TRANSEC Annual Report April 2009–March 2010

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TRANSEC'S aim

To protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those working in transport primarily from terrorist acts, and to retain public confidence in transport security.

Requirement to report

During the passage through Parliament of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, ministers gave an undertaking that an annual report would be produced on the development and implementation of the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP). A similar undertaking was given for maritime security. Channel Tunnel and rail security have also been covered in previous reports.

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Foreword

Once again this year has shown that transport remains a top target for international terrorism. For the first time in several years, the national threat level was reduced in July 2009 from "severe" (meaning an attack is highly likely) to "substantial" (meaning an attack is a strong possibility). Unfortunately this reduction in terrorist threat lasted only until January 2010.

The attempted attack on an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 inevitably caused us to look again at the security of our airports and aircraft. You will be able to read elsewhere in this report about the detailed response to the attack and the enormous amount of work it has generated both here in the UK and overseas.

It highlights our continuing need to keep ahead of terrorist methodologies. We do this in several ways. We are very much part of the counter-terrorism community and are able to draw on intelligence reporting to provide us with a view of the prevailing threat at the time. We also fund an in-house research and analysis programme that enables us to work with colleagues, industry and manufacturers to develop practical technologies for enhanced detection and deterrence.

While the security scanner debate has taken centre stage, TRANSEC has continued to deliver and develop its work in each of the regulated transport sectors and in assuring the resilience of the transport system. These activities include:

- legislating for airport security and widening maritime security in ports;
- representing the UK's interests at international and European level;
- keeping Parliamentarians well informed about our activities and current issues;
- improving engagement with the regulated industries;
- inspecting and auditing for compliance with security programmes on a regular basis;
- enhancing rail and tube station security;
- improving the transport security capabilities of vulnerable countries overseas; and
- co-ordinating the Department's response to the challenges faced by the transport networks during the prolonged severe winter weather.

With the high volume of work and the increasing demands placed on us from European legislation, we have taken the opportunity this year to take stock of how we can best deliver transport security and resilience now and in the future. We have been asking ourselves and taking informal soundings from our industries on the following points:

- As a regulator, are there better ways of working we can adopt drawing from other regulators' experience?

- Can we work more efficiently in our compliance effort and deliver more with the same number of staff?

- Do we have the right tools for the job to enable us to achieve greater levels of efficiency?

- How can Government best implement the lessons learned from our response to non-terrorist crises in the past year?

Already we are beginning to implement some internal changes that will help us on the way to improving our capability. For example, we will be placing all our inspectors and compliance activity together rather than spread across each transport mode as at present. We believe this will give us greater resilience, ensure inspection is conducted to the same standards and teach us the best elements of each other's ways of working.

By the time we report next year, we believe many of the improvements now in hand will help us deliver better outcomes. And that means transport that is as secure as it can be while allowing the free movement of goods and people.

Niki Tompkinson

Director of Transport Security and Contingencies

1. Introduction

1.1   The Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC) was set up as a separate unit within the Department for Transport (DfT) following the Lockerbie bombing of 21 December 1988.

1.2   It regulates the transport industries for security by devising and enforcing security measures with due regard to their deliverability and proportionality, based on the nature and scale of the prevailing threat.

1.3   The security regimes also consider the financial and operational costs to the industry and the consequences of a terrorist attack. Responsibility for delivering and paying for these measures rests with the regulated industries.

2. Aviation

This year

2.1   While our work on developing a secure yet more convenient way of screening for liquid explosives has continued, mainly at an international level, the new emphasis on low or no metal threat items has required urgent action.

2.2   Legislation at national and European level has also absorbed considerable time and effort, requiring regular liaison with and events for those in the industry who will be responsible for delivering the new arrangements.

2.3   At this time of heightened threat level, the work undertaken by our international team has become even more significant as, globally, we seek to develop consistent and responsive security regimes.

Review of security post-Detroit

2.4   Following the attempted bombing of an airliner bound for Detroit on 25 December 2009, an urgent review of security measures at airports was initiated.

2.5   The device had been constructed with the aim of making detection by existing screening methods extremely difficult. It showed that low or no metallic threat items concealed close to the body are difficult to detect by existing screening systems. However, it was clear that security (body) scanners, which have been on trial in UK and European airports, could help to detect such devices.

2.6   Therefore when the Home and Transport Secretaries reported the results of the airport security review to Parliament on 5 January 2010, they recommended a number of changes to the aviation security regime, including the introduction of security scanners at airports, increased use of explosive trace detection and hand searches.

2.7   On 1 February 2010, the then Transport Secretary announced an initial deployment of security scanners at Heathrow and Manchester airports and published an interim code of practice for their deployment and use. This sought to address concerns about privacy, health and safety, data protection and equality issues.

2.8 We provided a private briefing on the subject for members of the Transport Select Committee (TSC) so that they could gain a better understanding of the issues and the safeguards that have been put in place for passengers.

2.9 Given the concerns raised about the introduction of scanners, ministers decided to launch a full public consultation on the code of practice governing their use on 29 March 2010. The responses to the consultation will help to inform the Government's decisions about possible further deployment of this technology.

Legislation

Airport security planning

2.10 The Policing and Crime Act 2009 introduced a new framework for airport security planning and policing at UK airports. The framework, which came into force in January 2010, builds on existing arrangements and the multi-agency threat and risk assessment (MATRA) methodology at airports. It ensures that airports agree a local airport security plan with their key local partners based on an agreed assessment of risk; and ensures that, where it is agreed that a dedicated policing presence is required, the airport operator pays.

