



# Chapter 11

## Defence

## The summary

- The UK is one of the two major military powers in Europe<sup>480</sup>. In terms of international military operations and its wider security interests, it attaches foremost importance to its membership of the Nato alliance which binds the US to the security of Europe, includes most European countries in its membership and provides a unique platform for crisis response.
- In 1998, the EU began in earnest to develop an autonomous military capability, following a UK-French initiative at St Malo.
- By 2012, following the earlier entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had created a fully-fledged defence structure under the rubric of its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The EU High Representative, effectively the EU's Foreign & Defence Minister, is now supported, inter alia, by a Political & Security Committee, a Military Committee, an Assessment Staff (SitCen), a Military Staff, a European Defence Agency (EDA) as well as various permutations of operational planning HQs. It has launched some 27 "CSDP missions".
- The EU neither has, nor creates, any additional military forces. For its operations it draws on the same pool of diminishing military resources that nations have available for their own national operations, for Nato, the UN and other commitments.
- The UK is actively engaged across a spectrum of CSDP policies and missions.
- For the UK, CSDP is about generating more military capability from reluctant European allies. For example, MoD officials point out that, for a modest financial commitment, the EDA has developed extra capability through training helicopter pilots.
- For the EU institutions and the governments of many Member States it is about projecting the EU as a global actor and intensifying the process of political integration. The ambition for a "European Defence Policy", with a "European Army" was confirmed on 15 June 2012 by 10 Foreign Ministers from EU Member States, led by Germany.
- Some argue that CSDP is designed to strengthen Nato, while others argue that CSDP is a duplicative and increasingly costly replica of Nato, that none of its military operations stand up to scrutiny, and that it has a debilitating effect on the Alliance.
- In terms of defence equipment procurement, there may be budgetary and industrial merit in collaborative equipment schemes, although this is open to challenge. Whether these require the involvement of the institutions of the EU is open to challenge. There is possibly scope, however, for greater "pooling and sharing" of resources among Nato's European allies, provided this produces additional capability.
- The key difference between Nato and the EU is that the former is an inter-governmental alliance which does not impact to any degree on the sovereign defence capabilities of its member nations. The EU is essentially a supra-national body designed to replace national decision-making.
- CSDP is moving towards greater integration of policy, organisation and deployment. As the years pass, the UK's independent freedom of action is likely to be increasingly constrained.
- If the UK wished to consider a change in its relationship to CSDP without jeopardising its overall membership of the EU, there are examples for this in the defence policy positions that have been taken by France and Denmark.

---

<sup>480</sup> see World Military Strength Comparison, [www.globalfirepower.com](http://www.globalfirepower.com) using 2011 statistics.

### The options for change:

- Traditionally, the UK position on EU foreign policy and defence cooperation is to ensure that European cooperation bolsters the Nato and trans-Atlantic alliance rather than duplicates or weakens it. With the United States less willing to shoulder the burden of guaranteeing European security, due to changing strategic priorities, European countries must make efforts to boost their military capacity in order to ensure the durability of the Alliance. The UK could insist that EU activity in this area is complementary to Nato, or at least not in competition with it.
- The UK could be more assertive in vetoing EU proposals that compete with, or duplicate, Nato. In parallel, the UK could encourage EU CSDP to focus on areas of civil instruments and capability building, in order to complement Nato.
- Without any change to the treaties, the UK could reduce direct involvement in EU defence matters and insist that all defence matters be dealt with "in another institution" (i.e. Nato). As regards committee and institutional engagement, the UK could adopt an "empty chair" approach, or informally designate itself as a non-participatory observer.
- The UK could prioritise interoperability of equipment with Nato allies, especially the US, over the EU.
- CSDP initiatives which require assent of the Council through the unanimity voting procedure could be vetoed. The UK could also make a non-binding political declaration, publicising its intention to take a non-participatory role in CSDP and to apply its energies to revitalising Nato.
- A treaty amendment may be sought, delivering an opt-out from CSDP, on the lines of that applying to the Kingdom of Denmark, but, as a full EU Member State, the UK could retain the right to attend all meetings, in the same way as France previously acted in relation to the integrated military structure of Nato. Any attempts at further integration and strengthening the CSDP by treaty amendment could be vetoed and the UK could seek a complete opt-out from any such provisions while insisting that no steps be taken under CSDP which jeopardise or inhibit the UK's full access and engagement in the single market.
- The UK could invoke Article 50 (TEU) and negotiate a relationship with the EU which does not include any defence element. And such negotiation could include opt-outs from defence procurement regulations and directives, but may include opt-ins where this is in the national interest.

## The introduction

The defence of the realm is the most fundamental aspect of national sovereignty. The Armed Forces add an important dimension to foreign policy in the protection of UK national interests overseas, usually with allies. In the UK, when requested by the civil power, they assist in national emergencies, the provision of essential services, and in internal security and the maintenance of public order. The importance of our Armed Forces, however, is more than the sum of their parts. They are part of the fabric of our society. Their status, activities and performance enhance national prestige and contribute significantly to our national identity and many aspects of national life, including education and training.

There are 200,000 Service personnel, plus an establishment of 70,141 civil servants (full-time equivalents).<sup>481</sup> The UK defence industry has an annual turnover of £35 billion, making up ten percent of UK manufacturing. The export value of £7.2 billion (2009) places the UK as the second-largest defence exporter in the world, after the United States. The industry directly supports an estimated 300,000 jobs in 9,000 defence companies, including small businesses.

Since the Second World War, the role of UK forces has undergone a gradual transition. From defending UK possessions overseas, and supporting the Nato alliance in the defence of continental Europe against attack by the Warsaw Pact – while maintaining the nuclear deterrent to ensure national security, and supporting the civil power in Northern Ireland – they now function mainly as expeditionary forces, usually in support of multilateral operations.

In parallel to its long-standing commitment to Nato, the UK is now a full participant in the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)<sup>482</sup>. Under the control of the Council of the European Union, CSDP is managed by the EU High Representative, effectively the EU's Foreign & Defence Minister. It is supported, inter alia, by a Political & Security Committee, a Military Committee, a Military Staff, Assessment Staff (SitGen), a European Defence Agency (EDA) as well as operational planning HQs. Since 2003, it has launched some 27 "CSDP missions".<sup>483</sup>

According to the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP is aimed at "reinforcing the European identity and its independence".<sup>484</sup> Specifically it will "provide the Union (EU) with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets".

