THIRD REPORT FROM
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SESSION 2010-12

FCO PERFORMANCE AND FINANCES

RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AND
COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

Presented to Parliament
By the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
By Command of Her Majesty
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RESPONSE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS

This Command Paper sets out our response to each of the Committee's conclusions and recommendations. The Committee's text is in bold and the Government's response is in plain text. Paragraph numbers refer to the Committee's report.

1. **We conclude that the FCO is one of the major departmental losers in the Spending Review, certainly compared to the MOD and DFID, although we note that the 'core FCO' function has to some degree been shielded from the full ferocity of the cuts falling on the overall 'FCO family' budget, with a greater share of the pain being borne by the other 'family' members, the British Council and the BBC World Service. While it is not realistic to suppose that the FCO can be insulated from the need to scale back its spending and activities, in the context of the spending cuts being imposed across the entire public sector, we have particular concerns about its Spending Review settlement. (Paragraph 24)**

We endorse the Committee's recognition that the FCO has to contribute towards the Government's plans to reduce the budget deficit.

As the Foreign Secretary has made clear, the FCO views our 'flat cash' settlement in the Spending Review as a tough but fair outcome given the Government's overall fiscal position. In addition, the restoration of foreign exchange protection reduces a significant operating risk which the FCO faced during CSR07, although it does not restore the full protection against both inflation and exchange rates that we previously had. However, it will enable us to plan our operations with greater certainty as our conduct of foreign policy will no longer be so subject to exchange rate movements.

As a result, the FCO believes that our SR10 settlement provides us with the resources required to protect the UK's strategic interests and reach and to support British people and business overseas. It will also increase the FCO's contribution to the UK's ODA target. The cut to the FCO family as a whole is projected to be 10% in real terms by 2014-15, taking account of UK inflation and removal of funding for the BBC World Service in that year. Within that the effective cut to the FCO itself is also around 10% in real terms. The BBC

World Service and British Council will maintain roughly the same proportional share of the FCO budget they had in 2007-08.

2. **We conclude that reductions in spending on the FCO, if they result in shortfalls in skilled personnel and technical support in key countries and regions, can have a serious effect in terms of the UK's relations with other countries, out of all proportion to the amounts of money involved, especially in relation to the UK's security and that of its Overseas Territories. It follows that cuts to the core FCO budget even of 10% may have a very damaging effect on the Department's ability to promote UK interests overseas, given that these will come on top of previous cuts to the FCO's budget in the very recent past, which our predecessor Committee described, as recently as March 2010, as "unacceptably disrupting and curtailing" the Department's work and representing a threat to its effectiveness. We further conclude that the Spending Review settlement will accentuate the regrettable long term trend for the FCO to lose out relative to other departments and agencies in the allocation of government spending. (Paragraph 25)**

In December 2010 the FCO launched the Diplomatic Excellence initiative, designed further to bolster the FCO's strong policy and diplomatic skills. This will ensure that the FCO will continue to provide a world-class diplomatic service to the whole of Government. The FCO contributes to a number of the Government's top goals: security, prosperity and promoting and protecting our nation's interests. As the patterns of economic, political and diplomatic power in the world change, we will adjust our diplomatic presence to take account of these changes – but we will not be reducing the overall size of our diplomatic network.

Our settlement allows the FCO to boost its commercial activity over the next few years, to increase the FCO family's contribution to the UK's Official Development Assistance, and to sustain the BBC World Service and British Council.

We believe the restoration of foreign exchange protection also will mitigate a significant operating risk which we faced during CSR07. As your predecessor Committee recognised, the loss of this protection was the primary reason for budgetary pressures "unacceptably disrupting and curtailing" the Department's work during much of the period 2008-2010.

