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Disclaimer:

The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the client, DFID.

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Finally, we must stress that the findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations contained in this report represent the views of the evaluation team. MAG, HALO and UNMAT, as well as any other key informants we consulted during the course of the evaluation, are not responsible for the content of this report nor are they bound by its recommendations.

Report cover photo: Ananda S. Millard



List of Abbreviations

APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
AusAID	Australian Government Overseas Aid Program
CCM	Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CHA	Confirmed Hazardous Area
CHASE	Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (of DFID)
CL	Community Liaison
CLTs	Community Liaison Teams
CMAA	Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority
BAC	Battle Area Clearance
DFID	Department for International Development
DDG	Danish Demining Group
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
GMAA	General Mine Action Assessment
HDI	Human Development Indicators
IACG	Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IND	Mozambique National Demining Institute
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit (of the UN)
MA	Mine Action
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MAP	Mine Action Programme
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NAO	National Accounting Office
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMAA	National Mine Action Authority
NMAS	National Mine Action Standards
NPV	Net Present Value



OECD DAC	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Development Assistance Committee
OT	Operations Team
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Plan
QA	Quality Assurance
QRTs	Quick Response Teams
RRE	Risk Reduction Education
SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TOC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMAT	United Nations Mine Action Team
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance
VFM	Value for Money
VTF	UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action



Executive Summary

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has been providing significant funding to mine action for more than 20 years. In recent years, support has been predominantly channelled through its Mine Action (MA) Programme, a £30 million programme implemented in 2011–2013. The Programme is founded on the strategy document 'Creating a safer environment: clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war' (2010–2013). Two key features of this strategy are an emphasis on building national capacities to plan and carry out mine action and maximising its impact on socio-economic development of targeted communities. In pursuing these aims, value for money (VFM) is a primary consideration.

The Programme Evaluation

In February 2013, WYG International was commissioned to evaluate the DFID MA Programme. Evidence was collected by literature review, desk research, key informant interviews and community impact surveys. Four of the countries supported by the DFID MA Programme were visited: Cambodia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka and South Sudan. These countries present a range of profiles showing different realities of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, degrees of national capacities and programme ownership, quality of governance and commitment to development. The evaluation explores the impact of the Programme across a number of thematic areas. These are: deriving socio-economic benefits to communities from mine action, strengthening the link between mine action and the development process, promoting national ownership and capacity for mine action, delivering VFM, and consolidating programme management.

Community and Socio-Economic Impact of the Programme

The development logic of the Programme is intact. Since 2010, nearly 100 square kilometres of land in the eight main beneficiary countries have been cleared of mines or released as non-hazardous as a result of survey by the two MA operators; the HALO Trust and the Mines Advisory Group (MAG). This is not only a significant reduction in the extent of potential hazards, but also removes blockages to socio-economic opportunities in the affected communities. Across all eight main beneficiary countries, it is estimated that 450,817 people have benefitted from clearance activities. For communities living in mine affected areas in the four countries surveyed, the Programme has enabled safe access to means of production, development and use of public services, shelter and settlements, better use of natural resources and infrastructure. Mine clearance around major economic infrastructure, such as power lines and transport in Mozambique, has brought significant strategic benefits to the national economy as well as regenerating safe and sustainable livelihoods in the areas previously affected.

Our findings suggest that the prioritisation process for de-mining does not always consider which land will deliver benefits to the poorest and most vulnerable; who often lack access to essential resources (such as seeds or farming equipment). The Programme should actively work towards ensuring increased impact for the poorest and, over time, influence national prioritisation processes to become pro-poor focused.

The impact of MA on gender was most evident in Sri Lanka where the return to cleared land from Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps was perceived to have reduced the threat of violence against women. Women are also frequently employed as deminers by both MA operators. However, MA operators did not have specific strategies in place to address gender issues. A future Programme should be more explicit in addressing gender concerns.

Effectiveness of National Institution Capacity Building

Given the length of time typically needed to address mine and ERW contamination, the aim of developing national capacities for coordination and management is valid. Across the MA Programme, there is evidence of increased national ownership of mine action, as observed particularly in Cambodia and Mozambique and reported in Laos and Vietnam. MA Programme support through UNMAS to national mine action authorities in Afghanistan has delivered substantially positive results. Competence levels will continue to require focussed support in some countries.

The decision to fund relevant UN agencies (UNDP, UNMAS and UNICEF) to develop national mine action management skills and capacity was a logical choice. It has however been difficult to relate the delivery of UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) outcomes to the DFID MA Programme objectives. DFID engagement with UNMAT around the Theory of Change for mine action should address the respective competences and mandates of each UNMAT partner. The outcome of this would be a more differentiated set of objectives and outcomes for each agency within a coordinated monitoring and oversight framework, determined through a comprehensive baseline needs assessment.

The capacity building strengths of organisations like HALO and MAG lie in training and mentoring MA operational staff. They should not be required to deliver services aimed at strengthening management in governmental or quasi-governmental institutions.



Effectiveness of Linking Mine Action with Development

With the humanitarian impact of anti-personnel mines hugely reduced from 20 years ago, the central aim of the DFID MA Programme to maximise the impact of mine action on socio-economic development is fully justified. DFID has made a positive contribution by actively promoting the link between mine action and development globally.

Clear reference is made to mine action in national development plans in all survey countries. In Cambodia, the linkages between mine action and development are embedded in national planning, delivery and oversight systems. Many international agencies in Sri Lanka, are active in the Northern mine-affected province, working in proximity to - though not always coordinated with - mine action operators. Programming connections between mine action and national development institutions in South Sudan and Mozambique should be strengthened. In all countries, the role of government in creating the structures and systems to integrate mine action with development is critical.

The DFID MA Programme can increase the connection between mine action with development through effective and timely engagement with national development partners. The MA Programme appears on track to promote the value-adding involvement of the MA operators in the development process in mine affected areas, delivering real benefits to affected communities.

Value for Money

The Programme has delivered VFM in terms of land cleared of mines and returned to use, thereby creating the potential for socio-economic development within communities. Further, the Programme has delivered VFM by improving awareness of mine risks through the delivery of Mine Risk Education. HALO and MAG, the two organisations that received the bulk of DFID MA Programme support, have generally proven to be cost-effective in their clearance operations.

VFM calculations are not only a matter of the number of mines or hectares cleared. They hinge on assessments of, and planning for, how the land will be used afterwards. The MA operators and UN agencies could better demonstrate the VFM they deliver to DFID, and hence the UK taxpayer, if they reported on VFM in achieving development outcomes as well as activities and outputs. DFID therefore needs to develop common VFM measures and a VFM assessment system which enables consistent reporting on VFM in achieving activities, outputs and outcomes.

Programme Management, Reporting, and Monitoring

The centralised management model for the DFID MA Programme is appropriate to ensure overall coherence and to connect the Programme into global mine action. Oversight and engagement with national authorities and international agencies could be strengthened and coordination with DFID Country Offices, where present, improved. Mine action extends along a spectrum from emergency response and stabilisation to development. Within DFID generally, a more coordinated approach to the range of interventions across that continuum could bring greater consistency and lesson sharing.

Much has been learned about the impact of mine action on poverty and development since the introduction of the DFID MA Programme. Reporting requirements and templates, with a greater emphasis on outcomes and clarification of definitions of beneficiaries, could facilitate more informed monitoring in the future. In tandem, cumulative data on outputs and outcomes achieved at programmatic level should be compiled systematically. Likewise, the contribution of the Programme to building national capacity for planning, coordinating and delivering mine action can best be assured through direct agreements and reporting lines with UNMAT partners based on shared understanding of need in target countries.

Key Recommendations

The evaluation recommends that the DFID MA Programme should:

- Continue its central focus on funding demining through support to high-quality, efficient delivery organisations;
- Articulate more clearly how mine action can and should promote socio-economic development;
- Continue to promote capacity building of relevant national mine action management institutions but with enhanced focus on achieving outcomes;
- Reconsider funding UN agencies through the VTF in preference for direct bilateral funding in support of explicit developmental outcomes;
- Require reporting on VFM in achieving outcomes as well as activities and outputs; and
- Improve links and coordination between the MA Programme and other DFID programmes.



1.0 Introduction

1.1 Our Understanding of the Terms of Reference

1.1.1 Objectives of the Evaluation

The CHASE Mine Action (MA) Programme¹ is based on DFID's Mine Action Strategy 2010–2013, 'Creating a Safer Environment: Clearing land mines and other explosive remnants of war'. The Strategy, in keeping with the principles of the Paris Declaration², states that "DFID's mine action funding will be increasingly focussed on building countries' own capacities to carry out demining, and maximising the impact of demining on the socio-economic development of targeted populations." The evaluation aims to determine, using the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) evaluation criteria,³ how successful DFID and its implementing partners have been in building the goals of the strategy into mine action interventions; and further, how far they have progressed toward achieving DFID's specific strategic objectives.

In responding to these questions, the evaluation aims to:

- Assess extent to which strategic goals of the Mine Action Strategy have been met;
- Identify key issues that may improve DFID's ability to attain its strategic objectives; and
- Identify key issues that DFID should consider when adapting or updating its MA strategy.

1.1.2 The Logic of Linking Mine Action and Development

The framework of MA sees the mine action pillars⁴ as a means not only to allow but also to promote development. As such, socio-economic development is increasingly the purpose of mine action interventions, which include the following:

- **Demining:** the technical task of locating and clearing landmines and removing unexploded ordnance (UXO) (and releasing land that is not contaminated);
- **Mine Risk Education:** as risk reduction and support to demining.

The ultimate aim of mine action – post-conflict development – takes the CHASE MA Programme beyond clearance as an end in itself to broader development objectives. This involves greater complexity in planning, coordinating, sequencing, implementing, transferring results as well as monitoring of programme interventions. In examining the impacts of a MA programme, the evaluation team has been mindful of the complex and dynamic operational environment faced by mine action stakeholders across the MA life cycle. The international legal norms that drive mine action, underpinned by the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC)⁵, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)⁶ have also been taken into account.

The DFID Mine Action Strategy was developed before a Theory of Change (TOC) for mine action had been prepared. An outline TOC was subsequently developed for the January 2012 Mine Action Development Workshop⁷ as part of the meta-evaluation process and consulted with a wide and representative range of stakeholders. The five results chains articulated through the TOC are as follows:

- Mine affected land cleared for productive and other uses identified by communities and released to communities; (Benefits to Communities);
- Links established between MA Programme communities and development agencies/potential partners able to provide support; (Links to the Development Agenda);
- Efficiency and effectiveness of National Mine Action Authorities (NMAA) strengthened; (National Ownership and Governance of MA);

¹ Throughout the report, the CHASE MA Programme is variously referred to as "the MA Programme", or simply, "the Programme".

² Paris Declaration (2005), available through <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm> [accessed 10/06/2013].

³ OECD-DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance – relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

⁴ The other three pillars of mine action are: Victim Assistance, Advocacy for a ban on anti-personnel mines and stockpile destruction. IMAS 04.10 Second Edition, 1 January 2003, Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations.

⁵ Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction. 1997.

⁶ Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 1980.


⁷ Mine Action Evaluation Workshop, IOD-PARC, 25th – 26th January 2012.



- Global donor coordination on mine action strengthened; (Global MA and Donor Coordination);
- Monitoring and evaluation systems established to document and communicate lessons and improve overall programme implementation. (M&E and Measuring VFM).

These broadly reflect the logic and boundaries of the programme today and set the parameters for formulation of a future MA programme. Figure 1 outlines the relationship between these results chains and the key questions examined in this evaluation. The analysis and findings presented in Section 4 largely follow the framework provided by the results chains of the Theory of Change (TOC), although we have dealt with the global dimension in the context of our analysis of Programme Management (Section 4.6) and VFM is treated separately.

Figure 1: CHASE MA Programme Results Chains compared to Key Evaluation Questions



1.2 Country Selection for Evaluation

This evaluation primarily focused on eight countries covered by the CHASE MA Programme. A subset of four states (i.e. Cambodia, Sri Lanka, South Sudan and Mozambique) was selected for case study. Based on extensive data collection and analysis in each surveyed country, we have sought to identify lessons learned with a view to informing future mine action programmes more broadly, as well as, where appropriate, country-specific interventions. In addition, material from the four other states in the CHASE MA Programme (i.e. the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos), and Vietnam) has been reviewed, as well as from Libya and Afghanistan where the UK participates in two different types of MA programme. This extensive coverage provides the evaluation with a wide evidence base from which to identify findings and generate recommendations that will be of broad application.

The selection of countries to be visited in the course of the evaluation presented the evaluation team with contrasting contexts on each continent. Both Cambodia and Mozambique have a long history of mine action since the end of their respective wars several decades ago. Both countries rely heavily on subsistence farming, but they have very different land resource profiles. Densely populated Cambodia has fairly limited available agricultural land relative to need while Mozambique has substantial sparsely populated land available. This meant that in Cambodia the risk of accidents is higher but in Mozambique the hardship endured by certain communities aiming to find alternatives is clear and present. In addition, Mozambique and Cambodia have different landmine and UXO contamination profiles. Given the extent of contamination, in these two states, national authorities, supported by international donors, have, over time, developed a comparatively strong sense of national ownership. Development impacts from demining are also a factor of population density as we shall discuss in Section 4.2.

In the case of Sri Lanka and South Sudan, conflict and its aftermath continues to affect the course of socio-economic development and governance more generally. MA operators have developed different strategies to allow them to



operate effectively in keeping with the OECD 'do no harm' ethos⁸. They continue to deliver outcomes and impacts in line with DFID (and other donor) programmes, often in the face of challenging governance and security circumstances. Sri Lanka is still resolving internal security issues and focusses on mine action in support of resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction – a preliminary phase in the overall lifecycle of its mine action efforts.⁹ In South Sudan, amid endemic security concerns, the government has delegated much of the mine action prioritisation and management process to the UN¹⁰.

1.3 Methodology

1.3.1 Managing the Evaluation

The Evaluation Team comprised seven international experts who conducted fieldwork and analysis, fourteen national community surveyors and two international experts who peer reviewed the evaluation. The team included mine action specialists, socio-economic impact experts, institutional appraisal specialists and community survey specialists. National partners facilitated interaction with relevant institutions and local contacts, and recruited surveyors for the community impact survey. Both MA operators greatly assisted with logistics in their respective "host" countries. The Evaluation Workplan was broken down into four distinct phases; inception, country research and data collection, data analysis, and finalisation.¹¹

1.3.2 Evaluation Design and Framework

The evaluation was conducted using a qualitative, mixed-method approach which made it possible to identify and report on complexity, gather a range of data and triangulate the findings. The design was also based on a participatory approach. Respondents were not asked simply to respond to closed questions, but encouraged to enter into dialogue with the data collectors. The community impact survey analysed the differences between the current status of CHASE MA Programme beneficiary areas and areas not (yet) covered by the Programme (counterfactual). Purposive sampling was used to select community survey sites which had active or completed CHASE MA Programme funded operations, but which were as different as possible from each other in terms of variables such as contamination type, livelihoods, migration patterns and remoteness. Based on the OECD DAC framework, our Evaluation Framework (see Annex M) outlines the key evaluation questions, performance indicators, likely sources of data and data collection methods.

1.3.3 Understanding the Evaluation Context

A literature review and analysis of relevant background material was used to inform the evaluation and situate findings against best practice material. Desk research was undertaken to find and analyse the most relevant background material. This ensured that that we had a full and up-to-date understanding of the strategic context for the mine action programmes, their objectives and activities, their outputs to date and the recommendations from any previous reviews, including the Meta-Evaluation¹². The findings of our documentary review are set out in Annex B.

1.3.4 Stakeholder Mapping and Engagement

A roundtable stakeholder review session was held at the outset of the evaluation to map relevant interest groups and actors. This enabled the team to build a fuller picture of mine action activity and stakeholders in the four selected countries and across the Programme, their role in the components of the CHASE MA Programme and in related interventions. Table 5 in Annex M outlines the importance of each stakeholder to the evaluation, the interest the stakeholder has in the evaluation and/or the perspective they bring to it, and how the evaluation team sought to engage them. These are also set out in the Communication Plan at Annex K.

1.3.5 Data Collection Methods

The community impact survey comprised focus groups, key informant interviews, village mapping, wealth rankings and village timelines. The institutional capacity appraisal drew on a variety of secondary information sources (including legislative, organisational, human resource and budget reports), as well as primary data collected through key informant interviews, which generated multiple perspectives from informed and relevant stakeholders. The

⁸ OECD Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations – OECD – April 2007

⁹ See Annex E for more details on Sri Lanka.

¹⁰ See Annex F for more details on South Sudan.

¹¹ See Evaluation Framework in Annex M.

¹² Sheelagh O'Reilly, Judith Friedman, Hatty Dinsmore, Rob Storr, & Ronnie MacPherson, 'Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report', IOD PARC, Sheffield, 31 July 2012 (hereafter, Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report).



socio-economic assessment combined quantitative and qualitative measurements of progress and drew on the socio-economic baseline data to examine the extent to which the CHASE MA Programme delivers VFM. The MA specialists reviewed performance of the implementing agencies in the field and through six monthly reports.

1.3.6 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data analysis and interpretation began with initial coding and analysis of data taking place in the field to identify community and country level patterns and themes. Given the dispersed locations of team, the members worked in remote cluster groups to compare analyses of data and discuss anomalies encountered as well as initial key findings and conclusions. From these a more detailed analysis of findings from the fieldwork was prepared for each country visited and is provided within Annexes C-F, the country mission reports. Findings from attendance and interviews conducted at events such as the GICHD 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors were coded, analysed and summarised. These are included as Annex I. A review and detailed analysis of the literature and wider programme documentation was also undertaken and is included in Annex B.

The distillation of findings, conclusions and recommendations from the large body of evidence collected involved an iterative process of analysis and interpretation. This identified significant patterns and themes emerging from the multiple sets of primary data and secondary information sources and across multiple countries. Special attention was paid to those which related to the three core evaluation objectives and the evaluation questions. Discussions at the team drafting workshop and through bilateral internal reviews of data made it possible to nuance interpretations and subject findings to closer scrutiny. The final report has been subject to comprehensive peer review by our designated internal peer reviewers, as well corroboration and fact checking of findings with key stakeholders. Transcripts of all primary data are available in the language in which data was collected as well as in English.

