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# **Findings and lessons learned from the early implementation of the HMP Doncaster payment by results pilot**

**Daniel Murray, Jonathan Jones, Simon Pearce and  
Evelyn Hichens  
GVA**

Ministry of Justice Research Series 18/12  
November 2012

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First Published 2012

ISBN: 978 1 84099 579 4

## **Acknowledgements**

We would like to thank the range of individuals who have contributed to this piece of research. In particular, we would like to thank the strategic stakeholders, delivery staff and offenders who took part in the research. We would also particularly like to thank Pete Cooper for his coordination and support in arranging the multiple visits to HMP Doncaster.

## **The authors**

GVA specialises in delivering professional services to clients in all sectors across the UK. Our Social Policy Practice operates at the forefront of emerging public policy, and aims to maximise the impact of the public sector and its partners to deliver thriving economies and well-run public services. We are dedicated to delivering innovative solutions that enable our clients to meet, and exceed, their goals. GVA is a fully independent consultancy offering objective advice based on thorough and robust research and evidence.

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# Summary

## Context

The aim of this report is to identify early lessons from the development and implementation of the HMP Doncaster payment by results (PbR) pilot. The pilot will test the impact of replacing a multitude of process/output targets and performance monitoring with a single outcome-based target (to reduce the reconviction rate) with a strong financial incentive to achieve this.

HMP Doncaster is a privately operated Category B prison, managed by Serco. On 1 October 2011 Serco began delivering a PbR contract as part of an 'Alliance' with a voluntary sector provider, Catch 22. A key proposal of service delivery at the prison was to introduce a case management approach to offender management. This involved providing a single point of contact for offenders and the design of tailored support packages based on identified needs.

The Analytical Services Directorate at the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) commissioned GVA to undertake a longitudinal research and process evaluation of the pilot.

## Approach

This report is based on qualitative interviews with MoJ, National Offender Management Service (NOMS), Serco, Catch 22, partner agencies, and offenders held at HMP Doncaster. Quantitative data were largely unavailable due to delays in implementing Management Information systems by Serco and Catch 22. Research was conducted in November and December 2011 and between April and July 2012. Therefore, the report presents the findings of the early stages of the pilot.

## Results

The main findings in this report relate to the following key research questions:

- How, and to what extent, did the introduction of a PbR contract change service delivery, and why?
- What were stakeholders' views of the strengths and weaknesses of the contractual model, as implemented?

Service delivery before the introduction of PbR focused on the statutory requirements and delivery of interventions in custody for offenders serving sentences of more than 12 months. Those serving less than 12 months (and those on remand) had the option of accessing services, although the onus was on the offender to request them. Many services were

allocated on a 'first come first served' basis. There was a reported lack of continuity and duplication of procedures. Offenders identified that having to repeat 'their story' multiple times to different people was stressful and discouraged engagement.

The introduction of PbR resulted in two direct changes to the delivery of services.

The first was the **addition of community resettlement support** for offenders post-release through the provision of community-based case managers. The introduction of an 'end to end' case management system, including delivery in the community, was intended to reduce inconsistency, improve engagement of offenders and support reductions in reoffending. 58% of offenders discharged during the research period had engaged with the community management. Specific examples of case management in the community include:

- encouraging volunteering for offenders following their release from prison to help address their needs in relation to employability;
- community volunteers providing low-level mentoring and advocacy to offenders. For example ensuring offenders attend meetings by providing reminders and accompanying them. However, this was currently under-developed due to a lack of resources.

The second change as a result of PbR, and following the introduction of community resettlement support, was to keep staff responsible for the delivery of accredited programmes employed by Serco. In the absence of PbR this team would have been transferred to Catch 22 as part of the new management arrangements. However, with the addition of community based case-management, it was decided by Serco and Catch 22 that this team would instead remain with Serco. This enabled Catch 22, in their role within the Alliance, to **maintain a specific focus on case management**.

There has also been a key evolution of the delivery model as conceived by the Alliance (Serco and Catch 22) since PbR implementation. The original intention was to work with all offenders. During early implementation it was recognised that providing intensive case management in custody for all offenders was not the most efficient or appropriate use of resources. The focus of Alliance delivery is now on those serving sentences of between eight weeks and 12 months. This is because this group have high reoffending rates, and previously only received limited support in custody and 'through the gate'.

The strengths and weaknesses identified by stakeholders associated with the PbR contractual model as implemented included the following:



- A key strength is that the arrangement between Serco and Catch 22 means the voluntary sector provider has not been put at financial risk. A proportion of the reward-related payment will be paid to Catch 22 if the reconviction target is achieved. This provides an incentive to perform but no associated financial risk to the organisation, which could have precluded its specialist input.
- A transfer of two teams in the prison via TUPE<sup>1</sup> to Catch 22 created a new team responsible for delivering case management of offenders. This demonstrated innovation in delivering PbR although some staff reported they found this transition relatively difficult and required more support.
- It was reported the lack of a lead-in period for a gradual implementation of the new delivery approach under the PbR contract had a negative effect on ensuring adequate management information systems were in place. This initially meant a lack of strategic data for the Alliance to understand whether resources were being allocated effectively.
- The use of the binary measurement of reoffending required discussions and agreement between the commissioner and contractor. Serco suggested a measure which recognises reductions in the frequency or severity would be favourable.

## Implications

### What lessons can be learned to inform the development of further PbR projects or the commissioning of offender management services more generally?

- *Implementation and transition* - the incentive of PbR appears to be attractive to private sector providers. The successful implementation of a PbR contract, its design and subsequent implementation require a genuine commitment to partnership working between the commissioner and contractor. Serco identified that a six-month lead-in period to implement the new delivery approach under the PbR contract before introducing the outcome measure would have enabled early delivery issues to be identified and resolved.
- *Delivery model* – following the implementation of the PbR contract at Doncaster and introduction of the new service delivery, there have been radical changes in

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<sup>1</sup> TUPE: “The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations (TUPE) protects employees’ terms and conditions of employment when a business is transferred from one owner to another. Employees of the previous owner when the business changes hands automatically become employees of the new employer on the same terms and conditions. It’s as if their employment contracts had originally been made with the new employer. Their continuity of service and any other rights are all preserved. Both old and new employers are required to inform and consult employees affected directly or indirectly by the transfer.” ACAS, 2012. See: <http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=1655>

support for offenders (for example the introduction of ‘through the gate’ support) and model evolution (for example remand prisoners being included in service delivery). Future PbR commissioners should be aware such changes may occur during the course of service delivery.

- *Resources* – the transfer of staff from Serco to Catch 22 was highly innovative but the learning suggests such delivery arrangements need ongoing communication with staff and be resolved before the start of implementation. The budget for offender management has not changed with the potential to deliver better outcomes at the same or less cost.
- *Partnerships* – PbR led to the development of new agency partnerships between the prison and local criminal justice and voluntary organisations. However, there is a need to ensure work is not duplicated, for example where two organisations work separately with the same offender – this can cause problems for the individuals involved and in some cases could make attributing any change in reoffending problematic.
- *Data and evidence* – reliable data is valuable to PbR models both for provider (e.g. assisting with delivery) and for commissioner (e.g. assess the extent of ‘parking’, ‘cherry-picking’ and ‘gaming’).

## Further research

The next stage of the research will focus on questions into how the approaches adopted at HMP Doncaster may have influenced reoffending rates, and to identify areas of innovation and efficiency. The current report further highlights areas for future work including more detail on the evolution of the delivery model and on using case management data to further understand levels of targeting and engagement.

# 1. Context

## 1.1 Payment by results

Payment by results (PbR) has important implications for the MoJ and the criminal justice system (CJS) generally. It is intended that, by changing the way services are commissioned, better outcomes for the public can be delivered at the same or at a reduced cost. PbR introduces an element of risk and reward for providers and therefore makes them focus on the needs of the end user to achieve lasting positive outcomes.

The key aims of PbR include:

- a commitment to the overall principle that ‘we should only pay for what works’;
- a focus on outcomes rather than narrow outputs and/or delivery processes;
- the transfer of financial risk from the taxpayer to the provider;
- potential for increased levels of innovation facilitated by greater discretion for providers;
- diversifying the range of providers and services delivered.

A number of PbR pilots have been established to increase the MoJ’s understanding of what works in relation to the delivery of PbR contracts, and why. One of these pilots is the private sector model at HMP Doncaster.

## 1.2 PbR and reducing reoffending

PbR involves service providers being paid on the basis of the outcomes they achieve, rather than the inputs or outputs they deliver (Fox and Albertson, 2011). This means providers are paid after performance has been proven, and hence the Government does not pay for outcomes that it has not asked for or those that have not been met. The PbR system hopes to improve service quality – as bonuses are given when targets are exceeded while payments are withheld for underperformance – as well as increasing transparency of spending, as tariffs are placed on services and users’ needs.

There are different approaches to implementing PbR across government. The PbR system is currently being used to deliver the majority of acute healthcare in hospitals (Department of Health, 2012). Providers are paid for each patient seen or treated. There are national tariffs for admitted patient care, outpatient attendances, accident and emergency (A&E), and some outpatient procedures. PbR is also being incorporated into the provision of services in relation to drug rehabilitation, adult mental health, the Department for Work and Pensions Work Programme, and Sure Start Children Centres.

The need for a fundamental shift in the way the CJS operates was outlined in the 'Breaking the Cycle' Green Paper (MoJ, 2010a). This introduced a 'rehabilitation revolution' for more effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing of offenders to enable the cycle of crime and prison to be broken. It also introduced the PbR model in the context of reducing reoffending. A PbR approach was further supported in the Coalition Government's commitments set out in the Coalition Agreement (HM Government, 2011).

The rationale for the proposals in the Green Paper was based on high levels of reoffending. In 2011, 75% of all offences committed were reoffences and of those offenders sentenced for indictable offences, 31.2% had 15 or more previous convictions/cautions. This represented an increase on the 28.9% recorded in 2010 (MoJ, 2012a). In the 12 months ending December 2010, the national one-year proven reoffending rate<sup>2</sup> was 26.7%, which represents a rise of 0.4 percentage points compared to the previous 12 months, and a fall of 1.2 percentage points since 2000 (MoJ, 2012b).

The first pilot testing the PbR approach was launched in September 2010 at HMP Peterborough in the form of a Social Impact Bond (SIB). The aim of this pilot is to reduce the volume of reconviction events for male offenders who are serving sentences of less than 12 months (Cave *et al.* 2012). A Social Impact Bond involves incentivising non-government investors to fund support programmes in order to improve community outcomes (Cave *et al.* 2012). Social Finance holds the contract for the SIB with MoJ and acts as the intermediary for several investors for this Bond. They will be paid according to their success at reducing the volume of reconviction events of released prisoners. Social Finance has commissioned St Giles Trust and a range of other community and voluntary sector providers to work intensively with up to 3,000 prisoners who fall within the criteria, both pre- and post-release. This intervention model involves pre- and post-release mentoring, as well as linking prisoners to the appropriate services to help them address their offending behaviour.

Building on this, the 'Breaking the Cycle' Green Paper (MoJ, 2010) outlined a series of rehabilitation pilots to be delivered using the PbR mechanism. The Green Paper acknowledged that large amounts had been spent on funding rehabilitation programmes, without services being held responsible for results. The introduction of PbR models across other pilot schemes therefore presented the opportunity to tackle offending and reoffending in new and innovative ways. HMP Doncaster was one such pilot beginning in October 2011.

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<sup>2</sup> Proven reoffending is defined as any offence committed in a one-year follow-up period and receiving a court conviction, caution or reprimand in the one-year follow-up (MoJ, 2012b)

By increasing the focus of the CJS on outcomes, including reduced reoffending, it is anticipated that delivery will be improved, and the cost to the system of reoffending will decrease.

### 1.3 PbR at HMP Doncaster

HMP Doncaster is a privately operated Category B prison, managed by Serco. In July 2011, Serco's contract for running the prison was due to expire. MoJ commenced a procurement process for the operation of the establishment through the Prison Competition Programme (MoJ, 2011a). Serco's bid for the contract included an 'Alliance' with Catch 22 and Turning Point to deliver a new model of offender management and resettlement. Catch 22 and Turning Point are both community and voluntary sector organisations with considerable experience of working with offenders. They have worked in partnership with Serco since 2006, contributing to bids for the operation of prisons.

