



Operational Plan 2011-2015

DFID Somalia

Updated June 2013

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Introduction

The UK Government is determined to help end extreme poverty around the world. We believe that international development is not just the right thing to do, but the smart thing to do. Britain has never stood on the sidelines, and it is in all our interests for countries around the world to be stable and secure, to have educated and healthy populations and to have growing economies. DFID aims to end aid dependency through jobs – building the economies of developing countries so that they can stand on their own feet.

No country can develop with only half of the population involved, that is why DFID is scaling up its support for women and girls across all of our country programmes, including an increased emphasis on girls education and preventing violence against women and girls.

We are also focussing on what works, investing in research and taking advantage of new technology to ensure that UK development support has the greatest impact.

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency, and in 2012 was ranked the top aid organisation in the world for transparency. Transparency is fundamental to improving accountability both to UK citizens and to citizens in the countries where we work. Transparency also helps us achieve greater value for money and improves the effectiveness of aid. As part of our commitment to transparency we publish Operational Plans for each area of our work setting out what we will achieve and how we will achieve it. In June 2013 DFID launched a new online tool, Development Tracker, to provide an easy way to access information and data about DFID programmes.

With less than 1000 days to go, we will continue to focus our efforts on delivering the Millennium Development Goals, creating wealth in poor countries, strengthening their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.



1) Context

After two decades of conflict, Somalia is the **world's most fragile state**¹. It remains a base for extremists and piracy, and an insurgent group still operates in parts of the country. Illegal migration from Somalia to the UK still occurs and development needs are immense. Now, for the first time in a generation there is a real opportunity to address these challenges, with a recently elected Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in a position to make genuine progress on delivering security, stability and services to its people. Meanwhile, the autonomous zone of Somaliland remains more stable than the rest of the country, with a Government better able to provide for its citizens – although development needs in Somaliland also remain high. The challenges facing the FGS are great - not least, negotiating a national political settlement and providing security. The mandate of the AU Mission in Somalia to provide security has been extended for a further year. While reduced, the threat of attack from Al Shabaab (al-Qaeda linked insurgents) remains high, and has drawn Kenyan and Ethiopian troops into Somalia.

The causes of conflict in Somalia are complex. Somalia has known periods of stability and security in recent decades, and some parts of it remain relatively free of violence. But multiple levels of armed conflict and insecurity exist and will continue to do so for some time in some parts of the country. These include localised communal clashes over resources, political clashes over control of the state and its resources, regional involvement (sometimes through proxies), and violence fuelled by global ideologies. The effects of the conflict are far-reaching. 1.1 million people are internally displaced², and 43% of the population live on less than \$1 a day³. The unemployment rate is above 60%⁴. Women and girls suffer disproportionately – a woman has a 1 in 10 chance of dying during her reproductive years⁵. Years of conflict, drought and flooding have caused a prolonged **humanitarian crisis** and in 2011 Somalia was badly affected by the first famine of the twenty first century. 1 million people are estimated to be in need of emergency support⁶ with a further 1.7 million on the emergency threshold.

Instability in Somalia has broader impacts. It presents risks to regional stability, including in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. It remains the source of serious threats to the UK and elsewhere from terrorism, piracy and migration. Somalia is a **priority country for the UK National Security Council (NSC)**. Capitalising on the success of the London Conference in February 2012, a second Conference in May 2013, co-hosted by the Prime Minister with the Somali President, focused on delivering coordinated international support for the President's priorities: security, justice, public financial management (PFM) and building political stability. DFID's work is an important part of the **UK government strategy for Somalia**, which recognises that the underlying causes of instability need to be addressed. DFID staff work as one team with the rest of the UK government, in the British Office for Somalia (BOFS) in Nairobi, and alongside the Somalia Unit in London, to deliver the strategy.

Somalia is often thought of as three zones, with different characteristics. In **Somaliland** (about 2 million people) the signs remain positive and we are working to reinforce the successes seen there. While progress in Somaliland might help anchor stability for the rest of Somalia, the risk of spill-over or displaced threats from the south is prevalent. Semi-autonomous **Puntland** (about 2 million people) has government institutions of its own and a degree of stability, though no aspirations for independence. Like the rest of **South-Central Somalia** (about 3.5 million people) it continues to suffer from insecurity, criminality, as well as the impact of piracy. Nearly 75%⁷ of Somalia's humanitarian needs are in South-Central. Effective development programmes are possible, particularly where local government functions effectively, and should become more feasible as central government institutions are developed. Somalia as a whole has potential in services, notably telecoms, and for growth in fisheries and agriculture. GDP is estimated at around \$220 per capita per annum⁸.

Conflict, insecurity and constraints on access present significant challenges to delivering aid. DFID does not have staff based in Somalia, however the opening of the Hargeisa office, has enabled staff to spend short periods there more frequently. It will also become easier for staff to visit when an Embassy is opened this year on the Mogadishu Airport compound. We work mainly through a **range of trusted UN and non-governmental implementing partners**, who are able to operate on the ground across much of Somalia, and whose work is subject to scrutiny. We are working to diversify this by using more private contractors and other partners.