In these times of financial and economic crisis and given the inclination of the US to focus less on European interests, some question the wisdom of establishing structures under EU auspices that duplicate and create tensions in Nato, and create limited additional military capability.

CSDP has been presented differently in the UK and on the Continent. Previous British Ministers have confidently stated that the EU's CSDP "is not trying to compete with Nato, nor striving to replace it" and that "a key objective of our European defence policy is that it will strengthen Nato, not least by enhancing the European capabilities available to the Alliance."<sup>485</sup> For the UK, CSDP is all about trying to generate more military capability from

---

<sup>481</sup> <http://data.gov.uk/dataset/workforce-management-information-ministry-of-defence>.

<sup>482</sup> formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

<sup>483</sup> The term 'EU' is used as shorthand throughout and includes the previous EC/EEC.

<sup>484</sup> Preamble to the "Treaty of Lisbon" (the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with the annexes and protocols thereto, as they result from the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon and which entered into force on 1 December 2009.)

<sup>485</sup> [http://www.mod.uk/linked\\_files/european\\_def.pdf](http://www.mod.uk/linked_files/european_def.pdf).

reluctant European allies. For example, MoD officials point out that, for a modest financial commitment, the EDA has developed extra capability through training helicopter pilots. And Foreign Office Officials have noted that the EU has been useful in helping to develop effective sanctions against Iran, and in Serbia's extradition of Radko Mladic.

For the EU, however, CSDP was always about building Europe. In 1975, Leo Tindemans, then Prime Minister of Belgium, told the European Council that: "The EU will not be complete until it has drawn up a common defence policy".<sup>486</sup> Some deny that the objective is a "European Army", for others this aim is unquestionable.

The one-time Chairman of the EU's Military Committee, General Gustav Hagglund of Finland said of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF): "We are not talking about a subsidiary of Nato. This is an independent body. We are talking about co-operation with Nato..... it is a question of identity in the same way as the flag and the euro".<sup>487</sup>

In July 2006, Claude-France Arnould, Director of Politico-Military Affairs at the European Council (and subsequently Head of the EDA), declared at a seminar on the future of the European Security and Defence Policy that the then emergent EU Battle Groups were more a tool for political integration than to attain military objectives.<sup>488</sup>

European Commission President Romano Prodi, told an English newspaper in February 2000: "If you don't want to call it a European army, don't call it a European army. You can call it 'Margaret, you can call it Mary-Ann', you can find any name."<sup>489</sup>

The idea of a European Army is not some obsolete aspiration, long since abandoned. On 15 June 2012 the Foreign Ministers of 10 EU countries, keen to push ahead more intensively with European integration, issued a statement which included: "We need a more dynamic CSDP, stronger EEAS planning and command capabilities for civil-military operations, more pooling and sharing. We should commit to more majority decisions in the sphere of our Common Foreign and Security Policy. With regard to Defence Policy most Foreign Ministers feel that we should be more ambitious. We should raise the level of our ambition beyond "pooling and sharing". In the long term, we should aim for a European Defence Policy with joint efforts regarding the defence industry; for some members this could also include a "European army". We should also aim for a common seat in international organisations."<sup>490</sup>

The EU philosophy of "small steps" encourages what is known as the "ratchet effect". One thing leads inevitably to another.

In 2008, after the European Parliament had endorsed a report calling for a large standing military force under EU command, it was noted that "the same ratchet effect that was used to introduce the single currency and an EU diplomatic service is now being applied in the military sphere".<sup>491</sup>

Notwithstanding the more recent Lisbon Treaty, EU defence integration began in earnest in 1998. The objective was to develop an autonomous military capability, despite the fact that most EU members were already Nato members and that all sat at the Nato table in some form.

---

<sup>486</sup> <http://www.europeansecurityfoundation.eu/whitebook.php>.

<sup>487</sup> *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 April 2001.

<sup>488</sup> <http://www.eureferendum.com/blogview.aspx?blogno=78307>.

<sup>489</sup> *The Independent*, 4 February 2000.

<sup>490</sup> "The time for a debate on the future of Europe is now", Foreign Ministers Group on the Future of Europe, Chairman's Statement 15 June 2012.

<sup>491</sup> See: on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy and European Security and Defence Policy , [http://m.conservatives.com/News/News\\_stories/2008/06/EU\\_grabs\\_bigger\\_role\\_in\\_defence.aspx](http://m.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2008/06/EU_grabs_bigger_role_in_defence.aspx).

The key word that emerged was that the EU should have an "autonomous" military capability. In other words, its decision-making processes were to be separate from Nato, there was no longer a recognition of Nato 'primacy' - that the Alliance should have the 'first bite' at consideration of a crisis - and 'EU forces' should ultimately no longer have reliance on Nato command, control, communications or intelligence and target acquisition.

"Necessary" duplication, regardless of cost and additional complexity, was apparently a price worth paying in order to cement a policy whose primary aim was European integration.

The EU CSDP includes the concept of collective security. The collective self-defence clause (Article 41(7) of the Treaty on European Union) states that when an EU country is the target of armed aggression on its territory, the other EU Member States shall aid and assist it by any means possible. It remains doubtful how far this principle would be applied. For example, if the Falklands again came under attack by Argentinean forces, it is unlikely that EU member states would send troops to support the UK. Furthermore, the EU mutual assistance article is a duplication of Nato's Article 5, and the EU does not have the capacity to fulfill that obligation without the assistance of Nato.

## **The detail**

### **The Evolution of CSDP**

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU).<sup>492</sup> According to the Lisbon Treaty, CSDP is aimed at "reinforcing the European identity and its independence".<sup>493</sup> Specifically it will "provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets."

Defence was reintroduced into the EU policy arena when the Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992. This included as a formal objective "the *eventual* framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence". Such a development required the unanimous agreement of all governments, and the expectation was that certainly no British government, let alone others, would agree. At that time British policy was to sustain the Western European Union (WEU) which provided a forum for European discussion of defence matters but which was not a serious competitor with Nato as it lacked the capacity to act.

France in particular had different ideas about the WEU. It wanted to develop it as an effective and separate European military arm. At the WEU Council of Ministers at Petersberg, near Bonn on 19 June 1992, the status of the WEU was confirmed as "the defence component of the EU and the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".<sup>494</sup> The WEU also set out proposals for strengthening its operational role with what became known as the "Petersberg tasks".<sup>495</sup> The principle of *propagande par le fait* (the propaganda of the deed) was put into practice in 1992 when WEU deployed a fleet to enforce the UNSC embargo on the former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. However, Nato was already carrying out this task. So there were two fleets from more or less the same navies

---

<sup>492</sup> The terms 'EU' is used as shorthand throughout and includes the previous EC/EEC.