2.11 To support the introduction of the new framework, the Department, jointly with the Home Office, produced comprehensive national guidance with contributions from both industry and police colleagues. A series of regional training events for practitioners involved in airport security planning was run, as well as a high-level briefing for senior police and airport representatives. Both the guidance and the training events have developed a sound understanding of the new requirements and ultimately will help to ensure more effective and robust security arrangements at all our airports.

2.12 We will continue to work with industry and the police during the 15 month implementation period designated by the Act (until April 2011). Our plans include two further regional training events in the autumn to explore the new contractual requirements for dedicated policing.

Single consolidated direction

2.13 New EC legislation governing aviation security – under the umbrella of EC Regulation 300/2008 – came into effect on 29 April 2010. We used the opportunity to assess the need for additional UK-specific measures, reflecting the threat, and brought these together in a single consolidated direction (SCD). Taken together, these measures form the re-focused and realigned UK's national aviation security programme (NASP).

2.14 The project took nine months, in which we undertook a gap analysis, made risk assessments of the gaps and differences. The team ran nine regional road-shows that were attended by nearly 1,000 industry representatives. The road-shows explained the rationale and structure behind both the new EC legislation and the revised UK programmes. Over 2,000 CD-ROMs were

issued to directed industry representatives. The CD-ROMs contained the appropriate EC documentation, the new SCD and a substantial pack of frequently asked questions designed to assist industry in understanding and effectively implementing the changes.

2.15 Overall the exercise has helped industry gain a better understanding of the UK-specific requirements and the rationale behind them.

2.16 In streamlining and reducing the regulatory burden through this project, we are paving the way for developing future regimes that allow for innovation and improvement in the delivery of higher security standards while improving the passenger experience.

2.17 We have identified four specific areas: cargo, general aviation, intra-EU measures, and staff measures, where there is potential for further streamlining in the short term. Regulatory improvement work in these areas will be taken forward in 2010–11.

Working with the aviation industry

2.18 The Executive Committee (ExCo) of the National Aviation Security Committee (NASC) has met several times over the last year. It was formed to help NASC focus on current security measures and to determine what recommendations should be made to the Transport Secretary about future priorities. It has an independent chairman, with membership drawn from representatives of the airports and airlines as well as TRANSEC, the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI). It also provides strategic oversight and guidance to the operational response sub-committee (ORSC).

2.19 In the past year there has been particularly focus on EC300 (see above), the compliance improvement programme, the aviation security policy framework, personnel security and Olympic aviation security issues.

2.20 The ORSC has been working on the detail of the implementation of the new EC300 and undertaking in-depth analysis of the measures that will be brought into force.

International

2.21 The Detroit incident heightened the need to ensure that good standards of aviation security are in place worldwide in order to provide proper protection for incoming flights to the UK. We have re-focused and enhanced our efforts, in conjunction with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, to provide technical assistance to third countries where aviation security standards are in need of improvement. Through funding from the countering terrorism and radicalisation fund and our network of regional aviation security officers worldwide, we have assisted countries in North and East Africa, the Middle East and South Asia with training and equipment to enhance local security levels.

European engagement

2.22 We continue to be closely involved and actively participate in a variety of EU forums, for example the EU Civil Aviation Security Regulatory Committee, which comprises European Commission and member states' security experts. The Committee develops the common basic standards and implementing rules for aviation security at EU airports.

2.23 This year saw the conclusion of the Committee's work on the development of revised implementing legislation under EC Regulation 300/2008 (see above). The UK contributed fully in the working groups to obtain well-focused, easily understood and simplified legislation. We were able to offer expert advice on the development of standards for new screening methodologies such as the use of explosives detection dogs.

2.24 EU negotiations on the timetable for the lifting of restrictions on the carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) at EU airports have been given a high priority for us this year.

2.25 During the negotiating period, we invited a group of MEPs to a special liquid explosives demonstration and briefing at a secure government site. The event was held in conjunction with the European Commission and the ECAC (European Civil Aviation Conference) Technical Task Force (TTF). MEPs were able to gain a better understanding of the threat to aviation from liquid explosives and of the research and technical work that has been taking place to develop new screening technology. This is an area the UK has led by chairing the ECAC TTF liquid explosives study group.

2.26 The outcome of the negotiations has been an agreed timetable for the phased introduction of LAGs' screening technology at EU airports, starting with transfer passengers by 29 April 2011 and moving to a full lifting of restrictions across the EU by 29 April 2013.

2.27 The European Commission published a proposed aviation security charges directive in May 2009, following its report on financing earlier that year. The aim of the directive is to establish a common set of security principles with regard to the setting and modifying of security charges at all EU airports.

2.28 In order to help shape the UK's negotiating position for Council working groups, we ran a consultation in July 2009, which included an industry event. A summary of responses to this, together with the Government's own response, was published in January 2010. The UK has argued in Brussels that the directive should not duplicate existing regulations and that it should recognise economic structures already in place. It should also maintain member states' flexibility to put in place enhanced aviation security measures that are appropriate to the threat faced nationally. The UK will wish to retain the "user pays" principle, which means that transport operators pay for regulated measures and recover their costs from service users.

2.29 We have been pressing for the amendment of baseline aviation security regulations so that security scanners can be used as a primary screening technology for screening passengers in EU airports. At present they can only be used as a secondary form of screening. We believe that they offer a greater degree of assurance in the detection of low and no metal threat items.

