chief Programme and Planning UNMAS – Geneva 10-11th April 2013
[52] Interview with HALO Trust Country Manager for Afghanistan – Dumfries – 21st March 2013
[53] Livelihoods Analysis of Landmine/ERW Affected Communities in Herat Province Afghanistan (October 2011) Barry Pound, Åsa Massleberg, Qudous Ziaee, Samim Hashimi, Shapur Qayyumi and Ted Paterson MACCA, GICHD and Gender and Mine Action
[54] Clarification from GICHD – June 2013

placed to provide assistance to national authorities on subjects related to broad governance and institution building issues.

4 Delivery Mechanisms

Question 9: What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different ways that DFID manages mine action work? (Country office led, humanitarian, development CHASE central programme)

Mine action operations financed by DFID can be managed through several different channels. Emergency humanitarian funding for immediate post conflict situations, as was the case in Libya, come from sources such as Humanitarian and/or the Conflict Pool (involving the MoD, FCO and DFID). DFID Country programmes represent another channel, although rarely used. However, the DFID-Afghanistan mine action is funded and managed within the country programme funding framework of the DFID-Afghanistan Livelihoods Programme. The CHASE Mine Action Programme is a third channel, which unlike the country programme funds is managed by the centrally located unit in London.

Programmes that take place within an immediate post-conflict or emergency setting face challenges that are directly tied to the unstable and hazardous nature of the environment. The short-term character of the Libya intervention, for example, sets the post-conflict humanitarian mine action operation there apart from more predictable MA programmes. The question is whether, and if so, how to develop a more coherent and comprehensive MA strategy. First responders for CHASE are their Operations Team (OT), who make early assessments that inform DFID decisions for humanitarian relief. It is through these early assessments that the OT will integrate MA with other humanitarian activities. Some commentators believe that better coordinated MA could help stabilisation.[55]

We suggest that CHASE also engage with the Stabilisation Unit to explore if and how MA could be linked better with post-conflict stabilisation especially in such dynamic environments as was the case in Libya. There is a growing awareness of how MA should not only be better and more positively integrated into development programmes in order to maximise socio-economic outcomes, but also better integrated into stabilisation programmes wherever possible.[56] For these links to be effectively and efficiently secured, it is essential to have an appreciation of the specific skills and competences of the actors involved in the full cycle from stabilisation to MA to development.

DFID Country Office management offers more direct guidance, support and monitoring to operators in the field and is well placed to link the mine operations sector into DFID country plans. However, decentralised management would create a much greater confusion over the direction of the Mine Action Strategy. It would also deprive the policy centre for mine action with a direct source of information and contact with the mine action sector and diminish the potential of CHASE for bringing this experience to the global policy and coordination table.

The case for a cost effective centrally managed unit is made in the response to Question 11.

The Evaluation Team suggests that CHASE consider the disadvantages (perceived or otherwise) of the management system along with possible alternatives that need not be expensive, but are likely to forge stronger links with the mine action operators that will lead to less confusion and a stronger sense of partnership. One of the key management challenges is to integrate development into future programmes efficiently and cost effectively using where possible, established and available expertise such as that which is within the UN. The system has to be right in order to facilitate better, more responsive management.

DFID departments including CHASE and Country Offices develop their plans and strategies with the aim of arriving at an overall coherent approach to poverty elimination through, inter alia, the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), resilience in security, justice and humanitarian response. Even so, complete complementarity across the whole of DFID has yet to be achieved. At country office level, country plans and budget allocations are harmonised as are running costs required to meet delivery expectations.

Strategic and operational planning within and across DFID involves consultation between central departments and Country offices. When dealing with DFID target countries with a significant landmine and ERW problem, CHASE will

[55] Interview with Owen Barder – Centre for Global Development.
[56] Naidoo, S. 2013. Mission creep or responding to wider security needs? The evolving role of mine action organisations in Armed Violence Reduction. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2(1):11, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.av.

consult with the DFID Country Office on potential MA impact on development and other strategic priorities[57]. However, priorities are not always aligned and CHASE MA concerns may not necessarily be a Country Office priority. Moreover, it must be recognised that all Country Offices are working within tight running cost budgets which restricts their ability to interact with centrally managed interventions. It is up to CHASE MA Programme Managers to take the initiative here.[58]

The case of the DFID-A MA programme in Herat is relevant. Mines are a widespread problem in Afghanistan where mine action activities date back to 1988[59], MA is therefore an integral part of national development planning as evidenced by the creation of a 9th MDG.[60] Here DFID-Afghanistan is supporting a multi-annual mine action programme in the western region (2008-2013)[61]. The mine action programme is consistent with the CHASE Strategy[62] highlighting the interests of the poorest and most vulnerable by returning contaminated land to productive use. The lead position of DFID Afghanistan in negotiating the Herat Programme (an integral part of their livelihoods plan) naturally supports MA monitoring, evaluation and quality oversight.

Question 10: Do the programmes deliver what they say they will? Why and what difference does this make? (Effectiveness and efficiency)

The CHASE programmes have delivered clearance of contaminated land - 99 square kilometres of land have been released to date, so a key condition for economic and community development has been achieved. One of the differences the programmes are making concerns the use of cleared land. Most cleared land is going directly into productive use benefiting the household economy of beneficiaries and in some cases the community more broadly. Post-clearance land use is similar across the countries visited for this evaluation. In Cambodia the approximate order of significance of cleared land is: agriculture; roads and infrastructure; housing; fuel collection; fishing and access to fresh water. During the contract period to date, a total of 47,804 people have been re-settled into areas cleared of mines by HALO. The primary occupations of these beneficiaries are farmers (35%), labourers (28%), fishermen (18%) and 19% others. Most of them have resumed economic activity – another example of the difference the programmes are making. However, the absence of clear data precludes our showing a statistical representation of how clearance may have impacted beneficiary communities elsewhere. In Sri Lanka much of the initial focus has been on IDP resettlement, while in South Sudan the demining has ended very recently and impact is not yet visible. Mozambique, which like Cambodia has been in a post conflict phase for many years, does not face the same conditions as in Cambodia. Indeed beyond an increased sense of security, the economic impact of demining in the areas visited appeared to be quite limited.[63]

Mine action has a socio-economic development impact that requires a number of steps other than the physical removal of landmines to take place. Still, the removal of landmines is important because their presence can prevent development. For example, inability to access basic resources such as food, fuel, and water will keep development efforts out of reach. In addition to removing the hindrances to development, some of the CHASE MA Programme funded demining operations had the potential for actively promoting socio-economic developmental impact. An examination of communities where demining had taken place versus communities where demining had not yet taken place showed that even in cases where there was no direct link between the demining and a development activity, the potential for development activities to take place was increased as a result of demining (see Annexes C-F).

In terms of direct socio-economic development impact stemming from CHASE funded activities, the community surveys show that field operators have, on occasion, partnered with development actors to ensure that the resources freed by demining are maximised post-demining. However, this is not done consistently in all cases. The data collected in the field suggests that in cases where such partnerships are established the likelihood for clear impact is far stronger. A clear example of this is the coordinated work between HALO Trust and HelpAge International in Mozambique.

Efforts to *"To help governments take over the management of their national mine action programmes as soon as practicable"*, are by their nature long-term and involve many complementary actors and activities. In all the countries of study, CHASE funded UNMAT support to national mine action institutions is part of an assistance continuum

[57] Information from evaluation team members who previously worked as senior DFID managers.
[58] Interview with Owen Barder Centre for Global Development
[59] *Operation Salaam,* IRC Country Report, July 1 – December 31, 1989
[60] *Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development Final Report*
[61] Interviews with UNMAS – Afghanistan and HALO Trust
[62] HALO Trust Supplement – DFID Funded Clearance of All Remaining Mine/UXO Contamination in Herat Province 2013-18.
[63] HALO Trust's own community survey showed consistently that landmine impact in Mozambique had, above all else, impact in the sense of security people felt, but more limited impact in other areas.

spanning years, sometimes decades of similar support from a multitude of donors. As such, evidence of specific capacity development results that tie to certain UNMAT interventions is less straightforward to measure[64].

With regard to the efforts of the mine action operators, as we have stated elsewhere in this report, it is not the core operational business of either MAG or the HALO Trust to develop the capacity of central level national institutions. Indeed, there may at times be a conflict of interest for them to do so.

MAG, through its consortium approach and the consulting interventions of the GICHD, have led to the production of key normative reference documents such as national strategic plans and policies and National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).[65] In addition, through workshops and on-going discourse key staff within national institutions have been exposed to and become conversant with important themes such as Land Release and Information Management,[66] Quality Management and contracting in mine action. The GICHD has also facilitated specific technical support such as with mine detection dog (MDD) testing and accreditation[67] and mine detector trials.[68] All of these are positive outcomes. However, the GICHD is constrained by having no ongoing presence within the national authority and little ability to customise services beyond a core minimum and high operating costs. It is unclear to what extent isolated training interventions have built sustainable capacity.[69]

The HALO Trust sees institutional capacity development largely in terms of liaison and responsiveness to requests from national authorities on emerging issues. In its 18 month report on programme implementation, HALO Mozambique mentions that in the light of IND non-take-up of training offered, the provision of a number of courses as specified in the country logframe, should be removed from the planning and performance monitoring document[70]. This illustrates the ambiguity that the mine action operators are living with as they attempt to meet some of the Programme objectives of the Mine Action Strategy.

Concerning the capacity building effort of UNMAT, it is difficult to establish a clear connection between the work of the different agencies and the support received from CHASE. As stated earlier (see Question 8) only UNDP in Mozambique and Cambodia are in receipt of CHASE funding. Nevertheless, annual reports[71] and DFID reviews[72] indicate progress in meeting the targets and milestones as set out in the UNMAT logframe. Performance measurement however is problematic since there is no clear line of sight from funding to outcome and impact of funds used (see Question 8).

In summary, as is clear from the Review of Progress, substantial evidence was found confirming the effectiveness of CHASE funded mine action, in terms of clearing mines, providing education about mine and UXO danger, and creating opportunities for economic and community development. There is also some evidence of the DFID programme being co-ordinated with the work of other agencies to obtain leverage and thereby enhance effectiveness.

The challenge for CHASE remains one of maximising developmental outcomes and impacts from its mine action funding. To date, these outcomes have not been reflected in contractual milestones, which have focused instead on releasing a certain amount of contaminated land. In contrast, it is harder to gauge the effectiveness and efficiency of funding support to the United Nations with respect to their efforts at institutional capacity development as clear objectives do not tend to be set — or required. Similarly the sustainability of achievements made through other capacity building efforts by HALO and MAG through the GICHD, are also unclear.

We suggest that DFID needs to specify that project documents, tenders, reporting etc. are clearly in line with the strategy and demonstrate that funding meets the basic strategic goals of CHASE.

[64] This is compounded by the minimal and inconsistent UN presence in the study countries which is discussed in more detail elsewhere in the report.
[65] *DFID Support for Mine Action in Vietnam, MAG Annual Report*, 2012
[66] *DFID Support for Mine Action in Cambodia, MAG Annual Report*, 2012
[67] *Ibid*
[68] *DFID Support for Mine Action in Laos, MAG Annual Report*, 2012
[69] The lack of coordination with other contributing organisations – namely the UNMAT - and any accompanying strategic capacity development plans serves to further isolate the value of short, technical interventions...
[70] The HALO Trust – DFID SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION IN MOZAMBIQUE Eighteen Month Report 1st February 2011 – 31st July 2012
[71] UN Mine Action Team Project 2010-2013 Second Interim Report 2012
[72] DFID Annual Review UNMAT Global Demining – December 2012

Question 11: To what extent is the oversight of programmes managed efficiently and effectively?

Programme management is perceived by some CHASE partners as being too light touch or hands-off. There is also a lack of understanding of the CHASE centralised approach. CHASE takes an international perspective in order to address MA in an international context, such as its relationships with UNMAT members and the GICHD. However, this has left some partners in the field with the impression that CHASE is disconnected from MA on the ground.

CHASE engagement with MAG and HALO was mainly at HQ level. Field operators would have appreciated more interaction, but it is not clear whether this would have achieved anything more than has already been achieved.

Joint funding arrangements also proved sub-optimal. While the sub-contracting relationship between MAG and GICHD was a creative response to the requirement on MA operators to help "develop national structures at the institutional level"[73], the close to complementary relationship between an NGO Contractor and GICHD as a not-for-profit international quasi public body had its limitations. GICHD would prefer a direct [funding] link to CHASE. However, while GICHD have a unique role in providing high quality specialist research and training workshops, and have provided valuable facilitation[74], there is a need to ensure that GICHD programmes are geared to the needs of beneficiary countries.

The second joint funding venture funded through CHASE is the VTF. Here too challenges were experienced. Funding to the VTF is distributed roughly equally between UNMAS, UNICEF and UNDP and was intended to generate more coordination and cooperation between the different agencies. However there was no evidence to suggest that the three agencies work more closely together as a result of the CHASE funding. The evidence examined, review of projects and interviews, suggests that the VTF serves as a funding vessel, but does not affect the way the agencies interact. Moreover there are known delays in the disbursement of funds from the VTF (UNMAS) to other agencies. This is a recognised problem that is attributed to the different administrative structures of the agencies. Overall we could identify no advantage of funding different UN agencies through the VTF beyond reducing the administrative burden on the CHASE team.

UN partners complain about the disproportionate amount of time they spend answering CHASE queries, which might not happen if there was better dialogue on the ground[75]. In light of the time UN say they spend dealing with CHASE and by association, the amount of time CHASE must spend dealing with the UN, it seems that there is reason to consider how this relationship can be better managed in subsequent programmes.

An interview with an ex- DFID director confirmed that DFID Country Offices are reluctant to use their scarce resources that have been allocated for their country programmes, in order to manage or engage deeply with a programme that belongs to CHASE (including allocation of resources)[76]. An obvious point for interaction was when periodic reports were submitted, but this does not yet happen. Also, those reporting say that there is insufficient feedback from CHASE.

Most of the respondents interviewed over the course of the evaluation[77], including DFID and CHASE officials, were of the view that the centrally managed programme takes too much time to respond to situations/issues arising in-country. Although the CHASE team is highly regarded by NGOs and international agencies, most respondents were of the view that staff turnover in the central unit worked against the development of an institutional memory and sustainable learning. Mine Action operators reported that there is little direct feedback on their reports.

CHASE has tended to operate bilaterally with the organisations which it funds and has had little contact with national authorities in terms of programming its interventions. As a result, opportunities for working with national bodies (or indeed DFID in-country offices) to promote mine action within an inclusive pro-poor development agenda have been missed.

The CHASE programme is run by a small team of highly motivated officials. Several respondents, from UN agencies and operators alike, suggested that the DFID drive for efficiency had led to severe downsizing to the point where the team was over-stretched.

[73] ITT Vol 2 – Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War
[74] e.g. GICHD facilitating Transition and MA Strategy workshops in South Sudan
[75] Interviews with senior UNMAT officials – Geneva – April - 2013
[76] Interview with Owen Barder – Centre for Global Development
[77] Interviews with mine action NGOs and UN agencies in-country, in the UK and in Geneva

DFID Procurement also has a vital role to play and was closely involved in the formulation of the Mine Action Strategy, especially from the point of view of operationalisation. However, outside the contracting role, the Procurement team has little engagement with programme management and the handling of reports[78].

Any follow-on programme will need to consider these issues in order to ensure more efficient and effective cooperation and partnerships – including better engagement with host governments in terms of setting common objectives.

Question 12: Do the oversight arrangements of the various programmes (including anti-fraud and anti-corruption) represent value for money in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of management?

Both MA Operators have two decades of experience responding to landmine and ERW contamination around the world. MAG and HALO have become adept at deploying and establishing large operational programme teams within short time frames. This often begins immediately post-conflict and continues, in some cases, for years afterwards. In doing so, they have developed streamlined and efficient management systems that make maximum use of resources, blend operational assets[79] and increase operational efficiency through innovation[80]. Both organisations also reduce staff costs by downsizing expatriate management[81] and nationalising key programme functions as soon as possible.[82] Both have also explored and developed competitive asset maintenance/tendering processes (local/regional procurement, in-house maintenance facilities, etc.).

As discussed below a fair portion of CHASE funds to the UNMAT have been used in non-DFID CHASE priority locations and at times for tangential support functions.[83] UNDP and UNICEF's capacity development is focused on supporting national mine action institutions and relevant ministries which, while logical, does present considerable risk. In the case of Mozambique for example support to the IND (which is part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and staffed solely with MFA civil servants) will likely only exist for another 18 months. As mine action in Mozambique enters its final phase, the responsibility for dealing with the residual threat will be transferred to the Ministry of Interior (Police EOD[84]), which may, to a large extent, serve to negate much of the previous two decades of capacity development effort and as such brings into question current assumptions/strategies about national ownership and capacity development.[85]

The risks of working in a post-conflict environment are already significant and mine action can represent an additional risk due to the amount of cash transactions involved (e.g. payments to deminers). The choice of partners is the first and best line of defence to the risks of fraud and corruption and the framework partners CHASE has chosen are reliable and highly scrupulous operators. It should further be stressed that the evaluation team found no evidence that any abuse has taken place.

Beyond possible financial probity, DFID contracts do present a risk in that they refer only to square meter targets that need to be released. Achievement of targets is not externally verified and is therefore open to possible abuse.[86] Again, the team has found no evidence this has happened, however, as the contracts are currently structured, it is conceivable that a less scrupulous implementer could simply "cancel" an area, in order to meet these milestones and draw down the fixed price payments.

[78] Interview with DFID Procurement – East Kilbride - 27th March 2013
[79] From site observations in Mozambique, S. Sudan, Sri Lanka and Cambodia as well as programme reports, the use of mechanical assets, manual teams, survey and new technologies (HSTAMIDS for example) is evidenced in all four country programmes.
[80] E.g. through time and motion analysis, scent detection technologies, use of mechanical assets, dual sensor detector technologies, etc.
[81] As an example of this effort taken to the furthest degree, HALO Afghanistan manages a staff of 3,800 with only three in-country expatriate staff - *DFID Support To The HALO Trust For Mine/UXO Clearance In Western Region Of Afghanistan, 12 Month Final Report,* 1st March 2011 – 29th February 2012. More typically, MAG in Cambodia manage 324 staff (not all DFID funded) with only four expatriates-*Cambodia Programme Brief* supplied to the Evaluation Team, Phnom Penh, April 2nd, 2013.
[82] Attempts are also made to benefit from the training invested and experience gained when developing national capacity in one location by "cross-pollinating" programmes, i.e., by having national management staff from one country serve as the expatriate supervisors in another.
[83] E.g. Afghanistan, Colombia, Ethiopia and Nepal and "Policy and Advocacy Support", "Coordination, Knowledge and Advocacy"
[84] Meeting with Hans Riser and other UNDP colleagues, UNDP offices, Maputo, Mozambique, 1st April 2013
[85] Unfortunately a similar situation may await the SLNMAC in Sri Lanka and as UNDP funding for the RMAOs is being reduced trained and competent staff are facing dismissal - Interview with Bartholomew Digby, HALO Programme Manager, Jaffna, April 10, 2013
[86] From operator discussions in South Sudan

Question 13: What is the value for money embedded in the delivery mechanisms for the various delivery partners? (Private sector, NGOs, UN)

The challenge with the value for money concept here is that it is very much tied, we feel, to the degree to which the funds are able to achieve impact at either the community level, in terms of development, or at the national level, in terms of national ownership. However, these are two areas in which we have encountered some difficulty in tracking.

The evidence from the different countries suggest that there are very limited linkages between development and demining actors and this, in turn, reduces the developmental impact of demining. Demining is not tied to a development process, but rather appears to take place independently or as a pre-curser to development, but without a clear plan for what should follow. From this perspective it is arguable that a clear component of the delivery mechanism, the lack of a clear connection to development, is necessary to ensure that value for money requirements are met. Similarly, there was no evidence to suggest that the capacity building mechanism employed had been conceptualised as the most effective and efficient approach to achieve a specific goal. Rather capacity building support appeared largely dependent on what the provider had to offer rather than being demand driven. This approach poses a challenge in terms of value for money as it may very well mean that the best value (i.e. what is most needed) is not being provided.

Both MAG and HALO Trust do appear to provide clear reporting on expenditure, however reporting on the amount of money that was spent on a particular task does not necessarily mean that this is the best value for money.

For the UN Mine Action Team, the CHASE programme was approved before the current Business Case format was in operation. UNMAT is not therefore required to report on VFM within the MoU with DFID. The field visits did however offer an opportunity to gauge in general terms some VFM issues.

The funding mechanism between CHASE and the UN mine action agencies is the VTF. The three UNMAT agencies report varying degrees of constraint and frustration as a result of being joined into the 'One UN' concept by their funding and reporting arrangements with CHASE. While the VTF may have seemed the obvious vehicle at the outset, the lack of a uniform administrative system across the UN 'doomed it from the start[87]'. Payment flows to the three agencies are frequently delayed as a result of different financial reporting procedures for UNMAS/UNDP and UNICEF. The DFID funding mechanism is said to have become a 'source of aggravating tensions' among UN partners.

From a CHASE point of view, it is difficult to track value for money from the funds that are disbursed through the VTF because the current reporting systems do not allow for a clear tracking of how the funds were spent.

UNDP's main role is to work with national authorities providing technical support for capacity-building in efficient mine action work. The Evaluation Team consulted UNDP during field visits and reached broad conclusions that can be fed into the design of any future Programme that would involve UNDP in MA. Key impressions included:

- UNDP tend to hire project staff for specific tasks such as the database management in Mozambique rather than help National Authorities to recruit staff for these tasks, either from within the public service or on public service salaries. This causes problems in transferring knowledge and skills from UNDP to National Authorities;
- UNDP project salaries and conditions are typically more attractive than those in the public sector.

UNICEF tends to have strong relationships with government authorities, NGOs and communities. UNICEF supports national strategies and provides technical advice in sectors that include mainstreaming mine risk education into broader education curricula and child protection. UNICEF can also help in the transition from MA to development. Key impressions include:

- UNICEF tends to work with local CBOs to build national capacity;
- UNICEF tends to be engaged in building national capacity in national mine action authorities;
- UNICEF does not always mainstream mine action across its programmes;

[87] Interviews with various officials from the UNMAT – Geneva – 10-12 April 2013

- UNMAS focussed its activities on coordination, which improves cost effectiveness and VFM. However there were VFM issues to consider relating to staff recruitment (international vs. local) and not always being located in the optimum way e.g. South Sudan UNMAT would not leave the UN compound.

For CHASE there is the international perspective of improving the MA system and the roles that the UNMAT members play so that they are helping to build local capacity and transition to complete local management within a reasonable time.

Likewise, GICHD receive central funding from a few donors, the Swiss being the largest, and they also receive funds to transfer their knowledge to real situations where institutional capacity is weak. The Evaluation has found that while GICHD was able to deliver institutional capacity building in the context of the CHASE MA Programme, its exclusive contractual relationship with MAG created contradictions. Both organisations worked "at arms length" as MAG attempted to respect the special relationship GICHD had with national institutions. The arrangement may also have inhibited access to GICHD services for other potential users. GICHD would prefer direct assistance from DFID. However, their operational model is geared essentially research, generating knowledge and awareness, facilitating the exchange of good practice, at a more global level, rather than responding to the specific needs of beneficiary countries. It can nevertheless provide very targeted and punctual inputs to programmes run by UNMAT and other institutions charged with building national capacity in various aspects of mine action.

Budget Items by Operator	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £	% Spend
HALO			
Not spec.- bridging fund	1,500,000	1,500,000	*100%*
Sri Lanka	3,000,000	1,950,578	*65%*
Mozambique	2,500,000	1,938,481	*78%*
Total HALO	**7,000,000**	**5,389,059**	***77%***
MAG			
Not spec.- bridging fund	1,500,000	1,500,000	*100%*
Vietnam	2,500,000	2,016,382	*81%*
Cambodia	3,838,764	3,248,856	*85%*
Laos	2,500,000	2,119,755	*85%*
Iraq	2,600,000	506,454	*19%*
Sudan	2,500,000	2,080,241	*83%*
DR Congo	2,500,000	2,041,142	*82%*
Total MAG	**17,938,764**	**13,512,830**	***75%***
TOTAL HALO & MAG	**24,938,764**	**18,901,889**	***76%***
UNMAS			
Afghanistan OPS	523,680	523,680	*100%*
Rapid response	523,680	523,680	*100%*
Policy & advocacy support	523,678	523,678	*100%*
Support to MASG	106,666	106,666	*100%*
Total UNMAS	**1,677,705**	**1,677,705**	***100%***
UNDP			
Cambodia UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Colombia UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Ethiopia UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Iraq UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Laos UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Mozambique UNDP	276,858	276,858	*100%*
Total UNDP	**1,661,148**	**1,661,148**	***100%***
UNICEF	1,661,147	1,661,147	*100%*
DR Congo UNICEF	141,300	141,300	*100%*
Iraq UNICEF	207,240	207,240	*100%*
Nepal UNICEF	169,560	169,560	*100%*
Sudan UNICEF	263,760	263,760	*100%*
Institutional development Mine Action	260,545	260,545	*100%*

Budget Items by Operator	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £	% Spend
QA in mine action response	313,085	313,085	*100%*
Coordination, knowledge, advocacy	305,657	305,657	*100%*
Total UNICEF	**1,661,147**	**1,661,147**	***100%***
TOTAL UN	**5,000,000**	**5,000,000**	***100%***
IOD PARC			
Meta Evaluation	**60,000**	**60,000**	***100%***
CHASE TOTAL	**29,998,764**	**23,961,889**	**80%**

Country	Operator	Area cleared, or released thru' other means (m^2)	% of target in period	Mines Removed[1]	UXO Removed[2]	Mines and UXO combined	MRE/RRE beneficiaries	% of target in period	Reporting Period	Source documents
Vietnam	MAG	224,820	333	4	9,767	9,771	N/A	N/A	First 18 months of project, February 2011 - July 2012	MAG Annual Report, August 2012
Cambodia	MAG	1,908,643	117	3,598	2,359	5,957	5,808	20	First 18 months of project, February 2011 - July 2012	MAG Annual Report, August 2012
Laos	MAG	5,697,734	133	-	14,995	14,995	6,696	100	First 18 months of project, February 2011 - July 2012	MAG Annual Report, August 2012
Sri Lanka	HALO	1,090,320	94.8	14,643	1,816	16,459	7,992	82	First 18 months of project, June 2011- November 2012	HALO Interim Eighteen Month Report
Iraq[3]	MAG	88,344,834			1,054	1,054	N/A	N/A	October 2011-March 2012	DDG Final Report
Sudan/South. Sudan[4]	MAG	985,876	66			15,357	63,405	130	First 12 months of project, June 2011-July 2012	MAG Annual Report, August 2012
DR Congo	MAG	46,994	18	21	846	867	91,587	291	First 18 months of project, February 2011 - July 2012	MAG Annual Report, August 2012
Mozambique	HALO	704,000	85	4,600	488	5,088	1,954	86	First 18 months of project, February 2011 - July 2012	HALO Eighteen Month Report
TOTAL	**Both**	**99,003,221**	N/A	**22,866**	**31,325**	**69,548**	**177,442**			

Impacts / Benefits	Cambodia	Sri Lanka	South Sudan	Mozambique
People & Health				
Reduce mine casualties	✓	✓	✓	✓
IDPs Re-settled		✓	✓	
Stability for family planning	✓	✓		
Gender issue benefits	✓	✓		
Marginalised opportunity	✓	✓	✓	✓
Assets Released				
House sites		✓	✓	✓
Business sites				✓
Agricultural land	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fishing coasts		✓		
Infrastructure - rail	✓	✓		✓
Infrastructure - road	✓	✓	✓	✓
Infrastructure - power				✓
Infrastructure - community	✓	✓	✓	
Economic Opportunity				
Start new economic activity	✓	✓	✓	✓
Attract government investment		✓		✓
Attract NGO investment	✓	✓	✓	
Attract private investment				✓
Increased incomes	✓	✓	✓	✓
Create new employment	✓	✓	✓	✓

ANNEX H:

Response to Meta-evaluation Findings

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1 Response to the Meta-evaluation Findings

The Meta evaluation produced what it calls six "key findings". These are reproduced below together with our response based on the evaluation evidence presented in this report.

2 Review of the six main findings of the Meta-Evaluation

Meta-evaluation key finding 1:

There is a very diverse field of stakeholders operating in complex situations. This includes donors/UN agencies / NGO's / private sector / national and local governments as well as communities.

The meta-evaluation study (unsurprisingly) has confirmed that in the CHASE funded countries reviewed, there is a crowded playing field of stakeholders operating in the complex mine action arena. This is to some extent evidence of the success with which the MA programme has engaged these stakeholders; on the other hand coordination of diverse, and sometimes competing, interests adds to the difficulty of creating meaningful linkages between mine action and development. Some, albeit limited, cooperation has been evident between mine action implementers and NGOs, thus enabling mine action to be linked to broader development initiatives e.g. the construction of housing and shelters for land returnees. One conclusion of the current evaluation study is the need for continuing clarification, definition and consensus about the roles and relationships of different stakeholders in the mine action - development continuum within the context of the CHASE programme.

Meta-evaluation key finding 2:

The linkages between Mine Action and Development are not well articulated or understood and agreed. There is no overarching Theory of Change (TOC) in this arena which could be used to develop effective TOC narratives for individual countries. This then restricts the ability to coordinate activities between National Mine Action Authorities (NMAA), National Economic Development Plans (NEDP) and donors.

There is a slow but growing understanding among beneficiary country governments and stakeholders of the need and value of linking mine action to broader development goals. While there is not yet an over-arching TOC there is now sufficient evidence to support its rapid development as part of a process to design Phase II of the Mine Action Programme (MAP). The draft TOC resulting from the Meta-evaluation workshop and the DFID logic model for the CHASE Programme are both valuable building blocks. A related issue concerns the level and quality of engagement between DFID and national Government and Mining Authorities. Evidence from the current evaluation suggests that national stakeholders have limited opportunities for substantial dialogue with the DFID CHASE team or the national DFID offices (where present in country) about the mine action programme. A similar sentiment was expressed by the demining implementers. The development of a theory of change for Phase II of the MAP offers a chance to correct these perceptions as well as to tackle the need to build systematic engagement and dialogue into the implementation process.

