

External Review of DFID's Palestinian Programme

Final Report

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Preface

- i. In August 2013, DFID contracted GDSI UK to carry out an External Review of DFID’s Palestinian Programme and its Operational Plan (OP) 2011-2015 for the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs). The Review was conducted by a team of independent international and national consultants in two inter-connected phases. Phase 1 concentrated on the design of the overall framework for the Review and planning of evaluation fieldwork in London and the OPTs in September 2013. Phase 2 focused on the delivery of evaluation work in the OPTs, including consultation with DFID’s teams in London and Jerusalem in January and February 2014.
- ii. The Review placed considerable emphasis on discussion and consultation with DFID teams in Jerusalem and London, Palestinian Authority institutions, multilateral partner organisations and other stakeholders, such as the United Nations (UN) and civil society representatives, academics and private sector representatives in the OPTs.
- iii. The Review team would like to express gratitude to all stakeholders that were able to assist in the process of gathering and analysing data. The frankness and insights shared by all those met were invaluable to building the Review team’s understanding of the context and development challenges facing the programme and are reflected in this Review Report.

List of Abbreviations

CHASE	Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department DFID
CPRD	Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSR	Conflict Sensitivity Review
CT	Counter Terrorism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCED	Development Committee for Enterprise Development
DFID	Department for International Development
EQ	Evaluation Question
EU	European Union
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict Affected States
FCO	Foreign & Commonwealth Office
FNMD	Facility for New Market Development Programme
GF	General Fund (UNRWA)
Gol	Government of Israel
HLP	Housing, Land and Property Rights
HMG	Her Majesty's Government
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
JACS	Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability
JCP	Job Creation Programme
M4P	Making Markets Work for the Poor
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MENA	Middle East North Africa
MENAD	Middle East North Africa Department
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MoF	Ministry of Finance (Palestinian Authority)
MoNE	Ministry of National Economy (Palestinian Authority)
MoPAD	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development (Palestinian Authority)
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NDP	National Development Plan (Palestinian Authority)
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OD	Organisational Development (UNRWA)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OP	Operational Plan (DFID)
OPTs	Occupied Palestinian Territories

OQR	Office of the Quartet Representative
PA	Palestinian Authority
PB-SB	Peace-Building and State-Building
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PLC	Palestinian Legislative Council
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMDP	Palestinian Market Development Programme
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PNDP	Palestinian National Development Plan
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
PVH	Poverty Vulnerability Hunger
ToC	Theory of Change
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSCO	UN Special Coordinator's Office for the Middle East Peace Process
UVP	Urban Voucher Programme
VfM	Value for Money
WB	World Bank

PART A: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (in Arabic Language)

1- مقدمة

- 1.1. في أغسطس/ آب 2013 تم التعاقد مع GDSI UK لإجراء مراجعة خارجية للبرنامج الفلسطيني لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية قياساً على خطتها التشغيلية لفترة 2011-2015. وخلال هذه الفترة، ستكون وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية قد قدمت 349 مليون جنيه إسترليني كدعم إنمائي ومساعدات إنسانية للشعب الفلسطيني. شملت هذه المراجعة تقييم الاستراتيجية العامة لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية وقدمت النصيحة الاستراتيجية فيما يتعلق بما إذا كان الجمع بين التدخلات الحالية يعتبر الوسيلة الأكثر فعالية في دعم رؤيتها العامة وأهدافها الإنمائية.
- 1.2. أجريت المراجعة على مرحلتين بواسطة فريق من المستشارين المستقلين خلال الفترة من سبتمبر/ أيلول 2013 إلى أبريل/ نيسان 2014. واعتمد التقييم بشكل أساسي على المصادر الثانوية مثل وثائق السياسة وتقارير المشاريع الحالية. وقد أجريت المقابلات مع الجهات الفاعلة المنفذة للمشاريع، السلطة الفلسطينية والأمم المتحدة في الأساس، وأصحاب المصلحة لاستكمال أو إيضاح البيانات الحالية. كما أجريت المشاورات والمقابلات مع فرق وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في مكتب القدس ولندن، وقدم موظفو إدارة الصراع والمساعدة الإنسانية والأمن (CHASE) التابعة لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية تقارير مختصرة إلى الفريق. وقد تشاور الفريق مع ممثلين للقطاع الخاص والأكاديميات والمجتمع المدني والأمم المتحدة.
- 1.3. هناك استراتيجية اتصال تدعم تعميم التقرير لدعم سياسة الشفافية الخاصة بوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية. يشمل ذلك ترجمة الملخص التنفيذي إلى اللغة العربية. ويساعد فريق مهام التقييم التابع لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في تسهيل نشر تقرير المراجعة النهائي واستجابة الإدارة على الموقع الإلكتروني للوزارة.
- 1.4. تتمثل رؤية البرنامج الفلسطيني لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية، كما هي محددة في الخطة التشغيلية لفترة 2011 - 2015، في دعم أهداف الحكومة البريطانية لإنجاح عملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط عن طريق المساعدة في بناء المؤسسات الفلسطينية وتعزيز النمو الاقتصادي، مما يجعل أي دولة ستقام في المستقبل مستقرة ومزدهرة وتدار بشكل جيد وشريك فعال لتحقيق السلام مع إسرائيل. وبناءاً عليه فإن برنامج وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية وثيق الصلة بتحقيق نتائج ناجحة للمفاوضات المتعلقة بالتسوية السلمية بين السلطة الفلسطينية والحكومة الإسرائيلية من شأنها أن تؤدي إلى حل الدولتين المتصور.

2- السياق

1-2- يطبق البرنامج الفلسطيني لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في سياق إحدى أطول الأزمات أمداً على مستوى العالم، ألا وهي استمرار الاحتلال الإسرائيلي للضفة الغربية بما فيها القدس وغزة وما نتج عنه من صراع بين إسرائيل والفلسطينيين، وعلى خلفية ثورات "الربيع العربي". شهدت الفترة التي غطاها هذا التقييم مفاوضات السلام المتواصلة، مع استمرار العنف والصراع في الوقت نفسه، واستمرار مصادرة إسرائيل للأراضي الفلسطينية لبناء الجدار العازل للضفة الغربية، واستمرار التوسع في المستوطنات، وهدم المنازل والمخيمات الفلسطينية، واستمرار الحصار المفروض على قطاع غزة. لا يسيطر الفلسطينيون على حدودهم ومواردهم الطبيعية، وهناك قيود صارمة مفروضة على حركة البضائع والناس. والحصار المفروض على قطاع غزة منذ عام 2007 يعني الحاجة إلى مزيد من المساعدات الإنسانية لتلبية الاحتياجات الأساسية للناس، حيث يعتمد أكثر من 80 في المائة من العائلات على المساعدات الإنسانية،¹ وزيادة أعداد العائلات المحرومة من الأمن الغذائي في غزة من 44 في المائة في 2011 إلى 57 في المائة في 2012.² ومن المتوقع أن تزيد هذه النسبة بشكل كبير في 2014.³ كما وصل معدل البطالة إلى أعلى مستوياته في ثلاث سنوات في الربع الأخير من عام 2013 ليلبلغ 41.5 في المائة.⁴

2-2- في يونيو/ حزيران 2012، أعاد فاليري اموس، وكيل الأمين العام للشؤون الإنسانية ومنسق الإغاثة في حالات الطوارئ، التأكيد على هذا البيان: "يعد ذلك نوعاً من العقاب الجماعي لكل من يعيشون في غزة وإنكاراً لحقوق الإنسان الأساسية بما يخالف

¹ مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق المساعدات الإنسانية (UNOCHA)، بيان غزة، وكيل الأمين العام للشؤون الإنسانية ومنسق الإغاثة في حالات الطوارئ، فاليري اموس، يونيو/ حزيران 2012.

<https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG%20Valerie%20Amos%20Statement%20on%20Gaza%202013Jun12.pdf>

² pi0n8Rx.dpuf5.http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5D9B0A57FAFC791885257C37004F6F14#sthash

³ مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق المساعدات الإنسانية المقدمة إلى الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة، نشرة المساعدات الإنسانية، فبراير/ شباط 2014.

⁴ نفس المرجع المذكور أعلاه.

القانون الدولي".⁵ يصنف مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق المساعدات الإنسانية الوضع في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة على أنه "أزمة للكرامة الإنسانية"، حيث يعيش أكثر من 4 مليون فلسطيني محرومين من حقوق الإنسان الأساسية مثل حرية الحركة وحماية حياة العائلة والحصول على السكن اللائق والرعاية الصحية والعمل والخدمات.⁶

3- عملية السلام والسلطة الفلسطينية

- 3.1. تم التوقيع على إعلان المبادئ المتعلقة بترتيبات الحكم الذاتي المؤقت (اتفاقات أوسلو) في عام 1993. يدعو هذا الإعلان إلى قيام إسرائيل بالانسحاب التدريجي من بعض أجزاء قطاع غزة والضفة الغربية والتأكيد على حق الفلسطينيين في الحكم الذاتي داخل هذه المناطق من خلال إنشاء سلطة حكم ذاتي فلسطينية مؤقتة.
- 3.2. دعماً لمبادئ اتفاقات أوسلو، تم توجيه التمويل الدولي إلى مساعدة السلطة الفلسطينية في إنشاء مؤسسات فلسطينية فعالة مع التركيز على بناء القدرة وتعزيز الإدارة المالية والمساءلة وتأسيس قطاع أمني قوي وإشراك السكان الفلسطينيين في جني ثمار السلام.
- 3.3. طبقاً لأحد التقارير الصادرة عن البنك الدولي، أظهرت السلطة الفلسطينية خلال 20 سنة من إنشائها قدرة كبيرة واستعداداً لتحسين قدرتها بناءً على الإصلاحات الكبيرة الحالية. (...). الإنجازات المؤسسية للسلطة الفلسطينية كما ظهرت من خلال الإصلاحات والإنجازات في عدة مجالات (...). القدرة على القيام بمهام الدولة بالمقارنة مع القدرة في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال أفريقيا والدول الأخرى، وإظهار أنها مماثلة في الغالب ومتفوقة في بعض الأحيان (...). وفي عام 2011، أجرت الأمم المتحدة وصندوق النقد الدولي والبنك الدولي توصلت من خلاله إلى أن الوظائف الحكومية للسلطة الفلسطينية أصبحت الآن كافية لإقامة دولة فاعلة. هذا التقييم كان مدعوماً وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية والاتحاد الأوروبي: "ما من شك أن السلطة الفلسطينية حققت نتائج قوية للغاية فيما يتعلق بالركائز الأساسية المحددة لكيان الدولة بشكل عام. وبالتالي نستنتج أن السلطة الفلسطينية أصبحت مستعدة الآن لتولي مهام ومسؤوليات الدولة ذات السيادة".⁸ تجدر الإشارة أيضاً إلى أن السلطة الفلسطينية أوفت بتعهداتها فيما يتعلق بتأسيس قطاعاً أمنياً قوياً، كما أشار إليه مكتب منسق الأمم المتحدة الخاص لعملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط (UNSCO): "أظهرت قوات الأمن الفلسطينية في الضفة الغربية القدرة على أداء المهام الشرطية المطلوبة من الدولة، إلى الحد المسموح به في الحدود التي يفرضها الاحتلال".⁹
- 3.4. على الرغم من ذلك، تحققت هذه الإنجازات في ظل القيود التي تنذر من تدهور الجوانب المتعددة للتنمية السياسية الفلسطينية والتقدم نحو بناء كيان الدولة والأمن البشري. يشمل ذلك ما يلي، على سبيل المثال لا الحصر:
- (أ) على الرغم من الجهود المبذولة لتقليص العجز المتكرر لديها، لكن السلطة الفلسطينية تكافح من أجل الوفاء بالتزاماتها المالية لأن موارد الموازنة تكون أقل من المتوقع بسبب معدل النمو الأقل من المتوقع وتراجع التمويل الخارجي.
- (ب) على الرغم من زيادة التكامل الاقتصادي، لكن الاقتصاد الفلسطيني تعرض للركود بسبب الهيمنة الإسرائيلية على الاقتصاد، مما يؤدي إلى إضعاف القطاع الخاص بالفلسطيني وضعف النمو الاقتصادي المحقق عن طريق القطاع العام.
- (ج) المزيد من الفصل بين المجتمعات الإسرائيلية والفلسطينية وتعميق تشتت السكان الفلسطينيين بين قطاع غزة والضفة الغربية، وتقسيمهم إلى أكثر من 60 تجمع شبه معزولة في الضفة الغربية.
- (د) انقسام الشعب الفلسطيني، بين الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة، يعيق السلطة الفلسطينية التي تتخذ من رام الله مقراً لها عن تطبيق أجندة يمكن أن تحقق نمواً اقتصادياً مستداماً في جميع أنحاء الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة وبناء المؤسسات في غزة.¹⁰ وفي أبريل/ نيسان من عام 2014، أفضت جهود المصالحة بين حركتي فتح وحماس إلى توقيع الطرفين على اتفاق ينحيان بموجبه الخلافات القائمة بينهما جانباً. من المهم للحفاظ على الدولة الفلسطينية والشعب الفلسطيني كأمة واحدة أن يتم توحيد غزة والضفة الغربية وأنا تخضع كليهما مرة أخرى لسلطة فلسطينية موحدة. ومن شأن المصالحة بين غزة والضفة الغربية أن تسمح بإجراء عملية انتخابات ديمقراطية وتشكيل المجلس التشريعي والبرلمان، وهي الخطوات المطلوبة للتأسيس لعملية ديمقراطية قائمة على التمثيل النسبي. ولضمان التوصل لحل ناجح للصراع، من المهم أيضاً أن تتعهد أي حكومة يتم تشكيلها مستقبلاً بالتفاوض من أجل التوصل إلى تسوية سلمية للصراع. لكن يجب التنويه إلى أنه لا يمكن التوصل إلى حل ناجح إذا لم يكن كل طرف من أطراف الصراع حريصاً على الوفاء بتعهداته.

⁵ مكتب الأمم المتحدة لتنسيق المساعدات الإنسانية (UNOCHA)، بيان غزة، يونيو/ حزيران 2012.

⁶ <http://www.unocha.org/ocha20122012-opt/13>.

⁷ البنك الدولي، الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة، القدرة المؤسسية، يوليو/ تموز 2011. ص 1.

⁸ مكتب ممثل الاتحاد الأوروبي، الرئيس المشارك المانع لمجموعة استراتيجية الحكم، البيان المتعلق بمستوى التقدم في الحكم، تقرير مقدم إلى وزارة التخطيط والتنمية الإدارية، 26 يوليو/ تموز 2011.

⁹ بناء الدولة الفلسطينية: إنجاز عرضة للمخاطر المتزايدة. مكتب منسق الأمم المتحدة الخاص لعملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط (UNSCO)، 2012، ص 1.

¹⁰ نفس المرجع المذكور أعلاه.

هناك العديد من الجهود التي بذلت خلال 20 سنة منذ التوقيع على اتفاقات أوسلو لإعادة انطلاق مفاوضات السلام بين الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين (آخرها جهود الوساطة من أجل السلام المتواصلة من قبل جون كيري)، لكن لم يتم التوصل بعد إلى أي اتفاق على حل عادل ودائم للصراع حتى وقت كتابة هذا التقرير.

4- عرض عام للبرنامج

4.1. يقوم البرنامج الفلسطيني لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية على ثلاث ركائز للتدخل:

أ) **ركيزة الفقر والضعف والجوع** – تدعم ثلاثة أهداف: (1) دعم وكالة الأمم المتحدة لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى (أونروا) في تقديم الخدمات الأساسية إلى 5.3 مليون لاجئ فلسطيني في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة (42.1% من إجمالي عدد السكان لاجئين) وفي المنطقة، وتحسين الحصول على التعليم، والمشاركة مع أونروا على مستوى السياسة لدعم الاستدامة والفعالية (2) التعامل مع الاحتياجات الإنسانية في مجال الأمن الغذائي وحماية السكن والأرض والملكية (3) التعامل مع الأسباب الرئيسية للضعف والفقر في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة من خلال أعمال الدعم بشأن حرية الحركة والوصول ومطالبية إسرائيل بالوفاء بالتزاماتها بموجب القانون الدولي الإنساني. يكتمل التركيز على الإغاثة مع التدخلات الأصغر والأطول مدى. ذلك مع العلم بأنه يتم تخصيص نحو 46.5% من ميزانية وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية لركيزة "الفقر والجوع والضعف"،¹¹ بينما تخصص نحو 69.3% من هذا التمويل لدعم أونروا.

ب) **ركيزة بناء الدولة** – دعم السلطة الفلسطينية في بناء مؤسسات فعالة وتقديم الخدمات الأساسية مثل الصحة والتعليم. تركز الاستراتيجية بشكل رئيسي على تعزيز فرص الاتفاق حول حل الدولتين القابل للحياة من خلال زيادة الأداء والشرعية الديمقراطية للقيادة الفلسطينية المعتدلة. يأتي دعم وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية للسلطة الفلسطينية بالتوازي مع خطة التنمية الوطنية الفلسطينية 2011-2013، التي تركز على بناء المؤسسات الحكومية الفلسطينية من خلال الإصلاحات الإدارية والمالية، ودعم العدالة وقطاع الأمن.¹² وقد تعهدت وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية بتقديم نحو 131 جنيه إسترليني¹³ (أو 39%) إلى منحة البنك الدولي لتقديم الخدمات المصممة لتمكين الإدارة المالية للسلطة الفلسطينية، وبالتالي إتاحة الحصول بشكل أفضل على الخدمات ودعم التوظيف، والمساهمة في المضاعف الاقتصادي الوطني/ الأسري من خلال توفير موارد الدخل. كما تعد قدرة السلطة الفلسطينية على توفير فرص العمل من العوامل المهمة في ظل تراجع نمو القطاع الخاص وعدم القدرة على توفير فرص العمل نتيجة للقيود المفروضة. ذلك مع العلم بأن السلطة الفلسطينية هي الجهة الرئيسية الموفرة لخدمات مثل الصحة والتعليم والخدمات الاجتماعية والقانونية وخدمات الأمن والبنية الأساسية.

ج) **ركيزة صناعة الثروة** - دعم النمو الاقتصادي المستدام والشامل من خلال تعزيز قدرة القطاع الخاص على المنافسة، والتعامل مع قيود الحركة والوصول التي تقف عائقاً أمام تنمية القطاع الخاص. تخصص وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية نحو 9.5% من ميزانيتها لركيزة صناعة الثروة. وتركز التدخلات على ما يلي، على سبيل المثال لا الحصر: تنمية السوق لصالح الفقراء للتعامل مع إخفاقات السوق، وتشغيل الأسواق لصالح الفقراء، وتقديم رهونات عقارية في المتناول، وتحسين سياسة الإسكان، والتشغيل في قطاع البناء، والتنسيق بين الجهات المانحة لتنمية الأعمال ودعم جهود الجذب الفعالة الخاصة بمكتب ممثل اللجنة الرباعية لتخفيف القيود على الحركة.

5- النتائج والاستنتاجات

5.1. بشكل عام، يحقق برنامج التنمية الدولية البريطاني في الأراضي الفلسطينية قيمة جيدة للمال، وهو ما يعد فعّالاً في تنفيذ البرنامج وتخصيص موارده واختيار شركاء التنفيذ. هذا العامل الأخير يؤثر بشكل مباشر على اقتصاد البرنامج، أو التكاليف وجودة الإدخالات بموجب البرنامج. تتمتع وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية بسمعة محترمة في المجتمع الدولي ومن الوزارات التنفيذية في السلطة الفلسطينية ويعمل البرنامج على تعزيز آفاق السلام من خلال التركيز على بناء الدولة وتخفيف حدة الفقر. كما أنها تركز بقوة على المجموعات الأكثر ضعفاً، مع دعم التعليم والرعاية الصحية للأطفال وتمكين المرأة من الحصول على معاملة عادلة. يمكن لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تعزز المساواة من خلال برنامجها عن طريق دمج المناطق الجغرافية الأقل نمواً (مثل المنطقة ج) بشكل أكثر اكتمالاً. كما أن التمويل المقدم إلى الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة يسهم بشكل كبير في تعزيز القدرة المؤسسية، مما يوفر للبنات المحتملة للنمو الاقتصادي ودعم قدرة الناس على التعامل مع الأزمات الإنسانية. يتضح من مراجعة النتائج أن برنامج وزارة

¹¹ طبقاً لحسابات التقييم، يبلغ حجم ميزانية الركيزة 154.37 مليون جنيه إسترليني من إجمالي 332.32 مليون جنيه إسترليني للخطة التشغيلية لفترة 2011-2015.

¹² وزارة التخطيط والتنمية الإدارية (MoPAD)، الإطار العام لإعداد خطة التنمية الوطنية، 2014-2016، ص 4.

¹³ هذه الأرقام تعبر عن أرقام الميزانية الإجمالية حسب موقع "متنوع التنمية" الإلكتروني لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية.

التنمية الدولية البريطانية يتسم بالفعالية ويحقق نتائج وفوائد دائمة، على الرغم من محدودية الموارد التوظيفية المتاحة للمكتب القطري بالمقارنة مع حجم ومستوى تعقيد البرنامج. ويمكن لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تزيد قدرتها فيما يتعلق بإظهار فعاليتها من خلال تعزيز تحليل النتائج وإظهار كيف أن المخرجات تسهم في تحقيق النتائج. وهكذا فإن هذا البرنامج يشمل المزيج الصحيح من التدخلات ويتسم بالمرونة الكافية لتمكين وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية من ضبط تدخلات برنامجها حسب التغييرات في السياق السياسي.

5.2 لقد أسهمت وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية بشكل كبير في أولويات التنمية الخاصة بالمجتمع الدولي لبناء إدارة فلسطينية يمكنها توفير الخدمات للسكان. وفي عام 2000، خلصت دراسة لفعالية المعونة تستعرض ما تم في السنوات منذ اتفاقات أوسلو إلى ما يلي: "ساعد الدعم المقدم من الجهات المانحة في إبطاء التدهور الاقتصادي العام، وأسهم في تحقيق النمو الاقتصادي، وعزز المؤسسات الرئيسية والقدرات المحلية. وعن طريق القيام بذلك، أسهمت الجهات المانحة في تحقيق الاستقرار السياسي، وبالتالي المساعدة في الحفاظ على المفاوضات الإسرائيلية الفلسطينية المتواصلة"¹⁴.

5.3 كما يتضح من تقرير المراجعة، يرى فريق المراجعة أن وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية بصدد تحقيق الأهداف المحددة في خططها التشغيلية لفترة 2011-2015. وقد تبين أنه بينما يمكن الحصول بسهولة أكثر على البيانات المتعلقة بالإنجازات قياساً على الأهداف والنتائج المتوقعة، لكن تكون هناك صعوبة أكثر في إسناد النتائج على مستوى التأثير والنتيجة المحققة.¹⁵ ونتيجة لذلك، يحتمل ألا تتمكن وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية من تقديم إنجازاتها بنفس المستوى الجيد المتوقع منها. وقد اعتمدت منهجية التقييم إلى حد كبير على الموارد الثانوية الحالية والمقابلات مع أصحاب المصلحة، وجعلت البيانات الضعيفة في مقابل النتائج تحليل الإسناد أكثر صعوبة بالنسبة لفريق المراجعة. وبناءً عليه فإن جمع وتحليل البيانات على مستوى التأثير والنتيجة يعتبر من الجوانب التي تتطلب التعزيز من وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية وشركاءها في التنفيذ. تتم تقييمات التأثير والنتيجة في الغالب من خلال التقييمات على مستوى المشروع أو البرنامج، لكن لم تكن هناك تقارير تقييم متاحة بعد بالنسبة للكثير من التدخلات، كما هو الحال بالنسبة للصندوق الاستثماري الخاضع لإدارة البنك الدولي.

5.4 **ركيزة الفقر والضعف والجوع:** تسهم وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية من خلال الدعم المقدم إلى وكالة الأمم المتحدة لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى (أونروا) في توفير الوكالة للخدمات كموفر خدمات إلى 5.2 مليون لاجئ فلسطيني مسجل. هناك نحو 155633 لاجئ تغطيهم برامج التحويلات النقدية المدعومة من وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية، و30128 طفل تدعم وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في التعليم الأساسي ونحو 85.9% من النساء الحوامل يحضرن أربع زيارات على الأقل لرعاية ما قبل الولادة في عيادات أونروا الصحية. تعد وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية ثالث أكبر مساهم في الصندوق العام لوكالة الأمم المتحدة لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى (أونروا) وواحدة من ست جهات مانحة تقدم التمويل المتعدد السنوات المتوقع إلى الوكالة. كما تلعب دوراً رائداً في توفير تمويل حوافز الأداء، التي يبدو أنها مقبولة تمامًا بالنسبة لوكالة الأمم المتحدة لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى (أونروا)، وتشارك بقوة مع الوكالة فيما يتعلق بأجندة الإصلاح الخاصة بها.

5.5 تدعم **ركيزة الضعف** الخدمات الأساسية والصندوق العام لوكالة الأمم المتحدة لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى (أونروا)، مما يحسن من الأمن الغذائي وإنشاء مدارس جديدة في غزة وتوفير المساعدة القانونية والدعم لتحسين الوصول وإزالة القيود. وكما هو منصوص عليه بوضوح في تقرير اللجنة المستقلة لتقييم تأثير المعونة الصادر في سبتمبر/ أيلول 2013: "تحقق وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية فوائد حقيقية من خلال وكالة الأمم المتحدة لإغاثة وتشغيل اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في الشرق الأدنى (أونروا)، لاسيما في قطاعات الصحة والتعليم (...) وبشكل عام، تساعد الخدمات التي تقدمها الوكالة في التأكد من أن وضع اللاجئين الفلسطينيين لا يفاقم من حالة عدم الاستقرار في المنطقة. وعلى الرغم من ذلك، لا تحقق برامج الحد من الفقر المقدمة من خلال التحويلات النقدية والغذائية سوى تأثير ضئيل فقط".

5.6 **ركيزة بناء الدولة:** أسهم الدعم المقدم من وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية إلى حد كبير في زيادة قدرة السلطة الفلسطينية على تدبير وإنفاق الإيرادات بفعالية، لتوفير الخدمات الأساسية وخلق فرص العمل. وفي الأونة الأخيرة ساعد الدعم المقدم من وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في تطوير الحكم الفلسطيني في قطاعي الأمن والعدالة؛ كل الأولويات محددة في ورقات ممارسة وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية.¹⁶ كما توفر منحة تقديم الخدمات التي تخضع لإدارة البنك الدولي الدعم المباشر للموازنة للسلطة الفلسطينية مع ربط هذا الدعم بإصلاحات وتحسينات مؤسسية محددة في هيكلها الداخلي. وفي حين أن السلطة الفلسطينية ربما تكون قد شرعت بالفعل في تطبيق إصلاحات مشابهة بدون هذا الدعم، لكنها ستواجه صعوبات كبيرة للغاية بالنظر إلى معدلات العجز الكبيرة في الموازنة التي تدعمها منحة تقديم الخدمات. وبالإضافة إلى الدعم المالي، تقدم منحة تقديم الخدمات الدعم الفني ودعم تعزيز القدرة إلى السلطة

¹⁴فعالية المعونة في الضفة الغربية وغزة، دراسة أعدتها اليابان بالتعاون مع البنك الدولي لصالح أمانة لجنة الاتصال المخصصة، 2000، ملخص تنفيذي.

¹⁵المزيد من المعلومات والأمثلة على المؤشرات مدرجة في تقرير المراجعة.

¹⁶وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية، بناء دولاً ومجتمعات سلمية، ورقة ممارسة لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية.

الفلسطينية في الإدارة المالية والإدارية. هناك مشاريع أخرى لبناء الدولة تتكامل مع منحة تقديم الخدمات لتوفر نهجًا متوازنًا لبناء الدولة بشكل عام، مثل دعم المجتمع المدني في محاسبة السلطة الفلسطينية وتعزيز ضوابط مكافحة الفساد.¹⁷ وبينما تسهم منحة تقديم الخدمات في فعالية مؤسسات السلطة الفلسطينية وشرعية أداءها (أحد مكونات استراتيجية بناء الدولة لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية)، لكنها أصبحت تعتبر نوعًا من الدعم المشروط للموازنة يقدم إلى السلطة الفلسطينية لتغطية جزء من العجز في الموازنة الخاصة بها.

5.7. تركز الخطة التشغيلية/ ركيزة بناء الدولة لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية بشكل رئيسي على الحكومة. يمكن موازنة ذلك بشكل أكبر عن طريق زيادة الدعم المقدم إلى هيكل الحكومة المحلية والجهات الفاعلة غير الحكومية والمجتمع المدني الفلسطيني والمنظمات غير الحكومية للتنمية. كما يمكن التوسع في دعم التدخلات الإنمائية في المنطقة ج (60% من الضفة الغربية) والقدس لدعم إقامة دولة فلسطينية قابلة للحياة والمساواة بين كل الفلسطينيين في الحصول على الخدمات والتنمية الاقتصادية.

5.8. **ركيزة صناعة الثروة:** تعد ركيزة صناعة الثروة أصغر الركائز الثلاث حجمًا من الناحية المالية ومن حيث عدد التدخلات. تهتم هذه الركيزة بالنمو الاقتصادي الشامل من خلال دعم تنمية القطاع الخاص الفلسطيني وخلق فرص العمل وجذب الاستثمارات الأجنبية. ذلك مع العلم بأن التدخلات بموجب هذه الركيزة لم تبدأ إلا مؤخرًا، وبالتالي من السابق لأوانه تحليل تأثيرها.

6- توصيات المراجعة

1-6- التوصيات الرئيسية مرتبة من حيث الأولوية كما يلي:

6.1.1. استمرار الاحتلال والصراع يفرض قيود وعوائق كبيرة على ما يمكن إنجازه بفعالية. والمعونة البريطانية المقدمة إلى الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة لا تزال مهمة للغاية، لكن يجب ألا تكون مرتبطة بأجندة أو رؤية سياسية ثابتة.

6.1.2. يوصي تقرير المراجعة باتباع نهجًا ذو شقين: يجب أن تحافظ نظرية التغيير على عملية لبناء السلام ورؤية سياسية قوية لحل الدولتين مع دمج الهدف الإنمائي للحد من الفقر والضعف في نفس الوقت، والمساهمة في تأسيس مجتمع فلسطيني قائم على المساواة وإعمال حقوق الإنسان. كما يجب أن يشكل التعامل مع أسباب الفقر والضعف الأساس المنطقي لتخصيص موازنة الإعانة المقدمة من وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية. ويجب أن يبقى التوصل إلى حل عادل للصراع الإسرائيلي الفلسطيني بمثابة أولوية قصوى وهدفًا أسمى: يجب على المجتمع الدولي، الذي تعتبر بريطانيا جزءًا منه، أن يكثف الجهود للعمل مع كلا الطرفين للتوصل إلى حل عادل، وفي الوقت نفسه يجب أن تتكامل هذه الجهود مع العمل الإنمائي الأقوى على المدى البعيد.

6.1.3. يجب أن تستمر وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في دعم التدخلات بموجب الركائز الثلاث: يجب ألا تكون هناك أي تغييرات في اختيار الركائز، لكن تكون التغييرات بشكل أكبر في حجم التمويل والنهج المتبع في التدخلات المختلفة. يجب أن يتواصل دعم الموازنة المقدم إلى السلطة الفلسطينية والأونروا كمزودين رئيسيين للخدمات وفرص العمل في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة. ومع ذلك، يجب فرض الشروط على نهج التنمية الطويلة المدى متى أمكن، مع دعم البيئة المواتية للنمو الاقتصادي والشرعية الديمقراطية.

6.1.4. يجب زيادة المخصصات المالية بموجب ركيزة صناعة الثروة مع الأخذ بعين الاعتبار أهمية دعم النمو الاقتصادي المستدام للحد من الفقر وتوفير الإيرادات للسلطة الفلسطينية. ويجب أن تكون وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية استراتيجية للغاية في تطوير وتطبيق استراتيجية اقتصادية شاملة، مع التأكد من أن التدخلات شمولية التركيز وتستهدف النساء والشباب والمناطق الجغرافية المهمشة.

6.1.5. يجب ضبط الشروط المتعلقة بالدعم المقدم إلى السلطة الفلسطينية لتعبر عن التقدم المؤسسي الذي أحرزته والتغييرات المتوقعة ذات الأولوية في خطة التنمية الوطنية الفلسطينية لفترة 2014-2016، مع زيادة التركيز على النمو الاقتصادي والتعامل مع الفجوة الاجتماعية في المجتمع. ويجب تقديم الدعم بشكل أكثر قوة لدعم الشرعية الديمقراطية للسلطة الفلسطينية مع مواصلة دعم شرعية أداءها المعززة في نفس الوقت. وفي حين أن شرعية الأداء تم تعزيزها بشكل كبير، لكنها لا تزال هشّة وغير متكافئة فيما بين القطاعات وبالتالي تستحق الاهتمام باستمرار.

6.1.6. تسهم وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في الإنجازات المتعلقة بالأهداف الإنمائية للألفية من خلال مساهمتها في الصندوق العام للأونروا ودعم الموازنة لدفع الرواتب المستحقة على السلطة الفلسطينية، وهو العامل الذي يجب أن تعتبره وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية مرتبطًا بتطوير وتنفيذ السياسة في المستقبل. هذه هي الرسالة الأساسية للتقرير. يجب أن تبقى الشروط المرتبطة بالموازنة فيما يتعلق بشرعية الأداء والمحاسبة وأن تكون في الوقت نفسه مشروطة بالتساوي بتطوير وتنفيذ السياسة لسد الفجوة الاجتماعية المتسعة على نحو متزايد في المجتمع الفلسطيني: يتماشى ذلك مع خطة التنمية الوطنية الفلسطينية لفترة 2014-2016. ويجب أن

¹⁷يرجى الاطلاع على تقرير المرحلة الأولى والأقسام المتعلقة بالفعالية والتأثير أدناه للتعرف على نتائج المشروع هذه.

يكون دعم الموازنة المقدم إلى السلطة الفلسطينية مرتبطاً بأدائها في دعم السياسات والإصلاحات للحد من الفقر وتقديم خدمات اجتماعية عادلة والتمكين الاقتصادي والاجتماعي للشباب والمرأة والنمو الاقتصادي وتنمية القطاع الخاص.

6.1.7. الفرصة سانحة للتوسع في البرامج بموجب برنامج العدالة والأمن، مثل حماية حقوق الإنسان والتمتع بالعدالة بالنسبة للمرأة والفتيات ضحايا العنف القائم على الجنس أو الناجيات منه. ويجب أن تواصل برامج وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية الجمع بين الدعم المقدم إلى الحكومة ومنظمات المجتمع المدني على حد سواء في هذه المجالات.

6.1.8. هناك احتياجات إلى تحقيق توازن أفضل بين دعم السلطة الفلسطينية على المستوى المركزي وتطوير هيكل الحكومة المحلية. ويجب أن يستكمل دعم المؤسسات الحكومية بدعم الجهات الفاعلة الفلسطينية غير التابعة للدولة، بما في ذلك المجتمع المدني ووسائل الإعلام.