The bid was won by Serco and its Alliance partners. Serco was awarded 'preferred bidder' status on the basis of the core contract without PbR, but also submitted a variant proposal including a PbR approach in its delivery of the contract. It was proposed that this would use the service model developed by the Alliance under the original bid, but apply PbR principles to its contribution to reducing reconviction for offenders discharged from the prison.

Following a period of negotiation and PbR contract design between MoJ, the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and the Alliance, the PbR contract was signed in April 2011 and commenced on 1 October 2011. The key aim of the pilot is to test the impact of replacing a multitude of process and output targets and performance monitoring with a single outcome-based target (to reduce the reconviction rate) with a strong financial incentive to achieve this.

It is a four-year pilot that will end in 2015 and will cover four cohorts of offenders. Each cohort will be made up of all sentenced offenders discharged within a 12 month period, with the following exclusions:

- Foreign national prisoners who will be deported or transferred to an Immigration Removal Centre on release from Doncaster.
- Offenders sentenced to time already served on remand.
- Offenders serving sentences for breach of court orders.

Between the start of the pilot on 1 October 2011 and 30 June 2012, there were 1,178 eligible participants at HMP Doncaster (MoJ, 2012b).

The measure used to test the success or otherwise of the pilot is:

**The percentage of offenders reconvicted across the cohort for an offence or offences committed within a period of one year from the date of discharge.**

This measure will be tested against a historic reconviction rate,<sup>3</sup> and a threshold of success has been set which will trigger payment. 2009 was chosen as the baseline year as it was the most recent complete dataset available. If the reconviction rate in each year is not at least five percentage points lower than the baseline of 58.2% for January to December 2009, the MoJ will reclaim 10% of the core contract value from Serco. If the reconviction rate is reduced by five percentage points Serco will retain the full contract value. If reconviction rates are reduced by more than five percentage points against the baseline, Serco will be entitled to additional outcome payments (up to an agreed level and up to a maximum of a ten percentage point reduction). The five percentage point reduction target was agreed after analysis of historic reconviction rates and establishing that this would illustrate a demonstrable difference which could be attributed to the new system and not just natural variation.

## 1.4 Evaluation

MoJ's Analytical Services Directorate commissioned GVA to undertake a longitudinal research and process evaluation of the PbR pilot. The evaluation will deliver a programme of research during the four-year pilot to answer the following key research questions:

- 1 How, and to what extent, did the introduction of a PbR contract change service delivery, and why?
- 2 What were stakeholders' views of the strengths and weaknesses of the contractual model, as implemented?
- 3 What lessons can be learnt to inform the development of further PbR projects or the commissioning of offender management services more generally?
- 4 How, and to what extent, might these approaches have influenced reoffending rates?
- 5 How, and to what extent, did the pilot encourage greater efficiency?
- 6 How, and to what extent, did the pilot encourage innovation?

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<sup>3</sup> The reconviction rate used for the PbR pilot prisons is different from the National Statistics reoffending measure. It measures the proportion of offenders who are convicted at court in the 12 months following release from prison, with a further six months to allow for cases to progress through the courts. It excludes those who receive an out-of-court disposal only (MoJ, 2012b).

The process evaluation is a long-term exercise which will result in a final report covering all of these research objectives, to be published in 2016. This first report focuses on the first three research questions and the progress of the pilot to date.

## 2. Approach

The process evaluation of the PbR pilot at HMP Doncaster aims to identify the experiences, rather than the impact, of implementing and delivering a new approach to reducing reoffending. The approach to the research is primarily based on qualitative information obtained through consultation. Quantitative data, where available, supports the quality and credence of the qualitative research findings. This is a formative evaluation intended to support the future implementation of the PbR pilot at HMP Doncaster and the delivery of PbR approaches elsewhere.

This is the first of three evaluation reports to be published. The second report will be issued in 2014. The final report will be published in 2016, following the completion of the pilot.

### 2.1 Information collection

Information has been collected through consultation with senior stakeholders, delivery staff, offenders and partner agencies. Appendix A presents a list of the consultees. Quantitative information from Serco for the PbR pilot was largely unavailable during this first phase of the evaluation. The reasons for this are discussed in the Results section below.

All consultation with senior stakeholders, delivery staff and offenders was face-to-face one-to-one engagement. Partner agencies were consulted using one-to-one telephone conversations. Consultation with senior stakeholders, delivery staff and partner agencies used a semi-structured interview approach, guided by the use of a topic guide, which can be found in Appendix B. The topic guide includes a suite of questions relevant to the three research questions addressed by this report. The consultations were led by one of the research team, who used the topic guide to structure the conversation. Topic guides were adapted depending on the individual consulted.

The direction of the discussions was informed by the consultees' awareness and understanding of the pilot. Senior stakeholders provided particular insights into the strategic implementation of the pilot, whereas delivery staff provided an understanding of the day-to-day introduction of the pilot, while partner agencies provided a useful external viewpoint. Since they were not directly involved in the changes to service delivery they were able to comment on how partnerships and engagement with offenders had been impacted. The researchers therefore used the topic guide to explore the themes relevant to each individual. Each interview lasted approximately one hour.



Interviews with offenders were more structured and followed a defined questionnaire. This included closed questions to enable easily quantifiable responses. The interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis. The researchers made sure each offender understood the aims of the research and how their responses would be used. They were able to rephrase and repeat questions if a participant did not understand. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix C.

Additional resources, which provide further background information about the different organisations, interventions and processes referred to in the report can be found in Appendix D.

### **Senior stakeholders**

In total, 13 senior stakeholders from MoJ, NOMS, Serco and Catch 22 contributed to the evaluation. They were selected based on their involvement with the PbR pilot. The senior stakeholders were first consulted in November and December 2011 to obtain their views on the initial implementation of the PbR pilot. This consultation was used to inform areas of inquiry for the subsequent research activity between April and July 2012.

### **Delivery staff**

Catch 22 delivery staff provided an important insight into understanding how the introduction of the PbR contract changed service delivery. They have first-hand experience of supporting offenders both before and during the PbR pilot and capturing their views was essential to the evaluation. In total, 18 delivery staff were consulted. The nature of their work patterns made it very difficult to book specific appointments with individuals; so a convenience sampling approach was adopted. This yielded a breadth of staff including case support workers, custody-based case managers, community-based case managers, housing coordinators and volunteer coordinators. Individuals from each type of job role were consulted.

### **Offenders**

This phase of the evaluation included consultation with 51 offenders at HMP Doncaster. Although this was not intended to provide statistically significant results, it was envisaged that the 51 offenders would be representative of the prison's population. However, because the MegaNexus electronic case management system in the prison had not been set up, it was not possible to obtain a current population list from Serco and Catch 22. Once a list was received it was already out of date, and offenders selected for consultation were often no longer in the prison. Therefore, a convenience sampling approach was again adopted. Catch 22 staff asked custody officers from the different wings of the prison to select prisoners who were available to participate in a 30-minute discussion. Prisoners' availability depended on

whether they were attending other appointments and whether they wanted to take part in the research or not. Convenience sampling is not representative and may have introduced some selection bias although aims to provide an insight into a range of views and experiences.

The sampling frame consisted of all prisoners in the cohort who were in the prison during the consultation period in June 2012. Appendix E presents the analysis of responses of the offenders consulted.

### **Partner agencies**

Partner agencies included statutory service providers (for example, the Probation Service, local authorities and Jobcentre Plus) and non-statutory bodies (for example, housing associations, charities, and employment agencies). The partner agencies were working in the prison before the start of the PbR pilot and were identified in collaboration with HMP Doncaster. In total, 29 partners were identified, but only five were included in the study. Of the remaining 24 partners, 18 did not respond to several email or telephone enquiries, four initially agreed to an interview but the appointments were not kept, and two refused to take part stating that they had nothing to add to the research. This could be a finding in itself, and suggests that partner agencies are not currently fully informed about the PbR pilot. However it may also be the case that these agencies are informed about the PbR pilot, and for reasons unknown to the researchers have chosen not to participate in the research.

## **2.2 Data analysis**

The information obtained from the consultation activity was reviewed to establish the emerging messages. The consultation was guided by the topic guide which had been developed to answer the research questions. A team of five researchers reviewed the audio recordings and notes from interviews to identify the key messages emerging from each research question.

Having identified the most prominent messages from across the consultation activity they were cross-referenced between different types of consultee. This enabled consistent and inconsistent messages to be identified. It was recognised that particular groups of stakeholders had more knowledge and awareness of different aspects of the PbR pilot. Delivery staff for example provided a lot of detail on how delivering support to offenders had changed under the new contract compared to the previous contract. In contrast, MoJ and NOMS stakeholders provided insights into the contractual process, while delivery staff had little or no awareness of this aspect of the pilot.

The limitation of qualitative research is that 'opinions' and 'facts' are rarely neutral, and will be influenced by many factors including job role, personal relationships and world view. Therefore, in order to ensure that the findings are robust and valid, responses were understood in the context in which they were given. This includes recognising the difference between personal and professional opinions and identifying organisation/individual bias.

In addition, contradictions and inconsistent messages were further tested. This primarily included speaking again to senior stakeholders to gain further information which would help to explain apparent contradictions and inconsistencies.

The interviews with offenders were more structured and therefore the responses were inputted into survey analysis software. This created quantitative data for the responses to closed questions and enabled patterns of responses by offenders to be quantified.

The first phase of fieldwork for this evaluation took place in November and December 2011 with senior stakeholders. Between April and July 2012 senior stakeholders were re-interviewed, and delivery staff and offenders were consulted for the first time. Therefore, the report presents the findings of research during the early stage of the pilot.

## 3. Results

This chapter provides the results of the evaluation to date, by answering the following two research questions:

- How, why and to what extent did the introduction of a payment by results contract change service delivery?
- What were stakeholders' views of the strengths and weaknesses of the contractual model, as implemented?

### 3.1 How, why and to what extent did the introduction of a payment by results contract change service delivery?

#### **Service delivery before PbR**

Prior to the introduction of the PbR contract, services delivered at HMP Doncaster consisted of the following areas of service provision.

#### ***Reception and induction***

Before the PbR contract was introduced, offenders first arriving at HMP Doncaster were provided with a basic custody screening process which acted as a triage and signposting system to address their immediate needs. This screening was undertaken by custody officers who had limited involvement with that individual offender after their initial reception at the prison. Following the initial reception and induction process, offenders would have access to different services provided in relation to offender management and resettlement during their sentence. Offenders did not have dedicated case managers – this meant they had to repeat 'their story' each time they accessed an intervention. The services varied, but included the areas of provision set out below.

#### ***South Yorkshire Probation Service***

Offenders sentenced to more than 12 months, including those classified as high/very high risk, were subject to statutory supervision, both in custody and after they were released into the community. South Yorkshire Probation Service had a Service Level Agreement (SLA) with Serco to provide offender management for this group of offenders within custody and provided the statutory interventions required as part of their sentence plan. South Yorkshire Probation Service also provided the liaison with external agencies, including the Probation Service in the area of release, producing and implementing the release plan.

### ***Offender Management Unit (OMU)***

The Offender Management Unit was based in the prison and comprised Serco custody officers whose duties included patrols and searches. The OMU also completed Offender Assessment System (OASys) assessments for offenders sentenced to more than 12 months and subject to Probation Service supervision on release as part of their licence conditions (but not those that were high/very high risk). OASys assessment of this group of offenders is a statutory requirement, and this supports their sentence management by identifying the key areas of risk and the interventions required to reduce it.

### ***Community Re-integration Team (CRT)***

This team was employed by Serco to provide access to accommodation and education, training and employment services to all offenders who requested it (including those serving less than 12 months and remand prisoners) with a focus on resettlement for those nearing the end of their sentence.

Accessing these services was optional, and it was the responsibility of the individual offender to request an appointment using 'ATM' machines provided on the residential wings of the prison. Case managers reported that these requests were previously dealt with on a 'first-come first-served basis', which meant that in some cases offenders had been released before they reached the top of the list to access the support available. This was reported as a specific problem for those serving very short sentences, especially sentences of less than four weeks.