3. **We conclude that the 25% and 16% real-terms cuts to the budgets of the British Council and BBC World Service respectively will pose severe challenges to those two organisations. We note the FCO's arguments for redressing the balance of spending between the core FCO and the rest of the FCO family, in favour of the former, but we share the concerns that are likely to be felt in both the British Council and the World Service about the implications of the decision. (Paragraph 26)**

The British Council and the BBC World Service play an invaluable role in promoting British values overseas. However, all publicly funded bodies have to contribute to reducing the deficit. We recognise the challenges to be faced across the FCO family, and we will continue to work closely with the British Council and the BBC World Service in helping them meet these.

4. **We conclude that cuts of 50% in the FCO's capital spending will severely impact on the Department's estates management. As priority for the remaining money will quite rightly be given to much-needed improvements to overseas security, the likelihood is that 'routine' modernisation and upgrading to Embassy premises will largely be put on hold for the four years of the Spending Review period. (Paragraph 34)**

FCO spending and investment decisions on our estate will be aimed clearly at those areas where we can make most impact on the FCO's ability to deliver the Government's core foreign policy goals, achieve value for money and reducing running costs. Preserving the security and safety of our staff and visitors will continue to receive the highest priority in terms of investment.

The Treasury has agreed that funds generated through the sale of buildings which are surplus to requirements can be added to the FCO's capital allocation for further reinvestment in the estate.

5. **We further conclude that the target of raising about £50 million per year for the capital budget through selling existing buildings may be difficult to achieve, and may not secure savings in the long-term. This target may create an unwelcome incentive to sell historic or prestigious buildings which have a potential long-term value to the FCO greater than any immediate monetary benefit likely to accrue from their sale. (Paragraph 35)**

The property asset base of the FCO is approximately £2 billion, and the FCO is confident that we can meet the challenge of raising £50m per annum from selling property over the SR10 period without adversely affecting our global network.

Good asset management means that we should not keep buildings which are unfit for purpose if they are insecure, expensive or inefficient. The primary aim of selling surplus property is to ensure that we have the right mixture of owned and leased property overseas.

The long-term prestige and historic value will always be taken into account in assessing properties for sale. The initial list of properties that we intend to sell in FY 2011-12 does not include iconic buildings or buildings of historic merit.

6. **We recommend that the FCO, in its response to this Report, should supply us with a list of overseas properties which it proposes either to modernise or sell, updated to reflect the changed circumstances following the SR2010 settlement. (Paragraph 36)**

Although we are compiling an initial list of properties that we might sell, no decisions have yet been reached on sales in the SR10 period. The FCO would like to continue the practice of informing the Committee of sales in arrears since making a list available in advance would be commercially sensitive and may result in the FCO not achieving the price we want for particular properties.

7. **We conclude that the FCO's 'localisation' policy has brought benefits, but we do not believe that it is capable of indefinite extension. A further reduction in the opportunities for more junior UK-based staff to serve in overseas posts, and a consequent diminishing of experience and morale among FCO employees, will over time have a damaging effect on the quality of British diplomacy and the effectiveness of the FCO. (Paragraph 46)**

The FCO agrees with the Committee's conclusion that the policy of localisation has its limits and there will always be a wide variety of roles that need to be filled by UK based staff overseas.

However, there are ways we can continue to modernise our operations to make them more effective and better value for money. Local staff enhance our capability through the skills which they bring to overseas posts, including linguistic skills. They also provide, in some cases, corporate memory in posts. The Permanent Under Secretary wrote to the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee on 23 February to inform him of the FCO's intention to end the majority of overseas postings over the coming four years for our most junior UK-based staff (those in Bands A and B). Some of these roles will be localised but in others work will be reorganised or reconfigured to eliminate the need for a UK based officer.

We do not believe these changes will diminish the effectiveness of the FCO. In fact, they will allow us to make better use of UK based staff at home and overseas. It will undoubtedly affect the morale of the officers directly affected, but we are seeking ways of giving them new development and promotion opportunities that they need to progress. There will also continue to be some overseas FCO roles for staff in these grades, and jobs in UKBA which we will continue to encourage staff to apply for.