1.3.7 Communication and Reporting of Results

This results of this evaluation will be communicated to a number of stakeholders, including the global mine action community, governments of countries with landmine problems and international donors. The plan for the communication and dissemination of results is outlined at Annex K. In this we identify all key stakeholders, their needs in relation to the evaluation results and proposals for a set of information products against likely timings

1.3.8 Ethical Issues and Upholding 'Do no harm' Principles

The team has strived to uphold 'Do No Harm' principles. This has included efforts to ensure the evaluation process did not raise false expectations and that respondents were aware of their role in the evaluation process and of the independence of the evaluation team. Our approach addressed language, gender and data-protection issues. Two members of the evaluation team had previously worked with one of the MA operators (as highlighted in the inception report). We dealt with this potential conflict of interest by ensuring group analysis and peer review of the data. The evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference. Differences in opinion within the evaluation team or amongst stakeholders consulted are acknowledged in the report, and were confronted, debated and tested against the evidence at all times. Initial findings from the in-country fieldwork were checked for factual accuracy with key stakeholders before the evaluation team left each country, through both formal and informal debriefing sessions. During finalisation of the evaluation report key stakeholders were asked to review the report for factual accuracy.

1.3.9 Limitations of our Evaluation Approach

The qualitative approach used by this evaluation has an inherent limitation in determining the external validation of findings, especially when combined with purposive sampling. The concern is how far findings on the impact of the CHASE MA Programme gathered in the sampled areas and from key informants within the four fieldwork countries, can be generalised to explain the impact of the CHASE MA programme on mine action globally. To address this, all data included in the report has, where possible, been corroborated by multiple sources. Further, to the extent possible, we have cross-validated findings across a range of national, local and institutional contexts.

The countries selected for fieldwork as part of this evaluation represent a diverse range of mine action contexts. Within these countries, our criteria for identifying communities for the community impact survey included communities in which HALO or MAG are delivering or have completed CHASE MA funded operations. Additionally, these were as different as possible from other in terms of contamination type, livelihoods zones, migration patterns and remoteness. Within communities we sought as far as possible from the people that were available to gain views from people of different genders, ages and ethnicities. However, as discussed below, it was difficult to take a highly systematic approach to sampling and we therefore used a purposive sampling strategy. Our sampling process for the key institutional capacity appraisal first involved a stakeholder mapping process which ensured that a diverse range of stakeholders were considered and interviewed. By using consistent procedures to collect data across the



different country, local and individual level contexts, and by ensuring that findings on key issues have been cross-validated across a range of contexts, we have sought to optimise the external validity of our findings.

Deliberately identifying countries, communities and individuals with different experiences made it possible to collect data on a wide range of occurrences. However this reduced our ability to triangulate primary data since experiences may not have been replicated in other communities. Data triangulation has therefore to some extent relied on expert opinion (among our evaluation team and key stakeholders), as well as cross validation of findings against the hypotheses presented in our literature review and the Meta Evaluation.¹³ Data collected as part of the community impact survey was also triangulated at the community level. Survey teams used the focus group discussions (FGD) and interviews with men and women as a mechanism to ensure the validity of individual findings. This approach served to ensure that at the community level the data was verified to the highest possible degree. The qualitative methods generated large amount of interview notes and transcripts (which are available on request). Survey teams in the field alternated interviews and FGDs with data transcription, interpretation and early identification of key issues and trends. As a group, they reviewed findings daily. We have drawn all findings, conclusions and recommendations from the evidence and have referenced them to the data.

Given the resources available to this evaluation and the limited amount of time available to spend in each country and in each community, a purposive approach to site selection was necessary. Random sampling would have required a much larger population than was accessible in most countries. Time and distance factors meant that the evaluation team could only visit a small number of communities, particularly given the desire to minimise travel time and maximise time spent in communities. Many of these communities were small and taking a random sample would have been neither practical nor representative.

The purposive approach was best suited to the requirements of this evaluation. It enabled the evaluators to quickly identify an appropriately differentiated sample, including a counterfactual. The counterfactual was utilised as an additional case study to provide information on context and conditions that aggravate or minimise the threat to development caused by landmines. Counterfactuals were not primarily used to counter the findings of the results from the treatment group. Their value was largely in context differentiation.

The data collection tools used as part of the evaluation were tested through peer review and then in the context of in-country training workshops for the survey team. Furthermore, the approach taken to data collection is one that included components (i.e. focus group discussions, key informant interviews, wealth ranking, village mapping, and village timelines) which have been used for similar published studies. While not formally tested, the data collection tools were carefully scrutinized in view of lessons learned from other experiences.¹⁴

We avoided interviewer / researcher bias as far as possible by ensuring that experienced interviewers and surveyors were recruited to conduct data collection. The local survey team reflected, as far as possible, ethnic and cultural characteristics of the communities surveyed as well as gender considerations. They received training to ensure consistent and objective data collection procedures. Surveyors worked in teams. Further, while expert opinion can be highly relevant in focussing the areas of enquiry, we have sought to ensure that it did not influence unduly the interpretation of data by drawing on multiple perspectives within and outside the team. Opinions were confronted and debated, and tested against the evidence at all times.

As indicated in the inception report, during the early design of the assessment tools it became evident that the collection of primary quantitative data would not be realistic given the resource and time constraints. Following a review of the baseline survey, it was clear that the scale of resources put into these surveys is not comparable to the resources available for the evaluation. For example, the baseline survey conducted in Cambodia employed fourteen people for six months, while the baseline survey conducted in Sri Lanka employed thirty people for four months. Furthermore, baseline surveys in each country did not follow a standard methodological process, making any follow-on before and after survey complex, compromising external validity. The data collected in the evaluation was more nuanced than the baseline data which existed. In Mozambique, for example, the initial baseline data systematically showed that landmines were primarily a threat to security whereas the survey material shows the relationship between the landmines and development more broadly.

¹³ Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report).

¹⁴. Millard, Ananda. 2002. Assessing Landmine Impact at the Community Level - A Training Manual. Oslo: PRIO. Millard, Ananda and Kristian Harpviken 2001. Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique. PRIO Report 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO.



2.0 Review of Evidence and Key Issues from the Literature

A large body of literature exists which contains lessons for the CHASE MA Programme. These lessons are summarised here under several key headings. A more detailed literature review is included in Annex B.

The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) definition of mine action, which is generally accepted, including among donors, sets out a baseline for what mine action is and what it aims to achieve.¹⁵ Nonetheless, the definition is quite generic, has not been updated since 2009 and is beginning to 'show its age'. The focus on 'humanitarian' demining is clearly outdated and the definition reflects only the most basic model of interaction between mine action and development. Casualty rates from landmines and ERW have decreased steadily and significantly over the past two decades and a profound change seems to be taking place within the global mine action community. The purely humanitarian case for mine action has diminished while the developmental case has become more prominent. Thus, while safety and security remain at the forefront of mine action, prioritisation of clearance for casualty reduction purposes has been on the wane as significant progress is made in landmine clearance, shifting the focus towards development outcomes. The success of the APMBC has led to far fewer new mines being laid giving rise to hope that this is a finite problem with practical demining solutions.

2.1 Linking Mine Action and Development

While the linkages between mine action and development have been discussed in the literature they have struggled to gain sufficient traction in practice. The Meta Evaluation rightly asserts that mine clearance 'is a clear precursor to development'.¹⁶ However, social, economic and political development does not take place automatically. Consonant with TOC logic, such development demands, among other things, concerted efforts with local people 'combined with a process of planned investment in infrastructure, capacity and development of input/output value chains'.¹⁷ One way of achieving this is through ad hoc or sustained partnerships, but beyond cooperation and coordination with development actors, full integration of mine action in development at national level remains a significant challenge. To date, attempts to achieve this have been sporadic at best.

2.2 Institutional Capacity Development

The IMAS describes in straightforward terms a national mine action authority as the overarching institution based around an inter-ministerial committee and tasked with managing mine action at a national level, with day-to-day coordination performed by a national mine action centre.¹⁸ The task of building the capacity of these national institutions has largely — but not exclusively¹⁹ — fallen to the UN. However, as the UN Joint Inspection Unit reported in 2011, capacity building 'has not received the strategic attention it deserves, and the related support activities appear to be ad hoc'.²⁰ In its assessment of UNMAS performance, AusAID identifies substantial strengths in that agency's role in delivering results in line with the humanitarian and development goals of Australia and global partners and in building national partnerships. The report points to areas where there is a need for improvement as in strategic management and transparency and accountability²¹. UNMAS has been working to address these criticisms over the last two years²².

Research by DFID into capacity development has suggested that although donors recognise that local ownership is critical to successful development interventions, 'they often fail to invest in the local institutions that can do the ongoing research and analysis needed by policy makers.' This is a consistent challenge to many national mine action programmes.²³

2.3 Monitoring & Evaluation and VFM

In general, mine action has struggled to quantify the socio-economic benefits of mine action to communities. As has been observed, 'the mine action sector has been adept in generating comforting figures on outputs: square meters

¹⁵ IMAS 04.10: 'Glossary', Definition 3.172.

¹⁶ Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report, p. 16.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁸ See IMAS 02.10: Guide for the establishment of a mine action programme, First Edition, 1 August 2007, Section 6.

¹⁹ In certain instances (e.g. Iraq, South Sudan), mine action NGOs, private companies as well as specialised organisations such as the GICHD, have been engaged in building institutional capacity, particularly with respect to the relevant mine action centres.

²⁰ Enrique Roman-Morey and M. Mounir Zahran, 'Evaluation of the Scope, Organisation, Effectiveness and Approach of the Work of the United Nations in Mine Action', UN Joint Inspection Unit, UN doc. JIU/REP/2011/11, Geneva, 2011, para. 121.

²¹ Australian Multilateral Assessment (UNMAS), March 2012, available through <http://www.aisaid.gov.au/partner/Documents/unmas-assessment.pdf>

²² Discussion with senior UNMAS Manager

²³ DFID, DFID research strategy 2008-2013 Working Paper series: Capacity Building, p. 9.



cleared, landmines destroyed and the like. Such data are necessary and might be useful in advocacy campaigns, but they provide little insight into when and how mine action actually enhances the wellbeing of people in mine-affected communities.²⁴ MA operators funded by DFID have largely continued to report in classic terms on the area of land they have cleared or otherwise released, the number of explosive devices cleared and destroyed, and the number and length of roads verified. Reporting for mine action and development should focus on the developmental impact of their work on a systematic basis.

For its part, the UN has paid little attention to monitoring the effectiveness of mine action programmes that it supports. Data compilation and analysis on the performance of national mine action programmes in even the simplest terms, such as amount of land released, trends in casualty rates and resource mobilisation, has been conducted almost exclusively by the non-governmental monitoring mechanism, the Landmine Monitor.²⁵ In addition, individual operators gather their own data, which is then compiled, with varying degrees of accuracy, by national authorities. The UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) report recommended that in the context of the preparation of the UN's new mine action strategy, the UN Secretary-General 'should establish a global baseline of reliable data while building on ongoing efforts, which should facilitate the systematic monitoring of progress and the final evaluation of actual results achieved towards the strategic objectives.'²⁶

In terms of VFM, the classic metric for measuring the efficiency of mine clearance has been the cost per square metre of land cleared. This gives a figure which is comparable across MA operators within the same operational context, although it is difficult to use it fairly across countries and it clearly says nothing about *effectiveness*. Assessing the efficiency of survey in a) identifying suspect land, and b) releasing it from suspicion is inherently even more challenging.

In terms of support mechanisms, much of DFID's support to mine action has been channelled through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), managed by UNMAS. The VTF was criticised by the evaluation report of the UN Joint Inspection Unit of UN mine action.²⁷ Among other things, it recommended that fees charged for the administration of the VTF be revised with a view to increasing both transparency and efficiency.²⁸ The Australian multilateral review expresses similar concerns²⁹.

2.4 Lessons from the Literature

The following points drawn from the above short literature review and from the longer version in Annex B are relevant lessons for mine action:

Linking MA to Development:

- Looking at the mine action/development link from the perspective of international development offers a different view on the importance and role of mine action. Development theorists and practitioners now see security and safety as the neglected missing element of development, without which economic progress is impossible in conflict affected parts of the world. Human security is a necessary pre-condition for sustainable development and mine action makes a very substantial contribution to that security.
- The link between mine action and development is a widespread theme and one of growing relevance in the sector, endorsed by the UN and many other agencies. However, economic development does not always happen automatically upon clearance. A more challenging and pro-active approach to improving the mine action-development link is to build mine action into national development plans, for instance, with clear development objectives alongside the traditional objective of casualty reduction.
- Capacity building of mine action national institutions remains a challenge, which has been addressed so far in a largely ad hoc, unplanned and unsatisfactory manner. There is currently little advice available on best practice in this area.

²⁴ Ted Paterson, Barry Pound, and Abdul Qudous Ziaee, 'Landmines and Livelihoods in Afghanistan: Evaluating the Benefits of Mine Action', GICHD, Geneva, forthcoming in *Journal of Peacebuilding and Development*, p. 1.

²⁵ See, for example, <http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/About-Us/What-is-the-Monitor>; and Landmine Monitor, *Landmine Monitor Report 2012, Toward a Mine Free-World*, Geneva, December 2012, available at: http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2012&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=&pqs_section=

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Recommendation 3.

²⁷ E. Roman-Morey and M. Mounir Zahran, 'Evaluation of the Scope, Organisation, Effectiveness and Approach of the Work of the United Nations in Mine Action', *op. cit.*, p. v.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. vi.

²⁹ Australian Multilateral Assessment (UNMAS), March 2012, p 12.



Achieving Integrated Mine Action

- In non-emergency situations there is a move away from mine risk education (MRE)/risk reduction education (RRE) into accelerated survey and clearance of mines, for the purpose of promoting development;
- The IMAS ‘five pillars’ of mine action³⁰ are now seven years old and do not reflect recent developments in thinking in the sector. They continue to focus on humanitarian demining and include victim assistance³¹, stockpile destruction, MRE and advocacy. The pillars themselves make no mention of socio-economic development, which now needs to be made integral to the model for mine action.

VFM and Monitoring

- Quantifying the benefits of mine action remains problematic, and sound monitoring and evaluation in mine action are rare. As a consequence, VFM indicators are unsatisfactory and need to be agreed internationally.

Programme Management

- Overall, coordination within the mine action sector is inadequate. Donor and UN strategies are not aligned. The UN strategy for country ownership and capacity needs to be strengthened in terms of promoting development and delivering VFM.

3.0 Baseline of the CHASE Mine Action Programme

3.1 Programme General Framework


The CHASE MA Programme is delivered by six different organisations:

- Two MA operators (HALO and MAG)³²;
- Three UN Agencies (UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF, collectively known as UNMAT — the UN Mine Action Team); and
- A contractor for the Meta Evaluation Study.

The share of the six organisations is shown in Figure 2. While HALO and MAG have a combined share of 83.1%, the share of UN agencies is still a substantial 17.6%, disbursed in three almost perfectly equal parts of 5.5% each of the total budget. IOD PARC had a small share, allocated for a £60,000 study (the Meta Evaluation). MAG is operational in six of the eight DFID CHASE MA Programme prioritised countries. HALO is operating in two countries; UNMAS is not operational with CHASE MA Programme funding in any of the eight target countries;³³ while UNDP uses CHASE MA Programme funds in Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Mozambique, as well as Columbia and Ethiopia. UNICEF has a CHASE MA Programme funded operation in DRC, Iraq and Sudan (North), as well as in Nepal. The Programme finances UNMAS operations in Afghanistan (Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA)), rapid response and the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) (see section 4.4).

Progress is assessed through the partners’ six-monthly activity reports in each country to DFID, and also a retrospective report upon completion of each contract (which has yet to occur). UNMAT reports annually. These periodic reports are required to contain data on areas of land cleared, numbers of mines and other ordnance destroyed, numbers of beneficiaries receiving MRE, and so on, all against pre-agreed targets and showing percentage achievement of the target.

Figure 2: Delivery of the CHASE MA Programme



³⁰ IMAS 04.10 Second Edition, 1 January 2003, Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations.

³¹ Victim assistance covered through UK international development health related interventions rather than as part of mine action.

³² MAG operated in consortium with GICHD and the Danish Demining Group (DDG).

³³ UNMAS-Afghanistan is supported through CHASE.



3.2 Progress to Date

3.2.1 Funding and Disbursements to Date

The CHASE MA Programme has a budget of around £31 million, with disbursement of just under £24.3 million (or 78%) as of early 2013. Detail of expenditure is provided in Table 1. Disbursements for the three UN agencies (£5 million) were 99% complete as of the time of writing, while the two MA operators have achieved a level of about three-quarters (74%) of their respective total disbursements. On a country-by-country level for the eight countries covered by HALO and MAG, individual disbursements do not vary widely from the average, with the marked exception of Iraq at 25%. This is explained by the fact that the Iraq project has only completed a scoping phase prior to full implementation.

Table 1: CHASE MA Programme Expenditure

Budget Items by Operator	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £	% Spend
HALO			
Not spec.- bridging fund	1,500,000	1,500,000	100%
Sri Lanka	3,000,000	1,950,578	65%
Mozambique	2,750,000	2,183,368	79%
Total HALO	7,250,000	5,633,946	78%
MAG			
Not spec.- bridging fund	1,500,000	1,500,000	100%
Vietnam	2,750,000	2,102,271	76%
Cambodia	4,285,865	3,345,179	78%
Laos	2,750,000	2,285,404	83%
Iraq	2,044,914	506,454	25%
Sudan	2,750,000	1,642,641	60%
DR Congo	2,750,000	2,239,480	81%
Total MAG	18,830,779	13,621,429	72%
TOTAL HALO & MAG	26,080,779	19,255,375	74%
UNMAS			
Afghanistan OPS	523,680	523,680	100%
Rapid response	523,680	523,680	100%
Policy & advocacy support	523,678	523,678	100%
Support to MASG	106,666	106,666	100%
Total UNMAS	1,677,705	1,677,705	100%
UNDP			
Cambodia UNDP	276,858	276,858	100%
Colombia UNDP	276,858	276,858	100%
Ethiopia UNDP	276,858	234,276 ³⁴	85%
Iraq UNDP	276,858	276,858	100%
Laos UNDP	276,858	276,858	100%
Mozambique UNDP	276,858	276,858	100%
Total UNDP	1,661,148	1,618,566	100%
UNICEF			
DR Congo UNICEF	141,300	141,300	100%
Iraq UNICEF	207,240	207,240	100%
Nepal UNICEF	169,560	169,560	100%
Sudan UNICEF	263,760	263,760	100%

³⁴ Clarified by UNDP, 20th June 2013.