### ***'Through the gate' support***

Before the start of the PbR contract, unless an offender was sentenced to more than 12 months and was subject to statutory Probation Service supervision following release under their licence conditions, 'through the gate' support after release was very limited and delivered on an ad hoc basis. The CRT provided resettlement support for those nearing release, however this was reactive rather than proactive and it was the responsibility of the offender to request it.

One area which was, however, particularly strong for those not subject to statutory support 'through the gate' was accommodation. It was reported by delivery staff that the CRT had (and maintains) an excellent relationship with housing providers, as evidenced by Contract Delivery Indicator (CDI) performance and from the consultation with delivery team and senior stakeholders.

## Summary

Service delivery before the introduction of the PbR contract focused on the statutory requirements and delivery of interventions for offenders serving a sentence of more than 12 months. Consultation with Serco identified a gap in service delivery for those sentenced to less than 12 months – these offenders (and those on remand) received no offender management. They experienced a series of reactive procedures and assessments undertaken by different practitioners. Both senior stakeholders and delivery staff reported a lack of continuity, together with duplication of the procedures for offenders. This reduced offenders' motivation and engagement. Offenders also identified that having to repeat 'their story' multiple times to several different people was stressful and discouraged engagement.

## Development of the Alliance Model and contract negotiation

The Alliance Model was first developed in 2006 between Serco, Catch 22 and Turning Point. This Alliance was developed in response to encouragement from the government for collaboration between large private sector providers and voluntary sector organisations.

The key element of the Alliance Model was to introduce a case management approach. Each offender is allocated a case manager while in custody, who will be responsible for the offender's support requirements. Senior Serco stakeholders reported that, in developing the Alliance Model there was an expectation that Serco staff would be transferred to Catch 22 and Turning Point to deliver the model.

The Alliance made successful bids to run HMP Maghull and HMP Belmarsh West HMP Maghull did not proceed, however HMP Belmarsh West opened in March 2012, renamed as HMP Thameside (Wright and Jones, 2012).

The Alliance Model approach was also submitted for the re-tender of the HMP Doncaster delivery contract, which was subsequently successful. However, during the contract negotiation stage the Alliance introduced a PbR element, which was based on a single reconviction target. The nature of the target and its measurement of reconviction rates for the majority of offenders discharged from HMP Doncaster in each cohort<sup>4</sup> was a key consideration during the contract negotiation.

Turning Point did not proceed with the contract at the negotiation stage (although the organisation continues to work with the Alliance at other custodial establishments). It was reported by Serco and Catch 22 that this was because Turning Point focuses on delivering

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<sup>4</sup> For exclusions see section 1.3.

drugs interventions. The existing substance misuse (CARATS) provision in the prison is funded by the NHS and Drugs Intervention Programme (DIP) teams already worked with recently released offenders prior to the PbR pilot starting, so the services provided by Turning Point were not required. It was reported by senior stakeholders from MoJ, NOMS, Serco and Catch 22 that the negotiation stage had been a successful and effective process.

The PbR contract at HMP Doncaster went live in October 2011 and the single reconviction target was introduced. HMP Doncaster was the first prison to begin delivering the Alliance Model; before this it was a conceptual model.

### ***Alliance Model – PbR influence***

It was reported by senior Serco and Catch 22 staff that as a result of the introduction of PbR, the Alliance Model also included community resettlement support for offenders post-release, to be delivered by Catch 22. Senior stakeholders reported that the introduction of an ‘end-to-end’ case management system, including delivery within the community, was intended to reduce inconsistency, improve the engagement of offenders and support reductions in reoffending.

The other direct change to the Alliance Model driven by the introduction of PbR concerned the Programme Delivery Team. This team is a group of eight staff responsible for delivering accredited training in the prison. In the absence of PbR this team would have been transferred to Catch 22 as part of the new management arrangements. However, because community provision was being introduced it was decided that the Programme Delivery Team would remain employed by Serco and not be transferred out. This maintained the focus of the Alliance Model on case management.

The following section presents further detail on how the Alliance Model was implemented and how it evolved at HMP Doncaster between October 2011 and July 2012.

## **The Alliance Model as implemented at HMP Doncaster**

### ***Overview***

According to external stakeholders, including MoJ and NOMS, the Alliance is considered an exemplar of good practice in terms of its governance. This has been driven by the establishment of a Partnership Board. It provides a highly functional and formal structure with very senior representation and commitment from all stakeholder organisations.

This has contributed to the development of an excellent relationship between MoJ and NOMS and Serco and Catch 22. The ability of the Alliance to engage with external structures

and respond to emerging influences, most notably the forthcoming introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners, is also regarded by senior stakeholders as positive for its future work.

The introduction of the Alliance Model has resulted in important changes in the *process* by which offenders access services to support their resettlement. However, the *interventions* available to offenders in custody have not changed. This is a core element of the Alliance Model and would have occurred without the introduction of PbR. It also means that the budget for offender management and resettlement has remained unchanged – resources have simply been reallocated to fit the new model.

Seven of the ten Contract Delivery Indicators for rehabilitation have been suspended for the PbR cohort of prisoners. Mandatory Drug Treatment, Training and Education, and Tornado Training<sup>5</sup> will still apply as they relate to maintaining a safe prison and ensuring public protection. MoJ and NOMS will continue to collect shadow performance data where CDIs have been removed, which will be rated against the Prison Rating System. The monthly out-turn reports from NOMS have not shown a significant variation in the performance indicators pre- or post-PbR (up to July 2012).

A key change between service delivery under the old contract and the new delivery Alliance Model has been the merging of the Offender Management Unit and Community Re-integration Team into one team. All members of this team have been transferred to Catch 22 and are responsible for delivering the Alliance Model.

Unlike the previous service delivery at the prison, the Alliance Model is underpinned by case management. There are 12 custody-based case managers (supported by two senior custody-based case managers) each with a caseload of between 40 and 60 offenders. These are newly created positions under the Alliance Model, which have been introduced to deliver the end-to-end case management. They are responsible for assessing offenders, designing a tailored support package, and facilitating delivery through access to appropriate custody-based interventions. The interventions available to offenders in the prison remain unchanged from service delivery before PbR; therefore the case management approach can be described as a brokerage role.

A key evolution of the Alliance Model, and as a result of the introduction of PbR, has been the introduction of six community-based case managers and two volunteer coordinators who

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<sup>5</sup> Tornado Training – specialist trained prison officers who can respond to disturbances in establishments, such as riots.



are responsible for providing community-based support. Further details on these roles are explored later in this chapter (see the section 'Through-the-gate' support).

Serco and Catch 22 consider the Alliance Model to be an effective mechanism for reducing reoffending because the model allows for each individual to be given tailored support relevant to their needs. The community-based provision is also expected to help reduce reoffending by continuing the tailored support once an offender has been released.

The Alliance Model uses the MegaNexus case management system to support the delivery of the new approach. MegaNexus is also used in the delivery of the HMP Peterborough Social Impact Bond Pilot. Custody-based case managers are responsible for completing a MegaNexus assessment with each offender in their caseload to identify support needs across the seven reoffending pathways: *accommodation, education, training and employment (ETE), health, substance misuse, families, debt, and thinking skills*.

### ***Evolution of the model***

It was originally intended that the Alliance Model would target all offenders in the cohort by allocating a custody-based case manager on their arrival at HMP Doncaster. Targeting of intervention was then proposed to be undertaken according to the offender's Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS) score. Serco's classification based on the OGRS score was:

- high risk (OGRS 0.6–1.0) – mandatory intervention;
- medium risk (OGRS 0.2–0.6) – PbR enhanced provision;
- low risk (OGRS 0.0–0.2) – basic interventions.

The initial plan to focus on medium-risk offenders in the pilot was based on evidence taken from prisoners discharged within the 2008 cohort. A high proportion of these offenders are highly chaotic, but do not receive the mandatory intervention of high-risk offenders. In contrast, the focus for low-risk offenders was on ensuring that custody does not make them more susceptible to reoffending.

The Alliance Model has evolved as it was recognised by Serco and Catch 22 that providing intensive case management in custody for all offenders was not the most efficient or appropriate use of resources. In reality, sentence length, time until release and risk levels have been combined as the key determinant of intervention, as they all impact on the targeting of resources. Catch 22 has therefore developed four 'pathways' for different categories of offender.


The primary focus of the model following this evolution is Pathway Three. This is for offenders serving less than 12 month sentences. This was in response to an identified gap in service delivery. Before the introduction of the PbR contract, offenders sentenced to less than 12 months received no statutory offender management in custody or ‘through the gate’, despite having a high risk of reconviction.<sup>6</sup> The four custody-based pathways are described below, and the logic model underpinning the Alliance approach is provided in Appendix F.

**Pathway One: High-/very high-risk/indeterminate sentence for public protection (IPP)**

Figure 3.1 illustrates Pathway One. This group of offenders is subject to statutory offender management in custody, delivered by South Yorkshire Probation Service through its SLA with Serco. The SLA was due to end in September 2011, as Catch 22 designed the Alliance Model to take over offender management of this group. However, the issue of TUPE was raised by South Yorkshire Probation Service, which had not been planned for in the Alliance Model. Catch 22, as lead provider, could not meet the costs of absorbing new staff. From September 2011, Serco and Catch 22 have been sharing the costs of this service. It was subsequently agreed that South Yorkshire Probation Service would be retained to continue working with offenders in this pathway.

During the period of this evaluation a new SLA was being agreed. This would retain South Yorkshire Probation Service to provide statutory offender management and ensure their activities are aligned to the Alliance Model.

**Figure 3.1: Pathway One**



For this group of offenders, it is intended that an immediate needs triage assessment will be carried out by a Catch 22 support worker. Immediate needs can include housing arrears, and drug and alcohol dependency. An immediate needs triage assessment is more efficient than

<sup>6</sup> For offenders who are sentenced to fewer than 12 months in custody, there is no requirement for supervision by the Probation Service unless they are between 18 and 21 years old.

utilising case manager resources to complete a full MegaNexus assessment when the offenders arrive at HMP Doncaster. It will enable these needs to be addressed, but recognises that intensive work to address reoffending post-release is not the optimal use of resources at this stage. This is due to the length of sentence and high likelihood of the offender being transferred to another establishment where the MegaNexus system is not used.


Transfer is likely for this group of offenders as HMP Doncaster is a local prison serving courts in South Yorkshire and cannot meet all the requirements of an offender’s sentence plan. If the offender was to remain at HMP Doncaster, or is transferred back into the prison to enable a local discharge in the future, a MegaNexus assessment will be undertaken by a support worker approximately eight weeks before they are released. This will identify their resettlement needs, ensuring alignment with work being undertaken by custody and community-based Probation services.

**Pathway Two: Sentenced to over 12 months – not classified high-/very high-risk/IPP**

Figure 3.2 illustrates Pathway Two, which for this group of offenders is similar to that for Pathway One. The key difference is that, as a lower risk group, South Yorkshire Probation Service is not responsible for offender management in custody, although they would still be managed on licence in the community.

Under the Alliance Model as first implemented, a case manager was allocated to these offenders, who would complete the full MegaNexus assessment. Catch 22 identified that this was not an effective use of resources, given that they were also likely to be transferred to other prisons.

**Figure 3.2: Pathway Two**



The Alliance Model has evolved so that an immediate needs triage assessment is completed by a Catch 22 case support worker, rather than a full MegaNexus assessment by a case


manager. This responds to the considerations set out for Pathway One related to the likelihood of transfer and length of sentence reducing the benefits of full case management.

The key difference from Pathway One is that the offender is allocated a custody-based case manager, who completes the OASys assessment and sentence plan. There are four custody-based case managers who have been allocated solely to this work, based on their skills and experience under the pre-PbR model. If the offender is transferred to another establishment, these assessments can then follow that individual. If the offender remains at HMP Doncaster or is transferred back later in their sentence, the actions will be the same as for Pathway One.

### Pathway Three: Sentenced to less than 12 months

Figure 3.3 illustrates Pathway Three. Offenders sentenced to less than 12 months are the main focus of the Alliance Model. This is because this group has been identified as the key cohort where reconviction rates can be reduced, and therefore where the PbR target can be met. The rationale is that they receive no statutory offender management in custody, ‘through the gate’ or community. This group of offenders are also considered to be at the greatest risk of reconviction. The Alliance considers that the length of their sentence and the likelihood of them completing it at HMP Doncaster also increase the effectiveness of intensive multi-disciplinary work to address their needs.