6.1.9. يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تعزز تعريف وتفعيل الروابط المحتملة بين ركائز التدخل الثلاث. مثال: يمكن أن يركز الدعم المقدم بموجب عنصر بناء الدولة على تعزيز الوزارات التنفيذية ذات الصلة لتحقيق التنمية الاقتصادية (مثل دعم وزارة الاقتصاد الوطني لتطوير سياسة تدعم خلق بيئة مواتية لتنمية القطاع الخاص)، وهو ما يمكن أن يؤدي بدوره إلى دعم النمو الاقتصادي والقطاع الخاص من خلال ركيزة صناعة الثروة.

6.1.10. لدعم الأهداف الإنمائية لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية، يجب أن تكون أكثر استباقية تمامًا في استخدام نفوذها بين الدول المانحة الأخرى تدعم الجهود القائمة على القانون الدولي لزيادة الضغوط الدبلوماسية على إسرائيل لرفع الحصار عن غزة وإزالة العوائق المفروضة على حركة البضائع والناس في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة بشكل عام. ويجب أن تستخدم نفوذها لدعم احترام القانون الإنساني الدولي ورفع القيود الإسرائيلية التي تؤثر بالسلب على تحقيق نتائج للتنمية المستدامة.

6.1.11. يجب التركيز بشكل أكبر على المجتمعات المهمشة في المنطقة ج والقدس ووادي الأردن وغزة من منظور التنمية البشرية وكذا منظور بناء الدولة. لن تكون الدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة المتوقعة قابلة للحياة إذا لم تتمكن من تنمية هذه المناطق لصالح مواطنيها. يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تواصل المناقشات مع وزارة الخارجية لاتخاذ إجراءات مشتركة مع أعضاء المجتمع الدولي الآخرين ودعم إزالة القيود التي تعيق الفلسطينيين عن الوصول إلى القدس والمنطقة ج.

6.1.12. يجب دعم منظمات المجتمع المدني الفلسطينية للوصول إلى المجتمعات الأكثر ضعفاً (كما هو الحال في المنطقة ج والقدس وغزة)، حيثما تكون قدرة السلطة الفلسطينية على الوصول إليها محدودة أو منعدمة، بالتزامن مع السلطة الفلسطينية أو الحكومة المحلية. ويعد الدعم المقدم إلى المجتمع المدني الفلسطيني مهمًا للغاية أيضًا لحماية التنوع.

6.1.13. يجب أن تتواصل المساهمات في الصندوق العام للأونروا بموجب ركيزة الفقر والضعف والجوع. ويجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تقوم، بالتنسيق مع أصحاب المصلحة مثل الأونروا ومنظمات المجتمع المدني الفلسطينية، باستكشاف الوسائل الإضافية لزيادة التدخلات ذات النهج الإنمائي الأطول مدى لدعم الأمن الغذائي وسبل العيش المستدامة، مع التأكيد بشكل خاص على المرأة والشباب.

6.1.14. يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تزيد من التدخلات ذات النهج الإنمائي الأطول مدى لدعم الأمن الغذائي وسبل العيش المستدامة (مع التأكيد بشكل خاص على المرأة والشباب) مع الحفاظ في الوقت نفسه على المساعدات الإنسانية المقدمة إلى المجتمعات الأكثر ضعفاً والقدرة على الاستجابة في حالات التفشي الشديد للعنف أو الحصار.

6.1.15. يجب أن تعمل التدخلات بموجب ركيزة صناعة الثروة من خلال رؤية استراتيجية للتنمية الاقتصادية الشاملة الطويلة المدى التي تستهدف المرأة والشباب والمناطق المهمشة (بسبب عدم المساواة في التوزيع الجغرافي للتنمية). ويجب تعريف الشمولية ووضع مؤشرات أداء قابلة للقياس. كما يجب أن تعمل هذه الركيزة عن قرب مع فرق التفكير الرائدة وأصحاب المصلحة من القطاع الخاص المهمين بحق باستكشاف وسائل تحقيق النمو الاقتصادي الأكثر شمولية. ويجب أن يضمن البرنامج إمكانية إثبات نهج "النمو الاقتصادي الشامل" الخاص به.

6.1.16. يجب استكمال والتوسع في التدخلات الهادفة إلى دعم حماية السكن والأرض والملكية الفلسطينية، بينما تسعى وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية إلى تسهيل التنسيق بين ركيزتي الفقر والضعف والجوع وبناء الدولة فيما يتعلق بتحديات تسجيل الأرض. ذلك مع العلم بأن حقوق السكن والأرض والملكية تنتشعب من الخطة التشغيلية.

6.1.17. يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تتوخى الحذر للتأكد من أن الخطوات المتخذة لإنفاذ قوانين مكافحة الإرهاب لا تنتهك القانون الإنساني الدولي أو تؤثر بالسلب على التدخلات الإنمائية أو الحصول العادل على المساعدات الدولية للمجتمعات. ويجب تطوير نهجًا موحّدًا أكثر مع الجهات المانحة الثنائية الأوروبية والاتحاد الأوروبي.

6.1.18. يجب أن تترجم استراتيجية المساواة بين الجنسين 2013-2015 الخاصة بوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية للأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة إلى خطة عمل ملموسة تدعمها استراتيجية للرصد والتقييم قائمة على النتائج. كما يجب أن تكون هناك أولوية لتعزيز منع العنف القائم على الجنس، لاسيما العنف ضد المرأة والفتيات، ودعم التمكين الاقتصادي والاجتماعي للمرأة والفتيات.

6.1.19. تتطلب البرامج المستقبلية لوزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية التوسع أكثر في تركيزها على المرأة والشباب. وهناك احتمالات لمضاعفة البرامج الإرشادية مثل المشروع المنفذ فيما يتعلق بالوصول إلى العدالة بالنسبة للنساء الناجيات من العنف الأسري. هذه البرامج لها القدرة على تعزيز الارتباط بين برامج العدالة والأمن والسكان بشكل عام، وتكون مدعومة بموجب ركيزة بناء الدولة. كما يجب أن تعمل البرامج المستقبلية على خلق فرصاً اقتصادية عادلة للمرأة والشباب، وهو الهدف الذي يعبر عنه الإطار المنطقي المراجع لخطة التنمية الوطنية الفلسطينية.

6.1.20. يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية، مع ما لديها من خبرة ومعرفه، أن تأخذ بعين الاعتبار إجراء تحليلاً مشتركاً للصراع والاستقرار، ليس فقط بالنسبة للجهات الفاعلة البريطانية، لكن بالنسبة للجهات الفاعلة الدولية الأخرى أيضاً لأن كل جهة مانهة لديها القيود ونقاط القوة الخاصة بها للتعامل مع التحديات ودعم فرص تحقيق السلام. ويجب ألا يؤدي التحليل المشترك للصراع والاستقرار إلى وثيقة نظرية كما يحدث في الغالب مع تحليل الصراع: يجب أن تكون النتائج النهائية عبارة عن استراتيجيات عملية وتشغيلية مشتركة تدعم بناء السلام في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة وتدعم عملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط.

6.1.21. يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تراجع استراتيجية الرصد والتقييم الخاصة بها فيما يتعلق بالخطة التشغيلية للتأكد من ضبطها جيداً لإثبات النتائج والتغيير على مستوى التأثير والنتيجة. هناك مخاوف حالية من أن المؤشرات قد لا تكون هي الأكثر فعالية لإثبات النتائج الخاصة بـ مكتب وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية في الأراضي الفلسطينية المحتلة. ويجب إعداد البيانات الختامية ومؤشرات أداء نتيجة الاستجابة والتأكيد عليها مع شركاء التنفيذ الرئيسيين.

2-6 التوصيات الإضافية للركيزة تشمل:

ركيزة بناء الدولة

- 1-2-6-1 تنوع مجموعة أنشطة البرنامج لتشمل مشاريع تدعم الحكم والإدارة المحلية، مثل برنامج البنك الدولي لتنمية القرى.¹⁸
- 2-2-6-2 بالنظر إلى المراجعات التي أجريت على الاستراتيجية العامة لأنشطة بناء الدولة وبناء السلام، يجب التأكد من وجود روابط سببية مباشرة بين المشاريع التي تهدف إلى دعم و/ أو التأثير على عملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط (دعم الشرعية الديمقراطية للسلطة الفلسطينية وتقديم الخدمات على المستوى المحلي...). يرى فريق المراجعة أن دعم بناء الدولة وبناء السلام عبارة عن عمليات متعاضدة تهدف إلى دعم بناء دولة فلسطينية فعالة وشرعية وقابلة للحاسبة ومنجوبة تتميز بالعلاقة الصحية بين الدولة والمجتمع تحت قيادة لها القدرة على التفاوض حول السلام والتوصل إلى حل عادل للصراع.
- 2-2-6-3 يمكن التعامل مع الفجوة بين الهياكل الداخلية للسلطة الفلسطينية وتقييم الاحتياجات والتنفيذ الفعلي عن طريق التحليل الأكثر دقة لكيفية قيام الجهات الفاعلة المختلفة (الحكومة المركزية والمحلية والمجتمع المدني/ المنظمات غير الحكومية والمانيين المتعددين والثنائيين) بتنسيق الأنشطة وموائمتها مع السلطة الفلسطينية/ وزارة التخطيط والتنمية الإدارية.

ركيزة الفقر والضعف والجوع (PVH)

- 2-2-6-4 يجب أن تركز برامج الأمن الغذائي على زيادة دخل الأسر بأسلوب مستدام. المشكلة الرئيسية التي تواجه سكان غزة تتمثل في القدرة على تحمل أسعار المواد الغذائية الأساسية المتاحة في السوق، والتي تكون مرتبطة بالحصار.
- 2-2-6-5 يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تشجع وتدعم الأونروا ووزارة الشؤون الاجتماعية التابعة للسلطة الفلسطينية لإنشاء قاعدة بيانات وطنية، تضم اللاجئين وغير اللاجئين، لتجنب التكرارات والتأكد من توجيه التحويلات النقدية والحماية الاجتماعية إلى الأسر الأكثر ضعفاً.
- 2-2-6-6 يجب أن تعزز ركيزة الفقر والضعف والجوع الروابط على مستويات السياسة و/ أو المستويات التشغيلية من خلال برامج صناعة الثروة وبناء الدولة، بهدف تحقيق التمكين الاقتصادي والاجتماعي.
- 2-2-6-7 يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تشجع الأونروا على استكشاف أفضل الوسائل للاستفادة من خبرة منظمات التنمية الأخرى التي ثبت أنها حققت نتائج باستخدام نهجاً أكثر استباقية وابتكاراً للوصول إلى التنمية الاقتصادية الشاملة عن طريق تمكين المجتمعات الأكثر ضعفاً.

¹⁸ للحصول على ملخص لهذا المشروع، انظر: البنك الدولي، "برنامج تنمية القرى المقترح: مهمة تحديد النطاق". مذكرة، ديسمبر/ كانون الأول 2013.

8-2-6- يمكن الاعتماد في تحقيق التمكين الاقتصادي والاجتماعي للمرأة، بما في ذلك في غزة، على الدروس المستفادة من الوكالات الأخرى (الدعم المالي للحدائق المنزلية بالنسبة للنساء غير الماهرات والحصول على القروض الصغيرة لتأسيس شركات صغيرة وخلق فرص العمل في القطاع الخاص للنساء الماهرات لتقليل الاعتماد على المعونة). وطبقاً للاستراتيجية المتوسطة المدى للأونروا، يمكن أن يؤدي تشغيل المرأة في القطاعات المثمرة اقتصاديًا مثل الزراعة إلى تأثير أعلى نسبيًا على الأمن الغذائي للعائلة.

ركيزة صناعة الثروة

9-2-6- قد تكون هناك حاجة إلى مزيد من التمويل المؤكد لدعم النمو الاقتصادي الشامل كمحرك رئيسي للحد من الفقر وبناء دولة قابلة للحياة. والنمو الاقتصادي الشامل سيؤثر بشكل مباشر على النتائج المحققة من خلال ركيزتي بناء الدولة والفقر والضعف والجوع (PVH).

10-2-6- يجب على وزارة التنمية الدولية البريطانية أن تستكشف الخيارات الخاصة بدعم التدخلات في المسائل المتعلقة بتسجيل الأرض. يعد ذلك من العوامل الحيوية بالنسبة لمعاملات السوق وخدمات الإقراض، مع التسليم بأن 30% فقط من أراضي الضفة الغربية مسجلة حاليًا لدى إدارة تسجيل الأراضي التابعة لوزارة المالية وهي عبارة عن أصول ثابتة. يرتبط تسجيل الأرض أيضًا بحماية حقوق الفلسطينيين في السكن والأرض والملكية.

PART A: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (in English Language)

1. Introduction

- 1.5. In August 2013, GDSI UK was contracted to conduct an External Review of DFID's Palestinian Programme against its Operational Plan for 2011-2015. Over this period DFID will have provided £349 million supporting development and humanitarian assistance for the Palestinian people. The review assessed DFID's overall strategy and provided strategic advice on whether the combination of the current interventions is the most effective in supporting its overall vision and development objectives.
- 1.6. The Review was carried out in two phases by a team of independent consultants between September 2013 and April 2014. The evaluation relied primarily on secondary sources such as existing policy documents and project reports. Interviews were conducted with implementing project actors – mainly the Palestinian Authority (PA) and United Nations (UN) – and stakeholders to complement or clarify existing data. Consultations and interviews took place with DFID teams in the Jerusalem office and London, and briefings by DFID CHASE staff were provided to the team. The team consulted with private sector, academics, civil society and UN representatives.
- 1.7. In support of DFID's transparency policy, a communication strategy is supporting the circulation of the report. One aspect is the translation of the Executive Summary into Arabic. The DFID Evaluation Task Team assists with facilitating publication of the final Review Report and the management response on the DFID website.
- 1.8. DFID's Palestinian Programme's vision, as outlined in the Operational Plan 2011-2015, is to support *the UK Government's objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) by helping build Palestinian Institutions and promoting economic growth, so that any future state will be stable, prosperous, well run and an effective partner for peace with Israel.* DFID's Programme is therefore closely tied to the successful outcome of a future negotiated peace settlement between the PA and the Government of Israel (GoI) that will lead to an envisioned two-state solution.

2. Context

- 2.1. DFID's Palestinian Programme is being implemented in the context of one of the world's longest protracted crisis – Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and Gaza and the resultant conflict between Israel and the Palestinians – and against the backdrop of the 'Arab Spring'. The period covered by this evaluation saw ongoing peace negotiations, ongoing violence and conflict, continued Israeli expropriation of Palestinian land for the construction of the West Bank Barrier/Separation Wall, ongoing settlement expansion, the demolition of Palestinian homes and encampments, and the continuing blockade of Gaza. Palestinians have no control over their own borders and natural resources, and movements of goods and people are severely restricted. The impact of the closure on Gaza since 2007 has meant that more humanitarian assistance is required to meet peoples' basic needs – more than 80 per cent of families are dependent on humanitarian aid,¹⁹ and the number of food-insecure households in Gaza has increased from 44 per cent in

¹⁹ UNOCHA, Statement on Gaza, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, June 2012. <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG%20Valerie%20Amos%20Statement%20on%20Gaza%2013Jun12.pdf>.

2011 to 57 per cent in 2012.²⁰ This percentage is expected to increase significantly in 2014.²¹ Unemployment in the last quarter of 2013 reached a three-year high of 41.5 per cent.²²

- 2.2. In June 2012, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, reiterated this assessment: 'This amounts to a collective punishment of all those living in Gaza and is a denial of basic human rights in contravention of International Law'.²³ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) characterises the situation in the West Bank and Gaza as a '*crisis of human dignity*', where the Palestinian population of over 4 million is denied access to fundamental human rights such as freedom of movement, protection of family life and access to adequate housing, health care, employment and services.²⁴

3. Peace Process and Palestinian Authority

- 3.5. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government (Oslo Accords) was signed in 1993, calling for Israel's phased withdrawal from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the affirmation of the Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority.
- 3.6. In support of the principles of the Oslo Accords international funding was geared toward assisting the PA to establish effective Palestinian institutions with a focus on capacity building, strengthening financial management and accountability, establishing a strong security sector, and providing peace dividends to the Palestinian population.
- 3.7. In the twenty years since the PA was established it has shown, according to a World Bank report,²⁵ *considerable ability and willingness to improve its capacity, as significant recent reforms demonstrate. '(...) institutional attainments of the Palestinian Authority as seen through the reforms and achievement in several domains (...) capacity to fulfil state functions compares to capacity in MENA and other countries, and show that it is often comparable and sometimes superior (...)*. In 2011 the UN, IMF and World Bank assessed that the PA's governmental functions are now sufficient for a functioning state. This assessment was supported by DFID and the European Union (EU): '*The Palestinian Authority has, without doubt, delivered very solid results throughout the central pillars that commonly define statehood. Hence, we conclude that today the Palestinian Authority is prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of a sovereign state.*'²⁶ The PA has also met its obligations to establish a strong security sector, as mentioned by the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO): '*The PA Security Forces (PASF) in the West Bank have demonstrated the capability to fulfil the policing function required of a state, to the extent allowed within the limitations created by the occupation.*'²⁷
- 3.8. These achievements, however, are placed against the background of limitations that signal a deterioration of multiple aspects of Palestinian political development, progress toward Statehood and human security. These include, but are not limited to the following:

²⁰ <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5D9B0A57FAFC791885257C37004F6F14#sthash.5pi0n8Rx.dpuf>

²¹ UNOCHA OPT, Humanitarian Bulletin, February 2014.

²² Ibidem.

²³ UNOCHA, Statement on Gaza, June 2012.

²⁴ <http://www.unoach.org/ocha20122012-13/opt>.

²⁵ World Bank, West Bank and Gaza, Institutional Capacity, July 2011, p.1.

²⁶ European Union Representative Office, donor co-chair of the Governance Strategy Group, Statement on Progress in Governance, report presented to MoPAD, 26 July 2011.

²⁷ Palestinian State-Building: An Achievement at Increased Risk. UNSCO, 2012, p.1.

- a) Despite efforts to reduce its recurrent deficit the PA struggles to meet its financial obligations because budget revenue is less than expected due to lower than expected growth and decreased external funding.
- b) Instead of increased economic integration the Palestinian economy has stagnated because of Israeli domination of the economy, resulting in a disempowered Palestinian private sector and weak economic growth driven by the public sector.
- c) Further segregation between Israeli and Palestinian communities and deepening fragmentation of the Palestinian population between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and into more than 60 semi-isolated blocs in the West Bank.
- d) The Palestinian divide, between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, constrains the Ramallah-based PA from implementing an agenda that could yield sustainable economic growth throughout the OPTs and institution-building in Gaza.²⁸ In April 2014, reconciliation efforts between Hamas and Fateh resulted in both parties signing an agreement to put their differences aside. For the viability of a Palestinian state, and for the Palestinian people as a nation, it is important that both Gaza and the West Bank are unified and are reunited under the PA. Reconciliation between both Gaza and the West Bank will allow for an electoral democratic process, a legislative council and a parliament – steps needed to achieve a democratic and representative process. To ensure a successful resolution to the conflict it is also important that any future government formed is committed to a negotiated peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, successful resolution can only occur if both parties to the conflict fulfil their obligations.
- e) In the twenty years since the signing of the Oslo Accords multiple efforts have been made to restart the peace negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis (*the latest being the ongoing peace brokering efforts by John Kerry*), but an agreement for a just and durable solution to the conflict had not been reached at the time of this report.

4. Programme Overview

4.2. DFID's Palestinian Programme is centred on three intervention pillars:

- a) **Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger (PVH) pillar** – supporting three objectives: 1) Supporting UNRWA to provide basic services to 5.3 million Palestine refugees in the OPTs (42.1% of total population are refugees) and in the region, improving access to education, and engaging with UNRWA at the policy level to support sustainability and efficiency; 2) Addressing humanitarian needs in the area of food security and protecting Housing, Land and Property (HLP); and 3) Addressing root causes of vulnerability and poverty in the OPTs through advocacy work on movement and access, and seeking to hold Israel accountable for its obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The focus is on relief complemented with smaller longer-term interventions. An estimated 46.5% of DFID's budget is allocated to the pillar 'Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability'.²⁹ An estimated 69.3% of this funding is allocated to support UNRWA.
- b) **State-building pillar** – supporting the PA in building effective institutions and delivering basic services such as health and education. The main focus of the strategy is to promote the chances of a viable two-state solution through increasing the performance and

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ According to the calculations of the evaluation, the pillar budget amounts to £154.37 million out of a total of £332.32 million for the Operational Plan 2011-2015.

democratic legitimacy of the moderate Palestinian leadership. DFID's support to the PA is aligned with the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) 2011-2013, focusing on building Palestinian government institutions through administrative and financial reforms, and supporting the justice and security sector.³⁰ DFID committed an estimated £131 million³¹ (or 39%) to the World Bank Service Delivery Grant designed to enable the PA's financial management and thus provide better access to services, support employment and, through the injection of income, contribute to the national/family economic multiplier. The PA's ability to provide employment is important in a context where the private sector is under-developed and unable to provide jobs due to imposed restrictions. The PA is the main provider for services such as health, education, social, legal and security services, and infrastructure.

- c) **Wealth Creation pillar** – supporting sustainable and inclusive economic growth through promoting competitiveness of the Palestinian private sector, and addressing movement and access restrictions impeding private sector development. DFID allocates an estimated 9.5% of its budget to the Wealth Creation pillar. The interventions focus on, among others: pro-poor market development addressing market failures, making markets work for the poor, providing affordable mortgages, improving housing policy, employment in the construction sector, matching grants for business development and supporting effective lobbying efforts of the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR) to ease movement restrictions.

5. Findings and Conclusions

- 5.9. Overall, the DFID Programme in the OPTs presents good Value for Money; it is efficient in delivering the programme, its resources allocation and selection of implementing partners. The latter has a direct influence on the economy of the programme, or the costs and the quality of the inputs under the programme. DFID is well respected within the international community and by line ministries within the PA and the programme is strengthening the prospects for peace through its focus on state-building and poverty alleviation. It has a strong focus on the most vulnerable groups, supporting education and health care for children and promoting access to justice for women. DFID could strengthen equity under its programme by incorporating the less developed geographic areas (such as Area C) more fully. Funding provided to the OPTs makes a significant contribution in strengthening the PA's institutional capability, providing potential building blocks for economic growth and supporting people's capacity to deal with the humanitarian crisis. Based on the review of the results it is evident that DFID's programme is effective and provides lasting results and benefits, despite limited staffing resources for its in-country office considering the programme's size and complexity. DFID could increase its capacity in demonstrating its effectiveness through strengthening analysis of results, demonstrating how outputs contribute to outcomes. The programme has the right mix of interventions and is sufficiently flexible to allow DFID to adjust its programme's interventions depending on changes in the political context.
- 5.10. DFID has contributed significantly to the international community's development priorities to build a Palestinian administration that can deliver services to the population. In 2000, an aid effectiveness study reviewing the years since Oslo concluded: *'Donor support slowed the overall economic decline, contributed to economic growth, and strengthened key institutions*

³⁰ MoPAD, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, General Framework of Preparation of the National Development Plan, 2014-2016, p.4.

³¹ These figures are total budget figures from DFID's 'Development Tracker' website.

*and local capacities. In doing so, donors have contributed to political stability, thus helping to sustain continued Israeli-Palestinian negotiation.*³²

- 5.11. As evidenced in the Review Report, it is the Review team's opinion that DFID is on course to meet the targets set out in its Operational Plan of 2011-2015. It was found that, while data is more easily accessible on achievements against targets and expected outputs, results at the impact and outcome level are more difficult to attribute.³³ As a result, DFID probably does not present its achievements as well as it could. The evaluation methodology was highly dependent on existing secondary resources and interviews with stakeholders, and weak data against outcomes made attribution analysis challenging for the Review team. Collection and analysis of data at the impact and outcome level is an area for DFID and its implementing partners to strengthen. Impact and outcome assessments are mostly done through project or programme level evaluations; for many of the interventions no evaluation reports were yet available, such as for the World Bank managed Trust Fund.
- 5.12. **PVH pillar:** Through the support to UNRWA's General Fund DFID contributes to the Agency's provision of services as a services provider to 5.2 million registered Palestine refugees. Some 155,633 refugees are covered by DFID-supported cash transfer programmes; 30,128 children are supported by DFID in primary education and around 85.9% of pregnant women are attending at least four antenatal care visits at UNRWA health clinics. DFID is the third largest contributor to UNRWA's General Fund and is one of the six donors providing predictable multi-year funding to UNRWA. DFID also plays a leading role in introducing performance incentives funding – which appears well accepted by UNRWA – and has strong engagement with UNRWA on its reform agenda.
- 5.13. The Vulnerability pillar supports UNRWA's core services and General Fund, improving food security, construction of new schools in Gaza, and providing legal assistance and advocacy to improve access and for the lifting of restrictions. As stated appropriately by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) in their September 2013 report: 'DFID, through UNRWA, brings real benefits, notably in the health and education sectors (...) Overall, the services delivered by UNRWA help to ensure that the situation of the Palestine refugees does not add to regional instability. Poverty reduction programmes however, delivered through cash and food transfers, demonstrate only minimal impact'.
- 5.14. **State-building pillar:** DFID's support has contributed significantly to the PA's ability to raise and spend revenues effectively, to deliver basic services and employment. More recently DFID's support has aided the development of Palestinian governance in the security and justice sectors – all priorities defined in DFID's Practice Papers.³⁴ The World Bank managed Service Delivery Grant provides direct budgetary support to the PA while linking this support to specific institutional reforms and improvements in its internal structures. While the PA may have embarked on similar reforms without such support, it would have been severely challenged given the large budget deficits that the Service Delivery Grant supports. The Service Delivery Grant provides, in addition to financial support, technical and capacity strengthening support to the PA in financial and administrative management. Other state-building projects complement the Service Delivery Grant to provide a balanced approach to state-building overall, such as support to civil society to hold the PA accountable and

³² Aid effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza, a study produced by Japan and the World Bank for the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 2000, Executive Summary.

³³ More information and examples of possible indicators are included in the Review Report.

³⁴ DFID, Building peaceful states and societies, a DFID Practice Paper.

strengthen anti-corruption controls.³⁵ While the Service Delivery Grant contributes to the effectiveness of PA institutions and to the performance legitimacy of the PA (one of the two components of DFID's state-building strategy), it is now considered as conditional budget support to the PA to cover part of its budget deficit.

- 5.15. DFID's Operational Plan/State-building pillar has a central government focus. This could be further balanced by providing increased support to local government structures, non-state actors, Palestinian civil society and development NGOs. Supporting development interventions in Area C (60 % of the West Bank) and Jerusalem could be expanded to support a viable Palestinian State and equitable access to services and economic development to all Palestinians.
- 5.16. **Wealth Creation pillar:** The Wealth Creation pillar is the smallest in size financially and in the number of interventions across the three pillars. The focus is on inclusive economic growth through supporting Palestinian private sector development, employment creation and attracting outside investment. Interventions under this pillar have only recently been initiated and therefore analysing their impact is premature.

6. Review Recommendations

- 6.1. The **principal recommendations** are prioritised as follows:
- 6.1.22. The context of the continuing occupation and conflict puts significant constraints and limitations on what can effectively be achieved. British aid to the OPTs remains highly relevant but should not be linked solely to a fixed political agenda or vision.
- 6.1.23. The Review Report recommends a two-pronged approach: the Theory of Change should maintain a strong peace-building and political vision of a two-state solution while at the same time incorporating a development goal of Poverty and Vulnerability Reduction, contributing to an equitable Palestinian society and realization of human rights. Addressing the causes of poverty and vulnerability should be the rationale for allocating DFID's aid budget. A just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should remain the top priority and end goal: the international community, of which Britain is a part, should step up efforts to work with both parties to reach a just solution, but at the same time these efforts need to be complemented with stronger long-term development work.
- 6.1.24. DFID should continue supporting interventions under the three pillars: *No changes should be made on the selection of the pillars but more on the weight of the funding and the approach used for the different interventions.* Budget support to the PA and UNRWA should continue as the two critical services and employment providers in the OPTs. However, conditionalities need to be made around long-term development approaches where possible, supporting an enabling environment for economic growth and democratic legitimacy.
- 6.1.25. Financial allocation under the Wealth Creation pillar should be increased considering the importance of supporting sustainable economic growth for poverty alleviation and revenue for the PA. DFID should be very strategic in developing and implementing an inclusive economic strategy, ensuring that the interventions have an inclusive focus, targeting women and youth and marginalized geographical areas.
- 6.1.26. Conditionalities around support to the PA should be adjusted to reflect the institutional

³⁵ Please see the Phase One Report and the sections on Efficiency and Impact below for these project's results.

progress made by the PA and the expected priority changes in the Palestinian National Development Plan for 2014-16, with an increased focus on economic growth and addressing the social gap in society. Stronger support should be given to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the PA while further consolidating its strengthened performance legitimacy. While performance legitimacy has been strengthened significantly this remains fragile and unequal across sectors and therefore deserves continued attention.

- 6.1.27. DFID contributes to the achievements against the MDGs through its contribution to UNRWA's General Fund and budget support for salaries to the PA – which DFID should consider linking to policy development and implementation in the future. This is the core message of the Report. Conditions linked to budget should remain on performance legitimacy and accountability but at the same time should be made equally conditional on policy development and implementation to close the increasingly widening social gap in Palestinian society: this is in line with the PNDP for 2014-2016. Budget support to the PA should be linked to PA performance in supporting policies and reforms for poverty alleviation, equitable social services delivery, youth and women's economic and social empowerment, economic growth and private sector development.
- 6.1.28. Opportunity exists to expand programmes under the justice and security programme, such as human rights protection and access to justice for women and girls who are victims/survivors of gender-based violence. DFID's programmes should continue combining support for both government and civil society organisations in these areas.
- 6.1.29. There needs to be a better balance between supporting the PA at the central level and developing local government structures. Support to government institutions should be complemented with support to Palestinian non-state actors, including civil society and the media.
- 6.1.30. DFID should strengthen the identification and operationalization of potential linkages between the three intervention pillars. Example: Support under State-building could focus on strengthening line ministries relevant for economic development (such as support to the Ministry of National Economy to develop policy supporting an enabling environment for private sector development), which in turn could support economic growth and the private sector through the Wealth Creation pillar.
- 6.1.31. To support its development objectives DFID should be even more pro-active in using its leverage among other donor countries and support efforts based on International Law to increase diplomatic pressures on Israel to lift the blockade on Gaza and lift obstacles on the movement of goods and people in the OPTs in general. DFID should use its leverage to advocate for respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the lifting of Israeli restrictions that impact negatively on achieving sustainable development outcomes.
- 6.1.32. There needs to be more focus on marginalized communities in Area C, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and Gaza from a human development perspective as well as a state-building perspective. A future independent Palestinian State will not be viable without the ability to develop these areas to the benefit of its citizens. DFID should continue discussions with the FCO in order to undertake joint actions with other international community members and advocate for the removal of restrictions on Palestinians' access to Jerusalem and Area C.
- 6.1.33. Palestinian civil society organisations should be supported to reach out to the more vulnerable communities (such as in Area C, Jerusalem and Gaza) where the PA has limited or no access, in conjunction with the PA/local government. Support to Palestinian civil

society is also critically important to safeguard diversity.

- 6.1.34. Contributions to UNRWA's General Fund should continue under the PVH pillar. DFID should, in coordination with stakeholders such as UNRWA and Palestinian civil society organisations, explore further means of increasing interventions that have a longer-term developmental approach to supporting food security and sustainable livelihoods – with special emphasis on women and youth.
- 6.1.35. DFID should increase interventions that have a longer-term developmental approach to supporting food security and sustainable livelihoods (with special emphasis on women and youth) while maintaining humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable and the ability to respond in cases of significant outbreaks of violence or closures.
- 6.1.36. Interventions under the Wealth Creation pillar should work within a strategic vision of long-term inclusive economic development targeting women, youth and marginalized areas (because of uneven development geographically). Inclusiveness should be defined and measurable performance indicators established. This pillar should work closely with leading think tanks and private sector stakeholders who are genuinely interested in exploring ways for a more inclusive economic growth. The programme should ensure that evidence from its approach of 'inclusive economic growth' can be demonstrated.
- 6.1.37. Interventions to support the protection of Palestinian HLP (Housing, Land and Property) should be expanded and complemented, as DFID is looking to facilitate coordination between PVH and State-building pillars on land registration challenges. HLP rights are cross-cutting to the Operational Plan.
- 6.1.38. DFID should exercise caution to ensure steps taken to implement the Counter-Terrorism Legislation do not contravene International Humanitarian Law (IHL), negatively impact on development interventions or equitable access to international assistance for communities. A more unified approach with European bilateral donors and the EU should be developed.
- 6.1.39. DFID's OPTs Gender Strategy 2013-2015 should be translated into a concrete action plan supported by a results-based M&E strategy. Promoting the prevention of gender-based violence, specifically violence against women and girls, and supporting economic and social empowerment of women and girls should be a priority.
- 6.1.40. Future DFID programming needs to further expand its focus on women and youth. Pilot programmes such as the project implemented around access to justice for women survivors of domestic violence have the potential to be multiplied. These programmes have the capacity to strengthen the connection between justice and security programmes with the general population, supported under the State-building pillar. Future programmes should also create equitable economic opportunities for women and youth, which is a target reflected in the revised logframe for the PNDP.
- 6.1.41. DFID, with its knowledge and experience, should consider leading a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS), not only for UK actors but also for other international actors because every donor has limitations as well as areas of strength to address challenges and support opportunities for peace. The JACS should not result in a theoretical document as often happens with conflict analysis: the end results should be shared practical and operational strategies that will support peace-building within the OPTs and support the MEPP.
- 6.1.42. DFID should review its M&E strategy around the Operational Plan to ensure it is well

positioned to demonstrate results and change at the impact and outcome level. There is currently concern that the indicators are not the most effective for demonstrating the results of the DFID OPTs' office. Outcome statements and responding outcome performance indicators should be developed and confirmed with the main implementing partners.

6.2 **Additional recommendations** by pillar include:

State-building pillar

- 6.2.1. Diversify the programme portfolio to include projects that support local governance and administration, such as the World Bank's Village Development Programme.³⁶
- 6.2.2. In considering revisions to the overall strategy for state-building and peace-building activities, ensure there are direct causal links between projects that intend to support and/or influence the MEPP (supporting the democratic legitimacy of the PA, provision of services at the local level ...). It is the Review team's opinion that support to state-building and peace-building are mutually reinforcing processes aimed at supporting the building of an effective, legitimate, accountable and responsive Palestinian state characterised by a healthy state-society relationship guided by a leadership with the ability to negotiate peace and a just solution to the conflict.
- 6.2.3. The gap between the PA internal structures, the assessment of needs and actual implementation may be addressed by having a finer tuned analysis of how different actors (central and local government, civil society/NGOs, multi- and bi-lateral donors) coordinate activities and align these with the PA/MoPAD.

Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger (PVH) pillar

- 6.2.4. Food security programmes should focus on increasing the income of families in a sustainable manner. The main problem for the population in Gaza is the affordability of basic food items on the market, which is linked to the closure.
- 6.2.5. DFID should encourage and support UNRWA and the PA's Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) to set up a national database – for refugees and non-refugees – to avoid duplications and ensure that the most vulnerable families are targeted for cash transfers and social protection.
- 6.2.6. The PVH pillar should strengthen linkages at policy and/or operational levels with the Wealth Creation and State-building programmes, aiming at supporting economic and social empowerment.
- 6.2.7. DFID should encourage UNRWA to explore how best to utilize the experience of other development organisations which have reportedly achieved results by using more pro-active and innovative approaches to inclusive economic development by empowering the most vulnerable.
- 6.2.8. Economic and social empowerment for women, including in Gaza, could benefit from lessons learned by other agencies (financial support for home gardens for unskilled women, access to micro-credit to set up small businesses, private sector job creation for skilled women to reduce aid dependency). In line with UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy, increased employment of women in economically productive sectors such as agriculture could have a proportionally higher impact on family food security.