<sup>493</sup> Preamble to the "Treaty of Lisbon" (the Treaty on EU and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, together with the annexes and protocols thereto, as they result from the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon and which entered into force on 1 December 2009.)

<sup>494</sup> This had been announced in the Declaration of member states of the WEU at Maastricht on 10 December 1991.

<sup>495</sup> Military units of WEU member states, acting under the authority of the WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.



carrying out the same task in the same stretch of water (a situation to be repeated off the coast of Somalia in years to come).

On 1 May 1997, there was a change of government in the UK and British policy towards the EU began to shift in a way that, on the one hand was more sympathetic to French aspirations for European defence while still remaining strongly attached to the Atlantic Alliance. In the EU Treaty of Amsterdam, signed by Heads of Government on 10 November 1997, there was now to be a "*progressive* framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence", the "Petersberg tasks" were incorporated in the Treaty, along with the "possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union (EU)".

Effectively, the idea of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) *within* Nato, carried out through the WEU, was abandoned and movement began towards the creation of a separate EU military capability. The shift in policy was confirmed at the informal Pörschach European Council of 24-25 October 1998 where the remarks of British Prime Minister Blair, calling for an intensification of EU CFSP were apparently warmly received. Mr Blair was at pains to emphasise "I am certainly not - repeat not- talking about a European Army or anything like it at all [...] all I am saying, and I am not saying more than this, is that we need to allow fresh thinking in this and it is important for Britain to be part of this thinking..."<sup>496</sup>

France and Germany moved quickly to push at this opening, and at the bilateral Franco-German Summit of 1 December 1998 in Potsdam took the first decision that the EU should be given its own operational military capability and that the WEU should definitely be integrated into the EU. Two days later, on 3 December 1998, Prime Minister Blair met French President Jacques Chirac for their own bilateral summit in St. Malo. Afterwards, they issued a joint declaration in which was stated:

"...the Union (EU) must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises [...] the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the EU will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within Nato's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the Nato framework)".<sup>497</sup>

At Cologne on 3-4 June 1999, during the Kosovo conflict, the European Council decided that defence should have formal structures within an EU treaty framework. These were to be placed at the core of what was now labelled the "European Common Security and Defence policy" (ESDP). It was resolved that "the EU should play its full role on the international stage". To that end, it "should be provided with all the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence".<sup>498</sup> Echoing the language of the St Malo Declaration, it decided that the EU must "have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces."<sup>499</sup>

At the following Helsinki Council in December 1999, the pace of integration advanced further, with an agreement to create a European rapid reaction force. This was to be an EU-controlled military force able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year up to

<sup>496</sup> Extract from press conference given by Mr Blair following the Pörschach European Council of 25 October 1998.

<sup>497</sup> Cited in: [http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004\\_Venusberg\\_Report.pdf](http://www.cap.uni-muenchen.de/download/2004/2004_Venusberg_Report.pdf).

<sup>498</sup> [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/kolnen.htm).

<sup>499</sup> Presidency conclusions. Annex III. [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/57886.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/57886.pdf).

60,000 personnel capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.<sup>500</sup> Also agreed was a “Headline Goal” which set out the specific force components which member states agreed to contribute. The EU had an army in the making, and had now issued a shopping list for its equipment.

Recognising that a fruitful avenue for the EU to follow was in the broader 'security' arena, where non-military assets were required the Santa Maria da Feira Council of June 2000 took in civil aspects of the policy, identifying four civilian priority areas.<sup>501</sup> This was followed on 26 February 2001 by the creation of a financial “rapid-reaction mechanism” to “underpin existing Community policies and programmes and enable the Community to take urgent action to help re-establish or safeguard normal conditions for the execution of the policies undertaken, in order to preserve their effectiveness”.<sup>502</sup>

While the 16 December 2002 "Berlin Plus" agreement allowed the EU to draw on some of Nato's military assets for its own peacekeeping operations<sup>503</sup>, the ambition for EU autonomy remained.

In 2003, ESDP became operational, starting with the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM). Since then, 27 "CSDP operations" have been initiated, creating “a plausible narrative of security and defence activity”.<sup>504</sup> Most are on a small-scale, most are civil missions operating under the CSDP mandate, and only a handful have been purely military in nature.<sup>505</sup>

The military operations tend either to be French in origin, sub-contracted to the EU; recent Nato operations which have effectively been wound up or with which the EU seeks to compete; or the result of the EU efforts to find gaps in the wider international effort where the EU can respond – sometimes all three of these. Many argue that few of the CSDP missions stand up to critical scrutiny.

When the Libya crisis unfolded in 2011, the EU sought some sort of role under its CSDP heading but neither the UN, the US, nor European leaders had any desire to provide an opportunity for CSDP. The EU plea to run the maritime embargo or to deliver humanitarian assistance with military escorts was turned down. A “coalition of the willing” was quickly engaged, led by France and the UK. This then became a Nato operation, European-led, with strong US support.

### **Why CSDP?**

Over the years at least ten different justifications for CSDP have been developed with the "comprehensive approach" being most fashionable at the moment:

### **More influence in the world through Joint EU Action**

It is argued, with the growth of new powers such as China and India, the best way for Europeans to have more influence on the world stage is with a unified approach. This presupposes a common 'European' strategic interest or foreign policy and abandons the idea of 'national interests'. Of course, where 27 EU nations or 28 NATO nations can deliver

<sup>500</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/esdp/chrono.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/esdp/chrono.htm).

<sup>501</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm).

<sup>502</sup> Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R0381:EN:HTML>.

<sup>503</sup> [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004\\_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus\\_/berlinplus\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf).

<sup>504</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/csdp\\_handbook\\_web.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/csdp_handbook_web.pdf).

<sup>505</sup> For a list of operations, see: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?amp;lang=en>.



a common message, that is to be welcomed. In the field of Foreign Policy, the UK has viewed the EU as a useful tool, for example in developing sanctions against Iran over its Nuclear programme in 2012.

### **Common EU structures and procurement to save money**

It is suggested that closer EU co-operation in security and defence matters leads to efficiency savings, in manpower, in procurement, in communication systems, in HQs, and in role specialisation.