Meta-evaluation key finding 3:

There are multiple funding streams from different donors.

The important point is not that there are multiple funding streams but that they are directed and used in complementary ways within an over-arching framework for mine action. It is evident from the current evaluation that DFID is fully aware of these multiple funding streams and donors and has sought to develop cooperative approaches to mine action which makes best use of donor resources. CHASE has been careful to develop good relationships and working arrangements with the UN Agencies and these appear to be effective and provide an efficient division of responsibilities and labour between them. Effective donor coordination is an essential requirement and a review and possible redefinition of the role of the Mines Advisory Group should be part of the design process for CHASE phase II.

Meta-evaluation key finding 4:

There are different understandings of 'named' evaluation criteria including Value for Money (VFM). Valuation of efficiency, effectiveness and effect is complex with high level of non-monetised values, including treaty obligations. No agreed methodology was present in the evaluations reviewed, and there are different interpretations of evaluation criteria within the Mine Action sector and the development sector.

This finding is fully corroborated by the current evaluation study findings. Definition of VFM appears to be particularly problematic for the implementing agencies who continue to rely on simple indicators such as cost per hectare of cleared land, average cost of land mine removal etc. While developing the TOC for mine action, complementary definitions and specification of evaluation criteria will be necessary. The findings and conclusions in the current evaluation report suggest that it is possible to measure and demonstrate VFM more systematically and in particular to evidence development benefits from the CHASE programme. These approaches need to be shared with relevant stakeholders and their capacity to utilise them needs to be developed.

Meta-evaluation key finding 5:

Prioritisation at national and local levels is critical. However criteria need to be transparent and linked to wider work on land use planning as well as governance/anti-corruption

The need for greater clarity in the specification and prioritisation of criteria for the MAP consistently emerges as an issue across a number of areas: community development, development linkages, global donor coordination, as well as M&E and VFM. This current evaluation report draws conclusion and makes specific recommendations about these issues and the development of the TOC. The programme design process for Phase II of CHASE Mine Action will provide the opportunity to address these issues.

Meta-evaluation key finding 6:

Capacity development, including both technical and managerial aspects within the NMAA and NEDP is absolutely critical in relation to country ownership. This needs to include consideration of effectiveness around site prioritisation bearing in mind Finding 5. In post-conflict situations perceptions are as important as ground reality. Supporting engaged, non-discriminatory, stakeholder focused prioritisation will be important – especially if funding is limited.

This finding is fully corroborated by the current evaluation study. Effectiveness of site/country prioritisation, the maximisation of benefits to poor people, the detailed specification of criteria for M&E, the need for greater accountability in reporting, and targeted capacity building are all identified as areas for improved country ownership. This report also concludes that DFID needs to review its own role vis-a-vis the development of country ownership of mine action and development. More proactivity and engagement from the DFID CHASE team with national stakeholders, closer integration between CHASE and DFID country teams, and closer alignment of mine action with other areas of DFID activity, such as support for governance, also need to be looked at. We expand on these issues in the conclusions of this report.

3 Linking the DFID Mine Action Strategy priorities and indicators to the Meta-Evaluation and this evaluation study

Here we look at the three stated objectives of the MA strategy and the related priorities and measurement indicators and compare these with the "key" findings from the Meta-evaluation and the conclusions of this evaluation, in part to assess the extent to which the MA objectives have been fulfilled to date.

Objective 1 - To release mine affected land to make a measurable contribution to the socio-economic development of mine affected communities.			
Priorities	**Measurement indicators**	**Meta-evaluation**	**Evidence and conclusions from evaluation**
All implementing partners will be expected to target real need, as demonstrated by three kinds of impacts: **on land and assets** - where clearance of contaminated land alleviates significant constraints to livelihoods and development, as indicated by the development of strategic resources and communal assets	**Putting land back into productive use.** This will be measured through a basket of indicators which may include a mix of: Cleared land being used for habitation, agriculture or foraging for fuel supplies. Provision of access to critical resources to satisfy basic needs such as water supplies. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) able to regain safe and secure access to their land. Partnerships with providers of social/economic infrastructure, such as schools, medical centres, roads, areas of production, power supply and distribution systems etc. Land cleared to facilitate the work of other humanitarian and development organisations. Impact on human security, implying both freedom from fear of contaminated land and freedom from want of access to cleared land.	Prioritisation at national and local levels is critical. However criteria need to be transparent and linked to wider work on land use planning as well as governance/anti-corruption	Demining activities funded by CHASE served to enable community development. On the one hand landmines were a clear inhibitor to development, but on the other hand in most cases the intervention of other actors or activities is/was necessary in order to secure socio-economic development. Where implementers have excelled at implementing the strategy has been in aspects that are more traditionally understood as mine action activities: reduction of accidents and release of land. In short, the objective of delivering development benefits to mine-affected communities has been partially achieved. However, this was not the result of a systematic effort by implementers but rather as a consequence of their "traditional" demining activities e.g. the return of land to economic utility.
On people - where release of contaminated land has the maximum direct humanitarian impact, as indicated by victim numbers and livelihoods;	**Reduction in mine-related casualties.** This will be measured as an absolute number and will be judged on the reduction of casualties over time. **Reduction of poverty and vulnerability.** This will be measured through: Standard human development indicators at regional and sub-regional / local level. Qualitative assessments undertaken through project evaluations. **Promotion of confidence.** Although this is rarely a justification in itself for funding mine action, where appropriate, it will be considered as a supplementary measure of success in cases when mine action can uniquely foster confidence in fragile		Statistical data evidences this trend Not currently measured See Field Mission Reports in Annexes C-F to this evaluation Tentative yes although evidence

	communities and demonstrate international support for at least one of their concerns. **Effectiveness**. This will be primarily measured by examining impacts and outcomes in mine affected communities and the wider economy. Consideration will be given to greater effectiveness through better donor coordination and joined up prioritisation. **Gender.** DFID is committed to the inclusion of gender considerations in the planning and implementation of mine action projects that it funds.		to substantiate is weak Some evidence of improved effectiveness resulting from CHASE but serious issues of donor and national coordination remain In terms of effectiveness and gender sensitivity, both of which are issues mentioned in the Strategy, these have been interpreted in a very narrow manner and hence their active implementation has been limited. Largely de-linked and needs to be systematically planned into future design of CHASE
On the economy - where clearance of specific sites will bring the greatest benefit to the local economy, as indicated by market development and investment in infrastructure.	The strategy has no specific measurement indicators for this priority		Anecdotal evidence suggests this is the case – increased agricultural production, improved supply chains etc. but need for far clearer objectives and indicators of measurement
Objective 2 - To help governments take full responsibility for their National Mine Action Programmes			
Priorities	**Measurement Indicators**	**Meta-evaluation**	**Evidence from evaluation**
DFID wishes to help build, where appropriate: the capacity of efficient and appropriate national and local mine action structures; the development of effective and transparent strategies for the implementation of mine action and its integration into development plans; the creation of an appropriately-scaled supervisory body with an effective technical capacity; DFID will work in partnership with the recipient countries and help them meet their national priorities, where possible set out in the national Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) or Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP).	The development of national capacity will be measured against four expectations. The host government agreeing to and implementing measures to facilitate mine action activities in the country. This will include matters such as appropriate customs exemptions, prompt release of necessary equipment and the creation of the supervisory body mentioned below. The host government developing effective and transparent strategies to implement mine action and its integration into development plans, such as the PRSP. The creation of technical capabilities able to plan and manage mine action activities in their areas of responsibility. Initially such organisations might need to be trained, equipped and managed by implementing partners but it is intended that the supervisory	The linkages between Mine Action and Development are not well articulated or understood and agreed. There is no overarching Theory of Change in this arena which could be used to develop effective TOC narratives for individual countries. This then restricts the ability to coordinate activities between National Mine Action Authorities (NMAA), National Economic Development Plans (NEDP) and donors. There are different understandings of 'named' evaluation criteria including Value for Money. Valuation of efficiency, effectiveness and effect is complex with high level of non-monetised values, including treaty obligations. No agreed methodology was present in the evaluations reviewed, and there are different	The Mine Action Strategy brought with it a changed understanding of the role and context of mine action for national authorities, international agencies and implementing bodies. In the circumstances, it must be acknowledged that in terms of managing that transformation, given its very limited resources, the CHASE Unit has been less effective in operationalising the second objective of the mine action strategy than it might have desired. In designing country programmes, DFID CHASE had no interaction with national authorities in the target countries to position the intervention within that country context and negotiate conditions that would be coherent with the mine action strategy, undermining to an extent country ownership and sustainability.

	management transfers to a national body as soon as practicable. The creation of a supervisory body which, on behalf of the national authority, can undertake the required co-ordination with other sectors and perform strategic planning, prioritisation, and supervisory management of all mine action actors in the country.	interpretations of evaluation criteria within the Mine Action sector and the development sector Capacity development, including both technical and managerial aspects within the NMAA and NEDP is absolutely critical in relation to country ownership. This needs to include consideration of effectiveness around site prioritisation bearing in mind Finding 5. In post-conflict situations perceptions are as important as ground reality. Supporting engaged, non-discriminatory, stakeholder focused prioritisation will be important – especially if funding is limited.	Nevertheless, there is strength to the argument that a central locus for policy and resourcing is essential to longer term effectiveness and sustainability. Decentralising the management and oversight of mine action institutional capacity building interventions to DFID Country offices or other HMG bodies in-country can only lead to fragmentation of the policy coherence that CHASE has been attempting to build through the Mine Action Strategy. It is important to bear in mind that the mine action strategy has been operational for a short period of time. Much has been learned in terms of policy, programming and procurement. It makes sense that that learning is consolidated within a central policy unit. By the same token, it is clear that a tightly staffed and specialised unit like CHASE would benefit from developing closer relationships with DFID country offices in the target countries to ensure adequate oversight and engagement with the institutional capacity building process. It may be that to do this, DFID needs to consider reducing the number of countries targeted and concentrating funding on fewer states for more observable effect. Direct attribution of ownership and the development of capacity to CHASE programming is convoluted and the evidence is mixed. This is because of the presence of other co-financers of Mine Action, complementary resource routing through various UN actors (e.g. UNDP), variable national resource allocations and variable scales of difficulty and challenge. It is also the case that implementing partners' interpretation of institutional capacity building varied from skills and technical upgrading to a more institutional capacity support approach (e.g. UNDP in Cambodia). The evaluation team concluded that CHASE has played a contributing role in the

			development of ownership and capacity development .Even though the efforts have been varied from case to case. Hence, the degree and extent of influence and the extent to which it is sustainable was highly variable.
Objective 3 – To improve value for money in mine action			
Priorities	**Measurement Indicators**	**Meta-evaluation**	**Evidence from evaluation**
DFID will take a multi-layered approach to improving donor co-ordination through: engagement with multilateral agencies, such as the United Nations agencies dealing with mine action; Participation and support for donor groups such as the Mine Action Support Group (MASG). DFID will continue to explore ways to make these groups more effective through its work with the UN Mine Action Team; Bilateral arrangements with other donors, including actively encouraging and participating in joint donor evaluations.	At the commencement of each country programme a baseline assessment will be made of the development situation. Subsequent progress will be measured against that baseline. In some situations a net present value calculation may be made. This will usually be undertaken by measuring the change in development benefit (i.e., the present outcome value less the baseline value) against the cost of achieving that change. DFID will expect all its partners to use current best practice and strive to improve it. The best indicator is continual improvement to the international response to mine action. Mine action is best supported in conjunction and coordination with other stakeholders and can be judged at a variety of levels. Improving the efficiency of mine action to create better net present values. Support for, and improvements in the performance of the UN in meeting its stated responsibilities towards mine action. Engaging in and supporting co-ordination on the assessments of strategic issues, the needs of mine-affected countries and resource mobilisation. Mine action implementers wishing to work with DFID funding will be expected to be fully transparent about all their funding sources and to support donor coordination to the optimum host country interest. Pragmatic compliance of the MBT by States Parties and of the Deed of Commitment by armed Non-State Actors.	There is a very diverse field of stakeholders operating in complex situations. This includes donors/UN agencies/NGO's/private sector / national and local governments as well as communities. There are multiple funding streams from different donors.	Overall, the evaluation considers that the DFID CHASE programme has delivered good value for money in terms of areas cleared of mines, and returned to use, leading on to socio-economic development benefits for the local population. Substantial evidence was found confirming the presence of VFM effectiveness in DFID-funded mine action. This was ascertained in terms of clearing mines, providing education about mine dangers, and creating opportunity for economic and community development. Development benefits include enabling the re-settlement and re-employment of refugees, the commencement of new economic activities, the leverage of other aid programmes and funds, and essential preparation for national infrastructure projects. The risks of working in a post-conflict environment are already significant; these include security and of course financial probity. Mine action represents a particular, additional risk in such situations because of the amount of cash transactions involved (e.g. payments to de-miners). Choice of reliable partners for DFID CHASE (as seems generally to be the case) is therefore the first and best line of defence to the risks of fraud and corruption. No management or oversight mechanism can possibly be watertight, accordingly the relatively light oversight arrangements can thus be considered to represent value for money. Overall, the evaluation team has found that value for money is reasonably embedded in the delivery mechanisms for the various delivery partners. UN

			costs are almost always going to be higher than those for NGOs and even commercial companies (when constrained by the 'cost plus' formulation commonly used). While the mine action sector has still to find the ideal delivery mechanism for its work, there is no evidence that DFID is behind the curve of existing practice in its strategic approach.

ANNEX I:

Notes on the GICHD 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors

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1 Notes on the GICHD 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013

1.1 Introduction

A member of the evaluation team travelled to Geneva to take part in the 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors, which took place between 10th and 12th April 2013. The event made it possible to meet with, interview and discuss informally many aspects of mine action with stakeholders from national authorities, the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT), including country team members, non government organisations and research institutions. A full list of the interviewees is attached.

1.2 Key Issues

1.2.1 UNMAT and the VTF

The three UNMAT agencies report varying degrees of constraint and frustration as a result of being joined into the 'one UN' concept by their funding and reporting arrangements with CHASE. While the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) may have seemed the obvious vehicle at the outset, the lack of a uniform administrative system across the UN 'doomed it from the start'[1]. Payment flows to the three agencies are frequently delayed as a result of different financial reporting procedures for United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)/United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The DFID funding mechanism has become a 'source of aggravating tensions' among UN partners[2]. There are perception of 'lack of funding', 'over reporting' and having to "handle donor complaints". One informant estimated that CHASE represents approximately 2% of UNMAS funding, but it generates 40% of the administrative overhead as a result of a complex system of transactions. On the other hand, transaction costs of VTF are high - VTF charges a 3% management fee, United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 8% and UNDP 7%. Nevertheless, all interviewees rated DFID-CHASE funding highly, citing its flexibility and the three-year funding cycle.[3]

VTF sits within the Secretariat Controller at the Office of the Secretary General. Senior managers point to the volume of transactions associated with CHASE payments to UNMAT. A single payment from CHASE, it is estimated, generates up to 10 transactions per payment to UNDP and UNICEF country offices. There was a widely held view among senior UN officials that the so-called "one UN" concept as applied to mine action had more to do with easing transaction costs for DFID. For several managers, the difficulties around the running of the VTF, have created institutional tensions for UN agencies. One manager saw the concept as positive in that it encouraged coordination, but stated that it is aspirational and not thought-through[4].

Most of the VTF-related problems seem to arise because of the different financial reporting procedures for UNMAS/UNDP and UNICEF. Financial reporting posed a challenge to coordination. UNICEF can only spend money if in line with agreed purposes – delays in expenditures accumulate and grow from funding round to funding round. Since requests to DFID require all three agencies to draw down together, UNICEF delays crossed over to other agencies. While the former two can "front-load" using other funds and "reverse charges" when DFID funds arrive late, financial reporting rules for UNICEF do not allow for this.

The Inter-Agency Coordination Group comprises UNMAS/Policy, UNMAS/Operations, UNDP, UNICEF. All fourteen UN agencies are involved in coordinating mine action. However, the three organisations mentioned above are most directly engaged. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group can approve distribution of CHASE MA Programme resources allocated through the VTF[5].

[1] Separate and group interviews with senior UNMAS managers – Geneva – April 2013
[2] Ibid
[3] Interviews with UNMAT agency managers – Geneva – April 2013
[4] Interview with UNICEF Senior Advisor
[5] Interview with UNMAS Policy Coordination Officer

1.2.2 DFID engagement

There was some criticism of DFID practice in dealing only bilaterally with MA operators. Several informants cited a lack of oversight of CHASE interventions by the DFID country office, and in some cases complete disinterest, which contrasts with the role of the US Embassy when following US financed programmes[6]. Lack of consultation with national authorities on the part of DFID hinders effective programming, and misses an opportunity to develop local capacity and ownership[7]. There is a need for a multi-year programme with built in annual reviews – and mechanisms for adapting multi-year programmes to meet changing requirements. (In contrast, AusAid have a two-year $A3m agreement based on programme agreed between Mozambique Government, AusAid and UNDP. This covers capacity building, demining in the field, and managing residuals)[8].

1.2.3 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is involved in the CHASE Programme as a sub-contractor/partner to MAG, providing services related to the delivery of MAG commitment to Objective 2 of the Mine Action Strategy. By and large, the relationship seems to work 'at arm's length'. Under the arrangement, GICHD offers a range of core services related to best practice in mine action. Once agreed with the national authority, a programme of workshops and seminars is drawn up and implemented by visiting teams. The MAG country team is not involved in the interaction between the Centre and the host national authority. GICHD reports on activities to MAG as part of the DFID reporting requirement. There is understandable sensitivity around the somewhat asymmetrical fit between the NGO contactor and the not-for-profit 'quasi' international body profile of GICHD. The exclusive relationship with MAG may be undermining the Centre's independence in the view of other operators. The Centre would be keen to have a more direct link to DFID funding although it is not currently geared towards country specific demand driven services or competitive tendering.[9] The Geneva Centre received approximately 5% of the MAG contract which is allocated at £125,000 per country, although they only received £75,000 in Cambodia, due to a need to divert more resource to mine clearance[10].

In preparing tenders, MAG requested specific GICHD tasks for each tender – consultation with beneficiary countries was light and offers of support were "indicative"[11]. The tendering process required consultation with UN agencies in all countries. The GICHD reports through MAG to DFID. However, GICHD are of the view that their contribution is not fully reflected in the MAG logframe, given that "there can be only one 'purpose' in a DFID logframe"[12]. Commenting on the CHASE Programme, GICHD were of the view that the Programme would benefit from having a mechanism that allowed for exchange and sharing of best practice across the beneficiary countries. GICHD had proposed to share new technical approaches to mine detection from Lao PDR to other CHASE countries in the region, but the activity was not allowed under the terms of the Programme[13].

In South Sudan, GICHD, as part of the CHASE Programme, are involved in MA strategy workshops assisting mine action authorities to be more integrated into the national programme. They have been involved in annual reviews of national transition plans, facilitating the process for UNMAS.

As an international expert organisation for mine action, the Geneva Centre is involved in research, building knowledge, developing standards and dissemination of learning and best practice across the mine action sector. They are involved in defining standards for land release – terminology issues, work on legal and contractual efficiency – better contracts management and the development of IMSMA and improved database efficiency. A small but potentially expanding part of their work in recent times has been in developing protocols and practices for working with military-based institutions involved in mine action and improving efficiency and standards.

GICHD offers a menu of well researched and developed topics/themes critical to the MA sector. Beneficiary countries are invited to select what seems most relevant. These include land release, transition, strategy, quality management and monitoring and evaluation. As currently offered, GICHD seems to propose a standard menu of themes (e.g. new methods in detection, contract management etc) – not always specific to the needs of an individual country. GICHD needs to offer unique, distinctive, relevant and necessary services to DFID that would cause DFID

[6] Interview with a UNDP Programme Manager
[7] Informal discussion with Head of a national MACA – Geneva – April 2013
[8] Interview with UNDP Mozambique – Geneva 12 April 2013
[9] Interviews with GICHD Management – Geneva- 10-12 April - 2013
[10] Interview with senior GICHD managers - Geneva- 10-12 April - 2013
[11] Ibid
[12] Clarification from GICHD – June 2013
[13] Interview with senior GICHD managers - Geneva- 10-12 April - 2013

to seek to fund directly. This would be based around specific programmes addressing specific needs, based on where the country finds itself along the spectrum of mine affectedness. GICHD has had little contact with DFID teams and has received little feedback on reports[14].

1.2.4 Gender and Mine Action

Gender and Mine Action is a Swiss NGO linked to the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines and is partly funded by the Swiss government with offices within the GICHD. Anticipating a gender dimension to the DFID CHASE call for proposals of 2010, the group was initially linked to MAG as consortium partner. However, they were not finally part of the MAG proposal when the gender criterion was omitted from the Evaluation Checklist. They are currently working with MAG under the Dutch Government Mine Action programme in which action on gender is a cross-cutting requirement.[15.]

The Swiss Government provides 35% of its core funding based on an agreed workplan and budget. It currently has funding in place for the next two years. Some funding comes from AusAid through GICHD. Since it moved to GICHD there have been some changes in the type of work which are now centred on research and knowledge generation, advocacy, training and TA. They are working with MAG in Lebanon, Libya, South Sudan and DRC and have worked with UNMAS on preparation of UN Gender Guidelines.

1.2.5 MA in post 2015/MDG context

Plenary Discussion

The session focused on mine action and the bigger picture, particularly in the context of the post MDG debate and asked where mine action is positioned in this context. The work plan of the UN Post 2015 Development Group (Co-chair: Liberia, Indonesia and UK) will include a major global consultation exercise involving 83 states to be consulted on future development goals to follow on from MDGs. The 11 thematic consultation sectors include Conflict and Fragility.

Thirty nine of the “consultation states” are mine affected, emphasising the importance of getting the MA message into the wider policy framework. There is an opportunity to have conflict (and after-effects) and fragility included as a major cause for poverty in post MDG policy agenda. MA will not be articulated as a goal in itself – and the sector should seek to ensure that the wider issues of security, conflict and fragility and their links with endemic poverty be addressed. It was recalled that the theme “conflict, fragility and armed action” appeared in the Millennium Declaration. However, this was not carried through to the MDGs – education, health and other priorities were more clearly articulated.

[14] Interview with senior GICHD managers - Geneva- 10-12 April - 2013
[15] Interview with Arianna Calzi Bini of Gender and Mine Action – Geneva - 12 April 2013

2 Interview Programme for GICHD – 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013

Date	Time	Country	Interviewees
Wed 10th April	11.30	GICHD	Guy Rhodes Head of Operations Section and Ted Paterson
		DFID	Richard Boden Policy Analyst
	14.00		
	15.00	UNDP and UNICEF	Judy Grayson UNICEF and Tim Horner UNDP
	16.00		
	17.00	UNMAS	Paul Heslop Chief – Programme Planning and Management Section
Thurs 11th April			
	07.00	Vietnam	Thao Griffiths (Vietnam Veterans) and Alberto Agusta (Mozambique NMAA)
	09.00		
	10.00		
	11.00	UNICEF (Sudan/Somalia)	Vedesto Nsanzugwanko
	12.00	UNICEF Sri Lanka	Milhar Muhammed
		UNMAS Afghanistan	Abigail Hartley Programme Manager and Kurt Chesko (Programme Officer New York)
		MAG/DFID	Lunch discussion
	14.00		
	15.00	UNICEF	Judy Grayson UNICEF
	16.00	MASG	Donor Coordination meeting
	17.00	UNMAS	Maria Vardis – Policy Coordination Officer
Fri 12th April	09.00	Sri Lanka	Mahinda Wickramasingha – Asst Dir Mine Action Centre - Accreditation
		Gender and Mine Action	Arianna Calza Bini – Gender and Mine Action Programme
	10.00	UNMAS Libya	Diek Engelbrecht and Julia Goehsing
	11.00	Donor presentations	DFID presentation (RB)
	12.00	GICHD	Guy Rhodes, Ted Paterson Head, Strategic Management and Asa Massleberg

Date	Time	Country	Interviewees
		UNDP	Tim Horner
		DFID	Richard Boden
		UNDP Mozambique	Hans Risser
		UNMAS South Sudan	Lance Milan
	14.00	Plenary Session	Wider context – Post 2015 and MDGs

ANNEX J:

Analytical Methods for Mine Action Programming

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1 Introduction

A mine is a mine is a mine…. Although many countries have subscribed to the 1997 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction" or the Ottawa Convention, committing themselves to the full eradication of the world's remaining minefields and mine stockpiles, the task ahead is still daunting. For conflict-affected countries, most of them developing countries, mine action (MA) programmes compete with many other critical development priorities for scarce public and donor funding.

This paper attempts to examine whether there are analytical tools which can be developed in order to bring some rigour and method in assigning priorities among mine clearance and other mine action activities, well aware that the neglect of one area in favour of another may have tangibly tragic consequences for the people directly involved.

In the context of the CHASE Mine Action Programme evaluation, of which this document is an integral part, it is important to stress that the UK, Cambodia, Mozambique and South Sudan (but not Sri Lanka)[1] are signatories of the Ottawa Convention and that their firm commitment to remove all mines is not in question. But with limited resources available (at both local and international level) to address a vast amount of mines and to tackle the many direct and indirect impacts mines have on community life, it is necessary to find ways to prioritise mine action programmes and to ensure that at all times these programmes achieve the best value for money (VFM).

We will attempt to address the issue of MA programme prioritisation at three different levels:

- Physical clearing of mines (which we understand to include survey and clearance), considered as the first pillar of MA programmes;
- Implementation of MA programmes which cover other issues related directly to existing or cleared mines and unexploded ordnance) UXO including: extent of mined areas cleared, victims assistance, advocacy issues, MA governance, and mine risk education (MRE), jointly viewed as the other four pillars of MA programmes according to the IMAS definition.
- Finding ways to efficiently integrate national and donor MA programmes into the larger context of a given country's overall development priorities.

2 Assessing VFM in mine clearing

As with most search tasks requiring resources and effort, the first steps are arduous, then the team's search skills and productivity steadily improve to reach a peak point. After this it becomes increasingly difficult to find the last items due to scarcity, irrespective of team skills and experience having reached maximum efficiency.

In mine clearing targeted at a new site this process could be illustrated by a classical J-curve, with three distinct phases:

- High cost of starting mine clearance operations (identification of minefields through research and surveys, recruiting and training of specialised staff, importing equipment, setting up base camps, etc.);
- Rapidly diminishing marginal costs for mine removal as the MA efforts become more routine until these costs plateau at their most economically optimal level;
- At some stage, marginal mine clearance cost start picking up rapidly since more and more effort is needed to remove mines that are in more and more remote and/or difficult terrains or are increasingly untraceable.

Evidently, depending on geographic circumstances, past conflict intensity levels, technological sophistication of the ordnance used, in-country salary levels, cost of accommodation and travel, etc. each site has its own J-curve. Theoretically, the sum of the J-curves for all sites in a country should produce a national mine clearance cost J-curve.

It would take a considerable data collection effort to define precisely the national J-curve for "Mine Clearance Marginal Cost", but there is already a body of data available to identify the overall shape of the curve and the current location of the country's de-mining operations on this curve.

[1] This concept paper deals with the four survey countries from the CHASE MA Programme evaluation rather than all eight countries covered by the Programme

The following graph illustrates such a theoretical J-curve pattern as applied to the cost of mine clearance.



Without any claim to perfect scientific accuracy, and based on some very rough estimates, we suggest below the possible shape of the J-curve for the four countries visited during the CHASE MA Programme evaluation. It is important to stress that this data is speculative and would need to be further substantiated by considerably more extensive research, although we believe that the underlying trends may well be corroborated to an extent by such data.

We outline overleaf such a speculative graph only to illustrate the potential for improving policy-making in allocating priorities to various country MA programmes competing for limited national or donor resources. From a very cursory analysis of such J-curves, it would appear that the returns on investment of an extra UK pound in mine/UXO removal in South Sudan would yield much greater quantitative results than say in Mozambique.

The in-country cost (salaries, travel, lease/purchase of equipment, etc.) together with other factors such as geography, scattering level of the mines, and more, will determine the shape of the country J-curve, as well, of course as the total amount of mines/UXO still uncovered. Evidently, all estimates may be considerably off the mark if some large mine affected areas have remained completely undetected.

Still, in a situation where data is imperfect and incomplete, it is possible to identify patterns and evaluate likely costs, and to feed this information into policy-making models based in part on VFM.



3 Comparing MA Programmes

Even though the data on mines and UXO in a given country was of a high level of reliability, physical mine clearing operations are only one aspect, even though a most critical one, in tackling the direct impact of mines on a community. The use of the J-curve allows a dynamic view of where a country stands in terms of the overall objective of full mine clearance of the country.

A series of associated actions, with their costs, has also to be taken into account.

We suggest selecting six action groups to obtain a wider picture of the efficiency and effectiveness of MA programmes, and then try to evaluate how sometimes widely varied MA programmes can be compared with each other in order to guide policy-making. They cover the five pillars for MA programmes. Only the first pillar is covered by two indicators. This analytical tool offers a static view of progress achieved at a certain date in MA operations.

The six criteria are:

1. Marginal cost of mine/UXO removal – first indicator for the first pillar;
2. % of area of country's danger zone cleared of mines – second indicator for first pillar;
3. % of endangered population having received MRE/RRE;
4. Number of untreated victims or those in need of continued treatment from mine-induced wounds/trauma;
5. Advocacy and local MA ownership to gauge the country's authorities' commitment to direct and manage MA actions;
6. % of stockpile destruction.

We chose to use these six criteria in a radar-diagram format for a structured approach to arrive at a comparative assessment of otherwise widely diverging national MA priorities and programmes.

Again based on the best judgment of our MA country evaluators, we hereby submit four radar diagrams covering the four countries of the evaluation. Each country has been assessed on a 1 to 5 scale for each of the six criteria, whereby "1" indicates a good position for the country, and "5" indicates a situation where the country needs critical attention. Hence, the smaller the area covered by the radar diagram, the better the position of the country, and the less support it presumably would need from public or donor funds.

The combined draft diagram comparing the performance of the four countries is submitted below:



The individual radar diagrams for each country are provided on the page overleaf.