**Figure 3.3: Pathway Three**



Each offender in this group is allocated a custody-based case manager within two weeks of arriving at HMP Doncaster and completing the induction and reception process. The case manager completes the MegaNexus assessment and produces a support plan for the offender. As the single point of contact for the offender, they facilitate access to the required

interventions to deliver the support plan, aiming to reduce the risk of reoffending after release. These interventions and referrals include:

- volunteer mentoring;
- CARAT (substance misuse workers);
- mental health services (both internal and external);
- Make A Change (MAC) course;
- healthcare services;
- Jobcentre Plus;
- Families First (to build parenting skills, etc);
- education department;
- Sports Academy;
- apprenticeships;
- various housing providers;
- training agencies;
- prospective employers;
- education courses.

These are not new interventions and were in place before the start of the PbR pilot.

The case manager is not responsible for delivering these interventions; rather, they facilitate access to them by making the appropriate referrals at the right time during the offender's sentence. This is a fundamental change in service delivery as the frequency, targeting and volume of interventions is more tailored to the needs of the individual. The variation of Serco's contract, so that they are not being measured on a certain number of individuals completing a custody-based intervention (based on annual completion targets) was highlighted as a reason why Catch 22 was able to target services in this way. There is no longer a 'menu of interventions' that an offender must complete, and the case managers are able to decide on an individualised basis what is most appropriate for that offender.

Consultation with senior stakeholders from Serco and Catch 22 identified that this tailored support was proposed for the Alliance Model before the introduction of PbR. However, PbR resulted in the Alliance Model being adapted so that tailored intervention now continues once an offender has been released.

For this group of offenders, Catch 22 has further modified the model and will not focus resources on those serving sentences of less than eight weeks. An immediate needs triage assessment is completed by case support workers, and this provides initial case

management. However, Serco and Catch 22 considered that there is limited time to engage individuals effectively if they have short sentences. In future stages of the evaluation, when additional data are available, the question of whether this has had a negative effect on reconviction rates among this group of offenders could be explored.

#### ***Pathway Four: Remand prisoners***


Before the introduction of the PbR contract, a remand prisoner could request support from the CRT. For example, if a remand prisoner was at risk of losing a tenancy due to being in custody, the CRT could provide support. This was the most common request for support, and was cited by case managers and one of the housing providers consulted.

When the Alliance Model was originally implemented in October 2011, remand prisoners were excluded. This was because they are not yet convicted of an offence and so do not form part of the cohort of individuals against which the reconviction target is measured. They will only form part of the cohort if they are convicted *and* are subsequently released from HMP Doncaster. Remand prisoners are also not covered by the original performance metrics, which HMP Doncaster was previously measured against.

As no support was available, it meant issues associated with a future risk of offending could be intensified until the prisoner was convicted or acquitted. In the case of housing, for example, a lack of support could increase the likelihood of an individual losing their tenancy, and so heightening the risk of offending.

In response to this, the Alliance Model has been adapted to include remand prisoners as an additional pathway. The withdrawal of full MegaNexus assessments for offenders under Pathway Two (12 months plus) has enabled resources to be diverted to provide remand prisoners with an immediate needs triage assessment. Six Alliance orderlies (offenders undertaking work for Catch 22 in the prison while serving their sentences) complete this and facilitate any required referrals with support from the Accommodation Team. Please see Figure 3.4.

**Figure 3.4: Pathway Four**



Future stages of the evaluation could identify the effectiveness of this model for the orderlies providing the support (in terms of their skills development) and for remand prisoners receiving it.

### ***‘Through the gate’ support***

The provision of ‘through the gate’ support to offenders in the cohort, for a period of up to 12 months following their release, was identified by Serco and Catch 22 as an important change to service delivery driven by the introduction of PbR. This is especially true for offenders with sentences of less than 12 months. Before PbR was introduced, the only support available to offenders with sentences of less than 12 months was from DIP teams and supported housing providers (who offered some tenancy support). This support was therefore only applicable to those with drug problems and accommodation requirements.

Serco and Catch 22 considered two options for delivering community-based case management. Using the custody-based case manager was initially considered preferable as they could build on their existing relationship with the offender. However, it was concluded that this would be logistically impractical and would dilute prison-based activity (although this option was not tested). Instead, Catch 22 set up a team of community-based case managers to support offenders ‘through the gate’ for those released in South Yorkshire. The support available is varied and responds to the needs of the offender. Areas of support can include employment and training, housing, health and diversionary activities. The community-based case manager will frequently refer the offender to appropriate organisations, depending on their needs. For those released outside the local area, arms-length support is provided via the community-based case manager. Arms-length support includes help to arrange accommodation if required, and signposting to appropriate local services. It also includes periodic phone calls to find out if any further support is required.

Offenders under Pathways One, Two and Three are allocated a community-based case manager between six and eight weeks before their release from HMP Doncaster. The custody-based case manager provides a full handover to the community-based case manager, who is introduced to the offender at a tripartite meeting held at this point. This timing should ensure that the offender is able to build a relationship with the community-based case manager as their release plan is developed. When the offender is being released under licence, the Probation Service will take the lead, and the community-based case manager will only provide additional support. Consultation with Serco, Catch 22 and the Probation Service identified that this arrangement was generally effective. However, it was reported that there had been a small minority of instances when both the Probation Service and the Alliance had been trying to find accommodation for the same individuals.

Once an offender is released, engagement with the community-based case manager is entirely voluntary. The community-based case manager is the single point of contact and reacts to the offender's emerging needs as they resettle. Catch 22 is also developing a pool of volunteer mentors who are introduced to the offender before their release and can provide lower-level advocacy support, such as accompanying the offender to appointments.

The voluntary nature of engagement with post-release support could be a focus for the future evaluation. This could test the level of engagement and whether this is affected by the handover to a community-based case manager before release. Offenders under Pathways One and Two (sentenced to more than 12 months) are also subject to Probation Service supervision and licence conditions after release. As the community-based case management becomes increasingly embedded, it will be important to identify how Catch 22 and Probation Service objectives and interventions have aligned. Due to a lack of management information, it has not been possible to identify the characteristics of individuals choosing to engage in community-based support. This could be examined when the data become available.

### ***Summary of Delivery***

The Alliance Model has evolved into four different pathways. Before the introduction of the PbR contract, offenders with sentences of less than 12 months received no statutory offender management in custody or 'through the gate', despite having a high risk of reconviction. Figure 3.5 presents a summary of service delivery before and after the commencement of the PbR contract and introduction of the Alliance Model.



**Figure 3.5: Summary of delivery model**

		Over 12 months		Under 12 months	Remand
		High/very high risk/IPP	Others		
Before PbR contract	Statutory and other service provision.		Non-statutory provision. Onus on individual to request services, which were accessed on a first come first served basis.	Non-statutory provision. Onus on individual to request services, which were accessed on a first come first served basis.	
After PbR contract	<p>Statutory provision remains unchanged.</p> <p>Pathway 1 – Probation Service responsible for offender management. Catch 22 undertakes assessment of needs.</p> <p>If being released from HMP Doncaster: allocated community-based case manager between 6-8 weeks before release.</p>	<p>Statutory provision remains unchanged.</p> <p>Pathway 2 – Catch 22 responsible for offender management in custody. Offender is allocated a custody-based case manager.</p> <p>If being released from HMP Doncaster: allocated community-based case manager between 6-8 weeks before release.</p>	<p>Pathway 3 – allocated custody-based case manager and complete full MegaNexus Assessment. Individual Support Plan developed.</p> <p>If being released from HMP Doncaster: allocated community-based case manager between 6-8 weeks before release.</p>	<p>Pathway 4 – assessment of needs, with orderlies facilitating referrals.</p>	

**3.2 What were stakeholders’ views of the strengths and weaknesses of the contractual model, as implemented?**

This research question primarily explores stakeholders’ views of the contractual and service delivery model between Serco and Catch 22.

**Transition and evolution of the model**

A strong partnership between Serco as contractor and MoJ as commissioner was identified by both parties as crucial for the successful transition to, and implementation of, PbR delivery.

The evaluation has found that the transition to the PbR contract was largely effective in terms of Serco and Catch 22 being ready to 'go live' on 1 October 2011 as planned. It was reported by stakeholders that Serco and Catch 22 had a vision for the Alliance Model and an associated project plan, which set out the key steps to support the transition to a new delivery mechanism including PbR.

However, as with the introduction of any new process, problems have emerged and solutions developed throughout. Stakeholders from Serco and Catch 22 stated that the ability of the Alliance Model to adapt and evolve has been a strength of the model – for example, the introduction of the four pathways. Catch 22 identified that the model evolved because it was the first time it had been implemented: it was adapted to respond to the requirements of the cohort. The next stage of the evaluation could identify whether this state of flux continues, or whether the model becomes increasingly static as it is embedded.

### Staffing resources

Stakeholders reported that one of the most important changes in the transition to the Alliance Model has been the transfer of staff through TUPE from Serco to Catch 22. It was reported by Serco and Catch 22 that this was unprecedented in terms of transferring private sector employees to the community and voluntary sector, and represents innovation to ensure successful delivery both in custody and in the community. The transfer of staff from Serco to Catch 22 is a central component of the Alliance Model and would have occurred without the introduction of the PbR contract. However, some staff were transferred into posts (relating to community-based case management) created because of the introduction of the PbR contract.

The TUPE process involved the merger of the Offender Management Unit and Community Reintegration Team in the prison to form a single team, comprised of the same individuals, but under the management of Catch 22. However, skills gaps emerged in the delivery of case management. Staff reported that under the previous model there was a culture of 'silo working' in the OMU. 'Sub-teams' emerged who either undertook custody officer duties or delivered OASys assessments, rather than carrying out both duties. Under the new Alliance Model, case managers do not have any custody officer duties. Therefore, for those staff who in the past had only fulfilled custody officer duties, the learning curve in moving from an enforcement role to a supportive case management role was particularly steep.

"I think for some of the staff down here there has been training gaps. It has took different people different levels of time to come up to speed with a case management approach. I guess it's just another way of working, but compounded

with everything else that was going on it was just a bit of a corner for people to turn really.” (*Catch 22 senior stakeholder*)

“I don’t think they did quite enough homework – nobody came down here and sort of saw what we were already doing, saw where that would fit in with the new model and sort of worked out a transition period ... didn’t have any training, didn’t have a knowledge of the paperwork...” (*Delivery staff*)

Serco and Catch 22 stated that they provided additional training and support to staff to address the skills gaps that emerged, and there was increasing buy-in for the new way of working. Staff reported in many cases that they had found this transition relatively difficult and required more management support and guidance. However, despite this, the level of commitment to the overarching objective to reduce the reconviction rate and for the model to work was demonstrable among all the staff consulted. Catch 22 staff have been informed that if the service is successful in reducing reconviction rates, reward payments will be available via pay increments in line with the existing staff contribution review process.

The creation of generic case management and case support posts was reported as problematic by delivery staff. Due to the expertise associated with particular areas of support and the need to build strong external relationships with partners, case managers found providing advice in certain areas challenging. This was specifically a problem for accommodation and ETE. Therefore, the Alliance Model has been adapted to provide specific accommodation (2) and ETE (1) coordinator posts, staffed by individuals who had previously fulfilled these roles. Similarly, a single team of four custody-based case managers complete OASys assessments for offenders under Pathway Two with the aim of ensuring that Serco meets its targets for keeping this up to date.

“We’ve changed the service slightly to incorporate the ETE and the housing coordinator roles because what was originally put down was the case managers would sort out everything, sort out all the housing and ETE ... Housing, ETE and drugs are all very specialised areas and you were expecting a case manager to be specialist in far too many different areas.” (*Delivery staff*)

There were conflicting views regarding the TUPE process. Serco and Catch 22 management reported that they originally expected this to be problematic in terms of staff resistance, but this did not manifest itself when the process was implemented. In contrast, the staff affected generally reported that the process was poorly communicated, completed in too short a

timescale, and that they were presented with a choice of working for Catch 22 or redundancy. For example:

“We didn’t have much choice ... it was a question of ‘the offender management of the prison is moving into a payment by results model – if there are vacancies in the prison you are welcome to take them up’ ... but there was no guarantee you would get them.” *(Delivery staff)*

Vacancies were also cited as a source of dissatisfaction for staff, who felt that initial staff turnover during and following the TUPE process had placed additional pressures on them.