We are currently consulting staff and trade unions on our proposals. The money saved by this initiative will be help to meet the reductions in our funding in SR10. This approach will also enable us to maintain the strongest possible frontline diplomatic presence overseas.

8. **We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO should supply updated information on its localisation policy. This should include a list of all overseas Posts, giving in each case the ratio of UK-based staff to locally engaged staff as it (a) was five years ago, (b) is currently, and (c) is expected to be in any future years for which projections have been made. We further recommend that the FCO should explain how decisions to localise jobs are made in individual cases, and what steps are taken to ensure that these individual decisions reflect**

the FCO's overall strategic need to retain a suitably sized pool of staff with overseas experience. (Paragraph 47)

The list in **Annex 1** gives rounded figures for staff for each FCO Post by country. The figures include UK-based civil servants and staff employed locally. For operational and security reasons we cannot give a more detailed breakdown, nor can we discuss the situation in individual posts or comparisons between them.

We do not hold a comparable list for financial year 2005-6. However the general pattern since then has been an increase in management support as well as consular and entry clearance support work being carried out by local staff, especially in the developed world.

Staffing levels at posts are kept under constant review so it is not possible to give clear predictions for future years. The proposal mentioned above to end the majority of postings at the most junior grades will however result in the creation of a number of additional local positions. This is an essential element of our future financial planning for the spending round.

The scope for localisation varies from country to country depending on a variety of factors including security and local labour market considerations. Other factors that are taken into account include the expertise of local staff and the quality of work required.

Roles localised predominantly involve support activities but some include front-line policy work. Local staff also continue to play a major part in the delivery of commercial, consular and entry clearance services as well as management support. Under current plans we believe we will retain an appropriately sized pool of UK based staff with overseas experience, and we are actively considering how to ensure that this is the case.

9. **We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government should supply us with an assessment of how the future development of the European External Action Service is likely to impact on the work of the UK's global network of Posts. We further recommend that the Government should reconfirm the undertaking given by the previous Government to our predecessor Committee in April 2010 that "the establishment of the EEAS will not lead to our Embassies being replaced with Union Delegations". (Paragraph 55)**

The FCO can confirm that the establishment of the European External Action Service will not lead to our Embassies being replaced with Union Delegations. The EEAS is about supplementing and complementing, not replacing, national diplomatic services. The Lisbon Treaty makes clear that the EEAS "shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States."

10. **We conclude that the introduction of the Foreign Pricing Mechanism is a welcome step. However, we are concerned that the new mechanism does not make allowance for differential inflation rates and may leave the FCO's budgets**

prey to steep inflation in other countries. We recommend that the FCO keep the operation of the new system under close review, and that if differential exchange rates entail significant losses to its budget, it should seek to reopen negotiations with the Treasury over amending the FPM to include some degree of compensation for this. (Paragraph 60)

The FCO welcomes and agrees with the Committee's conclusion that the new Foreign Currency Mechanism will help the FCO to manage the uncertainty created by currency movements, and ensure foreign policy and FCO resources will be set by our national interests and not by foreign exchange markets.

We recognise that differential inflation is not covered under this new mechanism and will ensure that we closely monitor the impact of overseas inflation on our purchasing power. We will continue to set post budgets in local currencies, and manage any additional pressures centrally.

11. **We conclude that, while the Government's commitment to meet the long-standing international obligation to spend 0.7% of gross national income on Overseas Development Assistance is welcome, there is a danger that 'reclassification' provides a cover for meeting the 0.7% of GNI target without increasing the money actually spent on ODA. (Paragraph 68)**

The FCO notes the Committees conclusion but does not agree with it.

An element of the FCO's Overseas Development Assistance target will be met by ensuring that our spending that properly meets OECD definitions of ODA will be classified as such. However, most of the increased target will be met by funds which were previously not spent on ODA-eligible activity.