2.30 The Commission has made a commitment to producing a report on the use of security scanners, before putting forward any legislative proposal. There is considerable interest from MEPs and others in this work, in particular in relation to public acceptance of the technology. The UK currently has Commission approval for testing the technology in this way at Manchester airport.

Cargo

2.31 Work continues to create a known consignors' extranet, which should be operational by the end of 2010. It will allow the cargo industry to verify the status of known consignors.

2.32 We are assisting the European Commission in its development of a European cargo database (due to become operational on 1 June 2010), which will be able to cross-refer to the known consignors' extranet.

3. Maritime

This year

3.1   We continue to adapt our maritime security regime to take account of new requirements and the evolving threat. New European legislation adopted by the UK in September 2009 means we have started the roll-out of port security authorities, where necessary, to deliver a more joined up approach to port security.

3.2   Internationally, piracy continues to threaten commercial shipping lanes and, in the UK, TRANSEC is playing its part in reviewing and disseminating counter-piracy advice to UK shipping companies. We are also contributing to moves to improve co-ordination for maritime matters across Government departments and agencies, as well as reviewing our relationships with the maritime industry so that, together, we can develop a more co-ordinated and collective approach to maritime security.

Port security regulations

3.3   The Port Security Regulations 2009 came into effect on 1 September 2009, transposing an EC directive into national law.

3.4   TRANSEC has undertaken extensive work with the ports of Bristol and London, which have acted as test ports for the implementation of the new regulations. The port of Bristol became the first port in the UK to have completed a designation order under the regulations, which require a formal definition of the boundary of the port.

3.5   The Port of Bristol Security Authority is now designated as the port security authority (PSA) for Avonmouth and Royal Portbury Docks. The Order was laid before Parliament on 17 February 2010 and came into force on 19 March 2010. The first meeting of the Port of Bristol PSA was held on 10 March (exceptionally *before* the Order came into force) at which a port security officer (PSO) and a chair were appointed.

3.6   We now have a list of 16 port areas where we will be concentrating initial efforts to implement the Directive, and preliminary discussions have already taken place with the ports involved. We anticipate that each of these port areas will have established a PSA and appointed a port security officer by 31 December 2012.

Piracy

3.7 Although piracy is not regarded as a terrorist matter because of its economic rather than political motivation, TRANSEC takes the UK's lead in developing ship protection policy.

3.8 The surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia continued this year, with many ships hijacked, including two registered to the UK. TRANSEC has continued to lead on counter-piracy ship protection policy and has represented the DfT at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the UN Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

3.9 TRANSEC has also supported the work being done by others across Whitehall and by the shipping industry, to tackle the problem. We support the view that the best method of minimising the risk of successful pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia is contained in the industry's own document *Best management practices*.

3.10 We regularly disseminate guidance and information to industry contacts. The UK's official counter-piracy guidance document, *Marine guidance note 298* is currently being reviewed to bring it into line with *Best management practices* and recently updated advice and guidance published by IMO.

National security strategy

3.11 The first annual update of the national security strategy sets out the Government's intention to address national security challenges in the maritime domain. The continuing security of the UK border and its maritime assets both at home and abroad are key features of the strategy. DfT has been fully involved in the cross-Government group on these issues.

National Maritime Information Centre

3.12 Work on the national maritime security strategy is based on the premise that the UK can strengthen its response to potential maritime incidents through the integration and central co-ordination of maritime surveillance. To achieve this end, a start has been made to establish a National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) based at the Ministry of Defence's joint headquarters in Northwood.

3.13 The NMIC will bring together key agencies responsible for maritime safety, security and environmental protection. Based together in one centre, they will develop and monitor a coherent picture and shared understanding of maritime activity around the UK and its overseas territories. The involvement of DfT and Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is vital to this initiative.

Floating barriers

TRANSEC continues to fund research in the use of floating barriers as one element of protecting ships. During the reporting year, we loaned our barrier asset to the organisers of the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Trinidad and Tobago. This allowed us to contribute to the security arrangements of the event and to gather information on practical deployment issues.

4. Rail, light rail and metro

This year

4.1 National rail and tube networks are open to the free flow of passengers and goods in a way that international rail and the aviation sector are not. This presents challenges of its own and means that many aspects of the security regime take place behind the scenes.

4.2 Nonetheless we continue to review our arrangements to ensure they meet the current level of threat and that they are adaptable for any change in terrorists' methods.

Liberalisation of cross-Channel rail services

4.3 With the introduction of the EU Directive 2007/58/EC, cross-border passenger services are able to travel from any European Union member state to another. To allow these new services to begin operation in the UK in a secure manner, TRANSEC is currently working with our European partners, including national governments, private companies and existing service providers, to agree the security measures that will apply to all operators providing international rail services. This will ensure that, when these new services are ready to begin, they maintain the high levels of security Channel Tunnel passengers expect.

Maintaining existing rail and metro security

4.4 We continued throughout the year to work closely with the rail industry, including Network Rail and the train operating companies, to maintain and develop the National Railways Security Programme (NRSP). We also started work with London Underground on a review of its security instructions and maintained close liaison with both the Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow subway, following last year's publication of updated instructions and security programmes.

4.5 Our work includes providing advice to the industry on whether there are any implications for the UK following international events such as the Moscow tube bombings in 2010, and what, if any, further security enhancements might be required.