It would appear that Cambodia is the most advanced country in achieving results for its MA programme, while South Sudan and Sri Lanka seem to be the countries with the greatest potential for improvements in their respective MA programme.

From each individual graph, it is also possible to identify which of the six selected areas of MA need to be targeted with greater priority.


Cambodia
Mine Removal - Marginal Cost
% of Population with MRE
Number of Untreated Victims
Advocacy and Local MA Ownership
% Stockpile Destruction
% Surface area cleared of mines
0
1
2
3
4
5
Mozambique
Mine Removal - Marginal Cost
% of Population with MRE
Number of Untreated Victims
Advocacy and Local MA Ownership
% Stockpile Destruction
% Surface area cleared of mines
0
1
2
3
4
5
Sri Lanka
Mine Removal - Marginal Cost
% of Population with MRE
Number of Untreated Victims
Advocacy and Local MA Ownership
% Stockpile Destruction
% Surface area cleared of mines
0
1
2
3
4
5
South Sudan
Mine Removal - Marginal Cost
% of Population with MRE
Number of Untreated Victims
Advocacy and Local MA Ownership
% Stockpile Destruction
% Surface area cleared of mines
0
1
2
3
4
5

4 Embedding MA in National Development Programmes

Having devised decision-making support tools for evaluating and comparing mine/UXO removal actions and national MA programmes, it is now appropriate to assess the role and weight of MA programmes in a country's overall development strategy.

There are basically two main positions which help mark the extremes of MA programming. One view is that, to be fully effective, MA cannot be reduced to mere mine removal and other technical aspect, but needs to be integrated in a holistic programme which helps an afflicted community to regain to the fullest a 'normal' quality of life, including resettling populations with a proper local infrastructure, adequate social services, and support to help people find durable employment and sustain livelihoods.

Such a position tends to make MA programming a holistic, multi-dimensional, and multi-tasking effort, requiring an important emphasis on advanced planning and participatory approaches to the involvement of affected populations. The other extreme limits the scope of MA programming to the physical removal of mines and UXO and to deal with the immediate consequences of living in proximity of a danger zone. Here the focus is on removing danger as rapidly as possible, to the exclusion of extraneous distractions.

There is no question that MA has to work hand-in-hand with other dimensions of a country's development policy. The best place to start is to ensure that information on MA programmes is fully shared with other stakeholders and that local populations would play a full part in the consultation process.

However, before accumulating tasks and assignments in an MA programme, and then tender/contract it out to a potential operator, we should bear in mind several considerations:

- Mine clearance operators with the capacity to operate in an international context are a limited group of companies in the world. They tend to be hyper-specialised and it is worth wondering whether they are the optimal vehicle for executing programmes with many collateral assignments which go beyond their usual remit;
- Other local public agencies, NGOs or private operators may exist which are equally or even better able to handle the non-mine clearance aspects of such programmes;
- Donors who are multi-tasking, in a single programme or project, a wide variety of MA-related activities, will have greater difficulties in monitoring and assessing the overall success, which can be impeded by a bottleneck in one part of the programme to the detriment of all other tasks.

5 Case study: Linking MA programmes to development planning

This can be illustrated by the following "case study" of an imaginary Country X, with five major known mine areas (numbered) and three main target areas for economic development (light yellow circular areas):

Minefields as bottlenecks for development:

The five known minefields are described as following:

- Minefield 1 covers all main access to the capital Latipac. This region is a priority area for a large development plan to restart the moribund economy.
- Minefield 2 covers urban infrastructure and non-urban areas, as well as access infrastructure to the underdeveloped north.
- Minefield 3 is impeding access from the country's main agricultural area around Nod-Nol and the critical connection to Latipac, its main market.
- Minefield 4 is in a border area which in the past offered a strategic access to foreign support to one of the former armed factions fighting the war.
- Minefield 5 is in a mountainous and thinly populated area serving formerly as a refuge for rebels.

Country X: Overlap of minefields and national development zones



Policy-makers in Country X have identified three main priority areas for economic development; Latipac, Sirap and Nod-Nol. They need information and analytical tools to see how to allocate limited resources for MA operations in order to maximise the impact of the three national development plans with a minimum of delays.

Donors on the other hand have identified two main areas for priority support: the poorer agricultural district of Nod-Nol, hampered by the presence of Minefield 3, and the area around the city of Sirap which is the target of multiple donor initiatives in the social sphere. Without entering into further details, it is clear that prioritising MA operations is part of a complex process involving many stakeholders and demands. From the figure and the above description, policy-makers stand to gain a lot from finding ways to integrate MA programmes in their national development plans. The same is true for donors or private companies and investors for whom mine clearing is an absolute necessary pre-condition to many types of projects.

MA operators, if invited to provide input in the planning process could explain the danger, resources needed, possibilities to securely clear or ring-fence some fields. In a scenario where MA priorities and programmes can be planned ahead in conjunction with national development planning authorities and donors, the role of MA specialists would be to provide ways to help prioritise programmes taking into account a realistic assessment of MA constraints. This could lead to a chart of the following type:

Country X: Coordinating national policies with MA programmes



From the above graph, MA operators could argue that Minefield 5 in a remote, mountainous area is costly to clear, but a low development priority. The area around Latipac is high priority but can be easily accessed, with enough MA know-how and equipment to make fast progress and bring down the marginal cost of removal. Minefield 3 could be split into two MA assignments: 3a to cover the area necessary to render the road operational, and 3b to cover areas not in the immediate vicinity of the road itself.

Based on a very brief and preliminary assessment of MA programmes in the country covered by this elementary case study, it would seem that some caution is required in not over-extending MA programmes, and to ensure that each operator is being asked to contribute optimally in the fields where they have the greatest skills and know-how.

Mine clearance, except for high-risk sites in populated areas, is facing an immense task with limited means. Evidently, it will take time to achieve the 100% mine removal objective of the Ottawa Convention. In the meanwhile, efforts will need to be prioritised. That such priorities derive from the overall development strategies and policies in a country makes perfect sense. In that regard, MA becomes a tool for development. Hoping that, on the contrary, it would become the "locomotive" of a large development effort is perhaps turning things upside down.

6 Conclusion

The post-conflict needs of a mine-affected region should be addressed by service providers who have the best ability to make a change. Donor programming should reflect such concern and avoid a tendency to lump too many non-strictly MA services into a single MA programme.

MA programmes submitted to the attention and approval of authorities and donors can and should be evaluated on their own merits, but also compared with alternatives in order to invest limited resources in projects with the best value for money. Although in light of the horrendous impact on potential victims, it may seem difficult to choose between projects which may leave others highly vulnerable, this must be addressed. Resources are simply too limited not to be targeted to a set of reasonable priorities.

In this document, we have attempted to explore three ways of prioritising MA programmes:

- The impact of the cost of mine clearing as such, and especially the return of investing one additional pound at the margin;
- The comparison of the performance of multiple countries in prioritising and achieving results in more comprehensive MA programmes;
- The need to keep MA programmes targeted at what they can deliver best, especially in environments where alternative funding sources and alternative service providers exist. The only key requirement here is to organise close planning, coordination and monitoring of all authorities, donors and service providers involved, through well identified consultation mechanisms.

ANNEX K:

Communication Plan

Table of Contents

1 Introduction

The Terms of Reference state: "An important requirement of this report is that it reflects the global evidence base for what approaches are effective in the development and mine action area and therefore should be presented in a format which is appropriate for disseminating to a wide variety of audiences including beneficiaries and stakeholder". The main purposes of the evaluation as stated in the Introduction to the Report (Section 1.1.1) are to:

- Assess extent to which strategic goals of the Mine Action Strategy have been met;
- Identify key issues that may improve DFID's ability to attain its strategic objectives; and
- Identify key issues that DFID should consider when adapting or updating its MA strategy.

In drawing up a plan for the communication of results, we have been mindful of all three purposes and have attempted to take these into account in designing a cost effective communications plan[1]. Much of the focus over the timeframe of the evaluation, however, has been on the need for the report to inform the work ongoing to shape the new CHASE Mine Action Programme. Over the short term, this has, necessarily, created a particular set of requirements and to some extent influenced both the type of communication activities and the determination of key audiences. In the longer term, the durability of the results of the mine action evaluation will allow for more diverse, multi-stakeholder reflection and learning.

In the following section, we outline the objectives for a Communication Plan for the Mine Action Evaluation. We go on to indicate the target audiences who will be interested in the results and recommendations, and in the discussion arising around them both in the short and longer term. For each of the target audiences, we set out a number of proposed communication actions and suggest how these may be cost effectively delivered. In some cases, some of these actions are on-going as early drafts of the report have been circulated for initial consultation and fact checking.

2 Objectives of the Communication Plan

The core objectives of the Communications Plan are to:

- Provide timely input to the decision-making processes within DFID around the preparation of a new CHASE MA Programme (urgent and ongoing);
- Contribute to improvement of the design and implementation of a new CHASE Mine Action programme (short-medium term);
- Draw and disseminate lessons from the current Programme for DFID and other key stakeholders responsible for MA policy and practice (ongoing).

3 Audience

Over time, the results of this evaluation will be communicated to all relevant stakeholders within the global mine action community, governments of countries with landmine problems, and international donors. In the first instance, the findings, conclusions and recommendations will be of specific interest to the groups outlined in Table 1.

Table 1: Key Stakeholders for Dissemination and Communication of Results

Primary Stakeholders	
DFID staff	Senior management responsible for resource allocation
	Staff involved in the preparation of the revised strategy
	DFID country directors
	DFID and HMG staff in related programmes (e.g. Stabilisation Unit)
	DFID procurement

[1] DFID International Development Evaluation Policy – May 2013 – p 17.

Secondary Stakeholders	
CHASE MA Programme partner organisations from the first Programme	Implementing partners for the first programme - MAG, HALO, and other potential bidders
	International agencies UNMAT (UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF)
	Specialist knowledge and research organisations – e.g. GICHD (involved in earlier programme)
National partners (an increasingly important stakeholder for DFID as it seeks to promote a more integrated and joined up approach to mine action in beneficiary countries)	National Mine Action Centre/Authorities
	National development partner institutions in target beneficiary countries.
	All development organisations funded through DFID development schemes in CHASE MA targeted countries
Target Communities	Communities living in mine affected regions
Tertiary Stakeholders	
Global Partners	Donor coordination mechanisms, in particular the Mine Action Support Group (MASG)
	Bilateral donor partners
	Post 2015 Development Goals
	Other international forums
Research Institutions	DFID funded research institutions (e.g. ODI) and think-tanks
	GICHD, Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) and academies with centres specialised in international cooperation, peace and post conflict studies, humanitarian mine action (e.g. George Mason University, Cranfield)
	Online communities focused on mine action, humanitarian response, development interventions, peace-building, gender.
Disseminating Success Stories	Media and broad community of UK tax payers

4 Communications to Date

Since mobilisation and inception, the evaluation team has been responding to the DFID requirement for early and timely feedback and results from this intensive and time concentrated assignment. Following return from the field visits, Team Leader, Eric Filippino engaged directly with each of the evaluators and with the Africa and Asia Evaluation sub-teams to begin to draw out the key emerging messages. These were synthesised and then presented to the CHASE MA team via video-link on 19th April 2013 for discussion and issue identification. The main body of findings was largely confirmed through further analysis of the data by individual evaluators and in the drafting workshop conducted in London, the final session of which was attended by the CHASE MA Programme team on 1st May. A subsequent draft report was circulated to interested stakeholders in late May and the findings and recommendations were presented to a representative group of mine action organisations, agencies, programme managers and policy makers in London on 3rd June 2013. A later version has since been shared with many of the same stakeholders for fact-checking.

5 Disseminating the Results of the Evaluation

The plan for dissemination of findings, conclusions, recommendations and the lessons learned from the evaluation is pragmatic, realistic and focussed on the needs and utilisation of different groups of readers. Following QA and approval of the final report by DFID, it will be important to use the report to its fullest potential to convey the very positive impact of - and lessons learned from - the CHASE Mine Action Programme, to all relevant stakeholders over the next months, up to and following the launch of a new Programme towards the end of 2013.

5.1 Communication Plan

In the table below, we suggest specific audiences and specific communications products which DFID may wish to develop deriving from the evaluation report, and suggest how these may be developed and used. WYG and members of the evaluation team would be available to provide advice or assistance.

Table 2: Communications Plan

Target Group	Need	Type of Product	Timing
DFID			
DFID Senior Managers	Rapid assessment of impact and oversight of development of future Programme.	Informative, balanced and coherent executive summary.	Now and ongoing Urgent
DFID staff involved in the preparation of the revised strategy	Sound understanding of what worked, what did not, clear conclusions and well framed recommendations.	Review of findings connected to Theory of Change, Presentation of key issues and rationale for recommendations.	Now and ongoing. Urgent
DFID country directors	Appreciation of the relevance of the MA Programme to development priorities in mine affected areas. Need for better integration and closer oversight of CHASE MA Programmes in DFID target countries (with mine contamination).	Executive Summary. Policy briefing note based on 1) Community and Socio-Economic Benefits and 2) Promoting the links between MA and development.	2nd half 2013
DFID and HMG staff in related programmes (e.g. Stabilisation Unit)	Appreciation of the relevance of the MA Programme to stabilisation priorities in conflict situations where mine contamination is a factor.	Executive Summary. Concept note setting out the case for MA contribution to stabilisation – e.g. Afghanistan and Libya.	2nd half 2013
DFID Procurement	What worked and what did not work from the previous competitive tendering. Lessons for upcoming procurement e.g. building in gender dimension.	Main report. Briefing notes 1) linking MA to development; 2) "Objective 2"; 3) Programme Management, Monitoring and Reporting Presentation of main features of alternative donor approaches	Now and ongoing. Urgent
CHASE MA Programme Partner Organisations from the first Programme			
MAG, HALO, and other potential bidders[2]	What worked and what did not work from the previous Programme. Clarity in terms of CHASE MA Programme expectations, objectives and reporting mechanisms. Good practice in terms of linking MA and development.	Main report and Annexes Workshop and presentation on core findings and recommendations – and implications for future programme. Review of findings connected to Theory of Change.	Now and ongoing. Urgent
International agencies, UNMAT (UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF)	What worked and what did not work from the previous Programme. Clarity in terms of CHASE MA Programme expectations, objectives and reporting mechanisms. Good practice in terms of building capacity in MA and MA linked to development.	Main report and Annexes Briefing notes on 1) Governance and Capacity; 2) MA and development. Information note on approach to procurement Workshop and presentation on core findings and recommendations – and implications for future programme. Review of findings connected to Theory of Change.	Now and ongoing. Urgent

[2] Including private sector

Target Group	Need	Type of Product	Timing
Specialist knowledge and research organisations – e.g. GICHD	What worked and what did not work from the previous Programme. Clarity in terms of CHASE MA Programme expectations, objectives and reporting mechanisms. Understanding better the role of knowledge and specialist institutions in supporting an integrated approach to mine action.	Main report and Annexes Information note on approach to procurement Briefing notes on 1) Governance and Capacity; 2) MA and development; 3) Gender, and others as required. Workshop and presentation on core findings and recommendations – and implications for future programme.	July – Sept 2013
National partners			
National Mine Action Centre/Authorities	Making best use of CHASE MA Programme in-country.	Briefing note and presentation on what the CHASE MA Programme can offer in terms of capacity building. Country field mission reports (where appropriate).	2nd half 2013
National development partner institutions in target beneficiary countries	Consolidating the integration of MA into development programmes.	Briefing note and presentation on what the CHASE MA Programme can offer in terms of linking MA to the development process. Country field mission reports (where appropriate).	2nd half 2013
Development organisations funded through DFID development schemes in CHASE MA targeted countries	Consolidating the integration of MA into development programmes.	Briefing note and presentation on what the CHASE MA Programme can offer in terms of linking MA to the development process. Country field mission reports (where appropriate).	2nd half 2013
Global Partners			
Mine Action Support Group (MASG)	Sharing experience. Improving global donor coordination for MA linked to development.	Presentation on key findings and lessons for the global donor community.	Meeting of MASG towards end of 2013 – TBA.
Bilateral with other donors	Sharing experience. Improving bilateral coordination for MA linked to development.	Presentation on key findings and lessons for the global donor community.	2nd half 2013
Post 2015 Development Goals	Advocating need to address security and safety in reducing world poverty. Demonstrating impact of Programme in promoting responsive governance and stability and contribution to reducing world poverty.	Presentation demonstrating link between MA and security/safety and sustainable development and livelihoods based on the experience of the CHASE MA Programme. Presentation on link between MA and governance and stability.	Post 2015 Consultation Programme
Other international forum	Demonstrating UK contribution to mine action and its impact. Advocacy for MA and development.	Presentation on key findings and lessons for the global donor community.	Early 2014

Target Group	Need	Type of Product	Timing
Research Institutions			
DFID funded research institutions (e.g. ODI)	Further research questions. Identifying topics requiring further in-depth enquiry. Design of future evaluation of CHASE MA Programme	Review of evaluation of CHASE MA Programme and questions unanswered.	Early 2014
Centres specialised in MA and international cooperation, peace and post conflict studies, humanitarian mine action	Further research questions. Identifying topics requiring further in-depth enquiry	Presentation on key findings and lessons for research community.	Early 2014
Disseminating Success Stories			
UK media	Stories and background information.	Case studies from four sample countries. Background and context note.	Prior to and following launch of new CHASE MA Programme.
UK tax payers	Demonstrating impact and VFM for UK = investment in mine action.	Briefing note on achievements of CHASE Mine Action programme.	Prior to and following launch of new CHASE MA Programme

5.2 Publishing Reports

The final evaluation report will be an important vehicles and catalyst for communication of results. If DFID would like to present the report for publication in internationally peer reviewed journals, WYG and the evaluation team would be happy to collaborate and coordinate on this. The publication of the report would provide significant opportunity for presentation to key audiences internationally and nationally – policy shapers and decision makers, specialist interest groups and the media.

ANNEX L:

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Annex M:

Methodology

Table of Content

1 Managing the Evaluation

1.1 The Evaluation Team

The Evaluation Team comprised seven international experts who conducted fieldwork and analysis, fourteen national community surveyors and two international experts who peer reviewed the evaluation. The team included mine action specialists, socio-economic impact experts, institutional appraisal specialists and community survey specialists. The final composition of the Evaluation Team, their main areas of focus and research roles are as follows:

Table 1

Evaluation Team		
Asia Team		
Team Leader (TL)	▪ Eric Filippino	▪ Evaluation design, coordination, implementation oversight; ▪ Strategic planning and management; ▪ Oversee and finalise drafting of all reports; ▪ Oversee all project activities and the work of all experts; ▪ Financial and administrative management; ▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Lead the Asia field mission team; supervising and conducting fieldwork; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Meetings with ESG and other key stakeholders.
Community Impact Assessor	▪ Sabrina Aguiari	▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Design of assessment model and methods; ▪ Lead on design and implementation of the community survey, with in-region oversight of activities in Asia region; ▪ Training local experts and partners on implementation of the community survey in Asia region; ▪ Ensure evaluation methods are participatory where possible and that the impact of mine action on women and gender roles is measured; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Contribute to drafting of reports.
Institutional Development Evaluator	▪ Yusaf Samiullah	▪ Support document review and mapping; ▪ Support stakeholder mapping; ▪ Support design of assessment model and methods for key informant interviews and focus groups; ▪ Conduct key informant interviews and focus groups in Asia region; ▪ Support strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Support drafting of reports.

Strategic Assessment/Socio-economic Impact Evaluator	▪ Ken MacTaggart	▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Ensure that core strategic issues are taken into account over the four mission countries; ▪ Ensure evaluation is conducted and results analysed in wider context of DFID's other mine action programmes; ▪ Assess implementation of DFID Mine Action Strategy; ▪ Assess links between demining and economic growth; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Contribute to drafting of reports.
Africa Team		
Deputy Team Leader (DTL)	▪ Paul Davies	▪ Lead the Africa field mission team, supervising and conducting fieldwork; ▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Oversight on design of assessment model and methods; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Contribute to drafting and finalisation of all reports; ▪ Meetings with ESG and other key stakeholders.
Community Impact Assessor	▪ Ananda S. Millard	▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Design of assessment model and methods; ▪ Lead on design and implementation of the community survey, with in-country oversight of activities in Mozambique; ▪ Training local experts and partners on implementation of the community survey in Mozambique; ▪ Ensure evaluation methods are participatory where possible and that the impact of mine action on women and gender roles is measured; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Contribute to drafting of reports.
Institutional Development Evaluator	▪ Jo Durham	▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Stakeholder mapping; ▪ Design of assessment model and methods for key informant interviews and focus groups; ▪ Conduct key informant interviews and focus groups in Africa region; ▪ Lead on design and implementation of the community survey, with in-country oversight of activities in South Sudan; ▪ Training local experts and partners on implementation of the community survey in South Sudan; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Contribute to drafting of reports.
Strategic Assessment/Socio-economic Impact Evaluator	▪ Ken MacTaggart	▪ Document review and mapping; ▪ Ensure that core strategic issues are taken into account over the four mission countries; ▪ Ensure evaluation is conducted and results analysed in

		wider context of DFID's other mine action programmes; ▪ Assess implementation of DFID Mine Action Strategy; ▪ Assess links between demining and economic growth; ▪ Strategic analysis of evidence; ▪ Contribute to drafting of reports.
Documentary Review Team		
Document Review	▪ Graeme Brodie	▪ Supporting TL, DTL and Strategic Assessment Adviser in literature review, including statistical analyses, trend analyses, key issues.
Document Review	▪ Michelle Moffatt	▪ Supporting Community Survey and Institutional Development Evaluators in literature review, trend analyses, key issues.
Evaluation Support Team		
National Community Surveyors - Cambodia	▪ Charanay Chim (M) - Team Leader ▪ Tangkeav Chhiv (F) ▪ Channat Kleng (F) ▪ Sao Kosal (M)	▪ Conduct focus groups for the community survey; ▪ Conduct individual interviews for the community survey; ▪ Participate in initial analysis to support the drafting of community and country summaries; ▪ Data transcript from Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews; ▪ Consultation on the reliability of presentation of findings.
National Community Surveyors - Sri Lanka	▪ Judith Jayaratnam (F) ▪ Ratnasingam Ranesam (M) ▪ Arumugavadivel Ranjith Shaelindrakumar (M) ▪ Thirunavukkarasu Thirumayuran (M) Team Leader	▪ Conduct focus groups for the community survey; ▪ Conduct individual interviews for the community survey; ▪ Participate in initial analysis to support the drafting of community and country summaries; ▪ Data transcript from Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews; ▪ Consultation on the reliability of presentation of findings.
National Community Surveyors – South Sudan	▪ Aninyesi Tereza Mark Wanga ▪ Dorcas Francis Loly Werson ▪ Omara Joseph Iogborong Wani	▪ Conduct focus groups for the community survey; ▪ Conduct individual interviews for the community survey; ▪ Participate in initial analysis to support the drafting of community and country summaries; ▪ Data transcript from Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews; ▪ Consultation on the reliability of presentation of findings.
National Community Surveyors- Mozambique	▪ Francisco Raice (M) ▪ Tomas Gimo (M) ▪ Rosa Pedro (F)	▪ Conduct focus groups for the community survey; ▪ Conduct individual interviews for the community survey; ▪ Participate in initial analysis to support the drafting of community and country summaries; ▪ Data transcript from Focus Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews; ▪ Consultation on the reliability of presentation of findings.

Project Director (PD)	▪ Gerry McAlinden	▪ Contact with Evaluation Steering Group; ▪ Overall and ultimate responsibility for the evaluation - "Birdseye" project oversight on timeliness and quality; ▪ Ensuring performance management procedures in place and followed; ▪ Ensuring support resources are used to maximum effect; ▪ QA of reporting; ▪ Ensure Duty of Care (DoC) arrangements in place.
High Level Advisory Group		
Peer Reviewer	▪ Mike McCarthy	▪ Advice and guidance on post conflict / conflict environments and mine action (special reference to DFID CHASE and MAS) ▪ Advice and guidance on evaluation methods and approaches; ▪ Advice and guidance on post conflict/conflict environments and de-mining; ▪ Advice and guidance on effectively communicating lessons learned; ▪ Internal quality assurance of outputs and deliverables; ▪ Peer review; ▪ Ad hoc steerage and advice where required; ▪ Access to networks.
Peer Reviewer	▪ Stuart Maslen	▪ Advice and guidance on post conflict / conflict environments and mine action and international best practice and evidence ▪ Advice and guidance on evaluation methods and approaches; ▪ Advice and guidance on post conflict/conflict environments and de-mining; ▪ Advice and guidance on effectively communicating lessons learned; ▪ Internal quality assurance of outputs and deliverables; ▪ Peer review; ▪ Ad hoc steerage and advice where required; ▪ Access to networks.

1.2 Role of the National Partners

Local counterpart consultancy firms were engaged in each of the four evaluation focus countries. Our Evaluation Team worked closely with national partners in the target countries to facilitate interaction with relevant institutions to support the fieldwork, assisting with arranging meetings and introductions with local contacts, and with arranging transport to conduct fieldwork. The local partners also helped contract surveyors for the community impact survey in all four countries. Utilising local professionals to conduct this fieldwork was critical for the evaluation to deal sensitively and effectively with cultural and language issues. Each team of three surveyors had one Survey Team Leader.

Two or three days of training were conducted with each survey team, delivered by the international Community Impact Assessor responsible for the survey. The training aimed to introduce and familiarise the national survey team with the survey tools and key concepts and theoretical framework guiding the community impact survey

questions.[1] This training not only ensured that the community impact surveys were conducted in a way which ensured the greatest possible validity and reliability of findings, it also generated new awareness and learning amongst the in-country fieldworkers and ensured that the evaluation itself contributed to capacity development. The training also allowed for the adaptation of questions to local context including the identification of adequate language to explain the goal of the question and the data sought after. The training was supplemented by review sessions prior to data collection missions and data training sessions to ensure adequate team data transcription sessions.

Where possible (exceptions are noted below), a gender balanced survey team with local language competence was identified. The team was closely supervised, and worked in close coordination with the international Community Impact Assessor. In cases where time constraints required multiple interviews to be conducted simultaneously the international Community Impact Assessor was consistently available to respond to any query or issue of concern. The team worked together to compile data, initiate triangulation and analysis, which was used with the original transcript data as a basis for the community survey country report. In most cases a day was allocated to each village. However, in Mozambique due to time constraints each community survey was conducted in half a day.

Cambodia

The well established and networked WYG office in Phnom Penh served as a focal point and base of operations for the field work in Cambodia, with assistance from our socio-economic development partner, Khmer Consulting. They provided candidates for interview based on job profiles developed by our evaluation team, resulting in the appointment of a short term team of one Community Survey Team Leader and two junior surveyors with experience in participatory and qualitative methods. In addition, WYG (Cambodia) seconded an additional suitably qualified member of its staff to support the team in the field. The Community Impact Assessor conducted a three day training session with the national survey team. The team was gender balanced with two females and two males and training took place over a three day period prior to commencement of field data collection.

Mozambique

We have been working with Ozmozis for some time and have been impressed by their capacity and commitment to development. Ozmozis specialise in socio-economic development and gender equality. They have access to extensive knowledge networks and helped the evaluation team to recruit a team of two national and one international surveyors, taking account of language, cultural and gender issues. The chosen team was composed of two males and one female. The whole team had full domain of both Portuguese and all the local languages used, which was particularly important given the selected research area contained a population which spoke more than one local language. The Community Impact Assessor also spoke fluent Portuguese. The limited English language skills of the national survey team meant that all training, data collection and initial analysis was done in Portuguese. In Mozambique due to a last minute loss of a team member there was no national Survey Team Leader, this role was filled by the Community Impact Assessor who guided, supervised and assisted in the data collection and analysis process. The national partner also supported and facilitated the work of the other members of the team. Our Community Impact Assessor worked closely with national partners to finalise plans for the community survey and led the conduct of a two day survey training.

Sri Lanka

We established good links and a common understanding of needs with the Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA). CHA have experience and profile in supporting local development and post conflict development in mine affected areas in Northern Sri Lanka. We agreed conditions and worked with CHA to recruit and mobilise the national survey team, thereafter the Community Impact Assessor delivered two days of training to them. The team was composed of three men and one woman, but unfortunately due to health problems the female team member could not partake in data collection throughout. The international Community Impact Assessor was female and she, together with the Survey Team Leader, who was trained in social work, conducted sensitive interviews with female respondents. Although ideally such interviews would have been conducted by a female only team, linguistic constraints prevented this. The skill of the Survey Team Leader proved essential in dealing with gender sensitive issues and we received no indication that female respondents were uncomfortable or felt unable to discuss key issues with us during the data collection process.

[1] See Annex B2, Training Outline for Local Team of Surveyors

South Sudan

On the basis of good recommendations, we partnered with Fostier Consulting which is a development consultancy, active in Southern and Eastern Africa, which has been in South Sudan since 2009. They provided valuable insights for planning and taking forward the evaluation in South Sudan. Most importantly, they helped us to recruit three national experts to be part of the survey team for the conduct of the community survey. The chosen team was composed of one male and two females, and they were provided with three days of training. The team worked together to compile data, using audio recordings and notes to compile summaries, which have been used as the foundation for the community survey country report.

1.3 The Evaluation Workplan

The overall work plan breaks down into four distinct phases, as follows:

Table 2

Phase	Dates	Goals	Key Activities	Outputs
1. Inception	February 18 - March 15	1. Initiate evaluation process 2. Create contextual framework from which to pursue the evaluation 3. Design overarching evaluation framework, including methodological perspective and definitions 4. Develop country research/data collection protocols and tools 5. Schedule/plan following phases	▪ Team/client/ operator contact and liaison ▪ Document search ▪ Background research/ literature review ▪ Initial scheduling	▪ Introductions and kick-off meeting at DFID ▪ Contact/focal point lists ▪ Literature review ▪ Country research/data collection protocols and tools ▪ Phase 2, 3 and 4 work plans, country schedules and logistics
2. Country Research and Data Collection	March 15 - April 20	6. Using assessment tools, guides and reporting templates designed during inception, the team will engage with local partners to collect country, operator and community specific qualitative and quantitative data	▪ Country visits	▪ Country reports
3. Data Analysis	April 15 - April 30	7. Preliminary analysis of cumulative data 8. Development of preliminary findings and recommendations	▪ Compilation, analysis and editing of country reports ▪ Initial drafting	▪ Interim Presentation of Results
4. Finalisation	April 30 - May 15	9. Final synthesis and analysis of data 10. Development of conclusive findings and recommendations to inform DFID programming	▪ Further review and revision of data/interim report ▪ Response to DFID/operator feedback ▪ Final drafting, editing, layout	▪ Final Evaluation Report

1.4 Duty of Care Arrangements

WYGI has, since the award of contract, worked with its security advisers in Control Risks who have provided an up-to-date security briefing for the team prior to and during the deployment. Our local partners have undertaken to meet incoming team members at the airports and have, where necessary, advised on suitable local accommodation and facilitated settling in. We have worked closely with both mine action implementing agencies to ensure coordination with our local partners for the provision of safe transport to mine clearance sites, as appropriate. Both MAG and HALO senior managers in all four target countries confirmed that the team while in the mine clearance sites complied with their existing security arrangements where these were appropriate. The team members were all fully insured by WYGI's comprehensive travel and health insurance policy, further reinforced by our membership of International SOS.