³⁶ For a brief on this project, see: World Bank, 'Proposed Village Development Programme: Scoping Mission.' Aide-Memoire, December 2013.

Wealth Creation pillar

- 6.2.9. More assertive funding in support of inclusive economic growth as the main driver for poverty alleviation and viable Statehood is likely to be needed. Economic growth which is inclusive will have a direct impact on results under the State-building and PVH pillars.
- 6.2.10. DFID should explore options for supporting interventions in land registration issues. This is a crucial factor for market transactions and lending services, given that only 30% of land in the West Bank is currently registered with the Land Registration Department in the Ministry of Finance and is hard asset. Land registration is also linked to the protection of HLP rights of Palestinians.

Part B: REVIEW REPORT

1. Introduction

- 1.1. In August 2013, GDSI UK was contracted to conduct an External Review of DFID's Palestinian Programme against its Operational Plan for 2011-2015. Over this period DFID will have provided £349 million supporting development and humanitarian assistance for the Palestinian people. The aim of the Review is to assess DFID's overall strategy and provide DFID with strategic input and guidance on whether the current interventions are the most effective in supporting its overall political vision and development objectives.
- 1.2. The Review was carried out in two phases by a team of independent national and international consultants. Phase 1 concentrated on the development of the overall review framework and Phase 2 focused on the delivery of the evaluation work. Fieldwork was carried out in September 2013 for Stage 1 and in January 2014 for Stage 2. The evaluation relied primarily on secondary sources such as existing policy documents and project reports. Interviews with implementing project actors (mainly PA and UN) and stakeholders were carried out to complement or clarify existing data. Consultations and interviews took place with DFID teams in the Jerusalem office and London, and briefings by DFID CHASE staff were provided to the team. The team consulted with private sector, academics, civil society and UN representatives. Because of time constraints the approach focused on forming an informed opinion using existing project reports and other commissioned evaluation reports. Insufficient time was available to consult with beneficiaries in communities.
- 1.3. DFID's Palestinian Programme's vision, as outlined in the Operational Plan 2011-2015, is to support *the UK Government's objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) by helping build Palestinian Institutions and promoting economic growth, so that any future state will be stable, prosperous, well run and an effective partner for peace with Israel.* DFID's Palestinian Programme is therefore closely tied to the successful outcome of a future negotiated peace settlement between the PA and the Government of Israel (GoI) that will lead to an envisioned two-state solution.
- 1.4. In support of DFID's transparency policy, a communication strategy is supporting the circulation of the report. One aspect is the translation of the Executive Summary into Arabic. The DFID Evaluation Task Team assists with facilitating publication of the final Review Report and the management response on the DFID website.

2. Context

- 2.1. DFID's Palestinian Programme is being implemented in the context of one of the world's longest protracted crisis – Israel's continued occupation of the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and Gaza and the resultant conflict between Israel and the Palestinians – and against the backdrop of the 'Arab Spring'. The period covered by this evaluation saw ongoing negotiations, ongoing violence and conflict, continued Israeli expropriation of Palestinian land for the construction of the West Bank Barrier/Separation Wall, ongoing settlement expansion, the demolition of Palestinian homes and encampments, and the continuing blockade of Gaza. Palestinians have no control over their own borders and natural resources, and movements of goods and people are severely restricted. The impact of the closure on Gaza since 2007 has meant that more humanitarian assistance is required to meet peoples' basic needs – more

than 80 per cent of families are dependent on humanitarian aid,³⁷ the number of food-insecure households in Gaza has increased from 44 per cent in 2011 to 57 per cent in 2012.³⁸ This percentage is expected to increase significantly in 2014.³⁹ Unemployment in the last quarter of 2013 reached a three-year high of 41.5 per cent.⁴⁰

- 2.2. In June 2012 the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, reiterated this assessment: 'This amounts to a collective punishment of all those living in Gaza and is a denial of basic human rights in contravention of International Law'.⁴¹
- 2.3. The Israeli imposed blockade on the Gaza Strip from 2007 has resulted in Gazan residents facing severe shortages in basic needs, in critical healthcare equipment and medicines. The unemployment rate is 35.5% and shortages of fuel and electricity mean only a quarter of households receive running water for about two hours per day. Over 90% of the water extracted from the Gaza aquifer is unsafe for human consumption and some 90 million litres of untreated or partially treated sewage are dumped into the sea off the Gaza coast each day, creating public health hazards.
- 2.4. OCHA characterises the situation in the West Bank and Gaza as a '*crisis of human dignity*', where the Palestinian population of over 4 million is denied access to fundamental human rights such as freedom of movement, protection of family life, and access to adequate housing, health care, employment and services.
- 2.5. In the case of the sporadic effects of incursions or bombardments, the consequences for the civilian population range from physical injury and loss of life to destruction of homes, property and livelihoods, forced displacement and psychological trauma. Other factors contributing to the increased poverty include rising global food prices (which have an adverse effect due to high dependence on imported food) and harsh cyclical climatic conditions.⁴²

3. Peace Process and Palestinian Authority

- 3.1. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government (Oslo Accords) was signed in 1993 calling for Israel's withdrawal from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and the affirmation of the Palestinian right of self-government within those areas through the creation of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. Palestinian rule was to last for a five-year interim period during which 'permanent status negotiations' would commence. The Oslo process led to the development of an international consensus on the desirability of a two-state solution through a step-by-step process. Any subsequent peace initiatives built on the principles of the Oslo Accords.
- 3.2. In support of the principles of the Oslo Accords international funding was geared toward assisting the PA to establish effective Palestinian institutions with a focus on capacity building, strengthening financial management and accountability, establishing a strong security sector, and providing peace dividends to the Palestinian population.

³⁷ UNOCHA, Statement on Gaza, Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, June 2012. <https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/USG%20Valerie%20Amos%20Statement%20on%20Gaza%2013Jun12.pdf>.

³⁸ <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5D9B0A57FAFC791885257C37004F6F14#sthash.5pi0n8Rx.dpuf>.

³⁹ UNOCHA OPT, Humanitarian Bulletin, February 2014.

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

⁴¹ UNOCHA, Statement on Gaza, June 2012.

⁴² <http://www.unocha.org/ocha2012-13/opt>.

- 3.3. The PA was established twenty years ago and has shown, according to a World Bank report,⁴³ *considerable ability and willingness to improve its capacity, as significant recent reforms demonstrate. '(...) institutional attainments of the Palestinian Authority as seen through the reforms and achievement in several domains (...) capacity to fulfil state functions compares to capacity in MENA and other countries, and show that it is often comparable and sometimes superior (...)'*. In 2011 the UN, IMF and World Bank assessed that the PA's governmental functions are now sufficient for a functioning state. This assessment was supported by DFID and the European Union (EU): *'The Palestinian Authority has, without doubt, delivered very solid results throughout the central pillars that commonly define statehood. Hence, we conclude that today the Palestinian Authority is prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of a sovereign state.'*⁴⁴
- 3.4. The PA has met its obligations to establish a strong security sector as mentioned by UNSCO: *'The PA Security Forces (PASF) in the West Bank have demonstrated the capability to fulfil the policing function required of a state, to the extent allowed within the limitations created by the occupation'*.⁴⁵
- 3.5. However, these achievements need to be placed against the background of a number of limitations that signal a deterioration of multiple aspects of Palestinian political development, progress toward Statehood and human security. These include, but are not limited to:
- a. Rather than the increased economic integration between Israelis and Palestinians envisaged by the Oslo Accords, the reality since 1993 has been the domination of the Palestinian economy by Israel, a disempowered Palestinian private sector, further segregation between Israeli and Palestinian communities, and deepening fragmentation of the Palestinian population between Gaza and the West Bank and into more than 60 semi-isolated blocs in the West Bank.
 - b. Financial sustainability of the PA is under threat. The PA has managed to reduce its recurrent deficit significantly, from 24% of the GDP in 2009 to 13% in 2011. Despite these efforts the PA struggles to meet its financial obligations because budget revenue is less than expected due to lower than expected growth and decreased external funding. The PA has accumulated approximately US\$ 540 million in arrears.⁴⁶ To balance its books the PA is dependent on aid, forming 40% its budget.
 - c. The Palestinian divide, between the West Bank and Gaza, constrains the PA from implementing an agenda that could yield sustainable economic growth throughout the OPTs and institution building in Gaza.⁴⁷ It is a fractured agenda and so overall state-building, amongst other issues, is confined to specific areas, like institution building. The PA is less able to effectively pursue legitimacy. In the West Bank, internal conflicts within the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the lack of tangible successes with Israel reduce its legitimacy and accountability in Gaza where the PA has little governmental authority. This prevents legislative reforms geared for broader issues of state-building, e.g. legitimacy, democracy and representation, from coming to fruition.
 - d. In April 2014, reconciliation efforts between Hamas and Fateh resulted in both parties signing an agreement to put their differences aside. For the viability of a Palestinian

⁴³ World Bank, West Bank and Gaza, Institutional Capacity, July 2011, p.1.

⁴⁴ European Union Representative Office, donor co-chair of the Governance Strategy Group, Statement on Progress in Governance, report presented to MoPAD, 26 July 2011.

⁴⁵ Palestinian State-Building: An Achievement at Increased Risk. UNSCO, 2012, p.1.

⁴⁶ UNSCO, 2012, p.iii.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

state and for the Palestinian people as a nation it is important that both Gaza and the West Bank are unified and are reunited under a single PA. Reconciliation between both Gaza and the West Bank will allow for an electoral democratic process, a legislative council and a parliament – steps needed to achieve a democratic and representative process. To ensure a successful resolution to the conflict it is important that both parties comply with and implement any agreements reached under a negotiated peace process and for the occupying party to end the occupation and comply with International Law.

- e. There are also direct economic consequences, with annual growth dropping to less than 5.9% in 2012. This has raised concerns for the sustainability of the growth process and limitations to public sector driven growth. High growth between 2006 and 2011 was partly fuelled by the high flow of aid from the international donor community. Between 2006 and 2010, annual aid to the PNA was never lower than \$1 billion. In 2008 it reached a peak of nearly \$2 billion (more than 30% of that year's GDP). In 2011, as the international financial crisis affected donors' budgets, aid dropped to less than \$700 million – down from \$1.1 billion in 2010, and less than half the \$1.4 billion in 2009. As a consequence, the PNA increasingly struggled to meet its financial obligations while GDP growth halved to 5.9% by the end of 2012.⁴⁸
- f. During the twenty years since the signing of the Oslo Accords multiple efforts have been made to restart the peace negotiations (*the latest being the ongoing peace brokering efforts by John Kerry*) between the Palestinians and Israel, but no agreement has yet been reached for a just and durable solution to the conflict.

4. Programme Overview

4.1. DFID's Palestinian Programme is centred on three intervention pillars:

- a. PVH pillar – supporting three objectives: 1) Supporting UNRWA to provide basic services to 5.3 million Palestine refugees in all the OPTs and in the region (through the General Fund – GF), improving access to education, engaging with UNRWA at the policy level to support sustainability and efficiency; 2) Addressing humanitarian needs in the area of food security and protecting Housing, Land and Property (HLP) rights through the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC); and 3) Addressing root causes of vulnerability and poverty in the OPTs through advocacy work on movement and access restrictions, and seeking to hold Israel accountable for its obligations under IHL. The focus is on relief complemented with some smaller longer-term interventions. An estimated 46.5% of DFID's budget is allocated to the PVH pillar,⁴⁹ and an estimated 69.3% of this funding is allocated to support UNRWA.
- b. State-building pillar – supporting the PA in building effective institutions and delivering basic services such as health and education. The main focus and aim of the strategy is to promote the chances of a viable two-state solution through maintaining the stability of the PA and increasing the legitimacy of a moderate Palestinian leadership in two ways: a) performance legitimacy, and b) democratic legitimacy. DFID's support to the PA during the review period was aligned with the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) 2011-2013, which continued to focus on building Palestinian government institutions through

⁴⁸ The Portland Trust. Beyond Aid: A Palestinian Private Sector Initiative for Investment, Growth and Employment, 2013, p.8-9.

⁴⁹ According to the calculations of the evaluation, the pillar budget amounts to £154.37 million out of a total of £332.32 million for the Operational Plan 2011-2015.

administrative and financial reforms and supporting the justice and security sector.⁵⁰ Building effective Palestinian government institutions was a priority laid out in the 1993 Oslo Agreement. DFID allocates an estimated 44% of its budget to state-building, with 85% channelled through the World Bank managed Service Delivery Grant designed to enable the PA's control of its financial management and thus its ability to provide improved access to services.⁵¹

c. Wealth Creation pillar – Under this pillar DFID supports sustainable and inclusive economic growth through promoting competitiveness of the Palestinian private sector and addressing movement and access restrictions impeding private sector development. DFID allocates an estimated 9.5% of its budget to the Wealth Creation pillar. The interventions focus on, among others; pro-poor market development addressing market failures, making markets work for the poor, providing affordable mortgages, improving housing policy, employment in the construction sector, matching grants for business development and supporting effective lobbying efforts of the OQR to ease movement restrictions.

- 4.2. The vision for DFID in its Theory of Change is '*A viable two-state solution*', which underpins the Operational Plan, and peace-building and state-building are at the heart of DFID's Programme in the OPTs. However, the context in which DFID operates puts significant constraints and limitations on what can effectively be achieved.
- 4.3. The Review Report recommends a two-pronged approach for the Theory of Change (ToC): 1) A political vision of a two-state solution; and 2) A development goal of Increased Resilience, and Poverty and Vulnerability Reduction. A just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should remain the top priority and end goal, and the international community, of which the UK is a part, should step up efforts to work with both parties to reach a just solution. Addressing the causes of poverty and vulnerability should be the rationale for allocating DFID's aid budget.
- 4.4. The ToC should be supported by a 'developmental' vision, which can be impacted (positively or negatively) by the political context. The projects implemented under the three intervention pillars are 95% developmental projects in reality. As aid cannot be held accountable for achieving a political vision over which it has no direct control, 95% of the development projects should aim to achieve clear impact and outcomes against which it can be held accountable. Clear impact and outcome statements (limited in number) will enable DFID to conduct monitoring and evaluations that will provide performance data for assessing future planning.
- 4.5. Increased economic hardship and numbers of people living in poverty and deep poverty will ultimately lead to escalating unrest in the OPTs and will contribute to the region's instability. A development agenda that focuses on closing the social gap through inclusive economic growth will be in direct support of peace negotiations. As long as there is an opportunity for a negotiated peace and both sides continue to work on arriving at just solutions to the conflict then the international community should support these efforts. The alternative is violence and open-ended conflict with few scenarios in-between.

⁵⁰ MoPAD, Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development, General Framework of Preparation of the National Development Plan, 2014-2016, p.4.

⁵¹ These figures are total budget figures from DFID's 'Development Tracker' website.

5. Review Objective

- 5.1. The overarching objective of evaluation was to review DFID's Operational Plan (OP) at the higher strategic level and assess the Theory of Change that underpins it; in particular, the interactions between the three pillars and the mix of activities. Findings and recommendations will be used to inform the 2014-15 programming and the next OP.

6. Review Methodology

- 6.1. Stage 1 established the scope of DFID's Palestinian programme, including identification and analysis of documentary evidence, identifying a baseline of results achieved so far, developing a methodology for the full Review process that would take place during Stage 2, and confirming the evaluation questions with DFID. Short preliminary visits were made in August 2013 to London, and in early September 2013 to Jerusalem. The Stage 1 report was submitted to DFID in October 2013.
- 6.2. In line with DFID's evaluation policy, the DFID Middle East North Africa Department (MENAD) strategy and the OECD DAC evaluation principles, the evaluation centred on a set of evaluation questions (EQ) (see Annex 7.1; 7.2). An evaluation framework was prepared as a key evaluation tool during Stage 2 (see Annex 7.3). Reference documents consulted included the State-building and Peace-building Framework, Conflict Sensitivity Review guidance, An Integrated Approach to Building Peaceful States, and Societies and the Palestinian Programme Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic.
- 6.3. The fieldwork for Stage 2 took place in January 2014, followed by synthesis and Review Report preparation. The team was able to consult with the DFID teams in Jerusalem and London, and meet with key PA institutions, key donors and other relevant international or local stakeholders and observers. As the evaluation focused on a high level assessment of DFID's overall strategy and combination of pillars, it relied primarily on secondary sources such as existing policy documents and reports. Interviews with implementing actors of the projects funded under the Programme were carried out only where necessary to complement or clarify existing data. The heavy reliance on existing documentary evidence did not always allow for a complete triangulation of findings and evidence. However, the Review team was able to achieve an informed opinion against the evaluation questions and meet the objective of the Review.
- 6.4. Stage 2 Review team consisted of 5 team members, as listed below. Three assumed ownership over separate pillars and were supported by the Technical Director and the Team Leader:
 - Danil Samoilenko, Technical Director (Quality Assurance)
 - Martine Van de Velde, Team Leader (overall steering of the team, DFID debriefing, writing of the evaluation report, identification of possible programme gaps, civil society, review work in Gaza, contextual analysis, state-building, peace-building and Middle East Peace Process)
 - Michel Vanbruaene, Vulnerability pillar lead (focus on UNRWA, food security, education, legal aid, human rights, gender and other cross-cutting issues)
 - Dorian LaGuardia White, State-building pillar lead (support to the Palestinian Authority, governance, World Bank Trust Fund, financial management)
 - Muhannad Sandouka, Wealth Creation pillar and Area C lead

7. Review Findings

7.1. Relevance

EQ1 - Did the Operational Plan and Theory of Change help DFID to demonstrate its development results and contribution to the long-term vision of the Palestinian Programme, i.e. the two-state solution? Was this approach sufficiently flexible to allow change in light of changed political circumstances?

7.1.1. DFID's key underlying assumption is that improvements in the delivery of services and the financial sustainability of the OPTs will enhance the PA's case for Statehood. The Programme has a fair mix of programmatic elements that support these expected results. At the same time, the Service Delivery Grant may bind DFID into creating a level of dependency within the PA that could contribute in the future to a deterioration in related reforms and in service delivery overall. There may be opportunities to mitigate these inherent risks by providing more programmatic support to civil society and local government initiatives that encourage closer coordination and collaboration between these organisations and central government entities (see paragraph 7.2).

Note: A full list of all the individual projects implemented under each pillar is attached as Annex 7.6.

7.1.2. DFID Palestinian Programme: The Programme is not limited to supporting the geographical areas of the West Bank and Gaza, or limited to supporting the PA as it includes DFID's wider assistance to Palestinian refugees in the region. Financial support to the refugees is channelled through UNRWA, the UN refugee agency mandated to provide basic education, health and relief, social services and humanitarian assistance to Palestine refugees in its area of operations. There is an additional project under the State-building pillar which reflects the broader character of the Programme. DFID provides support to the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) in empowering the Palestinian leadership for effective negotiations with Israel – which impacts on the refugee diaspora – and for engagement with the international community.

7.1.3. The OP illustrates well the vision of the Programme, how the Programme will be delivered and the resources available. DFID is very transparent about resources allocation and delivery and provides information on efficiency savings and how it intends to deliver Value for Money (VfM). Headline results in the OP are closely aligned with Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets and in line with DFID's commitment to being a global leader on transparency and achieving MDGs.

7.1.4. Areas for strengthening in the OP include defining expected results to be achieved or contributed to and the selection of performance indicators. The current performance indicators are mainly quantitative and are not in support of the long-term vision of the programme or the objectives of the different pillar strategies. Improved selection of performance indicators will strengthen the reporting of stakeholders and reporting of results to the Palestinian and British public.

For each pillar the selected performance indicators should be closely linked to the outcome and strategy of the pillar. Performance indicators should allow for aggregation of results and combine the results of the different interventions under each pillar.

While not within the scope of the review a few examples of changed indicators have been included in the report.

PVH pillar: Indicators are poorly relevant to crucial UNRWA reforms towards financial sustainability or poverty alleviation.

- *To what extent did DFID's interventions contribute to reducing the number of people living below the poverty line (against baseline)?*
- % of vulnerable (below poverty level) households covered by DFID-funded cash transfers, which have been included in inclusive economic development programmes;
- Sustainable increase in income for women accessing sustainable income generating and livelihood opportunities;
- Improved access for families to diversified livelihood strategies;
- % of students (M/F) finding long-term employment opportunities after completion of the vocational training programme;
- Reduced incidence of gender-based violence;
- % of refugee families moving from dependency on cash transfers to be self-reliant through access to a sustainable income-generating opportunity.

State-building pillar: There are indicators that link the PA's financial sustainability to the World Bank's performance matrix for the Trust Fund as well as to DFID performance tranche indicators. Indicators on the PA's democratic accountability are in the performance tranche matrix, which is assessed annually by DFID OPTs.

There are no direct indicators for how state-building projects support overall legitimacy, democracy and sustainability. Indicators for these should be included and whatever evidence is available should be assessed to identify opportunities for how these programmatic elements can better support state-building as a whole. While more aligned with outcome indicators these are, after all, the primary goals. If there are no strong evidentiary links between output indicators and broader impact/outcome indicators it will remain unclear how such projects support state-building.

Institutional strengthening of the PA has been achieved and can be attributed to the support of donors such as DFID. This is an area in which the PA has achieved significant sustainability. For the next phase of the OP it will be important to re-focus the results DFID is expecting from its state-building support. Some other indicators DFID may want to consider include:

- *To what extent did the programme contribute to supporting an enabling environment for peace-building?*
- Public service efficiency reforms that enabled X per cent savings annually and that were re-distributed towards maintaining public services;
- Reforms that are judged as generally effective by a mix of civil society, NGOs and other public actors. While such judgements should not be binding their opinions should be actively sought;
- PA agrees to X+ number of policy recommendations from the World Bank and makes tangible progress towards their implementation.

Wealth Creation pillar: Performance indicator is the number of enterprises each year with improved performances in sales. There are no indicators linked to employment or 'inclusive growth'. For the PMDP the logframe is currently being redeveloped and will have impact and outcome indicators included. Possible indicators for wealth creation are:

- *To what extent did the projects impact on improved employment?*
- Number, level and duration of new jobs created for men, women, youth and people with disabilities in different regions in the West Bank and Gaza;
- Number of new small and medium-sized enterprises established or expanded under the Wealth Creation programme.

7.1.5. Therefore, while the OP is a solid strategy that presents the different aspects of the Programme, it also highlights the challenges of being able to demonstrate significant changes or results linked to the Programme's strategic priorities and vision.

7.1.6. The lack of adequate indicators and related evidence for all aspects of the OP strategy prevents DFID from adequately assessing the effectiveness and impact of its pillars and individual projects. It is the Review team's opinion that by not selecting better indicators DFID is under-presenting the results and the contributions it has made and continues to make. Improved indicator selection will assist DFID in using M&E data for planning purposes and for developing future operational plans.

7.1.7. Theory of Change: The ToC included in the TORs of the Review (see Annex 7.1) was a solid effort by DFID staff to bring together all the different interventions being implemented under the three pillars and to demonstrate how these contribute to the overall vision of the Programme. The ToC does illustrate the breadth of DFID's programmes and is underpinned by three higher level objectives:

- People live with dignity / poverty reduction
- Capable and effective Palestinian institutions
- Economic Growth

7.1.8. The ToC could be strengthened by complementing the 'political vision' with a 'developmental' goal, which can be impacted (positively and negatively) by the political context. The overall vision of the OP – *support to a two-state solution through a negotiated peace process* – should remain the same but a developmental goal focused on 'Reduction of Poverty and Vulnerability' should be introduced. Achievements and progress against the developmental goal will support DFID in achieving its long-term vision of a two-state solution. In the current ToC '*Reduced poverty and vulnerability*' is included but its position in relation to the political vision or the objectives of the different pillars is not clear. A proposed revised TOC is included in Annex 7.5 and further detail is provided in section 4.9.

7.1.9. The Programme has the right combination of pillars and objectives and makes sense as a response to the political context and development needs. The three pillars – and the wide range of activities within each of them – appear flexible in the case of changes and in case there is a need to reinforce one or another. This design of the pillars is likely to be useful should, for example, the peace negotiations succeed (strengthening/adapting State-building and Wealth Creation) or fail (strengthening the PVH or Vulnerability pillar), without discarding the set-up as a whole.

7.1.10. This Review concludes that the combination of the pillars and the interventions is the right one taking into consideration the priorities of the PA and Her Majesty's Government (HMG). However, the weight in effort and financial support of the different programme interventions under each pillar may have to shift in the coming years depending on the outcome of the current peace negotiations.

7.1.11. The different strategies and programmes implemented in support of each pillar were appropriate when taking the context and resources into consideration and by focusing on supporting the PA in achieving the development objectives outlined in the PNDP of 2011-2013. The OP could be strengthened to better capture the array of developmental and political results achieved through various programmes and thereby become more flexible and adaptive to changing political situations.

EQ2 - Does the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners in DFID's Palestinian Programme support the UK Government's objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as outlined under the vision statement of the Operational Plan?

7.1.12. In the framework of the long-term vision of the Palestinian Programme (two-state solution), the OP vision '*reduced poverty and vulnerability*' aims at supporting the PA strategy and stated priorities. However, after promising initial progress under the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) 2008-2010 and the design of the PNDP 2011-2013, governance and economic development processes have slowed down.⁵² Unemployment – particularly amongst youth – has increased again and poverty is still widespread in the OPTs. Quality of, and access to, health and education are also of concern. For as long as the Israeli occupation persists and Gaza is under a blockade, one of the three MDGs that were targeted as OP priorities for the State-building and Vulnerability pillars will be under threat (MDG 1: 'to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger'). While achievements under MDG 2 ('to achieve universal primary education') are within acceptable standards (94.5% for boys and 95.2% for girls) these will become increasingly under threat with a deteriorating economic climate. DFID contributes to the achievements against the MDGs through its contribution to UNRWA's General Fund and budget support for salaries to the PA – which DFID should consider linking to policy development and implementation in the future. This is the core message of the report. Conditions linked to budget should remain on performance legitimacy and accountability but at the same time should be made equally conditional on policy development and implementation to close the increasingly widening social gap in Palestinian society. This is in line with the PNDP for 2014-2016.

7.1.13. The situation is particularly critical in Gaza and for those living in Area C of the West Bank, due to various restrictions imposed by the Israeli authorities.

7.1.14. The OP strategic priorities focus in particular on PA support through the World Bank managed Service Delivery Grant (£123 million) and UNRWA's core services delivery (£107 million). In addition, other state-building projects support the budget preparation cycle, revenue collection and management, and overall business process efficiencies (Palestinian Governance Facility – PGF). These two priorities are critical for strengthening the Palestinian positions within the MEPP. If the PA is unable to deliver primary services and if its overall legitimacy deteriorates even further, it will be viewed as less of a legitimate representative in the MEPP. This would, inevitably, strengthen other political actors, e.g. Hamas. DFID's

⁵² http://www.mopad.pna.ps/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=313&Itemid=142&hideNav=true

support to the budget and technical support through the Trust Fund supports the PA in being an effective partner to deliver peace obligations. DFID's support to UNRWA is a direct link with the MEPP. UNRWA represents Palestine refugees' rights pending a political solution and its support to the refugees mitigates the worst effects of the crisis on the most vulnerable people, thus contributing to reduced tension and conflict.

- 7.1.15. DFID's interventions have indirect links to the MEPP in how they either increase governance and administrative and financial functions or in how they, for better or worse, position DFID as an actor in the MEPP to promote stability and help prevent violence in the OPTs. This is illustrated in the Service Delivery Grant, which is designed to enable the PA to continue delivering services, thus maintaining 'public support for state-building, non-violence and a negotiated Two-State Solution'. However, as mentioned above, the actual evidentiary links between this and related state-building support and the PLO's capacity to be an effective and legitimate actor in the MEPP is unclear. There needs to be a strengthening of the evidentiary links between output and outcome indicators related to state-building. Most of the indicators at the output level are discrete and quantifiable while those at the impact/outcome level are sufficiently vague to prevent any adequate assessment. DFID should be clearer in exactly how their projects position the PLO, the PA, other actors and DFID itself in the MEPP. At the moment, the framework for collecting and analysing any such evidence is insufficient.
- 7.1.16. There could be a direct and deleterious impact on this goal if DFID ceased support, however, for the Service Delivery Grant. It could weaken the PA, certainly in the short-term, and force it to cease the delivery of key services and/or to seek other partners who could fill this budget gap, both of which would have a knock-on impact on the MEPP.
- 7.1.17. The Service Delivery Grant, amongst others, illustrates that while DFID has a range of state-building activities their direct role to the MEPP is often unspecified (see above 4.1.17). However, providing services to the population will not automatically mean that the Palestinian public will support the PLO in its position at the negotiations table.
- 7.1.18. To help create an economically viable and stable Palestinian state living side by side with a secure Israel is a UK Government foreign policy priority whilst economic growth as the primary driver of poverty reduction is at the heart of DFID's development agenda. The Wealth Creation pillar is supporting the State-building and PVH pillars to promote state-building and the wider prospects for peace by increasing fiscal sustainability and reducing unemployment and poverty. It contributes to the overall operational objective of the Programme – an economically viable and independent Palestinian state through a successful peace process with Israel.
- 7.1.19. By facilitating market system development, catalysing more private sector investment vis-à-vis matching grants and deepening private sector links, PMDP is supporting the private sector to lead economic growth in the OPTs and reduce reliance on aid. Affordable housing is a fundamental component of social infrastructure. Supporting an efficient and stable mortgage industry via the AMAL project aims to facilitate construction sector growth and job creation. Through working with the OQR to ease Israeli restrictions on movement of people and goods, DFID contributes to a better business environment and increased trade.
- 7.1.20. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth could be considered as a long-term outcome for both poverty alleviation or/and a viable Palestinian state. Private sector competitiveness could be a precursor for economic growth yet will not be fully inclusive unless it is pro-poor,

and gender and youth mainstreamed. The extent of inclusiveness must be clearly reflected in result chains to enable measurement of attribution of private sector support programmes at output and outcome levels. Greater casual chain link is desirable between input, output, outcome and impact levels for each intervention.

EQ 3 - Does DFID's Palestinian Programme (mix of pillars, programmes, partners) effectively respond to the strategic objectives of the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) 2011-2013? Are there currently any development priorities that are not sufficiently responded to by the international development community and may threaten a key aspect of Palestinian autonomy?


7.1.21. The PVH programmes are appropriately targeting priorities, considering that other donors are already aiming at contiguous key issues such as social protection (PA) or water and sanitation in Gaza (EU). To the exception of UNRWA's general support to refugees, they are however more responsive than proactive and should further promote innovative solutions, e.g. inclusive economic empowerment targeting women and youth.

7.1.22. Equitable access to justice – which includes the underlying issue of rights against demolitions and restrictions – appears as a cross-cutting issue throughout the four priorities of the Palestinian national policy agenda, i.e. governance, social, economy and infrastructure. The legal assistance programme is therefore completely relevant to the PNDP, whereas the activities implemented by UNRWA (education, job creation in Gaza, general support to core services) are recognised in the PNDP, but are also considered as a 'parallel process' (*because of the refugee focus*).

7.1.23. In regards to State-building, DFID's Programme is sufficiently aligned with the PNDP, particularly given the PNDP's broader national policy goals for governance, social, economy, infrastructure, and fiscal frameworks, but also in specific sector strategies.⁵³

7.1.24. The PNDP has seven sector strategies related to governance, and DFID's Programme addresses most of these.

The majority of actual budget is committed to the Service Delivery Grant – if this is removed then there is a more equal spread across PNDP strategies. The graph on the right demonstrates this mix. It includes the budget amount for each project and what percentage of this can be attributed to each strategic area. While the correlation between DFID programmes and these PA strategies is not always direct, this does represent a fair demonstration of how DFID's programme is aligned to the PA strategies.



⁵³ Palestinian National Authority, 'National Development Plan 2011-2013: Establishing the State, Building Our Future', April 2011.

- 7.1.25. **Local governance represents a significant gap in DFID's support of Palestinian autonomy.** While the links between this level of state-building and actual Palestinian autonomy is difficult to estimate, DFID's portfolio seems heavily focused toward state-building at the PA central level. There are opportunities to expand the programmatic mix to include local councils and municipalities. This represents both a risk, given the PA's precarious position in the current political context, and an opportunity, given the roles of local councils at community level. While the PA does provide direct services at the local level (e.g. education and health) it is a missed opportunity to not provide more direct support to local government entities that also provide services (e.g. infrastructure, environmental health). Their success will not only ensure better support to Palestinians, particularly in rural areas, but could also support legitimacy for government overall. There is an increased interest among other donors to support local government and provide services to people through municipalities. Donors and actors such as the World Bank and the UN should work with the PA to ensure that support at the local level is coordinated within a development agenda for the OPTs.
- 7.1.26. **Wealth Creation pillar** responds to the first three strategic objectives in the PNDP 2011-2013: to ensure a positive investment environment in Palestine, to enhance the competitiveness of Palestinian products and services, and to promote economic integration and access to external markets. Moreover, in ensuring adequate, safe and affordable housing, AMAL is responding to the PNDP's infrastructure priority of 'increasing home ownership and addressing the housing needs of a rising population will be a major priority for the Government for many years to come'. Provision of new and more affordable housing across the country presents major challenges requiring significant public and private investment, and legal and financial sector reform.
- 7.1.27. In addressing economic constraints the Programme will work to create 1,500 new jobs, via PMDP, in at least 480 enterprises to improve their competitiveness and enable them to enter more than 350 new markets and develop/improve 250 products.
- 7.1.28. DFID supports the work of the OQR to improve the business environment and devise a comprehensive economic development plan. The OQR works on a wide range of enablers to support the private sector, including lobbying to remove various restrictions on movement and access and adopting accountable visa application procedures for investors in the OPTs.

7.2. Effectiveness

- 7.2.1. Considering the overall constraints of the Palestinian context – ongoing Israeli occupation and restrictions, Palestinian political divisions, global economic crisis impacting on aid budgets – the effectiveness of the programme so far has been positive. Where data is available, Dashboard indicators show that results are either 'on track' or 'over-achieving' – to the partial exception of the health sector. However, Dashboard indicators are quantitative rather than qualitative and some of them are poorly suited to the task of reviewing progress. A more detailed analysis is therefore provided below.

EQ 4 - To what extent have the objectives of DFID's Palestinian Programme been met? Does this suggest that progress is on course, in particular regarding legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority leadership, economic growth and poverty reduction?

- 7.2.2. **PVH pillar:** DFID's Dashboard provides good indications on progress, which are shown either as 'on track' (legal assistance, education and health by UNRWA) or 'overachieving'

(UVP by WFP, JCP by UNRWA). Only the antenatal visits component of UNRWA's health programme is indicated as 'off track'. However, some of these overall figures (jointly provided for the PA state-building grant and the general support to UNRWA) do not accurately reflect all the activities funded under the Palestinian Programme. Their different delivery modalities and indicators are sometimes not relevant, such as numbers of immunised children, births delivered with the assistance of nurses, or antenatal visits. Updates of the Programme's results for 2013 are scheduled to take place after the submission of the present report.