The increase of the FCO family's ODA target from £100m to £248m in 2014-15 should be set against the increase in the overall aid budget from £8.4bn in 2010-11 to an estimated £12.6bn in 2014-15. With this increase comes independent monitoring by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact. The FCO and other government departments will be subject to their reports, as will DIFD.

12. **We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO should give us a detailed breakdown of items of Departmental expenditure which it is proposed to reclassify as ODA, indicating in each case why they were not previously so classified, and noting whether the OECD and DFID have approved the reclassification. (Paragraph 69)**

In order to meet our increased ODA target, the FCO will report ODA-eligible activity in four areas:

ODA-eligible programme spend: The FCO will continue to classify, in line with OECD guidelines (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/21/34086975.pdf), its eligible programme spend as ODA. The FCO will increase resources allocated to ODA-eligible programme from around the £50m which we will score in 2010-2011 to around £90m in 2011-2012.

Aid-Related Front-line activity: The FCO has historically undertaken significant amounts of diplomatic activity in support of development assistance. However, we have not previously classified this activity as ODA, instead scoring a notional 'administration' cost as we did not have the systems in place to measure this accurately. Under OECD guidelines this activity should be classified as ODA.

From 2011-2012 the FCO will use its Activity Recording system to record and score the amount of aid-related frontline diplomacy undertaken overseas. This scoring system has been agreed with DFID and OECD officials. This activity provides vital support to development and is expected to be worth around £60m each year.

British Council. In line with OECD criteria and the methodology agreed with DFID, the British Council will undertake around £80m of ODA – eligible activity in 2010-2011. This will increase to around £91m in 2011-2012 and £98m in 2014-2015. A proportion of the British Council's programmes have previously been classified as ODA. In 2008-09, £45m was scored as ODA-eligible spend.

International Organisation subscriptions: The FCO will continue to classify the ODA-eligible portions of international organisation subscriptions as ODA in line with OECD guidelines. This will be worth around £16m in 2010-2011 and may be worth £18m-£23m in 2014/2015.

In total, the FCO family expects to spend around £150m on ODA-eligible activity in 2010-2011 increasing to £248m in 2014-2015. It has consulted closely with the OECD and DFID on the areas we expect to score, as indicated above.

13. **We conclude that the removal of the funding of peacekeeping operations from the FCO's baseline is a welcome development, one which will reduce the overall financial risks faced by the Department. We recommend that in its response to this Report, the FCO should supply a detailed breakdown of the FCO's latest allocation from the Conflict Pool and the uses to which it will be put; and that it should also supply us with its latest estimate of the extent to which the budget for peacekeeping operations will need to be 'topped up' from the Conflict Pool. (Paragraph 73)**

Conflict Pool allocations for 2011-12, along with our estimates for assessed peacekeeping costs, were published in a tri-departmental Written Ministerial Statement, which was issued on 5 April before the Easter recess.

14. **We conclude that the British Council faces great strain on its budget over the next four years. A 25% reduction over this period may well trigger some fundamental rethinking of the role and work of the Council. We appreciate that the Council, like other public-sector bodies, has had very little time to prepare its**

response to proposed reductions in expenditure. Nonetheless, we note that there was a lack of clarity from our British Council witnesses on the important issue of whether cuts would necessarily entail service reductions. It is difficult to conceive that some service reductions will not be necessary. We further conclude that the extent to which the British Council can maintain anything like its current levels of service and geographic coverage will depend on its ability to increase its income from commercial activity and partnership. That in turn will entail a difficult balancing act in which the Council must seek to maximise its income from the sale of English language teaching and other services, whilst not compromising over the pursuit of its primary purpose, to "build engagement and trust for the UK through the exchange of knowledge and ideas between people worldwide". (Paragraph 85)

We note the committee's conclusion and attention to the challenges the British Council faces over the spending review period. In setting budgets for 4 years we have given them a degree of certainty, which should allow them to plan and deliver their business model. The FCO will continue to work closely with the British Council to ensure that their grant funded activities are aligned with HMG's priorities for the projection of soft power.