For this calculation, the EU tends to amalgamate the activities of the 27 countries that are EU members and present these as if they are a coherent EU whole. This has been termed by some as the 'sin of elision'. We often hear reference to "EU forces" in Afghanistan for example. Of course, there is no such thing. There are various national contributions, by Nato allies and others, to a Nato mission. The EU has no military forces of its own.

The key comparator that is used is the US. On the world stage, the US remains by far biggest defence spender, having spent \$711.4 billion in 2011<sup>506</sup>. According to the European Defence Agency, the aggregated military spend for the 26 EDA participating member states (pMS), what we might better refer to as European countries, was \$257 billion – a ratio of 2.7:1.<sup>507</sup>

And while the US had seen a modest fall, of the three top spenders in Western Europe - France, Germany and the UK - France's military budget had fallen 4% since 2008, Germany had cut 1.4 % and only the UK was holding up, with a 0.6 % cut – although deeper cuts are in the pipeline.

In other European countries, far larger cuts had been made. Greece was down 26% since 2008, Spain 18%, Italy 16% and the Irish Republic 11%. Belgium had seen a 12% cut and most central European countries had also made severe cuts.

It is suggested that "pooling and sharing" capabilities is the best way to leverage more capability and to overcome budgetary limitations. Some also see this as a means of transition from individual national forces to full integration of military capabilities.

However, Nato is also looking at the possibility of more integrated military effort, in limited areas, through its 'Smart Defence' initiative.

### **The EU has resources which other organisations lack**

Supporters of European defence integration argue that, over and above operational economies, activity on a European level can receive additional subvention from the EU budget as well as extra-budgetary funding managed by EU institutions. This includes contributions from the European Development Fund, the Athena mechanism and programmes created by intergovernmental agreements, with the EU acting as the co-ordinator or facilitator.

Pressure for an EU budgetary component devoted to military capabilities is certainly increasing. In December 2011, the European Parliament considered a report on "the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States", which offered several suggestions in this direction.

---

<sup>506</sup> SIPRI Military Expenditure Database - <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>.

<sup>507</sup> [http://www.eda.europa.eu/News/12-01-25/EU\\_and\\_US\\_government\\_Defence\\_spending](http://www.eda.europa.eu/News/12-01-25/EU_and_US_government_Defence_spending).

Of course, the EU budget is largely made up of contributions from its Member States. Those same States could decide to spend their money elsewhere or with other organisations.

### **An EU military capability will reinforce Nato**

Conscious of the historic and political attachment of its members to Nato, and the widely expressed concerns that EU defence ambitions are undermining the Atlantic alliance, the rationale for CSDP is sometimes expressed in terms of strengthening Nato itself. Those EU integrationists that are Atlanticist foster the ambition for a future Nato in two parts - with a North American and an EU pillar. This would effectively dissect the Alliance and see the European allies pre-cooking their positions and presenting an EU caucus in Nato. Nato would effectively become a two-flag operation. And there is no evidence that countries committed to a CSDP path will strengthen their Nato contributions. On the contrary, certain nations with very capable armed forces such as Germany and Poland, refuse to contribute to Nato's operations.

### **The EU can go where the US can't**

For some, Nato is seen as a US organisation and they claim the US brand is sometimes toxic. Therefore the EU - with its currently limited military profile - would be more acceptable.

The most recent example of such sensitivity was in regard to the Lebanon crisis in 2006 when the EU was keen to create a role for itself, but this was rejected in favour of expanding the nature and scope of the UN's UNIFIL mission.

Of course, there may well be occasions when nations other than the US must take the lead in a crisis, but this does not automatically lead to a role for the EU. There is a plethora of more appropriate organisations, including the UN, African Union, and ASEAN as well as effective coalitions of the willing.

There is no good reason why Nato should not decide that European members of Nato should take the lead in a particular crisis and use Nato structures and assets. This was the idea behind the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) initiative in 1996 – a 'separable but not separate' part of Nato.

### **CSDP embodies the novel 'Comprehensive Approach'**

It is said that Nato does not have the ability to cover the full spectrum of defence and security-related tasks. In addition to high-end military intervention, there is a need for stabilisation and reconstruction measures to follow any major combat phase. This requires civilian skills and capabilities.

Since most of the conflicts that allies are likely to confront will be insurgencies and unconventional conflicts at the low end of the conflict spectrum, these capabilities will be at a premium. It is argued that only the EU has the means to engage both civil and military capability simultaneously, in what is known as the "comprehensive approach". There is no particular merit or advantage in institutionalising such a combination. It can equally well be achieved through good planning and liaison.

A division of labour rather than duplication would be helpful. If the EU had co-ordinated its civil missions in Afghanistan with Nato and got them right – development projects, police training etc – the situation there might have been improved. For a long time, the CSDP mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) had no contact with the local delegation of the EU.

The EU could perform a useful role if it concentrated on efficient delivery of civil tasks of conflict prevention, and post-conflict reconstruction. This would be helpful and complementary to the mainly military interventions best done by Nato.

### **CSDP enhances European nations' military capabilities**

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has the task of enhancing military capabilities. MoD officials point to specific examples, such as the training of helicopter pilots, which have added military capability. In some cases, the EDA duplicates roles already being performed at Nato. For example, Nato's Multinational Aviation Training Centre, which builds on operational experience and expertise from Afghanistan, provides training to helicopter pilots and ground crews.

The armed forces of European countries will become more capable when they are flexible and interoperable – not just with one another but with all other Nato allies, particularly the US - and properly financed.

Nato member countries agreed to spend a minimum of 2% of GDP on defence. Most European countries fail this test. The UK is an exception. However, even the UK – among the most active military powers – is already spending less now on defence as a proportion of national wealth than at any time since the 1930s. A favourite mantra of the EDA is that it is not the size of a defence budget that matters but how it is spent.

It is doubtful that the EU could spend defence funds more effectively than national governments.

### **Nato and the US support CSDP**

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US wanted to make Europe less dependent and able to contribute to defence needs in the face of the Soviet threat. In fact, the need for greater “burden sharing” has been the recurring theme of Alliance politics for decades. The US tended to the view that “how the Europeans organise themselves is up to them”, provided they come up with more capability and are reliable allies when it counts.

The problem has proved twofold – limited additional capability has been produced, and those driving the ambition for CSDP were often motivated by competition and distinctiveness rather than a desire for partnership with the US.