Passenger screening

4.6   On 26 June 2008, the British Transport Police (BTP) announced enhancements to their existing stop and search capability. These enhancements took the form of new baggage X-ray machines and additional explosives search dogs that would be deployed on the railway network.

4.7   This increased screening capability provides an enhancement to current security measures to meet the prevailing level of terrorist threat while still allowing people to go about their day-to-day business.

4.8   In 2009, DfT commissioned a qualitative study to understand passenger and stakeholder perceptions towards the enhanced screening measures. The study reinforced the findings from trials conducted in 2006, and found that respondents were broadly accepting of the measures on their current scale. However, it also highlighted the importance of passengers' personal attitudes towards security and safety in determining their views and experiences of the screening measures.

4.9   The police presence and screening measures were often felt to bring reassurance, and in particular the perceived 'proactive' approach of the screening was an important positive feature. For some, however, screening in stations had the potential to trigger increased fear or anxiety. Some respondents also emphasised the need to protect civil liberties and to ensure screening was done in a fair way.

4.10   The insights gained from this research will continue to inform the delivery of a proportionate and effective rail security strategy. (The qualitative study is on the DfT website at: www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/security/land/perceptions/.)

Dogs

Detection dogs can offer a number of benefits over conventional mechanical screening equipment, not least because they are mobile. This means that they can be deployed quickly and in locations where larger traditional screening equipment cannot be installed.

Our research programme is exploring new ways of deploying dogs most effectively in transport security regimes. For example, we have studied how dogs can be trained to carry out two discrete and different counter-terrorism tasks (detection as well as control). The approach has proved promising and, with operational testing, could, in the long-term, bring worthwhile cost-saving benefits for CT operations.

Security in the design of rail stations

4.11   This year, the DfT, in partnership with CPNI, BTP and others, produced a design guide of physical security recommendations to assist those involved with new-build or major redevelopment of railway stations.

4.12 The guide includes best practice on bomb blast and hostile vehicle mitigation, and builds on existing DfT and security agency work with project teams at key rail stations. It complements the work that the Home Office has undertaken on protecting crowded places.

Vehicle restraints

4.13 Progress continues to be made on protecting stations and the people who use them from hostile vehicle attacks. DfT is working in partnership with transport operators, station developers and other public bodies to ensure that vehicle restraint measures are installed at key railway stations. This approach is bearing fruit, as it has been possible to incorporate security measures into the design phase of refurbishments or new-build stations so that they form part of the streetscape. This provides increased protection while improving the overall appearance of the station.

International

4.14 Through our membership of the International Working Group on Land Transport Security, we continue to share and learn from the experiences of others in endeavouring to secure open, mass transit networks.

5. Cross-sector security

5.1 Many of the security programmes in development in TRANSEC have applications for all areas of the transport industry. Details of the latest work are given here.

Personnel security

5.2 Personnel security addresses the risks of terrorist insider action in transport by existing or new staff, whether through coercion or malicious intent.

5.3 Building on the 2008 independent review of transport personnel security, we have conducted workshops in each regulated mode of transport with support from CPNI. These workshops have systematically analysed threats, suggested key groups of staff that need closer attention, identified measures already in place and established areas for possible improvements to current security processes.

5.4 Mode by mode, the industry has been considering at a national level how to take forward this work, with the aviation and dangerous goods sectors already making substantial progress.

5.5 While the action to be taken will be specific to each form of transport, trends have already been identified. These include:

- the need for further training of employers;
- specific advice tailored to industry sectors; and
- a more consistent approach to resolving issues of concern about serving individuals.

5.6 TRANSEC has also devised, developed and delivered improved training materials and modules for compliance inspectors on personnel security and insider threat issues.

Overseas criminal records checks

5.7 Following full industry consultation, overseas criminal record checks were introduced in August 2009. These are now required for selected new staff working on security-related duties within the aviation sector, where applicants have lived in a foreign country for more than six months continuously during the previous five years. This enhances the existing

requirement for a UK criminal record check to be undertaken as part of the background checking of staff. This is becoming a requirement for *all* staff working airside, under new European legislation (EC 300/2008, referred to in paragraph 2.13).

Transport security for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games

5.8 The overall aim of the Olympic and Paralympic safety and security strategy is to deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit. Located in the Olympic Security Directorate's offices, a multi-agency transport security project team including TRANSEC staff is planning how best to protect those transport networks that will be most used by travellers – spectators as well as competitors – to or from venues.

International terrorism and the shipment of dangerous goods

5.9 Terrorists may be able to acquire dangerous goods in a number of ways. TRANSEC's interest relates to the vulnerability of such materials during transit.

5.10 Many of the dangerous goods likely to be sought after by terrorists are valuable and are protected by measures to prevent criminal activity. These measures also serve to protect the goods from terrorists and can be usefully supplemented by counter-terrorist efforts, particularly for those substances that have the potential to cause a very severe impact if used maliciously.

5.11 We have nearly completed work to produce a list of substances of greatest potential impact. The generic list can be tailored to specific contexts such as transport. We will gather information on the companies that routinely transport significant quantities of such substances in the UK and draw up a priority list of firms that will receive information and compliance advice. We will also pass on to trusted partners within the priority firms any intelligence indicating that an attack is being planned.

5.12 A key achievement during the year was the agreement at European level to introduce photo-identification for all drivers of vehicles carrying dangerous goods.

5.13 In the year ahead we will be working with the haulage industry to develop options for enhanced security measures for use at times of increased threat.