15. **We recommend that in its response to this Report, the British Council should supply us with a report on the progress it has made towards developing a detailed strategy for implementing the overall 25% cut, including details of further staff reductions and of the measures it has taken to ensure that the British Council's unique 'brand' will not be damaged by this strategy. (Paragraph 86)**

The British Council will provide a report on the progress it has made towards developing a strategy for implementing the 25 % cut in grant in aid. This report will be sent to the committee separately.

Annex 1

Country	Post	Number	Ratio of LE staff to UKB Staff[(2)] –
Afghanistan	Kabul	180	3:7
Afghanistan	Lashkar Gah	35	3:2
Albania	Tirana	30	4:1
Algeria	Algiers	50	7:3
Angola	Luanda	25	4:1
Anguilla	Anguilla	[(1)] -	[(2)] –
Argentina	Buenos Aires	65	4:1
Armenia	Yerevan	20	7:3
Ascension Islands	Ascension	[(1)] -	[(2)] –
Australia	Brisbane	10	1:1
Australia	Canberra	55	1:1
Australia	Melbourne	15	9:1
Australia	Perth	10	1:1
Australia	Sydney	30	9:1
Austria	Vienna (embassy)	55	7:3
Austria	Vienna (OSCE)	15	1:9
Austria	Vienna (UN)	10	[(2)] –
Azerbaijan	Baku	45	3:2
Bahrain	Bahrain	45	4:1
Bangladesh	Dhaka	230	9:1
Bangladesh	Sylhet	[(1)] -	[(2)] –
Barbados	Bridgetown	40	4:1
Belarus	Minsk	20	4:1
Belgium	Brussels (embassy)	65	4:1
Belgium	Brussels (NATO)	35	1:9
Belgium	Brussels (EU)	130	3:7
Belize	Belmopan	30	9:1
Bermuda	Hamilton	[(1)] -	[(2)] –
Bolivia	La Paz	25	7:3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Sarajevo	35	7:3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Banja Luka	[(1)] -	[(2)] –
Botswana	Gaborone	15	4:1

Brazil	Brasilia	150	9:1
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	35	9:1
Brazil	Sao Paulo	80	9:1
British Virgin Islands	Tortola	10	1:4
Brunei	Bandar Seri Begawan	25	4:1
Bulgaria	Sofia	45	3:2
Burma	Rangoon	85	9:1
Cambodia	Phnom Penh	25	4:1
Cameroon	Yaounde	45	9:1
Canada	Montreal	10	3:2
Canada	Ottawa	55	9:1
Canada	Toronto	25	4:1
Canada	Vancouver	20	1:1
Canada	Calgary	(1)-	(2)_
Cayman Islands	Grand Cayman	(1)-	(2)_
Chile	Santiago	55	7:3
China	Beijing	190	4:1
China	Chongqing	35	7:3
China	Guangzhou	60	4:1
China	Shanghai	60	4:1
Colombia	Bogota	80	9:1
Costa Rica	San Jose	20	9:1
Croatia	Zagreb	30	9:1
Cuba	Havana	50	9:1
Cyprus	Nicosia	65	9:1
Czech Republic	Prague	55	9:1
D R Congo	Kinshasa	80	1:1
Denmark	Copenhagen	45	9:1
Dominica	Santo Domingo	20	9:1
Ecuador	Quito	20	7:3
Egypt	Alexandria	20	7:3
Egypt	Cairo	120	9:1
Eritrea	Asmara	15	3:2
Estonia	Tallinn	30	4:1
Ethiopia	Addis Ababa	150	9:1
Falkland Islands	Stanley	(1)-	(2)_
Fiji	Suva	20	7:3