Budget Items by Operator	Approved Budget £	Actual Spend to Date £	% Spend
Institutional development mine action	260,545	260,545	100%
QA in mine action response	313,085	313,085	100%
Coordination, knowledge, advocacy	305,657	305,657	100%
Total UNICEF	1,661,147	1,661,147	100%
TOTAL UN	5,000,000	4,957,418	99%
IOD PARC			
Meta Evaluation	60,000	60,000	100%
CHASE M.A. TOTAL	31,140,779	24,272,793	78%

3.2.2 Mines and UXO Clearance

Table 2 shows the pattern of mine and UXO removal, and the areas cleared, in the eight CHASE MA countries.

Table 2: Cost of Mine / UXO Clearance by Unit and Area (see note 1 below)

	CHASE MAP spend to end of reporting period (£)	Removal of Mines and UXO			Clearance of Surface Area	
		Mines / UXO removed (no)	Average cost of removal (incl. overheads) (£ / unit)	Average cost of removal (excl "other costs" ³⁵) (£ / unit)	Area cleared, or released through other means (ha)	Average cost of clearing (incl. overheads) (£ / ha)
Cambodia	2,217,813	5,957	372	362	190.9	11,620
Mozambique	1,244,160	5,088	245	245	70.4	17,673
Sri Lanka	1,899,331	16,459	115	89.8	109.0	17,420
Sudan / South Sudan	1,064,884	15,357	69	66	98.6	10,801
Total evaluation sample	6,426,188	42,861	150		468.9	13,705
DRC	1,395,873	867	1,610	1482	4.7	297,032
Iraq	506,454	1,054	481	481	(see note 2)	
Laos	1,482,464	14,995	99	98	569.8	2,602
Vietnam	1,188,178	9,771	122	115	22.5 (see note 3)	52,850
Total others	4,572,969	26,687	171		597.0	6,812
Total CHASE	10,999,157	69,548	158		1,066	9,845

Notes:

- Country-specific programmes implemented by HALO and MAG
- Iraq land released through technical survey or cancellation of SHAs totalling 8,834 hectares.
- Only accounts for MAG Static Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team and does not include mobile teams (as per clarification from MAG – 18th June)

The assessment of mine clearance results is complicated by the many external factors which intervene to make comparisons of cost effectiveness, difficult or even meaningless. This is especially evident in the fact that the true extent of the problem to be dealt with is largely unknown until individual mines are unearthed. Then there is the extent to which clearance is of UXO through battle area clearance, or the slower and more costly activity of sub-surface mine clearance. Other indicators would include £ per square meter cleared or socio economic benefit of land released.

³⁵ Excludes GICHD costs to MAG in Cambodia, DRC, Laos, Sudan/South Sudan and Vietnam; contribution from HALO to ZOA and Sawalanke for temporary shelters in Sri Lanka.



Even taking these factors into account, it is clear that DRC has only demined an area of less than five hectares, at a cost of £297,000 per hectare. MAG activity in the first year of the project (February 2011– January 2012, the only period for which written reports are available) focussed on initiation, deployment, the General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) and MRE activity. MAG also collaborated with the Danish Demining Group (DDG) to develop ‘insight into strengthening current tools and practices, training of staff about revised tools and best practices’ and to ‘provide ongoing QA to enable MAG to deliver high quality impact measurement results’³⁶. This partnership allows MAG to apply a context specific analytical framework (based on phase, nature of Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs) etc.) to produce the data required for project development of eventually released land.

As part of the GMAA process, MAG trained and deployed Community Liaison Teams (CLTs)³⁷ and alongside their assessment data gathering activities, these teams have also provided extensive MRE. The CLTs conducted some 1,164 MRE sessions reaching nearly 73,276 beneficiaries (a very high number – it should be noted that the DRC accounts for more than 51% of the CHASE MA programme total MRE/RRE beneficiaries)³⁸. Naturally, as the initial period constituted MAG’s start-up phase, with efforts concentrated on the GMAA, little clearance/land release was achieved. The second reporting period running through to January 2012, showed continued MRE activity. However, since much of the GMAA was essentially complete, the CLTs pursued MRE at a greatly reduced rate, this time with 14,843 beneficiaries reached through 368 sessions. This period also saw clearance/land release activity marginally increase^{39, 40}.

MAG points to factors which have contributed to a slower than anticipated start. These include tasking orders which have affected clearance productivity. As a result, MAG was focused solely on minefield operations, rather than Battle Area Clearance (BAC) tasks as well, as expected when the project was conceived and drafted. Given that BAC results in faster land release, initial clearance estimates based on a combination of both methodologies were therefore unlikely to be met). Other factors include the insecurity surrounding the build-up to elections which resulted in shorter deployment periods due to operational stand down⁴¹.

3.2.3 Mines Action Beneficiaries

The table below is a summary of operator reported clearance and MRE/RRE outputs only. It does not account for other project outputs such as survey, training or work done to support national capacity building. DFID has not standardised reporting by MA operators on how beneficiaries must be recorded, so caution is required when making comparisons.

Table 3: CHASE Mine Action Beneficiaries (MAG and HALO)⁴²

Country	Operator	Area cleared or released through other means (m ²)	MRE/RRE beneficiaries	Area Clearance beneficiaries
Vietnam	MAG	224,820	n/a	256,752
Cambodia	MAG	1,908,643	5,495	58,271
Laos	MAG	5,697,734	6,696	68,390
Sri Lanka	HALO	1,090,320	7,992	47,804
Iraq ¹	MAG	88,344,834	n/a	n/a
Sudan/ South Sudan ²	MAG	985,876	63,405	123,054 ³
DR Congo	MAG	46,994	89,755	19,600
Mozambique	HALO	704,000	1,954	n/a
TOTAL		99,003,221	175,297	450,817

³⁶ Report to DFID from MAG, first 6 months, February 2011 – 31 July 2011.

³⁷ Primarily through local partners, RIAO in Bandundu Province, and ECC-MERU in Sankuru.

³⁸ The exact operational methodology of the MRE sessions is not discussed in MAG reporting, however an MRE beneficiary number as high as 73,276 (an average of 62 persons per session) would suggest a rather “mass dissemination” or “Bullhorn” approach rather than MRE that is interpersonal or involves any real interaction at the community level.

³⁹ 88,000m² SHAs were to be cleared and made available for communities and humanitarian access during the period. However, only “14,671m² cleared during this reporting period, and 15,627m² during the project to date, which will benefit a predicted 19,600 beneficiaries following land release”.

⁴⁰ As of now MAG have cleared 21 hectares. The total amount of the DFID contribution allocated to both clearance and MRE is £1,385,366. This means the actual cost per hectare, and not taking into account the fact that MRE costs are also covered here is just under £70k. Since January 2012 MRE activity has continued and there has been an increase in clearance/land release activity – Clarification – MAG June 2013.

⁴¹ Election related violence led MAG to close regional operations, evacuate non-essential international staff and suspend activities between 24th November 2011 and 8th January 2012.

⁴² Calculation of beneficiaries for UNMAT partners does not lend itself to such measurement.



Notes:

- 1 Six month survey project, sub-contracted to DDG. Land released through technical survey or cancellation of SHAs. UXO cleared through Quick Response Teams (QRTs).
- 2 Kassala, Blue Nile (both in Sudan), Greater Equatoria and Jonglei States (South Sudan)
- 3 Of these, 64,128 were in South Sudan and the remainder in Sudan.

3.2.4 Progress against the Logframe

The CHASE MA Programme’s overarching logframe was produced retrospectively⁴³. It does not provide baselines or inputs (funds and CHASE human resources), and is rather sparsely populated with targets. As such, it has not served as a guiding tool for implementation. Although the overall programme logframe is currently of limited use, there are fully populated logframes at country level, created by the MA operators. These are in active use and have a full set of indicators and targets. They do not completely align with the outputs of the higher programmatic logframe, but represent local operational objectives. Country logframes were used by the evaluation team to analyse progress recorded in six-monthly reports and as basis for discussion with MA operators.

Areas cleared: During its first 18 months, the CHASE MA Programme has released just over 99 million square metres (9,900 hectares, or 99 square kilometres) of land. However, the bulk of this is accounted for by 88.3 square kilometres in Iraq which was released through technical survey or cancellation of SHAs which largely proved not to be contaminated by mines, but nevertheless acting as an inhibitor to development. The remaining 10.65 square kilometres represents a substantial area cleared, metre by metre in extremely labour-intensive operations. This is a very high level of achievement against the original milestones, and in some cases exceeds them. Bearing in mind that the data point is approximately two-thirds (67%) of the way through the total programme period, the achievement of targets varies from 18% to 333%.⁴⁴

Mines/UXO removed: More than 69,500 mines and items of UXO have been removed, the largest numbers of which were removed from Laos, Sri Lanka and Sudan/South Sudan, at around 15,000 per country, in broad terms. About 10,000 items of mainly UXO were removed from Vietnam and about 5,000 items of ordnance (mainly mines) from Cambodia and Mozambique.⁴⁵ DRC has the lowest area of land released and the lowest number of explosive hazards removed, at under 900, most of them UXO rather than mines.⁴⁶

Table 4: Indicative Socio-Economic Impacts

Impacts / Benefits	Cambodia	Sri Lanka	South Sudan	Mozambique
People & Health				
Reduce mine casualties	✓	✓	✓	✓
IDPs resettled		✓	✓	
Stability for family planning	✓	✓		
Gender issue benefits	✓	✓		
Opportunities for marginalised groups	✓	✓	✓	✓
Assets Released				
House sites		✓	✓	✓
Business sites				✓
Agricultural land	✓	✓	✓	✓
Fishing coasts		✓		
Infrastructure - rail	✓	✓		✓
Infrastructure – road	✓	✓	✓	✓
Infrastructure - power				✓
Community-based infrastructure	✓	✓	✓	
Economic Opportunity				
Start new economic activity	✓	✓	✓	✓
Attract government investment		✓		✓
Attract NGO investment	✓	✓	✓	
Attract private investment				✓
Increased incomes	✓	✓	✓	✓
Create new employment	✓	✓	✓	✓

⁴³ Discussion with CHASE MA Programme Unit. February 2013.

⁴⁴ These percentage achievement figures do serve to illustrate the variability of what the MA operators are dealing with; however, comparisons in terms of performance are not useful. It is important to bear in mind that operators are frequently working in different countries and even within the same country are operating in widely different terrains, weather conditions, security environments/accessibility and with varied combinations of resources/assets. Furthermore, the nature and antiquity of the former conflicts in the areas being demined, including the types of ordnance used, vary greatly.

⁴⁵ The latter would seem to dispel a common impression that little mine action is required in Mozambique.




MRE/RRE: Operator progress towards MRE/RRE targets (see Table 3 at 3.2.3) indicates 175,000 individuals (of which the two largest are 89,755 in DRC and 63,405 in Sudan/South Sudan) or an average of approximately 120% of the original targeted beneficiaries have received MRE/RRE during the period (in six countries only; excludes Iraq and Vietnam). However, caution is necessary when comparing numbers. Within MRE/RRE statistics, different approaches and different styles of MRE (e.g. mass media dissemination versus training⁴⁷) can skew the overall numbers. For example, if MRE is done for 20 children in a school that would normally indicate 20 beneficiaries. If, though, during the course of the MRE session the children are given pamphlets to take home to their families, then conceivably they could be counted as beneficiaries as well.

Socio-economic impacts and benefits: In terms of calculating beneficiaries reached and the community-level socio-economic impact, it is important to note that each country included in this review is at a different stage in its development. Furthermore, impacts are, in many cases, recorded locally according to different standards, with weak data collection tools, resulting in omissions and double-counting, making some comparisons meaningless. Nevertheless, the discipline of regular reporting has been motivating MA operators to improve consistency⁴⁸.

An overview of the communities studied identified areas (see Table 4) where the CHASE MA Programmes have been influential and had a marked socio-economic impact⁴⁹. A disparity, though, remains among the different organisations and operators in both perception and practice of how exactly beneficiaries are identified and calculated.⁵⁰ Specifically, the definition of direct versus indirect beneficiaries differs, as does the calculation/inclusion of MRE/RRE statistics (and the format by which they are reported). A few simple scenarios demonstrate the complexity of harmonising beneficiary numbers. For example, when a one-hectare plot of land owned by a family of six is cleared for agriculture this would normally indicate six beneficiaries. If that land also spans a main footpath from the greater village to a water source, then the entire village could be considered direct beneficiaries or indirect beneficiaries depending on perception.⁵¹

Towards a new baseline: As a result of the more managed and coordinated approach to mine action over the years, however variably, in the four survey countries, it can be argued that MA operations, such as the CHASE MA Programme, can now be undertaken from a somewhat improved baseline than was previously the case. There is better knowledge of the extent of mine hazards, local capacity and better appreciation of socio-economic impact of those hazards. This has led to more accurate prioritisation, application of resources and relevant mine action, although still difficult to capture progress in terms of development. Figure 3 attempts to illustrate a comparative view of progress as of early 2013 with indicators capturing progress against the MA pillars⁵² (see page 3, Annex J). The diagram covers the four countries visited during the evaluation. Each country has been assessed on a 1 to 5 scale for each of the six criteria, whereby '1' indicates a good position for the country, while '5' indicates a situation needing critical attention. Hence, the smaller the area

Figure 3: Baseline compared to Key MA Indicators



⁴⁶ Though a strongly emotive statistic, the actual number of devices removed is not highly relevant in and of itself, as the numbers of mines and ERW in existence in the first place cannot, in the majority of tasks, be predicted with any accuracy. Consequently, the operators do not predict the number of devices to be removed as an indicator in the logframes. See operator country logframes.

⁴⁷ MAG's more selective, 'upon-request' approach in Cambodia, versus UNICEF's or HALO's more classical pedagogic approach in Sri Lanka, for example.

⁴⁸ For example, MAG IM manual (specifically unit 3— indicator table).

⁴⁹ The findings in this table were the result of a team exercise in judging which benefits were most evident in which countries, based on our collective experience of field investigations.

⁵⁰ Interviews with operational partner field staff in Cambodia, South Sudan and Sri Lanka.

⁵¹ HALO has mentioned this issue in a number of its reports and is currently revising its calculation policy.

⁵² We use two different indicators to estimate progress in one of the MA pillars, namely mine/UXO removal: (a) the marginal cost of removing a mine or UXO, and (b) the area of land cleared as percentage of the estimated/known total surface area affected by mines.



covered by the indicative radar diagram, the better the position of the country, and the less support it presumably would need from public or donor funds. By this set of standards, Cambodia is clearly the most advanced or mature of the four countries in terms of MA actions, followed by Mozambique. National ownership remains weak in South Sudan and the marginal cost of mine removal is high. Stockpile destruction is a significant issue in Sri Lanka though not an issue for developmental mine action⁵³.

The model is intended to illustrate an alternative and joined-up approach to measuring the impact of mine action and development. More systematic baselines, regular reporting and impact evaluations introduced through the CHASE MA Programme will make it possible to construct more informed representations of the likely contribution of MA to development in target countries. Parameters for such an assessment would include such criteria as extent of contamination, governance (capacity and human rights); commitment to inclusive development (eg pro-poor), demographics, proximity/remoteness.

4.0 Findings

4.1 Introduction to the Findings

This section presents the main findings of the evaluation study and a summary of conclusions based on them. Findings are presented under thematic areas which address in broad terms the five results areas of the Theory of Change. The thematic areas are: Community and Socio-economic Impact; MA and its Links with Development; Capacity Building; VFM and M&E; and Programme Management. Summary findings from the Meta Evaluation are included in boxes throughout this section.⁵⁴ These are elaborated on in Annex H. The evidence base on which these findings are constructed is found in the Country Mission Reports (Annex C-F), the literature review (Annex B), the note on the GICHD 16th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors (Annex I) and in the responses to 13 Evaluation Questions (Annex G).

4.2 Community and Socio-Economic Impact

This section assesses how the CHASE Mine Action Programme delivers development benefits to mine-affected communities as laid out in the 2010 DFID Mine Action Strategy

4.2.1 Impact of Mine Clearance on Communities

MA operators appear to have excelled at releasing land and thereby contributing to improved safety/reduction of accidents. As noted in Section 3 above, in the first 18 months of the programme, nearly 100 square kilometres of land in the eight CHASE MA countries had been cleared or released.⁵⁵ This is not only a significant reduction in the extent of potential hazards, but also in blockages to socio-economic opportunities in the affected communities. In the CHASE MA Programme countries visited, most often the poorest families feel the biggest negative impact of mined land on their livelihoods. The effects are not just seen in increased risk of death or injury, which is of course very real, but also in constraints to a wide range of activities essential to normal community and economic life: access to water, fuel collection, cultivation of land, livestock feed, access to schools and medical care, the free exchange of trade, and the value and ownership of land⁵⁶ (the latter particularly observed in Cambodia, where value of contaminated land was at least half of regular market price)⁵⁷. On the other hand, demined land can be used for a variety of development purposes including for agriculture and other livelihood activities, for the provision of public services, for infrastructure projects, for the extraction of natural resources, and for shelter, as observed in the four countries surveyed.