- 7.2.3. DFID has followed two different but complementary areas of intervention for the UNRWA general support programme: the funding of services with expected annual results,⁵⁴ and policy leverage to implement sectoral reforms ('Organisational Development' – OD) and improve efficiency and effectiveness of health, education and relief and social services. The ultimate objective is to improve UNRWA's financial stability to achieve sustainable services delivery for refugees.
- 7.2.4. The UNRWA 2011 Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) has found a sharp improvement in financial management systems since 2009, but the Agency has also identified a number of weaknesses and a significant scope for improvement on results and efficiency. The OD plan (completed in 2011) has accordingly focused on four levels of change: programme management, human resource management, leadership and management, and organisational processes and systems. The next stage of UNRWA reforms ('Sustaining Change') focuses on delivery in the education, health, and relief and social services sectors. DFID will support UNRWA in addressing these weaknesses through management response to FRA recommendations, the 'Results Compact' (linking a tranche of payments to progress) and lobbying via the UNRWA Advisory Commission. The next fiduciary risk review is due in 2015.
- 7.2.5. Whilst the above reform objectives are extremely valid, these are not adequately reflected in the impact and outcomes indicators of the Programme's ToC and logframe – which have been defined by UNRWA. There is a rather poor level of relevance between UNRWA's ambitious stated impact of 'long, healthy and dignified lives for Palestine refugees' and the impact indicators of 'Infant mortality rate' (also used in the state-building grant) and 'Percentage of registered refugees who receive social assistance from UNRWA'. Neither the impact objective nor some of the outcomes ('decent standard of living', 'human rights enjoyed to the fullest') can possibly be reached within the limits of the present Programme and under the current political climate. Similarly, some outcome indicators in the Programme logframe ('Percentage of children under 1 years that are underweight') appear inadequate to measure fully the achievements of UNRWA services delivery (what about stunted older children?). Only the last outcome indicator ('Average daily medical consultations per doctor'), which is related to the envisaged health reform (Family Health Team), can provide useful indications regarding progress in cost-effectiveness and financial sustainability. The scope of human rights (see 4.6) covered by the Programme appears restricted to socio-economic rights, as civil and political rights are not directly relevant to the UNRWA service delivery. However, whereas the rights to education and health are measured to a certain extent, it is doubtful that the amounts of cash transfers can adequately reflect progress in terms of right to housing, HLP, or right to an adequate standard of living.

⁵⁴ A minimum of 36,000 children educated; 6,000 pregnant women attending four ante-natal visits; 20,000 households supported by cash-transfers.

- 7.2.6. As part of the Results Compact, UNRWA produced an evaluation plan in October 2013 that will focus in the next three years on corporate management tools, the impact of education and health reforms, as well as UNRWA's Medium Term and Poverty Reduction Strategies. These sector level plans are the focus of current reforms for UNRWA.
- 7.2.7. In the food security programme, there are greater than expected numbers of beneficiaries of the JCP component (55,062 against a target of 31,800) because more low-skilled jobs (mostly male and cheaper) have been created to replace the loss of higher-skilled jobs (mostly female), due to donor shortfalls in the UNRWA project budget. As outlined under 4.6, this issue has been particularly detrimental to the crucial category of highly educated women in Gaza (doctors, nurses, teachers) and does not provide favourable prospects for future equality in higher education. For the UVP component, the implementing partner OXFAM GB pointed out that funds may be drying up rapidly as donors are pulling out. WFP is aware of the lower 'political' attractiveness of cash and voucher approaches for donors as compared to the much more 'visible' physical food distribution, and is working on mitigation measures.
- 7.2.8. Positive results shown for the indicator on numbers of eviction or demolition orders still refer to an earlier programme of legal assistance, on which the current one is based. Another indicator on HLP rights relates to both legal assistance under the Vulnerability pillar, and to the affordable housing programme under the Wealth Creation pillar.
- 7.2.9. The construction of twelve new UNRWA schools in Gaza – which were significantly delayed due primarily to the Israeli embargo on building materials⁵⁵ – does not appear in the Dashboard. How effective, however, could this programme be considering that Gaza has the highest population growth rate of the OPTs (3.44% per year) and that 10,000 new children are in need of additional school facilities every year. In particular, to what extent can the indicators used to date by this specific project really measure an 'improvement' of the situation when 80% of the children going to the newly-built schools will be transferred from old and run-down schools, 95% of which operate on double shifts?
- 7.2.10. **State-building pillar:** As demonstrated in Annual Reviews and programme logframes, the overall effectiveness of the State-building portfolio is fair; over 50% of project outputs are scored at 'A'. While this Review concludes that these results are positive, there are insufficient indicators for all aspects of state-building to draw a conclusion on overall achievements. For example, the indicators related to legitimacy are not fully articulated, either by DFID or in the performance tranches managed by the World Bank. In fact, the Bank stresses the direct budgetary support aspects of this project in their documentation: 'The release of funds from the PRDP-MDTF is concurrent with the implementation of key aspects of the PRDP (2008-2010) and the PNDP relating to budget execution and the maintenance of a sound macroeconomic framework, with the aim of strengthening the PA's fiscal position'.⁵⁶
- 7.2.11. In the Dashboard, the Governance and Security (i.e. State-building) pillar is covered specifically by one results indicator only, which relates to the Palestinian Governance Facility (PGF) programme: 'Proportion of activities completed in the PA's revenue reform plan'. This Review recognises that this and related indicators are being revised as a result of the most recent Annual Reviews. Although the Dashboard does not currently show any milestone or

⁵⁵ In February 2013, one school had been completed against a milestone of 5, and 110,000 man days of related work had been performed against 168,000 planned.

⁵⁶ See, <http://go.worldbank.org/JJUOZ8HYI0>.

progress – measured in figures – for the results in 2012-2013, the programme is estimated to be on track (and 100% attributable to DFID) as the revenue reform plan has been approved and implementation has begun. The PGF is supporting coordination and is considering leading the implementation of selected components.

- 7.2.12. Other Dashboard indicators for results (health, education, cash transfers) concern the PA state-building grant and are shared with the UNRWA general support programme under the Vulnerability pillar. For the period 2012-2013, all these indicators are either on track (primary education enrolment, immunisation for measles) or overachieving (beneficiaries of cash transfers).
- 7.2.13. A number of issues are worth considering. While PA internal structures and systems are fairly strong, relative to other governments in the region (for example, see World Bank 2011 report on 'readiness'), there remains a gap between these internal structures, the assessment of needs, and actual implementation. 85% of the pillar's budget is committed to the PA Service Delivery Grant and this could be balanced better with other programmatic elements that, while small in actual Sterling commitments, can deliver a significant impact. As noted in paragraphs 6.5 and 7.2, this could include projects designed to support local government entities and civil society. To avoid the inherent transaction costs associated with smaller projects, DFID could support existing programmes in these areas; for example, the World Bank's village development programme that supports local councils at the village level and whose scope and expected impact correlates with DFID's Programme.
- 7.2.14. At the same time, indicators are often static and may not represent the most appropriate areas of performance as compared to broader outcomes. A basket of indicators or indicators that are used for different stages of project implementation would be more accurate and responsive to different contexts. The rigidity of indicators decreases opportunities to identify and capitalise on new opportunities and may represent risks, such as the deterioration in quality of PA's reporting and governance levels, which are not being addressed through the Service Delivery Grant, PGF, WB expert, or other related projects.⁵⁷
- 7.2.15. Indicators that are tangible and yet related to the complexities of legitimacy, amongst other issues, would facilitate better analysis overall. For instance, indicators could be developed to assess public sentiment about the PA and/or the MEPP as reflected in the media, amongst other donors who work on these issues, or in surveys and other evaluative instruments deployed at the project level. It would be more feasible and effective to hold implementing partners accountable for developing such evaluative instruments and for the collection, analysis, and reporting of their results. For implementing partners to do this, DFID would have to develop better indicators of what they expect.
- 7.2.16. **Wealth Creation pillar:** The level of achievement of results for 2013 has been mixed. It was expected that the partner banks of the affordable housing programme would reach the \$10 million mortgages threshold in one year, but after about eight months since the first mortgage only ten mortgages have been issued with a total of around \$1 million. By May 2013, none of the intended results had been achieved for the housing policy component. Effectiveness of the awareness campaign also did not meet expectations: the proportion of the Palestinian public who are able to identify one key message from the media campaign was only 8.2% in May 2013, compared to a milestone for 2012 of 15%.

⁵⁷ See: World Bank, 'Proposed Village Development Program: Scoping Mission.' Aide-Memoire, December 2013.

- 7.2.17. However, for the mortgage finance training in July 2012, of 49 stakeholders who attended and responded 38 (78%) reported being satisfied or very satisfied – over double the target. Similarly, the cumulative total number of people who attended the home buyer education workshops, and reported receiving new information that influenced their home buying decision by December 2012, reached 1,158 participants against a target of 650.
- 7.2.18. Results indirectly and partially attributable to the OQR tend to reflect the overall economic crisis. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), the primary estimation of GDP growth in 2013 at constant prices (real GDP) was 3.78% and economic forecasting for 2014 at base scenario is expecting the GDP to increase by 3.8%.⁵⁸ The unemployment rate in the third quarter of 2013 was 23.7%.⁵⁹ There were 274,000 hotel guests in the West Bank during the first half of 2013, a drop of 1% compared with the first half of 2012 (656,000 nights spent in Palestine). During the third quarter of 2013, 136,000 guests stayed in hotels in the West Bank (321,000 nights); the number of hotel guests was 11% lower than in the previous quarter and 7% lower than in the third quarter of 2012.
- 7.2.19. It should be noted that the experts seconded by DFID to the OQR stated that the Programme's logframe was a rather static tool that did not properly encapsulate the scale and scope of their work, and that revised indicators are being considered.

EQ 5 – How is DFID viewed as a development partner in the OPTs? What are the main perceived strengths and weaknesses? Are we meeting international aid effectiveness commitments such as alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability?

- 7.2.20. During meetings with implementing partners of DFID-funded programmes and external stakeholders, respondents consistently pointed to a highly positive perception of DFID's activities in the OPTs. DFID is overwhelmingly seen as 'one of the main donors, well informed, adequately demanding, with a strategic vision'. The proactive involvement in the security and justice sectors is particularly appreciated.
- 7.2.21. Some Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) raised concerns about respect of human rights by Palestinian security services, while the security sector is being supported through the state-building grant.⁶⁰ DFID should encourage the PA to publicly report on progress against the PNDP 2013 target on increasing public satisfaction with the performance and services of the security establishment. Some national NGOs stated that they would not seek DFID funds due to the Counter-Terrorism (CT) Legislation, which they see as too restrictive for their activities.
- 7.2.22. Many stakeholders estimate that DFID could play an even larger role by using its budget support to leverage the policy of some key PA ministries (through more appropriate shares of the overall budget, improved accountability, inclusiveness of civil society and gender-sensitive approaches in programming). As DFID develops more evidence and correlated analysis between output indicators for state-building projects and how these support broader outcomes/impact related to legitimacy, democracy, sustainability, and the MEPP, it will have more leverage within the PA as a whole and within each Ministry. Direct tactics to influence change could include a strengthening of the conditions related to the Service Delivery Grant and tangible consequences, e.g. the reduction of funding, if these conditions are not met. Indirect tactics could include, as suggested elsewhere, a diversification of DFID's

⁵⁸ 7.4% in optimistic scenario and -8.9% in pessimistic scenario.

⁵⁹ Male: 20.3%, Female: 37.8%; about 21.3% in West Bank and 37.6% in Gaza.


⁶⁰ The Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), 18th Annual Report, The Status of Human Rights in Palestine.

programmatic mix with more support to civil society and local government entities with the focus on how these can exert more targeted pressure on the PA around direct services.

7.3. Efficiency

- 7.3.1. DFID defines VfM as a programme's capacity to 'Maximise the impact of each pound spent to improve poor people's lives'.⁶¹ DFID is diligent in developing issues of efficiency and VfM in business cases and then reflecting these in logframes and annual reports. DFID views VfM as a combination of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness that can be derived along the process chain, from input to impact.⁶² This is in line with other common standards.⁶³ It is the balance between these elements that should be assessed. A reduction of costs or the number of inputs does not necessarily result in greater VfM.
- 7.3.2. While the Programme's approach to economy and efficiency is mixed, with some projects providing a depth of analysis – see 'Support to the work of the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories' (202887) and 'Technical Assistance to the Palestinian Negotiations Support Project in the Occupied Palestinian Territories' (201812) – some do not, for example, 'Strategic Impact Fund for the Occupied Palestinian Territories' (202719). (See Table 1 'Assessment of Efficiency/VfM' below.)
- 7.3.3. DFID is good at scoping out issues of efficiency and VfM.⁶⁴ While there are areas that could be strengthened, efficiency/VfM analysis is fairly sound although it is dominated by qualitative analysis. A review of the business cases and annual reviews demonstrates that the primary analysis is qualitative, e.g. the nature of the inputs, the operational and political context, and the development objectives rather than comparative costs or other benchmarks.
- 7.3.4. **Portfolio Performance at Project Level (Outputs)**. This review has provided top-level portfolio analysis at the output level based on a comparison of budget and output scoring rather than strict efficiency.
- 7.3.5. DFID could explore strengthening actual cost/efficiency/benefit analysis through obtaining financial or Internal Rate of Return (IRR) data to provide other analysis. For this Review the team has used DFID's output scoring from Annual Reviews and has compared this to their actual budget allocations to provide basic return on investment.

- 7.3.6. As the graph demonstrates, 65% of project outputs across the portfolio are scored at an 'A', with 9% scored at 'A+' or higher. Only 5% of project outputs are scored at 'C'. When compared to the qualitative analysis in annual reviews, issues of efficiency are often aligned with this overall performance. This implies that a majority of projects are performing well at the output level, or, more precisely, that 65% of budget



⁶¹ DFID, 'DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)', July 2011, p.2.


⁶² Ibidem, p.4.

⁶³ 'ICAI's Approach to Effectiveness and Value for Money', Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Report 1, November 2011. See also Penny Jackson, 'Value for Money and International Development: Deconstructing Myths to promote a More Constructive Discussion', OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, May 2012.

⁶⁴ 'DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)', DFID, July 2011.


allocations have a return of 'A' or higher performance. This may be an acceptable outcome although it does imply that 45% of the portfolio do not have adequate return on investment or are achieving this basic efficiency metric.

7.3.7. State-building pillar: Overall, there is sufficient progress toward outputs associated with state-building activities. 77% of outputs are performing at a score of 'A'. However, the Service Delivery Grant is scored at an 'A' and represents 85% of the portfolio budget for state-building (£123 million for the Service Delivery Grant as compared to £143.5 million for all state-building projects). Thus the Service Delivery Grant contributes to this relatively high score. If the Service Delivery Grant is removed, the overall performance is more mixed. This shows that of project outputs currently scored, 52% are at 'A' while 22% are at 'C'.




If the Service Delivery Grant is removed, the overall performance is more mixed. This shows that of project outputs currently scored, 52% are at 'A' while 22% are at 'C'.

7.3.8. PVH pillar: The largest project by far is 202885: 'Support to UNRWA general budget and reforms' and this project's outputs are scored fairly high (A+/25%; A/50%; A/10%; B/15%) with an overall score of 'A'. Only one output is scored at 'C'. Other issues include:



- Figures for the Job Creation Programme (JCP) component (UNRWA) of the Food Security programme in Gaza show a sharp under-achievement for female workers. The JCP component employs only 1,069 female workers against 6,980 males and created only 101,132 workdays for women (against a target of 192,500).
- The challenges in implementation of the education programme reflect delays in school construction due to the Israeli embargo on building materials.

Wealth Creation pillar: At the output level, Wealth Creation has the lowest overall scoring with 77% of the portfolio scored at 'C'. This is largely due to the poor scoring for the project 114325: 'Support to Improve Access to Mortgages for Affordable Housing in the OPT – AMAL Project' whose primary output represents 74% of the portfolio and is ranked at 'C'. Other issues to consider include:



- AMAL project is currently behind schedule due to AMAL's requirements being too burdensome for the market, insufficient supply of low-cost housing, and the ambiguity of

the AMAL business plan.⁶⁵

- Efficiency of the PMDP is still too early to be assessed since the project has only recently started and therefore there is insufficient data.

EQ 6 - At the strategic level, have each of the three pillars of DFID's Palestinian Programme been adequately resourced to deliver its Operational Plan objectives in terms of human resources, financial allocations, M&E and ability to contribute to policy leverage?

7.3.9. **State-building pillar:** DFID may seek to better diversify its State-building portfolio. Additional contributions could be made to local municipal government, thus diversifying direct central government support, while exploring other state-building/peace-building projects. DFID should consider expanding its support to Civil Society and local government. This includes investigating support of the World Bank's programme in this area.⁶⁶

7.3.10. **PVH pillar:** According to the ICAI report of September 2013,⁶⁷ one of the three staff members of the VPH pillar plus the Head of Office has been following the support UNRWA in addition to four short-term advisers. DFID has also made available resources (£200,000) for technical assistance to support reform within UNRWA, amounting to 0.05% of DFID's total expenditure on UNRWA during the ICAI review period against 3.78% for the PA reforms. It was found that UNRWA is led by experts and needs less technical assistance than the PA. The ICAI report, however, stressed that delays in some UNRWA reforms indicated that more support was required.

7.3.11. **Wealth Creation pillar:** If the notion that promoting a more dynamic and vibrant private sector is the major contributor to economic growth, employment creation and consequently poverty reduction, then the financial allocation for the Wealth Creation pillar is proportionally insufficient compared to the other pillars.

EQ 7 – What are the major constraints in the current political and operating environment that may prevent DFID achieving its intended results?

7.3.12. **State-building pillar:** The primary constraint relates to the need for better indicators and more robust evidence related to state-building and peace-building activities that could contribute to stated outcomes and goals. The PA has a proven and recognised capacity to implement reforms. This capacity is jeopardised by the broader political context and its capacity to successfully collect revenue in this context. The PA's intrinsic constraints are the only modest coordination amongst ministries, paralleled by a lack of an accountable-monitoring system, a paralysed legislation system in the PLC, a modest Public Private Partnership (PPP) and weak political willingness to reform stewardship.

7.3.13. **PVH pillar:** Major constraints in implementing programmes in Gaza are the result of Israeli military operations and the Israeli blockade on Gaza. There are also a number of key constraints to policy reforms in UNRWA such as resistance to changes both internally (from some UNRWA staff, staff unions) and externally, from beneficiaries and political actors. Host Governments are concerned that a reduction in UNRWA services may require them to provide these services. Even if there is validity in the need for changing services delivery – to make them more cost effective to meet the budgetary limitations of UNRWA and the growing population – there is a strong risk of creating instability by changing the nature and/or the

⁶⁵ According to the McKinsey study 'Beyond Aid'; the current standard housing offering cost too much for lower income group (\$100,000-130,000), there is limited supply of low-cost housing for AMAL target group.

⁶⁶ For a brief, see: World Bank, 'Proposed Village Development Program: Scoping Mission', Aide-Memoire, December 2013.

⁶⁷ 'DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA', ICAI, September 2013.

level of services. This instability would impact not only on the OPTs but on the region as a whole.

- 7.3.14. Numerous coordination mechanisms are in place in the OPTs but do not automatically lead to better synergies between development actors in the field or joint policies.
- 7.3.15. Occupation and access restrictions block economic growth and significantly undermine DFID's efforts in promoting economic growth and private sector development. Movement restrictions and lack of control over their own resources and borders have a direct impact on the Palestinians' ability to achieve human security.
- 7.3.16. The Israeli-imposed Gaza blockade will continue to lead to deterioration in the humanitarian situation and the further 'de-development' of Gaza. The Gaza closure weakens DFID's efforts toward peace-building and poverty alleviation.
- 7.3.17. While the OPTs ranked the third highest aid recipient in 2011,⁶⁸ funding has been reducing since a peak in 2008. The economic crisis in the West could lead to a further reduction in international aid. Funding is often allocated for short-term assistance with less focus on long-term sustainable development interventions.
- 7.3.18. **Political developments in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region** could significantly influence changes in the political scene in the OPTs and may impact negatively on the funding levels for the OPTs.

EQ 8 - What evidence is there that the programmes implemented deliver Value for Money?

- 7.3.19. DFID's Annual Reports provide detailed analysis of VfM, which vary from programme to programme. However, in the absence of data and comparatives to assess the costs and efficiencies between inputs and outcomes/goals there is a tendency to justify VfM rather than demonstrate it. (See Table 1: Assessment of Efficiency/VfM for an analysis of each project.) For instance, the Service Delivery Grant proposes good VfM. The most recent annual review states:

It is performing well in delivering the expected Outputs with an overall score of 96% and positive feedback from PA beneficiaries. The Theory of Change remains valid. Although some of the Outcome indicators need to be revised down to be more realistic, this does not undermine the value for money of the programme. Maintaining access to public services at the current high level is an important objective both for reducing poverty in the OPTs and for promoting a peaceful Palestinian state and society – without the State-building Grant and support from other donors public services would be much weaker and the PA would be unable to fulfil its duties to its citizens and as a partner for peace.⁶⁹

- 7.3.20. In another example regarding the second largest project by budget allocation (UNRWA), the statement for VfM includes:

There is no alternative mechanism or organisation through which the needs of Palestinian refugees can be comprehensively met. Complementary mechanisms and service providers do exist but UNRWA is the only organisation with the legitimacy and capability of delivering the necessary combination of support.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/palestineopt>.

⁶⁹ Annual Review, project number 202564.

⁷⁰ Annual Review, project number 202375.

7.3.21. These and other examples, show the breadth of analysis that underpins VfM and how it is largely focused on qualitative value without sufficient supporting qualitative evidence. As one of DFID's top line messages about VfM states: 'All staff need to make VfM considerations central in deciding what we do, how we implement and how we learn lessons'.⁷¹ This is certainly done but it needs to be better underpinned with detailed financial and results analysis.

7.3.22. 'Maximising the impact of each pound spent' requires appropriate financial analysis. This is demonstrated in a review of the analysis for efficiency and VfM in projects that have completed annual reviews:

Table 1: Assessment of Efficiency/VfM

ID	Project	Assessment of Efficiency / VfM
State-building pillar		
202564	State-building and Service Delivery Grant to the PA in the OPTs	Good. Includes a mix of economy, efficiency, and other factors that contribute to overall VfM. Attempts to make link between actual service delivery (education and health) and efficiency/cost effectiveness. The causal links between these are weak. Still need to analyse the political benefits of this project. This does not imply a monetisation of the results/impact but instead in the collection and analysis of evidence that is directly correlated between the project, its conditions, and how this relates to the peace process. As noted above, attribution here is difficult but could be facilitated by better indicators and related data/analysis.
201935	Improved macroeconomic governance in fragile and conflict affected States through IMF	Fair. Does look at unit costs and multipliers but relies heavily on qualitative aspects of the project. Determines delays as a primary contributor to poor VfM whereas these may have aspects of benefit not captured in analysis.
201236	Support to accountable and responsive security and justice in the OPTs	Poor. Focuses primarily on unit costs (translations, working sessions) without providing analysis of how these contribute to impact. This is a difficult area to analyse given the often opaque nature of justice and security in any context. At the same time, this analysis should not rely on basic output numbers. There is a need to analyse the value in broader socio-economic terms, supported by good quantitative analysis. This would be a good case for IRR and other approaches to benefit/impact. This review recognises that VfM approaches are being developed for this project and that new draft CHASE guidance will be applied.
201812	TA to the Palestinian Negotiations Support Project (PNSP) in the OPTs	Poor. Focuses primarily on unit costs (consultancy fees) without providing analysis of how these contribute to broader impact. This could include analysis of the negotiations themselves, without considering the outcome. The value is in the actual negotiations, not in how many consultancy days were used.
202719	Palestinian Programme Strategic Intervention Fund	Poor. Focus is on 'keeping costs low' without analysing the nature of 'innovative approaches to maximise project outcomes relative to costs'. This should include a fine-grained analysis of

⁷¹ 'DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)', DFID, July 2011, p.2.

		costs, comparatives, efficiency gains from project adaptations.
PVH pillar		
202375	Food Security in Gaza	Good. Could better assess the VfM as compared to other implementing partners. UNRWA may be the only choice but it should still be compared, as much as possible, with other actors.
202611	Education in Gaza	Good. It is reasonable to depict the cost savings of doing this through a trust fund but this could be better analysed against the value-added from this trust fund.
202885	Support to UNRWA general budget and reforms	Fair. Uses actual costs but analysis is primarily qualitative and does not show the actual value across the process.
Wealth Creation pillar		
114325	Support to improve access to Mortgages for Affordable housing in the OPTs	Good. Provides a breadth of analysis across efficiency, economy, and with sound conclusions related to overall value. Interestingly, the conclusion is that this project does not provide value for money (the only project to do so). This level of analysis may prove suitable for adapting the project to achieve VfM.
202887	DFID support to the work of the OQR in the OPTs	Good. Provides a breadth of analysis across efficiency, economy, and with sound conclusions related to overall value.

7.3.23. The analysis above and the shortage of data related to efficiencies, transaction costs, and the broader political environment, indicates that DFID should remain diligent in conducting appropriate VfM analysis.

EQ 9 - To what extent did the harmonisation of programmes with other aid agencies contribute to reducing DFID's transaction costs?

7.3.24. Efficiency gains, related to transaction or other costs, must be viewed in relation to the actual value that may be provided by any implementing agency or partner. For instance, the World Bank provides a level of analysis and management in relation to the Service Delivery Grant that could not be easily managed by DFID. In this case, the World Bank performs this service on behalf of many donors.⁷²

7.3.25. Under the PVH and the State-building pillars a very high proportion of funds are transferred through well-established partners, i.e. the World Bank and UNRWA. Both agencies manage funding on behalf of multiple donors and against standard management overhead rates. Providing predictable funding, and multi-year funding in the case of UNRWA, is efficient for the partner organisation and for DFID. It lowers costs related to re-negotiating agreements and budgets. However, DFID should ensure that while the partners are well established and trusted, sufficient resources are allocated to follow up with partners to ensure that evidence is provided for the expected results.

7.3.26. **Influencing work:** A more detailed analysis needs to take place on the results of DFID's influencing work – how DFID was able to influence policy in the OPT. DFID needs to bring clarity on its own expectations and make clear what it aims to achieve. The following are

⁷² Please see "Influencing Work" below for a summary of different DFID partners.

observations made by the Review team for consideration by DFID in a broader analysis of its influencing work:

- a) **Palestinian Authority:** To a certain extent the PA is experiencing organisational malaise linked to lack of progress in the peace process that cannot be addressed through a 'carrots and sticks' approach.
- b) **Local Government:** Supporting local government presents not only an opportunity to strengthen the PA as a whole but also mitigates the risks associated with central government sustainability.
- c) **Bi-laterals:** DFID's Programme could be strengthened through more strategic work with other donors. DFID should capitalise on opportunities to take the lead given the respect other donors have for DFID's depth of knowledge, experience, and perceived trust/forthrightness. DFID has strong recognition for the role it has taken on the Security Sector Working Group. Donors and the PA should assess what the criteria are for working groups to be more successful.
- d) **Multi-laterals:** Multi-laterals are expensive but can provide opportunities to support programmes that make links between the PA, local government, NGOs, and others involved in direct service delivery. There is potential for better linkages in Gaza.
- e) **UNRWA:** DFID is exploring and encouraging better linkages between UNRWA and the PA. This is not straight forward, mainly because of political reasons, e.g. refugees' rights that need to be addressed under the MEPP.
- f) **Palestinian Civil Society:** Palestinian NGOs are not sufficiently present in DFID's Programme. Palestinian NGOs can play a vital role in achieving PNDP objectives and complement the role of the PA.

7.4. Sustainability

EQ 10 - Are the reforms or changes supported by DFID's Palestinian Programme moving in the direction of the vision statement of the Operational Plan, and are they likely to be sustained?

- 7.4.1. Overall, DFID's Palestinian Programme activities do contribute to how DFID supports the 'UK Government's objectives for a successful MEPP by helping build Palestinian institutions and promoting economic growth, so that any future state will be stable, prosperous, well-run, and an effective partner for peace with Israel'.⁷³
- 7.4.2. **State-building pillar:** The state-building vision includes three primary areas:
 - a) Predictable financial support for reform, governed by a multi-year Memorandum of Understanding with the PA;
 - b) Providing targeted expert support in key line ministries to improve budgeting and financial management;
 - c) Boosting citizens' rights by helping the PA to be more accountable and responsive to the public, including improving their services for female survivors of gender-based violence.⁷⁴
- 7.4.3. The state-building projects are sufficiently aligned with these areas. As noted in Evaluation Question 3, these are also aligned fairly well with the PNDP. In this sense, state-building

⁷³ 'DFID Palestinian Programme Operational Plan 2011-2015', DFID, p.3.

⁷⁴ IBID.

activities are moving in the direction set out in DFID's Operational Plan.

- 7.4.4. The issue of sustaining this progress is less secure. The complexity and volatility associated with the current political context makes a strategy that is focused on supporting the PA unnecessarily narrow and may not be sustainable. Having the majority of DFID's investment committed to the Service Delivery Grant prevents DFID from being more strategic. It has become bound by this support in the sense that it is unclear whether DFID would stop this support if the PA did not meet specific performance tranches according to the World Bank's assessments. This implies that support, if continued in this form, will simply maintain the PA's position. By broadening how and what is measured in relation to this support, by strengthening the evidentiary chain from project outputs to outcome and impact, DFID will be better able to analyse progress, what contributes to this progress, and how they can adapt their programmatic approach overall.
- 7.4.5. Integration of peace-building and state-building could be strengthened by having outcomes related to: government responsiveness to public expectations; capable core state functions; and progress towards a viable two-state solution.⁷⁵
- 7.4.6. **PVH pillar:** Where sustainability is an objective of the Programme (not the case for food vouchers, for example), levels depend to a large extent on political and economic achievements made under the other pillars. A notable exception is the UNRWA reforms process, which aims primarily at sustainability but is slowed down by internal resistance to change, financial shortfalls, reduction in voluntary donor contributions and political sensitivities with host governments.
- 7.4.7. The UFV, JCP and school construction programmes are not taken into account under sustainability as such, as they are still primarily focused on emergency relief interventions to alleviate the poverty and vulnerability of the abject poor, pending improvement of the overall political and economic situation in Gaza.
- 7.4.8. Further to the FRA of 2011 (see Evaluation Question 4), findings of the ICAI report confirmed that UNRWA's OD reforms have contributed to improvements in fiduciary risk; hence in the sustainability of the Agency's management performance.⁷⁶ Financial sustainability would, however, require either a sharp increase in donors' contributions, or savings in expenditures commensurate to the annual deficit.
- 7.4.9. To maximise the sustainability of legal outcomes the NRC programme is pursuing a number of strategies, including; promoting security of tenure, assisting women to assert their inheritance rights in Gaza, identifying individual solutions for HLP issues, and developing a planning strategy in the West Bank. The previous NRC project has also focused on the continued capacity building of partner organisations and local lawyers, mentoring of law students, training of traditional leaders on HLP law issues, and investment in local coordination mechanisms, such as the Legal Taskforces.
- 7.4.10. **Wealth Creation pillar:** Building competitiveness is often no longer dependent only on compliance with the classic parameters of competition but also requires strengthening systemic competitiveness and collective efficiency, i.e. intra-cluster relationships, relationships between firms and their institutional environment, efficiency of upstream and downstream value chains, global contexts of world market, etc. To that effect, and in light of

⁷⁵ These outcomes are adapted in part according to DFID proposed best practices for state-building and peace-building. See DFID, 'Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper', 2010.

⁷⁶ 'DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA', ICAI, 2013.

the fragile socio-political environment in OPTs that can shape economic growth in different aspects, innovation and job creation will not be predictable or sustainable (within PMDP) unless systemic constraints have been addressed.

7.5. Impact

EQ 11 - Given external factors and the contribution of other stakeholders, to what extent did DFID's interventions under the Palestinian Programme contribute to DFID's impact indicators supporting state-building, economic growth and poverty reduction?

- 7.5.1. In the Dashboard version provided to the Review team in January 2014, the achievements of the 16 impact indicators for the three pillars were last collected for the year 2011 (at the onset of the OP). Monitoring of the results of individual programmes for 2013 will only be carried out after the present evaluation report submission date.
- 7.5.2. **PVH pillar:** In the impact section of the Dashboard, six indicators are meant to measure progress in achieving the second main objective of the Programme and the ToC: 'Reduced poverty and vulnerability of Palestinians in the OPTs and the region'. Three of these indicators – poverty gap index, infant mortality rate and number of demolitions – are also to be found as impact indicators in the individual programmes' logframes. Others are either specific to the Dashboard⁷⁷ or to the logframes.⁷⁸ With the exception of the demolitions, which concern only the legal assistance activity, all the indicators in the Dashboard relate to programmes implemented under both the PVH and State-building pillars.
- 7.5.3. This approach provides a global overview and consolidated figures but mixes up rather different funding modalities and areas and actors, such as non-earmarked support to the PA through the World Bank Trust Fund or targeted provision in Gaza of food, jobs and policy leverage. The approach does not facilitate the assessment of impact for each pillar, and is also not fully consistent with the individual programmes' logframes. As previously discussed under Effectiveness (in particular for the UNRWA general support programme), some of the indicators are weak.
- 7.5.4. The interventions' levels of contribution to the overall impact indicators of the Palestinian programme are therefore rather difficult to evaluate (also considering the overall context of deepening economic crisis and stalled peace negotiations), although specific findings can be made for the individual programmes.
- 7.5.5. The intended impact of the Food Security programme is to reduce economic hardship and hunger amongst food insecure, abject and absolute poor refugees and non-refugees in Gaza. The programme is, however, unlikely to contribute decisively to MDG 1 ('To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger'). The abject and absolute poverty in Gaza will not be eradicated by the programmes but only temporarily alleviated to a limited extent, as long as Gaza, under the control of Hamas, is economically separated from the outside world and subject to CT legislation. No milestones were indicated for the two impact indicators in the programme logframe ('Poverty Gap Index' and 'Food Insecurity in Gaza'). The impact on educated women in Gaza as a result of UNRWA changing its job creation focus from skilled to unskilled workers is unfortunately not recorded.
- 7.5.6. The Completion Review of the previous Legal Assistance programme (completed in March

⁷⁷ Proportion below national poverty line, secondary education net enrolment rate, prevalence rate of violence against women.

⁷⁸ Food insecurity in Gaza, percentage of pass rates in Maths and Arabic, percentage of registered refugees who receive social assistance from UNRWA.

2013) mentioned several positive impacts,⁷⁹ such as increased partner capacity and psychological empowerment of beneficiaries to continue to lobby for their rights.