2 Evaluation Design

2.1 Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of this Mine Action evaluation is:

- To examine whether the CHASE mine action programme delivered development benefits to mine affected communities, as laid out in the 2010 DFID Mine Action Strategy;
- To evaluate whether the centrally delivered CHASE programme is the most effective and sustainable mode of delivery to enable national mine action agencies to prioritise and deliver mine action programmes in their own countries; and
- To assess whether the programme delivered value for money on behalf of the UK taxpayer.

The main focus of the evaluation will be the 30 months CHASE Mine Action programme, referred to above. The evaluation will also take into account the other DFID mine action programmes' objectives, outputs and outcomes, modalities of delivery and synergy of these with DFID's Mine Action Strategy, 2010-2013. We recognise that the strategic assessment of mine action programmes goes beyond the four target countries and we have addressed this wider focus (e.g. Libya and Afghanistan) in our methodology and team structure.

The evaluation was to:

- Draw out lessons for the evolution of MAS;
- Recommend changes and improvements to the delivery mechanisms including comments on sustainability, accountability, value for money and the delivery of results; and
- Inform next steps in programming.

DFID expects that this study will be of great interest to the broader mine action community, especially through the focus on the linkages between mine action and development. It intends to communicate these findings throughout the sector.

2.2 Evaluation Questions

The evaluation questions to be answered comprise three primary evaluation questions directly linked to the objectives of the CHASE programme, as well as targeted questions which focus on Strategy, Programme Outputs and Outcomes and Delivery mechanisms. The targeted questions are linked to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Evaluation Criteria.

Table 3

Primary Evaluation Questions:
1. Does the CHASE mine action programme deliver development benefits to mine affected communities, as laid out in the 2010 DFID Mine Action Strategy?
2. Is the centrally delivered CHASE programme the most effective and sustainable mode of delivery to enable national mine action agencies to prioritise and deliver mine action programmes in their own countries?
3. Does the programme deliver value for money on behalf of the UK taxpayer?
Strategy:
4. To what extent have the development objectives of the DFID Mine Action Strategy been delivered in the mine action programme results? (relevance)
5. Is the DFID mine action strategy implemented in non-CHASE led mine action programmes (Libya and Afghanistan for example)? Are they coherent with the objectives of the Mine Action strategy? (coherence, relevance)
6. Does the strategy provide a coherent evidence based framework for all of DFID's mine action work? (coherence)
Programme Outputs and Outcomes:
7. What are the mine action programme's outputs and outcomes at community level? (effectiveness)
8. What are the effects (impact) on women and girls in mine affected communities and on issues of gender?
9. How do the different approaches to linking mine action and development by the implementers compare? (effectiveness)
10. How has value for money been addressed and operationalised? What are the results? (relevance, effectiveness, sustainability)
11. Has the programme led to more ownership and capacity of national governments and national mine action agencies? What are the benefits or constraints found in the programme's support to national governments? (effectiveness, sustainability)
Delivery mechanisms:
12. What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different ways that DFID manages mine action work? (country office led, humanitarian, development CHASE central programme)
13. Do the programmes deliver what they say they will? Why and what difference does this make? (effectiveness and efficiency)
14. To what extent is the oversight of programmes managed efficiently and effectively?
15. Do the oversight arrangements of the various programmes (including anti-fraud and anti-corruption) represent value for money in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of management?
16. What is the value for money embedded in the delivery mechanisms for the various delivery partners? (private sector, NGOs, UN)

2.3 Evaluation Approach

Our evaluation sought to answer the evaluation questions outlined above using a mixed method, participatory, Do No Harm evaluation design; cognisant of potential ethical risks and following a robust methodological plan for how these and their related issues would be mitigated. Our evaluation approach adhered as far as possible to Paris Declaration Principles[2], in particular, through analysis of the literature, including the Meta Evaluation[3], to avoid duplication in data collection and to ensure that the objectives of our evaluation were situated within an understanding of global, national and local mine action contexts.

The mixed methods approach enabled us to gather more robust sets of data and to triangulate the data gathered. All data included in the report has, where possible, been corroborated by multiple sources. The community impact assessment was conducted using a literature review, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, village

[2] The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), available through http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm [Accessed 15/06/2013].
[3] Sheelagh O'Reilly, Judith Friedman, Hatty Dinsmore, Rob Storr, & Ronnie MacPherson, 'Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report', IOD PARC, Sheffield, 31 July 2012 (hereafter, *Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report*),

mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines. The institutional capacity and ownership appraisal was conducted using a literature review and key informant interviews. Data from these sources has been corroborated through triangulation enabling us to be confident in the validity of our findings and conclusions.

We adopted a participatory data collection approach, which aimed to be engaging rather than prescriptive. Our approach involved beneficiaries, girls and women and excluded groups, as well as implementing agents and government counterparts, and sought to ensure that beneficiary feedback was built into the evaluation programme. Respondents were not asked to simply respond to a set of pre-determined questions, but rather encouraged to enter into a dialogue with the data collectors that often led to the identification of new context specific questions. This approach to data collection has served to enrich the data collected. Throughout the data collection process the team has strived to be conflict sensitive and uphold basic "Do No Harm" principles. This has included, for example, efforts to ensure that the evaluation process itself did not raise false expectations, that respondents were aware of their role in the evaluation process and of the independence of the evaluation team.

The evaluation featured an initial stakeholder mapping and engagement exercise, as well as a review of literature, in order to harmonise understanding of the evaluation context and provide a common reference point for field level data collection. Beyond this initial stakeholder mapping and document review, the two key elements of the evaluation model are the community impact assessment[4] and the institutional capacity and ownership appraisal[5]. These two processes were run in each of the four selected countries (in some cases simultaneously and in others consecutively) and represent the core of our investigative approach. Each entailed the field deployment of thematic/methodological and area experts from our Evaluation Team who cooperated with community leaders and members to both observe MA activity and to survey their perceptions of the impact of contamination and the benefits stemming from the MA implementing partner outputs. Our Evaluation Team also met with MA operators and other relevant stakeholders to gauge the extent to which MA programming has, or will, transition to national control. This multi-layer process has generated the bulk of the evaluation's data.

In addition to these two survey streams an additional research layer was applied to examine the socio-economic "value added" of the MA Programme. This required not only field visits but also investigation of non-CHASE DFID MA country programmes, namely Afghanistan and Libya. This component also draws on socio-economic baseline data collected before and just after the beginning of DFID CHASE programmes, to enable meaningful conclusions on socio-economic impact and Value for Money (VfM) of DFID interventions from this perspective.

We have taken a qualitative approach to our evaluation which focuses on in-depth analysis of the differences between the current status of CHASE programme beneficiary areas (factual) and non CHASE programme beneficiary areas (counterfactual) (to answer Question 1), complemented by an in-depth appraisal of current mine action institutional capacity and ownership in CHASE programme areas (to answer Question 2). Our evaluation has therefore been conducted using largely qualitative mixed method approaches, which by nature of their design engage with and report on complexity; taking into account the perspectives and perceptions of different stakeholders, capturing unexpected outcomes, and providing rich description and a comprehensive picture of the links between mine action and development, and mine action and capacity development and transition to ownership. Our approach to Primary Evaluation Question 3, which focuses on whether the CHASE programme delivers VFM, will combine quantitative and qualitative measurement on progress, and will draw on the socio-economic baseline data, to examine the extent to which the programme delivers Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness.

We have used the criteria attached at Annex M16 for selecting villages, taking a purposive rather than technically representative sample. For the factual the team decided to focus only on sites where DFID was a significant funder, in order to ensure that the impact of Mine Action activities could be attributed to DFID. For example, in Cambodia, the MAG team initially identified a total of forty-six DFID CHASE sites, but on closer examination, many of these sites were shared with other donors. The list was refined further around those sites where DFID was a significant funder. In South Sudan, the DFID CHASE footprint in-country is quite limited, with only a small number of communities being exposed to the DFID Mine Action Programme. According to MAG, one and a half sites have been cleared. This had implications for the evaluation and the Community Impact Assessment team only visited four villages while there, three villages which have been exposed to the DFID Mine Action Programme and one counterfactual. In Mozambique, a total of five sites which had been exposed to DFID CHASE programmes were surveyed, plus one counterfactual. All of these communities were in the same province. In Sri Lanka, three villages which have been exposed to the DFID Mine Action Programme were visited, plus one counterfactual village.

[4] See Annex B15 for the Community Impact Assessment Tool
[5] See Annex B19 for the Institutional Capacity and Ownership Assessment Tool.

2.4 Evaluation Framework

Using the OECD DAC framework, we developed a robust and reliable Evaluation Framework that not only addresses the multi-part purpose of the Evaluation, but also considers the key evaluation questions, sub-questions and criteria; possible performance indicators; likely sources of data (both primary and secondary); and the data collection methods to be employed. The Evaluation Framework is outlined in Table 4.

Primary research was gained through extensive meetings with headquarters personnel in DFID, MAG, HALO, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) as well as representatives from UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF (UNMAT). At a minimum, the following activities were similarly carried out amongst field implementers during the country field visits:

- Meetings with Implementing partners;
- Meetings with the DFID Country Office/FCO (where relevant);
- Meetings with International financial/banking institutions;
- Meetings with national, provincial and district level representatives from:
  - Other mine action organisations;
  - Development organisations, specifically implementing partner organisations;
  - National mine action authorities;
  - UNMAT and other UN agencies;
  - Organisations involved affected by mine action such as community development, health, etc.

In addition, in order to gauge community impact and perspective the evaluation teams:

- Visited numerous mine action field sites to observe the implementing partner operations;
- Made numerous community visits to observe MA activity, and to meet with community leaders and members to survey their perceptions of the impact of explosives contamination and the impact of the DFID CHASE programme (Factual);
- Made community visits to meet with community leaders and members to survey their perceptions of the impact of explosives contamination in the absence of MA/DFID CHASE programme activity (Counterfactual).

The evaluation also made use of a wide variety of secondary source data, to serve as the intellectual backdrop for the evaluation approach, develop the investigative tools and triangulate results. These included:[6]

- Implementing partner project proposals and tender documents;
- Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports;
- DFID Annual Reviews;
- The Meta Evaluation previously commissioned by DFID;
- Landmine Monitor Reports;
- National Mine Action Plans and Policies;
- Thematic research;
- Other mine action donor strategies and reports.

In doing so the Evaluation Team has examined:

- Progress against project and log frame[7] targets;
- Progress as captured by the OECD-DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance, and with DFID's policy on evaluation;
- DFID's management approach;
- Other stakeholders' engagement and perspectives.

The Evaluation Framework (Table 4) below details the evaluation questions and sub-questions, the relevant criterion, observed performance indicators, sources of data and the data collection method employed.

[6] See Annex J, Bibliography
[7] Country log frame, as project log frame does not provide baseline.

Table 4: Evaluation Framework

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
1. To what extent have the development objectives of the DFID Mine Action Strategy been delivered in the mine action programme results?	▪ Relevance	▪ Specific achievements vis-à-vis objectives for MA pillars ▪ Capacity development milestones vis-à-vis objectives ▪ Concrete examples of contributions to development	**Secondary data including:** ▪ Project proposals ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID log frame ▪ Country and UNMAT log frames ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ Article 7 Reports (where relevant) ▪ Evaluations ▪ Landmine Monitor Reports ▪ National Mine Action Plans and Policies **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ Development Partners ▪ Government ministries ▪ District authorities ▪ Mine-affected communities	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ Community impact survey (factual and counter factual)
2. Is the DFID mine action strategy implemented in non-CHASE led mine action programmes (Libya and Afghanistan for example)? Are they coherent with the objectives of the Mine Action strategy?	▪ Relevance ▪ Coherence	▪ Programme reports ▪ Benchmarking against other MA programmes	**Secondary data including:** ▪ Project proposals, ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID log frame ▪ Country and UNMAT log frames ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ Landmine Monitor Reports ▪ National Authority Mine Action Plans and Policies **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
3. Does the strategy provide a coherent evidence based framework for all of DFID's mine action work?	▪ Coherence	▪ Level of understanding among Implementing partners, ▪ Commonality of implementation ▪ Comparison with overall UXO/mine action strategy and those of other mine/UXO action programmes.	**Secondary data including:** ▪ Project proposals ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ Implementing partner strategy and planning documents ▪ Country log frames ▪ Meta evaluation ▪ Thematic research ▪ DFID Annual Reviews **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ Development Partners	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD
4. What are the mine action programme's outputs and outcomes at community level?	▪ Effectiveness	▪ Concrete examples of contributions to the mine/UXO action process at community level ▪ Specific outputs and outcomes vis-à-vis objectives for MA pillars	**Secondary data including:** ▪ Project proposals ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ Evaluations ▪ Development partner reports ▪ National Authority Mine Action Reports **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ Development Partners ▪ Government ministries ▪ District authorities ▪ Mine-affected communities	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ Community impact survey (factual and counter factual)

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
5. What are the effects (impact) on women and girls in mine affected communities and on issues of gender?	▪ Effectiveness ▪ Coherence	▪ Programme compliance with UN Guidelines on Gender and Mine Action	**Secondary data including:** ▪ Project proposals ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID log frame ▪ Country and UNMAT log frames ▪ DFID Annual Reviews. ▪ Evaluations ▪ Development partner reports ▪ National Mine Action Reports **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ Development Partners ▪ Government ministries ▪ Mine-affected communities	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ Community impact survey (factual and counterfactual), particularly focus group discussions with women.
6. How do the different approaches to linking mine action and development by the implementers compare?	▪ Effectiveness	▪ Evidence of engagement with other mine/UXO, relief and development planning processes and agencies ▪ Comparison with overall programme strategies and activities	**Secondary data including:** ▪ Project proposals ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID log frame ▪ Country and UNMAT log frames ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ SoPs ▪ Evaluations ▪ Development partner reports ▪ Relevant National Mine Action Authority reports. **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ Development Partners ▪ National Mine Action Authorities ▪ UNMAT	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ Community impact survey.

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
			▪ Relevant Government ministries ▪ District authorities ▪ Mine-affected communities	
7. How has value for money been addressed and operationalised? What are the results?	▪ Relevance ▪ Effectiveness ▪ Sustainability	▪ Plans for growth, reductions or other programme modification, ▪ Evidence of MA asset application/sharing by Implementing partners ▪ Regular operational efficiency review	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ Programme Budgets ▪ SoPs ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ National Mine Action Authority planning documents and relevant reports. ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ National Mine Action Authority ▪ Relevant government ministries	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews
8. Has the programme led to more ownership and capacity of national governments and national mine action agencies? What are the benefits or constraints found in the programme's support to national governments?	▪ Effectiveness ▪ Sustainability	▪ National Mine Action Plan ▪ Qualifications of current managers ▪ Govt. contributions to MA ▪ Policy statements on development priorities (national, sector, etc.) ▪ Trends in productivity and safety ▪ Quality of survey and data management ▪ Quality of planning and prioritisation ▪ Existence of empowering legislation ▪ Evidence of links with other relevant govt. depts./agencies ▪ Evidence of engagement with key relief and development planning processes (MDGs) ▪ National policy and programming on decentralisation	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ SoPs ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ National Mine Action Authority planning documents and relevant reports. ▪ National strategy and programming documents ▪ Relevant national legislation, e.g. on the division of authority, mine ban policy ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ National Mine Action Authority ▪ the UNMAT	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
		▪ Comparison with other mine action programmes	▪ Relevant government ministries ▪ MA programme managers	
9. What are the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different ways that DFID manages mine action work? (country office led, humanitarian, development CHASE central programme)	▪ Efficiency ▪ Coherence	▪ Benchmarking against other MA donor strategies and programmes ▪ Qualifications of current managers ▪ Quality and clarity of written strategy reports/log frame	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ Meta Evaluation ▪ Thematic research ▪ Other donor reports and assessments ▪ Relevant National Mine Action Authority reports. ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ National Mine Action Authorities ▪ DFID-CHASE ▪ DFID Country Office ▪ Other MA donor country representatives ▪ UNMAT	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD
10. Do the programmes deliver what they say they will? Why and what difference does this make?	▪ Effectiveness ▪ Efficiency	▪ Specific achievements vis-à-vis objectives for MA pillars ▪ Capacity development milestones vis-à-vis objectives	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ Landmine Monitor Reports ▪ National Mine Action Authority planning documents and relevant reports. ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ National Mine Action Authorities ▪ DFID-CHASE	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ Community impact survey (factual and counter-factual) ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
			▪ DFID Country Office/FCO (where relevant) ▪ Beneficiaries and other stakeholders	
11. To what extent is the oversight of programmes managed efficiently and effectively?	▪ Effectiveness ▪ Efficiency	▪ Evidence of stakeholder participation ▪ Evidence of stakeholder acceptance ▪ Past and current deployment of resources (including prioritisation, accountability, transparency) ▪ Crisis points in MA programme	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ National Mine Action Authorities ▪ DFID-CHASE ▪ DFID Country Office/FCO (where relevant)	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ HQ interviews with DFID CHASE ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD
12. Do the oversight arrangements of the various programmes (including anti-fraud and anti-corruption) represent value for money in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of management?	▪ Effectiveness ▪ Efficiency	▪ Existence of anti-fraud and anti-corruption policies ▪ Evidence in reduction of fraud and/or corruption ▪ Transparent contracting and financial policies	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ Programme evaluations ▪ National Mine Action Authority progress reports ▪ Other donor reports , assessments and audits ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ National Mine Action Authorities ▪ DFID Country Office/FCO (where relevant) ▪ UNMAT	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ HQ interviews with relevant DFID CHASE ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD

Issue/Question	DAC Criteria	Indicators	Sources of Data	Data Collection Methods
13. What is the value for money embedded in the delivery mechanisms for the various delivery partners? (private sector, NGOs, UN)	▪ Efficiency	▪ Benchmarking against other MA programmes/projects ▪ Evidence of Implementing partner efficiency ▪ Evidence of cost-reduction/cost saving philosophy ▪ Evidence of Implementing partner QM approach	▪ **Secondary data including:** ▪ Implementing partner 6-month and annual reports ▪ DFID Annual Reviews ▪ SoPs ▪ Thematic research ▪ National Mine Action Authority planning documents and relevant reports. ▪ Programme audits ▪ **Key informants, including:** ▪ MA programme managers ▪ National Mine Action Authorities ▪ DFID-CHASE ▪ DFID Country Office/FCO (where relevant)	▪ Desk review of secondary data ▪ In-country key informant interviews ▪ HQ interviews with DFID CHASE ▪ HQ key informant interviews with relevant service providers: MAG, HALO, UNMAT, GICHD

2.5 Understanding the Evaluation Context

Stakeholder Mapping and Engagement

In order to establish the key stakeholders for this evaluation, at the outset of the evaluation the Evaluation Team held a round table stakeholder review session, to build a clear picture of de-mining activity and stakeholders both internationally and in the four selected countries (including the core players and their activities – past, current and planned), the components of the CHASE mine action programme, and of the non-CHASE activity. The key stakeholders listed in Table 5 below were identified as having a role in the evaluation process, as well as having an interest in the evaluations eventual findings and recommendations. Table 5 outlines the importance of each stakeholder to the evaluation (primary, secondary or tertiary), the interest the stakeholder has in the evaluation and/or the perspective they bring to it, the stakeholder's role in the evaluation, and how the evaluation team engaged them. Some of these stakeholders were present at the GICHD 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors, held in Geneva from 10th – 12th April 2013. One of our Evaluation Team members attended this and conducted interviews as outlined in the interview programme, outlined in Table 6 below.

Table 5. Stakeholder Mapping and Engagement

Stakeholder Name	Stakeholder Category	Interest or Perspective	Role in the Evaluation	How and When to Engage
DFID Conflict, Humanitarian & Security Department	Primary	Evaluation client	Oversight and direction.	▪ Milestone meeting, kick-off progress and interim as well as ongoing communication.
UNMAT – UN Mine Action Team ▪ UNMAS (DPKO) ▪ UNDP ▪ UNICEF	Primary	DFID Implementing Partner responsible for the delivery of the DFID CHASE programme.	Support to the evaluation pledged by relevant section heads of UNMAT agencies, including support of their in-country representatives.	▪ Communication initiated with the relevant section heads of the UNMAT agencies Tim Horner from UNDP, Judy Grayson from UNICEF and Paul Heslop of UNMAS. All pledged their support. ▪ Attendance by Gerry McAlinden at the UN Programme Manager's meeting in Geneva, April 10th 12th Interviews with relevant section heads (see Interview Programme below).
HALO Trust	Primary	DFID Implementing Partner responsible for the delivery of the DFID CHASE programme.	Assisting with site selection for HALO programme site visits in Sri Lanka and Mozambique. Supporting site visits by making a vehicle and driver available, facilitating clearance and drafting letters of introduction for the evaluation team. Supporting data collection activities in the field.	▪ HQ visit ▪ Meeting between Ken MacTaggart and Gerry McAlinden (evaluation team) and senior representatives of the HALO Trust in Dumfries – week commencing 18th March ▪ Site visits to HALO programmes in Sri Lanka and Mozambique ▪ Interview with the HALO managers responsible for implementation of the DFID (non-CHASE) Afghanistan Mine Action programme
MAG (Mines Advisory Group)	Primary	DFID Implementing Partner responsible for the delivery of the DFID CHASE programmes	Assisting with site selection for MAG programme site visits in Cambodia and South Sudan. Providing comprehensive and detailed site visit plan for site visits. Assisting with access to relevant ministries. Providing support for the Cambodia field research.	▪ Site visits to MAG programmes in Cambodia and South Sudan. ▪ Engagement with MAG M&E specialist, Emily Akalu, for consultation during the field missions on MAG baselines and performance monitoring. ▪ Attendance by members of the evaluation team at the MAG Global Leaders' event, week of March 18th in Manchester

Stakeholder Name	Stakeholder Category	Interest or Perspective	Role in the Evaluation	How and When to Engage
			Facilitating setting up interviews with key informants and stakeholders using letter of introduction prepared by the evaluation team.	▪ Meeting between Ken MacTaggart and Gerry McAlinden (evaluation team) and MAG managers on 22nd March, facilitating group discussion with DFID CHASE programme managers (all eight countries). ▪ Meeting with the principals running the Libya (non-CHASE) programme.
GICHD – Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	Primary	DFID Implementing Partner (sub-contracted) responsible for the delivery of the DFID CHASE programme.	Pledged support and expressed an interest in discussing the results they have delivered, particularly as they relate to DFID's second objective, the DFID strategy, how it was implemented by DFID (i.e. the tendering process), and recommendations for a future strategy and the meta-evaluation.	▪ Communication initiated with the relevant individuals at the GICHD: Ted Paterson, Senior Advisor, Strategic Management, Guy Rhodes, Head, Operations Consulting, Pehr Lodhammer, Advisor, Mechanical Systems and Contracting ▪ Attendance by Gerry McAlinden at the UN Programme Manager's meeting in Geneva, April 10th -12th 2013 Interviews with relevant GICHD individuals (see interview programme below).
Relevant National Governments and Ministries in the specific countries of study as well as other mine affected countries	Secondary	Overarching or controlling government entity in which mine action institutions are housed.	Providing overview of differing investment, understanding and degree of national ownership in mine action. National development, economic and planning linkages.	Communication initiated via implementing partners to arrange key visits in all four countries during field deployment.
Specific Government Mine Action coordinating and implementing bodies ▪ Cambodia – CMAC, CMAA ▪ Sri Lanka – SLNMAC, Ministry of Economic Development ▪ Mozambique – IND,MoFA ▪ South Sudan – SSDA, SSMAA	Primary	National mine action governing bodies in countries of study and the primary subject of the second objective investigation.	Facilitating contact with national and international stake-holding institutions in the respective countries. All the agencies concerned have made themselves fully available to the Evaluation Team, accommodating our scheduling and providing support and documentation.	Communication initiated via implementing partners to arrange key visits in all four countries during field deployment. A minimum of one team member meeting with key staff of national institutions.
MA Donor Community	Secondary	Support to the MASG is one of four work streams in the UNMAS	Providing overview of differing mine action funding trends, perspectives and priorities	Attendance at the MASG during the UN Programme Manager's meeting in Geneva, April 10th - 12th 2013

Stakeholder Name	Stakeholder Category	Interest or Perspective	Role in the Evaluation	How and When to Engage
		programme.		
Mine Action NGOs, both national and international	Secondary	Co-operators and members of the mine action community, globally and in study countries.	Providing differing views, operational experiences in countries of study.	During field deployment, meetings with other mine action NGOs, where relevant in the countries of study, including NPA, HALO/MAG, FSD and commercial where present.
Other development NGOs and CBOs	Primary	Cooperating partners of DFID's the primary mine action Implementing Partners.	Providing specific feedback on progress, issues constraints and future plans towards the first objective.	Meetings with all major cooperating development partners in ten countries of study, including ZOA, CARE, Helpage, LWD, World Vision and others

Table 6: Interview Programme for GICHD – 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors – Geneva 10th – 12th April 2013

Date	Time	Country	Interviewees
Wed 10th April	11.30	GICHD	Guy Rhodes Head of Operations Section and Ted Paterson
		DFID	Richard Boden Policy Analyst
	14.00		
	15.00	UNDP and UNICEF	Judy Grayson UNICEF and Tim Horner UNDP
	16.00		
	17.00	UNMAS	Paul Heslop Chief – Programme Planning and Management Section
Thurs 11th April			
	07.00	Vietnam	Thao Griffiths (Vietnam Veterans) and Alberto Agusta (Mozambique NMAA)
	09.00		
	10.00		
	11.00	UNICEF (Sudan/Somalia)	Vedesto Nsanzugwanko
	12.00	UNICEF Sri Lanka	Milhar Muhammed
		UNMAS Afghanistan	Abigail Hartley Programme Manager and Kurt Chesko (Programme Officer New York)
		MAG/DFID	Lunch discussion

Date	Time	Country	Interviewees
	14.00		
	15.00	UNICEF	Judy Grayson UNICEF
	16.00	MASG	Donor Coordination meeting
	17.00	UNMAS	Maria Vardis – Policy Coordination Officer
Fri 12th April	09.00	Sri Lanka	Mahinda Wickramasingha – Asst Dir Mine Action Centre - Accreditation
		Gender and Mine Action	Arianna Calza Bini – Gender and Mine Action Programme
	10.00	UNMAS Libya	Diek Engelbrecht and Julia Goehsing
	11.00	Donor presentations	DFID presentation (RB)
	12.00	GICHD	Guy Rhodes, Ted Paterson Head, Strategic Management and Asa Massleberg
		UNDP	Tim Horner
		DFID	Richard Boden
		UNDP Mozambique	Hans Risser
		UNMAS South Sudan	Lance Milan
	14.00	Plenary Session	Wider context – Post 2015 and MDGs

Documentary Review

Desk research was undertaken to find and analyse the most relevant background material for this evaluation, to ensure that we had a full and up-to-date understanding of the strategic context for the de-mining programmes, their objectives and activities, their outputs to date (as far as recorded in accessible documentation) and the recommendations from any previous reviews (including the important Meta-Evaluation of Mine Action and Development of August 2012). Through this exercise we extracted key material for benchmarking and informing the evaluation fieldwork, ensuring we learnt from the existing evidence, and used this to inform our evaluation and adopted a best practice approach. Specific attention was paid to the DFID Mine Action Plan, the latest DFID annual review of UNMAT Global De-mining, the new Strategy of the UN on Mine Action, 2013-2018, and the final report of the Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development. The key findings of our documentary review are outlined in Annex B.

2.6 Data Collection Methods

2.6.1 Community Impact Assessment

The Community Impact Survey component of the evaluation has been designed in consideration of the actual resources available for the overall exercise. The evaluation team opted for a qualitative approach using participatory techniques in all four country cases, identifying the sample villages through a similar process in all countries, but with different sample sizes depending on the extent of CHASE programme operations. As part of each village visit, focus groups, key informant interviews, village mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines were undertaken. An outline of the key component of each village visit is provided here:

Focus Group Discussions - Each community survey aimed to include two focus group interviews - one with at least four women and one with at least four men. Despite our best efforts, in some cases the number of participants did not allow for gender-disaggregated meetings. These interviews gathered general contextual data on the village visited and also provided a forum to discuss issues related to the landmine threat, the development prospect and the links between the two.

Key Informant Interviews – The individuals interviewed as part of community surveys were from mine affected (or formerly affected) communities and therefore their knowledge base, experience and expertise varied greatly from other respondents targeted during this evaluation. The questions posed to each respondent were common across countries and regions and aimed to identify significant community markers on issues related to the landmine threat, the conduct of demining and the development process. In addition, these interviews secured contextual and support data that was later used to explain or substantiate information gathered through other means. The methodological pre-requisites required that a minimum of three individuals be interviewed in each village. However, this number was often surpassed.

Village Mapping - During Focus Groups the community was asked to assist to design a map of the community. The visual recording of data including infrastructure, landmarks, location of current/former minefields, location of accidents etc. was essential to the triangulation of the data gathered during interviews and focus groups. The process also proved important in terms of mine action operations because in some cases the process of making the community map revealed new mine suspected areas. In such cases the landmine operator was contacted immediately and a follow up meeting between the demining operator and the community was held. In cases where new landmines or suspected areas were identified, the original copy of the map was left with the village leader, so that it could be used to inform the relevant authorities and be used as a component of dialogue with mine action operators at a later date.