In **Sri Lanka**, approximately 70,000 IDPs have resettled⁵⁸ and 114 temporary homes have been constructed⁵⁹ on land cleared through this programme. The role of demining in facilitating resettlement was confirmed by the

⁵³ The methodology for arriving at the six indicative scores for each of the four countries considered was a collective team judgement session, based on field work and desk research, and moderated by an independent facilitator. Team members' individual scores were compared and discussed until consensus was reached. The scores presented in the diagram reflect the consensus of the group session.

⁵⁴ Relating to findings of the Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report, page xi.

⁵⁵ See summarised clearance statistics in Section 3 of this report for more detail.

⁵⁶ The value of land when cleared of mines usually rises substantially from its uncleared value, and this is widely seen in Sri Lanka (HALO data) and Cambodia. It is less evident in South Sudan where the concept of individual land ownership is less prevalent. As noted elsewhere in this report, the poor have sometimes been obliged to sell their uncleared land before its true value can be realised.

⁵⁷ This was heard in every village sampled in Cambodia, during focus group discussions as well as in key informant interviews, with many different type of interviewees including beneficiaries of clearance interventions. See page 10, Annex C: Cambodia Country Mission Report for more details.

⁵⁸ In the Vanni only: DFID Support to Mine Action in Sri Lanka, HALO Trust Interim Eighteen Month Report, June 1-November 30, 2012.



community impact survey.⁶⁰ The impact of clearance has also been seen in terms of agricultural production. Demining has enabled families to return to subsistence farming, fishing and other income-generating activities.⁶¹

In **Cambodia**, approximately 58,000 direct and indirect beneficiaries of land released for development have been recorded⁶². Benefits include safe access, development and use of public services, shelter and settlements, collection of natural resources and infrastructure. Mine clearance activities delivered by MAG are typically followed by resumption of economic activity on cleared land. The survey confirmed the positive impact on agricultural productivity in Battambang and Pailin provinces for those communities that had benefited to some extent from the programme.⁶³ From the comparison of interviews held in counterfactual communities against communities with ongoing or completed operations, it emerged that a key differentiating factor was in the recorded increase in school attendance as a result of more stable livelihoods. Households in cleared site were not only able to guarantee food security, but also to generate sufficient cash for basic school material requirements⁶⁴. In the counterfactual sample it was also reported that many households migrated due to difficulties in making a livelihood with contaminated land.

In **Mozambique**, the results of the community impact survey show that, overall, the degree to which demining has contributed to poverty reduction in the surveyed areas is modest. This is because direct impact has been limited to only a few families, all of whom already had access to some agricultural land prior to demining. Further, based on interviews and focus group, discussions conducted by the evaluation team, mines were seen as a hindrance to livelihoods and a threat to security, but could be worked around⁶⁵. However, in all group interviews, the ways in which demining could promote (or at least remove the main blockages to) development were frequently mentioned. These included increased perceptions of security that would contribute to growth fuelled by external actors, increasing income from farming, and increasing the land available for potential development of local resources (e.g. roads, health centres).⁶⁶ Furthermore, in the case of the counterfactual community visited in Mozambique, a growing population has meant more demand for agricultural land and this in turn has meant that people have started to cultivate in more dangerous areas.⁶⁷ Other studies have indicated that the counterfactual has, over the last 12 years, experienced an ever increasing need for the resources blocked by the presence of landmines⁶⁸. Finally, in Mozambique much of the focus of demining in recent years has been on clearing economic infrastructure. Demining around the Maputo power line and Cahora Bassa hydro-electric dam clearance projects, for example, has led to the resumption of provision of electricity for domestic consumption and export. The dam is now a major national revenue earner.⁶⁹ A number of interlocutors referred to the increased opportunities created by such clearance for future major infrastructure projects⁷⁰. At the community level, demining of the Cahora Bassa dam also had implications for subsistence farmers living in the region, as the mined area is good agricultural land.

In **South Sudan**, 743,349 square metres of priority land cleared by MAG⁷¹ is close to villages in agricultural and livestock rearing areas. It has enabled livelihood activities to continue with reduced risk. Access to vital services has also been increased by MA operators collaborating with development agencies and to date the operator's reports record more than 64,000 beneficiaries from mine action land clearance.⁷² The community impact survey found that CHASE MA funding is contributing to releasing land in communities which have returned to their villages following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. In one village people had built their houses on the cleared land, bringing them closer to the road and passing trade. In another, bricks were being made on cleared land which would later be used for crops once the rainy season began. Another area was cleared close to the river where women and children go to collect water.⁷³ In contrast in the counterfactual community visited, as a result of landmine contamination people were unable to access land for quarrying, which they would ideally undertake as a dry season livelihood activity. Instead they cut grass for thatch and wood, providing less income. The full impact of demining on the communities surveyed in South Sudan compared to the counterfactual will be determined once an agrarian cycle

⁵⁹ Interview with Bartholomew Digby, HALO Programme Manager, Kilinochchi, April 11, 2013.

⁶⁰ See Table 2, page 13 of Annex E: Sri Lanka Country Mission Report which demonstrates the increase in the numbers of people resettled in the communities visited.

⁶¹ For more details see page 13 of Annex E: Sri Lanka Country Mission Report.

⁶² MAG programme brief delivered to Evaluation Team, Phnom Penh, April 2, 2013.

⁶³ See page 9, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report and page 13 for more details.

⁶⁴ For more details see page 11, Annex C: Cambodia Country Mission Report.

⁶⁵ See page 9, Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report for more details.

⁶⁶ See page 9-11, Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report for more details.

⁶⁷ See page 8, Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report for more details.

⁶⁸ A documented study of the same area was conducted in 2001. Millard, Ananda and Kristian Karpviken. 2001. 'Community Studies in Practice: Implementing a New Approach to Landmine Impact Assessment with Illustrations from Mozambique'. PRIO Report 1/2001. Oslo: PRIO.

⁶⁹ Interviews with HALO in Mozambique. Review of HALO records.

⁷⁰ Interviews with national and international development agencies.

⁷¹ For the period June 2011-November 2012 -DFID Support for Mine Action in Sudan & South Sudan MAG Annual Report.

⁷² Ibid. For more details see Section 3.2.2 of this report. Confirmed by MAG, June 2013.

⁷³ For more details, see page 8, Annex F, the South Sudan Country Mission Report.



has been completed, since at the time of the survey community members in the demined community were waiting for the rainy season in order to begin cultivation.⁷⁴

Evidence suggests that a key development objective of the DFID Mine Action Strategy, ‘to release mine affected land to make a measurable contribution to the socio-economic development of mine-affected communities’, has been achieved in all four countries surveyed. The cases of Mozambique and South Sudan demonstrate that the full impact of demining on socio-economic development does not necessarily occur immediately following demining, but can take time to accrue, for example due to the seasonality of agricultural productivity, the length of time it takes to complete a major infrastructure project, or the changing use of land over time. However, the clear successes so far in terms of community and economic impacts are in Sri Lanka and Cambodia, where population density and hence immediate pressures to use released land are greatest. The population density ranking of these four countries is quite striking (see Table 5), further reinforcing the idea that the top two countries are more likely to realise immediate sizeable benefits from cleared land, through its rapid return to productive use. In more sparsely populated regions, the role of development planning is all the more critical to address marginalisation, poverty and market failure.

Table 5: Population Density of Selected CHASE MA Programme Countries

Country	Operator	National Population Density (persons/km ²)
Sri Lanka	HALO	323
Cambodia	MAG	82
Mozambique	HALO	29
South Sudan	MAG	13

Population densities in those parts (provinces, districts) of the four countries where DFID-funded demining is being undertaken bear out this point. For instance, in northern Sri Lanka, the population density in Jaffna province, one of the main areas where HALO is currently working, is 528 persons per square kilometre. In Kilinochchi, where much refugee resettlement has occurred, it is 106 persons per square kilometre, which although below the Sri Lankan average, is still well above the national averages of other three countries. The two Cambodian provinces being worked, Battambang and Pailin, have population densities of 89 and 88 persons per square kilometre, respectively. In Mozambique, the areas where mine action is taking place are generally well below national population densities, and likewise for South Sudan. Accordingly, there appears to be a quite striking correlation between population densities in areas of mine clearance, and the demand to re-use land.

Furthermore, the extent to which demining benefits the poorest is highly related to the context in which demining operations take place. The community impact survey findings in all four countries demonstrate that demining does not always benefit the poorest first. In **Cambodia**, priorities are established through a nationally led process that incorporates the socio-economic needs of communities into their prioritisation approvals.⁷⁵ However, these do not always serve the needs of the poorest.⁷⁶ Most vulnerable people are particularly sensitive to the timing of demining. Small and very small land owners confronted by mine contamination do not have a buffer of reserves while waiting for their land to be demined. The result is often that they either attempt cultivation on contaminated land, or they decide to sell mined land for half its value price (meaning the benefits of demining accrue to others), or alternatively, they risk falling into a debt trap by taking accessible commercial loans which are only available at high interest rates.⁷⁷ In **South Sudan**, the limited community impact survey found that the DFID CHASE MA Programme is mostly benefitting relatively better-off families as they have better access to tools such as seed and equipment,⁷⁸ although a larger sample would be needed to draw any definitive conclusion.

In **Sri Lanka**, the level of improvement in livelihoods was found to depend on a variety of environmental and political factors. These include the amount, geographical position and quality of the land owned (which directly affects the amount of produce available to harvest/catch and then sell); the quality of the local infrastructure (which affects ability to transport and sell goods); and local gender patterns.⁷⁹ However, the Tamil population is exposed to the threat of sudden expropriation and land-grabbing by the military who are developing commercial, farming and

⁷⁴ For more details, see page 9, Annex F, the South Sudan Country Mission Report.

⁷⁵ National Guideline and Principal Operation on Management of Mine Clearance Integrated Socio-Economic Development issued by the CMAA (Sept 2011) (MAG).

⁷⁶ Analysis of MAG Cambodia baseline data, Key informant interviews as part of the community impact survey. For more details see page 9, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report.

⁷⁷ For more details, see page 9 and 13, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report.

⁷⁸ For more details, see page 9, Annex F, South Sudan Country Mission Report.

⁷⁹ For more details see page 13, Annex E, Sri Lanka Country Mission Report.



tourism in a visible fashion, along main roads, on the coast in high security zones, including on demined land.⁸⁰ In **Mozambique**, the benefits of demining were more difficult to disaggregate since, in the communities surveyed, everyone had equal rights and equal access in terms of land ownership, and since the benefits of demining accrued to only a few families, all of whom had access to land prior to demining.⁸¹ Only in the counterfactual community was there pressure for land rights given the restrictions due to mine contamination.

The findings from Cambodia, South Sudan and Sri Lanka demonstrate that the most vulnerable can at times struggle to maximise the benefits of demining due to a lack of resources. Exclusion can be made worse through policies which benefit certain socio-economic groupings over the most marginalised. This is backed up by Paterson *et al.*, who ask whether priorities for demining should be set mainly on the expected production value of each cleared area or through a more community-based approach. The former approach promises greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as well as being easily monitored. However, it is dependent on multiple assumptions, notably that the beneficiary households possess the complementary inputs (e.g., seeds, draught animals, farming implements) to use the land as anticipated; that the affected communities are sufficiently connected with markets to sustain themselves without the need for complementary initiatives (e.g., road rehabilitation); and that they have access to a variety of land types to sustain both crop agriculture and livestock.⁸² These are significant assumptions that are far from being well-founded in many affected communities. Accordingly, the authors advocate a more focused approach based on local community realities that should take into account the needs (essential resources) of the poorest and most vulnerable in order to achieve equitable socio-economic impact from mine action (see Box 1, recommendation a) below).

4.2.2 Impact of Mine Risk Education on Communities

The DFID MA strategy recognises that mine action is more than simply demining and is commonly defined as having five mutually supporting pillars, one of which is mine risk education (MRE). The CHASE MA Programme delivers MRE mainly through support to UNMAT/UNICEF and the two MA operators. The latter, though investing relatively modest portions of their overall funding, have included it in their operational portfolios and have reached a considerable number of beneficiaries.⁸³ As the Meta Evaluation rightly points out, *'an effective MRE system would encourage reporting of risks which could be responded to directly by mine operators. Where MRE is not effectively linked to the demining processes, the credibility of the MRE agencies may be undermined.'*⁸⁴ One issue for DFID is evidencing the link between UN support for MRE and specific outputs/outcomes. Certainly, whereas classical MRE may be more effective in an emergency context or context involving internal movement, MRE or RRE delivered through a Community Liaison (CL) framework is generally more appropriate for long term-application.⁸⁵ MRE evolves, constantly being adjusted and adapted to the changing needs of both the affected communities and the mine action operation.

MRE carried out in all four study countries recognises this. It is designed to meet both the multi-faceted needs of the affected population and the mine action operation, by providing not only education but also a feedback mechanism for communities to report mines and suggest areas for clearance prioritisation.⁸⁶ However, while MRE, as part of CL, (see 4.3.2 Inclusion) has also functioned to encourage and facilitate reporting on new mines/UXO, it does not always seem to have served as a means for sharing information with likely interested populations on plans for demining⁸⁷. In general, in the four countries surveyed, the CL functions were not conducted to their full potential, due to the limited resources assigned to them⁸⁸ (see Box 1, recommendation b) below).

⁸⁰ In Mullaitivu Province, the Army demined a large portion of land, obtained a certificate of clearance from Regional MA Centre and then re-fenced and put up mine alert sign to protect the area and develop a large farm..

⁸¹ For more details, see page 11, Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report.

Ted Paterson, Barry Pound, and Abdul Qudous Ziaee, 'Landmines and Livelihoods in Afghanistan: Evaluating the Benefits of Mine Action', GICHD, Geneva, - forthcoming in Journal of Peacebuilding and Development.

⁸³ More than 200,000 by current count, as seen in the combined operator annual reports.

⁸⁴ Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report, page 20.

⁸⁵ MAG's Community Liaison teams in Cambodia or South Sudan, for example.

⁸⁶ By means of illustrating how appropriately structured MRE not only serves the communities risk education needs but also aids the greater mine action process, a case in South Sudan is illustrative: MAG learned about and was subsequently able to clear one high priority site called Pajok, only as a result of its CL/MRE intervention session for employees of the British Embassy in Juba who initially identified a potential problem, which was subsequently confirmed by MAG's Community Liaison.

⁸⁷ In Cambodia in all the sampled villages with ongoing or completed operations people did not have accurate knowledge of which land was demined. In Phlov Meas not even the direct beneficiaries knew. Given the extent of contamination in Battambang, MA operators have cleared a number of tasks and revisited villages a number of times, which may lead to confusion about what is the most up to date information about contamination within the community. (MAG)

⁸⁸ For example, in Cambodia, as per information received from interviews with the CL Coordinator and Regional Supervisor, each two person team has an average of 27 villages to cover, which means there is not enough time in each village to reach out and get to know the village populations.



In **Sri Lanka**, national regulations prevent international MA organisations from conducting MRE, which has instead to be undertaken only by accredited local NGOs.⁸⁹ Interviewees referenced numerous MRE activities conducted in villages where HALO is operating during the survey: people recall the activities and the core messages.^{90 91} In **South Sudan**, in the communities surveyed community members were aware of the mine clearance process and the area that had been cleared; women had slightly less awareness of the process but nevertheless generally knew which areas had been cleared.⁹² In the communities surveyed in **Mozambique**, MRE had targeted only the village leader and any community members who happened to be around.⁹³ In **Cambodia**, the impact of MRE is unclear; the number of accidents in the areas surveyed is reducing. However landmines are still the biggest cause of accidents, as risky livelihood activities are still being undertaken, such as the selling UXO or landmines for scrap metal or fishing. It is, however, difficult to distinguish whether these activities still occur due to poor MRE or due to a lack of safe livelihood opportunities.⁹⁴ In the counterfactual community fishing and hunting in areas contaminated with landmines/UXOs were reported as being very common.⁹⁵

The success of MRE activities among the countries surveyed therefore appears to be mixed. Their impact on awareness-raising and behavioural change is difficult to measure given the complex post-conflict, impoverished and difficult-to-access contexts within which they are delivered. Multiple factors affect how individuals become aware of mine risks, and once aware, whether they seek to avoid mine risks or not.

4.2.3 Impact of MA on Inclusion

Within the broader development objectives, inclusion (gender, age and class) is one area in which the CHASE MA Programme appears to have had relatively little impact. There was no strong evidence of community inclusion and participation in mine action particularly for poorer people in the countries studied. This was as a result of the approaches to mine action taken by some MA operators and national MA authorities, but also largely a consequence of how priority setting is established at country level. In most cases, MA operators had little or no say on how overall priorities were identified (geographical areas and sometimes also type of land use), but they could decide which specific minefields were to be selected and cleared first in each prioritised area or sub-region. Nevertheless, even at this stage of the prioritisation process, little involvement of communities in the prioritisation process by the MA operator was observed, with the exception of South Sudan, where the operator carried out an impact survey to decide which community to consider first.⁹⁶ In this instance it should be noted that the CL Manager in the area surveyed reported that opportunity costs for the most vulnerable are high in attending community meetings and typically the middle-level families attend. The process typically benefits relatively better-off families as these have the resources to invest in attending community prioritisation meetings and the necessary investments to use the land following clearance. In Cambodia, based on the information collected in the survey, it appears that the prioritisation process favours reclamation of land that does not belong to the most vulnerable groups of owners, who are also less well physically and politically connected.⁹⁷

No evidence was found in any of the four surveyed countries that specific operator's workplans had been completed to prioritise minefields impacting the most vulnerable households. Rather, issues such as logistics, accessibility for mechanical means, seasonal weather patterns and potential density of contamination on land were considered as main criteria for prioritisation, even in the case of operators who had CL teams⁹⁸.

MAG has emphasised the need to focus more attention on communities and building dialogue, and the organisation has used a CL approach to develop relationships with communities⁹⁹. The purpose of CL is to collect community data, share information with communities and evaluate impact. CL can also be a route to deliver MRE.¹⁰⁰ HALO has adopted a technically focused approach to demining with less overt emphasis on interaction with communities about development issues. However, despite the different approaches taken, the community impact surveys conducted for

⁸⁹ In consultation with UNICEF, HALO contracted Sarvodaya for community liaison activities only while UNICEF is supporting another NGO for MRE activities in HALO operating areas. UNICEF has contracts with the other branches of Sarvodaya other than the one that is contracted by HALO.