2) Vision

Overview

DFID aims to promote longer-term stability, and to transform the lives of poor Somalis. The programme, closely linked to the UK's Strategy for Somalia, has **four pillars: a) governance and peace-building; b) wealth and job creation; c) health care, particularly for women and children; and d) humanitarian assistance.** By working in these areas, we aim to provide humanitarian assistance and reduce the impact of humanitarian crises, support delivery of basic services and promote economic growth, and promote the creation of democratic, capable and accountable government. We are designing a multi-year humanitarian programme with a focus on improving **resilience** to humanitarian crises, as well as responding to urgent needs. We believe we can reduce instability, including its impact on the region and the UK, by reducing incentives for people to participate in violence and crime; reinforcing peaceful ways for communities to agree on the use of resources; undermining reliance on militias for security, food, incomes and services; and by shifting expectations for a stable future from extremists or warlords towards legitimate authorities. There is much to build on, including a new federal government; a strong tradition of business and trade; deep-rooted community mechanisms for governance and resolving disputes; a large, active and sometimes wealthy diaspora; and development projects which are learning how to build on Somalis' own efforts to deliver services and achieve reconciliation. Our plans cover all three geographical zones, recognising the **differences in context and opportunities.**

As part of the UK cross-government team, we work with like-minded partners in support of a coherent international approach to political, development and humanitarian issues in Somalia. We will continue to offer **leadership in the international community** on our focal sectors and we are instrumental in efforts to reshape the partnership between the FGS and international partners, through the development of a **New Deal compact.** We will champion effectiveness, transparency and innovation, with support for the President's PFM, justice and policing reform plans, and a multi-donor **Stability Fund** to support positive political, security and development trends at a local level. In Somaliland we are supporting authorities to identify a medium-term development vision, and championing a multi-donor **Somaliland Development Fund** to ensure that development assistance responds better to their priorities.

Alignment to DFID and wider UK Government priorities

This operational plan has been developed with other UK government colleagues as a central part of implementing the UK strategy for Somalia and addressing the priorities of the National Security Council. It is aligned with the **Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR).** Our programmes also support delivery of DFID's **Structural Reform** priorities. We continue to help the UK to **honour international commitments,** including by increasing access to healthcare and reducing maternal mortality. We continue to boost **wealth creation** through supporting investment climate reform, skills development and job creation. A strong focus on **women and girls** ensures that women receive family planning support, develop skills to respond to demand for labour, and increasingly have access to justice; and reducing the incidence of female genital mutilation (98% prevalence rate⁹). Through innovative application of DFID's state-building/peace-building framework, the overall programme continues to **strengthen governance and security.** Our programme management reflects an increased investment in **monitoring and evaluation, scrutiny and transparency, value for money, anti-corruption,** and an increased awareness of the impact of **climate change** through our Strategic Programme Review. We have also applied for International Climate Fund funding which would enable us to play a more active role on climate change in Somalia.

What we will stop doing

We concluded our programme support to education at the end of 2011, as part of an agreed division of labour with the European Commission (EC), which withdrew from the health sector. DFID has, however, more recently approved Girls' Education Challenge funding for Somalia and so we have a limited stake in the education sector. With some exceptions in humanitarian assistance and conflict prevention, we will not fund small projects which do not fit with our wider programmes.



3) Results

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Wealth Creation	Additional number of jobs created. <i>(Attributable to DFID funding.)</i>	Somalia: 0 (new programme) (2010) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: 0 (2010)	Somalia: 45,000, 15,000 for women (2015) (end-year snapshot) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: 22,500, 7,500 for women (2015)
Governance and Peace- building	Total number of local governments (districts and communities) that meet citizens' performance criteria (participatory planning, budgeting, execution of priority services and projects). <i>(DFID is contributing to this total result. Accurate attribution is not possible.)</i>	Somalia: 12 districts, 17 communities (281,000 beneficiaries) (2010) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: six districts out of the nine supported (2010)	Somalia: 16 districts, 23 communities (370,000 beneficiaries) (2015) (end-year snapshot) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: eight districts out of the nine supported (2015)
Health	Number of female contraceptive users (aged 15-49 years old) for birth spacing each year. <i>(DFID is contributing to this total result. Accurate attribution is not possible.)</i>	Somalia: 10,000 (2006) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: 4,000 (2006)	Somalia: 100,000 (2015) (end-year snapshot) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: 55,000 (2015)
Health	Number of births delivered with the help of nurses, midwives or doctors, with DFID support each year. <i>(DFID is contributing to this total result. Accurate attribution is not possible.)</i>	Somalia: 42,000 (2006) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: 9,600 (2006)	Somalia: 100,000 (2015) (end-year snapshot) <i>of which:</i> Somaliland: 30,000 (2015)
Humanitarian	Number of starving children aged under five benefiting from specific acute malnutrition prevention programmes each year <i>(Attributable to DFID funding.)</i>	Somalia: 60,000 (2010), 30,000 are girls <i>(Humanitarian need and activity in Somaliland currently low.)</i>	Somalia: 61,000 (2015) (end-year snapshot), 31,500 will be girls



3) Results (continued)

Evidence supporting results

What we spend in 2013-15, and where, will depend in part on what we can prove we have achieved in 2011-13. Statistics are notoriously variable and unreliable, in part because of the poor security situation. Data availability and project monitoring are still major challenges. But we are confident that we will be able to demonstrate and quantify results particularly on health and employment. We are also seeking to contribute to less easily measurable outcomes – but potentially those which have a very high impact for the UK as well as for Somalis – such as stability, community strengthening, and resilience to conflict and to extremist and criminal influence. The evidence base for our ability to affect these through our programmes is weaker, and an important part of our approach is to find innovative ways to create stronger evidence.