Wealth Ranking - The survey included a wealth ranking in each community, but in some communities the exercise proved futile since community members highlighted their high level of economic homogeneity. However, it should be stressed that the confirmation of economic homogeneity is an important characteristic when examining development processes. Establishing the existing economic distinctions at the community level, or the lack thereof, has played a key role in our understanding of the establishment of priorities and of how levels of wealth influence these, if at all.

Village Timelines – This process involved identifying and meeting with the village head to record key milestones in the village's history, particularly in relation to mine action activities and their development benefits. In many cases the timeline produced were not rich in detail, given that often mine action activities had only recently occurred, and so the relevant history was quite short, and given that many of the village heads only had a overview knowledge of

the mine action activities that had occurred. However, the village timelines provide useful information to contextualise the findings of the community impact survey.

In each country a team of three or four national surveyors were identified, including a national Survey Team Leader, and at least one female. A two or three day training programme was scheduled to introduce and familiarise the team, not only with the survey tools but with key concepts and theoretical framework guiding the evaluation questions[8](for more details on this see 'Role of the National Partners', above).

In identifying villages to sample in each country, criteria included villages that have MAG or HALO ongoing or completed CHASE funded operations, but that are different as possible among each other in terms of: contamination type, livelihoods zones, migration patterns, remoteness. While sampling of areas where there is a complex demining history, to reduce attribution error (at least on questions related to the MA operations process), the sample was selected from among villages where in the last three years CHASE funded operations were the only ones active[9]. Table 7 below lists the location of each village visited. Specific details on each of these villages can be found within each Country Mission Report (Annexes C-F).

Table 7

Cambodia				
	Village	**Commune**	**District**	**Province**
	Chisang	Treng	Ratanakmundul	Battambang
	Phlov Meas	Plovmeas	Ratanakmundol	Battambang
cf	Serey Voan	Andeuk Hep	Rathanak Mondul	Battambang
	Thnal Bat	Steung Trang	Salakrau	Pailin
	Thnal Kaeng	Ou Andoung	Salakrau	Pailin
	Sung Muy	Sung	Samlot	Battambang
	Sek Sak	Phlov Meas	Rathanak Mondul	Battambang
Sri Lanka				
	Grama Niladari (GN)	**Divisional Secretary's Division**	**District**	**Province**
	Nagar Kovil	Vadamarachchi East	Jaffna	Northern Province
cf	Valalai (& Kadduvan)	Kopay	Jaffna	Northern Province
	Vannerikulam	Karaichchi	Kilinochi	Northern Province
	Malayalapuram	Karachchi	Kilinochi	Northern Province
Mozambique				
	Village	**Administrative post**	**District**	**Province**
	Mangala	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica
	Mapunguana	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica
	Mutuadza	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica
	Muchaiachaio	Espungeberra	Mussorize	Manica

[8] See Annex B2, Training Outline for Local Team of Surveyors
[9] See Annex B16, Site Selection Criteria

	Goi-Goi	Espungebera	Mussorize	Manica
cf	Zona Mugoriondo	Machipanda	Manica	Manica
Sudan				
	Village	**Payam**	**County**	**Province**
cf	Losito	Bur	Torit	Eastern Equatoria
	Saloro	Imurok	Torit	Eastern Equatoria
	At Hiliu	Himadongo	Torit	Eastern Equatoria
	Gotkwar	Pajok	Magwi	Eastern Equatoria

Available resources determined the amount of time that could be spent in each village (i.e. a few hours in each) and the tools that could be used. Given the time available it was not possible to test the tools used, however the approach taken is one that included components (i.e. focus group discussions, key informant interviews, wealth ranking, village mapping, and village timelines) which have been used for similar published studies. Therefore the data collection tools were carefully scrutinised in view of lessons learned from other experiences.[10]

The community impact survey used a set of data collection tools specifically designed for this component and these tools were systematically used in all twenty-one villages visited. The tool set was also modified to meet the demands of the counterfactual (cf) studies. The evaluation questions of the community survey component – adapted into topic outlines for facilitating focus group discussions, and topic outlines which allowed for the formulation of open ended questions for key informant interviews – were designed with a particular reference to primary Evaluation Questions 1 and 2. All data collection tools for the community impact survey can be found in the Annexes M1 to M15 of this methodology.

Data collection days through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs), village maps and wealth rankings (one day in each sampled village[11]) were followed by alternate days dedicated to data transcription to assure quality of transcription when memories were still recent.

2.6.2 Institutional Capacity and Ownership Appraisal

The long-term success of the CHASE programme will depend on the commitment and capacity of the national authorities in the target countries to take over, manage, implement and oversee programmes. The institutional aspect of the evaluation draws on a variety of information sources (including legislative, organisational, HR and budget reports) as well as the multiple perspectives of informed and concerned stakeholders in order to evaluate achievement of this objective. The evaluation will make balanced judgements on capability and ownership, taking account of circumstances in each country. The Evaluation Team also worked closely with national partners in the target countries, generating new awareness and learning and ensuring that the evaluation itself contributes to capacity development.

All data collection tools for the community impact survey can be found in the Annexes M16 to M19 of this methodology.

The starting point for this component of the evaluation was the Programme Theory of Change (TOC). This suggests that the outputs and outcomes of institutional capacity and ownership are expected to relate primarily to the State's leadership and governance role in ensuring that there are strategic policy frameworks which guide the sector defining goals, directions, spending priorities and identify the roles of the for and not–for-profit sectors and civil society. The TOC also suggests that these policy frameworks are inclusive and combined with effective oversight, coordination, regulation, evidenced–based learning and use of monitoring and evaluation and accountability. Together, this is expected to result in national policies and processes which address all Land Mine Ban Treaty criteria and conditions leading to compliance and ultimately contributing to improved quality of life in previously

[10]. Millard, Ananda. 2002. Assessing Landmine Impact at the Community Level - A Training Manual. Oslo: PRIO.
Millard, Ananda and Kristian Harpviken 2001. Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique. PRIO Report 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO.
[11] In Mozambique due to the limited time available for the whole study each village was only visited for half a day.

contaminated areas. Implicit in the Theory of Change is that mine action is institutionalised into development priorities and that gender is mainstreamed across the programme.

Based on a review of the literature and informed by the Theory of Change we began by identifying a number of stakeholders within and external to the mine action programme to understand to what extent mine action is seen as a vertical programme or whether a whole of government approach is undertaken to addressing the hazard and development bottleneck. We then developed draft questions for semi-structured key informant interviews. Questions were based on the Theory of Change and our understanding of the literature. The current Theory of Change does not articulate the specific strategies that DFID and its contractors are expected to employ in order to achieve expected outcomes. We have sought to address this through our key informant interviews and further reading of the literature. We selected key informant interviews as the main form of primary data collection as they enabled us to explore the key themes suggested by the Theory of Change and at the same time allowed informants to raise other issues they feel are pertinent.

2.6.3 Value for Money and Economic Assessment

Achieving value for money (VfM) is about achieving the maximum development benefits for the intended beneficiaries, using the available resources as efficiently as possible. It requires minimising wasteful expenditure and maximising the proportion of funds expended that lead directly to the intended outputs and outcomes.

Often the assessment of project achievements (outputs, outcomes, etc) has a subjective aspect to it, since they can often be difficult to measure, intangible (qualitative rather than quantitative) and misunderstood. VfM not only measures the cost of services and infrastructure provided, but also must take account of the mix of quality, cost, resource use, fitness for purpose, timeliness, and convenience to judge whether or not, together, they constitute good value. Judgement, in addition to numerical and statistical evidence, is therefore a requirement on the part of the evaluator when considering whether or not VfM has been satisfactorily achieved.

Assessing the VfM of mine action, given that it involves understanding the benefits achieved in relation to actual expenditure, therefore requires complete clarity about:

- The total costs of interventions from all sources;
- The complete range of benefits assessed and measured.

These are both critical to establishing the ratio of benefits to expenditure, and they both need to be measured as accurately as possible. VfM can only be calculated after true costs have been assessed, and benefits have been evaluated.

Our VfM evaluation was carried out at three levels – economy, efficiency and effectiveness – an approach which is endorsed by the NAO and DFID[12]. We have used various approaches to carrying out economy VfM evaluation of DFID mine action activities.

We drew upon the project budget data, and related the cost information to the inputs information available from the IPs' reports. This included examining and providing commentary on extraction rates of de-mining activities (costs per measure of area cleared, volumes of explosive materials lifted/ destroyed, etc).

For the efficiency VfM evaluation of mine action activities, it should be possible to conduct economic cost benefit analysis for those projects where outputs (and inputs) can be expressed in monetary value terms. This was achieved in the case of Cambodia, and grossing up methods were devised to assess overall programme impact in-country. We sought data on economic benefits from mine clearance in particular, and quantification if possible in terms of employment connected with cleared land, rural incomes etc.

Where a project generates a single (non-monetised) output, such as area of cleared land or volume of extracted materials, in theory it may be possible to conduct a cost minimisation evaluation and to rank similar projects in terms of their cost efficiency. This would have to take account of relevant influencing factors such as the nature of terrain being worked on in each case. In practice, this proved impractical due to the non-comparability of mine clearing in different countries, terrains and mine-emplacement patterns.

12 ITAD, Measuring the Impact and Value for Money of Governance & Conflict Programmes, DFID, 2010.

Finally, for effectiveness VfM evaluation, ex post impact evaluation was used. Typically, this involves both quantitative and qualitative evidence to show the contribution made to the objectives set for the project/intervention at the inception stage. Effectiveness VfM is intended to show the 'success' of the intervention and is less concerned with explaining the how or why of 'success' (or failure) in meeting objectives. In Cambodia a Net Present Value of a de-mining project was obtained, and grossing up methods were devised to assess overall programme impact in-country. In Sri Lanka, we were able to identify cohorts of beneficiaries by occupation, and attach average incomes to each. This enabled credible grossing up to arrive at collective incomes for the beneficiary group. A counterfactual was provided by their previous unemployed, aid-recipient status in refugee camps.

Several parties have made use of the 3Es approach. BOND has devised a useful methodological framework which can be used as, in effect, a set of checklists for best practice on how value for money considerations can be integrated into programme management systems. It aims to assist development agencies to make a robust and defensible case for how intervention activities may achieve VfM in terms of its three components, economy, efficiency and effectiveness[13].

Our approach to VfM measurement has cut across all components of the evaluation design. The Value for Money specialist has worked alongside Community Impact, Institutional Capacity and Mine Action Policy members of the team to ensure VfM considerations were built into to the enquiry at each level.

2.7 Data Collection Plan

Table 8 below presents our data collection plan, including persons responsible for the different aspects of data collection and the timeframe for data collection.

[13] Bond for International Development, *Integrating value for money into the programme cycle,* undated.

Table 8: Data Collection Plan

Activities	Deliverables	Primary Responsible	Secondary Responsible	Timeframe
South Sudan				
Implement Community Survey	Community Survey data, analysis and conclusions for South Sudan country report	Jo	Feedback and input from Africa Team	March 18 - 23
Implement Institutional Survey	Institutional Survey data, analysis and conclusions for South Sudan country report	Jo	Feedback and input from Africa Team	March 14 - 30
Implement VfM Assessment	Socio-Economic Survey data, analysis and conclusions for South Sudan country report	Ken[14]	Feedback and input from Africa Team	March 19 - 24
Mozambique				
Implement Community Survey	Community Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Mozambique country report	Ananda	Feedback and input from Africa Team	April 13 - 21
Implement Institutional Survey	Institutional Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Mozambique country report	Jo	Feedback and input from Africa Team	April 1 - 7
Implement VfM Assessment	Socio-Economic Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Mozambique country report	Ken	Feedback and input from Africa Team	April 18 - 22
Cambodia				
Implement Community Survey	Community Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Cambodia country report	Sabrina	Feedback and input from Asia Team	March 12 - 28
Implement Institutional Survey	Institutional Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Cambodia country report	Yusaf	Feedback and input from Asia Team	April 1 - 7
Implement VfM Assessment	Socio-Economic Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Cambodia country report	Ken	Feedback and input from Asia Team	April 1 - 7
Sri Lanka				
Implement Community Survey	Community Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Sri Lanka country report	Sabrina	Feedback and input from Asia Team	April 3 - 17
Implement Institutional Survey	Institutional Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Sri Lanka country report	Yusaf	Feedback and input from Asia Team	April 8 - 14
Implement VfM Assessment	Socio-Economic Survey Report data, analysis and conclusions for Sri Lanka country report	Ken	Feedback and input from Asia Team	April 8 - 14

[14] Ken MacTaggart was unable to travel to South Sudan and instead met with MAG Sudan officials in the UK, and corresponded with them by email in the field

2.8 Ethical, Reliable and Valid Data Collection

Here we present specific challenges posed to our data collection activities, and the actions we took to ensure the data we collected was as reliable and valid as possible, using ethically sound and efficient techniques.

Do no harm approach – Our evaluation has strived to take a do no harm approach, appreciating and protecting sensitivities of people in the process of evaluation and reporting, being respectful of privacy and the rights of evaluation participants to anonymity, gaining informed consent as a standard practice in our fieldwork, and seeking to represent viewpoints accurately.

Gender issues – The Community Impact Assessment team designed its survey approach with gender sensitivity in mind. We took care to ensure representation of women and men in the survey teams. All interviews and focus groups were conducted by the locally recruited and trained surveyors. Our training programme emphasised the importance of equality issues. Focus group sessions were conducted to ensure that gender and cultural matters were carefully handled and in the case of women-only groups the facilitators were women. For all surveys, interviews and focus groups we ensured that male and female staff could be assigned to ask sensitive questions and conduct sensitive interviews. In Sri Lanka, in villages where components of teams were only males, the Survey Team Leader (male), experienced in social work and protection, would accompany the international Community Impact Assessor (female) for more sensitive interviews or for interviews with groups of women.

Language issues – As part of the community survey it was extremely important that we recruited surveyors who were proficient in the local languages of the communities being surveyed, in order to ensure that we did not misrepresent the views of individuals from those communities, so that communication could be clear between surveyors and survey respondents, and so that survey could be conducted efficiently within the short time available and in order to reduce the burden on respondents time. In Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Mozambique there were no cases where language competence was an issue as the surveyors spoke the language of those being surveyed. In one village in South Sudan language was a challenge because none of the survey team spoke the local language. However, most of the village inhabitants spoke either English, as they had been refugees in Uganda, or Juba Arabic, which was spoken by members of the survey team. Therefore communication was not hindered.

Data protection – Participants in all aspects of the evaluation fieldwork were verbally informed of the objectives of the evaluation and told that their participation was voluntary and that they could withdraw at any time without discrimination. They were also told that the information they provided would be kept anonymous. Participants then gave their informed consent to participating in the evaluation fieldwork.

Quality of community impact surveyors – Community impact survey teams were selected based on participatory evaluation skills, language skills, local sensitivity and with a concern for gender balance. The quality of surveyors varied as did their respective levels of experience.

Selecting valid counterfactuals for the community impact survey – In Cambodia every village had received a mine action intervention at some point, so the counterfactual we used was a village which had no operations under the CHASE programme and which had not had any operations from any other organisation for several years, despite significant contamination still existing. In Sri Lanka, little demining had been conducted in the country as a whole, much agricultural land was still to be cleared and many villagers lived in IDP camps which the government declares do not exist. It was therefore difficult to isolate a place where no demining was performed, and the village selected for the counterfactual is a place where large areas are still contaminated and they are also not accessible to the population, being under the control of the military. Not all people who lived here have been authorised to come back. We therefore visited therefore both the counterfactual village and the IDP camp where many people originally from that village are still housed.

Gaining assistance from MAG and HALO whilst minimising bias - The evaluation was able to work freely and without interference. Often MAG and HALO assisted with introductions to villages being surveyed, since access to these communities and accurate details on their profile to enable purposive sampling would have been difficult without this assistance. However, MAG and HALO did not take part in any data collection, and the Evaluation Team tried to limit how much MAG/HALO and the Evaluation Team were seen together. In Sri Lanka the close control of territory conducted by the military imposed the requirement that we have strict coordination with HALO, who was often present in the same village at same time we were conducting fieldwork. In these instances we tried as far as possible to have meetings in closed buildings or even in private houses with large capacity, to limit the influence of HALO's presence on the response of those being surveyed. In Cambodia, an introduction to villages was provided by the community liaison team of the local demining organisation, who helped to establish first contact between the

Village Head and the Evaluation Team. However, in order to limit the influence of the community liaison team's presence with the Evaluation Team on the views of those being surveyed, the Evaluation Team limited how much they were seen with the community liaison team. In only one village, Chisang, in Cambodia were the Evaluation Team and community liaison team seen together by the local community, where the Evaluation Team quickly met the community liaison team before starting interviews at the Village Head's house. In South Sudan MAG transported the data collection team to a village and picked them up later the same day, while in Mozambique time did not allow for the HALO team to leave. However an effort was made to enable community members to feel that they had an opportunity to respond to questions privately and emphasis was placed on the independence of the team. Given that in all cases the respective operator was needed to support the initial contact with the village it is reasonable to assume that despite our best efforts communities did, at least at times, identify the survey team as linked to the demining operator. To this end efforts were made in the data collection process to ensure that data collected was as reliable as possible. This was achieved by collecting data from numerous sources and through multiple mechanisms (i.e. interviews, village mapping, etc). In cases where information on new suspected areas emerged during the data collection process, then the demining operator was engaged in a discussion with the village after data collection had finished. This was not the aim of the village surveys, but served as an added benefit of the surveys. In each country informal debriefings were held with the demining operators following the field visits.

Potential Conflict of Interest - Two members of the evaluation team had previously worked with one of the MA operators (as highlighted in the inception report), however, we dealt with this potential conflict of interest through group analysis and peer review of the data.

Dealing with divergent views – Differences of opinion within the evaluation team or amongst stakeholders consulted are acknowledged in the report, and were confronted and debated, but tested against the evidence at all times. Initial findings from the in-country fieldwork were check for factual accuracy with key stakeholders before the evaluation team left each country, through both formal and informal debriefing sessions. Further to this, during finalisation of the evaluation report key stakeholders were asked to review the report for factual accuracy and any points raised were dealt with.

2.9 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data analysis and interpretation began with initial coding and analysis of data taking place in the field to identify community and country level patterns and themes. Given the dispersed locations of team, the members worked in cluster groups to compare analyses of data and discuss anomalies encountered and initial key findings and conclusions. From these a more detailed analysis of findings from the fieldwork was prepared for each country visited. These are provided within Annexes C-F, the country mission reports. Findings from attendance and interviews conducted at events such as the GICHD 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors were coded, analysed and summarised; these are included as Annex I. A review and detailed analysis of the literature and wider programme documentation was also undertaken and is included in Annex B.

The distillation of findings, conclusions and recommendations from the large body of evidence collected involved an iterative process of analysis and interpretation. This identified significant patterns and themes emerging from the multiple sets of primary data and secondary information sources and across multiple countries. Special attention was paid to those which related to the three core evaluation objectives and the evaluation questions. Discussions at the team drafting workshop and through bilateral internal reviews of data made it possible to nuance interpretations and subject findings to closer scrutiny. The final report has been subject to comprehensive peer review by our designated internal peer reviewers, as well corroboration and fact checking of findings with key stakeholders.

Transcripts of all primary data are available in the language in which data was collected as well as in English.

2.10 Limitations of our Evaluation Approach

The qualitative approach used by this evaluation has an inherent limitation in determining the external validation of findings, especially when combined with purposive sampling. The concern is how far findings on the impact of the CHASE MA Programme gathered in the sampled areas and from key informants within the four fieldwork countries, can be generalised to explain the impact of the CHASE MA programme on mine action globally. To address this, all data included in the report has, where possible, been corroborated by multiple sources. Further, to the extent possible we have cross-validated findings across a range of national, local and individual contexts.

The countries selected for fieldwork as part of this evaluation represent a diverse range of mine action contexts. Within these countries, our criteria for identifying communities to sample for the community impact survey included villages that have MAG or HALO ongoing or completed CHASE MA funded operations. Additionally, these were as different as possible among each other in terms of: contamination type, livelihoods zones, migration patterns and remoteness. Within communities we sought as far as possible to gain views from people of different genders, ages and ethnicities from the people that were available. However, as discussed below, it was difficult to take a highly systematic approach to sampling and we therefore used a purposive sampling strategy. Our sampling process for the key institutional capacity appraisal first involved a stakeholder mapping process which ensure that a diverse range of stakeholders were considered and interviewed. By using consistent procedures to collect data across the different country, village and individual level contexts, and by ensuring that findings on key issues have been cross-validated across a range of contexts, we have sought to optimise the external validity of our findings.

Deliberately identifying countries, communities and individuals which have had different experiences made it possible to collect data on the widest possible range of experiences; however this did reduce our ability to triangulate primary data since experiences may not have been replicated in other villages. Data triangulation has therefore also relied on expert opinion (of our evaluation team and key stakeholders), and cross validation of findings against the hypotheses presented in our literature review and the Meta Evaluation.[15] Data collected as part of the community impact survey was also triangulated at the village level. Survey teams used the focus group discussions and interviews with men and women as a mechanism to ensure the validity of individual findings. This approach served to ensure that at the village level the data was verified to the highest possible degree. The qualitative methods we used generated large amount of interview notes and transcripts (which are available on request). Survey teams in the field alternated interviews and FGDs with data transcription, interpretation and early analysis of key issues and trends and, as a group, reviewed findings daily. We have drawn all findings, conclusions and recommendations from the evidence and have referenced them to the data.

Given the resources available to this evaluation and the limited amount of time available to spend in each country and in each community, a purposive approach to site selection was essential. Random sampling would have required a much larger population than was accessible in most countries. Time and distance factors meant that the evaluation team could only visit a small number of communities, particularly given the desire to minimise travel time and maximise time spent in communities. Many of these communities were small and taking a random sample within these communities would have been neither practical nor representative.

Instead, a purposive sample was selected as the sampling approach best suited to the requirements of this evaluation, enabling the evaluators to quickly identify an appropriately differentiated sample, including a counterfactual. The counterfactual was utilised as an additional case study to provide information on context and conditions that aggravate or minimise the threat to development caused by landmines. Counterfactuals were not primarily used to counter the findings of the results from the treatment group because the data available from the counterfactuals was limited. Their value was largely in context setting.

The data collection tools used as part of the evaluation were tested through peer review and then in the context of in-country training workshops for the survey team. Furthermore, the approach taken to data collection is one that included components (i.e. focus group discussions, key informant interviews, wealth ranking, village mapping, and village timelines) which have been used for similar published studies. While not formally tested, the data collection tools were carefully scrutinized in view of lessons learned from other experiences.[16]

We avoided interviewer / researcher bias as far as possible by ensuring that experienced interviewers and surveyors were recruited to conduct data collection. The local survey team reflected, as far as possible, ethnic and cultural characteristics of the communities surveyed as well as gender considerations. They received training to ensure consistent and objective data colleection procedures. Surveyors worked in teams. Further, while expert opinion can be highly relevant in focussing the areas of enquiry, we have sought to ensure that it did not influence unduly the interpretation of data by drawing on multiple perspectives within and outside the team. Opinions were confronted and debated, and tested against the evidence at all times.

As indicated in the inception report, during the early design of the assessment tools it became evident that the collection of primary quantitative data would not be realistic given the resources and time constraints. Following a

[15] Sheelagh O'Reilly, Judith Friedman, Hatty Dinsmore, Rob Storr, & Ronnie MacPherson, 'Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report', IOD PARC, Sheffield, 31 July 2012 (hereafter, *Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report*),

[16]. Millard, Ananda. 2002. Assessing Landmine Impact at the Community Level - A Training Manual. Oslo: PRIO.
Millard, Ananda and Kristian Harpviken 2001. Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique. PRIO Report 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO.

review of the baseline survey, it was clear that the magnitude of resources put into this survey is not comparable to the resources available for this evaluation. For example, the baseline survey conducted in Cambodia employed 14 people for six months, while the baseline survey conducted in Sri Lanka employed 30 people for four months. Furthermore, each country which undertook a baseline survey did not follow a standard methodological process, making any follow-on before and after survey complex, and giving the resulting findings little external validity. The data collected in the evaluation was richer than the baseline data which existed. In Mozambique, for example, the initial baseline data systematically showed that landmines were primarily a threat to security whereas the survey material shows the relationship between the landmines and development more broadly.

2.11 Communication and Reporting of Results

This results of this evaluation will be communicated to a number of stakeholders, including the global mine action community, governments of countries with landmine problems, and international donors. We have outlined a plan for the communication and dissemination of results at Annex K. In this we identify all key stakeholders, their needs in relation to the evaluation results and proposals for a set of information products.

Annex M1 - Operational Guidance for the Community Impact Survey

A PREPARATION FOR FIELD WORK

- All surveyors in the local consultation groups shall be fluent in the relevant local language(s).
- The villages to be visited will be informed prior to the arrival of the team and the calendar will be confirmed with the Head of Village (VH), and/or the traditional authority/ government leadership - where a dual system exists. Make sure the relevant authority is contacted prior to fieldwork taking place.
- Provide a letter of introduction to the relevant authority containing few bullet points to explain briefly the purpose of the survey and explain the work to be done and the people to be consulted, the type of composition for each focus group discussion (FGD) and the criteria to chose KIIs. Make sure the surveyors can quickly and clearly express all this information, especially keeping in mind the possibility of illiteracy among VHs.
- Be sure to request that VHs call the members of the community to participate in the fieldwork and to be available for KII. It is recommended that identification of the VH is confirmed by asking to school teachers, health focal point, and CBOs leaders if the named individual is indeed the VH.
- Confirm venue within the village to conduct the FGD.
- Explain how the interviews will be conducted (see point D) and make sure to fix the right time for each type of group of participant to join in. Avoid unclear communication and unnecessary loss of people's time by being specific about the times of interviews. Consult with the VH, school teachers, women's group .to identify the best timing for interviews and be flexible if specific needs arise (but keep in sights the minimum requirements - see Survey design document)
- To reduce the inconvenience to the community, consider having a person who is able to provide child care during the FGDs. let people know in advance about this arrangement.

B EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS

- Copy of Topic Outline for FGD, and guidance for wealth ranking and timelines in the local language version to be used during FGDs / group interviews.
- Copy of questions and issues to discuss with KIIs.
- Village information sheet.
- Clean printed matrix for data input to facilitate note taking during FGDs.
- Copy of community map developed during baseline assessment / LIS (if any).
- Clean paper sheets, pens, different color markers, larger paper sheets (A0).
- Cameras and video-cameras to record and document relevant aspects of the community and households interviewed (see point F).
- Portable computers for data input in the office space provided at the accommodation (if field work is itinerant - to be used once the FGDs / group interviews or KIIs are completed).
- Name badges for surveyors.
- Light refreshments for attendants to FGDs (check budget).
- Drinkable water and snacks for personal consumption during travel as needed.
- Road Map of the area to visit.
- Sufficient fuel for full mission, including portable tanks, and all necessary equipment for safety in car trips.

C FIELD MISSIONS ON MULTIPLE DAYS

- Bring sufficient material, as listed in point B, to cover all villages scheduled to be visited during the mission.
- Arrange safe and proper accommodation for the team.
- Inform main office about the itinerary and confirm team movements twice a day to a designated person who will be at the main office.
- Arrange office space (table, seats, electricity); including internet connection for transferring data (see point D).

D DATA COLLECTION

The team shall be composed of equal number of men and women

- In each village at least two FGDs and / or group interviews shall be held (morning and afternoon session). Each FGD will develop by using:

- The topic outline in local language;
- Materials to draw a timeline according to the guidance;
- Materials to develop a wealth ranking of community members in connection with rights to use the cleared/contaminated land.

- Additional tools estimated as necessary in the participatory work can be added and shall be shared with the international team and documented as they are introduced;
- Make sure it is clear to all contacted people that the information collected will be kept anonymous (those who will be reading the study results will not know who has said what);
- If only two FGDs are possible in each village, ensure that they are gender homogenous – hold one FGD with women and another with men. If due to village dispersion or community members' schedules this will not be possible, ensure to include some extra female KIIs to be interviewed by female surveyor(s) with no additional people present. Document on the village form the reason that prevented you from holding separate meetings for men and women.
- Also consider the influence that different age groups and different patterns of authority among respondents could influence groups and be aware of the potential for bias that could be introduced.
- Each FGD shall be facilitated by two surveyors: if the group is mixed the team can be mixed as well, in case of FGDs with women only, it is important to have female facilitators.
- One facilitator will interact with the group, while the other will take notes on the printed data input matrix.
- The Team Leader will conduct key informants interviews while the FGDs are taking place.
- If the Team Leader is a man ensure that only female members conduct interviews with women.
- If the KY interviews are completed before end of FGs, consider setting up group discussions with (some) of key informants to develop an (additional) agreed timeline.

E DATA TRANSCRIPTION

- At the end of every visit, organise time and space for team group discussion to exchange understanding and fresh impressions on data collected, and note them on the village information form.
- Take a picture of the graphic tools used and developed during the community survey, transcribe the comments of participant in the discussion in digital format (word), and insert the pictures into the same file (see point F).
- The video clips and photographs need to be archived properly according to the CS guidance sheet, using the following coding:
  - [Date of collection]_[Name of village]_[CATEGORY]_specific name for the picture/video
  - Categories to be used are:
    - "KII" (clip or picture of a key informant)
    - "FGD" (clip or picture of a focus group)
    - "MAP" (clip or picture of a community map)
    - "WR" (clip or picture of a wealth)
    - "SITE" (clip or picture of a cleared site / or still suspected hazardous area)

- All files related to a given village shall be saved in a folder named according to coding: [date]_[name of village]
- The files for FGDs will be coded:
  - [date]_[name of village]_FGD_M (male participants)
  - [date]_[name of village]_FGD_F (female participants)

- The files for KIIs will be coded
  - [date]_[name of village]_KII_[description of role]_[sex of KII]
    if the KII is not related to a specific village, but more to a district/province just omit that part (make sure to specify profile in the KII transcription form, as requested)

- In the workplan, days dedicated to data collection shall alternate with days dedicated to data transcription in ENGLISH onto the supplied form (for interviews) and matrix (for FGDs).
- Transcriptions and other data will be transferred over the internet to CS member of the international team of consultants on a daily basis.
- The Team Leader of each national consultants' group will be responsible for the completeness, accuracy and timeliness of data and to coordinate and share initial understanding emerging from the national team while conducting the survey.