Finland	Helsinki	45	7:3
France	Bordeaux	10	7:3
France	Lille	15	3:2
France	Lyon	15	7:3
France	Paris (embassy)	180	7:3
France	Paris (OECD)	15	4:1
France	Strasbourg (CoE)	10	1:1
France	Marseille	[1]-	[2]-
Gambia	Banjul	65	9:1
Georgia	Tbilisi	45	4:1
Germany	Berlin	110	7:3
Germany	Dusseldorf	60	9:1
Germany	Munich	25	4:1
Ghana	Accra	280	9:1
Gibraltar	Gibraltar	20	1:1
Greece	Athens	75	4:1
Greece	Corfu	[1]-	[2]-
Greece	Heraklion	[1]-	[2]-
Greece	Rhodes	[1]-	[2]-
Greece	Zakynthos	[1]-	[2]-
Guatemala	Guatemala City	25	4:1
Guinea	Conakry	10	7:3
Guyana	Georgetown	15	7:3
Hong Kong SAR	Hong Kong	100	9:1
Hungary	Budapest	55	7:3
Iceland	Reykjavik	15	3:2
India	Bangalore	20	4:1
India	Chennai	55	9:1
India	Kolkata	35	9:1
India	Mumbai	130	9:1
India	New Delhi	380	7:3
India	Hyderabad	[1]-	[2]-
Indonesia	Jakarta	90	4:1
Iran	Tehran	120	9:1
Iraq	Baghdad	65	7:3
Iraq	Erbil	10	1:4
Iraq	Basra	[1]-	[2]-
Ireland	Dublin	45	4:1
Israel	Jerusalem	55	7:3
Israel	Tel Aviv	65	3:2

Italy	Florence	10	7:3
Italy	Milan	35	4:1
Italy	Naples	10	
Italy	Rome	110	7:3
Italy	Venice	[1]-	[2]_
Ivory Coast	Abidjan	[1]-	[2]_
Jamaica	Kingston	60	9:1
Japan	Osaka	25	9:1
Japan	Tokyo	140	7:3
Jordan	Amman	100	4:1
Kasakhstan	Almaty	10	1:1
Kasakhstan	Astana	30	7:3
Kenya	Nairobi	150	4:1
Kosova	Pristina	40	4:1
Kuwait	Kuwait	70	4:1
Latvia	Riga	30	4:1
Lebanon	Beirut	75	4:1
Liberia	Monrovia	[1]-	[2]_
Libya	Tripoli	80	4:1
Lithuania	Vilnius	35	3:2
Luxembourg	Luxembourg	10	3:2
Macedonia	Skopje	30	4:1
Madagascar	Antananarivo	[1]-	[2]_
Malawi	Lilongwe	35	4:1
Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur	95	9:1
Malta	Valletta	25	3:2
Mauritius	Port Louis	20	7:3
Mexico	Mexico City	110	4:1
Mexico	Guadalajara	[1]-	[2]_
Mexico	Monterrey	[1]-	[2]_
Moldova	Chisinau	30	9:1
Mongolia	Ulaanbaatar	15	4:1
Montenegro	Podgorica	10	4:1
Morocco	Casablanca	20	7:3
Morocco	Rabat	80	9:1
Morocco	Tangier	[1]-	[2]_
Mozambique	Maputo	30	4:1
Namibia	Windhoek	25	4:1
Nepal	Kathmandu	110	4:1
Netherlands	Amsterdam	10	9:1

