



Home Office

SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO THE COUNTER TERRORISM BILL CONSULTATION



Summary of Responses to the Counter Terrorism Bill Consultation

Presented to Parliament
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department
by Command of Her Majesty

December 2007

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Introduction

This document summarises the responses to the consultation papers 'Possible Measures for Inclusion in a Future Counter Terrorism Bill' and 'Options for Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorist Cases', which were published on 25 July 2007.

Further copies of this report can be obtained via The Stationery Office.

This report can also be found at the following websites:

www.official-documents.gov.uk/menu/cmd2007.htm

www.security.homeoffice.gov.uk

Overview

1. On 7 June 2007, the previous Home Secretary announced to Parliament the Government's intention to bring forward a new counter terrorism bill later this year. A commitment was also given to consult widely on the proposed measures before introduction of the bill. Two consultation papers were published on 25 July 2007 entitled 'Possible Measures for Inclusion in a Future Counter Terrorism Bill' and 'Options for Pre-Charge Detention in Terrorist Cases'. These papers facilitated a more detailed consideration of the measures the Government were proposing and provided an analysis of the case for extending the maximum period of pre-charge detention in terrorist cases. These documents can be found at www.security.homeoffice.gov.uk

The Consultation Exercise

2. The counter terrorism legislation that has been introduced since 2000 has all been fast tracked through Parliament. While we remain firmly of the view that this action was absolutely necessary we recognise that this has resulted in criticisms. We therefore wanted to do things differently with this bill and to consult widely on possible measures before they are introduced to Parliament.

3. To achieve this we wrote to over 100 organisations asking for comments on the proposals. A list of all the people we wrote to can be found at Annex A. In addition, by using the knowledge and expertise of the Government Offices for the regions we held five regional seminars across the country which were attended by a number of organisations including community groups, civil liberty groups, law organisations and the police. A full list of those organisations we invited to the seminars can be found at Annex B. A number of the external stakeholders opted to take up the written offer to meet with officials to discuss the proposals further.

4. Anyone interested in the legislation was encouraged to become involved in the consultation exercise and we offered a number of ways to do this;

- We set up a web page dedicated to the Bill which could be accessed at <http://security@homeoffice.gov.uk>. This site contained documents relevant to the Bill and related issues such as pre-charge detention.
- Any queries or concerns about the Bill, measures for inclusion in the Bill or pre-charge detention could be emailed to CTBill2007@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk.

5. Lord Carlile, the Independent Reviewer of Counter Terrorism legislation has also produced a report on the Bill proposals which is published alongside this document.

The Responses

6. The total number of responses to the consultation through email and letter was **71**. A list of written responses is at Annex C

7. We wanted to hear the views of everyone interested and focus the consultation on the Government proposals whilst encouraging debate on wider issues. We are grateful for all those who took the time to submit responses.

8. Regional seminars aimed at engaging local communities, local police, devolved administrations, Government Offices and faith groups to discuss the content of the bill were held in:

16 th August.	Edinburgh
10 th September.	London – round table discussion
26 th September.	Birmingham
1 st October	Leeds – Attended by Rt Hon Tony McNulty MP.
2 nd October.	Belfast
16 th October.	Manchester

9. Other meetings included,

- Tony McNulty attended a ‘Question Time’ event hosted by Muslim News.
- Officials attended a meeting with community members in West Ham, London with MP Lynne Brown.

10. Official level meetings were held with,

- Human Rights Watch
- Liberty
- Justice
- Amnesty International
- The Information Commissioners Office
- The Muslim Safety Forum
- Representatives of the judiciary

11. Meetings have also been held with the police, officials from other Government Departments and the Crown Prosecution Service

12. An organisation, Muslim Voice UK (MVUK), whose aim is to research Muslim opinions making the results available to policy makers consulted Muslims from around the UK asking for their views on the proposed measures contained within the consultation documents.

13. We are very grateful for all the responses received, many of which were very detailed. The seminars we held were also helpful in opening up the discussion and allowed a constructive debate between a broad spectrum of community groups and organisations to take place. This paper aims to convey a summary of those responses.

Pre charge detention

14. The responses to the consultation clearly indicate that pre-charge detention is a controversial issue and the majority of the responses which we received did not support an outright extension to the current 28 day limit.

15. From the four possible options put forward in the consultation paper the majority of respondents expressed a preference for Option iii, which is the suggestion that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 might provide an alternative to extending pre-charge detention beyond the current limit of 28 days. What respondents found attractive about this option is that it was linked to specific operational circumstances and time limited. The majority of respondents were against option i (legislate now to extend the current limit on pre-charge detention, while at the same time introducing additional safeguards for any period of pre-charge detention over 28 days). For many respondents the key concern was whether the case for an extension had been made out and whether the police actually need these additional powers.

16. Whilst there were strong views about this measure many of those who responded to the consultation recognised that the challenge to prosecute terrorists through the criminal justice system had deepened.

17. Any support for an extension of pre-charge detention was on the understanding that there would be additional oversight to ensure that any further detention beyond 28 days was justified. Most respondents echoed the view that there should be added judicial or Parliamentary scrutiny should the Government decide to go beyond 28 days.

Disclosure in relation to suspected terrorist financing

18. The consultation paper on “Safeguards to Protect the Charitable Sector (England and Wales) from Terrorist Abuse” which was published jointly by the Home Office and HM Treasury in May this year highlighted the concern that there was a risk that the charitable sector could be used as a vehicle for terrorist financing.

19. This measure is designed to close a gap in the current provisions outlined in section 19(1)(b) of the Terrorism Act 2000, which requires disclosure of suspicious financial activity observed during the course of employment, trade, business or profession, to ensure it covers those carrying out unpaid or voluntary work. This measure was broadly welcomed, subject to appropriate safeguards being in place. Overall respondents felt that the charitable sector would welcome the new legislation, however concerns were raised about Government control of charitable activities and because of this it was suggested that there should be safeguards built in to avoid any real or perceived loss of autonomy and independence.

20. This is a very minor change and did not raise many responses. It should be noted that the Charity Commission’s current advice on the subject does not differentiate between paid and unpaid workers, and encourages all those in the charitable sector to disclose suspicious financial activity.

Measures in relation to fingerprints and DNA

21. We asked for views on four separate measures that we would like to introduce in relation to DNA and other forensic material. They are:

- a) Putting the police counter terrorism DNA database on a proper statutory footing, including the necessary oversight mechanisms;
- b) Enabling DNA samples and fingerprints obtained under the Terrorism Act 2000 to be loaded onto the National DNA and fingerprint databases;
- c) Enabling the Security Service to cross reference material they obtain with the National DNA and fingerprint databases for the purposes of national security; and
- d) Providing equivalent powers relating to DNA and fingerprints after a control order is served, as currently applies when arrests are made under the Terrorism Act 2000 or the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

22. The majority of respondents welcomed the fact that these measures are intended to develop greater safeguards while at the same time ensuring that the police and security services are able to make full use of all the information legally available to them. There was strong support for the retention of biometric data of individuals who have been charged or convicted of terrorism offences but some respondents questioned why this information should continue to be stored if the individual was subsequently found to be innocent. Respondents also raised concerns about whether mistakes could be made and whether DNA is foolproof.

23. Some respondents expressed concern regarding the fourth proposal (being able to take the DNA / fingerprints from a person served with a control order) and suggested that a person who is no longer subject to a control order (assuming they are not under arrest or subject to a criminal charge) should be

afforded the same rights as an individual who has never been the subject of such an order.

24. Respondents also suggested that additional safeguards would need to be in place to ensure samples would only be used for purposes set out in the legislation. In particular there were concerns about what safeguards would apply to samples secured from 'international partners'.

Data sharing powers for the intelligence and security agencies

25. This proposal places the intelligence and security agencies on to a similar statutory footing to that of the Serious and Organised Crime Agency in respect of their ability to acquire and disclose information. Given the very important role of the intelligence and security agencies it is essential that these perceived barriers to the agencies fully meeting their statutory functions are removed.

26. Oversight of these new provisions and, importantly, the existing statutory provisions that govern the obtaining and disclosure of information, will be undertaken by the Information Commissioner.

27. This measure has generally received support subject to all legal and constitutional issues being addressed.

28. Any concerns that were raised centred around the need to ensure that proper oversight mechanisms are in place.

Collection of information likely to be of use to terrorists

29. A key tactic of terrorist organisations is the gathering of targeting information about individuals, particularly Service personnel that can be used in the planning of attacks.

30. We plan to extend the current provision in section 58 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to make it clear that it includes communicating, publishing or otherwise eliciting information about Service personnel. This is in response to a particular need identified

31. We also asked whether there are other groups in addition to Service personnel that people think should also be covered. We have received requests to consider other groups such as Parliamentarians and the police.

32. Some respondents thought that it needed to be clearer what information would be perceived as being of use to terrorists. There was concern that some individuals may unwittingly access information that could then lead to their arrest. It was requested that guidance be made available which could then be passed down through schools and universities as well as in the home then this would provide clarity for many individuals who are uncertain on what the guidelines are.

33. Concern was also raised about whether the offence could be abused and cited examples of charges being laid against people who had political biographies in their homes or other publicly available material.

Post-charge questioning

34. Currently after charge, the police can only interview defendants to clarify earlier statements, where public safety is at risk or where, if the defendant agrees, new evidence comes to light. This applies to all criminal offences. The Crown Prosecution Service state that defendants invariably decline to be interviewed. It is also possible, at present, to interview defendants for intelligence purposes, but such questioning is again voluntary and is limited to questions *unrelated* to the offence for which they have been charged.

35. Our intention is to legislate so that in *terrorist* cases (i.e. those charged under anti-terrorism legislation or where the case is so determined by a judge at a preparatory hearing) suspects can be questioned after charge on any aspect of the offence for which they have been charged. Such questioning would not require the consent of the defendant. Any answers that are given as part of a post charge interview could be used for evidential purposes. Where a subject refuses to answer questions but then later relies on something they had the opportunity to mention previously (for example an alibi) then adverse inferences could be drawn where it was reasonable to do so. In effect we would be applying the caution that is given at arrest to post charge interviews.

36. Most respondents expressed support for this measure, and in particular that it might assist in lessening the need in some cases for lengthy pre-charge detention.

37. Some respondents suggested that post charge questioning should only be undertaken in relation to new information that has arisen since charge, and not simply be a repetition of previous questioning. The defendant must also have access to legal advice from a solicitor in person during any such questioning. It should be authorised by a police officer of Inspector rank, and the defendant must be entitled to challenge any requests for questioning

before the court, which should have the power to prevent it if not satisfied it would be in the interests of justice.

38. There measure raised reservations in Scotland concerning the legal issues that would have to be resolved for this proposal to be compatible with the Scottish Legal System.

39. Some respondents believed it wrong that this measure would open the doors for the case against the accused to continue to be built on after he or she had been charged.

40. Others considered the measure to be useful for the defendant as it would give them the opportunity to put their case forward.

41. Concerns were also raised regarding to the right to silence which some felt was being undermined.

Enhanced sentences

42. The enhanced sentencing measure brought mixed reviews with support both for and against.

43. We explained in the consultation paper that we would like to ensure that sentences for those who are clearly terrorists but who are convicted of non-terrorist specific offences (but where the motive for the crime was clearly terrorism) are enhanced to reflect the additional seriousness that terrorist involvement represents, for example forging of passports with intent to supply them to those involved in terrorism.

44. Some respondents felt that the aggravating factor of terrorism should form an element of the offence charged to which the defendant could either admit as a guilty plea or prove beyond reasonable doubt at trial in a similar way to racially or religiously aggravated offences.

45. Some respondents believed there should be a right of appeal in relation to such a determination at sentencing for both the defence and prosecution.

46. The consultation document explained that a further reason why we would like the court to determine whether a general offence is terrorism related is because this will act as a formal trigger for the notification requirements that are set out later in this paper to be applied in such cases. Without a determination as to whether a case was related to terrorism or not it would not be possible to identify which individuals should be subject to the notification requirements.

47. Generally, respondents were not opposed in principle to enhanced sentences for non-terrorist specific offences that are motivated by a terrorist purpose. However, on occasion it was suggested that the breadth of newly

created offences, such as 'acts preparatory to terrorism', would mean it is unlikely that an appropriate terrorism related offence could not be charged.

48. Some respondents also stated that they are not opposed in principle to enhanced sentences being given for offences deemed to be terrorist in nature reasoning that this would bring such offences in line with hate crimes. It was felt the advantage of this approach is that murder, attempted murder, or other such serious crimes are treated as crimes, and it is the sentencing that denotes society's particular disapproval of such crimes being motivated by hate crime and/or by terrorist motives. However it was argued that, as with hate crime, the terrorist motivation of an offence should be recorded from the outset, so that evidence to be adduced to the motivation is gathered.

49. Some respondents felt that the more terrorism can be treated like other crimes the better; the enhancing of sentences is a much better option than distorting the whole criminal justice system to penalise 'terrorist' murders, 'terrorist' attempted murders etc.

50. Some respondents also noted that introducing the concept of enhanced sentences would also assist the UK comply with its European obligations.

51. Other respondents felt that the case had not been made regarding the necessity or effectiveness of enhanced sentencing for non-terrorist offences believed to be linked to terrorism. It was felt that given the increased scope of terrorist offences arising from recent legislation, it was unlikely that any significant number of genuine terrorists could not be charged with an offence under such legislation. In any remaining cases, the evidence of a terrorism-linked motive is likely to be too limited to allow such an enhanced sentence to be passed. They do not therefore believe that enhanced sentencing would represent an effective tool in terms of combating terrorism. Some also remained unconvinced that the deterrent effect justified the policy.

Terrorism notification requirement

52. This proposal would strengthen the arrangements for managing convicted terrorists in the community following their release from prison. This would take the form of a notification requirement (which would work in a similar way to the sex offender notification requirements). The purpose would be for the police to have details of the identity, whereabouts and foreign travel plans of those who have been convicted of a terrorism or terrorism related offence. The individual would have to notify at a police station their name, any other names they use, where they live, any other address they stay at for five days or more and the details of any foreign travel they intend to undertake that will last for more than three days.

53. This would also apply, where appropriate to those convicted of a terrorism offence overseas if they came to the UK. This would take the form of an order made by the court following an application by the police.

54. Broadly speaking the majority of respondents were in favour of this provision.

55. Concern was expressed that there may be an unrealistic view of what the police role would be and there would be a need to handle people's expectations carefully, making it clear that where an individual was subject to a notification requirement this would not automatically mean that the police were monitoring them 24 hours a day.

56. Concern was also expressed that convicted terrorists are likely to mistrust the police and therefore unlikely to notify.

57. Others were concerned that this requirement could be perceived as an admission that the Government couldn't cope; that these people should already be on the radar of the intelligence services.

58. Some respondents expressed concern at the life long obligation to notify where someone is sentenced to five years or more. It was felt this assumed individuals could not rehabilitate and could discourage the trend towards reintegration into society.

59. It was suggested that the Government should make it possible for an individual subject to notification requirements to be released from them if it could be shown they had been rehabilitated. It was suggested that assessments on the level of threat an individual posed should be made on a case by case basis and that the appropriateness of continued notification requirements could form part of this.

60. We also suggested in the consultation that the notification requirements might help with the investigation of future crimes. For example, if a terrorist incident took place the police would be able to visit all those who had previously been involved in terrorism to rule them out from their enquiries. Some respondents, whilst not opposing the notification requirements, urged caution that this proposal should not become a vehicle whereby individuals would be subject to police questioning every time a terrorist incident takes place.

61. We believe the requirement may also help deter some previously convicted terrorists from becoming re-involved in terrorist activity (or deter others from seeking to involve them). Overall we believe this requirement is proportionate to the seriousness of the offences in question.

62. Some argued that MAPPA (Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements) should be considered instead of notification. However others noted that MAPPA did not apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland and that notification would be a more appropriate solution.

63. Some respondents expressed concern about where this information would be held.

Terrorist travel overseas

64. We put forward a number of proposals in relation to terrorist travel overseas.

65. First, a police have power to enable the temporary seizing of travel documents from individuals at port who are suspected, on the basis of the examination undertaken and/or other intelligence, of wanting to travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes. The period of seizure should be sufficient to enable further investigations to be undertaken.

66. Second, the introduction of a new foreign travel order, similar to sex offender foreign travel orders, which would enable the courts (on application by the police) to place limitations on foreign travel by convicted terrorists. As part of this process the court could order the confiscation of passports. We also considered whether to apply foreign travel orders to suspected terrorists.

67. Third, under the Bail Act 1976 it is already possible to place restrictions on foreign travel and to confiscate passports when a person is charged and bailed for any criminal offence. We therefore wanted to consult on whether any change in the law is necessary to tighten up bail conditions in cases that are linked to terrorism but which do not involve specific terrorist activity.

68. Finally, the proposed notification requirements to be placed on convicted terrorists will require them to notify the police of any intention to travel overseas for three days or more.

69. These proposals did not generate many responses. Some respondents were concerned about how they would work in practice. Most respondents welcomed the measures considering them to be proportionate and necessary to the current threat, provided that all legal and constitutional issues were addressed before implementation.

70. It was suggested by some respondents that there could be a tandem offence of obtaining another passport whereas the individual was subject to travel restrictions and had dual nationality.

71. However, some respondents felt that in relation to Northern Ireland this policy would be difficult to enforce due to the large level of cross border travel between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

Forfeiture of terrorist assets

72. Section 23 of the Terrorism Act 2000 permits a court to make a forfeiture order when a person has been convicted of a terrorist financing offence. The courts do not have this ability however for people convicted of any other terrorism-related offence.

73. We asked for views on extending the power of the courts to make forfeiture orders to anyone convicted of terrorism offences, if it can be shown that their assets have been or might be used for future terrorism purposes.

74. Overall this raised few comments in the consultation. Those comments received were generally concerned about potential damage the proposal could have to those innocent victims, for example family and children.

75. Other respondents commented that existing legislation can already be used to forfeit assets and questioned whether there is a need for an expansion of these powers.

76. One respondent suggested following the example of the Office for Victims of Crime in the United States whereby if a decision is taken to include the forfeiture of assets, then consideration should be given to ring-fencing at least part of what is recovered for services dedicated to the needs of those who have survived or been bereaved in a terrorist incident.

Additional measures for the control orders system

77. We propose making changes to the control orders system in relation to powers of entry, search and seizure. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 enables the Secretary of State to require a person under a control order to give access to the police to his residence and to allow them to search it. The police are also able to rely upon more general police powers of entry, search and seizure when investigating a breach of a control order (which is a criminal offence). However, the police believe that they have identified some circumstances (in particular where it is not possible to require the co-operation of the controlled person) in which it is necessary for them to have a self-standing power of entry and search of premises and seizure of items to enforce and monitor the control order effectively.

78. These measures in themselves did not attract significant attention. Where mentioned respondents broadly supported the measures as a way to make control orders more effective.

79. However some respondents were concerned about control orders generally. Some argued that the control order legislation is a difficult, costly piece of legislation to implement and that it is counter intuitive to winning hearts and minds; the core of the prevent strategy of CONTEST. It was suggested that allowing the use of intercept evidence in the criminal courts so police and prosecutors can gather evidence to bring criminal prosecutions would be a more beneficial step to take.

80. Most respondents felt that those on control orders should be put on trial rather than trying to make the orders more effective. Others felt that those on control orders should simply be removed from them and no further action taken

Power to remove a vehicle & power to examine documents

81. We are giving consideration to two (formerly Northern Ireland specific) powers on a UK wide basis. The provisions have worked well in Northern Ireland and have been proven useful in tackling terrorism. Given the nature of the threat we face we felt it prudent to look at whether equivalent UK-wide powers, as detailed below, would be useful and proportionate.

82. Section 95 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Part VII) provided a power to take a vehicle (or cause it to be taken), where necessary or expedient, to any place for the purpose of carrying out a search under a relevant provision in Part VII of the Terrorism Act 2000.

83. Section 87 of the 2000 Act provided that a member of the police or armed forces who performs a search under Part VII of that Act may examine any document or record found in order to ascertain whether it contains information of the kind likely to be of use to terrorists. Both these powers have now lapsed.

84. Respondents were broadly in support of these proposals and felt that such powers might be useful where documents are seized which are written in a foreign language and would need to be translated. Respondents noted that the documents would only be examined during a lawful search and that the appropriate safeguards would be put in place to protect items subject to legal privilege.

Definition of Terrorism

85. One of Lord Carlile's recommendations in his report on the definition of terrorism (Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000) that was published on 15 March 2007 was to amend the existing definition to ensure it is clear that terrorism motivated by a racial or ethnic cause is included.

86. Concerns were raised that there was not a clear need for this change and that it highlighted the problems with trying to define "terrorism" .

87. However, overall this proposal was supported as it was generally felt it would bring appropriate clarity to the definition of terrorism.

Funding of Increased security at key gas sites

88. This measure would ensure funding for appropriate security measures at key gas supply sites, including the deployment of additional police services, in order to counter the potential risks of disruption to the national gas supply should there be an attack. This proposal did not receive any major concerns.

89. This proposal received support on the basis that it will ensure police forces are not burdened with the cost of policing such installations. It was also suggested that this proposal should be extended to other critical national infrastructure sites.

Transfer of functions to the Advocate General (Northern Ireland)

90. With the devolution of policing and justice to the Northern Ireland Assembly, there will be a new, locally appointed Attorney General for Northern Ireland responsible for transferred law officer functions. However, certain Attorney General functions in the reserved and excepted fields will stay with the Attorney General for England and Wales who will be the Advocate General for Northern Ireland. Most of these functions are covered in the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002. We consulted on our plan to legislate so that the appointment of Special Advocates in Proscribed Organisation Appeals is carried out by the Advocate General (Attorney General in England and Wales) rather than the Attorney General for Northern Ireland. This proposal raised no concerns.

Minor technical amendments to Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCS) 2001

91. To ensure consistency with other legislation we will legislate to make three minor technical amendments to the Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. These relate to:

- Ensuring paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1 to the ATCS 2001 (initial detention period of terrorist cash) corresponds to the amended section 295(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002;
- Making reference to refusal to make an Order in paragraphs 7(2)(b) and (6)(b) and (c) of Schedule 1 of ATCS 2001 (removing a listed proscribed group) following a successful appeal at the Proscribed Organisation Appeals Commission; and
- Ensuring paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 of the ATCS (forfeiture appeals) corresponds to the amended section 299 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

92. These raised no concerns.

Conclusion

93. It is the first duty of government to protect its citizens. There remains a serious and current threat to the UK from terrorism. In order to protect the public it is vital that our legislation is kept under constant review to ensure that it remains adequate and proportionate to that threat. The Government is always mindful of not seeking additional powers for the sake of them. It is important to achieve the appropriate balance between measures necessary to counter threats to national security and preserving the civil and human rights of the population.

94. Overall the consultation has been very well received. Through the consultation exercise we have been able to engage with local groups and communities who have brought in views from a wide range of sources. We are now considering carefully the outcome of the public consultation and how this might shape the legislation proposed for the counter terrorism bill.

Annex A - List of all those written to in relation to the consultation

7 July Assistance
9/11 Families Group
Adab Project
Aftermath Support LTD
Al-Khoei Foundation
Amnesty International
Assist Trauma Care
Association of Chief Police Officers
Association of Chief Police Officers (Scotland)
Association of Police Authorities
Baha'I Community of the UK
Bali Bombing Group
British-Irish Rights Watch
British Muslim Forum (BMF)
British Muslims for Secular Democracy
British Security Industry Association
British Shia Muslim Council
British Sikh Consultative Forum
Catholic Bishops' Conference of England & Wales
Councillor Mashtaq Lashan
Church of England
Churches Together in Britain and Ireland
Churches Together in England
City Circle
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE)
Committee on the Administration of Justice
Community Safety Trust
Confederation of British Industry
Confederation of British Industry (Scotland)
Criminal Records Bureau
Cruse Bereavement Care
Disaster Action
Evangelical Alliance
Faith Based Regeneration Network UK
Faith Matters
Fatima Women's Network
Federation of Small Businesses Scotland
Forum Against Islamophobia & Racism
Government Office for the East of England
Government Office for the East Midlands
Government Office for the North East
Government Office for the North West
Government Office for the South East
Government Office for the South West
Government Office for the West Midlands
Government Office for Yorkshire and the Humber
Henna Foundation (Saheli), Trustee
Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Courts Administration
Hindu Council UK
Hindu Forum of Britain

Howard League
Human Rights Watch
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
Institute of Directors Scotland
Interfaith Council for Wales
Interfaith Network
International Bar Association
Iqra Trust
Islamic Human Rights Commission
Ismaili Council
Jain Samaj Europe
JET Derby
Joseph Interfaith Foundation
Karima Institute Nottingham
Law Centre (NI)
Law Reform Committee
Law Society
League of British Muslims
Liberty
Local Government Association
Lockbie Disaster UK Families Flight 103
Lord Justice General
Magistrates Association
Metropolitan Police Authority
Musa Admani (London Metropolitan University)
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)
Muslim College, London
Muslim Contact Unit (MCU)
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)
Muslim Institute
Muslim Safety Forum
Muslim Womens Resource Centre
Muslim Youth Helpline
National Association for the Care and Rehabilitation of Offenders
National Council for Voluntary Organisations
National Police Improvement Agency
Network of Buddhist Organisations (UK)
Network of Sikh Organisations
North of England Victims Association
Northern Ireland Association for the Care & Resettlement of Offenders
Northern Ireland Courts Service
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Northern Ireland Interfaith Forum
Northern Ireland Office
Plaid Cymru
Professor Clive Walker, (School of Law, University of Leeds)
Professor Conor Gearty (LSE, Centre for the Study of Human Rights)
Progressive British Muslims
Q News
Scottish Court Services
Scottish Interfaith Council
Scottish Judiciary

Scottish Prison Service Headquarters,
Scottish Trades Union Congress
Sharm El Shaikh 2005 Bombings
Somali Community Representative
Somali Voice
Stanmore Mosque
Sufi Muslim Council (SMC)
Support after Murder and Manslaughter National
The Board of Deputies of British Jews
The Compassionate Friends
The Criminal Bar Association,
The Free Churches Group
The Information Commissioner's Office
The Methodist Church
The Office of the Chief Rabbi
The Scottish Chambers of Commerce
Tim Parry Jonathan Ball Foundation for Peace
Victims Advisory Panel
Victims Support
Welsh Assembly
Zoroastrian Trust Funds of Europe

Annex B

List of those invited to the seminars

Birmingham

Bangladeshi Council
Bangladeshi Multi Purpose Centre
Birmingham Central Mosque
Birmingham City Council
Birmingham City Council Legal Services
Birmingham Somali Council
British Muslim Forum
Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Culture, University of Birmingham
Coventry City Council
Crown Prosecution Service
Department for Communities and Local Government
Dudley Metropolitan Borough Council
Ghamkol Sharif Mosque
Green Light Network
Horn of Africa – Somali
Markazi Jammah Ahle Hadith UK
Muath Welfare Trust
Muslim Council of Britain
Muslim Womens's Network
Pakistani Community Development Network
Saheli Women's Group
Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council
Staffordshire Police
Stoke-on-Trent City Council
Stoney Lane Islamic Centre
Sultan Bahu Trust
Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council
Warwickshire Police
West Mercia Constabulary
West Midlands Business Council
West Midlands CRE hub
West Midlands Faiths Forum
West Midlands Local Government Association
West Midlands Police
West Midlands Regional Assembly
Wolverhampton City Council

Manchester

Blackburn Local Authority
Blackburn with Darwen Strategic Partnership
Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council
Bolton Vision for the Future Steering Group
Burnley Action Partnership
Burnley LA
Cheshire Constabulary
Cumbria Constabulary
Greater Manchester Police
Hyndburn Borough Council
Hyndburn First
Knowsley CDRP
Knowsley Local Strategic Partnership
Lancashire County Council
Lancashire Police
Lancashire Strategic Partnership
Liverpool CDRP
Liverpool First
Manchester City Council
Manchester Council for Community Relations
Manchester Local Strategic Partnership (LSP)
Merseyside Police
North West Development Agency
North West Faith Forum
North West Regional Assembly
Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council
Oldham Partnership Board
Oldham Partnership Board
Partners in Salford
Pendle Partnership
Pendle LA
Preston Strategic Partnership
Pride Partnership, Rochdale Local Strategic Partnership
Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council
Rossendale Partnership

Leeds

Association of West Yorkshire Authorities (AWYCE)
Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council
Bradford University
Bradford Youth Development Partnership

Burngreave NDC
Calderdale Council
Churches Regional Commission for Yorkshire and the Humber
City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council
Government Office for Yorkshire and The Humber
Hull County Council
Humberside Police
Kirklees Council
Leeds City Council
Local Government Yorkshire and Humber
Nasiha, Bradford
North Yorkshire County Council
North Yorkshire Police
Regional Faiths Forum
South Yorkshire Police
West Yorkshire Police
Yorkshire and Humber Regional Forum
Yorkshire Forward

Belfast

Alliance
Bar Council
British Irish Rights Watch
Committee on the Administration of Justice
Council of HM County Court Judges in Northern Ireland
Democratic Dialogue
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)
Department for Social Development
Equality Commission
Extern
Law society
Life Sentence Review Commissioners
Northern Ireland Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders
Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action
Northern Ireland Courts Service
Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
Northern Ireland Prison Service
Northern Ireland Resident Magistrates' Association
Office of First Minister/Deputy First Minister
Office of Law Reform
Police Federation
Police Ombudsman
Police Service of Northern Ireland
Policing Board

Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)
School of Law - Queens University of Ulster
Sinn Fein
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)
Superintendents Association
Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG)
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

London

Al-Khoei Foundation
Association of Muslim Police
British Muslim Forum
British Muslims for Secular Democracy
City Circle
Fatima Women's Network
Henna Foundation
Islamic Cultural Centre
Islamic Forum Europe
Islamic Society of Britain
Liberty
Muslim Association of Britain
Muslim Council of Britain
Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre
Muslim Safety Forum
Muslim Women's Network
Muslim Youth Helpline
Somali Community Representative
Sufi Muslim Council
World Federation of Shia Ithna Asheri
Young Muslim Organisation

Edinburgh

Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland
Crown Office
Offices of the Advocate General for Scotland
Scottish Government
 Civil Contingencies Unit
 Constitutional Policy
 Criminal Procedure
 Legal Directorate
 Police Powers & Duties
 Police: Organised Crime & Support Services
 Sentencing Policy Unit

Annex C

WRITTEN RESPONSES TO THE CT BILL CONSULTATION

1. ACPO
2. ACPO (Scotland)
3. Amnesty International
4. Bar Council
5. British Irish Rights Watch
6. Burnley Borough Council
7. Caged Prisoners
8. Cheshire Police Authority
9. Committee on the Administration of Justice
10. Community Security Trust
11. Criminal Bar Association
12. Disaster action
13. Fair Trials international
14. General Council of the Bar
15. Harrogate Borough Council
16. Hindu Council UK
17. Human Rights Watch
18. Information Commissioner
19. JUSTICE
20. Law Reform Committee
21. Law Society – Justice & Home Affairs
22. Law Society – Legal policy Directorate
23. Law Society Scotland
24. LIBERTY
25. Mayor of London
26. Mission & Public Affairs Council of the Church of England
27. Muslim Council of Britain
28. Muslim Safety Forum
29. Muslim Voice UK
30. Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission
31. North Yorkshire Police
32. Policy Council – the States of Guernsey
33. Portobello Amnesty Group
34. Plaid Cymru
35. Tim Parry and Jonathan Balls Foundation for Peace

Plus 36 written responses from individuals



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