⁹⁰ See page 17, Annex E, Sri Lanka Country Mission Report.

⁹¹ UNICEF points to MRE teams in heavy conflict areas, e.g. Mullaitivu, creating "the vast majority of tasks for clearance teams".

⁹² See page 12, Annex F, South Sudan Country Mission Report.

⁹³ See page 12, Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report.

⁹⁴ See page 17, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report.

⁹⁵ See page 17, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report.

⁹⁶ See page 11, Annex F, South Sudan Country Mission Report.

⁹⁷ See page 11, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report.

⁹⁸ MAG has a more formalised system than HALO to engage with communities, which includes community liaison staff. It is noteworthy that the community surveys suggested that at the village level there was little perceived benefit of one approach over another.

⁹⁹ See: <http://www.maginternational.org/about/community-liaison/#.UZyqmZVfSVM>.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.



this evaluation (Annexes C-F) suggested little distinction between how local people perceive HALO and MAG interaction with communities on the ground.

4.2.4 Impact of MA on Gender

It is important to recognise, as outlined below, that landmines impact women and girls differently from men and boys. Specifically, the threat results from the type of activity they are responsible for undertaking in the community, and how that activity is hindered by the presence of landmines.

In **Cambodia**, the contamination of land and the resulting heightened risk in accessing natural resources seem to have led to the reshuffling of the division of tasks at the household level. The longer distances to fetch water or fuel and the higher risk attached to carrying out these activities meant that men were more likely to undertake these previously female tasks. This more equitable distribution of household work did not last after demining. Women interviewed felt that they fully returned to their 'traditional' roles following the completion of demining operations¹⁰¹. The contracting of women as deminers was said by villagers consulted to play only a symbolic role in challenging traditional gender structures. However, the temporary employment created for women was perceived as an important beneficial impact of mine action.

In **Mozambique**, the demining operation in the communities visited for this evaluation did not influence local gender structures and the existence of landmines did not affect one gender more than another.¹⁰² This was true of all cases including the counterfactual case study.¹⁰³ In **South Sudan**, data on questions related to women and girls were not conclusive due to the fact that the community impact survey in South Sudan was conducted shortly after the land had been demined and handed over to the community, and was therefore not yet returned to its full productive use¹⁰⁴. The impact of clearance in demined communities compared to the counterfactual could therefore not be fully determined. However, findings suggested that household activities such as water collection endangered women specifically, and since the demined areas bordered rivers where water was collected, demining ensured safer water collection by women¹⁰⁵. Furthermore, women in South Sudan tend not to leave the village's environs and hence the fact that the demining took place in the immediate confines of the village, enabling women to access agricultural land, also had an impact. It is unclear, however, whether men took up activities on behalf of women in South Sudan when land was mined.¹⁰⁶

Gender-based violence and security was a specific concern in **Sri Lanka**. It was claimed that the IDP camps were rife with sexual violence which targeted women and girls. This violence was not related to landmines *per se*, but exposure to violence was significantly reduced when women were able to return to cleared areas¹⁰⁷. The Sri Lanka community impact study also heard some reports of sexual abuse of women by military personnel,¹⁰⁸ a particularly problematic finding as the armed forces intend to take full control of mine action in future. This warrants further investigation.

Overall, MA operators did not develop a thorough vision of how to increase gender equality through mine action, and the baselines data they gathered did not present elaborated gender analysis,¹⁰⁹ as can be seen in the baseline reports which do not describe existing gender patterns or link livelihoods conditions and opportunities to gender. Interviews with MA operator managers also revealed that the operators understood including gender merely as offering employment opportunities to women. With the exception of human resource policies to recruit female staff in Cambodia and Sri Lanka, the gender impact of MA observed by this evaluation was not intentionally pursued (see Box 1, recommendation c) below).

¹⁰¹ See page 16, Annex C, Cambodia Country Mission Report for more details.

¹⁰² UNDP in Mozambique point out that of the landmine victims in MOZ recorded between 2009 and 2013, 76% were men and boys, while women and girls made up only 24%. UNDP – Clarification - June 2013

¹⁰³ See page 11, Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report

¹⁰⁴ At the time of writing, the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) was undertaking a review of gender mainstreaming across the Mine Action programme in South Sudan. UNMAS clarification June 2013

¹⁰⁵ It should be noted, however, that the water being accessed was not potable.

¹⁰⁶ See page 12, Annex D, South Sudan Country Mission Report

¹⁰⁷ See page 16, Annex E, Sri Lanka Country Mission Report.

¹⁰⁸ See page 17, Annex E, Sri Lanka Country Mission Report. Other recent studies from international CSOs have contained data on the current violence exercised by military and on the deliberate restriction of dissent operated by the Government in past months/years: International Civil Society Action (ICAN), *Elusive Peace, Pervasive Violence: Sri Lankan Women Struggle for Justice and Peace*, Spring 2013. Available through: <http://www.icanpeacework.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/SriLanka-final.pdf>; Amnesty International, *Sri Lanka's Assault on Dissent*, 2013. Available through: http://www.amnesty.org.au/images/uploads/news/4081_sri_lanka_april2013.pdf

¹⁰⁹ MAG Baseline Assessment Report, Battambang and Pailin Provinces, Cambodia 2011; Interview with Alistair Moir on the 14th of March, in Phnom Penh; HALO Trust / DFID MA programme Sri Lanka, Preliminary Baseline Assessment Report PO5563 (no date); Interview with Bartholomew Digby in Colombo, on the 2nd and 3rd of April, and in Kilinochi on 5th of April.



Box 1: Community and Socio-Economic Impact - Conclusions and Recommendations

- a) Demining should be prioritised not only in terms of which land can be cleared most efficiently or which land has the highest expected production value, but also which land will deliver benefits to the poorest and most vulnerable, taking into account the needs (essential resources) of the poorest and most vulnerable;
- b) Due to resource constraints, MRE has not always functioned to its full potential, falling short of providing a feedback mechanism for communities to suggest areas for clearance prioritisation and receive information on plans for demining. Properly resourced, community liaison-type functions can deliver more cost effective MRE as an integral activity of the MA operators and should be specified in future DFID procurement;
- c) Gender should feature in future tender requirements for mine action operations. Tenderers should propose a thorough vision of how to increase gender equality through mine action, and all monitoring and evaluation data they gather should present a disaggregated gender analysis.

4.3 Mine Action and its Links with the Development Process

This section addresses how effectively the CHASE Mine Action Programme has linked MA to broader development issues at country level.

4.3.1 Integration of Mine Action into Development Programmes

One of the four principles of DFID's MA strategy requires implementing organisations to support DFID's development goals and aid effectiveness principles, including closer integration of mine action in development programmes.¹¹⁰ The Meta Evaluation examined 'wider understandings' around mine action and development and concluded that linkages between mine action and development 'are not well articulated or understood and agreed'.¹¹¹ Often mine action is not tied to a development process. It appears to take place as a 'precursor' to development, but without a clear plan for what should follow. The mine action community in-country – operators and UNMAT alike – tend to have little substantive contact with the institutions, agencies, NGOs and networks that make up the development sector. An early indicator, in the course of the evaluation, of the gap between the two worlds was the realisation that country programme teams (MA operators and UN agencies) were generally not well placed to identify key informants from national development institutions.¹¹² In Sri Lanka, however, the MA operator did interact with local/regional (provincial) authorities dealing with development planning and prioritisation.¹¹³

Meta Evaluation key finding 1:

There is a very diverse field of stakeholders operating in complex situations. This includes donors/UN agencies/NGOs/private sector/national and local governments as well as communities.

This evaluation study (unsurprisingly) has confirmed in the CHASE-funded countries reviewed, there is a crowded playing field of stakeholders operating in the complex mine action arena. This is to some extent evidence of the success with which the MA programme has engaged these stakeholders; on the other hand, coordination of diverse, and sometimes competing, interests adds to the difficulty of creating meaningful linkages between mine action and development. Some, albeit limited cooperation has been evident between mine action operators and NGOs, thus enabling mine action to be linked to broader development initiatives e.g. the construction of housing for returnees. One conclusion of the current evaluation study is the need for continuing clarification, definition and consensus about the roles and relationships of different stakeholders in the mine action – development continuum within the context of the CHASE programme.

On the other hand, some CHASE MA Programme countries, namely Laos and Vietnam, seem to have fairly well developed links between mine action and development. In these countries socio-economic development is driven centrally by Government and through the Party structures at more local levels. National development planning in both countries makes provision for UXO clearance to take place as a part of development process.¹¹⁴

Figure 4 below draws on the logic model developed as part of the Meta Evaluation and seeks to illustrate the relationship between mine action outputs and development outcomes in a well connected process.

¹¹⁰ DFID Programme Strategy 2010–2013, Creating a safer environment: clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war, p. 5.

¹¹¹ Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report, p. xi.


¹¹² Meetings with national development agencies were sometimes arranged by national partner organisations.

¹¹³ Interview with the HALO Trust (Sri Lanka); Interview with UNICEF representative in Sri Lanka.

¹¹⁴ Interview with Vietnamese mine action NGO in Geneva and with MAG Vietnam team in Manchester.



Figure 4¹¹⁵: Adaptation of the MA Programme Logic Model



4.3.2 Situating MA within the National Development Agenda

The success of placing mine action within the development context in CHASE MA Programme supported countries will depend upon the extent to which key stakeholders have a shared understanding of the intended outcomes as well as a clear appreciation of the strengths and roles of each actor. Demining, including survey, is essentially a technical operation as critical to socio-economic development in mine-affected areas as irrigation is to agriculture in arid lands. The wider development community is dealing with a complex range of factors inhibiting or facilitating growth (livelihoods and economic development), one of which must be mine action.

Mine action, if effectively integrated into the development process, must be located upstream between the national mine action coordination systems, national and local development planning and downstream towards the implementation of development projects. In the following section, we see to what extent mine action is integrated in the development context of the survey countries.

In **South Sudan**, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan calls for operations to respond to national development priorities,¹¹⁶ linking mine action and safety of citizens with socio-economic development. Its targets for 2013 included almost 1,306 hazards prioritised on the basis of their socio-economic value, including roads, land for agriculture, resettlement and grazing. Integrating mine action with development is also seen as important in the Transition Plan¹¹⁷ although the capacity of the NMAA to interact with development institutions is gauged as weak: based on a zero to four scale it registers as 1 in terms of capacity in this field¹¹⁸. Indeed, key informant interviews suggested that in reality there was limited evidence of MA being mainstreamed into development. For example, both UNMAS and the NMAA reported that it had been difficult to engage other ministries in coordination and planning meetings, as evidenced by attendance register at coordination meetings which suggested that mine action coordination meetings are attended only by MA agencies. MAG also reported it did not work with any formal development partners and at Torit County level, the local South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Chief Administrator reported that MA was not integrated into broader development. This was further confirmed by there being no development agencies working in the three communities where MAG had worked with DFID CHASE MA Programme funding.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ With acknowledgement to Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report, page 25, Figure 8 – Mine Action as a Development Process, IOD PARC, July 2012

¹¹⁶ Office of the President, 'National Mine Action Strategic Plan', South Sudan Mine Action Authority, 2012.

¹¹⁷ South Sudan Transition Plan 6.

¹¹⁸ Idem.

¹¹⁹ For more details see Annex F, South Sudan Country Mission Report, p. 11.



The **Mozambique** Action Plan for the Reduction of Poverty for 2010-2014¹²⁰ recognises the impact of landmines as one of eight cross-cutting factors on poverty reduction and development. Mine action is also included in the Government Programme to Achieve the Objectives of the Poverty Reduction Action Plan (PARP) 2011-2014.¹²¹ The National Mine Action Strategic Plan includes reference to ensuring that operations respond to national development priorities.¹²² Nevertheless, despite references to integration, NGO representatives and UNICEF stated during interviews conducted for this evaluation that there was limited, if any, evidence of MA being practically mainstreamed into development.¹²³ The DFID Mozambique team had little direct engagement with the CHASE MA Programme, a point raised by the UNDP Programme Manager.¹²⁴ An evaluation team member briefed senior DFID Mozambique personnel during the field mission and while they expressed interest in the CHASE MA intervention, they made it clear they do not have the resources to become involved.¹²⁵

Development planning and coordination in **Sri Lanka** is located at district level as are the MA coordination bodies. The close proximity between the different regional agencies has made it possible for MA operators to be more closely linked into and informed about the development agenda¹²⁶. The UNDP Northern Livelihoods Project is explicitly designed to support conflict-affected communities re-establish meaningful and equitable livelihoods. The programme adopts a sequence of approaches linked to the status of recovery: from early recovery to mid-term recovery and development. Recovery status takes account of land clearance¹²⁷.

Given the extent of mine and UXO contamination in **Cambodia**, it is hardly surprising that demining should feature as a major field of activity in the National Strategic Development Plan.¹²⁸ Land clearance is one of four subsectors under the first (of four) strategic objectives – ‘Enhancement of Agriculture Sector’. The National Mine Action Strategy 2010–2019 has as one of its four strategic goals ‘to contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction’.¹²⁹ UNDP has been supporting the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) to systematically integrate mine survey and clearance operations with development planning and programmes at national, provincial and local levels through the ‘Clearing for Results’ programme.^{130 131}

It seems hardly surprising but nevertheless striking that the linkages between mine action and development are much more direct and real in the two more densely populated Asian countries. The pressure from communities and entrepreneurs to regain access to land for productive use is well evidenced through community surveys in both Cambodia and Sri Lanka. National development strategies have been largely centrally driven and recognise the connection between security and development. In the two African countries, there seems to be greater distance between the mine action sector and the development process. There is much more that international organisations can do to promote more joined-up planning. In particular, through developing stronger relationships with beneficiary governments, the CHASE MA Programme can encourage and facilitate more effective coordination between mine action and development (see also Box 2, recommendation c) below).

Meta Evaluation key finding 2:

The linkages between Mine Action and Development are not well articulated or understood and agreed. There is no overarching Theory of Change in this arena which could be used to develop effective TOC narratives for individual countries. This then restricts the ability to coordinate activities between National Mine Action Authorities (NMAA), National Economic Development Plans (NEDP) and donors.

There is a slow but growing understanding among beneficiary country governments and stakeholders of the need and value of linking mine action to broader development goals. There is now sufficient evidence to support TOC development as part of a process to design phase II of the CHASE MA Programme. The draft TOC resulting from the Meta Evaluation workshop and the DFID logic model for the CHASE Programme are both valuable building blocks (*Mine Action Evaluation Workshop Report, IOD-PARC, page 11, and Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development, Final Report, page 25*).

¹²⁰ IMF, 2011.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 2008.

¹²³ Interviews with key informants during field mission.

¹²⁴ Interviews with UNDP Programme Manager – Geneva and Maputo.

¹²⁵ Interview with senior DFID-M personnel, Maputo.

¹²⁶ Meeting with HALO Sri Lanka Desk Officer.

¹²⁷ Northern Livelihoods Development Project and Transition Recovery Programme, UNDP. See:

http://www.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/northern-livelihood-development-project/

¹²⁸ National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2013, Royal Government of Cambodia.

¹²⁹ Interview with Senior Manager CMAA; http://www.cmaa.gov.kh/upload/national_mine_action_strategy_2010-2019-english.pdf.

¹³⁰ Interview with Chair of CMAA in Phnom Penh.

¹³¹ Clearing for Results II - <http://un.org.kh/undp/media/files/CFR+Phase+II+Project+Document.pdf>.



4.3.3 Links with Other Development Agencies

The 'linking mine action to development' theme has most readily been understood by MA operators as MA operators linking efforts with development actors, mainly from the NGO sector. There are some clear examples of HALO and MAG working in conjunction with development actors. For example, in Mozambique, HALO has made agreements with external agencies¹³² as did MAG in Cambodia¹³³ where development partners worked in communities that had benefited from mine action funded by DFID.¹³⁴ In Sri Lanka, HALO has agreements with development partners (though not formal MoUs), but also took the unusual step of directly funding follow-on development work through third party agencies¹³⁵ from its operational CHASE MA Programme budget.¹³⁶ In South Sudan, no other organisations were involved in the communities selected for survey.

Overall, the evidence suggests that while there are clear examples of both HALO and MAG working alongside development organisations and doing so successfully, this approach is not standardised or regarded as a pre-requisite to demining operations. Moreover, cases where MA operators divert their own funding into development activities shows a lack of understanding about how development and mine action activities should interact¹³⁷. There was also no evidence to suggest that involving MA operators directly in development activities was cost effective or an efficient way of working.

4.3.4 Mainstreaming the Development Agenda across the MA Community

DFID has been promoting better understanding of the link between mine action and development, evidenced by the CHASE MA workshop convened in January 2012, the consultation day taking place in June 2013 about the present evaluation and ongoing discussion around future programming orientations. The organisational culture of mine action in the field is necessarily focused on technical tasks that make up mine clearance. The MA operator teams are highly skilled and resourceful and have been active in imparting skills to local people, so enabling them to tap into a regular source of income.¹³⁸ In some cases, MA operators also seem prepared to challenge (and refuse) assigned tasks if they do not fit with their corporate approach of working with more disadvantaged communities.¹³⁹ Some MA operator country teams¹⁴⁰ also work in the national and local development context, showing familiarity with development issues and existing networks.

The Global Impact Monitoring Adviser position created by MAG¹⁴¹ (and supported by the CHASE MA Programme) has introduced a peripatetic development resource to country teams which, if effectively used, has the potential to build a more nuanced awareness and understanding of the wider development impact of operations.¹⁴² Multi-country DFID funding afforded MAG the opportunity for impact monitoring lessons learnt to be drawn together to produce a revised approach to impact monitoring that was both coherent and had a degree of standardisation across different implementation contexts. This has contributed to better understanding of socio-economic development issues within the MA teams and has the potential to enable them to better link with national and local development programmes and projects¹⁴³ (see Box 2, recommendation a) below).