Just after the St Malo Declaration on creating an autonomous EU defence capability, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while diplomatically welcoming the burden-sharing possibilities of the Anglo-French initiative, felt compelled to warn against “no diminution of Nato, no discrimination and no duplication.”<sup>508</sup> In many cases, unfortunately all of what became known as “the 3 Ds” have become features of CSDP.

There is no good reason why, if it was decided that a crisis should be dealt with predominantly at a European level, Nato structures should not accommodate European-led operations. Furthermore, there is a precedent for the EU in a two-tier approach, which Nato successfully dealt with during the 40-year period when France absented herself from the integrated command structure of the Alliance. As its full Nato membership allowed, France continued to be present at all meetings (except nuclear) and cooperated in operational planning.

---

<sup>508</sup> Transcript of Albright Press Conference at Nato HQ 8 December 1998.

## Europe must take responsibility for its own backyard

The “backyard” argument came to the fore in June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from the Federation of Yugoslavia. The response of the Belgrade government was to order the Yugoslav National Army into Slovenia to put down the “rebellion” by force.

Of course, the US quite rightly expects the Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their immediate region, just as the US is increasingly concerned with the Asia-Pacific region. But all these issues demand the common focus of all the democracies. The great merit of Nato is that the North American and European allies sit at the same table and agree by consensus on the best approach to a crisis. This enables the most appropriate force configuration, avoids the danger of contradictory political signals, and ensures solidarity in the face of crisis.

Libya provides an example – albeit imperfect – of this process in action. Under the leadership of France and the UK and with the full support of the US, Nato allies and a number of partner nations including Sweden, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, undertook operations to protect civilians in Libya. On 31 March 2011, Nato took sole command and control of the international military effort in support of UNSCR 1973.

In many respects this provided the final evidence of the irrelevance of CSDP. EU representatives had desperately sought a CSDP role in the Libya crisis but these were all rejected in favour of intervention under Nato command.

## Popular legitimacy

A more contentious argument for EU defence involvement is the one of legitimacy, where it is asserted that European action enjoys high levels of popular support. Certainly there are Europe-wide polls that suggest that decisions on defence and foreign affairs made jointly within the EU are strongly backed by all national parliaments, and by 76% of European public opinion, with majority support in all 27 countries in the EU.<sup>509</sup>

But there is a considerable range of opinion, even within the terms of the polling questions as formulated, from 83% (Slovakia) to 20% (Finland), with the UK recording a 40% approval rating. By comparison 79% of respondents in Finland, 55% in the UK and 50% in Sweden would prefer decisions to be taken at national level.<sup>510</sup> Opinion seems remarkably stable, with little difference year-on-year, evidenced by results in the autumn of 2010.<sup>511</sup>

The argument is that, when the Union acts on the world stage, it does so by consensus. It is thus claimed that its actions are indirectly sanctioned by nearly 500 million people, with no single country able to lay claim to such legitimacy.<sup>512</sup>

However, traditionally, national sovereignty and national defence are seen to be intimately related, defence of sovereign territory being regarded as the principle duty of national governments.

In the UK at least, there is certainly a demonstrable lack of enthusiasm for the idea of sharing military resources with other nations, and a belief that it is important for the UK to retain a strong national grip on its defence assets. In a Harris poll conducted for the

---

<sup>509</sup> *ibid*, p.27.

<sup>510</sup> Eurobarometer Standard, “The EU Today and Tomorrow”, November 2008:

[http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69\\_part3\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_part3_en.pdf).

<sup>511</sup> Eurobarometer: [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74\\_publ\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_publ_en.pdf)

<sup>512</sup> [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What\\_ambitions\\_for\\_European\\_defence\\_in\\_2020.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What_ambitions_for_European_defence_in_2020.pdf).

*Financial Times*, more than a third actively opposed sharing resources, and 81% said they were “concerned” that reductions in national defence expenditure “will weaken the UK’s ability to protect itself”. Only 33% actively supported the idea of defence sharing.<sup>513</sup>

### **CSDP provides opportunity for military participation of non-Nato nations**

It is true that six EU member states are not Nato allies. But, with the exception of Cyprus, where there are specific problems, all the others have either sat at the Nato table<sup>514</sup> or participated in Nato operations. Equally, some seven Nato allies are not EU member states. Even more than the EU, Nato provides opportunities for operational involvement of nations that are not members of Nato or the EU. The Nato ISAF operation in Afghanistan included Australia, New Zealand, Mongolia, Korea, Singapore, Jordan, and Bosnia among others. The Libya operation, noticeably short of Nato allies Germany and Poland, included Qatar, UAE, Jordan. Denmark – a good Nato ally – has consciously opted-out of CSDP and contributed disproportionately to Nato air missions over Libya.

### **Defence industrial policy**

The Treaty of Amsterdam had contained only a weak reference to defence industrial policy with recognition that “the progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments”. In 2004 the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established in order to create major cooperation among Member States in the defence sector and to facilitate the birth of the European Defence Equipment Market.

The UK, however, remains a significant and attractive market, more so since the recent publication of the British Government’s White Paper, “National Security Through Technology: Technology, Equipment, and Support for UK Defence and Security”.<sup>515</sup> The issue of relevance was raised by the *Financial Times*, headlining: “MoD will no longer favour UK companies”. The Ministry of Defence stated that it:

“[...] will no longer give UK companies priority over their foreign competitors when buying equipment and weapons for the armed forces. The only exceptions will be cases where buying British is essential to maintaining national security”.<sup>516</sup>

Ostensibly, this opens defence purchasing to the international market in a manner which transcends CSDP. A commitment to “buying off the shelf” on the basis of value for money liberates the UK from politically motivated programmes. Although not specifically intended as such, this already reduces the impact of the common policy which holds as a central tenet that the creation of a competitive and efficient European defence market is a precondition to achieving better military capabilities across the EU through pooling and sharing.<sup>517</sup>

That notwithstanding, the effects of the unilateral action by the UK are mitigated by the need to conform with general treaty obligations. In particular, there is Directive 2009/81/EC “on the co-ordination of procedures for the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and

---

<sup>513</sup> *Financial Times*, 1 November 2010, Military sharing plan finds resistance.

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d6c63a7e-e5ec-11df-af15-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1v3SjeNxi>.

<sup>514</sup> All sit on Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

<sup>515</sup> MoD website: <http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/4EA96021-0B99-43C0-B65E-CDF3A9EEF2E9/0/cm8278.pdf>.