- 7.5.7. The intended impact of the Education programme in Gaza is 'to ensure that all refugee children have access to and complete an acceptable quality basic education which prepares them for productive life'. This impact is to be measured in the project logframe by the indicator 'percentage of pass rates in Maths and Arabic', although without any milestone set for 2013. This indicator is useful to measure some of the parameters of potential success in secondary school and professional life and can be seen as the result of outcome indicators (class sizes – recently amended by DFID – or motivation of teachers – not yet included) but is hardly attainable through a school construction project alone.
- 7.5.8. **State-building pillar:** The impact section of the Dashboard shows no less than seven indicators⁸⁰ to measure achievements towards the first main objective of the Programme and the ToC, i.e. 'Negotiated outcome enabling a viable, contiguous and democratic Palestinian state, alongside a secure and prosperous Israel'. These impact indicators are subdivided among three components: Support inclusive settlement; Develop core state functions; and Respond to public expectations. Although no milestones or achievements can be found in the Dashboard for 2012 or 2013, the analysis made under Effectiveness demonstrates sufficient overall progress in the state-building programmes to expect that they have contributed to the broader impact indicators.
- 7.5.9. An assessment of the correlation between impact and output indicators shows that for eight of the programmes (out of ten in the pillar), such linkages have been found 'good' or 'fair', i.e. the output indicators are sufficiently specific and measurable to allow impact analysis. The two exceptions are the World Bank PFM and the support to democratic participation of civil society.
- 7.5.10. **Wealth Creation pillar:** The evaluation was unable to assess the achievements of impact indicators for the Wealth Creation pillar, largely due to the lack of updated data but also the absence of indicators in some cases. Only one result indicator, related to both the former Facility for New Market Development (FNMD) and the new PMDP programmes (at the end of Inception Phase in February 2014), is to be found in the OP and the Dashboard: 'Number of enterprises reporting improved annual performance from DFID support in terms of sales or productivity'. Results for the initial programme showed over-achievement, but no data was yet available for the new programme. The impact section of the Dashboard further shows three indicators related to wealth creation, which can also be found in the logframe of the new PMDP programme: real GDP Growth; proportion below national poverty line; and unemployment rate. No milestones or data were available for 2012 and 2013.
- 7.5.11. DFID has appointed an independent Evaluation Contractor to undertake independent evaluation of PMDP throughout its lifetime. The design of the overall M&E framework for PMDP has started in 2013 and was made available in draft form in February 2014 by an Implementing Contractor of PMDP. The first set of the Evaluation Contractor's

⁷⁹ An Impact Assessment was conducted in April 2012 regarding impact in Area C.

⁸⁰ Prospect of two-state solution: Two State Stress Test score; *PA capability*: Government Effectiveness score; and % citizens rate PA's human rights record as 'good'; *PA fiscal sustainability*: Recurrent budget deficit as % GDP; *PA reach*: No. of new Palestinian police and civil defence stations in area B in the West Bank; *Accountability*: Voice & Accountability score; *Public satisfaction*: Proportion of population who are satisfied with the way that the PA is managing affairs.

recommendations, with regards to indicators in the results chain and revised logframe along with a complete M&E framework, are expected to become available at the end of the 1st quarter 2014.

- 7.5.12. One indicator is also included in the Dashboard to cover the training component of the Affordable Housing programme, and shows over-achievement (see also Effectiveness).⁸¹
- 7.5.13. The OQR programme is not represented by any indicator in the Dashboard. The impact of this programme is intended to be measured through the nominal GDP per capita (which has increased in current prices but slightly decreased in constant prices),⁸² unemployment rate in the West Bank (getting worse),⁸³ and US dollar value of Palestinian export (improving).⁸⁴ Attribution is however an issue, and these mixed indicators do not reflect the recent added value of OQR in designing the economic part of the 'Kerry Package' for the two-state solution.

EQ 12 - To the extent of the review's capacity to investigate, what real differences have the activities made to recipients, development partners (including the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA) and beneficiaries?

- 7.5.14. As the Review's methodological approach had to rely essentially on secondary sources, there was limited time to meet with DFID's implementing partners and beneficiaries directly. Annual Reviews provided limited data, as shown below. Effects of the programmes on women are assessed separately under Evaluation Question 13.
- 7.5.15. DFID's direct budgetary support to the PA clearly contributes to the PA's capacity to deliver vital services and to remain fiscally viable. In fact, the mix of state-building activities provides for institution-building and overall governance in key areas as distinct from legitimacy, democracy, sustainability, and other state-building elements. The PA has made progress in institution-building and governance despite the challenges of the context in which they work. At the same time, it is not clear how this has strengthened the PA's ability to govern, to be seen as a legitimate authority for Palestinians, or whether support of this kind will continue to make a positive difference. As the PA's institutions become more effective, DFID may face a law of diminishing returns, e.g. focusing on micro-level improvements that may be best achieved by a fully functioning state. Accordingly, DFID may make more of a difference by diversifying its projects to include civil society and other government entities (see paragraphs 6.5 and 7.2.).
- 7.5.16. As stated appropriately by the ICAI in their September 2013 report: 'DFID, through UNRWA, brings real benefits, notably in the health and education sectors (...) Overall, the services delivered by UNRWA help to ensure that the situation of the Palestine refugees does not deteriorate further and add to regional instability. Poverty reduction programmes, however, delivered through cash and food transfers, now demonstrate only minimal impact.'
- 7.5.17. The baseline report for the Food Security programme⁸⁵ further outlined that 'the limited duration of the JCP assignments and the long waiting times of 5 years for men and 8 years

⁸¹ It should be noted that economists suffer from a type of schizophrenia when it comes to assessing impact of investment in residential housing. On the one hand, economic theory favours investment in housing because it helps to fulfil human and social needs, creates employment, and reduces rent and therefore the cost of living and inflation. On the other hand, investment in residential buildings is speculative and unproductive compared to machinery, factories or other productive means.

⁸² GDP on current prices increased from \$626.1 in Q3 of 2011 to \$700.6 in Q3 2013; GDP per Capita at constant prices showed a 0.4 percent decrease between Q3 of 2012 and 2013. Source: PCBS 2013.

⁸³ Unemployment rate in the WB was 17.3% in 2011, 19.1% in Q3 2012, and 21.3% in Q3 2013. Source: PCBS.

⁸⁴ Exports grew from 1,802 million USD in 2011 to 1923.8 million in 2012. Source: PCBS.

⁸⁵ PAI/ATOS, April 2013.

for women significantly inhibit the poverty reduction impact of the JCP. The sporadic nature of the income from this labour conditional cash transfer means it is difficult to see how this programme can have significant impact on poverty within a given household.’

7.5.18. In the Legal Assistance programme, feedback forms from beneficiaries of training and information sessions (both among the population and implementing agencies) were collected by the NRC, and were found overwhelmingly positive. These positive outcomes, together with some explanatory statements, were confirmed by DFID monitoring and by an independent evaluation carried out in January-February 2013.

7.6. Coverage

EQ 13 - How successful has the Palestinian Programme been in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues around human rights, gender equality and the environment?

- 7.6.1. Despite DFID's Gender Strategy and contiguous programmes of the EU ('Spring Forward for Women') or USAID ('Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy; Community Engagement Project'), the lack of an overall enabling environment to empower women and girls and provide an inclusive social and economic development basis, is still repeatedly indicated as insufficient. Gender mainstreaming by donors, the comprehensive use of sex-disaggregated indicators wherever relevant in the programmes, or the insistence of DFID's Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic tool on inclusive poverty reduction and growth, are no substitutes for assertive political reforms. It should, however, be noted that the contribution of Wealth Creation programmes to inclusive economic empowerment is far from optimum.
- 7.6.2. The PA Ministry of Women's Affairs, although knowledgeable and supportive, needs to develop a strategy and further promote gender responsive budgeting and planning throughout the PNDP. Whereas the PA Ministries of Justice, Interior and Social Affairs have reportedly become more 'mature' regarding gender equality, this is not yet the case with, for example, the Ministry of Labour. Ministerial policies still depend significantly on the personality of new ministers and may even regress, such as in the case of child care services.
- 7.6.3. Discussions with DFID-funded or external actors engaged in the protection of the rights of women against gender-based violence in the OPTs have outlined both the results achieved up to now under the OP and the remaining challenges.
- 7.6.4. While a programme implemented by UN Women – separate from, but contiguous to, the Justice component of the PA state-building grant – has supported the setting up of Family Protection Units (FPUs) in police stations in all 11 districts of the West Bank to receive in dignity women victims of violence,⁸⁶ some NGOs still point out the lack of staff, training and equipment (computers, cars) of the FPUs. A second phase of the programme, to be jointly implemented with UNDP and building on the initial DFID support, should tackle some of the current shortcomings (e.g. rule of law for perpetrators, shelters for the victims). DFID is currently considering funding this new joint UNDP/UNW phase of the programme.
- 7.6.5. A survey conducted by NRC indicates that the NGO covers about 35% of cases (through private lawyers and support to legal aid NGOs) of persons suffering HLP violations in Area C in the West Bank, and who are represented legally. Within that figure however, the issue of

⁸⁶ According to UN Women, 42.1% of women were subjected to physical violence in 2011.

gender equality against demolitions and evictions by Israel, and more generally about HLP rights for women in Palestinian society, still emerges as a much wider problem.

- 7.6.6. The problems of the social and economic status of women and the violence they suffer are particularly acute in Gaza, where cooperation with Hamas authorities is prevented by CT legislation. A comprehensive report on women's HLP rights in Gaza was published by the NRC in November 2013.⁸⁷ The report concluded, for example, that while women are often knowledgeable about their rights to inheritance and wish to claim their rights, the consequences for doing so are high. Palestinian women face multiple layers of discrimination as problems of displacement are exacerbated by discrimination and cultural attitudes. Women's legal status and decision-making remain linked to that of a male relative and they are still unlikely to own land or housing. They face being cut off from their families, which can be a major deterrent to claiming their rights. Women's ownership of assets, be it property or land, should therefore be a crucial element of economic empowerment.
- 7.6.7. There are additional funds available under an existing EU grant for research on women's HLP issues and follow-up research will explore implementation of the recommendations of the women's HLP report as well as identify case studies to better track the outcomes of legal assistance to women in six to twelve months time. Additionally, women's HLP is a global priority for NRC; resources are available and will be requested from head office to learn best practices and comparative experiences in other countries to track the impact of legal assistance for women in various contexts.
- 7.6.8. In that context, due to shortfalls in donors' funding to the JCP programme – covered by UNRWA's project budget rather than the more predictable General Fund – the Agency has been unable to maintain several key initiatives which traditionally called for female skilled labour in Gaza (teachers, doctors, nurses). Against an initial milestone of 550,000 work days to be created (357,500 for men, 192,500 for women), the programme was able to provide 574,838 work days for men (hence the over-achievement in quantitative effectiveness) but only 101,132 – mostly unskilled – work days for women (-47.5%). Women, who are crucial actors in household and therefore wider community food security, are much more affected by job reductions in the current JCP. Job creation – especially for women – would benefit from lessons learned by other agencies (ICRC, SIDA, UNDP/DEEP, etc), e.g. on empowering vulnerable families to take them out of poverty, roof/vegetable gardens for unskilled women, more private sector jobs for skilled women, perhaps with more micro-loans, etc., to reduce aid dependency.
- 7.6.9. UNRWA is trying to address the issue through community-based projects, e.g. in agriculture, but these entail mostly low-skilled positions, which are already limited by cultural and societal factors. Furthermore, women are also disadvantaged by the limited duration of the JCP assignments and the long waiting times between UNRWA jobs: up to 8 years for women, against 5 years for men. This factor significantly inhibits the potential poverty reduction impact of the JCP, in particular for women.
- 7.6.10. In addition to gender violence and HLP rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of December 1948 includes a range of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Civil rights aim, among others, at ensuring physical and mental integrity, life and safety, protection from discrimination on the grounds of; e.g., national origin or ethnicity, Individual rights such as privacy, the freedoms of thought and conscience, speech and expression,

⁸⁷ https://www.nrc.no/arch/_img/9685838.pdf.

religion, the press, assembly and movement. Political rights also include some key concerns in the Palestinian context: the rights of the accused, including the right to a fair trial; due process; the right to seek redress or a legal remedy; and rights of participation in civil society and politics, such as freedom of association, the right to assemble, the right to petition, the right of self-defence, and the right to vote. In addition, economic, social and cultural rights are socio-economic human rights, such as the right to education, right to adequate standard of living, or right to health. Despite the expected outcome of the UNRWA general support programme which aims very ambitiously at ensuring 'human rights enjoyed to the fullest', only some of the socio-economic human rights are actually covered.

- 7.6.11. In the Wealth Creation Pillar, the PMDP and Affordable Housing programmes do not appear to be currently set to significantly benefit women or youths, or aid the inclusive economic empowerment of vulnerable categories. As stated in the PMDP Business Case (BC), 'sustained economic growth which helps reduce [this] high unemployment and poverty is a key part of Palestinian state-building objectives'. Registered Palestinian firms, start-ups, and cooperatives are eligible to apply for matching grants. However, 60% of Palestinian women are working in the informal sector – particularly in agriculture and in Area C – and may appear to be *de facto* excluded. Moreover, according to the PMU, the project is not intended to be an incubator for start-ups,⁸⁸ and agriculture as a sector can only benefit from the second component of the project ('addressing market system failures in specific sectors').⁸⁹ At the time of the Review there was no evidence available for gauging the extent that market studies may effectively contribute to the alignment of the planned programmatic inputs with outputs, outcomes and intended impacts.
- 7.6.12. In 2009 a study conducted by MAS⁹⁰ revealed that affordable housing in the OPTs should have a number of characteristics,⁹¹ which are not being met by most unit prices offered by the three new housing developments on which AMAL mortgages were intended to be primarily used for.
- 7.6.13. The environment is duly mentioned in all Business Cases although assessment of related risks is usually limited to shortages of drinking water for the beneficiaries, waste management or flash flooding, and is evaluated as 'medium/manageable'. UNRWA maintains a dedicated special environmental health team to ensure minimum negative environmental impact in the official refugee camps. The main environmentally related risk in the short-term is the rapid depletion and increasing pollution of the Gaza aquifer, which can threaten all the current cooperation programmes in the area, including UNRWA's. Technical solutions are being implemented or studied, e.g. by the World Bank, UNDP and the EU, and include the building of wastewater treatment plants. The projects are, however, facing strong political-cum-technical constraints, such as the Israeli embargo on construction materials and the fact that existing plants do not receive enough electricity from Israel to function due to outstanding payments for electricity supplies. Should the situation fail to improve rapidly, this risk will have to be upgraded in all the DFID programmes and stronger advocacy measures considered.

⁸⁸ The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Country Report 2012 concluded that youth entrepreneurship is an important source of job creation in OPT; http://www.mas.ps/2012/sites/default/files/Global%20Entrepreneurship%20Monitor%202012_Publication%20draft.pdf

⁸⁹ Only 15% of operating enterprises are active in the industrial sector, and only 8.1% of enterprises are managed and/or owned by women. Source: PCBS; Establishment Census-2012.

⁹⁰ Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institution-MAS, 2009; Housing and Mortgage Loans in Palestine.

⁹¹ An average unit price of \$60,000; for families with a monthly income of between NIS 3,000-5,000; with a down payment between 10% and 20% of the price and a monthly payment between 30%-35% of the income; mortgages should have fixed interest rates, ideally at a rate of 6.5% or below with a re-payment period of 25 years.

7.7. Coordination

EQ 14 - How well were programmes harmonised with other aid agencies working in the same sector or through the same aid delivery channels, and to what extent did DFID's participation in aid coordination mechanisms strengthen DFID's development results?

- 7.7.1. Among the 12 Sector Working Groups that support the Strategy Groups for Aid Coordination to Palestine, DFID has been the lead agency in the Security sector. DFID's proactive commitment and knowledge in this role has been much appreciated by every institutional stakeholder interviewed (donors, PA). There was, however, a caveat from some civil society actors who would like to see more transparency and accountability in the use of the large DFID funds channelled through the WB Trust Fund to the PA security apparatus.
- 7.7.2. DFID is also a member of the group of six key donors committed to fund primarily UNRWA's General Fund, and leads the efforts in providing technical assistance, monitoring and advocating organisational development reforms to UNRWA. Whereas other donors sound quite supportive, there is a lack of evidence of shared workload or related transaction costs in this crucial task.
- 7.7.3. The degree of coordination in any economy is generally a function of the level of economic development. As economies become more sophisticated, the level of coordination tends to increase automatically. Where economies operate at reasonably high levels of coordination, the private sector is encouraged to invest and innovate. In the OPTs coordination is minimal at different levels, which makes its ramification bigger in light of the dominating fragility as well as the small and poorly integrated economy.
- 7.7.4. The PNDP development process starts by guidance dissemination by MoPAD to different line ministries to submit their needs and priorities in light of the National Policy Agenda. The monitoring system is not yet well functioning and requires further institutionalization. Coordination amongst ministries is progressing in infancy steps, and capacities need to be enhanced especially in areas of project management and information management. MoPAD recognizes this⁹² and states its intention to address these gaps by the end of 2014. The inter-ministerial knowledge gap due to lack of coordination, validated by some interviewed donors, hinders the coordination landscape in Palestine and realization of national development objectives. Within the economic growth pillar, coordination between MoPAD and other line ministries becomes even more crucial as the current level of coordination between them is limited to identification of needed priority projects in the absence of a future vision for the Palestinian economy.⁹³
- 7.7.5. Though the Ministry of National Economy (MoNE) consults with the private sector through their coordination council in developing their plan and is currently working on developing a framework with the German Cooperation Agency on improving the PPP, the private sector sees that occasional meetings without clear agendas and mechanisms will not be enough, as noted by an interviewed businessman: 'There is a need for real PPP and coordination with central government and local government units for private sector-led economy; what we ask for is just to be heard'. Small-Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are not perceived to be well represented in private sector forums/unions by some interviewed think tank personalities and MoNE confirms 'we have a problem in private sector representation because of different

⁹² As captured and validated during an in depth interview with MoPAD representative.

⁹³ Explained by MoPAD representative to be partially driven by the nature of the national plans being mid-term in nature.

representation and competition amongst them, usually big businessmen lead and the voice of SMEs is not there or heard. We have to find better ways to communicate with them.'

- 7.7.6. For the PMDP, and the economic growth pillar in general, a more common vision and strategy needs to be shared by different stakeholders on what is needed for private sector-led economic growth. Different initiatives and efforts are not well coordinated. This needs to be strengthened in view of the increased focus on economic development in the peace negotiations.

7.8. Conflict Sensitivity

EQ 15 - To what extent did the programmes apply the Peace-building – State-building checklist (Annex 1 to the Terms of Reference) in their business cases and reviews, in terms of political analysis, programme design, conflict sensitivity and 'Do No Harm', and indicators?

- 7.8.1. **Draft Framework to assess the quality of design of DFID's programmes on peace-building and state-building:** The PB-SB tool was developed by a group of advisers within DFID CHASE as means to make operational DFID's policy on peace-building and state-building by providing a mechanism to review business cases that were going through the Quality Assurance Unit. The tool provides a structured way of thinking through the implications of a proposed programme and is being used by some staff in-country and at headquarters. The tool is currently being piloted and will need to be further assessed on its effectiveness in supporting the team in assessing the contribution of the different interventions toward peace-building and state-building.
- 7.8.2. The current Draft Framework to assess the quality of design of DFID's programmes on peace-building and state-building is found to be a good tool but is limited to the design stage of a programme (appraisal of the Business Case). The Programme team could benefit from further support from the CHASE team and conflict adviser in 'how' to assess progress against PB-SB indicators and how to mitigate risks during programme implementation.
- 7.8.3. It is often found in development programming that at the design and appraisal phase programmes are assessed against a number of set frameworks or guidance notes. However, experience is that during the implementation, operational pressures (workplans, financial expenditures, etc.) take precedence and less time is available for properly assessing progress against higher-level outcomes or expected impact. Support needs to be given to the Programme staff to develop OPTs specific conflict sensitive indicators to be integrated in the M&E system. This is especially important in a conflict setting where there is real potential for aid delivery to cause harm or exacerbate the conflict dynamics.
- 7.8.4. It is the Review team's opinion that the PB-SB is an appropriate tool to assist DFID teams during the appraisal phase but needs to be strengthened with more practical guidance on how to assess progress. The application beyond the Business Case phase is critical.
- 7.8.5. Across the Programme the PB-SB checklist is the basis for the Conflict Adviser to provide input in the design of the programmes. The Review team conducted a scoring of the reports against the PB-SB, which resulted in an average scoring of 3. The challenge for DFID, however, is to make the PB-SB checklist more operational to assist projects in improving their ratings. Strengthening 'Do No Harm' and Conflict Sensitivity in the Programme could be achieved through a Conflict Sensitivity Assessment relevant to the operating context and the

programmes implemented. It must be mentioned that the DFID staff are well informed and knowledgeable about the context, the challenges and the partners they work with. This knowledge would be better utilised for the Programme as a whole if it could be documented in a programme specific Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) to be conducted and utilised jointly by DFID, FCO and others. The JACS should not result in a theoretical document, as often happens with conflict analysis. The end results should be shared practical and operational strategies that will support peace-building within the OPTs and support the MEPP. Many donors operating in the OPTs do not have a conflict analysis in place. DFID, with its knowledge and experience, should consider leading a joint JACS, not only for UK actors but also for other international actors because every donor has limitations as well as areas of strength to address challenges and support opportunities for peace.

- 7.8.6. Under the **State-building pillar**, in a review of the Business Cases and Annual Reviews for each project, there is significant analysis in each in relation to the four areas covered by the checklist. In our review of these, no subject was ranked lower than '3' on the prescribed 1-4 scale.
- 7.8.7. Under the **PVH pillar**, the PB-SB framework appears to have been correctly used (with the exception of the School Construction programme – see below – and the logframe of the UNRWA general support programme), although results are fragmented in various sections of the programmes' documents.
- 7.8.8. **202375 Food Security in Gaza**: The political context is well analysed in the Business Case and updated in the 2013 Annual Review. The programme is designed to address the effects of conflict (embargo on Gaza) and fragility (lack of access to food security for the most vulnerable) although it lacks internal coherence. Whereas WFP's UVP is linked to other economic assets and provides choice and dignity to the (non-refugee) beneficiaries, UNRWA uses much less innovative approaches (low-skilled, short-term jobs here and physical food distribution in other projects) which tend to perpetuate a level of dependency among the refugees and discrimination between refugees and non-refugees. This risk has not been identified among the list in Section E of the management case, nor in Section 4 of the Annual Review, even though impact indicator 2 in the logframe will be looking at 'food insecurity in Gaza, disaggregated by refugees and non-refugees'.
- 7.8.9. **202611 Education in Gaza**: The political context of Gaza is well analysed, but the programme has a rather narrow focus, being restricted to the physical construction of 12 new UNRWA schools for refugee children. Assessments of conflict, fragility, risks and opportunities are limited to that framework and do not address wider PB-SB issues. Similarly, none of the indicators in the logframe are related to PB-SB.
- 7.8.10. **202885 Support to UNRWA general budget and reforms**: Successful UNRWA reforms that may improve financial sustainability of the Agency – or their failure – would have a direct impact on the resilience of the population in Gaza, hence on the peace negotiations. The context, need for reforms and options are well analysed in the strategic, appraisal and management cases of the BC. The table of risks duly addresses PB-SB issues (MEPP, two-state solution, credibility of the PA, conflicts, civil unrest, access restrictions). The ToC appears to be rather simplified.
- 7.8.11. The logframe's impact and outcome are both indirectly linked to PB-SB ('long, healthy and dignified lives for Palestine refugees', and 'basic services are sustainably provided and human rights are protected for Palestine refugees'). However, these objectives are poorly

translated into the logframe indicators, none of which can qualify as conflict indicators or even sensitivity 'interaction indicators', following DFID's definition.⁹⁴

7.8.12. **202443 NRC Legal Assistance:** Legal assistance activity is focused on addressing some key sources of conflict and fragility that undermine the peace process. In the BC, political analysis is thoroughly made in Section A, conflict and fragility are assessed in Section F, and risks are duly listed and assessed in Section B of the Management Case. In the logframe, outcome indicator 3 and outputs indicators 2.1 and 4.2 can be considered as interaction indicators. As the programme started only in April 2013, no Annual Review has yet been conducted.

EQ 16 - To what extent did the UK counter-terror legislation impact on the delivery of DFID's Palestinian Programme?

7.8.13. Counter-terrorism laws have had a significant impact on humanitarian action. They have increased operating costs, slowed down administrative functions and operational response, and have significantly undermined humanitarian partnerships.⁹⁵

7.8.14. The lack of clarity on what the definition 'support to terrorist groups' means adds to the negative impact of the CT legislation – the notion of 'support' varies across different jurisdictions. The EU Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, which is binding on all EU Member states, defines participation in the activities of a terrorist group to include 'supplying information or material resources, or funding its activities in any way, with knowledge of the fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of the terrorist group'. The UK has expanded this so that not only 'knowledge' will contribute to terrorist activity, but also 'having reasonable cause to suspect' that this is the case, is enough to attract criminal responsibility.

7.8.15. DFID aims to be very diligent in the application of the CT legislation to ensure that the funds are not misspent, either for terrorism or corruption. So far there has been no assessment of the due diligence approach used by DFID: this is something DFID may want to consider in the future when it is, itself, clearer on the boundaries of the CT legislation. DFID should also take this up with other donor agencies to ensure a more common understanding and application of the CT legislation in the OPTs.

7.8.16. Based on interviews conducted and a review of opinion documents from civil society, it is evident that the CT legislation does prevent national state-building and partnerships with a number of key actors in Palestinian civil society. Leading Palestinian NGOs, represented by the Palestinian NGO Network, have made it clear that they reject any form of terrorism and any act of violence against civilians. Their stand is that, if this principle is adhered to by Palestinian civil society, there is no need to sign the CT legislation. In their opinion, the CT legislation and signing of the clauses in grant agreements perpetuates the connection between Palestine and terrorism.⁹⁶ In principle, Palestinian NGOs take a stand against vetting beneficiaries.

7.8.17. The CT legislation has led to an increase in the provision of financial support to international NGOs or to multi-lateral organisations that sub-contract to Palestinian NGOs. Contractually, the international NGO is responsible for the application and adherence to the CT legislation.

⁹⁴ 'The interaction indicators track the dimension of the intervention that might be affected by the conflict, or might affect the conflict'; Monitoring and Evaluating Conflict Sensitivity, DFID, March 2013, Tool 2, p.28.

⁹⁵ Findings are based on feedback provided in interviews, meetings with NGOs and other stakeholders.

⁹⁶ MA'AN Development Center, Position Paper, Matrix of Control: The Impact of Conditional Funding on Palestinian NGOs, p.19.

This change is negatively affecting the viability of Palestinian civil society, particularly when some donors withhold funding if NGOs do not sign against the CT clauses in contracts. In addition, because of the CT laws in their home countries a number of donors are playing it safe and only providing funding to UN agencies.

- 7.8.18. The Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) has commissioned a report on the impact of the CT legislation on aid delivery in the OPTs. Unfortunately, at the time of this evaluation the findings were not yet available.
- 7.8.19. Some examples of projects are given to illustrate how DFID implements its programmes within the CT Legislation:
- 7.8.20. **202375 Food Security in Gaza:** WFP is relying on OXFAM (International NGO), which is well-established in Gaza and has a good track record of managing to safeguard its work from political interference by Hamas. UNRWA implements directly with beneficiaries through its own employees and it has pushed back 'robustly' when Hamas has attempted to exert influence over areas of UNRWA's work. Both partners have taken extensive precautions to ensure that Hamas does not derive any financial benefit from UK aid to Gaza. It would, however, be extremely difficult, costly and against human rights principles – to inquire about family linkages of individual beneficiaries of the programme. Beneficiaries should receive support to meet basic needs based on their living conditions and needs.
- 7.8.21. **202611 Education in Gaza:** UNRWA implements its projects directly through local contractors registered with the PA's Contractors' Union. The risk of financial benefit accruing to Hamas (e.g. through the use of tunnel-imported project inputs) was considered low even before the closing of the tunnels by Egypt. Negotiations are conducted with the Israelis to allow access to construction materials for UN projects through the Israel-Gaza border crossings. UNRWA maintains strict procurement procedures consistent with donor policies on prohibition of direct and/or indirect financial support to Hamas. However, projects are held up because of delays in the arrival of construction materials due to Israeli restrictions and failure to give approval to transport materials into Gaza.

EQ 17 - To what extent does each of the three pillars and the mix of pillars, programmes and partners in the Programme prevent exacerbating conflict in terms of aid delivery to refugees and non-refugees, geographic areas, and vulnerable groups?

- 7.8.22. **Partners:** One group that is not well represented under DFID's Palestinian Programme is Palestinian Civil Society. The programme 'Tajaawob' implemented by the British Council is very limited in size (funding and focus). British Council has partnered with 2 UK NGOs and 3 Palestinian NGOs. The programme had just commenced when the DFID review took place. It was found that the programme design is not clear on how it will be implemented in Gaza and East Jerusalem and, most importantly, it lacks clarity on the results it aims to achieve. From the documentation review and consultation it is also unclear how the project was designed and how much consultation took place with Palestinian civil society during the design process. The bulk of the project's budget (page 19 of the inception report) is for salaries and overheads of four large organisations, with very limited outputs and activities expected. Based on the review of the first quarterly report (December 2013) it is evident that more capacity building will need to be provided to the Palestinian partners before the programme will be able to deliver results. Areas that will need to be covered include programme management, planning and budgeting and using advocacy tools in the programme work. The Review team is of the opinion that it would be in Tajaawob's interest

to strengthen its linkages with other leading civil society organisations who could act as mentors to the programme.

- 7.8.23. **Geographical areas:** To support the viability of a Palestinian state there should be increased implementation of programmes in Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, Area C and the Gaza Strip.
- 7.8.24. **Refugees and non-refugees:** Based on interviews and a review of socio-economic data, the focus should not be on refugees versus non-refugees. Vulnerability, poverty, gender, youth, unemployment and geographic location should be the determining factors in allocating aid. This should be further assessed as part of DFID's future programming.
- 7.8.25. **Vulnerable groups:** Two groups stand out after reviewing the different interventions: women and youth (both young men and women).

7.9. Theory of Change (ToC)

- 7.9.1. DFID's OP and underlying ToC is based on an integrated approach that puts peace-building and state-building at the centre of the work in the OPTs.⁹⁷ The integrated approach is based on the following goal and four objectives:

<p>Goal: Building peaceful states and societies</p> <p>I. Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms</p> <p>II. Support inclusive political settlements and processes</p> <p>III. Develop core state functions</p> <p>IV. Respond to public expectations</p>

- 7.9.2. The four objectives are expected to contribute to strong state-society relations, which are critical to building effective, legitimate states and durable positive peace. Strengthening this will require engagement with non-state and informal institutions as well as the state.⁹⁸
- 7.9.3. In operational terms the Programme is aligned with the PB-SB Framework when reviewing the different interventions and the vision for the Programme. This, however, is not supported by the Headline Results and Results Achieved included as Annex 1 in DFID's OP, which are mostly linked to the MDGs. DFID should reconsider the way it presents its objectives and expected results. These should link with the integrated approach for state-building and peace-building developed in the DFID Practice Paper 'Building Peaceful States and Societies'.
- 7.9.4. **Progress of OPTs Programme against the integrated Peace-Building and State-Building Approach:**
- 7.9.5. **Objective 1:** Actions against this objective support or underpin interventions planned and implemented against the other 3 objectives. To strengthen DFID's performance against this objective the OP should be supported by a Conflict Sensitivity Review (CSR) of the country programme based on CHASE Guidance. The CSR is expected to clarify how the different interventions are intended to support PB-SB. The draft framework developed to assess the

⁹⁷ DFID, Building Peaceful States and Societies, A DFID Practice Paper.

⁹⁸ DFID, Building Peaceful States and Societies, A DFID Practice Paper, p.7.

quality of design of DFID's programmes on PB-SB supports this objective, but can be further strengthened through a CSR.

- 7.9.6. **Objective 2:** The vision of DFID's OP in the country is for a positive resolution to the conflict through a negotiated peace process based on a two-state solution. DFID supports the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) to develop its capacity in peace negotiations and aims to support democratic processes within the Palestinian society and the PA. The latter is facing obstacles because of the political divide between Gaza and the West Bank, the control of Hamas in Gaza, and the subsequent application of the CT legislation on the aid programme. These factors have prevented the PA holding elections since 2006 and the PLC convening. Overdue elections and a Palestinian legislature with the inability to function have resulted in certain parts of the governance system lacking legitimacy.
- 7.9.7. **Objective 3:** The focus of the Programme has been on the development of the core state functions with support to the security and justice sector, and the administrative and financial management capacity of the PA. Significant progress and results have been achieved against this objective but the weaker aspect of the Programme is in working with non-state actors, where appropriate, to ensure that justice and security is accountable and responsive to society. Supporting the development of core state functions was undertaken mainly through the Trust Fund managed by the World Bank.
- 7.9.8. **Objective 4:** It is the opinion of the Review team that DFID needs to significantly increase its efforts and focus under its OP. Core state functions have been established and the ability and capacity of the PA to govern have been confirmed by the World Bank and the UN. However, the public expectations around delivery of basic services (including security and justice), jobs and economic growth, human rights and democratic processes are not sufficiently addressed. During various interviews in-country, stakeholders pointed to a growing discontent among the population and the growing disconnect between the PA-based centre of Ramallah and the wider Palestinian society in the different geographical areas. DFID's focus should be on better balancing the democratic legitimacy of the PA with its performance legitimacy, which falls more under Objective 3.
- 7.9.9. Review team found that the gaps in the Programme are under Objective 4, with: insufficient attention to working with non-state actors; inadequate balance between short-term humanitarian aid and long-term sustainable poverty reduction programmes under the PVH pillar; insufficient financial resources allocated to the Wealth Creation pillar, and lack of strategic focus on how this pillar will impact on inclusiveness and unemployment. This finding was confirmed through interviews in-country and through an assessment of the selection of DFID's partners. It was found that the Programme was greatly centred on the PA and on UNRWA, without sufficient involvement of non-state actors. This is being rectified through a number of new programmes such as the UNDP/UN Women programme, which includes more civil society actors. However, even with this new initiative it is important for DFID to consider the balance and role of civil society under its existing programme.
- 7.9.10. **Palestinian Programme Country Poverty Reduction Diagnostic (CPRD)**
- 7.9.11. The OPTs' CPRD draft of January 2014 identifies the '*key barriers to a secure, timely, self-financed exit from poverty*'. The document identifies the lack of progress in negotiations to reach a two-state solution and an end to the occupation as the fundamental impediment to sustainable poverty reduction and equitable growth.

- 7.9.12. The CPRD examines similar areas as the 'Four Objectives under the integrated approach for' – both analyses are complementary (see Annex 7.8). The state-building and peace-building stat-b CPRD also assesses the conflict, political settlement, core-state capability and services delivery. In addition, it looks at growth and resilience. The document identifies well the obstacles for development posed by the occupation, the Gaza blockade, Palestinian political division and the regional instability. Importantly, the CPRD also alerts toward the dangers of the lack of an inclusive relationship between the Palestinian leadership and the Palestinian 'street'. Continued perceived disenfranchisement has the potential to undermine the current moderate Palestinian leadership and engender potential support for those less committed to peace.
- 7.9.13. The draft CPRD identifies four possible scenarios around peace talks and the effect on the poverty trajectory: 1) Peace talks continue beyond the set timescale; 2) Talks end in stalemate but hope for the two-state solution still exists; 3) Talks end acrimoniously with increased tensions and possible violence, and 4) Breakthrough in negotiations.
- 7.9.14. The different scenarios that DFID puts forward in the poverty diagnostic support the evaluation team's opinion that the Programme for the OPTs needs to have its own development goal and vision. This should be in support of the political vision for a resolution to the conflict within a two-state solution. Because the Programme is implemented in a conflict context and fragile environment both levels need to work directly on conflict (triggers and opportunities).
- 7.9.15. **Revised Theory of Change:** The OP should introduce 'poverty and vulnerability reduction' as a development goal. Interventions under each pillar should be assessed to ensure they are in support of the development goal, which in turn contributes to the political vision of a two-state solution to the conflict. The majority of DFID's interventions will contribute to the development goal which lays the foundation for a viable, inclusive and peaceful Palestinian state. A number of DFID's interventions will be in support of the peace negotiations, such as the support to the PLO Negotiations Affairs Department and the support to the refugees in the region through UNRWA, with relevance to long-term poverty and vulnerability reduction.
- 7.9.16. Under State-building, DFID support through the Trust Fund should be made conditional to the PA supporting an enabling environment for private sector development and inclusive economic growth. The Portland Trust study 'Beyond Aid' highlights well what should be done and can be done to support economic growth. Economic growth should, however, hold a poverty reduction agenda.
- 7.9.17. The Wealth Creation pillar should receive additional financial resources to those currently available. However, additional funding should only be provided if there is a clear strategy in place for the design and implementation of this pillar.
- 7.9.18. Under the PVH pillar a focus should remain on humanitarian assistance, but lessons should be learned from others and areas identified proactively where more long-term development approaches can be implemented to support income generation and food security. Good practice examples do exist among civil society organisations and UN agencies that an approach to sustainable livelihoods is possible. Even within UNRWA the micro-finance programme is an example that demonstrates other interventions are possible.
- 7.9.19. Supporting the three pillars are interventions that will aim to address causes of vulnerability linked to the conflict context through the OQR (access and movement of goods and persons,

access to Area C), the Conflict Pool and IHL (demolitions, access, HLP rights, access to Area C).

7.9.20. Assumptions underpinning the suggested Theory of Change:

- a. That continued international aid to the OPTs is available for both long-term sustainable development and humanitarian assistance programmes;
- b. That no violent conflict will take place which will put demands on financial resources for emergency and recovery assistance, with less funding available for long-term sustainable development interventions;
- c. There is a willingness of the population to accept changes in approaches of aid delivery after 60 years of aid dependency;
- d. That 'Reduced Vulnerability' and 'Inclusive Economic Growth' will have positive impacts on how the population views the possible outcomes of a negotiated and just peace process;
- e. That the occupying power eases access and movement restrictions;
- f. That there is an interest among the donor community to align support for inclusive economic growth;
- g. That commitment to inclusive economic growth is maintained at the PA level and that there is commitment to support an enabling environment;
- h. That there is an interest of national and foreign institutions to expand or introduce businesses in the OPTs;
- i. That the political division between the West Bank and Gaza will be resolved and the opportunity will exist for national institution-building and economic growth;
- j. That the Palestinian population has access to its resources and control over its borders to stimulate economic growth.

8. Review Conclusions

- 8.1. DFID has contributed significantly to the international community's development priorities to build a Palestinian administration that can deliver services to its population. In 2000, an aid effectiveness study, reviewing the years since the 1993 Oslo Accords, concluded: *'Donor support slowed the overall economic decline, contributed to economic growth, and strengthened key institutions and local capacities. In doing so, donors have contributed to political stability, thus helping to sustain continued Israeli-Palestinian negotiation.'*⁹⁹
- 8.2. It was found that the DFID Programme was in line with the PA's National Development Plan (PNDP) of 2011-2013, with its strong focus on strengthening the effectiveness of PA institutions, the financial management and accountability of the PA, and security sector reform. The PA is currently developing its PNDP 2014-2016 and, based on the General Framework shared by MoPAD with the evaluation team, it is expected that the new PNDP will shift away from the previous focus on governance in favour of more support for economic development. This shift will aim to ensure financial sustainability, strengthen the enabling environment for private sector growth, and support social development to address the increasing unemployment, poverty and widening social gap within Palestinian society. It is expected that, in line with this shift, DFID will need to adjust the balance of interventions in

⁹⁹ Aid effectiveness in the West Bank and Gaza, a study produced by Japan and the World Bank for the Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 2000, Executive Summary.

the different pillars. One of the DFID Programme's strengths is the way it is constructed around three pillars, allowing sufficient flexibility to change the level of interventions between the different pillars and the emphasis within each of the pillars based on actual needs and priorities.

- 8.3. Under the **State-building pillar** 86% of the budget goes through the World Bank-managed Trust Fund to provide support to the PA. While the WB-managed Service Delivery Grant has contributed to the effectiveness of PA institutions and governance, it is questionable whether Service Delivery Grant conditions could be broadened to make more tangible links to legitimacy and democracy if not to the MEPP.
- 8.4. The main weakness under **DFID's Operational Plan/State-building pillar** is the PA centred focus, which should now be balanced with providing support to local government structures, non-state actors, Palestinian civil society and development NGOs. Supporting development interventions in Area C (60 % of the West Bank) and Jerusalem should be expanded if DFID wants to support a viable Palestinian State and equitable access to services and economic development for all Palestinians. Conditionalities around support to the PA should be adjusted to reflect the institutional progress made by the PA and the expected priority changes in the PNDP 2014-16, with an increased focus on economic growth and addressing social disparities. This is not to imply that other programmatic areas should be reduced but simply that a better programmatic balance be achieved.
- 8.5. The **Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger pillar** funds programmes that support UNRWA's core services and general fund (69.3% of the pillar budget), improving food security, the construction of new schools in Gaza, and providing legal assistance and advocacy for the lifting of restrictions and to improve access. The PVH pillar supports the objectives of the OP's vision statement and the pillar strategy. However, programmes under this pillar have so far failed to tackle proactively the root causes of vulnerability, nor have they advocated the FCO to be sufficiently assertive in holding Israel accountable for its actions.
- 8.6. As stated appropriately by the ICAI in their September 2013 report: 'DFID, through UNRWA, brings real benefits, notably in the health and education sectors (...) Overall, the services delivered by UNRWA help to ensure that the situation of the Palestine refugees does not add to regional instability. Poverty reduction programmes, however, delivered through cash and food transfers, now demonstrate only minimal impact.'
- 8.7. Under the UNRWA supported programmes, the Job Creation Programme (JCP) stands out as one for closer monitoring and reform, to integrate lessons learned by other agencies. The baseline report for the Food Security programme¹⁰⁰ outlined that 'the limited duration of the JCP assignments and the long waiting times of 5 years for men and 8 years for women significantly inhibit the potential poverty reduction impact of the JCP. The sporadic nature of the income from this labour conditional cash transfer means it is difficult to see how this programme can have significant impact on poverty within a given household.'
- 8.8. Financial allocation for the **Wealth Creation pillar** under DFID's OP was found to be inadequate considering the importance of supporting sustainable economic growth for poverty alleviation and revenue for the PA. It was also found that DFID should be more strategic and give a higher priority to the development of Markets for the Poor, ensuring that the interventions have an inclusive focus. DFID should support all related interventions because of the context in which they are implemented, through strong advocacy on the lifting

¹⁰⁰ PAI/ATOS, April 2013.

of access and movement restrictions. The OQR and other mechanisms, through which DFID could use its leverage to bring about changes in the restrictions, should be assessed and supported to increase their effectiveness.

- 8.9. It was found that DFID's Programme was not sufficiently forthcoming in increasing its interventions in Jerusalem and Area C. Area C (mainly rural) is key to economic recovery and sustainable growth; the GDP of the OPTs could potentially increase by \$3.4 billion annually and lead to 35% growth.
- 8.10. DFID should ensure that the CT legislation does not do harm to supporting communities in need of urgent assistance. There is concern that, because donors are compelled to adhere to the CT legislation, many vulnerable communities will not be reached and the effectiveness of Palestinian civil society will eventually be negatively affected.
- 8.11. There is much debate amongst donors about what steps to take if the current peace process fails and whether to continue funding the PA. Aid funding in the OPTs is closely tied to a political agenda, which is a 'successful' peace process. This can only work if the international community is willing to sanction both sides for poor performance, both diplomatically and through economic and financial measures. International actors must play a decisive role in ending the conflict and this will require an extraordinary degree of political courage. At a minimum, donors such as DFID need to play a commanding role in communicating the real situation and using their leverage with both sides and within the international community to hold both sides to account for their obligations.
- 8.12. If the current peace process fails, aid to the OPTs may be at risk. What is unique in this context is that donor funding levels to the Palestinians depends upon performance by both sides to the conflict. The norm in international financing is to link conditional funding to the performance of the recipient – not to the recipient and a second party that does not stand to benefit *directly* from the funds in question. In this case, Israeli actions will play a large part in determining whether Palestinians will receive the 'quantum increase' that would enable the economy to 'turn the corner'.
- 8.13. The latest reconciliation efforts, in April 2014, between Hamas and Fateh (the dominant movement in the PLO and the PA) resulted in both parties signing an agreement to put their differences aside. For the viability of a Palestinian state and for the Palestinian people as a nation it is important that both Gaza and the West Bank are unified and are reunited under a single PA. To ensure a successful resolution to the conflict it is also important that any future government that is formed is committed to a negotiated peaceful settlement with Israel. Reconciliation between Gaza and the West Bank will allow for an electoral democratic process, a legislative council and a parliament – steps needed to achieve a democratic and representative process. At the same time it is incumbent on Israel to meet its obligations as a partner in the peace process and with respect to International Law.
- 8.14. Whether this current round of negotiations will succeed remains to be seen, but the general consensus amongst Palestinians is that as long as the root cause of the conflict and their legitimate rights are not addressed (as laid down in numerous UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions) there will be no resolution to the conflict in the foreseeable future.
- 8.15. Since 2000, the volume of humanitarian aid has increased in both absolute and relative terms as the Palestinian economy has contracted, and increasing numbers of Palestinians have found themselves below the poverty line, have lost their livelihoods and seen their

homes demolished as a result of Israeli military operations and an occupying power evading its humanitarian obligations under IHL.

- 8.16. Today's status quo is clearly untenable: the large and complex aid effort already in place is unable to halt Palestinian economic and social decline, and only makes strategic sense if seen as a bridge to a period of serious change.

9. Review Recommendations

- 9.1. The **principal recommendations** are prioritised as follows:
- 9.1.1. The context of the continuing occupation and conflict puts significant constraints and limitations on what can effectively be achieved. British aid to the OPTs remains highly relevant but should not be linked solely to a fixed political agenda or vision.
- 9.1.2. The Review Report recommends a two-pronged approach: the Theory of Change should maintain a strong peace-building and political vision of a two-state solution while at the same time incorporating a development goal of Poverty and Vulnerability Reduction, contributing to an equitable Palestinian society and realization of human rights. Addressing the causes of poverty and vulnerability should be the rationale for allocating DFID's aid budget. A just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict should remain the top priority and end goal: the international community, of which Britain is a part, should step up efforts to work with both parties to reach a just solution, but at the same time these efforts need to be complemented with stronger long-term development work.
- 9.1.3. *DFID should continue supporting interventions under the three pillars: No changes should be made on the selection of the pillars but more on the weight of the funding and the approach used for the different interventions.* Budget support to the PA and UNRWA should continue as the two critical services and employment providers in the OPTs. However, conditionalities need to be made around long-term development approaches where possible, supporting an enabling environment for economic growth and democratic legitimacy.
- 9.1.4. Financial allocation under the Wealth Creation pillar should be increased considering the importance of supporting sustainable economic growth for poverty alleviation and revenue for the PA. DFID should be very strategic in developing and implementing an inclusive economic strategy, ensuring that the interventions have an inclusive focus, targeting women and youth and marginalized geographical areas.
- 9.1.5. Conditionalities around support to the PA should be adjusted to reflect the institutional progress made by the PA and the expected priority changes in the Palestinian National Development Plan for 2014-16, with an increased focus on economic growth and addressing the social gap in society. Stronger support should be given to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the PA while further consolidating its strengthened performance legitimacy. While performance legitimacy has been strengthened significantly this remains fragile and unequal across sectors and therefore deserves continued attention.
- 9.1.6. DFID contributes to the achievements against the MDGs through its contribution to UNRWA's General Fund and budget support for salaries to the PA – which DFID should consider linking to policy development and implementation in the future. This is the core message of the Report. Conditions linked to budget should remain on performance legitimacy and accountability but at the same time should be made equally conditional on policy development and implementation to close the increasingly widening social gap in

Palestinian society: this is in line with the PNDP for 2014-2016. Budget support to the PA should be linked to PA performance in supporting policies and reforms for poverty alleviation, equitable social services delivery, youth and women's economic and social empowerment, economic growth and private sector development.

- 9.1.7. Opportunity exists to expand programmes under the justice and security programme, such as human rights protection and access to justice for women and girls who are victims/survivors of gender-based violence. DFID's programmes should continue combining support for both government and civil society organisations in these areas.
- 9.1.8. There needs to be a better balance between supporting the PA at the central level and developing local government structures. Support to government institutions should be complemented with support to Palestinian non-state actors, including civil society and the media.
- 9.1.9. DFID should strengthen the identification and operationalization of potential linkages between the three intervention pillars. Example: Support under State-building could focus on strengthening line ministries relevant for economic development (such as support to the Ministry of National Economy to develop policy supporting an enabling environment for private sector development), which in turn could support economic growth and the private sector through the Wealth Creation pillar.
- 9.1.10. To support its development objectives DFID should be even more pro-active in using its leverage among other donor countries and support efforts based on International Law to increase diplomatic pressures on Israel to lift the blockade on Gaza and lift obstacles on the movement of goods and people in the OPTs in general. DFID should use its leverage to advocate for respect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the lifting of Israeli restrictions that impact negatively on achieving sustainable development outcomes.
- 9.1.11. There needs to be more focus on marginalized communities in Area C, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and Gaza from a human development perspective as well as a state-building perspective. A future independent Palestinian State will not be viable without the ability to develop these areas to the benefit of its citizens. DFID should continue discussions with the FCO in order to undertake joint actions with other international community members and advocate for the removal of restrictions on Palestinians' access to Jerusalem and Area C.
- 9.1.12. Palestinian civil society organisations should be supported to reach out to the more vulnerable communities (such as in Area C, Jerusalem and Gaza) where the PA has limited or no access, in conjunction with the PA/local government. Support to Palestinian civil society is also critically important to safeguard diversity.
- 9.1.13. Contributions to UNRWA's General Fund should continue under the PVH pillar. DFID should, in coordination with stakeholders such as UNRWA and Palestinian civil society organisations, explore further means of increasing interventions that have a longer-term developmental approach to supporting food security and sustainable livelihoods – with special emphasis on women and youth.
- 9.1.14. DFID should increase interventions that have a longer-term developmental approach to supporting food security and sustainable livelihoods (with special emphasis on women and youth) while maintaining humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable and the ability to respond in cases of significant outbreaks of violence or closures.
- 9.1.15. Interventions under the Wealth Creation pillar should work within a strategic vision of long-

term inclusive economic development targeting women, youth and marginalized areas (because of uneven development geographically). Inclusiveness should be defined and measurable performance indicators established. This pillar should work closely with leading think tanks and private sector stakeholders who are genuinely interested in exploring ways for a more inclusive economic growth. The programme should ensure that evidence from its approach of 'inclusive economic growth' can be demonstrated.

- 9.1.16. Interventions to support the protection of Palestinian HLP (Housing, Land and Property) should be expanded and complemented, as DFID is looking to facilitate coordination between PVH and State-building pillars on land registration challenges. HLP rights are cross-cutting to the Operational Plan.
- 9.1.17. DFID should exercise caution to ensure steps taken to implement the Counter-Terrorism Legislation do not contravene International Humanitarian Law (IHL), negatively impact on development interventions or equitable access to international assistance for communities. A more unified approach with European bilateral donors and the EU should be developed.
- 9.1.18. DFID's OPTs Gender Strategy 2013-2015 should be translated into a concrete action plan supported by a results-based M&E strategy. Promoting the prevention of gender-based violence, specifically violence against women and girls, and supporting economic and social empowerment of women and girls should be a priority.
- 9.1.19. Future DFID programming needs to further expand its focus on women and youth. Pilot programmes such as the project implemented around access to justice for women survivors of domestic violence have the potential to be multiplied. These programmes have the capacity to strengthen the connection between justice and security programmes with the general population, supported under the State-building pillar. Future programmes should also create equitable economic opportunities for women and youth, which is a target reflected in the revised logframe for the PNDP.
- 9.1.20. DFID, with its knowledge and experience, should consider leading a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS), not only for UK actors but also for other international actors because every donor has limitations as well as areas of strength to address challenges and support opportunities for peace. The JACS should not result in a theoretical document as often happens with conflict analysis: the end results should be shared practical and operational strategies that will support peace-building within the OPTs and support the MEPP.
- 9.1.21. DFID should review its M&E strategy around the Operational Plan to ensure it is well positioned to demonstrate results and change at the impact and outcome level. There is currently concern that the indicators are not the most effective for demonstrating the results of the DFID OPTs' office. Outcome statements and responding outcome performance indicators should be developed and confirmed with the main implementing partners.

9.2. **Additional recommendations** by pillar include:

State-building pillar

- 9.2.1. Diversify the programme portfolio to include projects that support local governance and administration, such as the World Bank's Village Development Programme.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹ For a brief on this project, see: World Bank, 'Proposed Village Development Programme: Scoping Mission.' Aide-Memoire, December 2013.

- 9.2.2. In considering revisions to the overall strategy for state-building and peace-building activities, ensure there are direct causal links between projects that intend to support and/or influence the MEPP (supporting the democratic legitimacy of the PA, provision of services at the local level ...). It is the Review team's opinion that support to state-building and peace-building are mutually reinforcing processes aimed at supporting the building of an effective, legitimate, accountable and responsive Palestinian state characterised by a healthy state-society relationship guided by a leadership with the ability to negotiate peace and a just solution to the conflict.
- 9.2.3. The gap between the PA internal structures, the assessment of needs and actual implementation may be addressed by having a finer tuned analysis of how different actors (central and local government, civil society/NGOs, multi- and bi-lateral donors) coordinate activities and align these with the PA/MoPAD.

Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger (PVH) pillar

- 9.2.4. Food security programmes should focus on increasing the income of families in a sustainable manner. The main problem for the population in Gaza is the affordability of basic food items on the market, which is linked to the closure.
- 9.2.5. DFID should encourage and support UNRWA and the PA's Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) to set up a national database – for refugees and non-refugees – to avoid duplications and ensure that the most vulnerable families are targeted for cash transfers and social protection.
- 9.2.6. The PVH pillar should strengthen linkages at policy and/or operational levels with the Wealth Creation and State-building programmes, aiming at supporting economic and social empowerment.
- 9.2.7. DFID should encourage UNRWA to explore how best to utilize the experience of other development organisations which have reportedly achieved results by using more pro-active and innovative approaches to inclusive economic development by empowering the most vulnerable.
- 9.2.8. Economic and social empowerment for women, including in Gaza, could benefit from lessons learned by other agencies (financial support for home gardens for unskilled women, access to micro-credit to set up small businesses, private sector job creation for skilled women to reduce aid dependency). In line with UNRWA's Medium Term Strategy, increased employment of women in economically productive sectors such as agriculture could have a proportionally higher impact on family food security.

Wealth Creation pillar

- 9.2.9. More assertive funding in support of inclusive economic growth as the main driver for poverty alleviation and viable Statehood is likely to be needed. Economic growth which is inclusive will have a direct impact on results under the State-building and PVH pillars.
- 9.2.10. DFID should explore options for supporting interventions in land registration issues. This is a crucial factor for market transactions and lending services, given that only 30% of land in the West Bank is currently registered with the Land Registration Department in the Ministry of Finance and is hard asset. Land registration is also linked to the protection of HLP rights of Palestinians.

External Review of DFID's Palestinian Programme

Final Report

Annexes

06 November 2014

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ANNEX 7.1:

TERMS OF REFERENCE

EXTERNAL REVIEW FOR DFID'S PALESTINIAN PROGRAMME

1. Introduction

1.1 DFID's regularly undertakes periodic independent evaluation of Country Programmes.

1.2 These terms of reference (ToRs) set out the scope of work for an independent country programme review to be undertaken of DFID's assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) over the period 2011 to 2015. This review will follow evaluation principles and methodologies.

1.3 The primary audience for the review report is DFID-OPTs. The aim of the review is to assess DFID Palestinian Programme's Operational Plan, and use its findings and recommendations to inform its next operational plan.

1.4 The review will be independent and robust, but it might also be sensitive and highly political, and therefore if necessary there will be a confidential annex with any sensitive material. The published report will be of interest to other partners including Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) in Jerusalem and the Palestinian Government. The report will also benefit DFID's country teams focusing on supporting fragile and conflict-affected countries, DFID's Management Board, regional directors and corporate performance policy teams. A summary of the report will be published in Arabic.

1.5 These ToRs should be read in conjunction with the attached DFID Palestinian Programme Operational Plan 2011-2015 that sets the contextual situation of DFID assistance to the OPTs.

DFID assistance to the OPTs

1.6 Resolution of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a high priority for the UK Government. DFID supports UK Government objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) by helping build Palestinian institutions and promoting economic growth, so that any future state will be stable, prosperous, well-run, and an effective partner for peace with Israel.

1.7 DFID support to the OPTs is focused on three areas; helping the Palestinian Authority (PA) to build strong institutions and enable them to deliver essential services; promoting private sector growth to stimulate the economy; and providing humanitarian assistance and support to the vulnerable.

1.8 Over the current operational plan period, DFID will provide £349 million in support of Palestinian development. DFID’s programme in the OPTs will:

- give predictable financial support to help deliver basic services to ordinary Palestinians;
- improve accountability, security and justice for the Palestinian people – this will include helping women victims of violence by improving facilities at three family protection units and providing information, advice and legal assistance services for over 3,000 vulnerable households;
- provide basic services to refugees across the region through the UN agency for Palestinian refugees;
- help develop the private sector to stimulate the economy, including supporting 250 enterprises a year to improve their annual sales or productivity performance;
- support cash transfers benefitting over 217,000 individuals; and
- provide primary education for over 36,000 children

1.9 The PA is a strong partner to DFID and is central to our programme – we provide technical and financial assistance to the PA to support our statebuilding objectives and to deliver public services to non-refugees in the OPTs. DFID supports the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) as the main provider of basic services to Palestinian refugees across the region. Also, DFID work closely with a wide range of other partners to ensure that our programme is aligned to the political context and to support our development objectives, including non governmental organisations, the Palestinian private sector, UN agencies and the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR)¹⁰².

Link to other evaluations:

1.10 This assignment will be a review of the overall DFID’s programme in the OPTs. It will build on individual programmes’ monitoring and evaluations as set out in the Middle East North Africa Department (MENAD) Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy (2012-15). The review is expected to use these findings as secondary sources (where they are available). Key planned evaluations and reviews for the Palestinian programme include:

Project / Programme	Budget	Project /	Planned	When
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¹⁰² The Office of the Quartet Representative is Jerusalem-based and made up of policy experts from various countries and institutions – representing, but not limited to, the Quartet (US, UN, European Union and the Russian Federation – who collectively act as shepherds of the Middle East Peace Process. It aims to promoting ground-up change in support of political developments and helping build the institutions and economy of a future Palestinian state.

		Programme Period	Evaluation / Reviews	
State-building Grant to the Palestinian Authorities	£122.2 m	April 2011- March 2015	Evaluation	End 2013
Food Security programme in Gaza, to be delivered through UNRWA and WFP	£96m	Sep 2011 – March 2015	On-going evaluation	Baseline in April 2013, and full evaluation end of 2013
Affordable Housing Project	£14m	May 2012 – April 2015	Evaluation	2015
Support to the work of the Office of the Quartet Representative	£1.067m	Feb 2011 – March 2015	Review	February 2012
Support to UNRWA General Fund	£106.5m	Jan 2012-March 2015	ICAI	November 2013

1.11 Other key evaluations conducted to date include:

- Facility for New Market Development in Occupied Palestinian Territories (May 2012).
- Affordable Housing Project review (June 2012)

1.12 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the review will not be a joint evaluation. We have considered this option and decided that due to the complexity of our own programmes, it would be better to commission an independent review on our own. This does not mean that our partners and beneficiaries will not part of the review, they will be interviewed, and their views will be collected and assessed.

2. Overarching objectives

2.1 The objective of this assignment is to review DFID's Palestinian Operation Plan in line with DFID's evaluation policy, the DFID MENAD M&E strategy, and the OECD DAC evaluation principles. Findings will be used to inform our 2014-15 programming, and our next operational plan. In particular it will try to answer the following questions:

Relevance

2.2 Was DFID's Operational Plan appropriate in terms of:

- delivering DFID's objectives in the region as summarised in the theory of change in figure 1.
- meeting DFID's corporate objectives – including poverty alleviation and 'do no harm'
- responding to the national agenda in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem including domestic policy objectives for poverty alleviation
- taking account of the needs of other partners eg UNRWA
- Was DFID's choice of aid instruments and partners appropriate in the circumstances?
- Was DFID's approach sufficiently flexible to allow change in light of political stagnation?
- What are the consequences for the PA and intended beneficiaries of DFID not pursuing its Programme?
- To what extent have the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the PA helped in terms of the impact of DFID programme

Effectiveness

- What results has DFID achieved against its OP/ programmes to date? Does this suggest that progress is on course? Also to consider the extent:
- Our statebuilding work lead to improved PA / citizen relationship?
- Our wealth creation work lead to more private sector led growth?
- How is DFID viewed as a development partner in the OPTs? Strengths? Weaknesses? Are we meeting international aid effectiveness commitments?
- Are DFID programmes sufficiently joined up? Is the mix of programmes the most effective including the focus on UNRWA and Statebuilding grant?
- What is the impact of UK counter-terror legislation and our compliance with it on DFID Palestinian Programme effectiveness and flexibility?
- Through DFID funding, are we giving better services to refugees compared with non-refugees and if so are we breaching the principle of non-discrimination?


Efficiency

- How has DFID Palestinian Programme been resourced to deliver its OP? eg in terms of human resources, financial allocations and ability to spend and contributing to influence etc. Also in term of work of staff on
- Was the balance of support allocated to the three pillars of DFID Palestinian programme appropriate?
- How has DFID worked with other donors to minimise transaction costs?
- What evidence is there that programmes undertaken represent value for money?

Sustainability

- Are the reforms/ changes supported by DFID's OPT programme moving in the right direction and are they likely to be sustained?
- Is there a danger of creating aid dependency?

- Has transparency, voice and accountability improved?



Impact

- What progress has there been towards the impact indicators?
- Given external factors and the contribution of other stakeholders, to what extent was the change attributable to DFID's programme?
- What real difference have the activities made to beneficiaries?

Coverage

- Are programmes including / excluding geographic locations and particular groups (eg women, and other marginalised groups), and what is the differential impact on those included and excluded?
- How successful has the programme been in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues around rights as well as gender and the environment/ climate change?

Coordination

- How well were programmes harmonised with other aid agencies?
- How well did DFID and the implementing partners work together with other partners in the country/region, particularly the Palestinian Authority?

Coherence

- Was the operational plan coherent with the UK's wider security, humanitarian, trade and military activities?
- How did the programme contribute to peacebuilding and statebuilding using the new draft framework and how did it contribute towards creating a viable two state solution (Annex 1)?
- How do the different pillar programmes link together/could links between pillar programmes be strengthened (and in what areas)?
- The questions of the review will be refined as part of Stage 1 of this work, and outlined in the Stage 1 report.

3. Methodology

3.1 The review will be independent, transparent (published) and use systematic methodology and apply international standards. Wide consultation with recipients and other stakeholders will be an important part of the methodology. Stakeholders include donors, academics, representatives of the media, and PA ministries where appropriate. The consultants will try to include the views of beneficiaries where possible, particularly women

and other vulnerable groups, to consider, wherever relevant, the impact of the project or policy on conflict and where possible, to sex disaggregate findings.

3.2 This review will follow a similar approach to country programme evaluations (CPEs) in DFID, in having two stages.

Stage 1

- Fieldwork: to take place by September 2013 in London and OPTs;
- Draft report: available by October 2013;
- DFID to review and provide comments within two weeks;
- Final Stage 1 report provided by November 2013.

3.3 It will involve visits to DFID teams in London to learn about expectations for the review, as well as to learn about the Palestinian programme including policy, management, decision making processes, roles and responsibilities and to gain access to relevant documentation from London. It will also involve a field visit to the OPTs to meet the DFID's team, visit projects and programmes, meet recipients and partners including FCO in Jerusalem, other donors, and PA ministries where appropriate.

3.4 The main objective of Stage 1 is to establish a clear baseline situation of the scope and breadth of DFID's Palestinian programme, assess current progress against the operational plan, and to scope and outline the full review process for Stage 2.

In addition, key objectives for Stage 1 include:

- Review and agree the current theory of change with DFID team;
- Refine the key review questions that DFID staff and partners will want it to address;
- Determining the exact nature of the review and resolving key methodological / practical issues – e.g. which projects will be covered by the review, and the possibility and usefulness of doing some beneficiary analysis.
- Assessing the current progress against the operational plan, and how DFID work with other donors.
- Identifying all key relevant cross-cutting issues around rights and access to justice, as well as gender and pro-poor inclusion to be considered during the fieldwork stage.
- Ensuring the review team has access to all relevant contacts and documentation.

Key documents will include:

- OPT's Operational plan 2011-2015;
- All Business cases for projects and programmes to date;
- OPT team organograms;
- DFID's evaluation policy, and the MENAD M&E strategy 2012-2015;
- All available evaluation / review reports of individual projects (e.g Statebuilding Grant and Palestinian Facility for Market Development)
- Palestinian National Development Plan;
- Annex 1: DFID Draft framework on assessing contribution to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.
- Other studies / reports done by partners including UNRWA, IMF and World Bank.

3.5 A report will be produced at the end of Stage 1. It will outline the outcome of the stage 1, covering in detail the current situation of DFID's Palestinian programme, progress against the operational plan, the risks associated, and how Stage 2 will be undertaken taking into consideration the flexibility for DFID to decide on the direction of Stage 2 based on the findings of Stage 1 report. It will include a full evaluation framework setting out each evaluation question and the methodology and data source that will be used to answer the questions. This report will be the main output of Stage 1 and will inform subsequent decisions including the direction of Stage 2.

3.6 A draft report will be submitted to DFID Jerusalem as first point of contact for feedback and comments from relevant staff including MENAD regional evaluation adviser, and MENAD Senior Statistics Adviser, Evaluation Adviser from outside MENAD, and DFID's MENAD Management Board (MMB). The evaluation team will incorporate the comments and then the MMB will sign off on the report. We would expect the Stage 1 report to include:

- A baseline situation of the scope and breadth of DFID Palestinian programme, assessment of progress against the operational plan and to outline the full review process in Stage 2. The report should set out:
- overall review framework, including the evaluation questions and methodology of collecting and assessing the data;
- proposed review team, including team leader and with indications of the split in work between the team members;
- proposed fieldwork length and revised overall timetable;
- proposed fieldwork approach, including key agencies and people to interview, and documents to obtain etc.; in order to triangulate views and get a balanced impression
- proposed dissemination strategy;
- risks inherent in the proposed approach and mitigation strategies.
- proposed contents outline of Stage 2 report

Stage 2

- Fieldwork: completed by end March 2014;
- First draft report, including presentation: by end April 2014;

- DFID to provide comments including those from EvD and MENAD Management Board within four weeks;
- Final report, incorporating DFID management response and Arabic summary by end June 2014;
- Lesson Learning Note by June 2014.

3.7 The exact format of the fieldwork for Stage 2 will be outlined in the Stage 1 report (as indicated above). It is proposed that the DFID team in the OPTs may help in making introductions to facilitate meetings with relevant partners in country. The fieldwork will also involve meetings (possibly virtually) with key development partners which should include the World Bank and UNRWA among others. It should make use of any relevant monitoring reports and evaluations from specific projects and programmes.

3.8 The initial findings of the Stage 2 report will be summarised in a meeting with DFID Jerusalem including MENAD regional adviser and Evaluation Adviser from the EV department.

3.9 A first draft of the report should be sent to DFID Jerusalem who will send to others as appropriate including MENAD regional adviser. DFID Jerusalem staff will be invited to correct any factual errors and make comments. Although they may challenge findings they disagree with, and sometimes have additional information to support a claim, the MENAD Evaluation Adviser, Evaluation Adviser from outside MENAD and Senior Statistics Adviser will support the review team to ensure that the report remains a true independent evaluation. The draft report will be also sent to the MMB to provide comments on the draft and the Evaluation Quality Assurance Panel (via EvD) who will quality assure the report against specific criteria (to be provided). All draft reports submitted should conform to the EvD style guide and checked for typos, formatting errors and consistency of data presented. The final draft should be of publishable quality. The consultant organisation will translate the review summary into Arabic. Finally, the MENAD Management Board will sign-off on the report.

4. Governance

4.1 The MENAD Management Board will oversee the whole review process; it will be responsible for signing off the review ToRs, Stage 1, final reports, and the management response. DFID Jerusalem will set up small task team comprised of relevant staff, including MENAD Evaluation Adviser, MENAD Senior Statistics Adviser, Deputy Programme Manager, and an Evaluation adviser from outside MENAD. This body will act as a steering committee for the process and will be responsible for leading discussions with the consultants, advising on the purpose and methodology for the strategic review, and ensuring the quality and independence of the report. They will discuss Stage 1 report, the composition of the consultants team, and the strategy for the main fieldwork. They will be a sounding board for the consultants during both stages of the fieldwork.

4.2 The Task Team are responsible for ensuring access to documents relevant to the strategic review to the consultants in good time. This will include strategy documents, business cases, notes of board meetings, annual reviews and other relevant documentation about the design, implementation and monitoring/ evaluation of individual programmes (but not any restricted background policy information). They will also coordinate comments on draft stage 1 and 2 reports, correcting for any factual errors, and lead the drafting of the management response. They are responsible for ensuring publication of the final report and the management response on the DFID website.

4.3 EV Department will be responsible to quality assure the ToRs of the review, stage 1 report and the final report through the Evaluation Quality Assurance panel. The consultant organisation is responsible for identifying and engaging a team of consultants appropriate to the regional context from within their company/ consortium and informed by the outcome of Stage 1. The team must have strong evaluation skills, understanding of DFID, the Paris Declaration and the local context, expertise in qualitative interviewing, and at least one of the team should have ability to converse fluently in Arabic. The full evaluation team will be identified following Stage 1 and should cover all the major areas to be covered in the review as identified during the stage one.

4.4 At proposal stage, the consultant organisation is expected to set out their proposed information gathering approach and the balance between quantitative and qualitative collection techniques. This can then be tested and reviewed during Stage1. In addition, they have to provide a risk management strategy for the review process.

4.5 The consultant organisation will be responsible for setting up and planning both stages, although DFID OPTs staff will help as set out in 4.2. They are also responsible for maintaining ethical standards (Annex 2) in implementing the review and managing logistics in country, with support from the DFID Jerusalem's team. They are responsible for ensuring that the review is in line with DFID's evaluation policy and DFID MENAD's monitoring and evaluation strategy. They are responsible for drafting the report according to the agreed schedule and to a high standard¹⁰³. The review team need to be familiar with the DFID's Palestinian programme, the country context and the full range of DFID policy papers that are relevant to the country programme

5. Outputs and timing

¹⁰³ Quality standards to be in line with OECD DAC quality standards
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/qualitystandardsfordevelopmentevaluation.htm>

5.1 The outputs required from this contract include:

5.2 Stage 1 Report by August 2013: As indicated in 3.3 this will provide a baseline situation of DFID's Palestinian programme and detailing the way in which the strategic review is to be carried out (including an indicative evaluation matrix).

5.3 Stage 2 Final Report by June 2014: The report shall be approx. 50-60 pages long (excluding annexes) and will include detailed lessons and recommendations. The EvSum, should be no more than 4 pages, and will include the management response from the DFID Palestinian Programme, which EvD will obtain. This will include a presentation of preliminary findings to DFID Jerusalem before the end of the fieldwork. The review team will also provide DFID with access to any other supporting information produced as background for the main report. It is not expected that these should be of publishable quality.

5.4 Lesson Learning Note by June 2014: The consultants will be asked to prepare a short lesson learning note reflecting on the review process, outlining what worked well and what would be done differently. The report should be a maximum of 5 pages.