- The Team Leader of each national consultants' group will be responsible for organising the logistics of field missions and to ensure materials and tools for the survey are available and functioning.

F MULTIMEDIAL DATA

- Photos are necessary for each site visited, also for documenting that data collection has taken place.
- Ask participants if it is possible to take a picture during the FGD (not many are needed, just one per focus group).
- Take picture of each graphic representation that is developed in a participatory manner (community map, timeline, wealth ranking, etc).
- If during an interview or a FGD a story that could look like a positive case on combination of mine action work with development emerges from the narrative of community member, ask the person who introduced the concept to repeat it in the camera, possibly at the end of the FGD if it was expressed in the collective setting.
- If during interviews or FGDs someone describes an some innovative practice, procedure or technique used by MA organisation in performing their work, ask to the person who introduced the concept to repeat it to camera, possibly at the end of the FGD if it was expressed in a collective setting.
- Archive all multimedia files as specified above.
- The use of cameras shall be undertaken in a responsible and thoughtful fashion: ongoing work shall not be interrupted and distractions should be avoided.

Annex M2 - Training Outline for Local Team of Surveyors

DAY ONE

- Introduction of participants
- Scope of the evaluation study
- Landmines and their socio-economic impact
- What is Mine Action - highlights
- CHASE MA Strategy - highlights
- Socio-economic and Community impact: what is it and who will study it?
  - The sustainable livelihood framework
  - Gender Analysis
  - Do no Harm
  - Qualitative study: Participatory technique

DAY TWO

- Presentation of the topic outline for FGD – detailed discussion of each point
- How to conduct a FGD/Group interview
- How to make a community map, timeline, wealth ranking
- How to conduct key informant interviews
- Stakeholders for community survey

DAY THREE

- Exercise on the topic outline instrument / Facilitation and Note taking / validation of translation
- Field procedures
  - Calendar
  - Preparation of visit
  - Data transcription
- Essentials of MRE for staff safety
- Exercise on the topic outline instrument / Facilitation and Note taking / validation of translation

First day after data collection: tutoring data transcription

Facilitating team exchange on data collected and critical points

Annex M3 – Community Impact Survey Programme for a Standard Data Collection Day

AM

6:30 / 7:00 Departure

8:00 Arrival at the village
Meet the Village Head – introduction – explain the reason for the visit and how information collected will be used
Meet the group – introduction

8:30 Start the two FGDs (one male group and one female) – avoid presence of village head during the focus group discussions; one surveyor can do the timeline with the village head while the FGDs are held. Allocate a maximum of 20 minutes to do the community map.

While the FGD of women is being conducted, coordinate with the driver to entertain the children in the village, keeping driver and children in the sight of the mothers. Procure in advance some paper and pencils for the children to play with.

9:30 Bring some refreshments in for the FGD participants and some extra for other KIs who will be interviewed in parallel, and for the children. The driver can be responsible for the logistics of the refreshments.

10:30 (max 11:00) FGDs are completed.

10:40 to 11:00 (or 11:10 to 11:30) Plan KII interviews with the help of VH or with the community volunteer/s.

11:00 (or 11:30) try to start interviews with KII (will most likely be all males in this timeframe); make sure you also talk to women at a convenient time for them.

12:00 Pause for lunch

13:00 to 17:00 Interviews with key informants in the village and in the surrounding area. Split the group as necessary to optimise time and resources, and ensure female surveyors talk to women.

17:00 Departure

CHECKLIST OF TOOLS TO BE USED IN COMMUNITY IMPACT SURVEY

1. Village information form	(only for Team Leader)
2. Focus Group Discussion / Group Interview - topic outline	(use translation in local language)
3. FGD form for data collection	(use it in digital version for data transcription and printed for taking notes)
4. Wealth Ranking Matrix	(also in file for data transcription)
5. List and synopsis of Key Informant	
6. Questions for interviews to KIs	
a. Form for data transcription of KIIs	(only in file)
7. Timeline	
8. Community map guidance	
9. FGDs / GI in counterfactual village – topic outline	
10. Questions for interviews to KIs in counterfactual village	
11. Female Farmers Cooperative	

Annex M4 – Community Impact Survey Village Information Form

Date of visit		**Name of village**	
Estimated number of inhabitants		**District / Province**	
Characteristics	Type of land / landscape		
	Distance from main towns and services (water, market, schools, hospitals, roads)		
	Type of blockages/problems caused by landmines		
	Other:		
MA Organisation	HALO ☐ MAG ☐ NONE ☐		
Other organisations working in the village	Name and description of activities KII ☐		
	Name and description of activities KII ☐		
	Name and description of activities KII ☐		
Notes on demining / MA			
Notes on conflict in the area			
KI interviewed	1 – _____ 2 – _____ 3 – _____ 4 - _____ 5 - _____		
FGD			
Photo/clip			
Comments			

Annex M5 – Community Impact Survey Focus Group Discussions Topic Outline

(Full version for surveyor facilitating discussion)

TO BE USED AS A CHECKLIST TO COVER TOPICS IN A CONVERSATION, NOT AS A QUESTIONNAIRE.
WHEN TOPICS ARE SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED, SKIP THE PARTS THAT RE-PROPOSE THEM.
READ AND LEARN THE SECTIONS AND THE TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE,
USE THE QUESTIONS PROPOSED IN THIS OUTLINE TO HELP YOU REMEMBER THE ISSUES YOU WANT TO HEAR ABOUT PEOPLE'S PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND OPINION.
SURVEYOR 1 INTERACTS WITH PARTICIPANTS WHILE SURVEYOR 2 TAKES NOTES.
ENGAGE ALL PARTICIPANTS, LOOK AT PEOPLE WHILE TALKING TO THEM.
CODES IN THE FIRST COLUMN REFERE TO THE OVERALL QUESTIONS MATRIX,
MAKE REFERENCE TO THEM IN ANALYSIS AND REPORT WRITING.
WE WANT TO REFER TO THE WORK DONE UNDER CHASE FUNDING, THEREFORE MAKE SURE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THE MA ACTOR AND TIMEFRAME YOU WANT THEM TO TALK ABOUT.
ALSO USE COMMUNITY MAP ACCORDINGLY, TO VERIFY ATTRIBUTION.

Date of visit		**Name of village**	
Surveyor name		**Commune / District / province**	
Sex of participants	☐M ☐F	**Number of people**	
STARTING TIME		**ENDING TIME**	
Notes			

USE THIS SPACE TO CHECK WHEN A TOPIC AND THE RELEVANT SET OF QUESTIONS ARE SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED
▼▼▼

1 - Community Map of the village

	Start by drawing a map – see guidance note	

2 - Prioritisation / targeting (small p)

R.2	**HOW WAS THE LAND TO BE CLEARED CHOSEN?** Who decided which land had to be cleared? Were you consulted? Are you happy with the choice? What other land did you want cleared instead and why? How would you benefit from this land? How would have you have benefitted from some other task instead? Are there differences in the answers that men /women / girls and boys are providing?	
R.13 EFF.8	**WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THE PHASE FOR PLANNING?** Were you involved in the planning of the fieldwork set up by the MA actors? When MAG/HALO started to work here, did they consult the community? Did they talk with men and women, youth and elderly? If yes how? Would have you wanted things done differently? How? Why?	
EFF.5	**DID YOU PROVIDE INFORMATION** on which land was contaminated and other important issue? How? Do you think this information has been used by the MA organisation?	

R.14	**WAS SOME GROUP OR SOME INDIVIDUAL (M/F) TOTALLY DISSATISFIED BY THE CHOICE OF TASKS?** Why weren't they satisfied? What other task did they want instead? What is the profile of these people who were not happy (male or female/ how wealthy)?	
R.16	**WHO WAS / IS THE OWNER OF THE LAND DEMINED?** Who has the right to use it? Who frequents it most (men women girls boys)? Who gets the final benefit of what is produced / extracted or of the infrastructure that has been built on (men women girls boys)? If infrastructure is built on it, for who by who? *(first entry point to understand land tenure system in practice)*	
R.18 EFF.7	**HOW DOES THE CLEARANCE OPERATIONS BENEFIT VULNERABLE PEOPLE?** Have people who have more difficulties in making a living received benefits from the MA operations? If they did not get any benefit, how could they be supported more by mine action work? Do you feel the MA people have chosen the land to clear first in a way that is beneficial to very poor and vulnerable people? Can you share your impression on the type of choice of land that is being cleared first?	

3- Coordination with development actors

R.15 VM.1	**WHEN THE MA ORGANISATION STARTED TO WORK IN THE VILLAGE, DID THEY COORDINATE WITH OTHER NGOS?** Which ones? How? Were you involved in this dialogue?	
EFF.6 I.19 ESS.7	**DID MAG/ HALO WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER NGOS THAT ARE DOING DEVELOPMENT?** If yes how? What do they do together? What was the result? Can you provide some example? *(Consider taking footage of some interviews / discussions revolving around this point)*	
R.17	**IS THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTING DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS IN THIS AREA?** Which ones? What plans has the Government for these areas? Who are Government partners in development interventions? How is the work of MAG / HALO supporting these plans and priorities?	
    ESS.12	**ARE NGOS OR OTHER GROUPS OPERATING HERE TO PROMOTE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT?** When did they come? How do they react to mine contamination? Were they part of the demining initiative somehow?	

4-Mine Action as a livelihoods opportunity

  DNH.7	**WHAT WAS THE FIRST REACTION TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE MA OPERATORS IN THE COMMUNITY?** Who was opposing it, who was welcoming it? Why? Did opinions change over time?	
  EFF.1	**WERE THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY SOMEHOW PART OF THE MA OPERATIONS?** How? Who?	
I.8 DNH.2 VM.8 .15 EFF.9	*(DISCUSS THE FOLLOWING IF THERE ARE PEOPLE HIRED BY THE MA ORGANISATION – OTHERWISE ASK ONLY TO MA ORGANISATION STAFF AND SKIP THIS SET OF TOPICS)* **ARE THERE MORE MEN OR WOMEN WORKING FOR HALO/ MAG IN THE VILLAGE**? What type of jobs do they have? What is their economic treatment in comparison? How were / are women dealing with household care responsibilities while also working in these jobs? How did the salaries compare among men / women hired (proportion)? Were they from the community or from somewhere else? Describe the jobs that men and women had in the MA organisations. Are they alike or not? What do you think about it? What kind of profile did they seek? What training did they receive? Did both male and female receive the same training?	

	Can you describe the **characteristics** (skills, knowledge, wealth, background) of the people who work (or worked) for MAG / HALO? **Are there both men and women?** How many? What do they do? Can you describe the profile of people who obtained a direct benefit from land clearance? Who are they? And what about mine accident survivors? Where they employed by MAG/HALO?	
DNH.1 DNH.6 DNH.5	**WHICH GROUPS IN THE COMMUNITY HAD MORE BENEFITS FROM THE MA OPERATIONS?** And which had less so? Why? What was the reaction? What kind of effect has the presence of the MA operations, of MAG / HALO staff had on the village? On who specifically? Has it had the same effect on all? Who are those who cannot profit from the job opportunities that MA, or other development actors or some external private company is offering to the village?	
DNH.10	**IF TENSIONS AROSE DURING MA OPERATIONS** among different groups in the community or towards the MA organisation, how did the MA organisation respond to these problems? Was the MA organization aware of the type of issues that created these tensions?	
I.16	**PEOPLE WHO WORKED PREVIOUSLY FOR MAG / HALO, ARE NOW EMPLOYIED SOME WHERE?** ALL of them? What were they doing with MAG HALO and what do they do now? If they have a job now, do they earn same as before when working with MAG / HALO? *(consider taking footage of specific cases)*	
VM.9 I.9	**DID WOMEN PARTICIPATE IN THE COMBAT IN THIS AREA*?** How? Did they come back to the village? If yes, what did they do afterwards? Did they get involved in the MA operations? Did they get hired by MA organisations or others? How? Do they have same kind of jobs / activities now as the men who were involved in combat?	
I.7 I.20	**HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE WOMEN'S CONDITIONS** if you compare the situation before contamination, during and after? If yes, what changed? Was the change happening easily? Did landmine contamination change habits of male / female / young girls / boys? How? Was it the same for all? Can you provide some examples? And what about the MA operations, did they also influence what is considered to be appropriate for women and for men?	
I.18	**DID ANYONE START A SMALL BUSINESS WHEN THE MA ORGANISATION WAS HERE?** What type of business? Were more women or more men involved in this business? How were children and young girls and boys involved in this small business? How many people were - more or less - involved in this type of business? Did the business continue after the MA operation was concluded?	

5- Post Clearance situation

S.1	**CAN YOU EXPLAIN (ON THE MAP) THE TYPE OF OPERATIONS THAT THE MA ORGANISATION HAS CONDUCTED?** Are there areas that have not been demined? How were they treated? Why?	
ESS.3 DNH.3	**WHO IS CURRENTLY USING THE RELEASED LAND?** For what? Is the same person/group of people who were using it before the mines were laid? What changed with mining and with demining? Are the people in the community using the land cleared, or did others start to use it after demining?	
R.23	**DID YOU LIVE ON THIS LAND BEFORE IT WAS DEMINED?** And once it was demined?	
I.1	**WHO OWNS THE LAND THAT IS BEING CLEARED?** Who has the right to use it? What is the limit of this right? In the household, who are the members who frequent it most? And who are the members who benefit from the goods/services that can be extracted/produced by using that cleared land? (*Try to explore tenure system and its gender lines).*	
I.3	**CAN YOU THINK OF PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY WHO HAD SOME CLEAR BENEFIT** due to the MA operation? How did they benefit? What type of HH are they in terms of demographics and wealth rank?	
I.10	**DID YOU OBSERVE ANY CHANGE IN THE WAY THAT LAND IN THE VILLAGE IS USED / FREQUENTED?** Can you explain what changed - if anything? Who are the people involved in this change? Are they all from the village? How are they involved?	

I.11	**WHAT DO PEOPLE DO FOR A LIVING IN THE VILLAGE?** Was it different before landmine contamination? What changed after clearance?	
I.2 R.22	**WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF CLEARANCE OF THE CONTAMINATED LAND ON THE LIFE OF PEOPLE?** Can you describe any change that happened in their daily life, if any (mobility, access to, income, opportunities, confidence)? If nothing changed, why is that so? What is your opinion on the effect that the MA operations had on the people in the village? What changed for you personally? (Use of natural resource / relationships - social network / opportunities for cash / access to services, etc.). Was the effect the same for all people?	
DNH.4	**WHAT KIND OF COMPANIES / SUBJECTS ARE INTERESTED IN THE RESOURCES OF THE AREA?** What would they use this resource for? Are they blocked by the landmines? Are they interested in the removal of landmines? Did they have any argument / controversy with community members on the use / ownership of land? How? What happened?	
DNH.8	**DID THE PEOPLE WHO FREQUENT THE VILLAGE CHANGE AFTER DEMINING?** Did you start to see completely new people after the demining started or was completed? What kind of people started to frequent the village? And are there people who are not frequenting the village anymore since when the mines have been removed?	
ESS.11	**ARE YOU MORE / LESS / EQUALLY CONFIDENT TO BE ABLE TO USE FOREST / LAND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES NOW COMPARED TO A FEW YEARS AGO?** What are the most important natural resources here and how can you use them? Why? Did your mobility increase after the clearance operations conducted by the MA organisation?	
ESS.9 ESS.8	**WHO ARE THE MOST VULNERABLE HHs IN THE COMMUNITY?** How is their life changing because of the MA operations? Would you say that this MA operation is supporting the most vulnerable people in the community? Why? *(consider taking footage of response and possibly conduct some in depth interviews)*	
VM.5	**IS THERE AN EXAMPLE OF SOME SPECIFIC INTERVENTION / PROJECT THAT REVEALED ITSELF TO BE BENEFICIAL TO THE COMMUNITY, WHICH ALTHOUGH REALISED BY SOME OTHER ORGANISATIONS** (COULD BE IN EDUCATION, HEALTH, AGRICULTURE, INCOME GENERATING, MARKET, MOBILITY, COMMUNICATION) **HAS BEEN POSSIBLE THANKS TO THE WORK OF THE MA ORGANISATION?** Can you give details, tell the story, show the place etc.? *(Consider taking footage)*	

6- Connection and local capacity

ESS.5 ESS.2 ESS.6	**HOW DID YOU KNOW THE CLEARANCE OF THE MINEFIELD(s) CONSIDERED BY THE MA ORGANISATION WAS COMPLETED?** How did the people get to know that clearance was completed? Did everybody who needed to be informed receive the information? Did people understand the message? Can you give details on how the information on demining being completed was shared? With who? And what type of information? Who could understand better the information and who did not understand it? Has the understanding that the land was again "clean" made any transformation in life of people?	
R.24	**WHAT ABOUT FEEDBACK?** Did you have someone designated by MAG/HALO who you could speak to in case you had suggestions or in case problems emerged in relations to MA operations? What about issues strictly related to landmines: did you have access to someone to report these to?	
EFF.3	**ANY EXAMPLES?** Do you recall any cases in which some members or some groups of the community has asked for specific interventions or change in the organisation of the work of the MA NGOs? What type of issue was concerned?	
S.2 R.20 R.21	**DID YOU HAVE MRE INITIATIVES PROPOSED BY MAG / HALO?** What kind? Who participated in these initiatives/activities? What activities did the MRE group undertake here? Did MAG/ HALO conduct information activities on risk of mines? Can you describe the activities? Who were they addressed to?	
I.17 DNH.9	**ARE THERE ORGANISED GROUPS IN THE VILLAGE?** What kind? What are the types of people who participate in those groups? Did they exist before the MA operations? If yes, were they bigger / stronger before or now?	
I.6	**DID THE COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE AT SOME POINT DIVISION IN FACTIONS?** If yes, due to what? How were those factors connected with the demining operations? What change did you observe on the internal community division with the presence of the	

	deminers? And what about in the family? Did people experience any change in the relationships among family members / spouses?	
I.12	**DO YOU THINK THAT THE WORK OF MAG/ HALO INFLUENCED SOMEHOW THE LEVEL OF PEACE AND CO-EXISTENCE EXPERIENCED IN THE VILLAGE/AREA?** If yes how did that happen? And what about the rest of region?	
S.3	**HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE RISK THAT CLEARED AREAS ARE RE-CONTAMINATED?** Is that a concrete possibility or not? Why? Who would be interested in doing so? How could they get hold of landmines?	

7- Landmine accidents

R.8	**DID MINE ACCIDENTS HAPPEN IN THE VILLAGE? *(reference to the community map)*** Where? Under which circumstances? When and to who (M/F/ boys / girls) did it happen? What happened after mine accidents occurred in the village? What did MA organisations do? Who and when? What did other development organisations do?	
R.19	**ARE THERE PROGRAMMES FOR SUPPORTING THOSE WHO SURVIVED MINE ACCIDENTS? WHAT KIND?** Who is managing them? What is the relationship with MAG / HALO?	
R.7	**DID THIS VILLAGE EXPERIENCE COMMUNITY DEMINING?** Do people use (or did they use in the past) to demine by themselves land that was (supposed to be) contaminated? Did the MA organisation respond to your request to clear when you found UXOs / mines? The areas where community demining is happening is the same were the MA organization is clearing?	

8- Comparisons: MA organisations / priority village (capital P)

R.3	**HOW WAS YOUR VILLAGE CHOSEN FOR CLEARANCE?** Are there other communities which are contaminated and are more isolated than yours? Are there communities which are contaminated but less impacted than yours? (Probe to understand people's view on level of severity). Are you less isolated now? How did that change and why?	
R.23	**DO YOU HAVE REFUGEES/IDPS IN THE VILLAGE OR NEARBY?** * Do they have or have they had a problem of access to land? Due to what? How did the MA initiatives impact them (if at all)? (consider taking footage)	
R.25	If you look at the other MA campaigns that you had in the past (check years before CHASE Programme), would you say **YOU NOTICED SOME DIFFERENCES i**n the way the MA organization operated? What can you say it is different compared to the more recent work that the MA organisations are doing now? What about differences in type of areas chosen?	

ALWAYS ASK AT THE END:

IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT AND SHARE WITH US?

** Topics eliminated from Sri Lanka FGD outline*

Annex M6 – Community Impact Survey Focus Group Discussions Topic Outline – Reduced Version for Note Taking

Date of visit		**Name of village**	
Surveyor name		**Commune / District / Province**	
Sex of participants	☐M ☐F	**Number of people**	
STARTING TIME		**ENDING TIME**	
Notes			

1 - Community Map of the Village

	ANY RELEVANT COMMENT?

2 - Prioritisation / Targeting

R.2	**HOW WAS THE LAND TO BE CLEARED CHOSEN?**
R.13 EFF.8	**WERE YOU INVOLVED IN THE PHASE FOR PLANNING?**
  EFF.5	**DID YOU PROVIDE INFORMATION** on which land was contaminated
R.14	**WAS SOME GROUP OR SOME INDIVIDUAL (M/F) TOTALLY DISSATISFIED BY THE CHOICE OF TASK?**
R.16	**WHO WAS / IS THE OWNER OF THE LAND DEMINED?**

EFF.7R.18	**HOW DO THE CLEARANCE OPERATIONS BENEFIT THE VULNERABLE PEOPLE?**

3- Coordination with Development Actors

R.15 VM.1	**WHEN THE MA ORG STARTED TO WORK HERE, DID THEY COORDINATE WITH OTHER NGOS?**
EFF.6 I.19 ESS.7	**DID MAG HALO WORK TOGETHER WITH OTHER NGOS THAT ARE DOING DEVELOPMENT?**
R.17	**IS THE GOVERNMENT CONDUCTING DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS IN THIS AREA?**
ESS.12	**ARE THERE OPERATING NGOS OR OTHER GROUPS TO PROMOTE LOCAL DEVELOPMENT?**

4-Mine Action as livelihoods opportunity

DNH.7	**WHAT WAS THE FIRST REACTION TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE MA OPERATORS IN THE COMMUNITIES?**
EFF.1	**WERE THE PEOPLE IN THE COMMUNITY SOMEHOW PART OF THE MA OPERATIONS?**
I.8 DNH.2 VM.8 .15 EFF.9	**ARE THERE MORE MEN OR WOMEN WORKING FOR HALO / MAG IN THE VILLAGE**?
DNH.1 DNH.6 DNH.5	**WHICH GROUPS IN THE COMMUNITY HAD MORE BENEFITS FROM THE MA OPERATIONS?**
DNH.10	**IF TENSIONS AROSE DURING MA OPERATIONS, PLEASE EXPLAIN**
I.16	**DO PEOPLE WHO WORKED PREVIOUSLY FOR MAG AND HALO NOW HAVE A JOB?**
VM.9 I.9	**DID WOMEN PARTICIPATE IN THE COMBAT IN THIS AREA?**

I.7 I.20	**HAS THERE BEEN ANY CHANGE IN THE WOMEN'S CONDITIONS**
I.18	**DID ANYONE START A SMALL BUSINESS WHEN THE MA ORG WERE HERE?**

5- Post Clearance situation

S.1	**CAN YOU EXPLAIN (ON THE MAP) THE TYPE OF OPERATIONS THAT THE MA ORGANISATION HAS CONDUCTED?**
ESS.3 DNH.3	**WHO IS CURRENTLY USING THE RELEASED LAND?**
I.1	**WHO OWNS THE LAND THAT IS BEING CLEARED?**
I.3	**CAN YOU THINK OF SOME PERSONS IN THE COMMUNITY WHO HAS HAD SOME CLEAR BENEFIT**
I.10	**DID YOU OBSERVE ANY CHANGE IN THE WAY THAT LAND IN THE VILLAGE IS USED / FREQUENTED?**
I.11	**WHAT DO PEOPLE DO FOR LIVING IN THE VILLAGE?**

I.2 R.22	**WHAT WAS THE EFFECT OF CLEARANCE OF THE CONTAMINATED LAND ON THE LIFE OF PEOPLE?**
DNH.4	**WHAT KIND OF COMPANIES / SUBJECTS ARE INTERESTED IN THE RESOURCES OF THE AREA?**
DNH.8	**DID THE PEOPLE FREQUENTING THE VILLAGE CHANGE AFTER DEMINING?**
ESS.11	**ARE YOU MORE / LESS / EQUALLY CONFIDENT TO BE ABLE TO USE FOREST / LAND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES OR TO MOVE NOW COMPARED TO FEW YEARS AGO?**
ESS.9 ESS.8	**WHO ARE THE MOST VULNERABLE HOUSEHOLDS IN THE COMMUNITY?** (consider taking footage)
VM.5	**IS THERE AN EXAMPLE OF SOME SPECIFIC INTERVENTION / PROJECT THAT REVEALED TO BE BENEFICIAL TO THE COMMUNITY, REALISED BY SOME OTHER ORGANISATIONS (COULD BE IN EDUCATION, HEALTH, AGRICULTURE, INCOME GENERATING, MARKET, MOBILITY, COMMUNICATION) THAT THE MA ORGANISATION HAVE REALLY CONTRIBUTED TO REALISE?** Can you give details, tell the story, show the place etc (consider taking footage)

6- Connection and Local Capacity

ESS.5 ESS.2 ESS.6	**HOW DID YOU KNOW THE CLEARANCE WAS COMPLETED?**
R.24	**WHAT ABOUT FEEDBACK?**
EFF.3	**ANY EXAMPLE?**
S.2 R.20 R.21	**DID YOU HAVE MRE INITIATIVES PROPOSED BY MAG HALO?**
I.17 DNH.9	**ARE THERE ORGANISED GROUPS IN THE VILLAGE?**
I.6	**DID THE COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE AT SOME POINT DIVISION IN FACTIONS?**
I.12	**DO YOU THINK THAT THE WORK OF MAG HALO INFLUENCED SOMEHOW THE LEVEL OF PEACE AND CO-EXISTENCE EXPERIENCED IN THE VILLAGE/AREA?**

S.3	**HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE RISK THAT CLEARED AREAS ARE RE-CONTAMINATED?**

7- Landmine accidents

R.8	**DID YOU HAVE A MINE ACCIDENT IN THE VILLAGE? (refer to the community map)**
R.19	**ARE THERE PROGRAMMES FOR SUPPORTING THOSE WHO SURVIVED MINE ACCIDENTS? WHAT KIND OF PROGRAMMES/SUPPORT?**
R.7	**DID THIS VILLAGE EXPERIENCE COMMUNITY DEMINING?**

8- Comparisons: MA organisations / priority village (capital P)

R.3	**HOW WAS YOUR VILLAGE CHOSEN FOR CLEARANCE?**
R.23	**DO YOU HAVE REFUGEES/IDPS IN THE VILLAGE OR IN THE NEARBY AREA?**
R.25	**IF YOU LOOK AT THE OTHER MA CAMPAIGNS THAT YOU HAD IN THE PAST (CHECK YEARS BEFORE CHASE), WOULD YOU SAY YOU NOTICED SOME DIFFERENCES?**

Annex M7 – Community Impact Survey Focus Group Discussion Topic Outline for Counterfactuals

(For use in villages contaminated with no or little demining/MA operations)

TO BE USED AS A CHECKLIST TO COVER TOPICS IN A CONVERSATION, NOT AS A QUESTIONNAIRE.
WHEN TOPICS ARE SATISFACTORILY ANSWERED, SKIP THE PARTS THAT RE-PROPOSE THEM.
READ AND LEARN THE SECTIONS AND THE TOPICS TO BE DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE,
USE THE QUESTIONS PROPOSED IN THIS OUTLINE TO HELP YOU REMEMBER THE ISSUES ON WHICH YOU WANT TO HEAR PEOPLE'S PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND OPINION. SURVEYOR 1 INTERACTS WITH PARTICIPANTS WHILE SURVEYOR 2 TAKES NOTES. ENGAGE ALL PARTICIPANTS, LOOK AT PEOPLE WHILE TALKING TO THEM.
THE CODES ON THE FIRST COLUMN REFER TO THE OVERALL QUESTIONS MATRIX,
MAKE REFERENCE TO THEM IN ANALYSIS AND REPORT WRITING.
WE WANT TO REFER TO THE WORK DONE UNDER CHASE FUNDING, THEREFORE MAKE SURE PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THE MA ACTOR AND TIMEFRAME YOU WANT THEM TO TALK ABOUT.
ALSO USE COMMUNITY MAP ACCORDINGLY, TO VERIFY ATTRIBUTION.

Date of visit		**Name of village**	
Surveyor name		**Commune / District / province**	
Sex of participants	☐M ☐F	**Number of people**	
STARTING TIME		**ENDING TIME**	
Notes			

Community Map of the village

	Start by drawing a map – see Village Mapping guidance note. Make sure all suspected areas are marked on the map. Ask in detail what type of resources are being blocked by the landmines. Ask how many people are owners/users of the farming land blocked.	

1. **Who is most impacted by the land being contaminated?**
   The owners of the contaminated land? Or others (workers / labourers)?
   Are more women or more men resent the land being contaminated? Why?
   Are there households in the community who have no clear land at all? What do they do for a living?
   Are there households in the community who have sufficient clear land?

2. **How many households are directly blocked by the presence of landmines?**
   Are they poor or wealthy households? How large is property of the very poor households? How large is the property of rich households?

3. **How did the habits in the community change due to the landmines?**
   On food?
   On mobility?
   On activities that people could do to get an income?
   On what else?

4. **What services (education, health, markets) do you have access to?**
   If they are not accessible does it depend on mines contamination or on what other factors?

5. **How did the habits of men and of women change due to the mine contamination?**
   Can you think of some transformation? For example, do women walk longer distances too now? Or is it the opposite? Or what else?

6. **Is there farming land which is non contaminated?**
   Who does it belong to? Rich or poor families? Was it contaminated in the past? How was it cleared? Does it get rented by those who have no clear land?

7. **What crops are being farmed and by who?**
   Are they produced for self consumption or for selling?
   Do men and women have different crops they grow?

8. **Who in the family sells the produce?**
   Can women go to the market and sell? Who takes decision on how to spend the money at home?

9. **What inputs do you have for agriculture?**
   Who provides them? How do you afford to buy them?