<sup>516</sup> Defence Procurement Minister Peter Luff, in comments to *The Financial Times*, 31 January 2012.

<http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/435b4bfe-4c15-11e1-b1b5-00144feabdc0.html>.

<sup>517</sup> Claude-France Arnould. *et al* (2009), What ambitions for European defence in 2020? ISS, Paris.

[http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What\\_ambitions\\_for\\_European\\_defence\\_in\\_2020.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/What_ambitions_for_European_defence_in_2020.pdf).



service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC”.<sup>518</sup>

All of these rely on “Single Market” treaty provisions for their legal base, and were transposed into UK law as the Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations on 21 August 2011.

However, this Directive has a sting in the tail. The declared intention is to promote the “gradual establishment of a European defence equipment market” which is regarded as “essential for strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base”. But its additional objective is the development of the military capabilities required to implement the European Security and Defence Policy.

No longer are we talking about national defence industries. The Commission is aiming for a truly European defence equipment market. It has steadily eroded the national interest exemption in the procurement of military equipment, embodied in Article 296 of the Treaty, enabling them to by-pass Single Market rules on competition. This was achieved not by any new law or agreement, but by an “Interpretative Communication” of the Article, issued on 7 December 2006.

The crucial point here is that while Commission initiatives aimed at harmonising defence procurement are an integral part of the CSDP, with the actual instruments being part of the Single Market *acquis*, the UK cannot entirely exclude itself from them without being in breach of its treaty obligations. Nor does it have to.

In terms of equipment procurement, there may well be budgetary and industrial merit in collaborative equipment schemes, although this is open to challenge. In any case, such arrangements do not require the involvement of the institutions of the EU.<sup>519</sup> Invariably, multilateral equipment programmes cost more and take longer to develop than national or bilateral schemes. Furthermore, the important requirement for “interoperability” of military forces acting in coalition extends well beyond the EU. Britain is more likely to be fighting alongside US troops in any future conflict.<sup>520</sup>

## **The Case Study—Counter Piracy Operations off the Coast of Somalia**

### **International Co-Ordination**

Under the mandate of UNSCR1851(2008) the international community has responded to the piracy threat off the coast of Somalia. It has established co-ordination structures under UN auspices. Warships are provided mainly by the US and many European navies under Nato command. More recently, the same European navies also deploy their warships under EU command.

#### **Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. (CGPCS), New York**

Working Group 1: Improving naval operational co-ordination and building the judicial, penal and maritime capacity of Regional States. Chaired by UK.

Working Group 2: Establishing judicial frameworks for the arrest, detention and prosecution of suspect pirates. Chaired by Denmark.

<sup>518</sup> <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:216:0076:0136:en:PDF>.

<sup>519</sup> See “EU White Elephants?: The Political Economy of Multi-national Defence Projects”, Keith Hartley, *New Direction* 2012.

<sup>520</sup> [http://www.geoffreyvanorden.com/user\\_files/documents/Defence\\_Pamphlet\\_-\\_Oct.\\_2010.pdf](http://www.geoffreyvanorden.com/user_files/documents/Defence_Pamphlet_-_Oct._2010.pdf).



Working Group 3: Strengthening commercial shipping self-awareness and self-defence. Chaired by USA.

Working Group 4: Improving diplomatic and public information efforts within Somalia and the international community. Chaired by Egypt.

**Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism, Bahrain**

### **Maritime Capabilities**

**Operation Ocean Shield** Nato's current counter-piracy mission - succeeded two shorter counter-piracy operations dating from October 2008 to protect WFP ships. Counter-piracy operations at sea are its main focus. Controlled from Allied Maritime Component Command Headquarters Northwood, UK.

**CTF-151** is part of the US-commanded *Combined Maritime Force* - a 25-nation coalition headquartered in Bahrain. The Royal Navy regularly provides a frigate and occasionally a Royal Fleet Auxiliary Ship.

**EUNAVFOR** or **Operation Atalanta** - also headquartered in Northwood, UK. It was an evolution of a French operation out of Djibouti and was turned into an EU mission - "the first maritime CSDP mission" under the French EU presidency in 2009. It took over protection of WFP shipments from Nato, but has expanded to take on a broader anti-piracy role. The last extension of EUNAVFOR's mandate has allowed it to target both 'motherships' and pirate bases on land, thus extending its operational mandate considerably.

In addition to these three major taskforces, several nations have also deployed vessels independently, including Australia, Bahrain, China, Egypt, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Ukraine and Yemen.

### **Extent of UK involvement in CSDP**

CSDP has always presented a particular policy dilemma for the UK. The UK sees defence as the strong suit in its hand which it could play to win support in other EU policy areas. Equally, there is reluctance to concede defence leadership in Europe to France or to create a situation where defence matters in Europe were being discussed without a UK presence. The US might also have been uncomfortable with this.

The UK has therefore found itself on an endless escalator - unwilling to risk getting off and often engaged in activities producing no tangible benefit while diverting energy and resources from more important tasks.

The UK is a signatory to the succession of EU treaties from Maastricht to Lisbon which have included defence commitments of increasing intensity (see above). At no stage did the UK seek a defence opt-out except to insist that reference be included in the Treaties to "the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty".

Denmark is the only EU Member State to have excluded itself - and continues to exclude itself - from all aspects of CSDP, having negotiated an opt-out from this policy area following the Danish people's initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in a 1992 referendum.

The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon has given fresh energy and coherence to CSDP. The UK is engaged in policy formulation, provision of personnel, military operations, and funding.

The UK is fully engaged in all the policy committees. Much of the activity in relation to CSDP is devolved to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with representation at ambassadorial level and an EU Military Committee with representation at 3-star level (in the UK and most other cases the same officer who sits on the Nato Military Committee).

Given the British Government's role as midwife to CSDP it was not surprising that the UK should give early encouragement to CSDP missions and seek to contribute to them. For example, in December 2004, European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea, under British command, took over Nato's Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. This was hailed as the EU's first 'substantial military mission'.

In December 2008 the EU launched its first naval operation, Operation ATALANTA, to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. The UK provided the Operational Headquarters at Northwood and the Operational Commander. This operation draws on the same diminishing national naval assets that also help support Nato's counter-piracy mission in the same waters.

The EU's 2004 "battlegroup" concept was a response to the failure of the more ambitious project for a Corps-sized European rapid reaction force. Again, it drew on the same national forces that would have to be employed to mount other national or Nato missions. No battlegroup has yet been used on operations, in spite of the fact that there are two battlegroups on standby at any one time. The UK provided battlegroups in the second half of 2008 and the first half of 2010 and will do so, with Sweden, in the second half of 2013.

British contributions to CSDP missions inevitably varies. Of 27 CSDP missions, the UK has so far contributed to 18. Currently, as at February 2012, a total of 153 British Military personnel were deployed as follows: EUNAVFOR Somalia - 69; EULEX Kosovo - 35; EUPOL Afghanistan - 18; EUMM Georgia - 12; EUPOL Copps - 5; EUSEC RD Congo - 4; EUFOR Althea - 4; EUTM Somalia - 2; EUJUST LEX Iraq - 2; EUPM BiH - 2.<sup>521</sup>

The UK also contributes military and civil staff to the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the source of military expertise within the European External Action Service. Currently, the Deputy Director General is Rear Admiral B N B Williams RN, a British officer on secondment. It works under the direction of the EU Military Committee. Housed in a building in the European quarter in Brussels, it employs nine Generals and 57 Colonels, with a total of 135 staff in all.<sup>522</sup>

At the British Permanent Representation to the EU there is now an embedded military section led by a one-star officer supported by 6 personnel. In addition there are 12 diplomatic/civilian staff engaged on CSDP-related issues.

These personnel are, of course, additional to the much larger number of UK military and civilian personnel serving at Nato on both Alliance and national staffs. While the EU numbers are relatively small, they nevertheless represent a significant investment in manpower and resources.

At the heart of the European External Action Service, however, is the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). It was established in December 2008, when the European

---

<sup>521</sup> For full details and further breakdowns of national contributions, see here: <http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel>.

<sup>522</sup> <http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/behind-the-camouflage-nine-generals-and-57-colonels-are-ready-for-action/44434.aspx>.

Council merged civilian and military aspects of the planning for European peace keeping missions into a single directorate. It is envisaged that the CMPD will incorporate integrated strategic planning and CSDP policy development issues, including civilian and military aspects of capabilities, partnerships, exercises and lessons learned.<sup>523</sup>

The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is designated as the permanent structure responsible for an autonomous operational conduct of civilian CSDP operations. Under the political control and strategic direction of the COPS, the CPCC ensures the effective planning and conduct of civilian CSDP crisis management operations, as well as the proper implementation of all mission related tasks. It currently employs 60 staff, half of whom are Council officials, the other half seconded national experts.<sup>524</sup>

The Joint Situation Centre (JSC or SitCen) is the EU's intelligence assessment body, part of the EEAS, and under the authority of the EU's High Representative, with some 100 personnel based in the EU Council Building in Brussels and in the nearby Cortenberg building where the EUMS is located.

The EU Satellite Centre (EUSC) supports the decision-making of the EU by providing analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data.<sup>525</sup>

The EU has long regarded the establishment of an EU Operational Headquarters, or EU OHQ as a key objective in furtherance of EU operational autonomy. This has always been problematic for the UK<sup>526</sup> which preferred to make existing HQs available for command and control of EU Military or Civ-Mil missions.

This so-called 'framework nation' track was used during Operation Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (both using France's Mont Valérien HQ), EUFOR DR Congo (using Germany's Potsdam HQ), and currently Operation Atalanta (using UK's Northwood HQ).

However, the European Council of December 2004 took the decision to establish "a further OHQ option"<sup>527</sup> and has been trying to find an agreeable formula since then.

The issue arose again at the July 2011 European Council, and the UK made clear her fundamental objections. Foreign Secretary William Hague MP observed: "I have made very clear that the United Kingdom will not agree to such a permanent OHQ. We will not agree to it now, we will not agree to it in the future. That is a red line for us. We are opposed to this idea because we think it duplicates Nato structures and permanently disassociates EU planning from Nato planning. Secondly, it's likely to be a much more costly solution than existing structures; and thirdly, a lot can be done by improving the structures that already exist."<sup>528</sup>

---

<sup>523</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2009-6039&language=EN>.

<sup>524</sup> [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004\\_2009/documents/dv/sede131008cpcc/\\_SEDE131008CPCC\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/sede131008cpcc/_SEDE131008CPCC_en.pdf).

<sup>525</sup> <http://www.eusc.europa.eu/>.

<sup>526</sup> Even Prime Minister Blair made it clear that the establishment of any EU OHQ would be a red line for the UK. Instead of building up an entirely new institution at Tervuren (Belgium), it was decided to instead create a small unit of planners to join the existing EU military staff (EUMS), as part of the secretariat of the Council of Ministers.<sup>526</sup> A small unit of EUMS were also embedded at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) "to prepare for EU operations having recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities under Berlin plus arrangements".

<sup>527</sup> EU Council Secretariat - Background document: 'The EU Operations Centre' (p.2)

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070228-EU\\_OpsCentre.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/070228-EU_OpsCentre.pdf).

<sup>528</sup> In comments to journalists on 18 July 2011, as reported by news outlets - including: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britain-blocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html> and <http://www.euractiv.com/justice/uk-blocks-bid-permanent-eu-secur-news-506640>.

But, only eight months following this veto, on 23 March 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council took the unprecedented step of activating an EU OpsCen - "to coordinate and increase synergies" between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa - EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP NESTOR.<sup>529</sup>

---

<sup>529</sup> Foreign Affairs Council Press Release - 'EU Operations Centre to support CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa' - <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st07/st07858.en12.pdf>.

## EU Duplication Of Nato

### **Nato**

21 European countries  
US, Canada, Iceland\*, Norway  
Turkey\*, Albania, Croatia\*  
(\* EU candidate countries)  
Nato Article 5

### **EU (CSDP)**

21 European countries  
Sweden, Finland, Austria, Repub of IRL  
Malta, Repub of Cyprus  
  
Lisbon Treaty 'Mutual Assistance Clause'  
Art. 42.7)

### **Military Forces**

AWACS  
The Strategic Airlift Capability  
Missile Defence capability  
Alliance Ground Surveillance  
programme

NIL

NATIONAL ARMED FORCES

NATIONAL ARMED FORCES

### **Capability Improvements**

#### **"Smart Defence"**

*Nato-led projects to pool and share more military capabilities. e.g.*  
Remotely controlled counter IED robots  
Multinational Coop on Munitions  
Strategic Airlift Capability (see above)  
Missile Defence capability  
Multinational Aviation Training Centre  
Medical Treatment Facilities  
Multinational Logistics Partnership for Fuel Handling  
Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR).