Research, analysis and development

5.14 TRANSEC has its own research, analysis and development team which provides the underpinning evidence for policy decisions about the nature and application of transport security regimes. It is flexible enough to respond rapidly to a changing threat environment.

5.15 The team manages a research programme that is split into the following themes:

Aviation central search research

5.16 Here we assess ways of evaluating and optimising the interaction of security equipment and processes at airport security check-points. The outcome allows us to understand the most effective means of passenger screening whilst balancing security considerations with passenger facilitation. Currently we are evaluating security scanners and liquid explosives detection technologies.

Future screening model

This is a model of the search comb that encompasses different security processes such as archway metal detectors, X-ray, hand-search, security scanner and explosive trace detection. The model allows us to assess the effect of changing different components of the search comb system. By altering the various parameters it allows policy makers to see easily the implications of policy, technology or process changes on threat detection, passenger throughput and the user experience.

Chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) research

5.17 We are enhancing our ability to model the hazard, the performance of detection technologies and approaches to decontamination on transport networks.

Crowded places research

5.18 We are studying practicable options for the protection of crowded places such as rail and Underground stations and linking in to the Home Office's work on crowded places. This includes investigating the usefulness of dogs to detect explosives.

Maritime protection

5.19 We are assessing less lethal techniques to protect ships from seaward attack from both a terrorist and piracy perspective.

Electronic attack

5.20 We are exploring the issues surrounding possible electronic attacks on transport networks and the implications for security regimes.

Hold baggage and cargo research

5.21   We continue to evaluate and optimise technologies and security processes to enhance the existing screening of aviation hold baggage and cargo.

Knowledge and capability building

5.22   This part of the research programme seeks to understand emerging threats and provide appropriate underpinning research and development activity.

5.23   There is considerable cross-government and international collaboration that supports the delivery of the evidence base for TRANSEC. We are key partners in delivering the Government's counter-terrorism science and technology strategy and in directing cross-government research, including the innovative science and technology in counter-terrorism (INSTINCT) programme. And we seek to make the most of collaboration with our international partners, particularly in the fields of aviation, CBR and crowded places.

5.24   Finally, we work with security equipment manufacturers to ensure that they understand our requirements and so can enhance their product development. In February 2010 a private industry day was held in collaboration with the Home Office OSCT, CPNI and TRANSEC to enable us to discuss the security challenges post-Detroit with a number of industry representatives.

Secure communications

5.25   The development of our secure extranet, which will allow TRANSEC to communicate quickly with security contacts in the transport industry, continues. Deployment has been delayed to allow the system to be adapted for increasingly resilient Governmental security requirements. We are hopeful that the project will go live later in 2010.

Threats office

5.26   The threats office provides threat information on which our protective security policies and regulations are based. We liaise with JTAC on a daily basis to ensure we have the latest intelligence picture.

5.27   We have developed a risk audit matrix, which provides a complete analysis of terrorist risks to all regulated forms of transport and which records the priority risks. This enables the appropriate deployment of resources to areas of highest risk.

5.28   The office is the first point of contact for a wide range of organisations regarding transport security incidents or concern. It is therefore set up to respond quickly 24 hours a day, all the year round.

6. Contingencies

6.1 The Department for Transport engages in a co-ordinated programme of resilience planning to assure the security and resilience of transport systems. This work ensures that the DfT and the transport industry are more effectively prepared for and better able to respond to major emergencies and transport disruptions either from terrorist activity or other natural hazards.

6.2 The main response to disruptive events in the UK continues to rest at the local level and with transport operators. However, if the scale of the crisis demands it, national and even international arrangements may come into play and DfT will engage with the transport industry to co-ordinate the contingency response to any disruption caused to the transport networks. Our objective is to ensure that safe services can be restored as quickly as possible for the benefit of transport users and the UK economy.

6.3 During 2009–10 the DfT crisis response arrangements were called upon to deal with a range of issues including:

Swine 'flu

6.4 Although there was ultimately no significant wider impact of the H1N1 virus on transport services, the DfT worked closely with transport operators and the rest of Government in monitoring the potential impact of the disease and making contingency arrangements to ensure the continuity of essential services.

Flooding

6.5 Following heavy and sustained rainfall in November 2009 in Cumbria, there was severe flooding and damage to properties and key local transport links. We co-ordinated work by the transport operators and DfT agencies to provide effective incident response, resilience and subsequent recovery support.

Severe winter weather

6.6 The winter of 2009–10 saw the UK experience the most prolonged spell of freezing conditions since December 1981. The severity of the weather conditions caused disruption across all modes of transport. For the Department, the biggest issue was the unprecedented demand for salt for gritting roads. It led to TRANSEC facilitating the cross-government and transport sector emergency response.

Contingency exercises

6.7 During the course of the year DfT played an active role in a wide range of Government-wide contingency planning exercises. These exercises allowed the Department to practise pre-determined roles and responsibilities and to explore, in conjunction with transport operators and other stakeholders, our incident handling and recovery from a range of scenarios, including counter-terrorism. The lessons learned from these exercises are used to update DfT's crisis response mechanism.

7. Compliance and training

General

7.1 TRANSEC inspectors carry out compliance and enforcement activity across all regulated sectors of the transport industry. As well as formal inspections that may be announced or, more often, unannounced, they:

- carry out covert tests of security measures;

- provide advice and guidance on improving the effectiveness of security measures;

- provide a presence on the ground at transport hubs to ensure that security requirements are maintained during periods of disruption or special events of particular security sensitivity;

- attend industry security committee meetings and other meetings on an *ad hoc* basis; and

- where applicable, facilitate and support EC inspections in the UK and take part in EC inspections in other member states

7.2 Where deficiencies are identified, TRANSEC normally aims to resolve them in discussion with the operator concerned. However, it will use its powers under legislation where required.