- Our proposed wealth creation outputs are grounded in good analyses by implementing partners of how jobs are created and the markets for particular sectors and products. We have done our own analysis of the main constraints to growth and job creation in Somalia. Our work on wealth creation aims to tackle these.
- Global evidence from UNICEF and the World Health Organisation (WHO), demonstrates that the health interventions selected will have high impact and are cost-effective. In this sector, Somalia is relatively rich in data and evidence. The main source of data is the UNICEF multi-indicator cluster survey (MICS) 2006. The next MICS in 2011 (results still pending) will provide better health status statistics, and the UNFPA-led Population Estimation Survey will set a platform for future data collection. The innovations we will support, including performance pay schemes and solar panels, have been proven in Somalia: a DFID-project which introduced them resulted in significant increases over 12 months in deliveries by skilled birth attendants, and the provision of 24-hour services.
- The governance and peace-building pillar is informed by external research and analysis of state and peace-building efforts in Somalia, and by DFID's state-building and peace-building framework. Research on Somalia is analytically robust but cannot be backed up by reliable and long-term quantitative data. DFID is establishing a programme to improve the availability of data on governance and peace-building in Somalia to enable us and others to determine baselines, results and impacts of interventions in these sectors. This builds on surveys already conducted by Hargeisa University in five districts in Somalia.
- The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) provides comprehensive survey and assessment data to inform baseline and results measurements for humanitarian programmes to which DFID contributes. We are in the early stages of increasing our ability to monitor more attributable indicators, and increase our confidence in the monitoring (often done remotely) of UN, Red Cross/Crescent and non-governmental partners.

Value for Money (VfM) rationale

The success of DFID's investment in Somalia will be assessed both on the basis of its direct returns (such as numbers of jobs created and lives saved) and of wider, longer term security and economic gains. It can be expensive to provide aid in a conflict environment. But the potential benefits – to the UK, the region and Somalis – of increased security are also high. There are potential savings – if, for example, the need for a major UN peace keeping operation can be averted, the costs of piracy can be eliminated, and the need for humanitarian assistance significantly reduced. We will need to generate more evidence of this wider impact.

In 2012/13 we and our partners have invested in monitoring VfM in all sectors using indicators in new Business Cases. In the health sector, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and UN agencies working on maternal health are agreeing common indicators of economy, efficiency and cost effectiveness. In this and other sectors there are challenges with mapping costs to deliverables and – for DFID – comparing VfM indicators across partners, geographic areas and security contexts.

Despite the high costs of providing aid in a conflict situation, our partners are redoubling their focus on managing down the costs of delivery. UNDP, under a local government programme, is making more economical purchases in Somalia by improving the procurement standards districts use. This focus on economy is reinforcing the wider effectiveness of the programme, by increasing the capability and accountability of local governments. If the security situation allows, we will also increasingly encourage competition to deliver our aid. The impact of a deterioration in security would depend on its severity and location: partners have become adept at adapting or moving in response to security changes, although this is currently extremely challenging for those trying to deliver humanitarian assistance in the South. In a security downturn, it is likely that we would be able to continue most elements of our programme with adjustments and some scaling back; and we would also need to respond to increased humanitarian needs, potentially with even greater constraints on access.



4) Delivery and Resources

Between 2010 and 2013, the Somalia programme has changed radically, from a string of smaller projects to a small number of larger and more coherent programmes. We will build on this by contracting out more programme management, exploring new ways of channelling aid in Somaliland, looking for ways to harness diaspora skills and remittances for productive investment, using Challenge Funds, and diversifying from UN agencies and International NGOs to direct use of contractors (subject to security considerations). We are currently establishing an innovative Stability Fund, funded by a variety of donors including the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to support positive political, security and development trends at a local level. Somalia programme results are delivered through the following partnerships:

UK Government: DFID is part of the British Office for Somalia in Nairobi, which includes staff from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defence and other Departments. We are working ever more closely within this wider team to a joint UK strategy on Somalia. Our advisers contribute a development perspective to the whole cross-Government Somalia effort. We also contribute staff to the Somalia Unit, in London, which co-ordinates the UK's effort in Somalia.

Governments: We are developing a strong partnership with the recently elected Federal Government of Somalia in **Mogadishu**, and playing an instrumental role in developing a New Deal compact which will define the partnership between the FGS and international partners. We continue to have a growing relationship with the **Somaliland** authorities, and we are supporting their National Development Plan and the establishment of a Somaliland Development Fund. We also have a good relationship with the **Puntland** authorities who are also producing a National Development Plan.

Bilateral donors: We work with other bi-laterals on specific areas of co-operation. We have a number of shared advisory arrangements (e.g. share a health adviser with Sweden and a governance adviser with Denmark). We have attracted funding from other donors for various sectors and instruments, including a joint health programme (US, Sweden and Australia), a multi-donor Stability Fund (UAE, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands) and the Somaliland Development Fund (Denmark). The UK currently co-chairs the Somali Donor Group, bringing co-ordination and increased effectiveness to aid programmes and donor relations with the Somali governments.

Multilateral agencies: We continue to channel the majority of our funds through the **UN**, whose agencies have the widest reach and the greatest delivery experience. Our key UN partners are the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), UN Development Programme (UNDP), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organisation (WHO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and UN Population Fund (UNFPA). Although FAO scored poorly in DFID's review of multilateral aid, evidence suggests that in Somalia it is delivering. We monitor this closely, including through the adviser we have seconded (part-time) to the FAO Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme. We are helping the UN to improve its impact in Somalia, including through the results adviser we have seconded (part-time) to the Resident Coordinator's Office to improve the UN's management of results, transparency and development planning. Subject to its performance, we use the UN Common Humanitarian Fund as an important vehicle for humanitarian assistance. We work closely with the **World Bank** on private sector development and public finance management.

NGOs: We continue to support international NGOs, to deliver humanitarian, health, peace-building and employment results. Most of our support to Somali NGOs is received through international NGOs.

Managing agents: We will use more managing agents to deliver our programmes, to reduce the administration burden of an increasing aid budget.

Private sector and diaspora: We aim to lever more private sector investment through public/private partnerships and we are in discussion with CDC on the role that they might play in catalysing private sector investment in Somaliland. We are also looking at how to attract diaspora remittances (estimated at \$1 billion/year) as productive investments. The Somali nation is not confined by its borders: we are looking to encourage diaspora skills, ideas and investments wherever we think they can help to deliver results.



4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Planned Programme Spend

Pillar/Strategic priority	2010/11		2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15		TOT
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000
Wealth Creation	2,100		3,950		9,077		8,000		8,000		29,027
Governance and Security	6,600		10,400		17,871		32,000		32,000		92,271
Education	5,200										0
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health	2,250		7,950		18,341		19,000		19,000		64,291

Note:

2010/11 and 2011/12 figures are based on actuals and include a humanitarian uplift

2012/13 are a provisional outturn



4) Delivery and Resources(continued)

Planned Operating Costs

	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Frontline staff costs - Pay	808	1,059	1,509	2,289	2,730	7,587
Frontline staff costs - Non Pay	350	407	746	1,711	1,955	4,819
Administrative Costs - Pay	126	130	163	195	209	697
Administrative Costs - Non Pay	50	54	60	63	61	238
Total	1,334	1,650	2,478	4,258	4,955	13,341

Note: Figures for: 2010-11 and 2011-12 are actual outturn; 2012-13 are provisional outturn; 2013-14 and 2014-15 are planned budgets



4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Planned Efficiency savings

Strategic Reprioritisation	As part of a division of labour with the EU, we will do no new programme work on primary or secondary education from April 2011 (this does not include our Girls Education Challenge fund contribution, managed by PWC). In 2010/11, our education work cost £5 million.	£'000 20,000
Further examples of Programme efficiency	1. We will build more efficient management arrangements into the next phase of our wealth creation programme, and will look at linking these to our health programme management arrangements for additional efficiency savings. 2. As set out in our VfM plan, we are introducing VfM improvements to each pillar of our programme, e.g. both the Somaliland Development Fund (SDF) and the Somalia Stability Fund (SSF) are contracting out fund management to the private sector as a means of achieving greater efficiency and economy.	See below

Delivering programme efficiencies: 1. The saving achieved through improved programme management arrangements will be calculated when those arrangements are designed and should be available by mid 2014. 2. Efficiencies and economies achieved through contracting out the management of the Somaliland Development Fund and the Somalia Stability Fund will be calculated once arrangements are in place and should be available by March 2014.

Administrative costs savings: Following a fundamental review of the staffing and structure, DFID Kenya and DFID Somalia continue to operate with a shared corporate services team along with the rest of the British High Commission. The team is currently undergoing a re-structuring process which should generate greater efficiency and value for money on corporate services. However, the cost of staffing uplifts in 2011/12 and 2012/13 has off-set savings and we predict that having staff increasingly working in Somalia will result in an overall increase in administrative costs in 2013/14 and 2014/15.



5) Delivering Value for Money (VfM)

DFID Somalia attaches high importance to **demonstrating results** and **value for money** across the portfolio. We have also begun systematically to **strengthen logframes** and to use **economic analysis** through the programme reporting cycle. This has resulted in a higher burden of proof that interventions are maximising impact for the money spent, based on a clearer understanding of the unit costs of delivery. Improving **procurement** has also been prioritised in DFID Somalia, by strengthening staff capacity on procurement, better training, and attention to minimising costs of programme management.

Challenges

Between 2011 and 2015, challenges we will face in driving VfM through our programme include:

1. Developing a systematic **framework for monitoring progress** in improving VfM across all programmes and corporate services
2. Demonstrating **VfM in technically demanding areas**, including governance, health system strengthening, employment creation and humanitarian programmes
3. Putting the new **DFID Business Case (BC)** into practice – especially undertaking options analysis early on and ensuring design is informed by VfM analysis
4. Attaining appropriate levels of **VfM expertise and awareness** for different roles in DFID Somalia – advisory, programme and corporate staff
5. Increasing **implementing partners' understanding of VfM** and ensuring they are able to manage DFID-supported programmes to maximise and report on VfM

Actions

In 2012/13 we have:

1. Completed **VfM summaries** for each pillar showing the main VfM issues in the sector and steps taken to monitor VfM progress
2. Undertaken a **VfM study of humanitarian action**, reviewing how partners responded to a request to set targets for and report against common VfM metrics.
3. Designed a new **multi-year humanitarian BC** that provides the opportunity to gauge VFM improvements from moving to resilience activities from humanitarian, and from multi to single year funding relationships with partners
4. Worked with health sector partners to **integrate VFM within the monitoring frameworks** for the two major health programmes. NGO and UN partners have agreed a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators to monitor and report on in a peer review process
5. On wealth creation, worked with FAO and World Bank to establish **VFM indicators** relating costs to net attributable income and short and long term job creation
6. Increased **awareness among implementing partners** of DFID's approach to VfM and undertaken **VFM refresher training with staff internally** which has emphasised the opportunities for Programme Management staff to drive VFM through financial management, procurement and programme management tasks.

Going forward we will deepen progress in these areas with the following priorities:

1. Update **VfM summaries** for each pillar and use this as the basis for quarterly reviews of progress of VfM in each pillar portfolio
2. Complete a set of **VfM metrics** that are meaningful in driving performance and demonstrating cost effectiveness of interventions against useful comparators
3. Continue to **integrate VfM metrics within the monitoring and evaluation framework** so that VfM is considered alongside results, performance and programme management
4. Strengthen **commercial improvement** and monitor better the cost drivers, especially through indirect procurement, with advice from a shared **Commercial Adviser**
5. Deepen **VfM analysis** in on-going programmes, e.g. using new Annual Review and PCR formats and ensuring VfM is given sufficient priority
6. Require **implementing partners to provide better evidence** of how they maximise VfM of DFID funds, as well as encouraging other donors to make similar asks of the same implementing partners



6) Monitoring and Evaluation (see Annex: Step Change in monitoring results)

Monitoring

How: Somalia is one of the most difficult environments in the world in which to undertake project monitoring, with conflict and security presenting significant challenges to our partners, and particularly to direct monitoring by DFID staff. Addressing these challenges is a priority and one on which we have scaled up our efforts. DFID Somalia continues to explore innovative tools that harness the use of technology in Somalia, such as mobile and web-based data collection, and direct participatory monitoring. To facilitate increased and more regular access by DFID staff, we are investing in strengthened risk management (working with the UN), and establishing increasingly professional and efficient management of in-country travel. We will also use the new UK offices in Mogadishu and Hargeisa as bases for accessing wider parts of Somalia. Each of our programmes are underpinned by a monitoring framework that tracks progress against programme targets and provides the data required to monitor delivery of the Operational Plan and Results Framework. Good data sources exist, such as the six monthly post-rains assessments of the humanitarian situation and the UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster survey on health. Where the evidence base is weak or data is unavailable for monitoring, we are commissioning research or supporting partners to undertake new data collection.

Who: Our UN, non-governmental and other implementing partners are responsible for day-to-day monitoring. DFID Somalia lead advisers and programme staff provide oversight, and are responsible for reviewing progress against results frameworks regularly. The Accountability and Results Team (ART) provides a quality assurance role, feeding into design work to ensure effective monitoring frameworks, and contributing to annual reviews. The Results Adviser is supporting teams to improve the quality of their results management. We have also developed an independent third-party monitoring system for our governance and peace-building work.

When: DFID Somalia maintains continuous dialogue with implementing partners about programme performance, and agrees with them a formal results reporting cycle (usually quarterly). During annual reviews we assess progress against programme outputs and how this is contributing to the achievement of outcomes, broken down where possible between outcomes for women and men. The overall Somalia results framework is reviewed regularly, and this Operational Plan annually. DFID Somalia uses quarterly meetings to peer review results performance.

What: Monitoring is used for project management and to assess portfolio performance and value for money, and to inform future programming decisions. We use the results framework to report on headline results, and to feed into DFID Somalia's communications material and DFID corporate reporting.

Evaluation

DFID Somalia is working to ensure that more robust empirical and perception data is available to inform impact evaluations of our interventions. We are using evidence from impact evaluations of community-based development programmes in other fragile states to inform the design of our community-based development project in Somalia, and plan to undertake an impact evaluation of that project. We have also developed an evaluation strategy, which determines which of DFID's other projects in Somalia will be subject to evaluation and how. DFID Somalia supports partners to ensure that evaluations are carefully planned, conducted and used – the Results Adviser we have seconded to work part time in the UN Resident Coordinator's Office continues to help provide this support. Our Accountability and Results Team, led by an Evaluation Adviser, is helping ensure our programmes comply with DFID's guidance on impact evaluation, and we are prioritising making adequate financial resources available for evaluations.

Building capacity of partners

To strengthen the capacity of the international community and Somali authorities to focus on results and use information for improved decision making, the DFID Somalia Results Adviser dedicates approximately 50% of their time to working with external partners to help build their ability to do good monitoring and evaluation, and to steer donor dialogue towards results. Fragmentation of data systems and weak monitoring is also a challenge at the sector level. We are encouraging joined-up lesson learning and evaluation, and continue to support the UN Resident Coordinator's Office to strengthen monitoring and evaluation across the UN system.



7) Transparency

Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK Government. We will ensure that we continue to meet our commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee including publishing detailed information about DFID projects, including programme documents. We will provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback.

- Somalia is one of the most difficult environments in the world in which to work; ensuring transparency is challenging. Addressing these challenges is a priority and one on which we have scaled up our efforts. We continue to explore innovative tools that harness the use of technology in Somalia, such as mobile and web-based data collection, and direct participatory monitoring to help increase transparency.
- We **publish** programme/ project information in easy to understand formats on the DFID website. We publish detailed information on all new programmes and all procurement over the relevant thresholds. Annual project performance reporting and end of project evaluation is also published. We ensure that wherever possible information in the public domain is comprehensive, accessible, comparable, accurate and timely.
- We work hard to promote **access to information** in Somalia. This includes continuing in-house production of communication materials such as country fact sheets and sector briefs, and providing information on our main actions and results. These are made available in paper and electronic format to members of the public, partners and stakeholders. Selected documents are also published in the Somali language.
- Wherever possible we also ensure that the details of new and on-going programmes are publicised in the **media**, highlighting what the programmes aim to achieve, where they are being implemented, who the partners are and what the stakes are for beneficiaries, their families and communities.
- We work with **implementing partners to enable them to conform to the standards set out in the International Aid Transparency Initiative**. We aim to write transparency standards into all project contracts and agreements. Implementing partners are asked to raise awareness of projects among targeted beneficiaries using appropriate local dialects.
- We help to strengthen transparency among other donors and the broader **development effort in Somalia**. We support efforts led by the FGS and international partners to implement the Busan New Deal for Fragile States and to develop an accurate Development Assistance Database in order to increase transparency of donor flows to Somalia and the results achieved.
- We also work with government officials to help them manage revenue and donor financing, and encourage them to be more transparent to their citizens about their budgets and plans. We are supporting the Government to write and implement a Public Financial Management (PFM) reform plan which will improve the transparency of public finances. Through our governance programming we will increase the capacity of non-governmental organisations to hold both donors and government **accountable** to citizens for how aid is spent in Somalia. In health we propose to publish health and financial information in health facilities to facilitate transparency and thereby empower stakeholders, who will have access to relevant information. We are also looking at IT solutions to better enable remote management and strengthen engagement with our partners.
- Through stakeholder meetings we share **new policy directions and programme priorities** of the UK government.



8) Human Rights Assessment: Somalia

The UK recognises that the realisation of all human rights underpins sustainable development. Through its development programmes, the UK aims to support civil society and governments to build open economies and open societies in which citizens have freedom, dignity, choice and control over their lives; and institutions that are accountable, inclusive and responsive.

Human rights context:

- Somalia has suffered a human rights crisis for the last 22 years, characterised by serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law and some of the worst humanitarian and human development indicators in the world. There is a lack of reliable data available on human rights indicators and trends.
- Economic and social rights: Life expectancy is 51 years – 16 years below the regional average (UN Statistics, 2012). At 180/1,000, under-five mortality is the worst in the world (WHO, 2012). The humanitarian situation has resulted in massive displacement and raised acute protection concerns: 1 million Somalis are in need of emergency support with a further 1.7 million on the emergency threshold (UNOCHA, 2013). 43% of the population are estimated to live on less than US \$1 a day (UNDP, 2002); and only 30% of the population have access to safe water (UNICEF, 2008).
- Non-discrimination: The TrustLaw Survey 2011 ranks Somalia as the fifth most dangerous country in the world for women and girls to live. At 1,200/100,000 maternal mortality rates are second only to CHAD (UN, 2008). A report by the UN's independent expert on Somalia noted that domestic violence, sexual violence and female genital mutilation are some of the most common violations of women's rights reported across all areas of Somalia. In addition, women are marginalised in political decision-making processes, and differentially affected by violent conflict (Human Rights Council, 2011). UNICEF statistics show gross primary enrolment rate at 23% for girls (2007-10) compared with 42% for boys. However, 13.8% of MPs are now female, an increase on previous levels of representation. Minority groups and people with disabilities also face widespread marginalisation.
- Civil and political rights: In 2012, Somalia continued to be ranked 'Not Free' by Freedom House. A lack of protection of civilians, rule of law and accountability has led to extrajudicial killings of judges and journalists by Federal Government security forces, as well as militant group Al Shabaab.
- The **Universal Periodic Review** (UPR) reported in July 2011 and the Government accepted all 155 recommendations put forward, rejecting none. Implementation of recommendations will be reviewed at the next UPR process in 2016.

Direction of travel:

- The extension of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS)/AMISOM control across Mogadishu and Somalia has significantly reduced conflict and its direct impact on the civilian population of the capital.
- However, significant challenges remain, including translating FGS commitments to uphold human rights into action in the context of weak control over its security forces. We and others have condemned the extrajudicial killings of prisoners by the FGS Security Forces. Positive steps have been taken in terms of developing security and justice sector development plans which, in the longer term, will assist with arresting human rights' abuses .
- In general terms, the human rights situation – in all areas - remains highly compromised.

UK approach and focus:

The 2013 Conference on Somalia in London will focus on improving security and justice for Somalis as well as the prevention of sexual violence. In addition, the UK will:

- **Support the realisation of social and economic rights** for the poorest through development programmes that provide access to health services for women and children, improve access to clean water, and address the nutrition of vulnerable groups through the creation of sustainable jobs
- **Work to address inequalities** and, in particular, the rights of women and girls: through increasing access to healthcare including contraceptives, improving livelihoods and employment opportunities for women, and preventing sexual violence
- **Improve inclusion and accountability** including parliamentary and electoral systems and rule of law institutions to enable citizens to claim their rights: the UK will support a) training of political party and associated personnel on election procedures in Somaliland; training of new Federal Government MPs on parliamentary rules of procedure; and piloting mechanisms to ensure closer linkages between constituents and their MPs, and b) mobile courts, legal aid and paralegals, trained prosecutors and defence lawyers, trained, equipped and deployed police officers, and the construction of a prison facility in Mogadishu.



Annex A: Revisions to Operational Plan 2012/2013

- This Operational Plan has been updated to reflect changes following the successful, recent election of a new government for Somalia, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). It reflects the fact that the FGS is now in a position to make genuine progress on delivering security, stability and services to its people.
- As a result of the change of government and capitalising on the success of the London Conference in February 2012, a second Conference in May 2013, co-hosted by the Prime Minister with the Somali President, will focus on delivering coordinated international support for the President's priorities: security, justice, public financial management and building political stability. Through the development of a New Deal compact the refreshed Operational Plan reflects efforts to reshape the partnership between the FGS and international partners.
- Results progress has been included.
- Revised operating plans reflect that DFID Somalia will open offices in both Hargeisa and Mogadishu.
- A human rights assessment, updated with more recent human rights indicator data and a subsequent review of the direction of travel has been included.



Annex B: Results Progress

Progress towards headline results*

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (include year)	Progress towards results (include year)	Expected Results (include year)
Wealth Creation	<i>Additional Number of Jobs Created</i>	<i>0 (2010)</i>	<i>60,000 jobs created so far, comprising 40,000 men and 20,000 women (2013)</i>	<i>45,000 (2015)</i>
Governance and Peacebuilding	<i>Total number of local governments (districts and communities) that meet citizens' performance criteria (participatory planning, budgeting, execution of priority services and projects)</i>	<i>12 districts (2010)</i>	<i>UN Joint Programme for Local Governance now operating in 16 districts in Somalia (2013)</i>	<i>16 districts (2015)</i>
Health	Number of female contraceptive users (aged 15-49 years old) for birth spacing each year	10,000 (2006)	Data not yet available, but programme implementation on track	100,000 (2015)
Health	Number of births delivered with the help of nurses, midwives or doctors with DFID support each year	42,000 (2006)	Data not yet available, but programme implementation on track	100,000 (2015)
Humanitarian	Number of starving children aged under five benefitting from specific acute humanitarian prevention programmes each year	60,000 (2010)	130,000 children benefitted in 2012/13, including 60,000 boys and 70,000 girls	61,000 each year (until 2015)

* These results may not be directly aggregated with other country results due to different measurement methodologies.



Annex C: Step change in monitoring results

DFID Somalia is taking the following actions to deliver a step change in monitoring and understanding our results:

Improve aid effectiveness and results

- Approximately 50% of the Results Adviser is dedicated to working with external partners on bolstering national level monitoring.
- There is a much sharper focus on partners' results frameworks, ensuring as far as possible that: robust monitoring and evaluation plans are in place; and that there is a clear evidence-base for their interventions, underpinned by clear theories of change, or evaluation of innovation where the evidence base is weak.
- We have increased our investment in making sure that the UN Common Humanitarian Fund is effective.