### **Custody-based case management**

Serco and Catch 22 staff reported that the new model is preferable to the previous situation, which involved informal communication between the CRT and the offender, based on a reactive and request-driven approach. For example:

I didn’t like the drop-in aspect ... it was the other guys that weren’t coming forward who needed the most help ... For me a massive aspect of that service delivery and that change was to eliminate this kind of drop-in aspect. You no longer got help by chance or if you asked for it, but someone would actively work with you to encourage you to face up to the changes you needed to make.”  
*(Serco senior stakeholder)*

Requests were previously responded to in the order they were received, which meant some offenders were released before they reached the top of the list. This meant that particular issues that could trigger reoffending, for example accommodation problems, would not be resolved. It was reported that the introduction of case management allows a more proactive response to offenders in order of priority, supported by fortnightly review meetings to ensure referrals are progressed. This was reported by both delivery staff and offenders.

Custody-based delivery staff considered that the new approach is beneficial to the offenders:

“It’s more of a seamless delivery for the prisoner, and one which can only benefit him as he is getting the help right from day one.” *(Delivery staff)*

Appendix E provides results of consultation undertaken with 51 offenders at HMP Doncaster. There was limited awareness of the introduction of the Alliance Model or the role of Catch 22

among the offenders consulted. Only 35%<sup>7</sup> (18) were aware of the new model and of these, only 14 offenders had received an explanation of the model and what it aims to achieve. However, 70% (36) stated that they had a case manager. Offenders therefore did not understand the model itself but did recognise the role of their case manager and its potential benefits. For example:

“It’s better if you see the same person ... every time. I don’t need to explain to a different person that I don’t need help with this or I do need help with that.”

*(Offender)*

“It’s a lot better – they’ve got your own file ... it’s more personal, you don’t have to give out your name and number all the time to different people ... [who] don’t know your specific needs.” *(Offender)*

Awareness of the model and case management appeared to be associated with the different intervention pathways. Of the 51 offenders consulted, 26 were supported through Pathway Three. The majority of these offenders (19) stated that they had a case manager. Seven stated they did not have a case manager. Despite the small sample size, it is possible that this is related to a number of issues, identified through consultation with Serco and Catch 22. First, the case management system may not be working as well as it could be at this early stage; or second, offenders may not be well engaged in the process or do not understand this case management approach.

It was reported by Alliance staff that awareness of the PbR contract and the focus on reoffending is increasing among other prison departments. They are working closely with the Catch 22 team as they have a better understanding of its responsibility for resettlement. For example, on the Resettlement Wing, it was reported that Serco prison custody officers have increased awareness of the case management role and are keen to support it.

### **Community-based case management**

The introduction of community-based case management for offenders serving less than 12 month sentences was reported by stakeholders as one of the most radical changes to occur. This addition to the Alliance Model was a direct result of the introduction of PbR. It was stated that for the group of offenders under Pathway Three (serving less than 12 months), this offers an opportunity to make a positive impact on reconviction rates due to the lack of statutory support after release.

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<sup>7</sup> These percentages should be used with caution because of the small population size.

The introduction of this approach has, however, presented challenges for Serco and Catch 22, and the community-based case managers themselves. It was widely acknowledged by Serco and Catch 22 that at this stage, it is not working as well as it could be. There has been a delay in fully implementing the volunteer mentoring and the partnership working arrangements with the Probation Service and other community-based providers is taking time to become established. However it was recognised that the Alliance Model remains at an early stage of its delivery.

Exact data on the number of eligible offenders accessing support from community-based case management were unavailable at the time of this evaluation report. However headline management information from Serco has indicated that 58% of offenders discharged between the start of the pilot on 1 October 2011 and 30 June 2012 have engaged with community-based case management.

Although there have been challenges in relation to community-based case management, there have been examples of early successes as reported by community-based case managers. The model is increasingly focusing on supporting community volunteering for ex-offenders to address their needs in relation to employability. For example, one offender has now secured full-time employment after providing voluntary maintenance support on a weekly basis with a local employer.

Serco and Catch 22 consider that a focus on community volunteering as a route into employment is important to reduce the likelihood of reoffending. This is because volunteering increases an individual's skills and experiences, and provides a weekly structure and routine. Offenders become more likely to be able to obtain employment and therefore earn money. Chaotic lifestyles and a lack of money are factors in offending behaviour, so it is hoped that addressing these risk factors through volunteering will break the cycle of reoffending.

Serco and Catch 22 estimate that, of the cohort to date, approximately 80% of offenders were discharged to the four local authorities in South Yorkshire. Non-local releases are more challenging in relation to community-based case management. Originally, non-local discharges were the responsibility of the custody-based case managers. However, custody-based case managers reported that the absence of relationships with agencies in the discharge area presented a barrier to providing effective support and that this would absorb considerable time and resource. As housing was such an important issue in this regard, this responsibility has now been transferred to the newly created accommodation and ETE coordinators, who have greater expertise in this area.

Catch 22 is considering how the process for supporting offenders discharged out-of-area can be further developed. For example, this includes creating a network of volunteers and/or partner agencies nationally to deliver support to this group. It is also examining opportunities to develop reciprocal arrangements with other PbR pilots being implemented elsewhere. The success of this approach could be an important area for further research during later stages of the evaluation.

In the case of offenders under Pathways One and Two who are subject to Probation Service supervision, it is important that community-based case management does not duplicate the work of the Probation Service in the community. It was reported by Catch 22 that this is yet to be fully resolved, which has led to a number of problems. For example, in one case the Probation Service secured permanent housing for an offender. However, Catch 22 was working with the same offender and organised temporary accommodation. This was accepted by the offender, who therefore lost the opportunity of the permanent accommodation. A senior member of staff from Catch 22 stated that processes had since improved, reducing the likelihood of similar problems arising.

### **Volunteer mentoring**

Volunteer mentoring for offenders in the community is an important part of the Alliance Model, but is currently underdeveloped. Custody-based case managers reported that this is primarily due to a lack of resources, as the volunteer manager resigned and the volunteer coordinator role is currently being carried out by a community-based case manager on an interim basis. These posts are being advertised to resolve this problem. However, given the intensive nature of volunteer management, this has limited the extent to which volunteering is fully operational to date.

Catch 22 is aiming to recruit 60 volunteers (ten working with each of the six community-based case workers). Currently, approximately 25 volunteers are supporting delivery – they are predominantly individuals with an interest in criminology or aiming to pursue a career in the CJS and requiring work experience. Volunteer mentors participate in a two day training course which addresses topics including lone working, child protection, security reporting, vulnerable adults, mental health, equality and diversity and the expectation of being a volunteer mentor.

Catch 22 is keen to develop the pool of volunteers so they are more diverse, and work is being undertaken with the local community and voluntary sector to support this. However, Catch 22 reported that while recruitment is positive, the ability to use these volunteers effectively is constrained by the absence of a full-time coordinator.

It is expected that when volunteer mentoring is fully operational, volunteers will provide low-level mentoring and advocacy. For example, this will include ensuring offenders attend meetings and assessments by providing reminders and accompanying them. However, not all delivery staff considered that volunteer mentoring would be successful:

“When they are up for release we will actually say – because it’s a voluntary thing for them, its not something that they have to do – we will say ‘Do you want meeting at the gate?’ ... I will say it’s actually only a handful of lads that will let you meet them at the gate. Because they have been locked up in here, all they want to do is go and see their mates, go buy some beer ...” (*Delivery staff*)

The success of volunteer mentoring will be further researched during future phases of the evaluation when it is fully operational.

### Partnership working

The early stages of the implementation of the new model have resulted in new partnerships being forged and the development of different ways of working with external organisations. The involvement of Catch 22 was central to this due to their established networks with other organisations working in the CJS in South Yorkshire. For example, Catch 22 reported that over 60 organisations were invited to the prison for a Stakeholder Open Day to demonstrate the services they can provide and how these could link to the pilot.

Impact Teams are a network of co-located practitioners from the police, Probation Service, local authorities and other statutory agencies enabling the delivery of the Integrated Offender Management model. The Community Case Management Team has hot-desk facilities with three of the four Impact Teams in South Yorkshire. The close working relationships developed have been acknowledged as good practice by external stakeholders, including NOMS.

The co-location with other practitioners has not worked in all cases, and partnerships must be supported by excellent communication and clarity of shared objectives. In one area, until recently the community-based case manager was unable to work with the Probation Service effectively as it is co-located with the DIP team. The DIP also delivers a case management model for offenders released from HMP Doncaster. Catch 22 reported that DIP initially did not allow Catch 22 to use its premises to engage with them. There were managerial discussions which resolved this situation and prevented any negative effect on delivery or partnership working. This was not a significant issue and Catch 22 identified it as a teething problem of the new approach.



There is variable understanding of the new Alliance Model among the partnerships that existed before the model was implemented. The model has not affected how these providers engage with offenders or with the prison. This is particularly the case with housing providers such as local authorities and registered social landlords (RSLs), as cited by delivery staff. However, delivery staff did report that the role of community-based case managers appears to be initially positive in terms of helping offenders attend appointments, make rental payments and sustain their tenancies. A generic housing referral form that is accepted by all providers in South Yorkshire is also a new and beneficial approach. Future stages of the evaluation could explore how this area of work progresses as the new model becomes increasingly embedded.

The relationship between the Alliance and the Probation Service was reported to be positive, despite the issues concerning the intended termination of the contract between Serco and the Probation Service. However, the case management of offenders has not always been fully coordinated. This relationship will be further examined in future evaluations.

Some senior Serco and Catch 22 stakeholders recognised that other public sector CJS providers who receive statutory grant funding may perceive Serco as getting paid for successes and outcomes that may be equally attributable to their work. This will be a key area for future evaluation as relationships with these partners will be important to the success of the pilot.

### Targets and measurement

The collection and management of data has been a more complex process than originally anticipated by Serco and Catch 22. The MegaNexus case management system was chosen to collect management information, but there was a delay in implementing the system and agreeing the appropriate accreditation. No interim data control measures were implemented which meant that all data management was paper-based.

“It’s a lot of paperwork. In fact we’re running out of filing space I think, and it’s a case of unfortunately no matter how hard you try to file them, things go missing, paperwork goes missing.” *(Delivery staff)*

“Only difficulty is IT ... it has been a real source of frustration ... I think it has been compounded by Doncaster going for IL3 accreditation, which is a higher degree of data control and IT security.” *(Catch 22 senior stakeholder)*

The issues in terms of implementing the system have only recently been resolved (nine months after the pilot commenced) and the lack of a data system from the outset has resulted in a backlog of paper-based records for each offender.

Delivery staff reported that the lack of management information impacted on the ability of the Alliance to efficiently case manage each offender. The paper-based system takes longer than the electronic system and it means other staff cannot view an offender's file so easily. In addition, a lack of strategic data has limited the Alliance's ability to understand whether resources are being allocated effectively. For example, while there have been qualitative perceptions on issues such as the most common offender needs, patterns of engagement and interventions accessed, these have not been validated by quantitative data.

In relation to the binary measure of reconviction, NOMS stated that this was by far the simplest measure available. The rationale for using it was linked to the complex nature of other measures considered and methodologies to capture the required data. However, it was also recognised that it is a relatively stark measure. For example, Catch 22 may not be able to stop an individual reoffending completely, but could reduce the severity of this reoffending, which will not be captured. When additional data become available these changes could be explored.

### **'Parking', 'cherry-picking' and transfers**

NOMS has identified that it expects no offenders to be 'parked' (or marginalised within the pilot) because they all count towards the reconviction target if they are to be released from HMP Doncaster within a specific cohort.

Serco and Catch 22 staff stated that no offenders are parked and in-custody interventions are available to all offenders. This includes offenders who have reoffended within a cohort year and have therefore already been counted as a reconviction. However the Alliance recognised that, due to the way the delivery model has evolved, offenders serving less than 12 month sentences receive more intensive support. Resources are focussed on offenders serving less than twelve months (Pathway Three) or those with a short time remaining until discharge (Pathways One and Two) to try and address the factors which may influence an offender's likelihood of reoffending.

'Cherry-picking' is the extent to which Serco and Catch 22 select certain offenders for support rather than others. Serco and Catch 22 stated that they did not prefer particular offenders over others. Case managers did however identify that the case management approach is reliant on offenders being responsive.