10. **Are there microfinance organization?**
    How do they work? Who asks for loans? Who cannot get loans?

11. **How is the community of the village dealing with the problems of landmine?**
    Are there examples of solutions realized collectively? Can you describe?

12. **Are there people that take most risk in the village in walking in fields that are contaminated by landmine and UXOs?**
    Are they men /women /girls / boys? What do they do in minefields?

13. **Are people hiring individuals for demining?**
    For what cost? Are they confident in the quality?

14. **Are people touching and using UXOs?**
    For what? (hunting, fishing)

15. **Did any accident with landmines happen?**
    When, where, to who (male/female)? What was the person doing?

16. **Did conflict over land arise in connection with presence of landmines?**
    Explain, give details

17. **If people had to show a property title for having the land demined, who would not be able to produce one?** (Men and women equally?)
    What are current problems in the access to land beside the presence of landmines? Who are the categories that experience these kinds of problems the most?

18. **Did migration increase in relation to land mines?**
    Are men or women migrating most? Towards were? To do what? Do they send remittances home?

19. **If a MA operator was available to work for your village, where would you want them to start clearing from?**
    What type of land shall be cleared first? What would be the best way to talk also to the poor households?

20. **Did you receive the visit from MAG/HALO or other operators for a preparation of the baseline/needs assessment?**
    Who was consulted? How? Who was not included in the process? Why? Do you know which land was inserted in the baseline? Are all suspected areas included there?

Annex M8 – Community Impact Survey Synopsis of Key Informants at Village / Provincial Level

INDIVIDUAL FORM ☐ (NAME OF SURVEYOR _____) **FINAL RECAP** ☐

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
village / **Key Informants**	CHISANG	PHLOV MEAS	Andurk Hep	Thnal Bat	Thnal Kaeng	Ou Kokir	Boeung Run
☞Village head							
☞people who have land which is contaminated (poor / rich)							
☞beneficiary of land clearance (poor / rich)							
community development officers							
☞women's organisations							
agricultural cooperatives							
☞community based organisations							
☞deminers							
☞community volunteers (MA or other)							
agricultural extensionists							
small agro-traders							
larger traders							
construction company							
☞owners of small businesses (include: vegetables, telecommunication, taxi							
☞temples / church representatives							
☞school teachers / school directors							
☞health focal points							
traditional doctors							
☞traditional birth attendants							
local government officers							
☞Microfinance providers							
Soldiers / former soldiers							
Field officers from Development NGOs							
…							

Annex M9 – Community Impact Survey Key Informant Interviews / conversations - List of topics

The KI marked with the sign ☞ shall be prioritised

Ask each KI to elaborate on the topics listed in the relevant section.
Female surveyor shall prioritise interviews to female informants.
Always remember at the end to ask if there is anything else he/she/they want to share with you.
Make sure the conversation is on operations funded by CHASE through MAG/HALO in the correct timeframe.

☞ Village head, Local government officers

- Prioritisation process: role of Village Head, extent of involvement of the KI, criteria to decide which/whose land to target first, role of the community;
- Relationships between provincial/local level government agencies and MA organisations;
- Existence, modalities and result of MAG/HALO connection and coordination with other development actors at the village level;
- Type activities, promoters and target of MRE initiatives in the village;
- Profile of direct beneficiaries of land demined by MAG/HALO, consideration on distribution of effect on village population;
- Main issues and challenges from his/her perspective connected with demining (before, during, after);
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and possible solutions.

FOR THE VILLAGE HEAD:
Ask him/her to introduce you to the beneficiaries of the CHASE funded intervention that MAG/HALO recently finished / is conducting (concentrate only on what MAG/HALO is doing from beginning of CHASE funded operations)
*Consider doing the **timeline** with him/her (and someone else, such as deputy chief or community volunteers).*

☞People whose land is contaminated (poor / rich)

- Extent of land contaminated owned, ownership of additional land / assets beside the contaminated land;
- Wealth rank of the person *(discus dimension of households, access to education, livelihoods, etc.);*
- Use of his/her land before and possibly after contamination, comparison with other owners, possible hiring of third parties to demine and/or cultivate contaminated land;
- Coping strategy of the owner to face the lack of access to its own assets;
- Intra-household gender patterns influencing decision making related to land, agriculture, crop sale, land sale or purchase;
- Land transactions: contaminated land purchased as such, or sold, or none;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Landmine/UXOs accidents in relation to the owner's land and to the village in general: year, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivors;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations.

☞Beneficiary of land clearance (poor / rich) done by MAG / HALO OPERATIONS CONDUCTED UNDER DFID CHASE OPERATIONS

- Extent of land owned in general vs. extent of contaminated one, extent of land demined, ownership of additional assets beside the contaminated land;
- Wealth rank of the person *(discuss dimension of households, access to education, livelihoods, etc.);*
- Use of his/her land before contamination, comparison with other owners, possible hiring of third parties to demine and/or cultivate contaminated land;
- Use of his/her land before and after clearance, comparison with other owners, use of land, strategies to access inputs, use of hired labour;
- Coping strategy of the owner to face the lack of access to its own assets until clearance, plan for recovery after clearance;
- Intra-household gender patterns influencing decision making related to land, agriculture, crop sale, land sale or purchase;
- Land transactions: contaminated land purchased as such, or sold, or none;

- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Landmine/UXOs accidents in relation to the owner's land and to the village in general: year, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivors;
- Direct benefits of the demining operations received and evaluation on opportunities for livelihoods improvement;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions.

☞**Women's organisations / Community based organisations / Agricultural cooperatives / Agricultural extensionists**

- Mission, activities and governance of the organisation;
- Interaction with the demining process, level and modalities of involvement in prioritisation process;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Type activities, promoters and target of MRE initiatives in the village;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and possible solutions;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations per different type of households or communities.

☞**Owners of small businesses (include: vegetables, telecommunication, taxi etc)**

- Characteristic and background of his/her business;
- Observed or expected benefits or effects of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations on his/her activities, and on the farmers;
- Challenges existing before or even after demining;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations per different type of households or communities.

☞**Community volunteers (MA or other)**

- Type of training, functions and activities undertaken, type of coordination with MA centre at regional or provincial level;
- Type of public addressed (children, youth, men, female, old people etc), type of messages conveyed;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Example of a work week;
- Constraints and needs experienced while being a volunteer;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities.

Community development officers

- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation process;
- Interaction with the demining process, level and modalities of involvement in prioritisation process;
- Interaction with provincial level mine action agency;
- Considerations of mine action in supporting development: how, for who, modalities, gaps, success stories, ideas for improvement.

☞**Microfinance**

- Profile of those asking for microloans, relationship with contaminated land;

- Reason for loans requests, inclusion or exclusion from loan granted, conditions;
- People's capacity to repay, profiles;
- Coping strategy when loan cannot be repaid;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Consideration and trends of demand of microloans as demining progresses.

Small agro-traders / larger traders
(REFER AS STRICTLY AS POSSIBLE WHILE ASKING THIS QUESTION TO THE VILLAGE YOU ARE VISITING THAT DAY)

- Consideration and trends on agricultural production, input and crop sales as demining progresses;
- Gender patterns influencing agricultural production, opportunity to sell, access to input, productive capacity;
- Gender patterns in agriculture in relation to landmine contamination and to demining;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritization process;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities.

Construction companies
(REFER AS STRICTLY AS POSSIBLE WHILE ASKING THIS QUESTION TO THE VILLAGE YOU ARE VISITING THAT DAY)

- Consideration and trends on construction business as demining progresses;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data.*

☞ **Temples / church representatives**

- Profile of people with contaminated land, coping strategies adopted;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities;
- Extent to which demining is beneficial to the poor;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data*
- Involvement in prioritization;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal), profile of those involved and management of solutions.

☞**School teachers / school directors**

- Intersection between school attendances, land mine contamination and demining. Examples, differences according to sex, age, wealth status patterns;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities;
- Extent to which demining is beneficial to the poor;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation.

☞ **Health focal points / traditional doctors / traditional birth attendants**

- Intersection between access to health services, land mine contamination and demining. Examples, differences according to sex, age, wealth status patterns;
- Landmine/UXOs accidents in the village and in general: year, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivors;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation.

☞**Deminers**

- Accessibility of MAG/HALO job opportunities;
- Presence of female in MAG/HALO staff included deminers, HR treatment and selection process;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritization;
- Considerations on demining, reduction of poverty, outreach of vulnerable people.

Soldiers

- Background, role in conflict;
- Consideration on CHASE funded operations: quality, efficiency, relevance;
- Risks of the process;
- Accessibility of MAG/HALO job opportunities;
- Considerations on demining, reduction of poverty, outreach of vulnerable people;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation;
- Landmine/UXOs accidents encountered in his/her experience: year, place, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivor.

☞ **Field Officers of development NGOs**

- Livelihoods situation for households impacted by landmine contamination;
- Livelihoods perspectives after clearance, differences on different people;
- Practices and gaps in communication and coordination with MA organisations;
- Type of successful intervention in coordination with MA;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations per different type of households or communities.

Annex M10 – Community Impact Survey Key Informant Interviews - Transcript

Date of visit		**Name of village**	
Surveyor name		**Commune /District / province**	
Sex of the KII	☐M ☐F	**Function / occupation**	
STARTING TIME		**ENDING TIME**	
Notes			

Annex M11: Community Impact Survey Key Informant Interviews / conversations - List of topics for Counterfactuals

The KI marked with the sign ☞ shall be prioritised.

Ask each KI to elaborate on the topics listed in the relevant section.
Female surveyor shall prioritise interviews with female informants.
Always remember at the end to ask if there is anything else he/she/they want to share with you.
Make sure the conversation is on operations funded by CHASE through MAG/HALO in the correct timeframe.

☞ Village head, Local government officers

- Profile of people and households interested by land contamination, coping strategy, timeline;
- Type of contamination of landmines, impact on people, on agriculture, on other aspects of life;
- Gender differences in relation to mine contamination;
- Prioritisation process: role of Village Head, extent of involvement of the KI, criteria to decide which/whose land to target first, role of the community;
- Reason for not being prioritised by demining;
- Relationships between provincial/local level government agencies and MA organisations;
- Existence, type of work of development actors in the village despite landmines;
- Existence, type of activities, promoters and target of MRE initiatives in the village;
- Main issues and challenges from his/her perspective connected with contamination and with demining;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and possible solutions.

FOR THE VILLAGE HEAD:

- *Ask him/her to introduce you to the people with contaminated land;*
- *Consider doing the **timeline** with him/her (and someone else, deputy chief or community volunteers).*

☞People whose land is contaminated (poor / rich)

- Extent of land contaminated owned, ownership of additional land / assets beside the contaminated land;
- Wealth rank of the person *(discuss dimension of households, access to education, livelihoods, etc.);*
- Use of his/her land before and possibly after contamination, comparison with other owners, possible hiring of third parties to demine and/or cultivate contaminated land;
- Coping strategy of the owner to face the lack of access to its own assets;
- Intra-household gender patterns influencing decision making related to land, agriculture, crop sale, land sale or purchase;
- Land transactions: contaminated land purchased as such, or sold, or none;
- Understanding of the person of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Landmine/UXOs accidents in relation to the owner's land and to the village in general: year, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivors;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations.

☞Beneficiary of land clearance (poor / rich) if any, from former operations

- Extent of land owned in general vs. extent of contaminated one, extent of land demined, ownership of additional assets besides the contaminated land;
- Wealth rank of the person *(discuss dimension of households, access to education, livelihoods, etc.);*
- Use of his/her land before contamination, comparison with other owners, possible hiring of third parties to demine and/or cultivate contaminated land;
- Use of his/her land before and after clearance, comparison with other owners, use of land, strategies to access inputs, use of hired labour;
- Coping strategy of the owner to face the lack of access to its own assets until clearance, plan for recovery after clearance;

- Intra-household gender patterns influencing decision making related to land, agriculture, crop sale, land sale or purchase ;
- Land transactions: contaminated land purchased as such, or sold, or none;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Landmine/UXOs accidents in relation to the owner's land and to the village in general: year, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivors;
- Direct benefits of the demining operations received and evaluation on opportunities for livelihoods improvement;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions.

☞**Women's organisations / Community based organisations / Agricultural cooperatives / Agricultural extensionists**

- Mission, activities and governance of the organisation;
- Interaction with the demining process, level and modalities of involvement in prioritisation process;
- Type of activities, promoters and target of MRE initiatives in the village;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/landmines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and possible solutions;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, reason for being left out, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations per different type of households or communities.

☞**Owners of small businesses (include: vegetables, telecommunication, taxi etc)**

- Characteristic and background of his/her business;
- Impact of landmine contamination on local economy;
- Impact of landmine on people according to age, sex and class;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations per different type of households or communities.

☞**Community volunteers (MA or other)**

- Impact of landmine contamination on communities and households;
- Type of training, functions and activities undertaken, type of coordination with MA centre at regional or provincial level;
- Type of public addressed (children, youth, men, female, old people etc), type of messages conveyed;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Example of a work week;
- Constraints and needs experienced while being a volunteer.

Community development officers

- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to have village prioritised in the demining workplan, reason for it not to be prioritised yet, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation process;
- Interaction with the demining process, level and modalities of involvement in prioritisation process;
- Interaction with provincial level mine action agency;
- Considerations of mine action in supporting development: how, for who, modalities, gaps, success stories, ideas for improvement.

☞**Microfinance**

- Profile of those asking for microloans, relationship with contaminated land;

- Reason for loans requests, inclusion or exclusion from loan granted, conditions;
- People's capacity to repay, profiles;
- Coping strategy when loan cannot be repaid;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Consideration and trends of demand of microloans as demining progresses.

Small agro-traders / larger traders
(REFER AS STRICTLY AS POSSIBLE WHILE ASKING THIS QUESTION TO THE VILLAGE YOU ARE VISITING THAT DAY)

- Consideration and trends on agricultural production, input and crop sales in relations to area contaminated or demined;
- Gender patterns influencing agricultural production, opportunity to sell, access to input, productive capacity;
- Gender patterns in agriculture in relation to landmine contamination and to demining;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation process;
- Consideration on impact observed in communities with high level of contamination where clearance has not been performed yet, as opposed to villages where demining has progressed;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities.

Construction companies
(REFER AS STRICTLY AS POSSIBLE WHILE ASKING THIS QUESTION TO THE VILLAGE YOU ARE VISITING THAT DAY)

- Consideration and trends on construction business as demining progresses;
- Presence of construction companies in still mined areas / villages;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data.*

☞ **Temples / church representatives**

- Profile of people with contaminated land, coping strategies adopted;
- Impact of landmine contamination on communities and households;
- Extent to which landmine contamination impacts the poor;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions.

☞**School teachers / school directors**

- Intersection between school attendances, land mine contamination and demining. Examples, differences according to sex, age, wealth status patterns;
- Impact of landmine contamination on communities and households;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Observed benefits of the recent CHASE funded MAG/HALO operations for him/herself, and for the different types of households or communities;
- Extent to which demining is beneficial to the poor;

- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation.

☞ **Health focal points / traditional doctors / traditional birth attendants**

- Intersection between access to health services, land mine contamination and demining. Examples, differences according to sex, age, wealth status patterns;
- Impact of landmine contamination on communities and households;
- Landmine/UXOs accidents in the village and in general: year, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivors;
- Extent of non military use of UXOs/land mines (hunting, scrap metal, etc), profile of those involved and management of solutions;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation.

Soldiers

- Background, role in conflict;
- Impact of landmine contamination on communities and households;
- Accessibility of MAG/HALO job opportunities;
- Considerations on demining, reduction of poverty, outreach of vulnerable people;
- Understanding of the prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation;
- Landmine/UXOs accidents encountered in his/her experience: year, place, profile of victims, activities conducted, existing support for the survivor.

☞ **Field Officers of development NGOs**

- Livelihoods situation for households impacted by landmine contamination;
- Practices and gaps in communication and coordination with MA organisations;
- Understanding of prioritisation process, attempts made to be prioritised in the demining workplan, level of involvement in decision process – *consider it might be sensitive to fully understand what the real or perceived requirements to be prioritised are, make sure your interlocutor is aware of confidentiality of data;*
- Involvement in prioritisation.

Annex M12: Community Impact Survey - Instructions for Community Mapping Exercise

To draw a Community Map of the village:

- Ask one person to draw on the paper the village including:
  - main road to access village;
  - main paths inside village;
  - where are we;
  - houses;
  - important reference points (school, municipality, house of village head, temple/church, cemetery etc);
  - water source (wells, lake, river, pagoda pond);
  - cultivated areas;
  - forest;
  - suspected hazardous areas;
  - victims (mark sex, number, year, activity and impact);
  - workplace where MA has been completed;
  - workplace where MA is being conducted.

Ask people who are not drawing to confirm all the positions.

Limit the exercise to max 15-20 min.

When asking the last two questions start with the TO – questions on prioritisation.

Annex M13: Community Impact Survey - Wealth Ranking Matrix

Date of visit		**Name of village**	
Surveyor name		**Commune / District / province**	
Sex of participants and number of people	☐M QT____ ☐F QT____		
STARTING TIME		**ENDING TIME**	
Instructions	1) Take a large piece of paper (A0/A1 format) and draw five columns as in the matrix in following page; 2) Ask participants to imagine and divide all the households of the village into four categories, the extreme being very rich (best off) or very poor (worst off), and in between having the poor but not poorest, and the somewhat wealthy but not rich. Ask participants to describe the characteristics of each category of households, and write them, under headings for the different areas involved (food, housing, education, etc); 3) Collect 100 small stones / big seeds and ask the persons you are doing the exercise with to distribute as many seeds as they need to make a right balance of them in each column, so to have a right proportion of household in each wealth rank. Note down the number of stones / seeds that have been put in each amount; 4) Ask and note down how each category of households benefitted from demining: both from clearance and from the actual operations; 5) Then ask participants to describe the households profile of the most vulnerable (How many of them are single headed? How many are female single headed households?) How did they benefit from MA clearance or from operations? Note down; 6) Ask what type of marriage / marital status we can find in each group. Ask which are the households with polygamous husbands, where are the widows, where are the divorced; 7) Ask what the reason is for passing from one category to another.		
OBSERVATIONS			

Criteria	Wealth Categories							
	Category 1		**Category 2**		**Category 3**		**Category 4**	
	Before clearance	After (CHASE?)	Before clearance	After (CHASE?)	Before clearance	After (CHASE?)	Before clearance	After (CHASE?)
Food / Diet (quality and quantity)								
Livestock								
House								
Size of Land-holding								
Their Land is contaminated?								
Remittances								
Crop Production								
Access to Credit								
Role in conflict								
OTHER								

Proportion of HH				
HOW DID THEY Benefitted from: **Clearance** **Livelihoods benefit from MA operations** **Demographic profiles**				

Annex M14 – Community Impact Survey - Instructions for Developing Village Timeline

Explain to the group the objective: tracing the history of the village in relation to landmine contamination, establishing links with the development initiatives after war and demining.

Start with identifying some key milestones around when conflict and mine contamination happened.

Then progressively move towards the present day, finding milestones on the evolution of demining, on migration, tensions, livelihoods, and development interventions. In MA interventions conducted from 2011 on, ask to elaborate around the main focus: who benefits from MA interventions? How? How is MAG/HALO dealing with the community in these latest years? Consider using large paper if you have several participants.

Year	Event	Comments

Annex M15: Community Impact Survey - Summarised Community Impact Assessment Tool

	COMMUNITY MODULE	COMMUNITY MODULE	COMMUNITY MODULE	COMMUNITY MODULE	COMMUNITY MODULE		DESK REVIEW / ANALYSIS		
	C Focus Group	Timeline	Interviews with community level key informants	MA organisation mgmt	FG / direct observation/Kyi nterviews **counterfactual**	local and international NGOs in development initiatives		Mine Action Center	UN Organisations
RELEVANCE									
Was the project designed after an assessment for the preparation of a baseline, as the strategy requires?				✔			✔		
Were Socio economic data for understanding impact on communities collected?	✔		✔	✔					
How isolated and vulnerable - due to mine contamination were the communities in which the MA operations were co	✔		✔						
What tools (i.e.: MAG impact assessment tool, Norwegian People's Aid's Task Impact Assessment (TIA) and the Afghani Community-Based Demining (CBD), LIS) were used?				✔					
How were LIS data used?				✔					
Were qualitative surveys used to understand the importance of each type of blockage on local livelihoods and in a gender sensitive way?				✔					
How was community demining dealt with?	✔		✔	✔					
How was data on dangerous areas (with highest accident rate) dealt with?	✔	✔	✔	✔					
Do post clearance assessment exist? Are their results confirmed by the community?				✔					
In the needs assessment / baseline / mine impact assessment what level of aggregation was considered? Province/district – communities – households?				✔			✔		
Were data used as baseline / initial assessment sex disaggregated?				✔			✔		
How gender sensitive was the assessment? What did the assessment understand of gender patterns in the impacted communities?	✔			✔			✔		
Was any gender analysis of impacted communities developed or considered in the design / monitoring / implementation?				✔			✔		
How important was the participatory approach involving communities in assessment, but also in prioritization of tasks and planning of camps, in monitoring?	✔		✔	✔					
How was the process interacting with coordination mechanisms among development actors?	✔	✔	✔	✔					
Have the prioritizations criteria (GICHD) been respected? And if so (see my notes on the GICHD doc) is - exactly because of this "GICHD LMAD orthodoxy" - penalized gender? (LAND OWNERSHIP ISSUE)	✔		✔	✔			✔		
If prioritization was in line with National development priorities, was this conducive to communities?	✔		✔	✔				✔	
How explicit was in the operation the focus on the most vulnerable and impacted by mines, also in the interaction – if existing - with other NGOs?	✔		✔	✔		✔			
Did the country programme provide health support / including mine accident survivors, or livelihoods support?	✔			✔			✔		
Were MRE activities conducted in a fully integrated way with demining operations?	✔			✔					
Were the MRE messages and strategies developed gender sensitive and based on a gender sensitive analysis of risky behaviours?	✔			✔			✔		
Do communities consider the MA interventions useful for their own efforts to improve their livelihoods? Why?	✔		✔						
Were in the programmes specific actions / task / contracts including IDPs as beneficiaries? How was access to land for them linked to mine contamination?	✔		✔	✔					
Was any system or procedure in place to hear community feedback during implementation?	✔		✔	✔					

EFFECTIVENESS									
Did the achieved results correspond to what expected in programme proposal?							✔		
How was the release of land communicated to close communities? Do they know land is cleared? Do they tru	✔		✔						
What is the current use of released land? Who is using it? How was before contamination?	✔	✔	✔						
Did the results correspond to what communities interested by operations were expecting, based on what th	✔	✔	✔						
How was the release of land communicated to benefiaries, public authorities, development actors?	✔		✔	✔					
How was information on contamination shared? With who?	✔		✔	✔					
How did the MA teams interact with other development actors present in the operations areas?	✔		✔	✔					
How explicit was in the operation the focus on the most vulnerable and impacted by mines, also in the inter	✔		✔						
how have poor HHs and community members benefitted of the MA operations and its outputs?	✔		✔						
how did the Human development ranking and elemental indicators changed in country and in those areas interested by the opertions?		✔					✔		
How is people's confidence on the possibility of using local natural resources after the MA operations compared to - 2/3/4 years ago?	✔	✔		✔			✔		
Can we observe any vulnerable and isolated mine contaminated community becoming a point of intervention of development initiatives after the MA operations?	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔			✔
IMPACT - EFFECTS ON LIVELIHOODS (and on peace???)									
What is the profile (sex, ethnicity, class, age) of beneficiaries of released land?	✔		✔						
In the opinion of different age and sex people living in communities interested by the operations, what was	✔		✔						
Are there evidence that poverty was reduced - livelihoods improved? For who, where and how? Gender wise?	✔	✔	✔						
Are there evidence that victims of mines accident decreased in areas of operations?		✔		✔			✔	✔	
Are there evidence that local economy improved after MA operations? Why? Who participated in this? Who benefitted and how? Who was excluded and how?	✔	✔	✔						
Was any of the operations considered connected or responsible with decreased / increased tensions among communities?	✔	✔	✔	✔					
Are there changes in gender patterns and women's condition (access to economic opportunities, personal security, mobility, education, decision making) in the communities where MA was conducted? Is there any relation?	✔	✔							
What differences exist, if any, in type of jobs at implementing agencies covered by women and men?Why?	✔		✔	✔					
Were women involved in combat offered by MA operations same opportunities as men 'demobilized'?	✔		✔	✔					
How did people's livelihoods change in the latest years?	✔	✔							
Did the organisation play a role in stabilizing peace at local level? How	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔	✔			
Did the organisation play a role in stabilizing peace at national level? How?	✔	✔	✔						
Were development plans of other organisations or of Government re-designed/adjusted in function of the MA work?			✔			✔			✔
How inclusive gender-, ethnicity-, and wealth-wise was the MA project? Which people were beneficiaries, which people were staffed, which people were heard?	✔		✔						

EFFICIENCY									
How were the communities involved during the operations? Did the organization involve different stakeholders in the community while assessing mine contamination and realizing technical survey, to maximise access to sources?	✔		✔	✔					
How was the M&E system designed and implemented? Was it gender sensitive?							✔		
Was feedback from monitoring used to adjust programme?	✔						✔		
Was a socio-economic approach integrated in the monitoring? How?				✔			✔		
How was information on contamination and SHA handled? How was it shared with communities, local government, and with other key humanitarian and developmental actors?	✔		✔	✔		✔		✔	
How did the MA teams interact with other development actors present in the operations areas?	✔		✔	✔		✔			
How explicit was the focus on promoting the attention on the most vulnerable and impacted by mines in the interaction – if existing - with other NGOs?	✔		✔			✔			
Was pre and post clearance assessment performed? How?	✔			✔			✔		
What was the HR overall policy? Were men and women equally recruited? What was over the full period the percentage of local staff recruited? M/W?	✔			✔			✔		
What was the turnover rate? And what was the reason? Same for male and female staff?			✔				✔		
SUSTAINABILITY									
Were there areas that have just been marked? How? What percentage? Motivation? How do people deal with it?	✔		✔	✔					
What are the mechanisms in place for MRE? Is it completed or does it continue throught the community? How?									
What are the challenges?	✔		✔	✔					
Are there risks that cleared areas could be re-contaminated? By who? Why? Were would the mines come from?	✔		✔						
DO NO HARM									
Which groups in the communities are more satisfied with the MA operations and which are less so? Why?	✔		✔						
Were the jobs / income earning opportunities connected with the operation of equal value for men and women?	✔		✔						
Are the people in the community using the land cleared, or did it start to be used by others / foreigners / internationals?	✔		✔						
How does the specific set of MA operations interplay with land grabbing?	✔	✔	✔						
How inclusive were the job opportunities?	✔		✔						
What kind of advantage/impact the people in the community obtained from the MA operations conducted close to their territory? Explore on men, women, girls and boys	✔	✔	✔						
What was the first reaction to the arrival of the MA operators in the communities? Who was opposing it, who was welcoming it? Why? Did positions change over time?	✔		✔						
Did new people/actors arrive after the clearance of land? Who are those and what do they do?	✔	✔	✔						
In the communities interested by the operations, did local civil organisations exist who somehow were active on mine and security issues? Where them involved / reinforced / ignored / excluded ?	✔	✔	✔						

Annex M16: Community Impact Survey Site Selection Criteria

Sites were selected that have MAG or HALO ongoing or completed CHASE funded operations, but were as different from each other as possible regarding characteristics considered significant in terms of level and type of development (listed below). Counterfactual sites were communities which were still mined.

Operational Status

- Post clearance (with sufficient degree of time lapsed to measure socio-economic impact);
- Pre-clearance;
- On-going clearance.

Contamination Type

- SHAs close to/within villages are:
  - Roads (major / minor) - bridges – railroads – airstrips;
  - Water sources;
  - Schools / health posts;
  - Market places / electrical plants;
  - Productive forest / Agricultural / grazing lands;
  - Houses;
  - Churches / religious sites / cemeteries.

Type of Livelihoods Zone (if relevant)
Depends on characteristics of the country and the type of areas in which the organisation is operating, might be more or less homogeneous in this regard. Differences in livelihoods could be given by:

- Proximity to seaside / lakes;
- Mostly agricultural / big landowner or small farmers;
- Mineral mines – industrial;
- Urban location.

Migration Patterns (current and in recent past)

- Villages with high level of migration;
- Villages with many IDPs;
- Villages with no significant population movement.

Remoteness

- Distance from main town, main road and main services (schools, hospitals, markets, roads, rails roads, government offices, banks, etc.);
- Level of isolation due to contamination of surroundings;
- Presence of other international actors engaged on development activities.

Other Relevant Categories that the organisation itself might suggest (e.g. type of conflict history / warfare experience).

Annex M17: Institutional Capacity Appraisal Key Informant Interview Questions

International development NGOs /government bodies (especially development, rural development, roads)

Key Informants programme managers, *Intro self, purpose of evaluation, how evaluation will be used*

- What do you know about the mine action programme here?
- Do you work in mine contaminated areas? What are your needs vis-a-vis MA? Do you budget for clearance in your proposals?
- Have you ever asked for information / collaboration from the MAC? If so, why, and for which areas?
- Do you have collaboration with any MA actors? Do you ever collaborate with MAG / HALO? If you have interaction with other actors of MA, please describe. If you only interact with other MA other than MAG or HALO please describe why. If yes, can you give some practical example of collaboration with them?

FOR NGOs/ministries FUNDED BY DFID - are you aware of the interest that DFID has in integrating development intervention and mine action work?

- Can you describe how the interaction with MAG/HALO started and happen? Do you have regular meeting/ newsletter/mailing list etc? On what occasions do you meet them for discussion about programmes? Is the interaction mainly conducted in unofficial settings or does it happen mostly in organised / institutional situations?
- Has there been any difference since MAG/HALO started their project under the CHASE funding (mention which areas and workplaces are covered by the programme, and when they started it)?
- Do you find yourself in coordination table with local governmental unit where MA actors are present?