Netherlands	The Hague	60	4:1
New Zealand	Auckland	10	9:1
New Zealand	Wellington	60	4:1
Nigeria	Abuja	220	9:1
Nigeria	Lagos	250	7:3
North Korea	Pyongyang	10	3:2
Norway	Oslo	40	4:1
Oman	Muscat	60	9:1
Pakistan	Islamabad	310	9:1
Pakistan	Karachi	80	9:1
Panama	Panama City	20	7:3
Papua New Guinea	Port Moresby	20	7:3
Peru	Lima	45	4:1
Phillipines	Manila	60	4:1
Pitcairn Islands	Pitcairn	(1)-	(2)_
Poland	Warsaw	75	9:1
Portugal	Lisbon	50	9:1
Portugal	Portimao	(1)-	(2)_
Qatar	Doha	30	9:1
Romania	Bucharest	55	9:1
Russia	Moscow	170	9:1
Russia	St Petersburg	25	4:1
Russia	Yekaterinburg	15	7:3
Rwanda	Kigali	30	7:3
Saudi Arabia	Al Khobar	15	3:2
Saudi Arabia	Jedda	30	4:1
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	110	4:1
Senegal	Dakar	40	4:1
Serbia	Belgrade	70	9:1
Seychelles	Victoria	15	3:2
Sierra Leone	Freetown	200	9:1
Singapore	Singapore	90	3:2
Slovakia	Bratislava	25	3:2
Slovenia	Ljubljana	20	3:2
Solomon Islands	Honiara	15	3:2
South Africa	Cape Town	40	7:3
South Africa	Johannesburg	20	3:2
South Africa	Pretoria	160	4:1

South Korea	Seoul	80	9:1
Spain	Alicante	10	9:1
Spain	Barcelona	20	4:1
Spain	Madrid	110	4:1
Spain	Malaga	15	9:1
Spain	Bilbao	(1)-	(2)_
Spain	Ibiza	(1)-	(2)_
Spain	Las Palmas	(1)-	(2)_
Spain	Palma	(1)-	(2)_
Sri Lanka	Colombo	80	4:1
St Helena	Jamestown	(1)-	(2)_
St Helena	Tristan da Cunha	(1)-	(2)_
St Lucia	Castries	(1)-	(2)_
Sudan	Khartoum	250	9:1
Sudan	Juba	(1)-	(2)_
Sweden	Stockholm	50	4:1
Switzerland	Berne	35	7:3
Switzerland	Geneva (consulate general)	10	1:1
Switzerland	Geneva (UN)	45	2:3
Syria	Damascus	35	7:3
Taiwan	Taipei	50	4:1
Tajikistan	Dushanbe	40	4:1
Tanzania	Dares Salaam	40	9:1
Thailand	Bangkok	130	4:1
Trinidad and Tobago	Port of Spain	30	4:1
Tunisia	Tunis	55	4:1
Turkey	Ankara	120	7:3
Turkey	Istanbul	90	9:1
Turkmenistan	Ashgabat	10	7:3
Turks and Caicos Islands	Grand Turk	10	1:4
Uganda	Kampala	60	4:1
Ukraine	Kiev	50	7:3
United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi	80	4:1
United Arab Emirates	Dubai	110	7:3
Uruguay	Montevideo	20	4:1
USA	Atlanta	10	3:2
USA	Boston	25	9:1

USA	Chicago	30	7:3
USA	Houston	25	4:1
USA	Los Angeles	35	4:1
USA	Miami	15	9:1
USA	New York (consulate general)	55	9:1
USA	New York (UN)	90	2:3
USA	San Francisco	35	4:1
USA	Washington	250	7:3
USA	Denver	[1]-	[2]_
USA	Orlando	[1]-	[2]_
USA	Plymouth	[1]-	[2]_
Uzbekistan	Tashkent	30	3:2
Vatican	Holy See	10	1:1
Venezuela	Caracas	45	4:1
Vietnam	Hanoi	40	9:1
Vietnam	Ho Chi Minh	25	4:1
Yemen	Sana'a	140	9:1
Zambia	Lusaka	30	4:1
Zimbabwe	Harare	70	4:1
[1] 5 or fewer. *Note:* Posts with fewer than 100 staff are rounded up to the nearest 5 and those with 100 or more are rounded up to the nearest 10. [2] *Note:* Ratios are rounded to the nearest whole number and are not provided for posts with 5 or fewer staff for operational and security reasons.			

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