#### **"Pooling and Sharing"**

*EU-led projects to pool and share more military capabilities e.g.*  
Counter IED  
  
Strategic and Tactical Airlift Management  
  
Helicopter Training Programme  
Medical Support  
Multinational Logistic Support/  
Fuel and Energy  
Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

### **Command & Control Structures**

#### **NATO Military Committee**

Highest Nato military decision-making body, comprising 28 national Chiefs of Defence Staff, represented on permanent basis by 3-star military officers. Advises NAC

#### **EU Military Committee**

21 of the same officers that sit on Nato. Provides military advice through EU/PSC

#### **Defence Policy & Planning Cttee**

Senior defence advisory body comprising defence counsellors from all national delegations.

#### **Political and Security Committee**

Ambassadorial level. Provides defence policy advice within EU.

#### **NATO International Military Staff**

450 military and 90 civilian staff for military staff-work and planning at highest pol-mil level.

#### **European Union Military Staff**

200 military and civilian staff seconded from national armed forces. Tasks similar to Nato IMS.

#### **Civil Emergency Planning Cttee**

Oversight of all civil emergency planning.

#### **Civ Planning and Conduct Capability**

60 staff plan civil aspects of CSDP missions.

## **Effects of change in UK relationship with CSDP**

The UK's main concerns seem to be twofold. Firstly, there are concerns that policy disagreements over CSDP might impact on the UK's ability to find support in other policy areas. We are not aware of evidence for this proposition or indeed that other countries, France for example, have in any way been marginalised by a strong policy stance. The UK tends to be on the back foot, fearful of the consequences of robust action. In reality, given the size of the UK's subvention to the EU, it should be the *demandeur*. Assertiveness in one area does not signal an unwillingness to co-operate in other areas of EU policy.

For the British, there is a huge disparity between the strategic assumptions governing UK forces, and those of our European partners. In the UK, it is still assumed that our Armed Forces must be prepared to fight "high-end" warfare and also be capable of dealing with a range of low intensity conflict situations, and with non-European allies, particularly the US.

Secondly, our defence industries do not wish to be excluded from opportunities that might arise from involvement in CSDP structures such as EDA. British interests should be protected through single market mechanisms and legislation. It should also be noted that non-EU countries such as Norway are able to participate in EDA on an ad hoc basis.

### **Should we disengage – can it be done?**

Protocol 10 of the Lisbon Treaty acknowledges that "the common security and defence policy of the Union does not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States."

Arguably, Britain's interests are best served by building capacity and support within Nato, keeping the US embedded within the Atlantic Alliance.

As to European defence cooperation in general, there is no reason why European allies within Nato should not take the lead in specific operations, when it is appropriate, as we have seen in Libya. This has the enormous advantage of ensuring that all allies, including the US and Canada, are round the same table with European allies in order to discuss the most effective way of dealing with a crisis.

On the other hand, a fully institutionalised EU security policy means a second bureaucracy beside Nato. In times of austerity, two bureaucracies with more or less the same job is an extravagance. If EU countries wish to spend even less on defence, they would be better off concentrating on one organisation rather than financing two.

If we were to ask - would it make one jot of difference to our military capabilities or to the security of the European democracies if the EU had no military role? The answer is surely no. The same cannot be said if Nato were to wither.

However, if the UK were to withdraw from the CSDP, the remaining EU Member States would be likely to proceed with further integration in the absence of the UK. This ultimately could present the UK with a difficult strategic position of a large military power on its doorstep.



## The Options for change

Traditionally, the UK position on EU foreign policy and defence cooperation is to ensure that European cooperation bolsters Nato and the trans-Atlantic alliance rather than duplicates or weakens it. With the United States less willing to shoulder the burden of guaranteeing European security, due to changing strategic priorities, European countries must make efforts to boost their military capacity in order to ensure the durability of the Alliance. From within the EU, the UK can seek to ensure that EU activity in this area is complementary to Nato, or at least not in competition with it. Arguably, France's decision to formally re-join Nato's military command under President Nicolas Sarkozy illustrates that this UK objective has been somewhat successful.

The UK could be more assertive in vetoing EU proposals that compete with, or duplicate, Nato. In parallel, the UK could encourage EU CSDP to focus on areas of civil instruments and capability building, in order to complement Nato. And the UK could help build capability by supporting various groups of Member States to collate their efforts in different areas—cooperation does not have to be Pan-European.

The UK could develop the 'comprehensive approach' to include conflict prevention, and more effectively combine CSDP with development and regional strategies.

Since active involvement in EU-led operations, and the provision of headquarters and planning staffs, is largely discretionary, it is open to the UK to reduce such involvement, without the need for treaty change or formal negotiations. As regards committee and institutional engagement, the UK can either adopt the "empty chair" approach, or informally designate itself as a non-participatory observer.

New initiatives within the CSDP, which require assent of the Council through the unanimity voting procedure could be vetoed by the UK, on the basis that any such development is against the national interest, and detrimental to the role and status of Nato.

To assert the primacy of British policy in respect of Nato, it is also open to the UK to make a non-binding political declaration, publicising its intention to take a non-participatory role in CSDP. This can be done at an EU level, with a statement made at a routine European Council meeting and appended to the communiqué. In the UK, it may be generated at the executive level, as a Cabinet decision, and/or as a resolution from both Houses of Parliament.

Within the context of an Inter Governmental Conference (IGC), given the agreement of the President of the European Council and the unanimous agreement of all member states, a treaty amendment may be sought, delivering an opt-out on the lines of that applying to the Kingdom of Denmark.

Should – as may well be the case in the light of the current Eurozone crisis – an IGC be convened in the near future, in which modifications to the treaties are sought, the UK could seek discussion, *inter alia*, concerning CSDP with the possibility that the UK might seek an opt-out from any or all CSDP provisions as well as from other areas of policy.

Alternatively, to formalise the separation from CSDP, the UK could invoke Article 50 (TEU) and negotiate a relationship with the EU which does not include any defence element. And such negotiation could include opt-outs from defence procurement regulations and directives.

However, any such option could also include specific opt-ins to EU programmes that are deemed to be in the national interest. Norway, which is not an EU member, has been granted an opt-in to participate in EDA programmes on a case-by-case basis, without voting rights. The UK could also seek such provisions.