“The people that don’t want to engage can’t understand the change in trend, and why would we be wanting to support them when they’re on no licence.”

*(Catch 22 senior stakeholder)*

Before the start of the new PbR contract the onus to access support was on the offender, as identified by the following:

“If someone was here for quite a few months they would be left a long length of time before they actually got to see anybody, unless they put an application on the ATM system” *(Delivery staff)*

However, the Alliance Model means that all offenders receive case management support, even if they would not have requested any support under the previous model. Case managers reported that some offenders were more willing to access support and be involved in the process than others. The service is being promoted via posters, leaflets and verbally during the offender’s induction process when they arrive at the prison to raise awareness of its purpose and what it is seeking to achieve. Senior Catch 22 staff also reported that there is a Compact Agreement between the offender and Catch 22, which is agreed at the outset of intervention, and if this is not met the individual is moved to ‘basic’ provision.

The transfer of offenders to and from HMP Doncaster could theoretically be a mechanism to enable ‘gaming’ of the system by removing those who are disengaged or at higher risk of reoffending. Alternatively, this could also involve the opposite – retaining offenders within the establishment who may have otherwise been transferred out before release. HMP Doncaster is a local prison and transfers offenders every day, as it has to serve the courts and create capacity if it is full. National population management policy has also changed so that prisoners cannot simply be transferred out for disruptive behaviour, which further reduces the chances of ‘gaming’ the system via transfers.

It was reported by Catch 22 delivery staff that patterns of transfer had recently changed but this was due to external factors rather than the PbR contract. The ‘holds’ process has changed to ensure that prisoners with sentences of over 12 months are not unduly kept at HMP Doncaster for their entire sentence for trivial reasons (for example the job they do in the prison). Senior Serco and Catch 22 staff stated that as a local prison, HMP Doncaster does not provide the full range of courses to enable this group to complete their sentence plan and achieve decategorisation to a lower security establishment.

Transfer is a complex issue and the lack of data available at this stage of evaluation means that it cannot be fully assessed. NOMS is, however, confident that it would be able to identify any unusual patterns that emerged and has received no complaints with regard to inflows occurring at other establishments.

The issues of 'parking' and 'cherry-picking' are a risk of any PbR programme, and transfer is a further potential problem specific to a pilot being delivered in a prison. The lack of data available currently reduces the extent to which this can be assessed, but robust monitoring throughout the pilot should be undertaken to address this. To help mitigate this issue in future PbR initiatives, MoJ have developed a methodology that allows them to control for any changes in the case-mix of offenders in PbR cohorts compared to the case-mix of offenders in the baseline year. This means that if a PbR cohort is less likely to reoffend than the baseline cohort of offenders (based on the average OGRS scores of the cohorts), then the baseline will be adjusted retrospectively to reflect that fact.

### **Risks and incentives**

The key area of concern for some stakeholders early in the evaluation was that the financial risk associated with the pilot would be passed from Serco (as the private sector lead contractor) to its subcontractors. It was also stated that there was a risk this could be passed onto individual staff in terms of performance penalties. Both Serco and Catch 22 have reported that the 10% revenue risk has not been passed to Catch 22 and its costs are covered. However, a proportion of the reward-related payment will be paid to Catch 22 if the reconviction target is achieved. This provides an incentive to perform but no associated financial risk to the organisation, which could have precluded its specialist input. As one NOMS stakeholder described it, the partnership between Serco, Catch 22 and the other external partners is *"a genuine Alliance, not a supply chain"*.

Stakeholders have identified several strengths and weaknesses of the implementation of the Alliance Model. The implications from this, and the lessons that can be learnt, are examined in the following section.

## 4. Implications

This chapter provides early findings on the following research question and covers the main implications of the research at this stage:

**What lessons can be learnt to inform the development of further payment by results projects or the commissioning of offender management services more generally?**

### Implementation and transition

The incentive of PbR appears to be potentially attractive to private sector providers as it was introduced by Serco in the negotiation process for the operation of the prison. The Alliance Model had been designed before PbR was introduced. However, prior to the start of the PbR pilot in October 2011 the Alliance Model was untested. The introduction of PbR also resulted in the inclusion of community-based case management, which was not originally part of the Alliance Model and demonstrated radical change.

It is clear that PbR increased the commitment by the Alliance to making the model work. Consultation with the Alliance has indicated that this was due to a combination of the financial and reputational rewards of success and the subsequent financial and reputational risks of failure.

To be successful, the implementation of a PbR contract, its design and subsequent implementation requires a genuine commitment to partnership working between the commissioner and contractor. Serco, Catch 22, NOMS and MoJ all reported an excellent working relationship and its specific benefits during the design of the contractual model and reconviction measure.

The partnership between Serco, as the private sector lead contractor, and Catch 22, as a specialist community and voluntary sector provider, is innovative. It also responds to the Green Paper by diversifying the types of provider involved in CJS delivery (MoJ, 2010).

The contractual arrangement between Serco and Catch 22 has not resulted in the transfer of risk to the smaller provider. This is similar to the HMP Peterborough model (MoJ, 2011b). In contrast, if the reconviction targets are met, Catch 22 will receive a proportion of the reward payment. This is likely to be fundamental to the success of this partnership arrangement, and maintained the fidelity of the model when PbR was introduced at the contract negotiation stage.

While the contract negotiation process was a success, not all new systems and processes were in place at the start of the contract. In particular the data management system and contractual arrangements with South Yorkshire Probation Service were not resolved. Serco identified that a six-month lead-in period between the implementation of the new delivery model under the PbR contract and starting to measure the reconviction rate would have enabled these issues to be identified and resolved. For future PbR pilots a gradual implementation of the PbR contract could be considered to enable any emerging issues to be resolved before the outcome measure is introduced.

## Delivery model

The Alliance Model has been sufficiently flexible to respond to changing or emerging needs of the target group. The development and ongoing evolution of the delivery pathways for different groups of offenders is likely to be important to the success of the pilot and to ensuring that resources are allocated in the most appropriate way.

The introduction of case management has resulted in changes to the *process* by which offenders in custody access services, but the *interventions* have not changed. Case management has been introduced as a brokerage role and allows a more proactive response to the needs of offenders in order of priority. This encourages a focus on outcomes and what works – an approach advocated by the Green Paper (MoJ, 2010) – rather than a cycle of non-tailored intervention.

Offenders with sentences of less than 12 months are the main focus of the model. This is because of a lack of statutory support for this group and no ‘through the gate’ support after they are discharged. Addressing this gap in service delivery is considered to have the biggest impact in meeting the target of the PbR contract. This demonstrates an approach that is grounded in evidence and identified gaps in service delivery that can result in a revolving door of reoffending.

The availability of ‘through the gate’ support for offenders discharged from HMP Doncaster including those with sentences of less than 12 months, is the most radical change to service delivery. Community-based case management, while voluntary, offers the potential to deliver a positive effect on reoffending.

The focus on offenders with sentences of less than 12 months means that there is a certain degree of selection between offenders, despite all eligible offenders being included in the cohort. However, the model has developed in order to allocate resources on the cohort where the greatest impact on the reoffending rate is expected.

Following the introduction of the new case management approach, it was identified by the Alliance that remand prisoners should also be included in service delivery. It was recognised that an absence of support could mean that issues associated with a future risk of offending are intensified until a conviction or acquittal. The delivery model was adapted to incorporate this group. Future PbR commissioners should be aware of the potential for changes to occur and consider the need for the flexibility to adapt accordingly.

## **Resources**

Under PbR, the budget for offender management at HMP Doncaster has not changed and resources have simply been reallocated to fit the new model. This demonstrates the potential to deliver better outcomes within the same or less resources, as advocated by the Green Paper (MoJ, 2010).

In the case of HMP Doncaster, the transfer of staff from Serco to Catch 22 was highly innovative but also resulted in some dissatisfaction among staff – this may have also been caused by the changes in job roles that occurred. To maximise a smooth transition, early and ongoing communication with all staff should be considered for future models.

The potential TUPE issue between Catch 22 and South Yorkshire Probation Service was not resolved until around nine months into the delivery of the contract, when a new SLA was agreed. This aligned the statutory offender management activities of South Yorkshire Probation Service with the Alliance Model. However, such delivery arrangements should be resolved prior to the start of any PbR contract to avoid the distraction that such issues present.

## **Partnerships**

The implementation of the PbR contract has led to the development of new partnerships and working arrangements through stakeholder events. Raising awareness among existing partner agencies operating in community settings should not be overlooked to maximise buy-in and understanding of the model.

Delivering PbR needs excellent communication with partners and mutual clarity of shared objectives. This includes ensuring that the work of external agencies is not duplicated or disturbed by the introduction of a new delivery model such as community-based case management. This also has an implication for measuring success - there is a need to ensure that any change in reoffending is appropriately attributed to the providers involved.

Stakeholders from MoJ, NOMS and the Alliance identified strong governance structures with highly committed members as important to the success of the HMP Doncaster pilot.

### **Data and evidence**

The collection of management information and the implementation of the MegaNexus case management system was a key weakness of the HMP Doncaster pilot during the fieldwork period. These issues were not resolved before contract delivery began. This has reduced the availability of evidence and has created a backlog of paper-based information. The value of such evidence for a PbR approach should not be underestimated and it may be necessary for these structures to be in place from the outset of future models.

The extent to which 'parking' and 'cherry-picking' of offenders has or has not occurred in the HMP Doncaster pilot cannot be assessed in the absence of this data. However, resources have been allocated according to the objectives of the intervention and the pathways developed, ensuring that duplication with statutory services is minimised.

In the case of PbR delivered in prisons, the issues associated with the transfer of prisoners make the risk of 'gaming' the system more acute and complex to identify. Those planning future PbR models may wish to consider getting relevant data in place to enable this to be readily identified from the outset.

The binary measure of reconviction is easier to calculate and interpret compared to determining severity and/or frequency of reoffending. Agreeing the binary measure required discussions and agreement with Serco who favoured a more nuanced measure, which included the severity and frequency of reoffending. This is a complex area for PbR implementation and needs to be considered for each new PbR scheme.



## 5. Further research

This first report has answered three research questions of the process evaluation of the HMP Doncaster PbR pilot. Subsequent reports will revisit these questions and address the remaining research questions – specifically:

- 1 How, and to what extent, might these approaches have influenced reoffending rates?
- 2 How, and to what extent, did the pilot encourage greater efficiency?
- 3 How, and to what extent, did the pilot encourage innovation?

The work undertaken for this first report has also identified opportunities for further research. These are additional areas of research or current themes that have been constrained at this stage by: (a) the lack of availability of data or (b) the fact that the pilot is at an early stage of development. These areas for research will be examined during the future phases of the evaluation. The additional areas of research fall into two categories; evolution of the model, and case management data.

### 5.1 Evolution of the model

The following research questions can be considered in relation to the model of intervention developed by the Alliance.

- To what extent has the service model continued to evolve, and what are the advantages and disadvantages of a flexible, rather than static, model?
- How are the different pathways impacting on reconviction rates?
- How effective is the support provided to remand prisoners by Alliance orderlies, and is this an appropriate service model?
- For offenders discharged on licence, how have Catch 22 community case management objectives and activities been aligned with the Probation Service?
- How are other departments within HMP Doncaster engaging with the Alliance Model, and what are the benefits of any behavioural changes?
- To what extent has the Alliance been able to forge partnerships and working arrangements with other PbR pilots, and has this been a success?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of the community-based case management for offenders, volunteer mentors and other stakeholders?
- How aware are partner agencies of the PbR pilot, and has this increased over time? What is the effect on their day-to-day work?
- Do partners consider that the Alliance is being rewarded for success that can be attributed to their work, and what is the impact of this?

## 5.2 Case management data

The lack of case management data available at this stage of the evaluation has been a constraint so the following research questions must be considered during future stages of the evaluation. These could be considered from a process evaluation perspective but may also support future measurements of impact.

- In relation to the binary measure, what has been the effect of the pilot in terms of reducing the severity and/or frequency of offending as opposed to complete desistance?
- What is the profile of offenders supported under each pathway within the model and what type of intervention have they received?
- Is there evidence of 'cherry-picking' or 'parking' of individuals as a result of the pilot, and what were the reasons for this?
- Are there any patterns associated with 'gaming' the system?
- What has been the take-up of community-based case management and volunteer mentoring, and how has this changed over time?