Aviation

Compliance

7.3 TRANSEC inspects airports, airlines, air cargo handlers and aviation catering providers. During the year, we undertook a full programme of inspections at airports and other aviation locations such as cargo facilities, both on- and off-airport. Our audit programme continues with comprehensive audits of several airports and assessment of airline compliance.

7.4 The covert testing programme is continuing to prove effective as it is used more widely at more UK airports and in other areas of the industry.

Training

7.5 The following training was provided:

- recurrent training for managers was introduced in December 2009 after consultation with the aviation sector;

- a revised cabin baggage X-ray competency test was developed to reflect the latest threat images – it was rolled out in April 2010;

- a hold baggage X-ray competency test was developed with the close co-operation of the industry and it is due to be rolled out this summer;

- five 'train the trainer' courses were successfully delivered in conjunction with CPNI;

- the revision of training syllabuses to reflect revised EC regulations is well advanced – two of the seven have been issued for consultation to industry partners; and

- London successfully hosted meetings of the ECAC training task force and the International Transport Security Human Factors Group (InterTAG).

Maritime

Compliance

7.6 Compliance activity remains a key area of our operational work. Our port facility and ship programmes continue through the inspection activities of TRANSEC's compliance teams and the MCA's regionally based security liaison officers (SLOs) and inspectors. The MCA undertakes inspections of cargo ships on TRANSEC's behalf, governed by a service level agreement between the two organisations.

7.7 Under EC regulations, our compliance teams are now required to review port facility security assessments on a rolling five-year cycle. This has added a significant requirement to the teams' work, and we are very grateful for the co-operation received from port facilities and their security officers in delivering the programme.

7.8 The overseas passenger ship inspection programme's primary aim is to test compliance on UK-flagged cruise ships operating in ports outside of the UK. In 2009–10, we conducted overseas inspections of UK-flagged cruise ships and UK-flagged passenger ferries operating overseas. We also conducted security visits to a number of Bermudan-flagged cruise ships that regularly carry large numbers of UK nationals. This programme fulfils a compliance role and is a highly effective liaison and information gathering tool.

7.9 The EC conducted port facility inspections at three locations in the UK and inspections of nine UK- and Gibraltar-flagged ships within the European Union this reporting year. The United States Coast Guard (USCG) completed a first visit under its International Port Security Programme (IPSP) to the UK's Overseas Territories in the Caribbean region and Bermuda. This visit included

TRANSEC representation and a visit to the US Virgin Islands (USVI) to look at security procedures in place at USVI port facilities operating ferry routes to the British Virgin Islands.

7.10 TRANSEC participated in an EU reciprocal visit to the USA facilitated by USCG. This provided the opportunity for EU delegates to look at the security measures in place at port facilities in Miami, Port Everglades and Savannah and to build links with USCG sector commands in these areas.

Training

7.11 TRANSEC continued its programme of regular maritime security awareness road shows at port facilities throughout the United Kingdom. These are delivered in conjunction with CPNI and are aimed at all those working in the maritime industry.

7.12 Following on from the very successful *Safe harbours* DVD promoting port security awareness, we produced a similar DVD *Everybody's business* focusing on ship security. It has received a number of accolades, including a gold award from Omni Intermedia.

Rail

Compliance

7.13 Throughout the year the compliance team has continued to deliver a balanced programme of inspection activity on the domestic rail network.

7.14 On the national rail network this included both announced and unannounced inspections, thematic audits and a targeted programme of covert tests.

Light rail and underground

7.15 A similar balance of compliance activity was delivered for the regulated light rail and metro sectors – London Underground, Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow subway. Following on from a successful trial last year, a programme of covert tests for the London Underground sector was fully established.

Channel Tunnel

7.16 TRANSEC inspectors have monitored compliance amongst the regulated operators serving the Channel Tunnel system covering Eurostar, Eurotunnel shuttle services, and international rail freight operations. This has included work with operators to assist them in developing their own quality assurance and testing programmes.

Dangerous goods

7.17 During the year Vehicle and Operator Services Agency traffic examiners and TRANSEC rail inspectors have monitored compliance with the regulations on the security of the movement of dangerous goods by road and rail. These inspections have been undertaken both at the roadside and on sites served by road and rail. Inspectors from DfT's Dangerous Goods Division have monitored compliance at those sites handling radioactive materials.

Training

7.18 We issued a new comprehensive syllabus covering the training needs of staff undertaking security responsibilities in the Channel Tunnel passenger rail sector.

Annex A
Corporate resources

Business planning and resources

A.1 TRANSEC is a Directorate within DfT's International Networks and Environment Group (INE), so its annual business plan is prepared and scrutinised as part of the Department's planning arrangements. The business plan supports TRANSEC's request for resources to the INE Director General.

A.2 Our agreed headcount target for 2009–10 of 215 full-time equivalent staff was not exceeded. The breakdown of staff in TRANSEC's main divisions at the end of the financial year is indicated in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1 TRANSEC staff by division at 31 March 2010

- Aviation Security Division
- Maritime & Land Transport Security Division
- Threats, Contingencies & Operations Division
- Corporate Planning & Performance Team & the Director's Office

8%
16%
41%
35%

A.3 We reported regularly to both the INE and DfT Boards during the year on progress towards achieving the objectives, milestones and key performance indicators set out in the business plan.