Looking at the UNMAT, particularly UNDP operations, the senior international advisers are more experienced in the technical matters of the mine action sector. There is often a lack of critical understanding of the development context and processes within the office. The priorities for technical assistance typically include explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) training, information management and quality assurance.¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, many of the UN programme managers are skilled and able networkers, well placed to facilitate relationships for mine action with national and other donor bodies, as evidenced in the UNMAS endorsement to DFID Afghanistan of the HALO proposal for mine action in Herat Province in Afghanistan, for example. In several countries,¹⁴⁵ however, the distance between the two sectors – development and mine action – is considerable and inhibits their integration. UNMAS, as the lead MA

¹³² For example, HelpAge International and World Vision International.

¹³³ For example LWD, World Vision and CARE.

¹³⁴ From field visits to Mozambique with HALO, April 2013.

¹³⁵ HALO sub-contracted the development organisation ZOA to provide semi-permanent shelters directly on cleared land, at an approximate cost of £300,000.

¹³⁶ HALO stated that this interpretation was discussed and endorsed by DFID. Meetings with the HALO Programme Manager, Kilinochchi, April 11, 2013 and HALO Trust HQ staff, Carronbridge, Dumfries, Scotland, April 2013.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Community survey reports and six monthly implementation reports from MA Operators.

¹³⁹ MAG Laos Country team declined to undertake demining task linked to the construction of a football stadium.

¹⁴⁰ For example Cambodia and Laos.

¹⁴¹ See Country Mission Reports – Annex C for Cambodia and Annex F for South Sudan.

¹⁴² Meetings with Impact Monitoring Adviser and evaluation field mission teams.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ For example UNDP capacity-building project in Mozambique.

¹⁴⁵ Mozambique and South Sudan from the survey countries.



agency, has an important role to play here but needs to identify the issue and be willing and able to address it. The example of joined-up mine action and development supported by UNMAS in Afghanistan show what can be achieved when institutions work together¹⁴⁶. The UNDP can - and should be asked to - draw on its much deeper development resources to supplement MA services in countries benefitting from the CHASE MA Programme (see Box 2, recommendations b) and c) below).

Box 2: Mine Action and its links with the Development Process - Conclusions and Recommendations

- a) In specifying requirements for future tendering for mine action operations, DFID might consider specifying the inclusion of a development specialist for monitoring impact with a roving role to work with country teams;
- b) Given DFID's commitment to promoting the link between mine action and development, it would make sense for DFID to specify in a MoU with UN agencies that a substantial part of its contribution to UNDP, as the main capacity building agency, would be dedicated to resourcing experienced development specialists familiar with governance in fragile and conflict-affected states. Their main purpose would be to connect better the mine action sector with development programmes and planning processes at national, regional and local levels. The development specialist would be well placed to facilitate access to development networks for the mine action country teams as necessary. This point is further developed in the context of findings on UNMAT experience in capacity building for the CHASE MA Programme (see Section 4.4);
- c) See also recommendation under Section 4.6 (Programme Management) for a part-time specialist adviser to work as part of the CHASE MA Programme to facilitate linkages with a range of development and MA actors in-country.

4.4 Capacity Building

This section addresses how the CHASE Mine Action Programme enables national mine action agencies to prioritise and deliver programmes in their own countries.

4.4.1 Linking CHASE MA Funding with Capacity Building

UNMAT was deployed to help governments in CHASE MA target countries take full responsibility for their national mine action programmes. Approximately 17% of the CHASE MA Programme budget was allocated and then divided almost equally between each of the UNMAT partners – UNDP, UNICEF and UNMAS.¹⁴⁷ However, the strategic alignment between the Programme objectives and the allocation of capacity building resources to UNMAT is difficult to follow.¹⁴⁸ UNMAT provides support to countries that are not targeted for mine clearance by the Programme, although they are on shortlist for the Mine Action Strategy.¹⁴⁹ For example, UNDP used some of its funding from the CHASE MA Programme for its operations in Colombia and Ethiopia. It also covers Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR and Mozambique, where it has lead responsibility for institutional capacity building and promoting the link with development.

UNICEF finances operations in Nepal from the Programme, as well as DRC, Iraq and Sudan. None of the UNICEF offices in the countries visited was receiving support from this Programme. The major part of the UNICEF effort has been in supporting national ownership of MRE, as for example in the DRC, Nepal and Iraq.¹⁵⁰ UNICEF has also been active in developing standards and quality assurance. UNICEF's 'knowledge coordination and advocacy' role is also financed through the CHASE MA Programme funding.¹⁵¹

UNMAS funding delivers support to the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) and to deploy 'rapid response' teams in specific cases. UNMAS has also used CHASE MA Programme funds to set up and run the part-time Secretariat of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG).¹⁵² Although working in South Sudan, UNMAS did not receive CHASE MA Programme funding for this country^{153 154}. Overall, the net result of the relative lack of

¹⁴⁶ Integrated Clearance Development Strategy, Supplement, Herat Province 2013-2018. Interviews with UNMAS personnel and HALO team.

¹⁴⁷ See Section 3.2.1, Funding and Disbursements to Date.

¹⁴⁸ DFID MoU with UNMAS.

¹⁴⁹ Programme Strategy 2010-13, Creating a Safer Environment – clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war

¹⁵⁰ UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012.

¹⁵¹ Interview with senior UNICEF Manager, Geneva, April 2013. UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012.

¹⁵² Interview with senior UNMAS managers.

¹⁵³ UNMAT logframe and meeting with UNMAS Programme Manager in South Sudan.

¹⁵⁴ UNMAS did not have a capacity building mandate in South Sudan when the Programme started but does now. Interview with senior UNMAS manager.



alignment is a somewhat scattered pattern of capacity building activity separate from the Programme's mine clearance and development investment in the eight beneficiary countries. Nevertheless, in the case of Afghanistan, CHASE MA Programme funding to support the MACCA is consistent with the capacity building, governance and indeed development objectives of the CHASE MA Programme.¹⁵⁵

'Objective 2' funding from the Programme also contributes (through UNMAS and UNICEF) to 'rapid response', supporting improved links between stabilisation and mine action and providing rapid response activities in such places as Côte d'Ivoire and Ukraine, Syria, Mali, Myanmar, Congo Brazzaville and Libya,¹⁵⁶ although it is not entirely clear if these actions were financed through the Programme.¹⁵⁷ Such interventions are critical and undoubtedly add value in terms of 'creating a safer environment'. Yet these benefits cannot easily be captured within the CHASE MA Programme objectives in target countries as currently articulated through the Mine Action Strategy¹⁵⁸ (see Box 3, recommendation a) below).

4.4.2 Monitoring and Reporting on Capacity Building

The UN MA logframe covers the outputs and activities of all UN agencies, and UNMAT annual reports (2011 and 2012) offer a brief account of progress towards agreed milestones for UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF. A DFID desk review of the report against the logframe was largely positive, although concern was expressed at the lack of data with which to measure results.¹⁵⁹ The evaluation visits offered a first opportunity to assess the situation in target countries. Measuring the impact of UNMAT contribution has been difficult since only the UNDP offices in Cambodia and Mozambique are supported through the Programme.

Mozambique is in the final stages of transition to national ownership. UNDP have been supporting the establishment of planning and coordination mechanisms for residual clearance post 2014.¹⁶⁰ According to evaluation team interviews in the field with the National Demining Institute (IND) and UNDP, the government funds civil servant salaries but non-civil servant salaries of people working in the IND are covered by UNDP.¹⁶¹ IND expects that the government will take over the costs of maintaining the capacity that will be required to manage any residual risk following Mozambique's expected 2014 declaration that it has cleared all known mined areas.¹⁶²

Provincial demining commissions have been created in Mozambique and include the Directorate of Planning and Finance, the Provincial Police Command, and the army. Other sectors are represented on the commissions depending on the province. For instance, the Inhambane commission includes representatives from the tourist industry, and in Tête the mineral resources sector is represented on the commission.¹⁶³ It was not, however, possible within the time constraints of this evaluation to observe the Provincial demining commissions at work.

The lead UN agency in **South Sudan** is UNMAS. Since 2011, the NMAA has hosted monthly and quarterly mine action coordination meetings, with support from UNMAS. According to UNMAS, NMAA and MA operators, most of the coordination is undertaken by UNMAS and all sites are approved by UNMAS. The NMAA chairs coordination meetings for all mine action stakeholders, although there is no inter-Ministerial coordination forum. That the NMAA chairs coordination meetings was verified by meeting minutes and in interviews with mine action stakeholders,

Meta Evaluation key finding 6:

Capacity development, including both technical and managerial aspects within the NMAA and NEDP is absolutely critical in relation to country ownership. This needs to include consideration of effectiveness around site prioritisation. Supporting engaged, non-discriminatory, stakeholder focused prioritisation will be important – especially if funding is limited.

This finding is fully corroborated by this evaluation study. Effectiveness of site/country prioritisation, the maximisation of benefits to poor people, the detailed specification of criteria for M&E, the need for greater accountability in reporting, and targeted capacity building are all identified. This report also concludes that DFID needs to review its own role vis-à-vis the development of country ownership of mine action and development. More proactivity and engagement by DFID with national stakeholders, closer integration between CHASE and DFID country teams, and closer alignment of mine action with other areas of DFID activity, such as support for governance, also need to be looked at.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with UNMAS Programme Manager MACCA, Afghanistan. Interviews with MA operators.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with UNMAS Chief Operations Officer. Clarification by UNICEF, 20th June, 2013.

¹⁵⁷ UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012.

¹⁵⁸ DFID Programme Strategy 2010-13, Creating a Safer Environment – clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war.

¹⁵⁹ DFID Annual Review (Final). UNMAT Global Demining, December 2012.

¹⁶⁰ UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012.

¹⁶¹ For more details see Annex D, Mozambique Country Mission Report, p. 13.

¹⁶² Interviews with IND and UNDP in Mozambique.

¹⁶³ GICHD, 2012.



although there was general agreement among key informants from national and international agencies of the need for further capacity development¹⁶⁴. As noted above, this is now within the remit of UNMAS.¹⁶⁵

According to interviews with the NMAA and UNMAS in South Sudan there have been increased joint operations with UNMAS for quality assurance and accreditation purposes. However, there has been some criticism of UNMAS for not co-locating with the NMAA staff so they can provide ongoing mentoring.¹⁶⁶ At the time of the evaluation, apart from a few national staff, UNMAS staff, including the capacity building coordinator, continued to work from the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) compound.^{167 168}

The Annual Report indicates that as a result of the UNDP/DFID effort, **Cambodia** has been able to take general responsibility for its National Mine Action Programme.¹⁶⁹ The increased capacity has enabled the CMAA to monitor implementation more effectively and to revise mine action plans to take account of baseline studies.¹⁷⁰ Over the period, the outputs recorded in the 2012 annual review included such activities as quality assurance teams accrediting all MA operators and the appointment of quality control specialists.¹⁷¹

None of the UN operations in **Sri Lanka** is financed through the CHASE MA Programme. The Government of Sri Lanka expects to take full ownership of mine action from the end of 2013. However, the UNDP has been instrumental in setting up and supporting the national mine action centre in policy definition, setting standards, accreditation and quality assurance and control.¹⁷² The national accreditation process has been supported by UNDP and involved a thorough review of Standard Operating Practices (SOP) of all MA agencies active in Sri Lanka. Four international MA operators (including both HALO and MAG) have been accredited along with the Sri Lankan army.¹⁷³ The priority areas for UNICEF in Sri Lanka are MRE, advocacy and victim assistance. The MRE project has now been taken up by seven national agencies in the north of the country.¹⁷⁴

4.4.3 Comments on the Reporting System for Capacity Building

The composite logframe¹⁷⁵ bringing together the activities, outputs and outcomes of the UNMAT partners is less than the sum of the individual components. It provides a confusing framework for coordinating implementation and reporting results, undermining any measure of overall impact or attribution. The overall reporting format is activity based,¹⁷⁶ which makes it more difficult to link back to the core purpose and intended outcomes of the Programme. Tracing the link between programme contribution and results contributing to the objectives of the CHASE MA Programme and DFID strategy is problematic. (see Box 3, recommendation a) below) Reporting seems to be viewed as an exercise in compliance and is seen by some UNMAT managers 'as disproportionate to funding'.¹⁷⁷ Issues linked to transparency of the VTF (managed by UNMAS) are dealt with in Sections 4.5.4 (VFM and the Mine Action Strategy) and 4.6.2 (CHASE MA Programme engagement with International MA) of this report.

Reports are essentially collations of brief activity statements for the three agencies for the previous year. It is difficult to monitor progress against intended outcomes or to attribute cause to the Programme. As the sole sponsor of UNMAT support to the 2010-2013 DFID Mine Action Strategy,¹⁷⁸ DFID Programme managers have options to ensure better oversight and eventual return on this element of the MA Programme investment. Six-monthly monitoring, in line with reports from other operators, would go some way towards enabling a better comparison with other CHASE-funded mine action work in those countries where the CHASE funded MA operators are active. Such a shift would also involve more frequent engagement with implementing agencies centrally on the basis of these reports. This would provide links back to the objectives of the programme. UN criticisms of the 'overhead' incurred

¹⁶⁴ For more details see Annex F, South Sudan Country Mission Report, p. 12.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with senior UNMAS manager.

¹⁶⁶ GICHD, 2012

¹⁶⁷ GICHD, 2012.

¹⁶⁸ UNMAS is working with the NMAA to improve these facilities in the NMAA offices. Once completed, a feasibility study of co-location will be completed. – UNMAS clarification June 2013.

¹⁶⁹ UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012.

¹⁷⁰ Interview with senior manager in CMAA, Phnom Penh.

¹⁷¹ UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012; Logical Framework, UNMAT Support to the 2010-2013 DFID Mine Action Strategy.

¹⁷² UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery - http://www.undp.org/content/srilanka/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/in_depth/

¹⁷³ Interview with Assistant Director Mine Action/Chair of Accreditation Committee of Sri Lanka, Geneva, April 2013.

¹⁷⁴ Interview with UNICEF representative in Sri Lanka, Geneva, April 2013.

¹⁷⁵ UNMAT, Project Document, Logical Framework.

¹⁷⁶ UNMAS Second Interim Report, 2012.

¹⁷⁷ Interviews with UNMAT managers, Geneva, April 2013.

¹⁷⁸ Review of logframe.



when reporting against relatively small CHASE funding¹⁷⁹ cannot outweigh the need for better oversight of such a large proportion of the CHASE MA Programme budget (see Box 3, recommendation b) below).

The continuing need for capacity development, particularly in countries with a long history of mine action, questions the degree to which these efforts have been effective to date. Technical support has been provided, but knowledge transfer and the acquisition of skills and competence appear to have been only moderately successful thus far, as evidenced by the continued demand for technical support in many mine-affected countries. A critical issue for transition will be the large differences in the scale of resources available to UNMAT for mine action compared to the resources from national budgets in some countries. In Afghanistan, for example, while the MACCA employs some 170 staff, the Department for Mine Clearance has a team of 13 officials.¹⁸⁰ However, it is also clear that the resources applied over the years to create national capacity in countries like Mozambique will become largely redundant when declared “mine-free”.¹⁸¹ This raises questions about the type of capacity building required.

4.4.4 MA Operators Delivering Objective 2 – Capacity Building, Ownership and Governance

While the core effort to strengthen national competence and ownership (Objective 2) is delivered through the UNMAT, both MA operators (HALO and MAG) have also included provision for training and capacity building for national authorities.¹⁸² From the start of the tendering process, both organisations took different approaches. HALO presented a more minimalist approach to capacity building for national authorities. The HALO logframe for Mozambique, for example, proposes training for police and IND officials as well as attendance at coordination meetings. As a result of little or no response from national agencies, HALO requested that the activity be deleted from the logframe.¹⁸³ HALO work closely with UNICEF in Sri Lanka in the context of the Regional Mine Action Centres, improving coordination and demining.¹⁸⁴

MAG sub-contracted the GICHD for national mine action capacity building¹⁸⁵. However, despite the GICHD teams consulting with MAG in-country they operate quite independently.¹⁸⁶ This association with MAG seems a pragmatic arrangement serving needs of both partners, given the procurement conditions^{187 188}. GICHD largely operates ‘at arm’s length’.¹⁸⁹ While feedback on activities is channelled through MAG’s six-monthly reports, GICHD reports tend to stand alone and are not subject to any in-depth scrutiny by the MAG management team.¹⁹⁰ MAG, for its part, has provided support, including financial support, to national institutions and NGO in Laos for capacity building purposes.

The relationship between MAG and GICHD, however, creates something of an awkward fit between on the one hand NGO as main contractor and an international body, partly funded by the Swiss government.¹⁹¹ The GICHD feel ‘constrained’ by DFID’s procurement methods and would prefer to work directly with DFID and other donors¹⁹². The GICHD itself offers a menu of topics or themes from which beneficiary countries select what they deem to be most relevant, such as land release, transition, strategy, quality management and monitoring and evaluation¹⁹³. The GICHD has, for example, facilitated workshops in South Sudan (as part of the MAG programme) on transitioning and links with development programming.¹⁹⁴ The GICHD has been serving the global mine action community through their research, generation and sharing of knowledge and good practice across the sector. The Centre has undoubted value to add in the context of institutional capacity building for a major integrated MA programme such as the CHASE MA Programme. However, its contribution could be defined more clearly in terms of the specific needs and intended outcomes of the Programme. These should be determined through a comprehensive baseline needs assessment undertaken by UNMAT in the MA institutions in the target countries (see Box 3, recommendation c) below).

¹⁷⁹ Interviews with senior UNMAT officials, Geneva, 10-12 April 2013.

¹⁸⁰ Interviews with UNMAS Programme Manager, MACCA; Interview with MA Operator.

¹⁸¹ Head of IND – speaking in plenary session in GICHD conference, Geneva –10-12 April 2013.

¹⁸² Country logframes HALO (Mozambique) and MAG (Cambodia).

¹⁸³ Mine Action in Mozambique -18 Month Report to DFID, HALO, 1st Feb 2011 – 31 July 2012.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with UNICEF Sri Lanka Representative, Geneva, April 2013.