6. Timing & Budget

6.1 The detailed timeframe will be agreed following Stage 1; but indicative timings are as follows:

Stage 1

- Fieldwork: planned to take place by June 2013 in London and OPTs;
- Draft report: available by July 2013;
- DFID to review and provide comments within two weeks;
- Final Stage 1 report provided by August 2013. The report will be signed off by MENAD Board.

Stage 2

- Fieldwork: completed by end February 2014
- First draft report, including presentation: by end March 2014

- DFID to provide comments including those from EvD and MENAD Management Board within four weeks
- Final report, incorporating DFID management response and Arabic summary by end June 2014.
- Lesson Learning Note by June 2014
- An indicative budget for this assignment is £100,000. This is based on cost of previous country plan evaluations.

OPTs Team April 2013

Appendix 1: Draft Framework to assess quality of design of DFID's programmes on peacebuilding and statebuilding.

	0	1	2	3	4	weighting
1. Analysis of political context	No Political / conflict analysis done; no link to SCA/PEA/GS EA (if done)	Limited political analysis. Programming not based (or very weakly based) on analysis.	More extensive analysis; some links to programming	Good political analysis using appropriate tools, and with some direct links to programming	Complete and robust political analysis (SCA/PEA or similar). Programme design directly and thoroughly responds to political analysis.	25%
2. Programme design addresses conflict and fragility	Options assessment and appraisal section do not address conflict or fragility. Objectives and theory of change do not reflect any elements of PBSB.	BC identifies some outputs with potential to contribute to PB-SB, but not clearly articulated, evidenced or included in assessment of options or in appraisals section.	Design options assessed against some elements of PBSB contribution. Theory of change links intervention to progress on some aspects of PB-SB, but articulation and evidence is limited. Appraisal section mentions likely impact on conflict or fragility.	Options for programme assessed against all relevant elements of PBSB Theory of change links intervention to PBSB, with links evidenced, or a plan in place to test evidence gaps. Appraisal section considers in detail the impact on conflict and fragility, including conflict sensitivity.	Options for programme are assessed and chosen based significantly on their PBSB impact. Theory of change presents a clear and logical link from the intervention to progress on all relevant aspects of PBSB. The appraisal section provides robust, evidence based assessment of impact on conflict and fragility, including conflict sensitivity. A clear plan is in place to test evidence gaps.	40%

3. Risks (and opportunities)	None of the identified risks relate to conflict or fragility	Some identification of programme risks related to conflict and fragility, with limited mitigation	Some key conflict/fragility-related risks identified and managed; some key risks ignored or not recognised	Systematic approach to identifying manageable and residual risk, including risk of doing harm.	Exhaustive identification of risks which are specific to FCAS (e.g. political/ reputational risks, programme & staff security). Risk of harm / conflict sensitivity analysis completed. Clearly identifies the potential risks of non-intervention on instability and fragility.	15%
4. Results Framework	No indicators that focus on PBSB objectives	Programme results are linked (e.g. in appraisal case) to PBSB, but no indicators in place to monitor this.	Programme results are linked to PBSB. Indicators are included or earmarked to measure this, but they are not technically robust	Results framework includes some good indicators for PBSB results, but these do not provide evidence of DFID attribution/ contribution. PBSB not (or weakly) referenced in evaluation strategy.	Includes high-quality indicators with transparent methodologies that explicitly measure the intervention's results against PBSB objectives, and provide robust information on DFID attribution/ contribution. PBSB a clearly articulated part of evaluation strategy.	20%
Total score: where 0-20 = 0 (inconsistent with PBSB principles), 20-40 = 1 (weak consistency with PBSB principles), 40-60 = 2 (consistent with PBSB principles), 60-80 = 3 (PBSB principles directly incorporated), and 80-100 = 4 (best practice):						/ 100

Weighting rationale: No programming should take place in FCAS without due consideration for the wider political context. Without this analysis, the risk of doing harm is very high, as is the risk of not achieving the intended results. This is therefore heavily weighted (25%). Similarly, the design of the programme – the theory of change, the criteria used to compare options, the evidence presented of

what works, will shape the programme's impact on conflict and fragility. Again, this is heavily weighted (40%). Special consideration should be given to risk (weighted at 20%) in FCAS, given the increased systematic risks, which can dramatically affect development outcomes. While a focus on results drives the heavy weighting on the programme design and risk, the results framework (weighted at 15%) is focused primarily on the business case logframe, and whether specific PBSB outcomes are considered.

Appendix 2: DFID Ethics Principles for Evaluation

1. Researchers and evaluators are responsible for identifying the need for and securing any necessary ethics approval for the study they are undertaking.
2. Research and evaluation must be relevant and high quality with clear developmental and practical value.
3. Researchers and evaluators should avoid harm to participants in studies.
4. Participation in research and evaluation should be voluntary and free from external pressure.
5. Researchers and evaluators should ensure confidentiality of information, privacy and anonymity of study participants.
6. Researchers and evaluators should operate in accordance with international human rights conventions and covenants to which the United Kingdom is a signatory, regardless of local country standards.
7. DFID funded research and evaluation should respect cultural sensitivities.
8. DFID is committed to publication and communication of all evaluations and research studies.
9. Wherever possible, research and evaluation should be independent of those implementing the intervention or programme under study
10. All DFID funded research/ evaluation should have particular emphasis on ensuring participation from women and socially excluded groups

The responsibility for conduct of research and evaluation in line with these principles generally rests with the principal investigator. Bids for research/ evaluation work should state that DFID's ethics principles will be upheld.

Appendix 3: DFID Overall Project/Intervention

Summary Risk Assessment Matrix

Project/intervention title: Palestinian Market Development Programme (PMDP) to strengthen the Private Sector in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs)

Location: Occupied Palestinian Territories

Date of assessment: 24 January 2013

Assessing official: Michael Sansour, Programme Officer

Theme	DFID Risk score
OVERALL RATING ¹	2
FCO travel advice	4
Host nation travel advice	Not available
Transportation	2
Security	2
Civil unrest	2
Violence/crime	1
Espionage	4
Terrorism	4
War	3
Hurricane	1
Earthquake	4
Flood	2
Medical Services	2
Nature of Project/ Intervention	1

¹ The Overall Risk rating is calculated using the MODE function which determines the most frequently occurring value.

ANNEX 7.2: FINAL EVALUATION QUESTIONS

Relevance

1. Did the Operational Plan and Theory of Change (*figure 1 of the Terms of Reference*) help DFID to demonstrate its development results and contribution to the long term vision of the Palestinian Programme, i.e. the two State solution? Was this approach sufficiently flexible to allow change in light of changed political circumstances?
2. Does the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners in DFID's Palestinian Programme support the UK Government's objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as outlined under the vision statement of the Operational Plan?
3. Does DFID's Palestinian Programme (mix of pillars, programmes, partners) effectively respond to the strategic objectives of the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) 2011 – 2013? Are there currently any development priorities that are not sufficiently responded to by the international development community and may threaten a key aspect of Palestinian autonomy?

Effectiveness

4. To what extent have the objectives of DFID's Palestinian Programme been met? Does this suggest that progress is on course, in particular regarding legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority leadership, economic growth and poverty reduction?
5. How is DFID viewed as a development partner in the OPTs? What are the main perceived strengths and weaknesses? Are we meeting international aid effectiveness commitments (such as alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability)?

Efficiency

6. At the strategic level, have each of the three pillars of DFID's Palestinian Programme been adequately resourced to deliver its Operational Plan objectives in terms of human resources, financial allocations, M&E and ability to contribute to policy leverage?
7. What are the major constraints in the current political and operating environment that may prevent DFID achieving its intended results?
8. What evidence is there that the programmes implemented deliver Value for Money?
9. To what extent did the harmonisation of programmes with other aid agencies contribute to reducing DFID's transaction costs?

Sustainability

10. Are the reforms or changes supported by DFID's Palestinian Programme moving in the direction of the vision statement of the Operational Plan, and are they likely to be sustained?

Impact

11. Given external factors and the contribution of other stakeholders, to what extent did DFID's interventions under the Palestinian Programme contribute to DFID's impact indicators supporting State-building, economic growth and poverty reduction?
12. To the extent of the review's capacity to investigate, what real differences have the activities made to recipients, development partners (including the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA) and beneficiaries?

Coverage

13. How successful has the Palestinian Programme been in mainstreaming crosscutting issues around human rights, gender equality and the environment?

Coordination

14. How well were programmes harmonised with other aid agencies working in the same sectors or through the same aid delivery channels, and to what extent did DFID's participation in aid coordination mechanisms strengthen DFID's development results?

Conflict Sensitivity – 'Do No Harm'

15. To what extent did the programmes apply the Peace Building – State Building checklist (Annex 1 to the Terms of reference) in their business cases and reviews, in terms of political analysis, programme design, conflict sensitivity and 'Do No Harm', and indicators?
16. To what extent did the UK counter-terror legislation impact on the delivery of DFID's Palestinian Programme?
17. To what extent does each of the three pillars and the mix of pillars, programmes and partners in the Programme prevent exacerbating conflict in terms of aid delivery to refugees and non-refugees, geographic areas, and vulnerable groups?

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

18. **Gender.** Assess to what extent gender (girls and women) has been incorporated into the OP/Programmes and make suitable recommendations. It will be necessary to review the DFID guidelines and policy on gender and assess how far these have been applied.
19. **Influencing work.** DFID would like to assess approach to influencing others (PA, WB, etc.) for each pillar. This is different from the programme work but is present in all the pillars. This may include a review of systems currently in place, bottlenecks in delivering those systems (DAC criteria) and coloration with related policy work they are doing. What are the opportune areas of influencing that are not (or not sufficiently) captured by DFID in their influencing work?
20. **CHASE.** Consultation is required.
21. If there is any 'disconnect' in any pillars between existing and any new overarching **UK's HMG policy statements?**

ANNEX 7.3:

EVALUATION MATRIX

High-level Review Questions	Sub-questions	Indicators (high-level outcomes and/or impact indicators in log frames, other SMART or no)	Sources of information
Relevance			
<p>1. Did the Operational Plan and ToC (figure 1 of the ToR) help DFID to demonstrate its development results and contribution to the long term vision of the Palestinian Programme?</p> <p>Was this approach sufficiently flexible to allow change in light of changed political circumstances?</p>	<p>1.1. Were the OP and ToC appropriate tools to demonstrate and adapt expected results in line with the long-term vision in the State-building pillar?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>PA capacity was effectively and flexibly assisted through predictable financial support, multi-year MoU and TA support in delivering:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -health services -education services -own development priorities (PNDP) in the context of MEPP -accountability to the public -protection for female victims of violence 	<p><u>High-level documents:</u></p> <p>OP (Vision)</p> <p>PNDP</p> <p>Reports (IMF, OQR, PA, UNSCO WB) to AHLC, Mar 2013</p> <p>Evaluation of state-building grant to PA (WB Trust Fund), end 2013</p> <p>Sections 14 in individual programme assessments (annex G)</p> <p><u>Project-level documents</u> (as relevant / feasible): sections 1, 9, 11, 14 in individual programme assessments (annex G)</p>

			<p><u>High-level stakeholders</u> (see cross-reference table in chapter 4.C, and sections 15 of the individual programme assessments)</p> <p><u>Other stakeholders (project level)</u> as relevant / feasible : as above</p>
	<p>1.2. Were the OP and ToC appropriate tools to demonstrate and adapt expected results in line with the long-term vision in the Wealth Creation pillar?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>Economic growth was effectively and flexibly assisted to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -reduced movement and access restrictions, through support to OQR -increased short-term growth and employment in the construction sector, through improving access to affordable housing and supporting reconstruction in Gaza; - increased long-term growth and employment in key „tradable“ sectors 	<p>As above</p> <p>-Evaluations of support to OQR, FNMD and affordable housing projects, 2012</p>
	<p>1.3. Were the OP and ToC appropriate tools to demonstrate and adapt expected results in line with the long-term vision in the PVH pillar?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>Poverty, vulnerability and access were effectively and flexibly addressed by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -ensuring that financial assistance to the PA helps it deliver responsive and targeted services to the most vulnerable groups; -signing a new multi-year core funding agreement with UNRWA and providing additional support to construct UNRWA schools in Gaza; -providing better access to legal services and representation for vulnerable households and individuals - including women headed households 	<p>As above</p> <p>-ICAI report on DFID support to Palestine refugees through UNRWA, sep 2013</p>

		<p>- in areas most affected by demolitions, house eviction, access to livelihood and/or services;</p> <p>-providing recovery and humanitarian support in Gaza, such as food vouchers and cash-for-work to poorer households, including those headed by women and with disabled members.</p>	
<p>2. Does the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners in DFID's Palestinian Programme support the UK Government's objectives for a successful MEPP as outlined under the vision statement of the OP?</p>	<p>2.1. Were the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners appropriate tools to demonstrate and adapt expected results in line with the long-term vision in the State-building pillar?</p>	<p>As 1.1 above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>2.2. Were the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners appropriate tools to demonstrate and adapt expected results in line with the long-term vision in the Wealth Creation pillar?</p>	<p>As 1.2 above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>2.3. Were the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners appropriate tools to demonstrate and adapt expected results in line with the long-term vision in the PVH pillar?</p>	<p>As 1.3 above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>2.4. What would be the consequences for the PA and intended beneficiaries of DFID not pursuing its Programme, and how would this affect aid dependency?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>Perception by key stakeholders:</p> <p>-PA</p> <p>-other donors</p>	

		-development partners	
<p>3. Does DFID's Palestinian Programme (mix of pillars, programmes, partners) effectively respond to the strategic objectives of the Palestinian National Development Plan 2011 – 2013? Are there currently any development priorities that are not sufficiently responded to by the international development community and may threaten a key aspect of Palestinian autonomy?</p>	<p>3.1. Were the mix of pillars, strategic priorities and partners appropriate tools to respond to the strategic objectives of the PNDP?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -The PNDP was effectively responded to by DFID in its governance agenda -The PNDP was effectively responded to in its social agenda -The PNDP was effectively responded to in its economy agenda -The PNDP was effectively responded to in its infrastructure agenda <p>(if not, why not?)</p>	As above
	<p>3.2. Are some PNDP priorities not sufficiently funded to the extent that they threaten a key aspect of Palestinian autonomy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -differences (% , amounts) between PNDP estimates and actual funding in the governance agenda -differences between PNDP estimates and actual funding in the social agenda -differences between PNDP estimates and actual funding in the economy agenda -differences between PNDP estimates and actual funding in the infrastructure agenda 	As above

	<p>3.3. Are some priorities as defined by DFID not sufficiently funded to the extent that they threaten a key aspect of Palestinian autonomy?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the State-building pillar -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the Wealth Creation pillar -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the PVH pillar 	<p>As above</p>
	<p>3.4. Are some priorities as defined by other key international actors not sufficiently funded to the extent that they threaten a key aspect of Palestinian autonomy?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the governance agenda -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the social agenda -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the economy agenda -estimated level of underfunding of priorities in the infrastructure agenda 	<p>As above</p>
<p>Effectiveness</p>			
<p>4. To what extent have the objectives of DFID's Palestinian Programme been met? Does this suggest that progress is on course, in particular regarding legitimacy of the PA</p>	<p>4.1. Extent to which objectives have been met in State-building pillar and legitimacy of PA leadership has improved?</p>	<p>(Outcome indicators and milestones in log frames)</p> <p>202241: see separate table 'list of impact – outcomes indicators per project'</p>	<p><u>High-level Documents:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Dashboard - As above

<p>leadership, economic growth and poverty reduction?</p>		<p>202564: as above</p> <p>201935: NA</p> <p>203397: NA</p> <p>(not SMART)</p> <p>-effectiveness of PA's M&E in reporting to WB Trust Fund</p> <p>-level of satisfaction from regarding legitimacy</p>	<p><u>Project-level documents</u></p> <p>Sections 6-7, 13 in individual programme assessments (annex G)</p> <p><u>High-level stakeholders:</u> as above</p> <p><u>Other stakeholders (project level) as relevant / feasible:</u> as above</p>
	<p>4.2. Extent to which objectives have been met in Wealth Creation pillar?</p>	<p>(Outcome indicators and milestones in log frames)</p> <p>114325: see separate table 'list of impact – outcomes indicators per project'</p> <p>201828: as above</p> <p>202887: as above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>4.3. Extent to which objectives have been met in PVH pillar?</p>	<p>(Outcome indicators and milestones in log frames)</p> <p>202375: see separate table 'list of impact – outcomes indicators per project'</p> <p>202885: as above</p> <p>202443: as above</p> <p>202611: as above</p>	<p><u>High-level documents:</u></p> <p>-As above</p> <p>-Dashboard</p> <p>-ICAI report on UNRWA GF</p> <p>-PAI/Atos report on UNRWA food security</p> <p>-UNRWA evaluation framework</p>

			2014-2016 (oct 2013)
5. How is DFID viewed as a development partner in the OPTs? What are the main perceived strengths and weaknesses? Are we meeting international aid effectiveness commitments such as alignment, harmonisation, results and mutual accountability?	5.1. What are the key strengths and weaknesses of DFID in the OPTs, as perceived by the PA ministries?	(not SMART) Level of satisfaction Examples of impact / difference	<u>High-level documents:</u> -As above -Evaluation of State-building grant to PA authorities (end 2013)
	5.2. What are the key strengths and weaknesses of DFID in the OPTs, as perceived by other key donors and relevant international community actors	(not SMART) Level of satisfaction Examples of impact / difference	As above
	5.3. What are the key strengths and weaknesses of DFID in the OPTs, as perceived by DFID's implementing partners	(not SMART) Level of satisfaction Examples of impact / difference	As above
	5.4. Is DFID in the OPTs meeting the commitments of the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action?	(not SMART) -DFID OP is <u>aligned</u> behind the PNDP objectives and is committed to improve the PA institutions -DFID is committed to harmonisation by <u>coordinating</u> with other donors, simplifying procedures and sharing information to avoid duplication -DFID is focusing on development <u>results</u> and	<u>Documents:</u> -As above -Paris Declaration -Accra Agenda for Action

		<p>their measuring</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <u>DFID is accountable to the PA</u> and its partners for development results - <u>The PA is accountable to DFID</u> for the results of its funding 	
Efficiency			
<p>6. At the strategic level, have each of the three pillars of DFID's Palestinian Programme been adequately resourced to deliver its OP objectives in terms of human resources, financial allocations, M&E and ability to contribute to policy leverage?</p>	<p>6.1. Is the Wealth Creation pillar adequately resourced to deliver its OP objectives?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>Perceived needs by pillar staff in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -human resources as compared to actual allocations -Financial allocations -M&E capacities (internal and partner's) -ability to contribute to policy leverage 	<p><u>Documents:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Organisational chart of DFID OPT <p><u>Stakeholders :</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pillar staff of DFID OPT Management of DFID OPT MENA management at DFID HQ
	<p>6.2. Is the State-building pillar adequately resourced to deliver its OP objectives?</p>	<p>As above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>6.3. Is the PVH pillar adequately resourced to deliver its OP</p>	<p>As above</p>	<p>As above</p>

	objectives?		
7. What are the major constraints in the current political and operating environment that may prevent DFID achieving its intended results?	N.A.	(not SMART) Perceived major constraints in terms of -political environment -operating environment	As above
8. What evidence is there that the programmes implemented deliver Value for Money?	8.1. Does the programme have realistic and appropriate objectives and a clear plan as to how and why the planned intervention will have the intended impact?	(not SMART) - Optimum availability and accuracy of data for VfM assessment. - Sufficient programme maturity - Significant percentage of the pillar and overall OP budgets - Possibility of conducting full (all 3Es) or partial analysis in VfM assessment	<u>High-level documents:</u> DFID approach to VFM, Jul 2011 policy <u>Project level documents:</u> Sections 8 in individual programme assessments (annex G) <u>High-level stakeholders</u> (see cross-reference table in chapter 4.C, and sections 15 of the individual programme assessments) <u>Other stakeholders (project level) as relevant / feasible</u> : as above
	8.2. Does the programme have robust delivery arrangements, which support the desired objectives and demonstrate good governance and management through the delivery	(not SMART) Assessed quality (by DFID staff and review team) of delivery arrangements	As above

	chain?		
	8.3. Is the programme having a transformational, positive and lasting impact on the lives of the intended beneficiaries and is it transparent and accountable?	-See question 11 below	As above
	8.4. Does the programme incorporate learning to improve future aid delivery?	-See question 10 below	As above
9. To what extent did the harmonisation of programmes with other aid agencies contribute to reducing DFID's transaction costs?	N.A.	(not SMART) -see also questions 6 and 14 -perceived economy in transaction costs by DFID staff	<u>Stakeholders:</u> DFID staff, other donors, agencies, coordination bodies (see 4.C)
Sustainability			
10. Are the reforms or changes supported by DFID's Palestinian Programme moving in the direction of the vision statement of the OP, and are they likely to be sustained?	10.1. Are the reforms and changes supported by DFID moving in the direction of the OP visions in the State-building pillar?	(not SMART) -see also question 1 -estimated capacity (by DFID staff and review team) to incorporate learning to improve future aid delivery -estimated risk of to sustainability caused by growing gap between demand (increasing	As above

		population, needs) and supply of services -estimated appropriateness of exit strategy	
	10.2 Are the reforms and changes supported by DFID moving in the direction of the OP visions in the Wealth Creation pillar?	As above	As above
	10.3. Are the reforms and changes supported by DFID moving in the direction of the OP visions in the PVH pillar?	As above	As above
Impact			
11. Given external factors and the contribution of other stakeholders, to what extent did DFID's interventions under the Palestinian Programme contribute to DFID's impact indicators supporting state-building, economic growth and poverty reduction?	11.1. To what extent did impact indicators reach the 2013 log frame milestones in the State-building pillar?	(Impact indicators and milestones in log frames) 202241: see separate table 'list of impact – outcomes indicators per project' 202564: as above 201935: NA 203397: NA	<u>High-level documents:</u> -as above -Dashboard <u>Project-level documents</u> Sections 6-7, 9 in individual programme assessments (annex G) <u>High-level stakeholders</u> (see cross-reference table in chapter 4.C, and

			sections15 of the individual programme assessments) <u>Other stakeholders (project level) as relevant / feasible:</u> as above
	11.2. To what extent did impact indicators reach the 2013 log frame milestones in the Wealth Creation pillar?	(Impact indicators and milestones in log frames) 114325: see separate table 'list of impact – outcomes indicators per project' 201828: as above 202887: as above	As above
	11.3. To what extent did impact indicators reach the 2013 log frame milestones in the PVH pillar?	(Impact indicators and milestones in log frames) 202375: see separate table 'list of impact – outcomes indicators per project' 202885: as above 202443: as above 202611: NA	<u>Documents:</u> ICAI report on UNRWA GF PAI/Atos report on UNRWA food security UNRWA evaluation framework 2014 - 2016 Dashboard <u>Stakeholders</u> as above
12. To the extent of the review's capacity to investigate, what real difference have the activities made to recipients, development partners	12.1. What is the impact of the funded activities on the PA?	(not SMART) -Level of satisfaction	As above

(including the Palestinian Authority and UNRWA) and beneficiaries?		<p>-Examples of impact / difference</p> <p>-Counterfactual: what would happen if the programme did not exist</p>	
	12.2. What is the impact of the funded activities on the partners?	As above	As above
	12.3. What is the impact of the funded activities on the beneficiaries?	As above	As above
Coverage			
13. How successful has the Palestinian Programme been in mainstreaming cross-cutting issues around human rights, gender equality, and the environment?	13.1. How successful has the Programme been in mainstreaming DFID's rights-based approach in terms of Human Rights and IHL?	<p>Indicators and milestones in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -access to education (OP/MDG) -access to health (OP/MDG) -social security for most vulnerable groups through cash transfers (OP) -evictions and demolition orders suspended (OP) 	<p><u>High-level documents:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Dashboard -Latest DFID policy paper on Human Rights <p><u>Project-level documents</u></p> <p>Sections 10, 13 in individual programme assessments (annex G)</p> <p><u>High-level stakeholders</u> (see cross-reference table in chapter 4.C, and</p>

			sections 15 of the individual programme assessments) <u>Other stakeholders (project level) as relevant / feasible</u> : as above
	13.2. How successful has the Programme been in mainstreaming DFID's rights-based approach in terms of equality and non-discrimination?	(not SMART) -perceived results/shortcomings in gender equality (gender segregated data if available) -perceived results/shortcomings in non-discrimination among refugees and non-refugees	Latest DFID policy paper on gender equality
	13.3. How successful has the Programme been in applying DFID's rights-based approach in terms of democracy and the rule of law?	(not SMART) -perceived results/shortcomings in governance and accountability to civil society -perceived results/shortcomings in safety, security and access to justice -perceived results/shortcomings in protection of women against violence	Latest DFID policy paper on governance
	13.4. How successful has the Programme been in mainstreaming DFID's guidelines on environmental protection?	(not SMART) -perceived results/shortcomings in access to water (WB, Gaza)	Latest DFID policy paper on climate change
Coordination			

<p>14. How well were programmes harmonised with other aid agencies working in the same sectors or through the same aid delivery channels, and to what extent did DFID's participation in aid coordination mechanisms strengthen DFID's development results?</p>	<p>14.1. How well were programmes harmonised and development results strengthened in the State-building pillar?</p>	<p>(not SMART) -perceived results of harmonisation (by DFID staff and review team); examples of results</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>14.2. How well were programmes harmonised and development results strengthened in the Wealth Creation pillar?</p>	<p>As above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>14.3. How well were programmes harmonised and development results strengthened in the PVH pillar?</p>	<p>As above</p>	<p>As above</p>
<p>Conflict Sensitivity – ‘Do No Harm’</p>			
<p>15. To what extent did the programmes apply the Peace Building – State Building checklist (Annex 1 to the ToR) in their business cases and reviews, in terms of political analysis, programme design, conflict sensitivity and ‘Do No Harm’, and indicators?</p>	<p>15.1. To what extent did the programme carry out an analysis of the political context?</p>	<p>(not SMART) -perceived level of application (by DFID staff and review team), and why? : -level 0: none -level 1: limited extent</p>	<p><u>High-level documents:</u> -PBSB chart (annex 1 to ToR) -DFID policy and guidelines on peaceful societies, peace-building, conflict sensitivity</p>

		<p>-level 2: some extent</p> <p>-level 3: good extent</p> <p>-level 4: complete and robust extent</p>	<p><u>Project-level documents</u></p> <p>Business cases, annual reviews</p> <p>Existing evaluation reports</p> <p><u>High-level stakeholders</u></p> <p>DFID OPT pillar staff</p> <p>DFID CHASE</p>
	15.2. To what extent did the programme design address conflict and fragility?	As above	As above
	15.3. To what extent did the programme identify risks (Do No Harm, conflict sensitivity) and opportunities?	As above	As above
	15.4. To what extent did the indicators in the results framework of the programme integrate PSBP?	As above	As above
16. To what extent did the UK counter-terror legislation impact on the delivery of DFID's Palestinian Programme?	N.A.	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>Perceived impact (by DFID staff, review team, implementing partners) in WB and Gaza, in terms of relevant CONTEST objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -with multilateral organisations, to build collective capabilities to tackle terrorist threats overseas -to support countries most affected by terrorism 	<p><u>High-level documents:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -UK's counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), 3rd version of July 2011 -Annual report 2012

		<p>and, where necessary, strengthen governance and sponsor judicial reform</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -to seek international consensus on dealing with the growing threat of terrorist kidnapping. 	<p><u>High-level stakeholders</u> (see cross-reference table in chapter 4.C, and sections 15 of the individual programme assessments)</p> <p><u>Other stakeholders (project level) as relevant / feasible</u> : as above</p>
<p>17. To what extent does each of the three pillars and the mix of pillars, programmes and partners in the Programme prevent exacerbating conflict in terms of aid delivery to refugees and non-refugees, geographic areas, and vulnerable groups?</p>	<p>17.1. To what extent does the State-building pillar prevent exacerbating conflicts?</p>	<p>(not SMART)</p> <p>Perceived results (by DFID staff, review team, partners, others) in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -aid delivery to refugees and non-refugees -geographic areas (WB, Gaza) -vulnerable groups 	<p>As above</p>
	<p>17.2. To what extent does the Wealth Creation pillar prevent exacerbating conflicts?</p>	<p>As above</p>	<p>As above</p>
	<p>17.3. To what extent does the PVH pillar prevent exacerbating conflicts?</p>	<p>As above</p>	<p>As above</p>

ANNEX 7.4: OVERVIEW OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE USED

State Building Pillar Bibliography

In addition to all project documents and other primary documentation, the State Building sections have cited the following:

1. Shantayanan Devarajan, Lyn Squire & Sethaput Suthiwart-Narueput; "Beyond Rate of Return: Reorienting Project Appraisal," *The World Bank Research Observer*, Vol. 12, No. 1, February 1997.
2. DFID, "Annual Reports and Accounts 2011 -12." Available at <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/What-we-do/Publications>.
3. DFID, "Annual Review: Support to the Palestinian Authority to improve public financial management in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Palestinian Governance Facility (PGF)." (September 2012).
4. DFID, "Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper." (2010).
5. DFID, "DFID's Approach to Value for Money (VfM)." (July 2011).
6. DFID, "DFID Palestinian Programme Operational Plan 2011 -2015."
7. ICAI, "ICAI's Approach to Effectiveness and value for Money." Independent Commission for Aid Impact, Report 1. (November 2011).
8. Penny Jackson, "Value for Money and International Development: Deconstructing Myths to promote a More Constructive Discussion." OECD Development Co-operation Directorate, May 2012.
9. Jones, B. and R. Chandran with E. Cousens, J. Slotin and J. Sherman, "From Fragility to Resilience: Concepts and Dilemmas of State-building in Fragile States". Research paper for the Fragile States Group of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD DAC). Paris: OECD DAC (<http://www.cic.nyu.edu/global/docs/fragilitytoresilience.pdf>).
10. Colin Kirkpatrick and John Weiss, *Cost-Benefit Analysis and Project Appraisal in Developing Countries*. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1996.
11. Oxford Policy Management, "Palestinian Governance Facility CNTR PO5592." Quarterly Report No. 6. July – September 2013. (October 2013).
12. Palestinian National Authority, "National Development Plan 2011 – 2013: Establishing the State, Building Our Future." (April 2011)
13. "Results Based Management Handbook." United Nations Development Group. (March 2010).
14. Isabel Vogel, "Review of the Use of 'Theory of Change' in International Development," UK Department for International Development. (April 2012)
15. World Bank, "Proposed Village Development Program: Scoping Mission." Aide-Memoire. (December 2013).

Wealth Creation Pillar Bibliography

In addition to all project documents and other primary documentation, the wealth creation sections have cited the following:

1. IFC (March 2010) *West Bank and Gaza housing finance facility: IFC project document for first loss and technical assistance grant from DFID.*
2. Jallad, Sahar; Palestine Land Authority.
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nr/land_tenure/pdf/18-SaharJalladOpenSource.pdf
3. World Bank, 2013; Palestinians Access to Area C Key to Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth. <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/10/07/palestinians-access-area-c-economic-recovery-sustainable-growth>
4. *Haj Yahya, M. 2013; Violence against women in Palestinian society. MIFTAH.org*
5. *Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institution-MAS-2012; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Palestine Country Report.*
http://www.mas.ps/2012/sites/default/files/Global%20Entrepreneurship%20Monitor%20012_Publication%20draft.pdf
6. *Palestinian Economic Policy Research Institution-MAS-2009; Housing and Mortgage Loans in Palestine.*
7. *McKinsey & Co, 2013; Beyond Aid: A Palestinian private sector initiative for investment, growth, and employment- Portland Trust.*
8. *PCBS; Establishment Census-2007, 2012*
9. *PCBS; Labor Force Survey, Annual Report-2012*
10. *PCBS-Per Capita by region and quarter for the years 2011-2013 at current prices*
11. *PCBS 2013. Press Report, Preliminary Estimates of Quarterly National Accounts (Third Quarter 2013). Ramallah – Palestine*
12. *PCBS-Labor force annual survey 2011 and 2012*
13. *PCBS- Balance of payments preliminary results 2011 and 2012*

Vulnerability Pillar Bibliography

1. DFID, "Business Case and Intervention Summary: Project 202375: Improving Food Security levels for people in Gaza". (2011)
2. DFID, "Logframe: Project 202375: Improving Food Security levels for people in Gaza". (2011)
3. DFID, "Annual review: Project 202375: Improving Food Security levels for people in Gaza". (August 2012 and April 2013)
4. PAI / ATOS "Baseline report: Independent Evaluation: Improving Food Security for the People of Gaza", (April 2013)
5. DFID, "Initial DFID response to food security baseline report recommendations – and action plan" (August 2013)
6. DFID, "Business Case and Intervention Summary: Project 202611: Improving Access to Education in Gaza". (2011)
7. DFID, "Logframe: Project 202611: Improving Access to Education in Gaza". (2011)
8. DFID, "Annual Review: Project 202611: Improving Access to Education in Gaza". (February 2012 and February 2013)
9. DFID, "Background paper on UK funding to UNRWA". (2011)
10. DFID, "Business Case and Intervention Summary: *Project 202885: UNRWA, funding basic services and protection for Palestine refugees 2011-15*". (2011)
11. DFID, "Logframe: *Project 202885: UNRWA, funding basic services and protection for Palestine refugees 2011-15*". (2011).
12. DFID, "Annual review, *Project 202885: UNRWA: funding basic services and protection for Palestine refugees 2011-15*". (April 2013)
13. UNRWA, "Evaluation Work Plan 2014 to 2016" (October 2013)
14. ICAI, "DFID's Support for Palestine Refugees through UNRWA". (September 2013)
15. UNRWA Advisory committee, "reform strategies for health, education, relief and social services sectors". (August 2012)
16. DFID, "Project Completion Review, *Project 201304: Legal Assistance to prevent displacement and demolitions in the OPTs*" (2013)
17. DFID, "Business Case and Intervention Summary: *Project 202443: Legal Assistance to prevent displacement and demolitions in the OPTs*" (2013)
18. DFID, "Logframe: *Project 202443: Legal Assistance to prevent displacement and demolitions in the OPTs*" (2013)
19. DFID, "Dashboard" (January 2014)

ANNEX 7.5:

REVISED THEORY OF CHANGE



Annex 7.5. Revised
Theory of Change.ppt

ANNEX 7.6: LIST OF DFID-FUNDED PROJECTS UNDER IMPLEMENTATION¹⁰⁴

Ref n° (GB-1)	Title	Dates	Total Budget (£)	Sector(s)	Implementing partners	Short description	Docs available
114325	Support to improve access to mortgages for affordable housing in the OPTs	Sep 2008 – Apr 2015	14,403,330	Finance, multi-sector	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, NGOs, civil society, other.	Stimulate construction sector growth through mortgage provision for Palestinians in the West Bank.	Intervention summary (IS) Logframe (LFA) Annual review (AR) X2
201828	Palestinian Market Development Programme (PMDP) to strengthen the private sector in the OPTs	2013 - 2019	15,3 million (or 11 million if EU takes part for 4,3 million)	Business, industry	DFID, Palestinian Investment Promotion Agency (PIPA), DAI, delegation agreement with EU	To improve the competitiveness of the Palestinian private sector by i) providing matching grants and technical assistance to mitigate the risk associated with business development, ii) undertaking market analysis to identify and address market failures, iii) strengthening inward investment and transfer of know how. This will benefit at least 480 companies leading to develop 250 new products and enter 350 new markets, and contribute to MDGs by reducing those below the national poverty line to 13% in 2014.	Business Case (BC) IS LFA

¹⁰⁴ (source: DFID Development Tracker website)

202887	Support to the work of the OQR in the OPTs	2012 – 2015	1,062,592	Government, business	OQR	Improved trade flows and strengthened business and security environment through the work of the OQR on easing restrictions in the West Bank and Gaza.	BC, IS, LFA, AR
		Sub-total	30,765,922				

Statebuilding Pillar

201236	Support to accountable and responsive security and justice in the OPTs	2010-2014 (31.12.2010 – 31.3.2014)	3,299,999 (UN Women 2,104,711) (MoI 968,289.00) (Balance Design)	Women Human Rights Security Sector: Security System Management Judiciary: Legal and judicial development	UN Women (UNW) Ministry of Interior (MoI)	Criminal justice sector is more accountable and responsive to the public in the West Bank. Grant to UN Women (UNW) to work with Palestinian Civil Police, justice sector institutions and civil society to strengthen policing and justice services for women victims of violence. Grant to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) for effective central governance of the security sector linked to public accountability and human rights.	IS AR 2013
201812	TA to the Palestinian Negotiations Support Project in the OPTs	07/2012 – 09/2014	1,000,000	Government - Public sector policy and administrative management	PLO NAD (Negotiations Affairs Department)	Palestinian leadership empowered for effective negotiations with Israel and for engagement with the international community and in diplomatic efforts.	BC LFA AR 2013

				Peace-building			
201935	Improved macroeconomic governance in fragile and conflict-affected States through IMF	09 2010 – 02 2015	4,895,585	Public finance management	IMF	Improved macro-economic governance. Part of a wider regional program: benefitting countries: Libyan Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza	No DFID Reports (IMF?)
202241	Support to PA to improve public financial management in the OPTs: Palestinian Governance Facility (PGF)	09/2011 - Until Dec. 2014	5,499,999	Government - Public sector policy and administrative management	OPM (Oxford Policy Mgt) Ministry of Finance MOPAD	To improve the capacity of the PA to raise revenues and to plan, prioritise and manage expenditure - including donor funding, in order to deliver better functioning public services for the Palestinian people. Modernise and improve PA's ability to raise revenue, thereby reducing PA dependence on aid and reducing their budget deficit.	BC LFA – original + revised Jan 13 Contract AR 2012
202564	Statebuilding and Service Delivery Grant to the PA in the OPTs	08/2011 – 03/2015	123,523,846	Government - Public sector policy and administrative management (99.84%) Education policy and management (0.16%)	World Bank	To improve the PA's management of its financial systems and to provide better access to services for the Palestinian public. Strengthen PA's ability to provide essential services and pay salaries of public servants. Provision of PA budget support through the World Bank against approved annual reform workplans. Reforms will contributing long term to reduce dependency on aid.	IS/BC LFA AR
202719	Strategic Impact Fund for the OPTs	12/2011 – 03/2015	1,000,000	Social/welfare services 80.01% - Public sector policy	DFID and external	To improve the quality of DFID's and partners' work in the OPTs, ensuring that resources are used to deliver a	BC

				and administrative mgt. 10% - Research/scientific institutions 9.99%	partners	high quality programme which improves the lives of Palestinian people and contributes to a two State solution.	LFA
202886	Supporting stability and promoting democracy in the OPTs	11/2012 – 03/2015	2,000,000	Democratic participation Civil Society	British Council	Palestinians are better able to hold their authorities to account through a more inclusive and effective civil society. Support civil society to monitor spending of public funds, support independent media, assist youth in engaging with PA.	BC LFA Contract
203366	Development and dissemination of evidence and policy tools to support the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)	06/2012 – 06/2014	600,000	Peace-building, conflict resolution (55%) Government - Public sector policy and administrative management (45%)	ECFR (European Council on Foreign Relations)	Better informed and more effective policy engagement on MEPP issues by UK government and key international partners. DFID funds will enable ECFR to conduct research and activities to create awareness about the dangers of impasse in the MEPP, to better understand its roots, to explore ways in which to overcome problems.	BC LFA Contract (accountable grant) AR 2013
203452	Support to Palestinians at Risk of Displacement in Israeli Controlled Area C of the West Bank	2013- 15	5,000,000 (4M to EC – 1M to FAO)	State-building Services	FAO	Co-finance a EC program on Area C: DFID 4 million + EC 7 Million. In addition: 1 million to FAO. Aim to reduce direct and indirect Palestinian displacement. Strengthen results of state-building investments. Provide services to vulnerable Palestinians living in area C.	Draft BC, IS
203397	WB expert assistance to	10/2012	367,500 (50% of	Public finance	World Bank	To provide the World Bank with the capacity to influence the Palestinian	Draft BC, IS

	Improve Public Financial Management in the OPTs	– 03/2015	expert costs)	management		Authority (PA) to make progress on Public Financial Management (PFM) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories	
		Sub-total	147,186,929				

Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger (Humanitarian) Pillar

202375	Financial support to improve Food Security for people living in Gaza in the OPTs	2011 - 2015	24,104,998	Social, budget	- UNRWA: 14.4 m for job creation - WFP (OXFAM GB): 9.6 m for vouchers	To reduce household poverty and improve food consumption for vulnerable Gazans.	BC LFA AR
202400	Financial assistance to the UN Access Coordination Unit in the OPTs	2011 - 2015	1,100,000	Disaster	OCHA	Improved access and movement of humanitarian staff and goods throughout the OPTs.	BC LFA
202611	Financial support to improve access to education in Gaza in the OPTs	2011 - 2015	14,672,500	Social, education	UNRWA	To ensure improved access to UN human-rights-based education for vulnerable refugee students (building of 12 schools).	BC LFA
202885	Support to UNRWA: funding basic services and	2012 - 2015	106,999,999	unallocated	UNRWA	To provide basic services (education, health, and social services) and protection for Palestine refugees.	BC LFA

	protection for Palestine refugees in the region						
203783	Financial assistance to the conflict affected population in Gaza	Ad-hoc / short term	1,500,000	disaster	ICRC	(Emergency response to conflict – Not in OP) To improve conditions for the conflict affected population in Gaza by supporting the ICRC, to provide (for example) medical care, materials for repairs to damaged houses and emergency repairs for water infrastructure.	BC LFA
201304	Support for the NRC ICLA programme in the OPTs	Dec 2010 – Mar 2013	2,990,600	Government	NRC	Improved access to justice in the OPTs for refugees, internally displaced persons, and persons/communities at risk of displacement or affected by displacement	BC LFA AR Completion review
202443	(as above - renewed for 2 years)	Apr 2013 – 2015	3 million	Government	NRC	(as above)	BC LFA
Sub-total			154,367,497				
GRAND TOTAL			332,320,948				

ANNEX 7.7: IMPACT AND OUTCOME INDICATORS

Project	Impact indicators in logframe	Milestone 2013 in logframe	Outcome indicators in logframe	Milestone 2013 in logframe
WEALTH CREATION PILLAR				
114325 – Afford housing	1. Value of mortgages provided in Palestine 2. # of defaults on conventional mortgage products	1. \$700 million N/A	1. % of potential homebuyers will consider themselves better informed to make a decision if or when they should buy a home (those who report being exposed to campaign who also report being better informed, 800 people surveyed across WB) 2. % of potential homebuyers who need to obtain mortgage financing to make their purchase consider themselves to better understand the process and better prepared to approach a lender for financing 3. % of university students/real estate professionals who rate course materials as contributing to their professional development goals	1. 75% 2. 75% 3. 75%
201828 - PMDP	1. Real GDP Growth 2. Extent of poverty: Proportion below national poverty line 3. Jobs: Unemployment rate	1. N/A 2. N/A 3. N/A	1. Snapshot number of enterprises reporting improved annual performance due to the Palestinian Market Development Programme (PMDP) (e.g increased sales, reducing costs, improved processes etc.) 2. Snapshot of enterprises reporting increase of exports or first time exporter as a result of the PMDP 3. Number of enterprises using own funds to pay for Business Development Services (BDS) 4. Estimated number of jobs directly created (net) by MDP 5. Value of additional sales attributable to PMDP (£m)	1. N/A 2. N/A 3. N/A 4. N/A 5. N/A

202887 – OQR	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Nominal GDP per capita in WBG (USD) Unemployment rate in WBG (percentage of labor force) USD value of total Palestinian exports 	<p>(2013-14)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> USD 2,658 15 - M:, F:? USD 900m 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Cumulative increase in trade flows from reductions in restrictions as a result of OQR work Annual number of truckloads exported out of Gaza to West Bank and/or Israel Annual number of truckloads exports out of West Bank to third market through Allenby crossing USD value of exports out of Gaza to third markets 	<p>(2013-14)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> £40m 500 30,000 baseline 2011-12: USD 1.4m (agri) + 250,000
STATEBUILDING PILLAR				
201236 – justice for women	NA	NA	NA	NA
201812 - negotiations	Extent to which there is progress towards a Permanent Status (PS) Agreement between the PLO/PA and the Gol.	negotiations underway; minimal progress	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Percentage of population reporting positive perception of Palestinian negotiation positions Positive Stakeholder views of NAD (two focus groups one for diplomats one for leadership) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 40% 40%
201935 - IMF	NA	NA	NA	NA
202241 – PGF	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Fiduciary risk rating of Palestinian Authority's Public Financial Management and Accountability system Proportion of population who rate quality of public education as 'good' Recurrent budget deficit as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> High 55% 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> Revenue: % of activities in IMF's medium term strategy for improving revenue administration that are implemented Fiscal Framework: Proportion of the officially published medium term fiscal framework which meets IMF standards which is prepared by Ministry of Finance staff Strategic Planning and Budget Preparation: Fiduciary Risk Assessment Benchmark 5: budget allocations are broadly consistent with any medium term expenditure plans for the sector or for the overall budget 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 40% 50% Substantial

		3. 12,2%	<p>4. Budget execution: proportion of in-year budget reports which report expenditure against programmes in a meaningful way</p> <p>5. M&E: Number of high quality monitoring reports on Palestinian National Plan that meet agreed quality criteria. (This project will contribute to that)</p> <p>6. Aid coordination & management: Proportion of aid recorded on budget</p>	<p>4. 50%</p> <p>5. 4</p> <p>6. 70%</p>
202564 – Statebuilding grant	<p>1. Poverty: Poverty gap ratio (%)</p> <p>2. Poverty: Secondary net enrollment rate for boys (M) and girls (F) (%)</p> <p>3. Poverty: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)</p> <p>4. Respond to public expectations: Proportion of the public nationally (N), in West Bank (WB) and Gaza (G) who are satisfied with the way the Palestinian Authority is managing affairs in the OPTs(%)</p> <p>5. Respond to public expectations: Unemployment rate (%)</p> <p>6. Core state functions: Recurrent budget deficit as share of GDP (%)</p>	<p>1. 4%</p> <p>2. 73.5% (M) 76.5% (F)</p> <p>3. 21%</p> <p>4. 60%(N) 70%(WB) 40%(G)</p> <p>5. 20%</p>	<p>1. Education: Primary net enrollment rate for boys (M) and girls (F) (%)</p> <p>2. Health: number of non-refugee children under 5 years old immunised for measles with DFID support</p> <p>3. Social protection: Number of extremely poor individuals covered by DFID-supported cash transfers</p> <p>4. Security: Proportion of the public who are satisfied with the performance and services of the security establishment (%)</p> <p>5. Fiscal sustainability: Net present value (NPV) of money saved for the PA by reforms in DPG Matrices 2011-2014 and reforms promoted by education and health efficiency technical assistance (\$m)</p> <p>6. Public financial management and accountability (PFMA): Fiduciary risk rating for PA PFMA system</p>	<p>1. 96.6% (M) 97.9% (F)</p> <p>2. 1.831</p> <p>3. 6.528</p> <p>4. 50%</p> <p>5. 80</p> <p>6. substantial</p>

		6. 11,6%		
202719 – Impact Fund	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Number of microwork aggregators pilots starting up or functioning in the OPTs 2. Number of youth who have made income from microwork in the OPTs 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.2 TBD 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Microwork is selected as a priority intervention by WB MDTF 2. Number of local entrepreneurs with expressed interest in setting up microwork aggregators 3. Five-year implementation plan adopted by a private or public sector entity 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Microwork included in the MDTF work plan 2. 2 3. An entity like PITA or Ministry of ICT takes ownership of the five-year plan
202886 – Civil society	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Proportion of population who are satisfied with the way that the PA is managing its affairs 2. World Bank Voice and Accountability score for the OPTs 3. World Bank Control of Corruption score for the OPT 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. NA 2. NA 3. NA 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Level of capacity of CSOs to engage effectively in key sectoral areas (score 0-12 with 0 representing low levels and 12 strong) 2. Number of evidence based high quality case studies which demonstrate policy changes attributable to the programme 3. Number of the instances of newspapers, television and radio channels, covering issues of inequality and discrimination with a particular focus on transparency, media and youth issues 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 5 to 7 2. 0 to 2 3. 10 to 20%
203366 – MEPP	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Two state stress test indicates two state solution remains possible (OP indicator) 2. PA fiscal sustainability: Recurrent budget deficit as % GDP 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. TBD 2. 8.5 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. UK policy on MEPP issues is based on more solid evidence base and strengthened by external challenge 2. UK government better prepared to anticipate scenarios affecting political and development policies and therefore better able to respond to crises should they arise and also to promote scenarios if they are adopted as UK government priorities 3. More effective and joined up international management on MEPP issues 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Evidence and arguments from ECFR policy work are used in FCO and DFID ministerial advice 2. ECFR work on scenarios communicated to UK government 3. ECFR work lays groundwork with potential partners for new joint efforts via new analysis and awareness
203452 – Area C	NA	NA	NA	NA
203397 –	1. Government effectiveness	1. 40.7	1. Public access to key fiscal information - indicators	1. C

World Bank expert	index 2. Control of corruption index	2. 48.3	PI-10 of PEFA 2. Stock and monitoring of payment arrears - indicator PI-4 of PEFA 3. Percentage of donors who provide unearmarked financial assistance to the PA	2. D+ 3. 41%
PVH PILLAR				
202375 – Food Security	1. Poverty Gap Index 2. Food Insecurity in Gaza (disaggregated by refugees and non refugees)	1. N/A 2. N/A	1. WFP/vouchers: Annual number of households with improved Food Consumption Score (FCS) amongst non refugees 2. WFP/vouchers: Percentage of participating shops which show and maintain at least 25% increase in sales one year after their inclusion in the programme 3. UNRWA/jobs: The percentage of abject and absolute poor benefiting from programme	1. 5549 2. 90% 3. 70%
202611 – Education	1. The percentage of pass rates in Maths and Arabic	1. N/A	1. Basic education enrolment rate for refugees in Gaza 2. Proportion of eligible refugee students entering UNRWA schools a grade 1	1. 80% 2. 95%
202885 – GF UNRWA	1. Infant mortality rate 2. Percentage of registered refugees who receive social assistance from UNRWA	1. N/A 2. Gaza: 8,5%; WB: 4,3%	1. Percentage of children under 3 year that are underweight 2. REFORM: Mean score obtained by students in Monitoring Learning Achievement Scores in Arabic and Maths (sex disaggregated) 3. Percentage of graduates working in a job in relation to their training or studying in a relevant field on year later (female) 4. Survival rate to the end of basic education (female) 5. REFORM: Average daily medical consultations per doctor (across all services)	1. Male 1%. Female 1% 2012 2. Math 49.8 % ; Arabic 44.5% (women) 3. 76.7% 4. 94.1% 5. 88
202443 - NRC	1. Poverty gap index 2. Number of demolitions	1. N/A 2. N/A	1. % of households in Area C and East Jerusalem who receive a temporary suspension of demolition order due to legal representation	1. 95% (Mar 2014)

			<p>provided through NRC</p> <p>2. % of beneficiaries participating in information sessions who report the information presented will assist them in their daily lives (sex disaggregated)</p> <p>3. Number of incidences in which cases of positive action taken as a result of information received from NRC in an effort to reduce forced displacement (weighted measure)</p>	<p>2. 80% (Mar 2014)</p> <p>3. 10 (Mar 2014)</p>
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ANNEX 7.8: DFID – PEACE BUILDING AND STATE BUILDING APPROACH AND THE COUNTRY POVERTY REDUCTION DIAGNOSTIC

(Provided separately)



Annex 7.8. PBSB and the CPRD.docx

ANNEX 7.9: PROGRAMME OVERVIEW

1. DFID supports UK Government objectives for a successful Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) by helping to build Palestinian institutions and promoting economic growth so that any future state will be stable, prosperous, well-run, and an effective partner for a sustainable peace with Israel. DFID support to the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs) is focused on three areas: i) helping the Palestinian Authority (PA) build strong institutions to enable them to deliver essential services; ii) promoting private sector growth to stimulate the economy; and iii) providing humanitarian assistance and support to the vulnerable.
2. Over the current Operational Plan period (2011-2015), DFID will provide £349 million in support of Palestinian development, focusing on three pillars: 1) State-building, 2) Wealth Creation, and 3) Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger. DFID's programme in the OPTs will:
 - a) Give predictable financial support to the PA to help deliver basic services;
 - b) Improve accountability, security and justice for the Palestinian people including helping women victims of gender-based violence by improving facilities at three family protection units and providing information, advice and legal assistance services for over 3,000 vulnerable households;
 - c) Provide basic services to refugees across the region through the UN agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA);
 - d) Help develop the private sector to stimulate the economy, including supporting 250 enterprises a year to improve their annual sales or productivity performance;
 - e) Support cash transfers benefitting over 217,000 individuals; and
 - f) Provide primary education for over 36,000 children (through UNRWA's Education Department).
3. DFID works in partnership with a number of actors to achieve its goals. The PA is a strong partner to DFID and is central to the programme. DFID provides technical and financial assistance to the PA to support DFID's state-building objectives and to deliver public services to non-refugees in the OPTs. DFID supports the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) as the main provider of basic services to registered Palestine refugees across the region. DFID also works closely with a wide range of other partners to ensure that the programme is aligned to the political context and to support development objectives, including non-governmental organisations, the Palestinian private sector, UN agencies and the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR).

ANNEX 7.10: OUTPUT SCORING AS COMPARED TO OVERALL PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

Those projects highlighted in grey have not started and/or have not completed an annual review.

Project ID	State Building Projects	Budget	% of Portfolio Budget by Pillar	% of Portfolio Budget ALL	Output Indicators	Score	Output as % of Budget * Weighting (PILLAR)	Output as % of Budget * Weighting (ALL)
State Building Projects								
202564	State-building and Service Delivery Grant to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs)	123,523,846	86.08%	40.14%	Education	A	43%	20%
					Health:			
					Social protection:			
					Public finance reforms	A	30%	14%
					Public service efficiency reforms			
					Accountability reforms:			
					Aid predictability - UK	B	13%	6%
					Aid predictability - international			

					Results-focus			
201935	Improved macroeconomic governance in fragile and conflict affected States through IMF (Annual Review, October 2013)	4,900,000	3.41%	1.59%		A	2.73%	1.27%
						B	0.68%	0.32%

201236	Support to accountable and responsive security and justice in the occupied Palestinian territories. (Annual Review, February 2012.)	3,300,000	2.30%	1.07%	Women referred by security personnel to receive specialist support.	C	0.57%	0.27%
					Ministry of Interior and Justice annual budgets provide specialist criminal justice support for women victims of violence.			
					Three police stations restructured to create Family Protection Units.	A	0.57%	0.27%
					Extent of data availability	A+	0.46%	0.21%
					Conditions of women inmates in Correction and Rehabilitation Centres (CRCs) monitored.			
					Extent to which complaints mechanism is operating effectively.	C	0.69%	0.32%
Code of conduct in place.								
201812	TA to the Palestinian Negotiations Support Project (PNSP) in the OPTs (Annual Review,	1,000,000	0.70%	0.32%	Number of up-to-date high quality Reference Guides available (High quality defined as current, comprehensive covering the main	A	0.35%	0.16%



	July 2013)			issues and seen as useful)						
				Number of Strategy or position papers, and presentations produced on negotiations issues (Water, border, refugees etc) in periods of non- negotiations						
				Percentage of leadership who are at least satisfied with the availability of high quality Reference Guides, position papers, presentations etc. produced by NAD advisers						
				No of media products jointly produced by NAD, PLO, Government Media Centre, and by 2014, the Office of the President				A++	0.21%	0.10%
				No of presentations, press releases, opening editorials, fact sheets, question and answer sheets etc produced						
				Number of times media draw on NAD's output						
				Total number of hits on NAD website annually						
				Percentage of consultancy provided by local advisers/consultants (based on total number of consultancy days and of these how many were local advisers compared with				A+	0.14%	0.06%



					international)			
					Percentage of PLO negotiating documents stored on accessible document management system (DMS) that ensures intellectual property rights.			
					Percentage of PNSP budget provided by Palestinian Authority			
202719	Palestinian Programme Strategic Intervention Fund (Annual Review, December 2012)	1,000,000	0.70%	0.32%	Deployment of emergency preparedness and response officer.	A	0.35%	0.16%
					Research into links between economics and conflict in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTS)			
					Two pilots were submitted, one was refused after further exploration showed it did not fully meet the SIF criteria. The second was cancelled after DFID learned a similar pilot was being undertaken by another organisation therefore did not feel that it was value for money to continue with it.	C	0.21%	0.10%



					As part of the UNRWA emergency preparedness project, DFID has asked the emergency preparedness officer to carry out influencing activities which bring together different actors, utilising workshops or other mechanisms to engage different stakeholders.	A	0.14%	0.06%
202251	Support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) to improve public financial management in the OPTs: Palestinian Governance Facility (PGF)	600,000	0.42%	0.19%	Revenue Action Plan approved by the MoF and IMF	B	0.10%	0.05%
					Proportion of Revenue Action Plan targets met where DFID is providing support			
					Number of trained specialist MoF staff working in the MFU.	B	0.04%	0.02%
					Proportion of the Budget Statement that is prepared directly by the staff of the MFU			
					Number of staff in General Budget Department (GBD) capable of analysing budget submissions against programme heads and using these to prepare the budget on a programme basis.	C	0.08%	0.04%
Proportion of line ministries making budget submissions on a programme basis which broadly adhere to the guidance issued by the MoF.								



				Proportion of programmes with a dedicated manager in the line ministry with the training tools and procedures to execute and report the programme against budget.			
				Proportion of programmes in Ministries of Education, Health and Interior that reflect the recommendations of the Efficiency Study in their costings as part of the budget.			
				Extent the Palestinian National Development Plan (PNDP) complies with international best practice.	C	0.06%	0.03%
				Proportion of line ministries with action plans that operationalize their sector strategies according to MoPAD guidelines.			
				Proportion of line ministries with joint planning and budgeting teams trained to produce costed sector strategies, action plans and budget submissions according to MoPAD and MoF guidelines.			
				Functioning M&E database on DARP.	C	0.06%	0.03%



				Percentage of overall estimated ODA funding captured by aid database.	C	0.06%	0.03%
				Proportion of aid information captured within database which is consistent with the programme structure of government and linked to the budget.			
				Number of annual donor consultations with clear minutes according to defined content format that are run by MoPAD without project support.			

203366	<p>Development and Dissemination of evidence and policy tools to support the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) (Annual Review, August 2013)</p>	600,000	0.42%	0.12%		B	0.42%	0.12%
203397 (No Annual Review Available)	<p>To deliver 50% of the costs of a World Bank (WB) Public Financial Management (PFM) Expert to Improve PFM in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Business Case & Logframe)</p>	367,500	0.26%	0.12%	<p>PA's understanding of the need and options for reform to provide Public Access to Information, as evidenced by action taken.</p> <p>Satisfaction of the PA with Expert's ability to offer technical solutions and to support implementation of policy decisions.</p> <p>Whether or not a PEFA assessment has been completed that complies</p>		0.26%	0.12%

					with international best practice.			
					Extent that an Action Plan has been drafted and implemented that addresses some of the main weaknesses raised by the PEFA assessment.			
					Number of areas where the PA has improved the level of detail of its monthly and quarterly fiscal reporting.			
					Number of reports per year analysing the State Audit and Administrative Control Bureau report on the PA's annual accounts, with recommendations to the PA to address priority issues.			
203452 (Not yet started)	Support to Palestinians at Risk of Displacement in Israeli Controlled Area C of the West Bank (Business Case & DFID Development Tracker)	6,200,000	4.32%	2.01%			2%	1%
							2%	1%
202886 (No disbursements to date.)	Supporting stability and promoting democracy in the OPTs (Logframe)	2,000,000	1.39%	0.65%	Number of meetings in a year between civil society networks to address issues of marginalisation and exclusion. Meetings should have a clear agenda, minutes and monitorable action points that are followed up in subsequent meetings.	N/A	1.39%	0.65%



					Number of meetings in a year between civil society and the PA that allow for policy and performance monitoring (meetings could be part of budget process and national plan consultations and reporting). Meeting minutes should be produced with clear action points to be followed up at subsequent meetings.			
					Number of meetings in a year between civil society and the Anti Corruption Commission focusing on publication and progress of the PA's anti corruption strategy. Meeting minutes should be produced with clear action points to be followed up at subsequent meetings.			
					Number programmes in a year broadcast (TV/Radio) focusing on social exclusion issues. There should be a feedback function for each programme recording audience numbers and views.			
		143,491,346						
Vulnerability and Humanitarian Pillar								
202375	Food Security in Gaza	24,093,860	16.20%	7.83%	Number of work days created annually. Milestone: 550,000 (357,500 men,192,500 women)	A	9.72%	4.70%

					Average number of work days per beneficiary. Milestone: 104			
					Number of JCP direct beneficiaries employed annually. Milestone: 5300			
					Average number of food vouchers booklets distributed monthly. Milestone: 5,325.	A	6.48%	3.13%
					Total cumulative monetary value equivalent of commodities indirectly supplied to beneficiaries. Milestone: \$4,315,080			
202611	Education in Gaza	14,672,500	9.86%	4.77%	Number of new schools constructed in Gaza City and North Gaza	B	8.88%	4.29%
					Number of refugee students enrolled in the newly constructed schools			
					Number of man days of employment created through schools construction (annual)	C	0.99%	0.48%
202885	Support to UNRWA general budget and reforms	106,999,999	71.92%	34.77%	Number of children enrolled in UNRWA basic education schools (% girls)	A	35.96%	17.38%
					Percentage of all children identified as having disabilities (or Special			



				Educational Needs)			
				Number of students completing vocational training courses (of which women)			
				REFORM: Pupil teacher ratio in basic education			
				REFORM: Number of areas where all teachers have been trained through UNRWA school-based teacher development programme (out of 20 areas)			
				Annual number of medical consultations	A+	17.98%	8.69%
				Percentage (Number) of patients with diabetes under control (of which women)			
				Percentage of pregnant women attending at least four anti-natal care visits			
				Percentage (Number) of children under 18 months who have received all (Expanded Programme on Immunization) EPI vaccinations according to host country requirements)			
				Percentage of new inscriptions meeting UNRWA standards	B	10.79%	5.22%



					Number of education staff with successfully complete the Human Rights and Conflict Resolution training programme (of which women)			
					Percentage of new inscriptions meeting UNRWA standards	A	7.19%	3.48%
					Number of education staff with successfully complete the Human Rights and Conflict Resolution training programme (of which women) note: waiting for UNRWA to provide data			
202443	NRC Legal Assistance	3,000,000	2.02%	0.97%	Number of households receiving legal counselling on HLP issues (cumulative total)			
					Number of opened and ongoing cases of legal assistance			
					Percentage of beneficiaries who are at least satisfied with quality of legal counselling and representation services provided			
					Number of discriminatory and/or unfair laws, policies or practices exposed through public interest cases			
					Number of persons receiving HLP training or technical assistance from NRC (sex disaggregated)			



					Gaza:			
					Number of instances where beneficiaries of trainings or technical assistance have used information received from NRC training and technical assistance in their work.			
					Number of advocacy briefings given on specific HLP issues (verbal or written)			
					Number of instances reported where NRC research, advocacy, and information documents have been used			
					Number of technical services provided to the PA to strengthen their capacity.			
					Number of direct issues of cooperation where NRC is actively working with UNDP and PA and legal aid partners on development of a sustainable legal aid system for HLP law			
		148,766,359						
Wealth Creation								



114325	Support to improve access to Mortgages for Affordable housing in the OPT	14,403,330	93.01%	4.68%	% of 800 individuals surveyed will report exposure to the campaign through at least one form of media (print, TV, radio, mobile units)	C	74.41%	3.74%
					% of 800 people surveyed will be able to identify one key campaign message			
					% of 800 people surveyed will be able to tell us what they learned that they did not previously know about buying a home in the West Bank.			
					% of participants in consumer education sessions report receiving new information that influences their homebuying decision	B	9.30%	0.47%
					Number of Participants trained across the West Bank			
					% of Female Participants trained across the West Bank			
					Local institution(s) identified to take on education material	B	9.30%	0.47%
					Teachers at those local institutions are trained and prepared to offer curriculum.			

202887	DFID support to the work of the Office of the Quartet Representative (OQR) in the OPT	1,062,592	6.86%	0.35%	Number of Palestinian quarries with licences to operate in the West Bank (in Area B and C)	A	2.06%	0.10%			
					Annual number of overnight stays by tourists in the WB						
					Quality of analytical and programme management work of DFID secondees that inform the selection and lobbying for changes on the ground (Measured on scale: 0 Does not display the behaviours that support analytical & programme work I Displays a practical understanding of effective behaviours II Displays some impact by providing effective advice and guidance III Displays inspiration by effectively influencing their environment IV Displays excellence and innovation in advice and programme work)						
					Number of sectors currently exporting out of Gaza to third markets				C	2.40%	0.12%
					Percentage progress towards Implementation of Khan Younis Waste Water Treatment Plant						



					<p>Quality of analytical and programme management work of DFID secondees that inform the selection and lobbying for changes on the ground (Measured on scale: 0 Does not display the behaviours that support analytical & programme work I Displays a practical understanding of effective behaviours II Displays some impact by providing effective advice and guidance III Displays inspiration by effectively influencing their environment IV Displays excellence and innovation in advice and programme work)</p>			
					Number of PA-led education and health facility improvement projects implemented in Area C	A	2.40%	0.12%
					Number of new Palestinian police and civil defence stations in area B in the WB			
					Number of village master plans in Area C developed in participatory approach facilitated to submission to Israel Civil Administration			



					Quality of analytical and programme management work of DFID secondees that inform the selection and lobbying for changes on the ground (Measured on scale: 0 Does not display the behaviours that support analytical & programme work I Displays a practical understanding of effective behaviours II Displays some impact by providing effective advice and guidance III Displays inspiration by effectively influencing their environment IV Displays excellence and innovation in advice and programme work)			
201828	Palestinian Market Development Program (PMDP) to strengthen the private sector in the OPT	20,375	0.13%	0.01%				
		15,486,297						
	TOTAL PORTFLIO	307,744,002						

ANNEX 7.11: ALIGNMENT OF DFID STATE BUILDING PROJECTS WITH PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY SECTOR STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE

Project ID	State Building Projects	% of Portfolio Budget	% of Portfolio Budget - Service Grant	PA Sector Strategies: Governance
201236	Support to accountable and responsive security and justice in the occupied Palestinian territories.	2.30%	16.53%	Justice & Security (3.69% / 26.54%)
202886*	Supporting stability and promoting democracy in the OPTs	1.39%	10.02%	
201812	TA to the Palestinian Negotiations Support Project (PNSP) in the OPTs	0.70%	5.01%	International Relations (5.44% / 39.06%)
203366	Development and Dissemination of evidence and policy tools to support the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)	0.42%	3.00%	
203452*	Support to Palestinians at Risk of Displacement in Israeli Controlled Area C of the West Bank	4.32%	31.05%	
No direct project support.				Local Governance & Administrations
Public Financial Management projects do indirectly support Administration.				Administrative Department
202564	State-building and Service Delivery Grant to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs)	86.08%		Public Financial Management (29.39% / 90.17%)
201935	Improved macroeconomic governance in fragile and conflict affected States through IMF	3.41%	24.54%	
202251	Support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) to improve public financial management in the OPTs: Palestinian Governance Facility (PGF)	0.42%	3.00%	
203397*	World Bank (WB) Public Financial Management (PFM) Expert to Improve PFM in the Occupied Palestinian Territories	0.26%	1.84%	



202719	Palestinian Programme Strategic Intervention Fund	0.70%	5.01%	Information (0.70% / 5.01%)
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* Has not yet disbursed and/or been formally reviewed.

ANNEX 7.12: LIST OF PERSONS MET AND INTERVIEWED BY THE REVIEW TEAM

No	Organisation	Name	Position
1.	DFID		Deputy Director, MENAD
2.	DFID		Head, DFID Jerusalem, Palestinian Programme
3.	DFID		Programme Officer, Palestinian Programme
4.	DFID		Governance Adviser, Palestinian Programme
5.	DFID		Senior Statistics Adviser MENAD
6.	DFID		Deputy Head, Palestinian Team, MENA
7.	DFID		Conflict Advisor, Private Sector Department
8.	FCO		Head, Levant Regional Team, FCO, Near East Group
9.	DFID		Fragile States and Conflict Group Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department
10.	DFID		Fragile States and Conflict Group Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department
11.	DFID		Fragile States and Conflict Group Conflict Humanitarian and Security Department
12.	DFID		Governance Adviser (DESA), the Systems Team
13.	DFID		Senior Policy and Programme Officer, Palestinian Programme
14.	DFID		Team Leader – Poverty, Vulnerability and Hunger, Palestinian Programme
15.	DFID		Conflict Adviser, Palestinian Programme
16.	DFID		Wealth Creation Team Leader, Palestinian Programme
17.	Office of the Quartet Representative		Private Sector Development Adviser
18.	OQR		Team member
19.	OQR		Team member
20.	DFID		Resilience Team
21.	DFID		Resilience Team
22.	DFID		Resilience Team
23.	World Bank		Head
24.	British Consulate-General, Jerusalem		Charge d'Affaires
25.	UNOCHA		Deputy Head of Office
26.	Ministry of National Economy		Staff member
27.	Ministry of Planning & Administrative Development		Head of Planning for Governance & Admin Development
28.	PGF MoPAD Direct Grant		Coordinator for preparation of the NDP
29.	UN Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process		Coordination Officer
30.	USAID		Supervisory Program Officer
31.	Local Aid Coordination Secretariat		Staff member
32.	NRC		ICLA Programme Manager
33.	Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development		Special Advisor to the Minister/Head of Aid Management and Coordination Directorate
34.	MAS		Director of research
35.	Ma'an		Director
36.	Arij		Director General

37.	Asala		Director
38.	Qattan		Director
39.	Juzoor		Director
40.	Welfare Association		Director general
41.	Welfare Association		Director of programs operations
42.	DFAT		Head of Office
43.	DFAT		Head of Cooperation
44.	UN Women		Staff member
45.	SDC		Deputy Director of cooperation
46.	Padico/PIBF/Portland Trust		CEO Padico, Chairman of PIBF
47.	DAI / PMDP		Chief of Party
48.	Deloitte / Trade Facilitation Project		Staff member
49.	UNDP		Poverty Reduction Team Leader
50.	EU Delegation		Head of Operations
51.	USAID		Office Director
52.	Women Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling		Director
53.	DAI / Effective Governance Program		Chief of party
54.	UNRWA		Director of Operations, Gaza
55.	Islamic Relief		Head of Mission, Gaza
56.	CIDA		Counsellor
57.	AFD		Director of Cooperation
58.	Former PM/Finance Minister		Former Prime Minister, Former Minister of Finance