Finance

A.4   We spent £25.7m during the year. Expenditure in 2009–10 and during the previous year is summarised in Table A.1.

Table A1 Expenditure for 2009–10 and 2008–09		
	2009–10 £000	2008–09 £000
Staff costs	14,713	11,417
Delivery programmes	10,486	9,145
Capital programmes	188	247
Non-cash	272	184
Total expenditure	**25,659**	**20,993**

A.5   Staff-related costs accounted for 57% of expenditure in 2009–10 (54% in the previous year). A further 41% (44% in 2008–09) was spent on delivery programmes, including £6.5m on research and development. The remaining 2% was spent on capital programmes and non-cash costs (depreciation and cost of capital).

A.6   The increase in expenditure during 2009–10 over the previous year was due primarily to additional spending on new cross-cutting work programmes, such as the Olympics transport security and the personnel security programmes, and on a comprehensive programme to improve the Directorate's compliance capabilities (the compliance improvement programme).

A.7   Expenditure against budgets was monitored regularly at monthly meetings of TRANSEC's Resource, Planning and Performance Group (RPPG). Totals were also reported each month to the INE Board.

Resource management strategy

A.8   We made good progress during 2009–10 to enhance the Directorate's resource and business planning processes and arrangements, including the introduction of a TRANSEC Programme Delivery Board to oversee the delivery of strategic projects and core functions, and to manage business-critical risks.

Annex B
Highlights of the year:
April 2009 – March 2010

April

- TRANSEC briefs Lord Carlile, the Government's independent reviewer of counter-terrorism legislation, as part of his annual review of the Terrorism Act 2000.

May

- Close of consultation on overseas criminal records checks.

- Maritime security training DVD *Security: everyone's business* wins The Communicator Awards' motivational award of distinction.

June

- TRANSEC leads series of workshops for industry on personnel security.

July

- National threat level is reduced from "severe" to "substantial".

- Start of consultation on EC's proposed directive on aviation security charges (closes September 2009).

August

- Overseas criminal records checks come into effect for new staff in posts requiring national security vetting.

September

- Transposition of EC Ports Security Directive into UK law.

- Single direction on cargo comes into effect.

- Three men found guilty of conspiracy to murder using explosives on aircraft (the so-called liquid explosives plot of August 2006).

October

- TRANSEC briefing and demonstration for MEPs on liquids explosives.

November

- Policing and Crime Bill gains Royal Assent (is enacted in January 2010).

- Cumbria suffers major flooding resulting in damage to transport links.

December

- Alleged terrorist attack on flight Northwest 253 to Detroit.

- Severe winter weather leads to grit shortages for major roads.

January

- National threat level increases from "substantial" to "severe".

- First deployment of security (body) scanners at Heathrow airport.

February

- Secretary of State announces national security (body) scanner rollout at UK airports and publishes an interim code of practice.

- TRANSEC provides confidential briefing for Transport Select Committee on aviation security.

- TRANSEC and the Home Office jointly host an industry day for science and industry on the security challenges post-Detroit.

March

- Briefing on airport policing for senior aviation and police representatives. Marks the end of a number of regional events on the subject.

- TRANSEC undertakes a number of regional awareness raising sessions ahead of the introduction of the single directive on aviation security at the end of April.

- Start of installation of vehicle access measures at three pilot rail stations.

- Start of consultation on code of practice for the use and deployment of security (body) scanners (closes 19 July 2010).

Annex C
History of regulating UK transport security

Legal basis for the regulation of transport security

C.1 Transport security regulation extends to aviation, maritime, railways (including London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and Glasgow subway), the Channel Tunnel and the movement of dangerous goods by road and rail.

C.2 DfT ministers are directly accountable to Parliament for the security policies and the programmes that TRANSEC directs industry to implement. These are underpinned by the following legislative powers (see box below).


TRANSEC's legal basis

This includes:

- Aviation Security Act 1982

- Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (AMSA)

- Channel Tunnel (Security Order) 1994

- Relevant sections of Railways Act 1993 (sections 119 -21)

- EU regulation for aviation and maritime security

- European Commission Regulation 2320/2002

- Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001

- Civil Aviation Act 2006

- Railways and Transport Security Act 2003 (section 121A)

- Railways Act 1995 (section 54)

- Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment (Amendment) Regulations 2007

- Policing and Crime Act 2009

Counter-terrorism strategy

C.3 Since the attacks on 11 September 2001, TRANSEC has also become increasingly embedded in the counter-terrorism community, helping to deliver the UK's overall counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST).

C.4 The CONTEST strategy is divided into four principal workstreams:

- *Prevent* the radicalisation of individuals;

- *Pursue* those who pose a terrorist threat;

- *Protect* by reducing vulnerability to attack; and

- *Prepare* for the consequences of an attack.

C.5 TRANSEC's work falls mainly within the *protect* and *prepare* themes.

C.6 For more information see the first annual report of CONTEST – see link.

C.7 TRANSEC also delivers DfT's departmental strategic objective 3: "to contribute to better safety, security and health and longer life-expectancy through reducing the risk of death, injury or illness arising from transport, and promoting travel modes that are beneficial to health" and public service agreement 26: "reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism".