Deliver a step change in results

- At least 10% of all our programme funding will be allocated to monitoring and evaluation.
- We are investing in our partners to scale up efforts to provide on-going monitoring of wider impacts, such as security and conflict.
- We will look to different approaches and innovation to improve monitoring. For example, we will support conflict and mapping mechanisms that provide trends in conflict tensions, governance and security. We will look at IT solutions to monitor results remotely.
- Partners will be required to demonstrate sufficient allocation of programme and human resources to monitoring and evaluation (M&E) at the outset, and annual reviews will drill down on whether plans have been successfully implemented.
- We will ensure that partners' M&E frameworks have clear plans on establishing baselines, and log-frames set realistic targets and milestones and work to realistic timeframes.
- We are investing in strengthening risk management (working through the UN), and establishing clear rules and procedures for managing visits. This is helping facilitate increased and more regular access by DFID staff.
- We are also investing in third party monitoring to verify or triangulate results and support independent evaluations. For example we are supporting the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in undertaking an independent evaluation of the overall humanitarian response in South-Central Somalia.

Transparency and accountability

- We ensure that our partners publish their results in the online Development Assistance Database for Somalia where Somalis and the wider diaspora can view the results and provide feedback.
- We also publish detailed project information, making summary information available in the Somali language in line with the Aid Transparency Guarantee.



Annex D: Regional differences – Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central

We separated our initial programme allocations and intended results between the three geographical zones in Somalia: Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central. We keep these intended results and allocations under review, and adjust them according to results and potential.

Working in Somaliland

- Somaliland, with five successful elections behind it, a functioning and quite stable central authority, and relative stability and absence of daily conflict in most localities, represents both an opportunity for delivering development results, and a challenge to reinforce its relative stability for the benefit of its people and of the region and the UK.
- The focus of the programme is on jobs and economic development; health and reproductive care; and governance and security at local and central levels. We can do more on governance and security than we can in Puntland or South-Central. We will help to strengthen central government core functions, policing and access to justice. Humanitarian assistance is not excluded, but historically humanitarian needs have been much smaller than in South-Central.
- We take a lead on Somaliland in the international community, from both development and political points of view. This includes championing transparency and effectiveness - major preoccupations of the authorities. The authorities are keen to diversify delivery mechanisms. They do not feel that they own programmes implemented by the UN and INGOs. We are establishing a Somaliland Development Fund with Denmark to align donor funds with government priorities. We are also looking for ways to harness diaspora skills and remittances for productive investment, and helping to address other key barriers to investment.
- Subject to demonstrating results, our allocations for development (i.e. non-humanitarian) spend in Somaliland will rise. We have based our figures on an assumption of continued stability. We estimate the likelihood of this as medium and the impact of this not being the case as high although Somaliland remains highly vulnerable to the spill over or displacement of conflict in the South, and on its disputed border region with Puntland.

Working in Puntland

- Puntland lies between Somaliland and South-Central on the political and security scales. It is semi-autonomous with government institutions of its own but does not seek independence. It has a degree of stability, which must be watched closely. More recently, Al-Shabaab's presence in the area has been growing as it has been pushed out of more southerly areas. And areas on Puntland's borders remain contested. Meanwhile, the de-stabilising impact of piracy on Puntland may further reduce as the practice is increasingly less tolerated by local communities.
- Development assistance can function well here, even if vulnerable to change.

Working in South-Central Somalia

- Historically, South-Central Somalia is notorious for conflict. Thanks to actions taken by the new Federal Government, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the Somali National Forces, the area in and around the capital, Mogadishu, and other areas around South-Central Somalia are now free of insurgents and some are relatively stable. However, parts of South-Central are still controlled by Al-Shabaab. Access is limited, with widespread expulsions of humanitarian organisations by Al-Shabaab in 2011-12. Development and humanitarian assistance function here, albeit it with difficulty and inherent risk, and are vulnerable to change.
- Most of our humanitarian support has been in South-Central Somalia: 75% of current needs are there. The main geographical difference in programming terms is on governance and security: rather than focus on core state functions, we aim to work on peace-building and strengthening communities at a local level, where things work relatively well. We will focus hard on getting evidence of the impact we are achieving. This will complement our support for national level efforts to achieve a political settlement and reconciliation; and for legitimate, credible and accountable federal institutions in the future.
- Future programming in South-Central Somalia depends in large part on the continued success of AMISOM and others in releasing areas from Al-Shabaab's control, and securing those areas. We estimate the risk of worsening conflict to be high, but the impact of this on the programme to be medium: we are designing programmes to be flexible in location, and to be able to work in conflict. We need to overturn a perception that nothing works in South-Central and that money spent there is wasted. Optimism around the arrival of the Federal Government will help in this regard.



Annex E: Endnotes

1. See e.g. The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World - The Brookings Institution, 2008
2. UNHCR, 2013
3. FSNAU, January 2011
4. Somalia Joint Strategy Paper, 2008-13, page 17
5. Somalia Reproductive Health National Strategy and Action Plan, 2010-2015
6. UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), 2013
7. FSNAU, January 2013
8. World Bank Development Indicators Database 04/05/05
9. Somalia Reproductive Health Strategy and Action Plan, 2010-2015