MAG/HALO
Informants - Programme manager (i.e. senior decision maker) *Intro self, purpose of evaluation, how evaluation will be used*

- What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed? - ask for evidence of claims. Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do? - ask for evidence of claims;
- How do they work with the NMAC at central/ provincial/district level/Village development committees? (or other relevant local authorities if no local NMAC) - PROBE – what impacts have they seen at the different levels (in terms of ability to take on their MA role? – e.g. coordination, informing development partners in advance, advice on integration with development tasks). Ask for specific behavioural examples;
- Can you give examples of how the programme is contributing the MDG targets for (country) (ask for specific behavioural indicators)?
- What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the ToC)? How do they understand 'development' as used by DFID? How do they understand 'institutional capacity building'? What do they see as their role in institutional capacity building?
- Who are the main partners (i.e. people/agencies they want to influence)?
- What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity (at central, province, district, and community level – e.g. VDCs)? - ask for specific examples and evidence of outcomes/impacts;
- How do they communicate to the government/NMAC/VDCs/programme recipients their (and DFID) expectations?
- How and what information do they share with the local authorities/VDCs?
- What would success look like in terms of institutional capacity building?
- What would the MAC, local authorities be doing? – How does/would this affect programme impact at different levels?
- What changes (behavioural - e.g. faster responses, faster processes of MOUs, undertaking regulatory role) have they seen in their key partners since the beginning of the DFID project? - ask for specific examples/evidence of change;
- What changes (behavioural) would they like to see in the future in their key partners?
- What is their HR strategy for their staff?
- What senior positions are filled by national staff?
- How comparable are the salaries compared to their salaries to the MAC?

- To what extent are salaries standardised across the MA sector - is this voluntary or regulated?
- How do they work with other sectors (e.g. health, rural development, disability) to build institutional capacity to manage landmines/ERW?
- Ensuring compliance with relevant conventions is seen as a key impact of institutional capacity building –how would this contribute to impacts at the different levels? – ask for specific examples of outcomes/impacts not outputs.

Informants – CL/MRE and provincial/district level manager, ops, CL/MRE if position exists - *Intro self, purpose of evaluation, how evaluation will be used*

- What are the main purposes of CL/MRE? - why is it needed? - ask for evidence of claims;
- How do they work with the MAC at central/ provincial/district level/community level (or other relevant local authorities if no local MAC)? PROBE – what impacts have they seen at the different levels? - ask for specific behavioural examples;
- What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC)? How do they understand 'development'/ institutional capacity building as used by DFID?
- Who are the main partners (i.e. people/agencies they want to influence)?
- What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity (at central, province, especially at district, community level – e.g. VDCs)? - ask for specific examples and evidence of outcomes/impacts;

Mine action centre - Informants – senior staff (e.g. director/deputy director level) - *Intro self, purpose of evaluation, how evaluation will be used. Tailor questions to the DFID CHASE programme*

- How long has the NMAC been established?
- What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed - ask for evidence of claims - Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do?
- Can you explain the structure of the mine action sector in (country)? Prompts:
    - Current status (e.g. UN project/government/private not for profit (national/international)/quasi government/public service);
    - Focal point for the landmine and cluster monition conventions – achievements of the focal point;
    - Advisory board and structure;
    - What is their vision for the MAC - how do they expect it to work;
    - Main donors, % of funding from DFID in programme under evaluation;
    - How DFID money is spent – observable achievements/outcomes over the last three years;
    - How NMAC staff are paid (e.g. 100% government, 100% UN/donors, mix of donors and UN/donors) – how this has changed in the last three years;
    - How comparable salaries are to the public service sector/other mine action agencies;
    - Sections (e.g. ops, QA, MRE, VA, advocacy) – What changes (behavioural) - have they seen in the way the different sectors work over the last three years /achievements/outcomes? - specific examples;
    - Focal points at province, district and village level;
    - Coordination and tasking.
- What changes (behavioural) - have they seen in their key partners since the beginning of the DFID project? - ask for specific examples/evidence of change;
- How does the NMAC contribute to impact at the national, province, district and community level?
- How does the NMAC coordinate with different stakeholders? Prompts:
    - UNDP/UNMS (as appropriate), not-for-profit service providers, for profit, development agencies (for and not for profit).
- How does it coordinate with MAG/HALO (as appropriate)?
- Who does the MAC see as the main actors they can influence (Where do they see their main sphere of influence)?
- How do they work with these actors?
- How do they communicate with these different actors?
- How are mine action projects discussed and approved?
- Are there any national NGOs/private operators? How are national NGOs funded?
- How are the commitments in the CBL/CMC communicated to province/district/village level?
- How do they make sure the provinces/districts/other partners are aware of the landmine/ERW issue?
- How do they work with other sectors to mainstream and build institutional capacity to manage landmines/ERW?
- How is information on contamination and injuries shared with other sectors/in cluster meetings?

- Changes/outcomes and impacts of their coordination work over the last three years – specific examples
- Can you give examples of how the programme is contributing the MDG targets for SS (ask for specific behavioural indicators)?
- Part of DFID funding is towards institutional capacity building - what are the NMAC's strategic objectives during the DFID programme? How were these decided?
- What performance indicators are used to measure progress? (technical – planning, budgets, regulation, QA [MRE, VA, Ops] advocacy, integration, coordination, HR policies, delivering community impact, linking to development objectives).
- Can you explain the assessment of capacity was undertaken prior to the programme? Is a report available?
- What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity?
- What outcomes have they observed (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)?
- How have these outcomes translated to impacts, for who? (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)
- Are there any barriers to institutional capacity (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)?
- What is your understanding of the DFID strategy for MA? Prompts:
    - Objectives;
    - What does DFID mean by development;
    - What does DFID mean by institutional capacity;
    - What does DFID mean by value for money.
- What progress has there been in terms of compliance with relevant conventions – how will compliance contribute to impact for communities and provincial/national economy?
- Is there transition strategy to in place from international support (staff and funding) to national supported sector? What would mine action sector look like without international funding? How will they know when international support is not needed?

Mine action centre - Informants – senior staff (e.g. Ops manager, MRE manager, VA manager/QA – QA maybe under ops – may include internationals and TAs – especially where TA is DFID funded) - *Intro self, purpose of evaluation, how evaluation will be used*

- What are the main purposes of (clearance/MRE/VA/QA as appropriate) MA/why is it needed? - ask for evidence of claims;
- Can you explain the structure of (clearance/MRE/VA/QA as appropriate) in (country)? Prompts:
    - Vision, aims, objectives;
    - Main players, how they work;
    - Role of NMAC in securing impacts;
    - How do they monitor outcomes/impacts;
    - Main donors, % of funding from DFID in programme under evaluation;
    - How DFID money is spent – observable achievements/outcomes over the last three years.
- What changes (behavioural) - have they seen in the way the different sectors work over the last three years/achievements/outcomes over the last three years? - specific examples;
- Focal points at province, district and village level;
- Coordination and tasking;
- How does (clearance/MRE/VA/QA as appropriate) contribute to impact at the national, province, district and community level?
- How does the NMAC (clearance/MRE/VA/QA as appropriate and as funded by CHASE programme) coordinate with different stakeholders? Prompts:
    - Who do they work with;
    - How do they work with these actors;
    - How do they communicate with these different actors;
    - How are mine action projects discussed and approved?
- How are the commitments in the CBL/CMC communicated to province/district/village level?
- Ops - How is information about cleared/contaminated land communicated to other sectors in and outside of government? - How does it contribute to outcomes/impacts at community level? - specific examples;
- QA – explain QA role – how does it contribute to outcomes/impacts at community level? - specific examples;
- MRE – how does it build capacity of communities to manage the threat, how does it contribute to outcomes/impacts at community level? - specific examples;
- How is information shared on contamination and injuries with other sectors/in cluster meetings?
- Can you give examples of how the programme is contributing the MDG targets for SS (ask for specific behavioural indicators)?
- What is your understanding of the DFID strategy for MA? Prompts:

  - Objectives;
  - What does DFID mean by development;
  - What does DFID mean by institutional capacity;
  - What does DFID mean by value for money.
- Are there any international personnel working in their section? Where does that support come from? What do they do? What institutional capacity building strategies are employed? Is there transition strategy in place from international support (staff and funding) to national supported sector? What would the mine action sector look like without international funding? How will they know when international support is not needed?

UN - Mine action team (in-country) - Informants – in-country programme manager, senior technical NMAC, UNICEF MRE (for UNICEF tailor questions to MRE) - *Intro self, purpose of evaluation, how evaluation will be used. Try and get specific examples from the DFID programme.*

- What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed? - ask for evidence of claims - Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do? What is the humanitarian impact of landmine and ERW contamination and, in the framework of the MDG, how does it contribute to South Sudan's socio-economic development and poverty reduction strategies (ask for specific examples)?
- What is the role of the UN? How will the UN teams know if they have been successful?
- Capacity building and transition to national authorities – how is this understood? Institutional framework needs to be able to plan, implement, coordinate and monitor all aspects of mine action, mainstreaming mine action activities into development programme. How do they make sure aligned with broader stabilisation and development priorities? Prompts:
  - Who are the main partners (i.e. people/agencies they want to influence) that the UN team work with (Where do they see their main sphere of influence)?
  - What is their vision for the NMAC? - how do they expect it to work and for what purpose?
  - What would the MAC, local authorities be doing;
  - How does the NMAC currently work? What observable behavioural changes have they seen in the last three years? (behavioural - e.g. ratified CMC, demining integrated into sector strategies, undertaking regulatory role, contributing to budget of MAC) have they seen in their key partners since the beginning of the DFID project - ask for specific examples/evidence of change
  - What have been some of the reasons for these changes?
  - What progress has there been in terms of compliance with relevant conventions – how will compliance contribute to impact for communities and provincial/national economy?
  - Can they describe the gap between where the NMAC is now and their vision?
  - How do they communicate to the government their (and DFID) expectations?
  - How does the NMAC contribute to impact at the national, province, district and community level
- What performance indicators are used to measure progress (technical – planning, budgets, regulation, QA [MRE, VA, Ops) advocacy, integration, coordination, HR policies, delivering community impact, linking to development objectives). How were these objectives developed? By who? How do these relate to the 3 IC objectives in the strategy? How are they reviewed?
- How are the criteria of accountability, effectiveness, relevance efficiency, sustainability, relevance, harmonization, impact incorporated into IC?
- Can you explain how the assessment of capacity was undertaken prior to the programme? Is a report available?
- Can you explain the analysis of the local context (including political, social and cultural norms and practices)?
- What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity? Prompts :
  - What outcomes have they observed (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)?
  - How have these outcomes translated to impacts, for whom? (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence);
  - Are there any barriers to institutional capacity (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)?
  - What monitoring and evaluation framework is in place to track how outcomes are being affected by DFID capacity building investments?

Linking with Development

- How are tasks prioritised? What is the criteria? How is reliability of information considered? By who? A strategic objective is to ensure beneficiaries are involved in the planning and implementation of mine action activities – how is this achieved in reality? Whose views are privileged? How are community views balanced with other perspectives? How is capacity being built at the community level? What input did you get from humanitarian agencies? How could this be improved to meet the objective of including beneficiaries' voice in prioritisation? How are the criteria of accountability, effectiveness, relevance efficiency, sustainability, relevance,

harmonisation, impact incorporated into prioritisation? DFID - efficiency itself is important but of little value if it does not provide the outcome required;

- How does UNMAS/UNDP work with other sectors in the UN family and the government to mainstream and build institutional capacity to manage landmines/ERW? Prompts:
    - How is MA mainstreamed into their programme (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)?
    - For development projects - how incorporated into programme /funded?
    - For agriculture - how incorporated into programme /funded?
    - For food for work - how incorporated into programme /funded?
    - Education/life skills –how incorporated into programme in and out of school youth?
    - Share information on contamination and injuries with other sectors/in cluster meetings?
- Can you give examples of how the programme is contributing the MDG targets for SS (ask for specific behavioural indicators)? How and in what ways is it encouraging cooperation among the population and important contribution to reduced social tensions and preventing conflicts?
- How is post clearance outcome and impact data collected, fed into IMSMA and used in subsequent planning?
- Are there any villages/districts which can be declared 'impact free' and what does impact free mean?

Funding

- What % of their MA budget is spent on institutional capacity building and how is this $ spent (what activities)?
- How is the UN Mine action programme funded in (country)? Prompts:
    - Main donors, % of funding from DFID in programme under evaluation;
    - How DFID money is spent? – observable achievements/outcomes (in terms of behavioural outcomes/impacts not outputs) over the last three years;
    - What have been the results of the 28 per cent of funding spent on capacity building from 2003 to 2010? Lessons learned and strategies changed?
- How are NMAC staff paid (e.g. 100% government, 100% UN/donors, mix of donors and UN/donors)? – how has this changed in the last three years;
- How comparable are salaries to the public service sector/other mine action agencies?
- To what extent does the government have the will and capacity to cover mine action costs?

IC

- Sudan recognises mine action as a prerequisite for development and includes mine action in the top national development priorities – why no UNDP? Is UNMAS the right agency do institutional capacity building? Does it have the skills and expertise? – cf UNDP – governance;
- Are there certain conditions that need to be in place before it makes sense to talk about institutional capacity building? If so what? What are the ideal conditions for institutional capacity building to be successful? What is the skill set needed for the transition team (and above?)?
- How does UNMA align its objectives and strategies with the institution(s) whose capacity is to be built, with DFID, with broader national strategies?
- What lessons have been learned in regards to institutional capacity building and how have these been applied (specific examples). How has this translated to impact /changes in behaviour/the way things are done? (specific examples)
- What evidence of success have they seen to date (in which institutions?)
- What progress is being made towards commitments in the relevant treaties? Prompts:
    - Measureable progress towards securing stockpiles;
    - Measureable progress towards destruction of stockpiles;
    - No reported usage of landmines/cluster munitions;
    - No reported transfer of landmines/CM;
    - National legislation to implement the CMC/OT;
    - Transparency report as required by CMC/OT complied and submitted on time;
    - No reports of importing LM/CM;
    - Evidence that lessons learned from reports have been applied (ask for specific examples);
    - How is progress monitored.
- What is your understanding of the DFID strategy for MA? Prompts:
    - Objectives
    - What does DFID mean by development;
    - What does DFID mean by institutional capacity;
    - What does DFID mean by value for money.

Annex M18: Mine Action Evaluation List of Interlocutors

Headquarters

DFID-CHASE

- Richard Boden, Policy Analyst;
- Dr. Jennifer Leith, Evaluation Adviser;
- Prudence Buxton, Policy Analyst;
- Andy Wheatly, Humanitarian Results Advisor.

HALO Trust

- Guy Willoughby, Director;
- Tim Porter, Desk Officer Sri Lanka;
- Valon Kumnova, Desk Officer Sri Lanka;
- Matthew Hovell, Desk Officer for Cambodia, Burma, Lao and Colombia.

Mine Advisory Group

- Darren Cormack, Director of Development;
- Jamie Eyre Regional Operations Manager;
- Greg Crowther, Regional Operations Manager;
- Matt Thomas, Regional Operations Manager;
- Alastair Moir, MAG Programme Manager, Cambodia;
- Nick Roseveare, CEO.

UNMAT

- Tim Horner – Mine Action Advisor, Livelihoods and Economic Recovery Group UNDP BCPR;
- Judy Grayson – Senior Advisor, Child Protection Section, Armed Violence & Weapons Team, UNICEF;
- Sharif Basser – Programme Specialist, UNICEF;
- Paul Heslop – Chief of Programmes, UNMAS;
- Maria Vardis –UNMAS, Policy Coordination;
- Kurt Chesko - UNMAS Programme Officer;
- Diek Englebert - UNMAS Libya;
- Julia Goehsing - UNMAS Libya;
- Abigail Hartley Programme Manager UNMAS Afghanistan.

GICHD

- Ted Paterson, Senior Advisor, Strategic Management;
- Guy Rhodes, Head, Operations Consulting;
- Pehr Lodhammer, Advisor, Mechanical Systems and Contracting.

OTHER

- Richard MacCormac DanChurchAid;
- Thao Griffiths Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation;
- Arianna Calza Bini – Gender and Mine Action Programme;
- Ian Mansfield – MASG Secretariat;
- Julia Goehsing - Deputy Head , Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section, United Nations Support Mission in Libya;
- Diek Engelbrecht – Arms and Ammunition Advisory Section, United Nations Support Mission in Libya.

Sri Lanka

- N.B.M. (Monty) Ranathunge, Director of National Mine Action Centre and Director of Rural Development, Ministry of the Economic Development, Colombo;
- MR Mahinda, Assistant Director, Planning & De-Mining Operation, National Mine Action Centre, Colombo;
- Varatharajah Murugathas ('Thas'), Mine Action Officer, District Mine Action Office (UNDP-funded), Jaffna;
- Mrs Rubawathi Ketheeswaran, District Secretary and Government Agent, Kilinochchi District;
- Mr. Sathiyaseelan, Divisional Secretary, Pachchilappelli Division, Kilinochchi;
- Valon Kumnova, Desk Officer for Somalia and Sri Lanka, The Halo Trust;
- Bartholomew Digby, Programme Manager Sri Lanka, The Halo Trust;
- Camille Wallen, Programme Officer Sri Lanka, The Halo Trust;
- Guido de Vries, ZOA, Programme Manager;
- Lakshi Abeyasekera , Sewalanka, Director of special projects.

Cambodia

- Chum Bun Rong, Secretary General, Cambodian Mine Action & Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), and Advisor to the Prime Minister, Phnom Penh;
- Chan Rotha, Deputy Secretary-General, CMAA;
- Heng Ratana, Director General CMAC and Adviser to Prime Minster, Cambodian Mine Action Centre, Phnom Penh;
- Prum Suon Praseth, Project Development & Management Director, CMAC, Phnom Penh;
- Som Mony, Deputy Chief of MAPU, Battambang Office;
- Paul Eldred, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, Phnom Penh;
- Jamie Franklin, MAG Representative Americas (former Country Programme Manager, Cambodia, MAG);
- Clare O'Reilly, Programme Officer, MAG, Phnom Penh;
- Heng Long, amputee De-miner, MAG, Thnal Bat village, Pailin Province;
- Cameron Imber, Programme Manager Cambodia, The Halo Trust, Phnom Penh;
- Keita Sugimoto, Mine Action Adviser, UNDP (based in CMAA), Phnom Penh;
- Kevin G. O'Brien, Country Director, The Handa Foundation (Japanese medical charity and hospital), Battambang;
- Nicola Donati, Surgical Director, The Handa Foundation, Battambang;
- Am Samnang, Programme Co-ordinator, Finn Church Aid, Phnom Penh;
- Dr Sam Inn, Executive Director, Life With Dignity (LWD), Phnom Penh;
- Bill Pennington, Assistant Country Director, CARE Cambodia, Phnom Penh;
- Jan Noorlander, Programme Coordinator, CARE Cambodia, Phnom Penh;
- Villagers at Phnom Koy, Pailin Province (post-clearance village).

South Sudan

- Yurkuc Barak, Director, Southern Sudan Mine Action Center Juba;
- Emmanuel Ohide, Chief of Admin SSRRC;
- Mike Rashid Fulla Director for Operations, National Mine Action Authority;
- Malek MRE Officer, National Mine Action Authority;
- Emily Akalu, Global Impact Advisor, Mines Advisory Group;
- Edin Muric, Technical Operations Manager, Mines Advisory Group;
- Irina Ulmasova, Country Director, Mines Advisory Group;
- Jamie Eyre, Regional Operations Manager, Mines Advisory Group;
- John Sorbo, Project Manager, NPA Capacity Development Project (SSMAA);
- Sharmala Naidoo, Advisor Mine Action, Security and Development, GICHD;
- Asa Massleberg, Capacity Development Advisor, GICHD;
- Rebecca Roberts, Head of Armed Violence Reduction, DDG/DRC South Sudan;
- Hannah Bryce, Country Director, DCA;

- Lance Mallin, Programme Manager UNMAS;
- John Dingley, Deputy Programme Manager and Capacity Development Advisor, UNMAS;
- Sasha Logie, Programme Officer, UNMAS;
- Peter Trotter, UNHCR, Protection Cluster Coordinator;
- William K. Kollie, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF;
- Mariyaselvam Mariyampillai, Sub-Cluster Child Protection, UNICEF;
- Diana Surur, Protection Officer, MRE, UNICEF;
- Francesca Marzatico, Programme Manager, Information, Counselling and Legal Assistance (ICLA);
- Lisa Monaghan, NGO Protection Cluster Coordinator, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC);
- Hamish Falconer, DFID CO;
- Justin Otim, Redeem Primary School.

Mozambique

- Alberto Augusto, Director, IND;
- Alicia Herbert, Head of Office, DFID Mozambique;
- Cormac Quinn, Results & Programme Manager, DFID Mozambique;
- Dr Maria Angela Ismael Manjate Janace, Moamna District Governor, Maputo Province;
- Basilio Alcinar Quichine, Sub-District Administrator, Songo District, Tete Province;
- Amelia Tembe, Chief of Post, Bella Vista Administration Post, Matatuninie District, Maputo Province;
- Donald MacDonald, Regional Support Manager, G4S Ordnance Management Africa;
- Calvin Ruysen, Desk Officer, Desk Officer, Southern Africa, HALO Trust;
- Geraldo Pedro Jamal, Senior Survey Officer, HALO Trust;
- Yuri Shahramanyan, Programme Manager, HALO Mozambique;
- Tom Griffiths, Chimoio Location Manager, HALO Mozambique;
- Jamie Monteith, Maputo Location Manager, HALO Mozambique;
- Joaquim Mutatiua, Provincial Operations Manager for Maputo Province, HALO Mozambique;
- Laercio Lourenco Mavale, Manual Team Supervisor, HALO Mozambique;
- Vicky Hawker, Projects Officer, HALO Mozambique;
- Tom Griffiths, Chimoio Location Manager, HALO Trust;
- Dr Xavier Agostinho Chavana, Head of Operational Planning Division, Ministry of Planning & Development, Maputo;
- Humberto Nunes Pavela, Chef des Linhas de Transmissao, Electricidade de Mocambique (EDM), Matola;
- Lucas Rafael Macamo, Principal des Linhas de Transmissao, EDM, Matola;
- Arnaldo Agostinho Manjate, Caminhos de Ferro de Mozambique (CFM), Maputo;
- Meque Mandlate, Permanent Way Inspector, CFM, Maputo;
- Muniro Usse, Permanent Way Engineer, CFM, Maputo;
- Eng. Ortigio L. Nhanombe, Deputy Director of Electrical Energy, Ministry of Energy, Maputo;
- Ambrosio Adolfo Sitoe, National Director, Directorate of Studies & Projects, Ministry of Transports & Communications, Maputo;
- Julia Filipe Vasconcelos, Technical Planner, Directorate of Studies & Projects, Ministry of Transports & Communications, Maputo;
- Lucia Simao, Programme Analyst for Mine Action & Small Arms, UNDP;
- Ilaria Carnevali, Deputy Country Director, UNDP;
- Janet Duffield, Country Director, Help Age International;
- Pedro Joia Ilisses Gundana, Maintenance Services Support Director, HCB, Cahora Bassa Dam;
- Meeting with members of Kalawe & Nhanchenge Community, Cahora Bassa Dam, Songo, Tete;
- Victor Mulungo, consultant & lawyer, Sal & Caldeira Avogados, Maputo;
- Hans Riser, Chief Technical Adviser, IND, UNDP;
- Lucia Simao, Programme Analyst for Mine Action & Small Arms, UNDP;
- Ilaria Carnevali, Deputy Country Director, UNDP;

- Carlos Javier Rodriguez, Planning and Monitoring Officer, UNICEF;
- Janet Duffield, Country Director, Helpage International;
- Gisla Dewey, National Director, World Vision;
- Rosa Costa, Director, Kyeema;
- Ana Zandamela , Veterinarian, Kyeema;
- Cormac Quinn, Results and Programme Manager, DFID;
- Meeting with members of Kalawe & Nhanchenge Community, Cahora Bassa Dam, Songo, Tete.

Annex M19: Summarised Institutional Impact Assessment Tool

UNMAT/UN SENIOR ADVISORS/TAs	MAC MANAGERS/ DIRECTORS /OTHER GOVERNMENT	UNDP/WHO, WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMME DECISION MAKERS/DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO PROVINCE/DISTRICT TBC ON TIME/RESOURCES	PROVINCIAL/ DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	VDC
What is the MAC's legal status (project/government/ private not for profit)	What is the MAC's legal status (project/government/private not for profit)	What involvement do they have with the MA programme	What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC)	What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC)	Have they heard of the CMC, OT (if country has signed)	How is the landmine/ERW threat managed in their village
What is the UNMAT team's understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC)	What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC)	How does landmines/ERW affect their programmes	What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC & if aware of institutional capacity building objective)	What is their understanding of the DFID strategy for MA (probe if they are aware of the TOC & if aware of institutional capacity building objective)	How did they find out about it	What strategies do they have to protect their community
What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed - ask for evidence of claims. Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do - ask for evidence of claims	What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed - ask for evidence of claims - Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who	How do they get clearance support for their projects	What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed - ask for evidence of claims. Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do - ask for evidence of claims	What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed - ask for evidence of claims. Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do - ask for evidence of claims	What is their understanding of these conventions	Do they have a village volunteer

UNMAT/UN SENIOR ADVISORS/TAs	MAC MANAGERS/ DIRECTORS /OTHER GOVERNMENT	UNDP/WHO, WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMME DECISION MAKERS/DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO PROVINCE/DISTRICT TBC ON TIME/RESOURCES	PROVINCIAL/ DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	VDC
			How do they work with the MAC at central/ provincial/district level (or other relevant local authorities if no local MAC)	How do they work with the MAC at central/ provincial/district level (or other relevant local authorities if no local MAC)	What are the main purposes of MA/why is it needed - ask for evidence of claims. Many areas still do not have clearance - how does this affect them compared to those who do - ask for evidence of claims	Do they maintain a map of areas contaminated/areas cleared (can you see it, can they explain it to you)
Who are the main partners (i.e. people/agencies they want to influence) that the UNMAT team work with (Where do they see their main sphere of influence)	How do they work with the UNMAT	How is MA mainstreamed into their programme (ask for specific examples/behaviours/evidence)	Who are the main partners (i.e. people/agencies they want to influence)	Who are the main partners (i.e. people/agencies they want to influence)	How do they work with the MAC at the central level	How do people who move to the village find out about which areas are contaminated
Where do they see their partners main sphere of influence	Who does the MAC see as the main actors they can influence (Where do they see their main sphere of influence)		Where do they see their partners main sphere of influence	Where do they see their partners main sphere of influence	How do they work with MAG/HALO at the provincial district level	How do they work with MAG/HALO
What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity	How do they work with these actors		What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity	What strategies do they use to build institutional capacity	How do communicate to other development agencies about the landmine/ERW threat	

UNMAT/UN SENIOR ADVISORS/TAs	MAC MANAGERS/ DIRECTORS /OTHER GOVERNMENT	UNDP/WHO, WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMME DECISION MAKERS/DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO PROVINCE/DISTRICT TBC ON TIME/RESOURCES	PROVINCIAL/ DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	VDC
How do they communicate to the government their (and DFID) expectations	How do they communicate with these actors what activities do they do with their partners		How do they communicate to the government their (and DFID) expectations	What would success look like in terms of institutional capacity building. What would the MAC, local authorities be doing		
What would success look like for the UNMAT team in terms of institutional capacity building. What would the MAC, local authorities be doing	What is their vision for the MAC - how do they expect it to work		What would success look like in terms of institutional capacity building. What would the MAC, local authorities be doing	What changes (behavioural - e.g faster responses, undertaking regulatory role) have they seen in local government/VDCs/ communities since the beginning of the DFID project - ask for specific examples/evidence of change		
What changes (behavioural - e.g. ratified CMC, demining integrated into sector strategies, undertaking regulatory role, contributing to budget of MAC) have they seen in their key partners since the beginning of the DFID project - ask for specific examples/evidence of change	What changes (behavioural - have they seen in their key partners since the beginning of the DFID project - ask for specific examples/evidence of change		What changes (behavioural - e.g. faster responses, faster processes of MOUs, undertaking regulatory role) have they seen in their key partners since the beginning of the DFID project - ask for specific examples/evidence of change			

UNMAT/UN SENIOR ADVISORS/TAs	MAC MANAGERS/ DIRECTORS /OTHER GOVERNMENT	UNDP/WHO, WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMME DECISION MAKERS/DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO PROVINCE/DISTRICT TBC ON TIME/RESOURCES	PROVINCIAL/ DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	VDC
How do they review progress towards institutional capacity building	How do they make sure the provinces/districts/other partners are aware of the landmine/ERW issue and mainstream it into planning		How do they review progress towards institutional capacity building			
What changes (behavioural) would they like to see in the future in their key partners	What changes (behavioural) would they like to see in the future in their key partners		What changes (behavioural) would they like to see in the future in their key partners			
What % of their MA budget is spent on institutional capacity building and how is this $ spent (what activities)	How does MA work at the provincial/district/community level		What is their HR strategy for their staff			
How does MA work at the provincial/district/community level	How are the commitments in the CBL/CMC communicated to province/district/village level		What senior positions are filled by national staff			
How is the MAC funded	How is the MAC funded		How comparable are the salaries compared to their salaries to the MAC			
How are the salaries paid	How are the salaries paid		To what extent are salaries standardised across the MA sector - is this voluntary of regulated			

UNMAT/UN SENIOR ADVISORS/TAs	MAC MANAGERS/ DIRECTORS /OTHER GOVERNMENT	UNDP/WHO, WFP COUNTRY PROGRAMME DECISION MAKERS/DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO CENTRAL LEVEL	MAG/HALO PROVINCE/DISTRICT TBC ON TIME/RESOURCES	PROVINCIAL/ DISTRICT AUTHORITIES	VDC
How comparable are the salaries compared to the public sector	How comparable are the salaries compared to the public sector		How do they work with other sectors to build institutional capacity to manage landmines/ERW			
To what extent are salaries standardised across the MA sector	To what extent are salaries standardised across the MA sector					
Have they discussed a transition strategy. What does it/would it look like	Have they discussed a transition strategy. What does it/would it look like					
How will they know when ready to transition	How will they know when ready to transition					
How do they work with other sectors in the UN family and the government to mainstream and build institutional capacity to manage landmines/ERW	How do they work with other sectors to mainstream and build institutional capacity to manage landmines/ERW					