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## Glossary

CARATS – Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice and Throughcare Services

CDI – contract delivery indicators

CJS – criminal justice system

CRT – Community Reintegration Team

DIP – Drugs Intervention Programme

ETE – education, training and employment

IPP – indeterminate sentence for public protection

MAC – Make A Change

MAPPA – Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements

MoJ – Ministry of Justice

NHS – National Health Service

NOMS – National Offender Management Service

OASys – Offender Assessment System

OGRS – Offender Group Reconviction Scale

OMU – Offender Management Unit

PbR – payment by results

RSL – registered social landlord

SLA – Service Level Agreement

TUPE – Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment)

# Appendix A

## List of consultees

### Senior stakeholders

- Senior Civil Servant, representative from Analytical Services, Ministry of Justice.
- Senior Civil Servant, representative from Justice Policy Group, Ministry of Justice.
- Ministry of Justice PbR Policy Team, Ministry of Justice
- Prison Controller, National Offender Management Service
- Head of Business Development, National Offender Management Service
- Business Development Manager, National Offender Management Service
- Transition Manager, National Offender Management Service
- PbR Team, National Offender Management Service
- Prison Director, Serco Home Affairs
- Assistant Director, Reducing Reoffending, Serco Home Affairs
- Assistant Director, Serco Home Affairs
- Director of Offender Management and Custody, Catch 22
- Senior Manager, Alliance Offender Management Team, Catch 22

### Delivery staff

- Senior custody-based case manager
- Senior community-based case manager
- Six custody-based case managers
- Two community-based case managers
- Community-based case manager/volunteer coordinator
- Temporary volunteer coordinator
- Two housing coordinators
- Four case support workers

### Partner agencies

- Senior Probation Officer, Probation Service Doncaster Prison
- Thinking Skills Programme Resettlement Manager, Probation Service Doncaster Prison
- Team Manager, South Yorkshire Probation Trust
- Barnsley Area Coordinator, South Yorkshire Housing Association
- Housing Coordinator, Sheffield Council

## Appendix B

### Stakeholder topic guide

#### HMP Doncaster payment by results pilot – process evaluation interviews with professionals – topic guide

The Offender Management and Sentencing Analytical Services Department at the Ministry of Justice has commissioned a longitudinal research and process evaluation of the HMP Doncaster payment by results (PbR) pilot.

The process evaluation is being undertaken by independent consultants, GVA. It is a long-term exercise which will result in a final report covering all of the above research objectives to be published in early 2016. This consultation will inform the production of the first main report, which is focused on answering the following key research questions:

- How, and to what extent, did the introduction of a PbR contract change service delivery, and why?
- What were stakeholders' views of the strengths and weaknesses of the contractual model, as implemented?
- What lessons can be learnt to inform the development of further PbR projects or the commissioning of offender management services more generally?

This discussion is based on your experience and understanding of the PbR pilot to date. Your responses can either be completely confidential or attributable to you and/or your organisation depending on your preference. *(Refer to consent form and ask them to complete.)*

#### ***Please complete the separate consent form***

#### **Ask if the meeting can be recorded**

Are you happy for the discussion to be recorded? This will be used to transcribe the responses you provide and will assist the process of analysing findings. *[If no, record responses by hand.]*

*Please note that stakeholders will vary significantly in terms of their specific role and their level of involvement in the project. As a result, interviews will be specifically tailored to each individual stakeholder – this document therefore represents only an outline topic guide.*

## Your role

- Please outline the organisation you work for and your specific role.
- To what extent have you been involved in the HMP Doncaster PbR pilot to date (and the concept of PbR more widely) and how do you anticipate being involved in the future?

## The payment by results project – rationale, aims and design

- What is your overall understanding of the HMP Doncaster PbR pilot, including the nature of the contractual model?
- What is the rationale behind it?
- What are its key aims and objectives?

## Implementation to date

### Service delivery

- What changes in service delivery have you observed?
- Which of these changes do you think would have happened anyway (if any)?
- How have interventions been delivered to offenders? How have these changed? (*See list below for services available to offenders*)
- Do you perceive any of these changes to be innovative? How?
- What has been done differently (from previously) after the introduction of the pilot? (*Probe to unpick exactly what has changed and the drivers for this*)
- To what extent do you think changes to delivery have been driven by the financial incentive/single reoffending target? (*Probe how and why changes have occurred*)
- How have resources been allocated?
- If extra resources have been allocated, where did this money come from?
- How adaptable has the model been so far? What has changed and why? How easy has this been?
- To what extent are services delivered ‘through the gate’? (Everyone? Those with less than 12 month sentences?)
- What is happening for offenders released outside of the local area? (*Explore directory of local services. How successful is this? How is its success being measured?*)



## Management, staffing and partnership working

- What changes in management, staffing and partnership working have you observed after the introduction of the pilot?
- How has Serco worked with other providers? What benefits have been generated from these partnerships? How are they enabling the overall success of the pilot?
- How is Serco working with the Probation Service in relation to offenders who would be released on licence?
- How has Serco monitored and managed the performance of subcontractors?
- How aware have front-line staff been of a shift to PbR? What is their understanding and how has it affected them? *(Further test how staff are being encouraged to think differently about their role in reducing reoffending)*
- How have other service providers been affected? E.g. local probation, police and court services. How has the supply or demand for their services changed?
- *For public sector CJS providers: Do they perceive that others (i.e. Serco) get paid for success that may be equally attributable to their work?*
- How are subcontractors paid? Are they paid up front or incentivised? What have been the consequences of this?
- It is understood that the 10% revenue risk has not been passed on to Catch 22 but they are eligible for a proportion of the reward payment. Is this still the case? How has this influenced individual staff? What has been the result of this for both Serco and Catch 22? *(Further explore impacts of minimal risk transfer – good or bad?)*

## Spending

- Did spending on resettlement/rehabilitative services change after the PbR contract was introduced? Why and how did this occur?
- How is the uncertainty of outcome payments being managed in the budgeting and accounting process?
- How has spending changed since the implementation of the pilot? *(Probe service delivery costs – staff resources, training, and development. Also materials including equipment, accommodation)*
- Is comparative cost data under policy-off conditions available?
- What are the reasons for variations/changes to spending?
- *For stakeholders from partner organisations: How have your costs changed as a result of the pilot? Reasons for this?*

## Meeting targets

- What are your views of the chosen outcome/success measure?
- How is progress being tracked?
- How is the progress and performance of subcontractors being tracked?
- How did the choice of outcome measure influence Serco's (and other subcontractors') approach?
- Would resources have been targeted differently with a different outcome measure or baseline?
- How many offenders does a case manager typically have? How many of these are active? What constitutes an active client?
- What is your perception of offenders being 'parked'?
- Why are some offenders 'parked'? What happens to those offenders who are 'parked'? How does this impact on individual offenders?
- How have offenders been selected for interventions and support? Have some offenders received more support at the expense of others? (*Explore whether offenders are being cherry-picked*)
- What has been the approach to transferring prisoners prior to discharge? Have harder-to-help offenders been transferred out? What is the pattern for transfer in?

## Strengths and weaknesses

- What have been the primary strengths of the PbR pilot to date? Consider impact on offenders, changes to delivery, staff engagement, partnership working.
- What are the main benefits for your organisation of the pilot? To what extent have these been experienced so far?
- What are the main risks for your organisation of the pilot? To what extent have these been experienced so far?
- Were there any challenges and how were these overcome?
- What is working well or not so well? How has delivery adapted to respond to this?
- Were any perverse incentives or unintended consequences created? How/why and what was the impact of these?
- At this stage would you enter into a similar contract again? If not, why not? (*Explore from both Serco's and subcontractors' point of view*)

## **Lessons learnt to date**

- Are there any key lessons from the initial negotiation, contracting and implementation stages?
  - specific examples of good practice;
  - opportunities for improvement.
- (Further explore if innovation is still evident in the process of delivery rather than in the interventions themselves.)
- Do you have any other comments?

# Appendix C

## Offender questionnaire

### HMP Doncaster payment by results pilot – process evaluation consultations with offenders

Doncaster Prison is adopting a new approach to supporting offenders. Its aim is to provide more personalised and tailored support to each individual and therefore reduce the reoffending rate for all offenders following their release.

This approach is called payment by results and is being piloted in Doncaster Prison for the next four years. In order to understand how successful it is, the Ministry of Justice has appointed GVA to evaluate the pilot.

The purpose of this discussion is to listen to your opinion of the pilot and the support you have received so far. There are no right or wrong answers, just your opinions.

All the information you provide will be treated in the strictest confidence and your individual answers will not be shared with the MoJ or prison staff. However your responses will be used to inform the overall analysis and will feed into the report. All responses will be anonymous and you will not be identifiable. The responses you provide will not affect your sentence in any way.

***Please complete the separate consent form***

**Ask if the meeting can be recorded**

*To complete from Population Dataset*

Beneficiary:	Length of sentence:
Age:	Date of release:
Ethnicity:	OGRS:
	Consultant and date:

Are you happy for the discussion to be recorded? This will be used to transcribe the responses you provide and will assist the process of analysing findings. All responses will be confidential and you will not be personally identified on the tape. *[If no, record responses by hand.]*

**Background**

1. Is this the first time you have been in prison?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

If no,

2. How many times have you been in prison before?

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
Other – state	

3. What prison(s) were you in?

.....

4. When were you last in prison? (*The start and end date of sentence*)

.....

**The introduction of the pilot**

5. Were you aware that Doncaster Prison has introduced a new approach to supporting offenders?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

6. If yes, what is your understanding of this approach?

.....

7. Has this pilot been explained to you in terms of what it is trying to achieve? *(If no, explain the purpose of the pilot)*

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

8. If yes, what do you think the pilot is trying to achieve?

.....

9. What are your current support needs that will help you to address your offending behaviour? *(e.g. housing, substance misuse, employment, skills and education etc)*

.....

### Service delivery

### Case manager

10. When did your case manager first introduce themselves to you? *(e.g. first night reception, after a week)*

.....

11. Did the case manager explain their role, how they can help you and the interventions that will be available at HMP Doncaster?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

12. Was this useful? Why/why not?

.....

13. What were your expectations of the case manager? *(e.g. what did you think they would be able to help you with?)*

.....

14. Have your expectations been met?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

15. Why/why not?

.....

16. How often do you meet with your case manager?

Daily	
2-3 times a week	
Once a week	
Every 2 weeks	
Monthly	
Less often – state	

17. How many times have you met with your case manager?

.....

18. Do you think you have had sufficient contact with your case manager?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

19. Why/why not?

.....

20. What is your experience of the first night reception?

Very good	
Good	
OK	
Bad	
Very bad	

21. Why is this?

.....

22. For previous offenders: How does this compare to your experience of other first night receptions?

Significantly better	
Better	
The same	
Worse	
Significantly worse	

23. Why is this?

.....

**Interventions/support**

24. How have you been informed about the different interventions/support available? How did you access them?

.....

25. What interventions/support have you been offered?

.....

26. What interventions/support have you participated in? (Use list of interventions provided by Serco for reference)

27. For each intervention: What did you hope to achieve/how did you expect it to help you? (e.g. tackle addiction, find employment, find housing, learn new skills)

28. For each, on a scale of 1-5 how helpful were they? (1 = not very helpful and 5 = very helpful)

Intervention	Offered	Participated	Expectation	Score (1–5)



29. Why have these interventions (*refer to those stated*) been the most helpful? (*Refer to expectations and how they were met*)

.....

30. Why have these interventions (*refer to those stated*) been less helpful? (*Refer to expectations and how/why they were not met*)

.....

31. How could interventions be improved?

.....

32. Is there any additional support you need?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

33. What is this?

.....

**Previous experiences (for previous offenders)**

34. What interventions/support have you previously accessed when in custody?

35. How did you rate them? (1 = not very helpful and 5 = very helpful)

Intervention	Participated	Score (1–5)

36. Why is this?

.....

37. How do the interventions/support you received at HMP Doncaster compare to this provision?

Provision at HMP Doncaster is ...

Significantly better	
Better	
No different	
Worse	
Significantly worse	

38. Why is this?

.....