Figure C.1 TRANSEC's place within wider Government security and resilience activity

Department for Transport	HMG Counter-Terrorism Programme (CONTEST)
Policy teams Aviation Directorate, Shipping and Ports Policy, Regional and Local Transport, National Networks Group	**Home Office** Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
	Foreign & Commonwealth Office Counter-Terrorism Dept, UKREP, Embassies
Specialist teams Economics, Legal, Chief Scientist, Communications	**Cabinet Office** National Security and Civil Contingencies' Secretariats
International & Better Regulation	**JTAC** and Intelligence Agencies
TRANSEC	
Private Office and Parliamentary	**Olympic Security Directorate**

Developing transport security programmes

C.8 Two fundamental principles underlie our development of transport security programmes.

- *Risk management* where analysis of the threat is set against the vulnerability of potential targets and the consequences of an attack, thus providing an evaluation of the risk faced. The risk is managed by introducing appropriate measures, where practicable, to bring down the level of risk to an acceptable level.

- *Proportionate and practical measures* are developed whose costs are balanced against the risk, are not unduly burdensome to industry and are practicable and sustainable.

Aviation security

C.9 The National Aviation Security Programme (NASP) has been in place since the mid-1970s.

C.10 The broad thrust of the programme is that every person and item being placed on public service aircraft is subject to security screening, and that aircraft are searched on entry to the secure zone of the airport.

C.11 In August 2006 a plot to bring down transatlantic aircraft using improvised liquid explosives was uncovered. There are now international restrictions in place to limit the amount of liquids that can be taken through search areas into aircraft cabins. (Details of the current restrictions can be found on the Directgov website – see link.)

C.12 Following the alleged attempt on an aircraft over Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, security (body) scanners are in place at UK airports to counter the threat posed by low or no metal threat items worn close to the body. (For details see paragraph 2.5.)

C.13 Since 2003 Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessments (MATRAs) have been produced jointly by all security stakeholders at airports, the regulatory authorities and industry. These assessments identify the threats to airports from terrorism and crime, and the roles and responsibilities the different agencies have for addressing them. This has established a culture of more effective joint working. The Policing and Crime Act 2009 builds on these arrangements with the creation of risk advisory groups whose risk reports are considered by security executive groups in the formulation of each airport security plan. (For more details see paragraphs 2.10 and 2.11.)

Maritime security

C.14 Up to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the UK was one of the few countries that had a maritime security programme in place. Following those attacks, DfT played a leading role in the adoption by the IMO in 2004 of its International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code. The Code details security-related requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies, many of which build on UK best practice.

C.15 Since then, DfT has introduced further measures and implemented international requirements for both ships and ports. Port security authorities have also been encouraged to undertake joint agency threat and risk assessments similar to those carried out at airports.

C.16 New Port Security Regulations introduced in 2009 extend the focus of port security. (For further details see paragraphs 3.3–3.6.)

Rail, light rail and metro security

C.17 Protective security programmes for the rail network were developed in conjunction with the work of the British Transport Police (BTP) during the 1970s and 1980s in response to Provisional IRA attacks. DfT took responsibility for railway security from Railtrack in 2000 and introduced a National Railway Security Programme (NRSP) in 2001. These programmes were reviewed and expanded following terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, with an emphasis on staff and public awareness.

C.18 On the London Underground network this led to the extensive deployment of CCTV in stations and on platforms. DfT assumed responsibility for the regulation of security of the London Underground in 2003. It has also regulated the security of the Channel Tunnel since operations began in co-operation with France.

C.19 Passenger screening trials on London Underground in 2006 showed the effectiveness of screening equipment and dogs to detect explosives, or traces of explosives. BTP now carries out highly visible and regular dog patrols at tube stations with a number of additional trained dogs.

C.20 Vehicle restraint measures are built into new build projects such as St Pancras International and Ebbsfleet stations.

C.21 The NRSP contains a range of additional measures, including regular searches of stations, and public and staff vigilance. These are regularly monitored by DfT inspectors to ensure maximum compliance.

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Annex D
Abbreviations used in this report

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
AMSA	Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990
BTP	British Transport Police
CBR	Chemical, biological and radiological
CONTEST	(Government's) Counter-Terrorism Strategy
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CT	Counter-terrorism
DfT	Department for Transport
ECAC	European Civil Aviation Conference
EU	European Union
ExCo	Executive Committee of the National Aviation Security Committee
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INE	(DfT's) International Networks and Environment Group
InterTAG	International Transport Security Human Factors Group
IPSP	(US) International Port Security Programme
ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
LAGs	Liquids, aerosols and gels
MATRA	Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment
MCA	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
NASC	National Aviation Security Committee
NASP	National Aviation Security Programme
NMIC	National Maritime Information Centre
NRSP	National Railway Security Programme
ORSC	(Aviation) Operational response sub-committee

OSD	Olympic Security Directorate
OSCT	Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism
PFSO	Port facility security officer
PPM	Programme and project management
PSA	Port security authority
PSC	Port security committee
PSO	Port security officer
SCD	Single consolidated direction (on aviation)
SDOC	Single direction on cargo
SLO	Security liaison officer
TRANSEC	Transport Security and Civil Contingencies (Directorate)
TSC	Transport Select Committee
TTF	(ECAC) technical task force
USCG	United States Coast Guard
VOSA	Vehicle and Operator Services Agency

Annex E
Useful websites

Businesslink www.businesslink.gov.uk

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure www.cpni.gov.uk

Department for Transport www.dft.gov.uk

Directgov www.direct.gov.uk

Home Office www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism