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To follow on from where the discussion left off, I enclose a short note below (on defence), if helpful. With regard to our discussion of 'strategy', I attach a quick piece I drafted http://ecfr.eu/blog/entry/a_cyberstrategy_for_europe._now_what_about_a_strategy

With the EU still in the throes of the euro crisis and in the face of diminishing budgets, there are two way of going about things-- together or alone. As Francois Hollande indicated at the European Parliament on 5 February 2013, EU governments for the moment have by and large chosen to go it alone. In times of crisis, there is a natural trend to conduct foreign policy on a national basis, concentrate on domestic issues, and to scale back resources on a strictly national basis. It is obviously detrimental to European interests for each country to attempt to frame its response in isolation, cutting national capability without reference to the effect on the capability of the whole.

But it is also detrimental to national interests. With the combined effect of waning budgets and the exponential costs of military technology, every European country including the UK risks either some losing capabilities entirely or ending up with a superficial smattering of defence capabilities -- which will neither do not protect national sovereignty, guarantee strategic autonomy or fulfil national foreign policy aims. EU countries today can either i) share capabilities (e.g. Benelux cooperation in the field of air policing) ii) choose to give some capabilities up (e.g. submarines for Denmark, battle tanks for the Netherlands) which amounts to laying the burden on other EU countries; or they can end up with a decorative defence that fails to constitute any convincing deterrent. In view of this, we need to ask the question head-on: what measure of concerted defence planning, collaborative procurement, joint ownership of assets and common maintenance is acceptable amongst EU countries?

Another powerful impulse has developed in the shape of America's shifting global strategy. It should now be clear to all Europeans not only that the US 'pivot to Asia' requires them to cooperate more closely on defence – but that Washington now positively wants them to do so. US officials are quite explicit about this – Europeans should acquire for themselves the strategic enabling capabilities (ISTAR, air-tanking, precision strike) for which they had to call on the Americans in Libya and now in Mali. In these circumstances, the old debates between Atlanticists and Europeanists lose their meaning. The aim – effective European capability for autonomous action – should be equally shared.

So the incentives are in place – but the rupture required, to achieve the shift towards a predominantly collective rather than national approach to defining and satisfying defence needs in Europe, remains a huge challenge. Indeed all the more significant European military powers (one thinks for example of the defence cuts announced over the last two years not just by the UK, but Germany and Italy) have responded to deteriorating budget positions not by trying to rebalance their armed forces, nor yet by serious efforts at mutualisation, but simply by trying to shrink what they already have – to keep what they have, but less of it.

It is not original to point out that what is needed is to increase strategic convergence. And that what is needed to achieve convergence of strategic thinking is a new European Strategic Defence Review. A process must be initiated which brings about an intellectual convergence on the reality of Europe's transformed geostrategic position; on the nature of the changing relationship with the US; on the role and utility of armed forces in combating risks and threats, and in asserting European influence; and on striking the right balance between autonomy and cooperation. Its achievement is as important to the future of the transatlantic security relationship as it is to Europe's, and through it Britain's ability to count for something in the new multi-polar world.