39. Has having a single case manager been preferable to having assessments and interviews undertaken by multiple different people or not?

Yes	
No	
Don't know	

40. For offenders previously at HMP Doncaster: How does support/interventions compare with when you were previously at HMP Doncaster?

Significantly better	
Better	
No different	
Worse	
Significantly worse	

41. Why is this?

.....

**Reoffending**

42. What support do you need to help prevent you reoffending after you are released?

.....

43. What are your expectations of the support you will receive after you are released? (e.g. meet case worker, help with housing and employment)

.....

44. Who will enable you to access this support?

.....

45. What do you think your likelihood of reoffending in the future is?

Very high	
High	
Medium chance	
Low	
Very low	

46. Why is this?

.....

47. To what extent do you think the interventions/support you have received at HMP Doncaster has reduced your likelihood of reoffending?

Very high	
High	
Medium extent	
Low	
Very low	

48. Why is this?

.....

49. Do you have any additional comments you would like to make?

.....

## Appendix D

### Additional resources

For more information on **CARATS** (Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice, Throughcare) see:

- Home Office (2007) *An introduction to the Drug Interventions Programme for prisons and probation services*.  
<<http://www.ohrn.nhs.uk/resource/policy/DIPProbation.pdf>>.
- HM Prison Service (2002) *Counselling, Assessment, Referral, Advice and Throughcare Services*.  
<[http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/psipso/PSO\\_3630\\_carats.doc](http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/psipso/PSO_3630_carats.doc)>

For more information on **Catch 22** see:

- Catch 22 homepage: <<http://www.catch-22.org.uk/>>
- Catch 22, Offender Management Service – Doncaster Prison and Youth Offender Institute: <<http://catch-22.org.uk/Service/Offender-Management-service-Doncaster-Prison-and-Youth-Offenders-Institute>>

For more information on **MAPPA** (Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements) see:

- Ministry of Justice (2012) *MAPPA Guidance 2012, Version 4*.  
<<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/mappa/mappa-guidance-2012-part1.pdf>>

For more information on **NOMS** (National Offender Management Service) see:

- Ministry of Justice (2012) About the National Offender Management Service:  
<<http://www.justice.gov.uk/about/noms>>
- Ministry of Justice (2012) How the National Offender Management Service works:  
<<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/about/noms/noms-org-chart.pdf>>

For more information on **OASys** (Offender Assessment System) see:

- HM Prison Service (2005) Offender Assessment and Sentence Management – OASys.  
<[http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/psipso/PSO\\_2205\\_offender\\_assessment\\_and\\_sentence\\_management.doc](http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/offenders/psipso/psipso/PSO_2205_offender_assessment_and_sentence_management.doc)>

For more information on **OGRS** (Offender Group Reconviction Scale), a predictor of reoffending based only on static risks (age, gender and criminal history), see:

- Ministry of Justice (2009) *OGRS 3: the revised Offender Group Reconviction Scale*, Research Summary 7/09.  
<<http://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/49988/1/ogrs3.pdf>>

For more information on the **Prison Competition Programme** see:

- MoJ (2011) *Competition Strategy for Offender Services*.  
<<http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/2011/DEP2011-1211.pdf>>

For more information on **Serco** see:

- Serco homepage: <<http://www.serco.com/>>
- Serco: HMP and YOI Doncaster:  
<<http://www.serco.com/markets/homeaffairs/custodial/doncaster.asp>>

For more information on **TUPE** (Transfer of Undertaking) see:

- The Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006:  
<<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/246/contents/made>>

For more information on **Turning Point** see:

- Turning Point homepage: <<http://www.turning-point.co.uk/>>

## Appendix E

### Offender responses

#### Overview

In total, 51 offenders were consulted for the first phase of the evaluation. It should be noted that this is a small sample and therefore the results should be interpreted in the context of the indicative findings that this provides. Additional cohorts of 50 offenders each will be consulted during subsequent stages of the evaluation.

Of the offenders consulted in the first phase, six (12%) were high-risk/very high-risk/IPP offenders; 16 (31%) were serving sentences over 12 months (not classified high-/very high-risk/IPP); 26 (51%) were serving under 12 months; and for three (6%) their sentences were unknown.

For 31% (16) of these offenders this was their first time in prison. Of those that had previously been in prison, 54% (19) had been in prison more than five times.

Only 35% (18) of offenders interviewed were aware that HMP Doncaster had introduced a new approach to supporting offenders. In total, 70% (36) of offenders stated that they had a case manager.

Of those that had a case manager, 66% (23) felt they had sufficient contact. However 34% (12) did not (one offender skipped this question). Of the offenders previously in prison 80% (20) preferred having a single case manager rather than multiple assessments and interviews undertaken by several different people.

#### High-risk, very high-risk and IPP offenders (N =6)

Six offenders interviewed were in this category. Half stated that they had a case manager, and the other half did not. It is highly likely that the three individuals who stated they had seen a case manager were referring to their offender manager from the Probation Service.

#### Over 12 month sentence - not classified high-/very high-risk/IPP

Sixteen offenders interviewed were in this category. Of these, 75% (12) stated that they had a case manager, while the remaining 25% (4) did not. Of the offenders who identified that they had a case manager only five (42%) considered that they had sufficient contact. In addition, seven (54%) felt they needed more support.

### **Less than 12 month sentence**

Twenty-six of the 51 offenders consulted were serving sentences of less than 12 months. Of the offenders consulted who were serving less than 12 months, 73% (19) stated that they had a case manager, whilst the remaining 27% (7) stated they did not. Every offender serving less than 12 months should be allocated a case manager. Therefore the fact that seven offenders stated they did not have a case manager implies that either the case management model is not completely effective or offenders could not recall the meeting. In addition 78% (14) thought they had sufficient contact with their case manager (eight offenders skipped this question).

# Appendix F

## Logic model

Figure F1 presents the current logic model for delivering the HMP Doncaster PbR pilot. The content of the model has been informed by interviews with senior stakeholders, delivery staff, offenders and partner agencies. The policy context and contractual documents have also shaped the development of the model. The logic model will continue to evolve throughout the delivery of the pilot. Once finalised, it will detail the ‘theory of change’ of the PbR pilot at HMP Doncaster.

**Figure F1: Logic model**

Stage of the Logic Chain	Description
<b>Rationale</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The project involved amending the core contract for HMP Doncaster to enable a four-year rehabilitation PbR pilot.</li> <li>• The pilot will test the ability of the provider (Serco) to affect the levels of reoffending in a cohort of offenders at HMP Doncaster. It will cover four offender cohorts – one <b>for each year of the pilot</b>.</li> <li>• The PbR pilot places 10% of the core contract price at risk – this sum is only payable if the one-year reconviction rates of the offender cohort discharged from the prison are reduced by five percentage points from the baseline.</li> <li>• If reconviction rates are reduced by more than five percentage points against the baseline, Serco will be entitled to additional outcome payments up to an agreed level and up to a maximum of a 10 percentage point reduction.</li> <li>• The baseline is the reconviction rate of 58.2% (January to December 2009).</li> <li>• HMP Doncaster was selected for PbR due to the high number of prisoners discharged each year, allowing a large sample size, and the stable reoffending rates which will support a robust assessment of outcomes.</li> <li>• The intention of PbR is to refocus the CJS towards outcomes – and specifically reduced reoffending – by paying for what works, and improving public service delivery while maintaining or reducing overall levels of expenditure. Other key drivers of PbR include:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• transferring financial risk from the taxpayer to the provider;</li> <li>• increased levels of innovation facilitated by greater provider discretion;</li> <li>• opening up the provider market to new entrants.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• As part of the pilot, the standard prison contract delivery indicators (CDIs) will be suspended for the PbR cohort prisoners. This will allow the provider the flexibility to align resources to deliver more effective and innovative services.</li> </ul>



Stage of the Logic Chain	Description
<b>Inputs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The restructuring and movement of Serco staff from the Offender Management Unit and Community Resettlement Team to Catch 22 under TUPE.</li> <li>• Individuals no longer have Serco custody officer duties, so that disciplinary and rehabilitative roles are separated.</li> <li>• Catch 22's involvement as a subcontractor to Serco – for example, links with established networks and involvement in original non-PbR bid.</li> <li>• The budget has remained unchanged; however resources have been realigned towards reducing reoffending.</li> <li>• Resources have been specifically allocated to case management activity and 'through the gate' provision.</li> <li>• The development of volunteer mentors who support community-based case managers. Volunteer mentors provide practical support to individuals. This service is not currently operating at full capacity, with approximately 25 volunteers recruited compared to a target of 60.</li> </ul>
<b>Activities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Alliance (delivery) model was already being developed before PbR was introduced into the bid for the new contract.</li> <li>• The enhanced community aspect of the rehabilitation provision was the biggest change to the model originally proposed, which was driven by the introduction of PbR.</li> <li>• Four offender pathways have been developed under the Alliance Model. This means that offenders do not all receive the same service, and it is tailored according to their circumstances. The four pathways are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• high-risk, very high-risk and IPP offenders;</li> <li>• over 12-month sentences - not classified high-/very high-risk/IPP;</li> <li>• under 12-month sentences; and</li> <li>• individuals on remand.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• The introduction of the pathways ensures that resources are allocated to prioritise a reduction in reconviction. Offenders serving less than 12-month sentences receive the most intensive support. This is because they have been identified as the group receiving the least support, despite high rates of reconviction. Targeting this group has been deemed the most appropriate use of resources to reduce reoffending rates.</li> <li>• Under the new model, support was not initially available for individuals on remand. However, this meant certain issues became exacerbated because they were not addressed early.</li> <li>• The Probation Service leads on the support for high-risk, very high-risk and IPP offenders.</li> <li>• Case managers lead for offenders serving over 12-month (not classified high-/very high-risk/IPP) and under 12-month sentences.</li> </ul>

Stage of the Logic Chain	Description
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Case support workers and prison orderlies provide the support to individuals on remand.</li> <li>• On release, offenders are supported by a community-based case manager, with support from volunteer mentors. Participation in this service is entirely voluntary.</li> <li>• The community-based case manager is only available for discharges to South Yorkshire. Releases out of the area receive arms-length support.</li> <li>• Removal of predetermined targets – i.e. CDIs – means that case managers are able to decide on an individualised basis what is most appropriate for the individual offender.</li> <li>• Two dedicated members of staff work with all providers of housing – a common referral form has been developed to support this process. This was introduced within the first six months of the pilot in recognition of the specialist nature of the role.</li> <li>• A dedicated education, training and employment coordinator role has also been created.</li> <li>• Partner agencies have seen little difference in service provision. This is because the interventions have not changed.</li> </ul>
<b>Outputs</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An enhanced case management role in rehabilitation activities – an increased level of contact and support.</li> <li>• Greater consistency of approach: offenders have one point of contact, who understands their needs and provides support. This is preferable to having multiple individuals, which can be confusing and prevents constructive relationships developing.</li> <li>• Provision of earlier, structured needs-based assessment on arrival.</li> <li>• Employment of six case workers located in the community, based with local Integrated Offender Management (IOM) teams.</li> <li>• An increased level of contact and support for offenders on release, particularly those serving sentences of less than 12 months. Between 1 October 2011 and 30 June 2012, 58% of discharges engaged with community-based case managers.</li> </ul>
<b>Outcomes</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To earn the full contract price, Serco will need to reduce the proportion of offenders who are reconvicted within 12 months of their release from Doncaster by five percentage points.</li> <li>• The PbR pilot presents an opportunity to produce positive outcomes for offenders and society more generally.</li> </ul>
<b>Impacts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a strong economic case for the PbR pilot in terms of long-term benefits for the CJS and wider society from reductions in crime.</li> </ul>

**Ministry of Justice Research Series 18/12**

**Findings and lessons learned from the early implementation of the HMP Doncaster payment by results pilot**

This report presents the findings of research commissioned to identify the experiences of implementing and delivering the payment by results pilot (PbR) at HMP Doncaster. The process evaluation included consultation with strategic stakeholders, delivery staff and 51 offenders. The findings from the research indicate that a PbR contract has encouraged innovative service delivery, particularly in the community. The new arrangements have facilitated tailored support for offenders within a flexible approach. It also identifies some implications for future PbR models.

ISBN 978 1 84099 579 4

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E-mail: [research@justice.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:research@justice.gsi.gov.uk)

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