¹⁸⁵ MAG logframes and programme documentation.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with MAG teams in Manchester. 22 March 2013.

¹⁸⁷ ITT 3 – Terms of Reference for CHASE MA Programme

¹⁸⁸ Interviews with GICHD and MAG Management.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with GICHD Senior Managers. 10-12 April 2013.

¹⁹⁰ Meeting with MAG Management and Country Teams, 22 March 2013.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Interview with GICHD Senior Managers. 10-12 April 2013.

¹⁹³ Interviews with GICHD, with MA operator (MAG), with UNMAT officials, field mission reports.

¹⁹⁴ For more details see Annex F, South Sudan Country Mission Report, p. 12; MAG Reports.



Several national and UN informants believe the obligation to deliver institutional capacity building places a burden on the MA operators which they are not equipped to carry¹⁹⁵. It places the NGOs in a difficult institutional space between UNMAT and national authorities (see Box 3, recommendation d) below). However, as part of their mine clearance work, both current contractors make a substantial contribution to up-skilling local staff and teams in technical and land clearance related skills.¹⁹⁶

Box 3: Capacity Building - Conclusions and Recommendations

- a) There is a need for further engagement with UNMAT around the DFID Theory of Change for mine action which would encompass the respective competences and mandates of each, including rapid response. The outcome of this would be a more differentiated set of objectives and outcomes for each of the three UNMAT partners within a coordinated framework for monitoring and oversight. Such a framework should be better able to measure impact in terms of the core governance and capacity building purpose of the Mine Action Strategy and along the stabilisation – development continuum;
- b) Six-monthly monitoring, in line with reports from other operators, would go some way towards enabling a better comparison with other CHASE-funded mine action work in those countries where the Programme funded MA operators are active;
- c) Institutional capacity needs should be determined through a comprehensive baseline needs assessment undertaken by UNMAT in the MA institutions in the target countries;
- d) The evaluators are strongly of the view that the MA operators should not be required to submit proposals for capacity building at national level in the next round of the MA Programme.¹⁹⁷

4.5 Value for Money

This section addresses whether the programme delivers value for money on behalf of the UK taxpayer.

Overall, the evaluation has found that the CHASE MA Programme has delivered reasonable value for money (VFM) in terms of land cleared of mines and returned to use, thereby creating the potential for socio-economic development for the local population. There has also been improved awareness of mine risks through MRE, and somewhat less success in capacity building of national mine action institutions. CHASE MA operations are consistent with the DFID VFM cycle.¹⁹⁸ VFM has different aspects and in this evaluation it has been considered in terms of the '3Es' of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It is expounded at length in the ITAD report prepared for DFID in 2010 and more recent guidance.¹⁹⁹ VFM can be measured by two main approaches: auditing of performance and economic appraisal. Delivery of VFM can be usefully directed by the VFM Cycle approach advocated in the DFID guidance.

4.5.1 Economy VFM

In brief, this aspect of VFM is about whether the CHASE MA Programme is supporting activities of sufficient quality at the right price. Unit costs are a typically appropriate measure, but because of uncertainties surrounding contamination, unit costs in operator proposals cannot be relied upon and would have to be field tested, a technical exercise beyond the scope of the present study.²⁰⁰ One key way for DFID to ensure the achievement of economy VFM (lowest cost, best value) is by competitive tender. However, there are a number of practical obstacles to achieving VFM in the normal way through bidder or supplier competition.

First, the market in the requisite specialist skills allied with the experience required to reliably undertake mine action work is not completely open. Only two competent suppliers were appointed for the field demining work under the current CHASE MA contract: HALO and MAG. A third operator, G4S, was pre-qualified but did not finally submit a proposal. Hence the market may be regarded as an oligopoly and not sufficient to provide free and functioning bidder price competition.

¹⁹⁵ Briefings with DFID CHASE; Interviews with UNMAT Programme Managers Mozambique, South Sudan; NMMA Coordinator – Mozambique.

¹⁹⁶ Six monthly reports from MA Operators.

¹⁹⁷ The Dutch Government Mine Action Programme specifically excludes the requirement for a mine action NGO to contribute to a 'legitimate government with sufficient capacity' - Order of the Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation of December 5, 2011, No. DJZ/BR-1403/2011, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Humanitarian Mine Action and Cluster Munitions), (p. 7).

¹⁹⁸ DFID, DFID's Approach to VFM, July 2011, page 9.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰⁰ For instance, an MA operator's original proposal to DFID could be field tested by tracking precisely all direct input costs over a given period of operations, and the recording precisely of how many mines are removed for that investment. That actual rate of extraction and therefore cost per mine can be compared with predictions in the original proposal, to ascertain reliability of the prior estimates.



Furthermore, switching MA operators between contracts, which would be a normal requirement of open competition, entails considerable inefficiencies. Mine action requires specialist equipment and skilled labour to be deployed in foreign countries and often in remote areas with poor infrastructure and limited local resources. It requires a host of safety and medical facilities beyond those of the average engineering operation. Hence serious dis-economies result from switching MA operators, and these costs (such as start-up costs for a successful bidder who has displaced a previous incumbent) would be reflected in any bidder's price and would serve to inflate it.

This meant that there was no competitive bid against HALO in Mozambique, or against MAG in Iraq or South Sudan. This of course does not prevent successful contracting and MA operations, but does mean that competitive procurement on its own is unlikely to be a route to achieving Economy VFM. The exception would be when neither or both MA operators are present in a country. It would also be considerably improved by soliciting bids from a range of private sector MA operators to supplement NGO bids.

The quality aspect of the services provided can be monitored against expenditure and enhanced by good project management on the part of CHASE.

4.5.2 Efficiency VFM

This relates to how well the programme activities convert inputs into outputs and results, i.e., its productivity. Measurement of efficiency is also problematic. At first sight, it might be thought that cost per mine destroyed, or cost per square metre of land released, or number of mines extracted per week, would be appropriate Efficiency VFM measures. Of course, mine location and destruction rates, and areas cleared are highly variable and unpredictable due to ground conditions, degree of vegetation, patterns of mine emplacement and so on.²⁰¹ No general conclusions can be drawn from such figures, and they apply only to the very specific conditions at the localities in question.

The classic metric within mine action has been clearance costs per square metre. This gives a figure for efficiency which is comparable across operators within the same context only (although it clearly says nothing about effectiveness). As noted above, assessing the efficiency of a survey in identifying suspect land, and releasing it from suspicion, is inherently even more challenging.

One efficiency measure endorsed by ITAD is to monitor the scheduling of activity (e.g., through workplans) and to monitor the timely delivery of outputs, comparing actual with planned milestones. This is a useful approach for optimising the value of outputs and is already being done through the six-monthly reporting system and the Annual Review. It is less useful to draw performance generalisations from inter-country comparisons of efficiency, except in so far as they relate to effectiveness – e.g., similar sums are being spent in the DRC as in Laos, South Sudan and Vietnam, but to much less apparent effect.²⁰²

Field visits to the four countries offered observable evidence that the MA operators were working in an efficient manner. The well-organised large teams were seen to deploy early and undertake full working days. Landmine detection and removal operations were seen to be meticulous, including keeping full records and carrying out good liaison with local stakeholders. The MA operators showed no hesitation in providing detailed and convincing answers on all aspects of their operations.

For example, HALO uses low-cost second-hand Land Rovers in Mozambique to save costs on basic transport for staff. It also recycles previously-used specialist mine clearance equipment from other countries of operation, when they have finished their tasks there, which is cheaper than purchasing new equipment. Both MA operators have also

Meta Evaluation key finding 4:

There are different understandings of 'named' evaluation criteria including Value for Money. Valuation of efficiency, effectiveness and effect is complex with high level of non-monetised values, including treaty obligations. No agreed methodology was present in the evaluations reviewed, and there are different interpretations of evaluation criteria within the Mine Action sector and the development sector.

This finding is fully corroborated by the current evaluation study findings. Definition of VFM appears to be particularly problematic for the MA operators and implementing agencies that rely on simple indicators such as cost per hectare of cleared land, average cost of landmine removal, etc. While developing the TOC for mine action, complementary definitions and specification of evaluation criteria will be necessary. The findings and conclusions in this report suggest that it is possible to measure and demonstrate VFM more systematically and in particular to evidence development benefits from the CHASE programme. These approaches need to be shared with relevant stakeholders and their capacity to use them needs to be developed.

²⁰¹ As reported by MA operators HALO and MAG on all field visits.

²⁰² See Table 2 on Mine and UXO Removal, Section 3.2.2.



succeeded in obtaining new equipment (e.g. from the US government) to provide the equipment donor with feedback on field operational experience, in return for its use in actual demining operations.

4.5.3 Effectiveness VFM

This aspect of VFM relates to achieving the desired outcomes, or achieving intended objectives. Substantial evidence was found confirming the presence of Effectiveness VFM in terms of clearing mines, providing education about mine dangers, and creating space for economic and community development.²⁰³ Development benefits include enabling the resettlement and re-employment of refugees, the commencement of new economic activities, and clearance as essential preparation for existing national infrastructure assets and future projects.²⁰⁴ Additional evidence exists of the CHASE MA Programme being coordinated with the work of other agencies to obtain leverage and thereby further enhance effectiveness.²⁰⁵ As an example, in South Sudan, MAG has improved VFM in mine action and development activities through partnerships with Oxfam, Relief International and Save the Children.²⁰⁶ HALO has secured funding from the US Department of State to develop projects in two mine-affected communities with HelpAge International. This funding commenced in August 2012 and is being used to purchase ploughs, seeds and oxen, and to start small-scale industries.²⁰⁷

Meta Evaluation key finding 5:

Prioritisation at national and local levels is critical. However criteria need to be transparent and linked to wider work on land use planning as well as governance/anti-corruption

The need for greater clarity in the specification and prioritisation of criteria for the MA programme consistently emerges as an issue across a number of areas: community development, development linkages, global donor coordination, as well as M&E and VFM. This report draws conclusion and makes specific recommendations about these issues. The development of the TOC and design for Phase II of CHASE Mine Action gives the opportunity to address these issues.

Detailed evidence of effectiveness is presented in the Country Mission Reports in Annexes C to F.

There is a degree of repeat attendance at MRE sessions and hence double-counting of this class of beneficiary.²⁰⁸ These sessions are sometimes regarded locally as 'entertainment' and opportunities to socialise. Repeat attendance is not to be discouraged, as messages are being reinforced, but programme managers should be aware when reviewing these figures in terms of effectiveness.

4.5.4 VFM and the Mine Action Strategy

The Strategy has three objectives: release of mine-affected land for socio-economic development; helping governments take full responsibility for MA; and achieving VFM. The preceding VFM analysis mainly focuses on the first objective concerning socio-economic development.

In terms of support mechanisms to governments, most of DFID's activity has been channelled through the VTF. Regarding the capacity building effort of UNMAT, it is difficult to differentiate between what is normally done by UNMAT members and what additional work was done through the VTF. Only UNDP in Mozambique and Cambodia are in receipt of VTF funding from the Programme. Nevertheless, annual reports²⁰⁹ and DFID reviews²¹⁰ indicate progress in meeting the targets and milestones set out in UNMAT logframe. Performance measurement, however, remains problematic because there is no clear line of sight from funding to outcome and impact of funds used.

The circularity of applying Effectiveness VFM to the CHASE MA Programme's third objective, 'To improve value for money in mine action', reinforces the impression of the evaluators that this is not a useful objective for the programme. It would be better covered through regular monitoring of VFM as part of project management, rather than being an explicit objective that is itself subject to VFM analysis like the other objectives.

The evaluators believe that future assessment of VFM would benefit from a better and common understanding of VFM scope and how it can be measured. In some cases, this may permit grossing up to establish collective income generation or Net Present Value of the investment. Issues relating to attribution of benefits to DFID will need to be

²⁰³ See Table 3 on Areas Cleared, Section 3.2.3.

²⁰⁴ See Country Mission Reports, Annexes C-F – e.g. Mozambique especially for infrastructure.

²⁰⁵ In Sri Lanka, HALO records collected on Excel list show 38 organisations deploying assistance post-clearance. In Cambodia, the MAG Annual Report (page 2) identifies four development partners they are working within the mine action target areas.

²⁰⁶ DFID Support for Mine Action in Sudan, Annual Report, page 3.

²⁰⁷ DFID Support for Mine Action in Mozambique, 18 Month Report to DFID, page 38.

²⁰⁸ Explained by both MAG and HALO to the evaluators in country visits.

²⁰⁹ UN Mine Action Team Project 2010-2013, Second Interim Report 2012.

²¹⁰ DFID Annual Review UNMAT Global Demining – December 2012.



considered. For instance, it will likely be 100% in cases of relocation of unemployed IDPs, but less where other agencies complement DFID's investment with development support. Attribution will not be relevant in NPV calculations on total input costs. Although such work is perhaps not within the normal skills sets of the MA operators, they are best placed to collect the field data from which DFID can undertake subsequent analysis.

Overall, it is apparent that mine clearance is effective as a critical prerequisite to the resumption of normal life in post-conflict areas, and to the improvement of local prosperity. VFM, and the associated measurements required, are highly complex and there is no agreement on the basic parameters that should be tracked (see Box 4, recommendation c) below). However, the full and very real social impact of a community 'feeling safe' cannot be underestimated – it impacts positively upon self-confidence, attitudes to entrepreneurship, and having a more optimistic view of the future of community and individual life. Impacts of psychological safety are significant and should be measured through qualitative and quantitative methods.

Box 4: Value for Money - Conclusions and Recommendations

- a) The CHASE MA Programme has delivered reasonable VFM;
- b) Both MA operators work efficiently and effectively in all four survey countries;
- c) VFM measures are problematic and need further investigation. DFID need to develop common VFM measures and a VFM assessment system, including perceptions of safety.

4.6 Programme Management

This section addresses whether the centrally delivered CHASE Mine Action Programme is the most effective and sustainable mode of delivery of the global programme and what programme management lessons can be learned.

4.6.1 CHASE Engagement with Programme Implementers

The main MA implementing partners are HALO and MAG. Both have been awarded CHASE funds through a tendering process that required them to respond to the priorities and objectives of the CHASE MA Programme. This was a clear step forward from previous funding procedures that were essentially awards of grants for demining.²¹¹ However their ability to deliver integrated mine action programmes that meet all the CHASE MA objectives²¹² was limited by their core focus on demining. Capacity building and involvement in reconstruction/development activities such as building shelters were not their key strengths.²¹³ HALO and MAG have international reputations for excellence in the clearance and disposal of mines and UXO.²¹⁴ These skills should be maintained and built upon. MA contractors have limited influence over priority setting other than at community level and the tasks that are assigned to them.²¹⁵ They do not, as a matter of course, engage with development actors, although in both Laos and Vietnam, development is driven centrally by Government and through the Party structures at more local levels, often involving MA operators in the planning process.²¹⁶ Future programmes need to have a clearer understanding of the critical and unique skills and also limitations of implementing partners (see Box 5, recommendation a), b) and c) below).

Another issue of service specification and procurement relates to gender and mine action. While the MA Strategy emphasises that 'DFID is committed to the inclusion of gender considerations in the planning and implementation of mine action projects that it funds'²¹⁷, when the MA Programmes were tendered in 2010–11, the gender criterion did not feature within the evaluation grid.²¹⁸ As a result, the opportunity to build a stronger gender dimension into country programmes was missed for the current Programme.²¹⁹ The Dutch Government Policy Rules²²⁰ setting out the grant

²¹¹ Interview with DFID Procurement – East Kilbride; Briefing meeting CHASE MA Programme Team.

²¹² ITT Vol 3 – Terms of Reference for CHASE MA Programme.

²¹³ Meetings with MAG and HALO Management Teams; DFID briefings.

²¹⁴ UNMAS Programme Manager - Afghanistan; UNMAS Programme Manager – South Sudan; general comment from other UN officials; Discussion with Vietnam NGO; NMMA in Mozambique; Geneva and field missions.

²¹⁵ Interviews with NMMA officials, UNMAT and MA Operators.

²¹⁶ Interviews with MAG country team, March 2013, Interviews with UNMAT Managers in Geneva, 10th-12th April 2013, Interviews with Vietnam NGO representative, Geneva, April 2013.

²¹⁷ DFID Programme Strategy 2010-2013, Creating a Safer Environment – clearing landmines and other explosive remnants of war., p12.

²¹⁸ Interview with MAG Management Team, Manchester, March 2013.

²¹⁹ Interview with Gender and Mine Action, Geneva, April 2013.

²²⁰ Order of the Minister for European Affairs and International Cooperation of December 5, 2011, no. DJZ/BR-1403/2011, laying down administrative rules and a ceiling for grants awarded under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Grant Regulations 2006 (Humanitarian Mine Action and Cluster Munitions).



conditions for mine action stress that gender is 'an important cross-cutting theme'. The Dutch Government has built this requirement into tender conditions (see Box 5, recommendation d) below).

MA contractors should adhere to long established international quality assurance and control systems which ensure that their operatives are fully trained and able to do their jobs and therefore require only light-touch management and oversight beyond the demands for regular and comprehensive reporting. However, if future CHASE MA Programmes are to broaden out to include commercial operators, the importance of meeting minimum quality assurance/quality control standards (as set out by the IMAS generally and the NMAS specifically) cannot be overstated.²²¹ Competitive tendering may deliver cheaper mine clearance, but incentives to maximise profit margins could undermine standards through less rigorous controls.²²² UNMAS should be able to advise further on how best to safely introduce commercial incentives into mine and UXO clearance, while the GICHD²²³ has created a Guide to Contracting in Mine Action and runs training programmes on the same theme.

Section 4.5.4 Value for Money and the Mine Action Strategy demonstrates the need for a coherent standard reporting system for effective programme management. This should ensure basic distinctions between types of activity (e.g., clearance or land release, activities clearly tied to development activities versus those which are not). Such reporting would help CHASE MA Programme managers to have a better overview of the activities they fund while optimising their direct engagement and reducing follow-up costs.

4.6.2 CHASE Engagement with the International MA System

In an effort to improve coordination between the UNMAT agencies and better link UNMAT with this Programme, CHASE MA Programme funding was channelled through the VTF. However, while the UNMAT Global Demining Programme is presented as a unified programme,²²⁴ there is little evidence of coordination in practice. Indeed, some UNMAT managers voiced concerns over the 'DFID mechanism' as a source of aggravating tensions among UN partners^{225, 226}. Different reporting and financial management requirements across the UN have led to delays in drawing down Programme allocations. The dispersal of funding through the VTF has made it virtually impossible to trace or attribute the full impact of outputs and outcomes.²²⁷ While the VTF approach may have minimised the management burden for DFID,²²⁸ it has simultaneously made it difficult for the Programme to be seen to meet DFID requirements of efficiency and effectiveness.

The GICHD has also received CHASE funding, channelled through contractual arrangements with MAG, which meant that the Programme had no direct engagement with GICHD. From reports, GICHD have been delivering high quality workshops, training and seminars to national institutions under the contract.²²⁹ However, there was little sense of common purpose with the MAG country effort due to limited interaction between MAG and the GICHD.²³⁰ Also, GICHD support is felt by some to be more supply driven than demand led.²³¹ There are, though, opportunities that merit further consideration because GICHD is supported by other donors for activities which could complement CHASE-funded activities (e.g., Information Management²³²).

Meta-Evaluation key finding 3:

There are multiple funding streams from different donors.

The important point is not that funding streams are multiple but rather that they are directed and used in complementary ways within an overarching framework for mine action. It is evident from this evaluation that DFID is fully aware of these multiple funding streams and donors and has sought to develop cooperative approaches to mine action that make best use of donor resources. CHASE has been careful to develop good relationships and working arrangements with the UN agencies and these appear to be effective and provide an efficient division of responsibilities and labour between them. Effective donor coordination is an essential requirement and a review and possible redefinition of the role of the Mine Action Support Group should be part of the design process for CHASE 'Phase II'.

²²¹ UNMAS Programme Manager, MACCA, Afghanistan

²²² Interview with GICHD, Geneva, April 2013; and feedback from field visits (QA for commercial demining in Mozambique seen as weak).

²²³ GICHD, GICHD Guide to Contracting in Mine Action, 2010; 2012 - Pehr Lodhammar

²²⁴ UNMAT, Project Document, Logical Framework

²²⁵ Annual Review. 2012. UNMAT Global De-mining. DFID. <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/project.aspx?Project=201526>

²²⁶ Discussion with CHASE MA Programme Manager.

²²⁷ Interview with UNMAT senior officials on functioning of VTF; DFID Annual Review Final, December 2012.

²²⁸ Comment from UNMAT senior managers.

²²⁹ MA Operator Implementation Reports.

²³⁰ Interviews with GICHD senior managers; and interviews with MAG Management Team and Country Teams.

²³¹ Interview with GICHD senior managers and informed expert opinion.

²³² www.gichd.org.



Overall, in addition to its membership of formal MA conventions and networks, DFID engagement with the international MA system is widely recognised. DFID also participates in the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) and provides funding for the Secretariat through the CHASE MA Programme.²³³ DFID is regarded as one of the most active members of the Group in terms of promoting topics for discussion.²³⁴ However, there is little evidence to suggest that the MASG is engaged with or supporting this Programme and by extension other MA interventions other than through the sharing of high level information.²³⁵ The MASG could support stronger coordination to secure better, measurable benefits from programme implementation through lesson sharing and providing a global framework for monitoring donor funded MA programmes²³⁶ (see Box 5, recommendation e) below).

4.6.3 Rapid Response Mine Action

Programmes that take place within an immediate post-conflict or emergency setting face challenges that are directly tied to the unstable and hazardous nature of the environment. The short-term character of the Libya intervention²³⁷, for example, sets the post-conflict humanitarian mine action operation there apart from more predictable multi-annual MA programmes. The question is whether, and if so, how to develop a more coherent and comprehensive MA strategy. First responders for CHASE are their Operations Team (OT), who make early assessments that inform DFID decisions for humanitarian relief. It is through these early assessments that MA is taken into consideration within the humanitarian relief effort. Some commentators believe that better coordinated MA could help stabilisation wherever possible.²³⁸ For these links to be effectively and efficiently secured, it is essential to have an appreciation of the specific skills and competences of the actors involved in the full cycle from stabilisation to MA to development (see Box 5, recommendation f) below).

4.6.4 CHASE Engagement with other Elements of DFID for Programme Implementation

DFID departments including CHASE and Country Offices develop their plans and strategies with the aim of arriving at an overall coherent approach to poverty elimination through, inter alia, the achievement of the MDGs, resilience in security, justice and humanitarian response. Even so, complete complementarity across the whole of DFID has yet to be achieved. At country office level, country plans and budget allocations are harmonised as are running costs required to meet delivery expectations.

Strategic and operational planning within and across DFID involves consultation between central departments and Country offices. When dealing with DFID target countries with a significant landmine and ERW problem, CHASE will consult with the DFID Country Office on the potential MA impact on development and other strategic priorities.²³⁹ However, priorities are not always aligned and CHASE MA concerns may not necessarily be a Country Office priority. Moreover, it must be recognised that all Country Offices are working within tight running cost budgets which restricts their ability to interact with centrally managed interventions. It is up to CHASE MA Programme managers to take the initiative here.²⁴⁰ (see Box 5, recommendation g) and h) below)

The case of the DFID-Afghanistan MA programme in Herat is relevant.²⁴¹ Mines are a widespread problem in Afghanistan where mine action activities date back to 1988,²⁴² MA is therefore an integral part of national development planning as evidenced by the creation of a 9th MDG.²⁴³ Here DFID Afghanistan is supporting a multi-annual mine action programme in the western region (2008-2013).²⁴⁴ This mine action programme is consistent with the CHASE Strategy²⁴⁵ highlighting the interests of the poorest and most vulnerable by returning contaminated land to productive use. The lead position of DFID Afghanistan in negotiating the Herat Programme (an integral part of their livelihoods plan) naturally supports MA monitoring, evaluation and quality oversight (see Box 5, recommendation i) below).

²³³ CHASE funding through UNMAS and VTF.

²³⁴ Interview with Secretariat to MASG

²³⁵ Discussion with MASG members - Observing MASG, Geneva, April 2013.

²³⁶ Ibid.

²³⁷ See Annex G – Response to Evaluation Questions 2 and 9.

²³⁸ Naidoo, S. 2013. Mission creep or responding to wider security needs? The evolving role of mine action organisations in Armed Violence Reduction. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2(1):11, DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.av> .

²³⁹ Expert opinion: evaluation team members/former senior DFID managers.

²⁴⁰ Interview with Owen Barder Centre for Global Development and informed expert observation.

²⁴¹ See Annex G – Response to Evaluation Questions 2 and 9.

²⁴² Operation Salaam, IRC Country Report, July 1 – December 31, 1989.

²⁴³ Page xi, Meta Evaluation of Mine Action and Development Final Report.

²⁴⁴ Interviews with UNMAS – Afghanistan and HALO Trust.

²⁴⁵ HALO Trust Supplement, DFID Funded Clearance of All Remaining Mine/UXO Contamination in Herat Province 2013-18.



Box 5: Programme Management - Conclusions and Recommendations

- a) CHASE needs to ensure that future MA programmes engage not only with clearance specialists such as HALO, MAG and other authorised clearance contractors (e.g. from the private sector) but also with institutional and development specialists, in order to maximise socio-economic impact and improve in-country MA capacity;²⁴⁶
- b) Improved and early interaction between CHASE/DFID Country Offices and the host government would help ensure common purpose in setting programme priorities. DFID analysis of the procurement process has already noted these aspects as challenges requiring attention;²⁴⁷
- c) Gender should feature in the procurement notices and evaluation grid for the future CHASE MA Programme;
- d) Through its participation in MASG (and other international MA fora) DFID should draw on the experience of the CHASE MA Programme to inform and influence policy and practice debates at global level. This is subject to having comprehensive and coherent reporting systems in place for the CHASE MA Programme;
- e) As recent post-conflict countries develop their Country Assistance Plans and programmes, we recommend that the CHASE MA team engages with the emerging strategy to ensure that complementary activities are being designed to connect mine action to the service of development;
- f) Early and ongoing engagement between CHASE and DFID Country Offices will help to understand better how MA can contribute in a practical manner to development and governance outcomes in such countries;
- g) The CHASE MA Programme should consider appointing, for a fixed term period, a dedicated part-time specialist to help achieve better integration of MA with development and national capacity building as part of any follow-on MA programme. This Programme appointment could also improve connections between the CHASE MA Programme and host governments as well as assess effectiveness at the point of delivery of UNMAT central support and facilitate the integration of CHASE MA Programme operators within the wider development context;
- h) We recommend CHASE explore the DFID-Afghanistan MA programme further as a good practice example of how CHASE might integrate the mine action agenda more coherently into other country development plans.

4.7 Conclusions from the Findings

Conclusion 1: The CHASE MA Programme has succeeded in creating a safer environment for targeted populations through its funding of high-quality mine clearance operations. Lives and livelihoods have been preserved by clearance operations in every country that the programme has supported. The decision to channel support to two of the world's best demining organisations — HALO and MAG — was judicious, as evidenced by their decades of professional experience, very good clearance rates and excellent safety records.

Conclusion 2: Success in building national capacities to carry out demining has proved to be mixed at best. The aim of developing national capacities for coordination and management is valid. Funding of the relevant UN agencies (the UNDP, the UNMAS, and, to a lesser extent, UNICEF) to develop national mine action management skills was a logical choice, but delivery of outcomes (as opposed to implementation of activities) has not often matched Programme expectations. Among UN agencies, the lack of a consistent and measurable strategic approach to capacity building outcomes remains a major impediment to performance improvement. The decision to fund HALO and MAG for similar national-level capacity building purposes was less appropriate. The strengths of these organisations in terms of capacity building lie in mentoring and training an operational demining workforce, not in creating effective management in governmental or quasi-governmental institutions.

Conclusion 3: The aim of maximising the impact of demining on socio-economic development is fully justified, but remains work in progress. Understanding of how mine action can actively promote development continues to be poor across the range of organisations and agencies supported by the CHASE MA Programme. Too often, organisational efforts have concentrated on demining either as pure risk reduction or as creating the conditions for development, but with insufficient attention and comprehension as to how, or indeed if, development actually occurs. In part, this is due to insufficient clarity from DFID of its vision of how mine action should support development. Mine action today is part of the development challenge. However, in most cases, the mine action community in-country (international and national agencies as well as MA operators), remains at a distance from established development processes. The UNMAT partners could do more to create linkages with development plans and planners. The CHASE MA Programme could promote and facilitate more effective engagement with the development sector. The mine action and development initiative financed by DFID Afghanistan, delivered by the MA

²⁴⁶ Interview with Owen Barder Centre for Global Development; UNDP Programme Manager, Mozambique.

²⁴⁷ Annex B - Options for the competitive tendering process (DFID Procurement).



operator and supported by UNMAS-MACCA presents a model with some instructive lessons for the CHASE MA Programme.

Conclusion 4: The Programme is delivering substantial benefits but could do more to promote inclusion and address more directly the concerns of women and girls. The total area of land cleared by the Programme has not only resulted in a significant reduction in the extent of potential hazards, but also in blockages to socio-economic opportunities in the affected communities. Mine action removed constraints upon a wide range of activities essential to normal community and economic life such as access to water, fuel collection, cultivation of land, livestock feed, access to schools and medical care, the free exchange of trade, and the value and ownership of land. These were especially evident in the more densely populated countries and areas. However, inclusion (gender, age and class) is one area in which the CHASE MA Programme appears to have had relatively little impact, in part due to the MA operators' lack of influence over prioritisation and absence of a specific pro-poor focus in the Programme. The impact on gender was most evident in Sri Lanka where the return to villages and cleared land from IDP camps was perceived to have reduced the threat of violence against women. MA operators did not have strategies in place to address gender specific issues related to clearance, e.g. access to health care, education. The Programme is not explicit in addressing gender.

Conclusion 5: With the benefit of hindsight, the decision to channel funding to UN agencies through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) was ill-judged. Funding the VTF has made it very difficult for the CHASE MA Programme to trace the impact of its funding on the end beneficiary. Transaction costs are high and cumulative. Different UN financial reporting requirements have created delays in disbursements causing programme delays. Reporting is viewed as an exercise in compliance and is seen by UNMAT managers 'as disproportionate to funding'. While the approach has minimised the management burden on the CHASE team, it has made it difficult to meet internal requirements of efficiency and effectiveness. DFID should agree clear CHASE MA Programme objectives and outcomes with each of the UNMAT partners and put in place effective reporting and monitoring procedures.

Conclusion 6: The CHASE MA Programme has ensured reasonable value for money (VFM) for its funding of mine action, but significant improvements can certainly be achieved in future. HALO and MAG have generally proven to be cost-effective in their demining but VFM calculations are not only a matter of the number of mines or other items of ordnance destroyed or hectares cleared. They hinge on assessments of, and planning for, how the land will be used afterwards. Both UN agencies and MA operators would enhance the VFM they deliver to DFID, and hence the United Kingdom taxpayer, with greater focus on achieving - and reporting on - outcomes as well as outputs. DFID could improve VFM by moving from a £/output approach to measurement and incorporating more systematic reporting framework for impact reporting.

Conclusion 7: The centralised management model for the CHASE MA Programme offers greater policy coherence than decentralised models. However, there is a need for closer engagement with DFID Country Offices in beneficiary countries, where these exist, to improve oversight of the Programme and to facilitate engagement with wider development processes. CHASE should consider cost effective options to secure these links. Mine action extends along a spectrum from emergency response and stabilisation to development. While the Programme accommodates a range of interventions across that continuum, there is a need for a more coordinated approach within DFID and CHASE generally. The tendering arrangements for the eight country programmes required MA operators to deliver institutional training for national authorities for which they are not equipped. The gender dimension of mine action was not addressed through the procurement exercise. Finally, with improved reporting and feedback, CHASE participants in the global coordination structures (e.g. MASG) can contribute more effectively to the mine action and development agenda.

5.0 Recommendations

This section presents the main recommendations of our report. These are made based on the findings and conclusions of our evaluation, and are of course subject to the limitations of the evaluation as outlined in Section 1.3.8. The main recommendations of the evaluation are that the CHASE MA Programme should:

5.1 Continue funding high-quality demining for development

The programme is achieving demonstrably good results, clearing land of mines and UXO at an impressive rate in most countries of operation, bringing substantial benefits to local communities in terms of safety and socio-economic development. We recommend that the programme continue its central focus on demining linked to development, i.e. mine and UXO clearance and land release of SHAs by survey, freeing up land, other assets and communities for sustainable economic development. This recommendation is made based on the findings outlined in Section 3,



Section 4.2 and Section 4.5, and the conclusions drawn based on these findings under Conclusion 1 (in Section 4.7)..

5.2 Clarify and promote mine action support for inclusive socio-economic development

Mine action can create the preconditions for development. In the next phase, using a clear and tailored TOC approach and a supporting logframe, DFID CHASE should clarify how mine action can also produce development outcomes. As an integral part of the effort to support socio-economic development, the CHASE MA Programme should actively promote inclusion by incorporating an explicit pro-poor and gender focus into programme design. This recommendation is made based on the findings outlined in Section 2.1, Section 2.4, Section 4.2, Section 4.3 and Section 4.6, and the conclusions drawn based on these findings under Conclusions 3 and 4 (in Section 4.7).

5.3 Ensure institutional capacity building is directed towards outcomes

Among UN agencies involved in the Programme, the lack of an agreed strategic approach on capacity building outcomes remains an impediment to performance improvement. Accordingly, UN agencies should be required to design capacity building support in pursuit of specific national institutional outcomes based on thorough institutional needs assessment. MA operators should not be asked to provide similar national capacity building. The strengths of these organisations lie in mentoring and training operational staff, not in creating effective management in governmental or quasi-governmental institutions. This recommendation is made based on the findings outlined in Section 2.2 and Section 4.4, and the conclusions drawn based on these findings under Conclusion 2 (in Section 4.7).

5.4 Consider funding UN agencies directly in support of explicit developmental outcomes

With the benefit of hindsight, the decision to channel funding to the three UN agencies (UNDP, UNICEF and UNMAS) through the VTF was not thought through. DFID should agree clear CHASE MA Programme objectives and outcomes bilaterally with each of the UNMAT partners and put in place more effective reporting and monitoring procedures. This recommendation is made based on the findings outlined in Section 2.3, Section 4.3, Section 4.4 and Section 4.6, and the conclusions drawn based on these findings under Conclusion 5 (in Section 4.7).

5.5 Improve VFM with a greater focus on reporting on outcomes

The VFM Objective is an important priority for the programme, but strictly speaking is not an objective or purpose; rather it is a laudable operational aspect of delivery to be pursued. The CHASE MA Programme is correct to emphasise it. To ensure continual improvement, DFID CHASE should require reporting on VFM in achieving outcomes as well as activities and outputs. In line with the 3Es approach to VFM, this in turn requires DFID to develop common VFM measures and a VFM assessment system (fed by the monitoring and reporting procedures) for the following activities: procurement of MA services; mine/UXO clearance; MRE/RRE; national capacity building; community and social development (including gender and land rights); and economic development. This recommendation is made based on the findings outlined in Section 2.3, Section 2.4, Section 3 and Section 4.5, and the conclusions drawn based on these findings under Conclusion 6 (in Section 4.7).

5.6 Improve links and coordination between CHASE MA Programme and other DFID programmes

The long term effectiveness and sustainability of the CHASE MA Programme would be enhanced through the active involvement of DFID country offices in planning and oversight. However, the priorities of central and country programmes often differ and shape the allocation of operational resources. CHASE needs to consider how, cost effectively, it can secure a greater degree of engagement with the Programme in the target beneficiary countries. In view of the need to deal with rapid response and stabilisation, the CHASE MA Programme should actively pursue a more coordinated approach with relevant departments within DFID. This recommendation is made based on the findings outlined in Section 2.4 and Section 4.6 and the conclusions drawn based on these findings under Conclusion 7 (in Section 4.7).