

**CHAPTER 25****MUNITIONS INCIDENTS REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION****CONTENTS**

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**1 MUNITIONS INCIDENTS REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION****1.1 Introduction**

1.1.1 The purpose of this chapter is to outline the procedures to be applied when there is an incident involving explosives. These arrangements are to be followed in all MOD (including Defence Agencies) establishments in the UK and abroad covering all aspects of the OME business. This includes management, storage, maintenance, inspection, processing, handling, transport and disposal of explosives, explosives storage and use of explosives on ranges or other MOD facilities. Complimentary arrangements for incident reporting are contained in:

- (1) JSP 862 Volumes 1 and 2 – when afloat.
- (2) JSP 335 Regulations for Dangerous Air Cargo, Part II, Section 1 Leaflet 3 - during air transport operations.
- (3) JAP 100A-01 Chapter 14.8 - for airborne stores (including Attack Helicopter).

**1.2 Legislation**

1.2.1 Regulation 5 of the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 1999 places a general duty on employers to have in place arrangements for the monitoring and review of the preventative and protective measures in their organisations. This includes the

requirement to adequately investigate the immediate and underlying causes of accidents to ensure that remedial action is taken, lessons are learned and longer-term objectives are introduced. The instructions contained within this chapter provide the methodology for ensuring MOD discharges its duties under regulation 5 as they apply to explosives incidents. The instructions contained in this section do not alter the need to make reports to regulatory authorities as required by legislation, for instance, The Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR) (SI 1995/3163). The regulations in this chapter are complimentary to those detailed in all Safety and Environment related JSP's.

### **1.3 Service Inquiries (SI)**

1.3.1 For Accidents involving Service Personnel and equipment guidance on the conduct of Service Inquiry (SI) should be sought from Queens Regulations for the Armed Forces. For accidents involving civilian personnel or equipment, guidance on the conduct of a SI are contained in JSP 375 Volume II Leaflet 14.

1.3.1 In accordance with Queens Regulations and JSP 375 all copies of SI, both Service and Civilian are to be made available to the MID Cell. This is necessary as this provides the respective Project Team (PT) with the complete picture of the incident and allows them to take any necessary safety actions.

### **1.4 Role of the MID Cell and use of MID Information**

1.4.1 The MID Cell is tasked by the Weapons Operating Centre (WOC) to collate incidents involving OME and to report incident trends and statistics accordingly. The MID Cell therefore utilises the information gathered from all reports raised to inform OME Safety in a number of different ways. Each report, as detailed in this chapter, is issued to relevant stakeholders for their investigation and respective closure and action. The closure of OME Incidents aims to ensure that accident and incident causes are identified and appropriate measures are taken to prevent re-occurrence. The MID Cell also looks closely at the statistics that the reports produce and is continually looking for trends. The MID cell is authorised to produce reports across Defence on incidents and accidents for all stakeholders. Information on the MID cell plus reports can be found on the Defence Intranet by searching for "MID CELL" on the search panel.

### **1.5 Losses**

1.5.1 All losses of ammunition should be reported in accordance with JSP 440 Part 7 Section 7 Chapter 1 – Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives and are not covered by this Document.

### **1.6 Retention of Records and the Use of Electronic Signatures on Reports**

1.6.1 The formal record for any incident, involving a death or injury, must be kept for a period of 100 years from the date of the accident in accordance with the provisions of JSP 441 – Defence Records Manual. The formal records of incidents, that do not cause death or injury, are to be kept for the lifetime of the weapon system that is involved. In order to simplify managing this process such records must be kept for a period of 50 years from the date of the accident. The MID Cell is responsible for retention of all such records. This process includes custody of the record utilising the services of the MOD Archive Office whilst also retaining scanned copies for immediate information access and trend analysis if required. Once it has been confirmed by the MID Cell that a report has been received, there is no requirement for the investigating agency to retain a copy. However, a register of all reports raised must be maintained by the investigating unit or agency in order to confirm the audit trail of all reported incidents.

1.6.2 The formal record includes details of the initial investigation as well as the records of any Service Inquiry that was convened. It is the responsibility of the Convening Authority to hold the formal record of the SI.

1.6.3 The formal record must be the original signed copy of the report. However in order to speed the reporting process it is permissible for electronic versions of reports to be forwarded to the MID Cell for expediency and to assist with the speed of the investigation.

These reports must be endorsed by the originator electronically. This endorsement can take the form of validation by E mail address or by the statement on the report “*signed on original*”.

## 1.7 Use of Chapter 25

1.7.1 This Chapter has been split into a series of instructions in the form of Annexes. On all occasions when an incident occurs reference should be made to Annex A which provides generic guidance to the type of report which should be made. This Annex provides Generic Incident reporting processes for the Maritime and all Land based Establishments and Units and a specific flow diagram for the Air Environment due to the nature of incidents which occur during flight. This Annex has a number of hyperlinks in place to take the user to the correct Annex. Annexes B to E relate to all types of incident reporting, whilst Annexes F to J provide supporting information to Reporting and Investigation.

1.7.2 If there are any problems with incident reporting the MID Cell should be contacted for clarification. MID Cell contact points are listed at Annex J.

## 1.8 Timelines for all Reports

1.8.1 The following timelines are mandated by these regulations for the submission of reports. These timelines are designed to ensure that any incident can be quickly investigated and any actions required emanating from the incident can be implemented as quickly possible. It is accepted that reports could breach these timelines on occasion; however it is imperative that reporting Units inform the MID Cell of the potential delay including the reasons why.

TYPE OF REPORT	TIMESCALE	REMARKS
<b>ACCIDENT – ANY SEVERITY – INITIAL REPORT</b>	<b>24 HOURS</b>	<b>Can be any method of notification to the MID cell as detailed in Annex B.</b>
<b>ACCIDENT –ANY SEVERITY – FULL REPORT</b>	<b>28 DAYS</b>	<b>Any reports for which an investigation is likely to be longer than 28 days should be notified to the MID Cell.</b>
<b>NEAR MISS – INITIAL REPORT</b>	<b>24 HOURS</b>	<b>Can be any method of notification to the MID cell as detailed in Annex B</b>
<b>NEAR MISS – FULL REPORT</b>	<b>28 DAYS</b>	<b>Any reports for which an investigation is likely to be longer than 28 days should be notified to the MID Cell.</b>
<b>NEGLIGENT DISCHARGE</b>	<b>1 CALENDAR MONTH</b>	
<b>PERFORMANCE FAILURE (INCLUDING SIMPLIFIED REPORTING)</b>	<b>28 DAYS</b>	<b>Due to the differing reporting regimes between the Services and DM this is a guideline only as to the maximum length of time to prepare a report. It is anticipated that under normal circumstances reports can be</b>

		<b>produced much faster than this timeline.</b>
<b>FAULT</b>	<b>28 DAYS</b>	<b>Faults identified where a potential adverse effect on the stockpile is noted should be reported to the appropriate PT immediately.</b>

1.8.2 The MID Cell will hasten for outstanding reports if they have not been received within the timelines provided unless notification of a delay has been received. It will also produce information on Closure of reports. This is particularly important if safety concerns have been highlighted in reports.

### 1.9 MID Cell Defence Intranet Website

1.9.1 Information referred to in this Chapter is included on the MID Cell Defence Intranet Home page. This site can be found by typing "MID CELL" in the search pane of the home page of the Defence Intranet. This site is regularly updated and refreshed with information regarding all aspects of MID Cell business and provides all Units and Establishments with MID information and various search facilities.

### 1.10 Electronic Signatures

1.10.1 Electronic Signatures are permitted on all reports which are sent and received on the MoD Computer network. This is accordance with guidance received from DG Info IM Protocol 047.

### 1.11 Formatting of Unit Serial Numbers


1.11.1 Units are to follow the format for their Unit Serial Numbers:

- (1). Unit/AT Monogram/Year/Unit Serial Number.
- (2). Example BSN/AIX/09/001

1.11.2. Where a report is not instigated by an AT/ATO personnel are to use their inspection Monogram or sub unit name.

CHAPTER 25 ANNEX A

GENERIC INCIDENT REPORTING FLOW DIAGRAMS - METHOD OF REPORTING AN OME INCIDENT FLOW DIAGRAM




**NOTE: ITS IS IMPORTANT TO REPORT ALL INCIDENTS – ANY DOUBTS CONTACT THE MID CELL**

**Footnote:**

1. All incidents which physically involve Munitions/Explosives are to be reported to the MID Cell. The purpose of this reporting mechanism is to ensure that all incidents across the whole Munitions inventory are reported.
2. Occupational Health Safety and Environment (OHSE) Incidents such as slips, trips falls, minor chemical or fuel spills in explosive environments or where explosives/munitions are present, but not involved should be reported to the appropriate Incident Notification Cell or through the appropriate chain of command.
3. If the above matrix does not provide sufficient guidance contact is to be made with the MID Cell for guidance. In the case of any doubt the reporting unit should always consider raising a Near Miss report. A Near Miss is an event where no injury or damage has been caused, however a near Miss could be a significant event and may help to prevent future accidents.

**PERFORMANCE FAILURE, FAULT, INCIDENT, ACCIDENT AND NEAR MISS REPORTING - DECISION MAKING FLOW DIAGRAM - AIR ENVIRONMENT ONLY**



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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX B****EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS AND NEAR MISS REPORTING LAND, MARITIME AND AIR UNITS ONLY****CONTENTS**

## Para

## 1 EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS AND NEAR MISS REPORTING LAND, MARITIME AND AIR UNITS ONLY

## 1.1 General Information

## 2 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESSES

## 2.1 Introduction

## 2.2 General Compilation of the Report

## 2.3 Dissemination of Accident or Near Miss Reports

## Appendix

## 1 Generic Details To Be Provided Following An Explosive Accident Or Near Miss

**1 EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS AND NEAR MISS REPORTING LAND, MARITIME AND AIR UNITS ONLY****1.1 General Information**

1.1.1 Units and Establishments must report all Accidents and Near Misses involving Munitions in accordance with these regulations. It is essential that incidents are reported even when considered trivial or attributable to the equipment rather than the munition. Only if all incidents are reported can a safe and fit for purpose munitions stockpile be maintained. In addition to the reports required by these regulations reports must also be made to the relevant incident notification cell listed below (for details see JSP 375). These additional reports are required by the Secretary of State for Defence so that accidents and near misses of all types are properly recorded and evaluated.

(1) **Navy.** The Naval Service Incident Notification Cell (NSINC).

(2) **Army.** The Army Incident Notification Cell (AINC).

(3) **RAF.** Through Air Command (AC) CESO (RAF)

1.1.2 Whenever an Explosives Accident or Near Miss occurs the details of the Accident/ Near Miss is to be reported to the focal points identified above dependent upon location of incident. Failure to report incidents could result in disciplinary action being taken. Information should be copied to the respective Chains of Command, the appropriate Inspectorate of Explosives (IE), MID Cell and the respective Incident Notification Cell by the fastest possible means. A signal, E Mail, telephone call or MoD Form 1668 should be completed by the appointed investigating agency/officer at the earliest opportunity but no later than 24 hours of the Accident or Near Miss. The generic format for this initial notification showing addressees and information required is shown at Appendix 1 and this format can be applied to any of the

notification methods used. Failure to report incidents could result in disciplinary action being taken.

1.1.3 In order to assist with reporting and full investigation, suitably qualified assistance can be obtained utilising the information provided at Annex G. In the process of obtaining qualified assistance consideration must be given to the service environment involved, the type of store involved and the respective expertise which is available to deal with or fully investigate the incident.

1.1.4 Flying Accidents occurring within the Period of Operation, other than those affecting unmanned drone aircraft, are subject to separate reporting and investigation procedures in accordance with Military Aviation Authority (MAA) Regulatory Publications (MRP). The Period of Operation is defined as the period between the time at which the air crew start their pre-flight checks for the purpose of flight to the time when shut down checks are complete. Reports on those accidents where the explosive component has played an integral part in the accident must be forwarded to the relevant IE.

1.1.5 For Accidents and Near Misses in partly contractorised establishments where the establishment head is a MoD employee, the responsibility for reporting accidents under RIDDOR 1995 etc to the HSE or other authorities rests with the contractor for accidents involving his own employees. However, the contractor must inform the establishment head who is the Duty of Care Holder, who will follow the procedures laid down in this chapter. If an establishment is fully contractorised (i.e. a Government Owned Contractor Operated or Private Finance Initiative) the contractor must inform the MoD Authority overseeing the contractual arrangements. In both cases the convening authority for any SI would be the MoD Authority overseeing the contractual arrangements.

1.1.6 In cases where a member of the public suffers death or injury, or there is damage to public plant, buildings, property, or equipment as a result of a MoD activity involving explosives, regardless of where the activity was taking place, an Inquiry must be carried out by the parent establishment in accordance with this Chapter. This is also reportable to the HSE under RIDDOR 1995. JSP 375 refers.

1.1.7 If it is decided that an accident shall be reported to the Defence Press Office (DPO) and Chief of Public Relations (CPR), the appropriate headquarters authority will provide the DPO and CPR with the basic factual information relating to the event. The Head of Establishment (HoE) or his representative may provide similar information in reply to enquiries from the Local Press and Media. Particulars of fatalities may also be released to the press and media provided the next of kin have been informed. Particulars of injured personnel should only be given to the press and media with the express permission of the individual concerned. The HoE or his representative must tell the DPO and CPR when next of kin have been informed. No further information will be given until sanction has been obtained following a discussion between the appropriate headquarters authority and the DPO and CPR.

1.1.8 The formal record for any accident, involving a death or injury, must be kept for a period of 100 years from the date of the accident in accordance with the provisions of JSP 441 – Defence Records Management Manual. The formal records of accidents, that do not cause death or injury, are to be kept for the lifetime of the weapon system that is involved. In order to simplify managing this process such records must be kept for a period of 50 years from the date of the accident. The MID Cell is responsible for retention of all such records. This process will include custody of the record utilising the services of the MoD Archive Office whilst also retaining scanned copies of records for immediate information access if required. Once it has been confirmed by the MID Cell that a report has been received, there is no requirement for the investigating agency to retain a copy of the report. However, a register of all reports raised must be maintained by the investigating agency in order to confirm the audit trail of all reported incidents. The formal record includes details of

the initial investigation as well as the records of any SI that was convened. It is the responsibility of the Convening Authority to hold the formal record of the SI.

## **2 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESSES**

### **2.1 Introduction**

2.1.1 Once the Investigating Officer has finished the investigation, a Full Report on MoD Form 1670 should be completed. Detailed completion instructions are included on the MoD Form.

### **2.2 General Compilation of the Report**

2.2.1 All reports, statements, evidence, photographs etc. are to be annotated with the reporting establishment / units reference number and where known the MID Cell reference number.

2.2.2 Reports should be typed before submission to ensure legibility. In exceptional circumstances, a clear hand written copy will be accepted if excessive delays will be encountered in trying to get the report typed (for instance when operating with limited resources).

2.2.3 Where handwritten statements are taken by the Investigating Officer, copies are to be typed and certified as a true copy. The typewritten copies are to be forwarded with the report as annexes and the original statements are to be retained by the Investigating Officer for presentation at an SI. Once presented original statements are to be forwarded to the MID Cell.

2.2.4 Copies of Military Police / MDP reports, Armourers' reports, medical reports etc. are to be submitted as enclosures to the MOD Form 1670. Items of evidence are an important part of the investigation and must to be submitted to the MID Cell with Free From Explosives (FFE) certificates if they are available. This will assist with PT investigation post report.

### **2.3 Dissemination of Accident or Near Miss Reports**

2.3.1 A Minimum of three copies of the report should be prepared. One is retained by the Investigating Officer for presentation to a Service Inquiry. The second copy is to be dispatched to the MID Cell and the third Copy should be issued to the Unit/Establishment concerned in the event that Unit/ Establishment corrective actions have been discovered by the Investigating Officer. Any further copies required should be produced in such an instance were an authority outside of the normal chain of command is required to take action. Instances such as "Error in Drill", where the ammunition was not found to be at fault, but a procedural error had been discovered, are an example of such an occurrence.

2.3.2 The MID Cell, on receipt of a report that requires investigation by multiple authorities will disseminate accordingly.

2.3.3 If there are any doubts over initial dissemination of reports the MID Cell should be contacted for clarification. MID Cell contact points are listed at Annex J.

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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX B APPENDIX 1****GENERIC DETAILS TO BE PROVIDED FOLLOWING AN EXPLOSIVE ACCIDENT  
OR NEAR MISS****SUBJECT - OME ACCIDENT/NEAR MISS – REPORT IAW JSP 482 CHAPTER 25**

<b>TYPE OF INCIDENT:</b>	In accordance with Classification in Annex G e.g. Critical Accident, Near Miss etc.
<b>UNIT REFERENCE NUMBER:</b>	
<b>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</b>	
<b>DATE OF INCIDENT:</b>	<b>DTG</b>
<b>AMMUNITION INVOLVED:</b>	<b>INCLUDE ADAC, NSN, FULL DESIGNATION, BKI OR SERIAL NO.</b>
<b>WEAPON/PLATFORM INVOLVED:</b>	<b>INCLUDE SERIAL NO. IF APPLICABLE</b>
<b>CASUALTY DETAILS (IF APPLICABLE):</b>	
<b>DAMAGE (IF APPLICABLE):</b>	<b>ANY DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OR THE ENVIRONMENT</b>

<b>INCIDENT DETAILS:</b>	
<b>DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER:</b>	

*This form can be found on the MID Cell Defence Intranet home page.*

*This can be found by typing MID CELL in the search pane on the Defence Intranet Home page.*

**DISTRIBUTION:**

Higher Formation (Div/Bde/ Gp)

DE&S ABBEY WOOD – FOR MID CELL

Appropriate PT (if not known the MID Cell will pass to the appropriate PT)

Inspector Explosive (Navy/Army/Air force\*)

Fleet /HQ Land Forces/HQAC\*

JSEODOPSCEN Didcot/NBC\*

\* = Delete as applicable

**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX C****EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS AND NEAR MISS REPORTING DM****CONTENTS**

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- 1 EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS AND NEAR MISS REPORTING DM
  - 1.1 General Information
- 2 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESSES
  - 2.1 Introduction
  - 2.2 General Compilation of the Report
  - 2.3 Dissemination of Accident or Near Miss Reports

## Appendix

- 1 Generic Details To Be Provided Following An Explosive Accident Or Near Miss

**1 EXPLOSIVES ACCIDENTS AND NEAR MISS REPORTING DM****1.1 General Information**

1.1.1 Establishments must report all Accidents and Near Misses involving Munitions in accordance with these regulations. It is essential that incidents are reported even when considered trivial or attributable to the equipment rather than the munition. Only if all incidents are reported can a safe and fit for purpose munitions stockpile be maintained.

1.1.2 Whenever an Explosives Accident or Near Miss occurs at a DM Establishment the details of the Accident/ Near Miss is to be reported to the DE&S Incident Notification Cell (DINC) by the fastest possible means. An E Mail or telephone call should be completed by the appointed investigating officer at the earliest opportunity but no later than 24 hours after the Accident or Near Miss. The generic format for this initial notification showing the information which should be supplied to DINC is shown at Appendix 1 and this format can be applied to any of the notification methods used. DINC will be responsible for forwarding this report to the MID Cell and other relevant authorities on receipt.

1.1.3 In order to assist with reporting and full investigation, suitably qualified assistance can be obtained if required utilising the information provided at Annex G.

1.1.4 For Accidents and Near Misses in partly contractorised establishments where the establishment head is a DM employee, the responsibility for reporting accidents under RIDDOR 1995 etc. to the HSE or other authorities rests with the contractor for accidents involving his own employees. However, the contractor must inform the DM Head of Establishment who is the Duty of Care Holder before notifying the HSE, who will follow the procedures laid down in this chapter.

1.1.5 In cases where a member of the public suffers death or injury, or there is damage to public plant, buildings, property, or equipment as a result of a DM activity involving explosives, regardless of where the activity was taking place, an Inquiry must be carried out by DM Head Office in accordance with this Chapter. This is also reportable to the HSE under RIDDOR 1995. JSP 375 refers.

1.1.6 If it is decided that an accident shall be reported to the Defence Press Office (DPO) and Chief of Public Relations (CPR), the appropriate DM Head Office point of contact, generally DM PO, will provide the DPO and CPR with the basic factual information relating to the event. The HoE or his representative may provide similar information in reply to enquiries from the Local Press and Media but should be subject to scrutiny and agreement by DM Head Office PO on all occasions. Particulars of fatalities may also be released to the press and media provided the next of kin have been informed. Particulars of injured personnel should only be given to the press and media with the express permission of the individual concerned. The DM HoE or his representative must tell the DPO and CPR when next of kin have been informed. No further information will be given until sanction has been obtained following a discussion between the appropriate headquarters authority and the DPO and CPR.

1.1.7 The formal record for any accident, involving a death or injury, must be kept for a period of 100 years from the date of the accident in accordance with the provisions of JSP 441 – Defence Records Management Manual. The formal records of accidents, that do not cause death or injury, are to be kept for the lifetime of the weapon system that is involved. In order to simplify managing this process such records must be kept for a period of 50 years from the date of the accident. The DOSG MID Cell on behalf of the DINC Cell is responsible for retention of all such records. This process will include custody of the record utilising the services of the MoD Archive Office whilst also retaining scanned copies of records for immediate information access if required. Once it has been confirmed that a report has been received, there is no formal requirement for the investigating depot to retain a copy of the report. This is optional; however, a full register of all reports raised must be maintained by the Depot in order to confirm the audit trail of all reported incidents. The formal record includes details of the initial investigation as well as the records of any SI that was convened. It is the responsibility of the Convening Authority to hold the formal record of the SI

1.1.8 The MID Cell will be able to retrieve any original record from the MOD Archive Office within 24 hours. Scanned copies are immediately available on request from the MID Archive.

## **2 ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROCESSES**

### **2.1 Introduction**

2.1.1 Once the Investigating Officer has finished the investigation, a Report on Form AR1 should be completed.

### **2.2 General Compilation of the Report**

2.2.1 All reports, statements, evidence, photographs etc are to be annotated with the reporting establishment reference number.

2.2.2 Where handwritten statements are taken by the Investigating Officer, copies are to be typed and certified as a true copy. The typewritten copies are to be forwarded with the report as annexes and the original statements are to be retained by the Investigating Officer for presentation at a Service Inquiry. Once presented original statements are to be forwarded to the DINC Cell.

2.2.3 Copies of Military Police / MDP reports, Armorers' reports, medical reports etc. are to be submitted as enclosures to the AR1 post Service Enquiry. Items of evidence are an important part of the investigation and must to be submitted to the DINC Cell with Free From Explosives (FFE) certificates if they are available post Inquiry. This will assist with PT investigation.

### **2.3 Dissemination of Accident or Near Miss Reports**

2.3.1 A Minimum of two copies of the report should be prepared. One is retained by the Investigating Officer for presentation to a Service Inquiry as necessary. The second copy is to be dispatched to the DINC Cell. Additional copies may be required but will be determined by the severity of the accident.



2.3.2 If there are any doubts over dissemination of reports the DINC Cell should be contacted for clarification. The DINC Cell may request assistance with this process from relevant authorities including the MID Cell.

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## CHAPTER 25

## ANNEX C APPENDIX 1

GENERIC DETAILS TO BE PROVIDED FOLLOWING AN EXPLOSIVE ACCIDENT OR  
NEAR MISS**SUBJECT - OME ACCIDENT/NEAR MISS – REPORT IAW JSP 482 CHAPTER 25**

<b>TYPE OF INCIDENT:</b>	In accordance with Classification in Annex H e.g. Critical Accident, Near Miss etc.
<b>UNIT REFERENCE NUMBER:</b>	
<b>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</b>	
<b>DATE OF INCIDENT:</b>	<b>DTG</b>
<b>AMMUNITION INVOLVED:</b>	<b>INCLUDE ADAC, NSN, FULL DESIGNATION, BKI OR SERIAL NO.</b>
<b>WEAPON/PLATFORM INVOLVED:</b>	<b>INCLUDE SERIAL NO. IF APPLICABLE</b>
<b>CASUALTY DETAILS (IF APPLICABLE):</b>	
<b>DAMAGE (IF APPLICABLE):</b>	<b>ANY DAMAGE TO PROPERTY OR THE ENVIRONMENT</b>

<b>INCIDENT DETAILS:</b>	
<b>DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER:</b>	

*This form can be found on the MID Cell Defence Intranet home page.  
This can be found by typing MID CELL in the search pane on the Defence Intranet Home page.*

**SEND ON ALL OCCASIONS TO THE DINC CELL**

**COPY TO THE MID CELL**

**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX D****NEGLIGENT DISCHARGES (ND) REPORTING****CONTENTS**

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- 1 ND REPORTING
  - 1.1 Definition
  - 1.2 Action
  - 1.3 Action By The Explosives Technical Support

**1 ND REPORTING****1.1 Definition**

1.1.1 A Negligent Discharge (ND) or a suspected ND are terms that are only used with Small Arms Ammunition (SAA) up to and including 9 mm in calibre. Any ND for Calibres or Explosive Stores above 9mm should be reported as an Explosive Accident/Near Miss in accordance with Annex B. An ND or suspected ND is deemed to have occurred when the initiation of the SAA is unauthorised and unintentional or inadvertent. No death, injury or damage to equipment or property is to have occurred, and the weapon and ammunition performed to the designed specification.

1.1.2 Therefore, the following criteria must be met for this to be reported as a ND:

- (1) No death, injury or damage has occurred.
- (2) It involves SAA up to and including 9 mm.
- (3) The weapon is fully serviceable and performed to the designed specification. The weapon is to be inspected by a Technical Authority. If, during inspection, any fault is found which results in the weapon being other than serviceable the incident is to be reported as an explosive accident.

1.1.3 The SAA performed to the designed specification. If the SAA failed to perform correctly then the incident is to be reported as a performance failure.

1.1.4 Although the cause of a ND is normally human error, it is still important to report all such occurrences. What may be a one off to an individual unit may be one of many occurrences world-wide. If a large number of NDs occur in a similar fashion it may indicate a design fault with the weapon or an error in the specified drills. NDs are classed as dangerous occurrences within the scope of RIDDOR 1995 and must be reported as a matter of course.

**1.2 Action**

1.2.1 When an ND or a number of NDs occurs units are to report the incidents to their local Explosives Technical Support this can either be when the ND occurs (the preferred method of reporting) or on a monthly basis on MoD Form 1664. Where applicable a copy of the Technical Authority Weapon Report is to be forwarded along with the report. Please note that for NDs in the RN environment they should be completed in accordance with BRd 8988 but also copied on each occasion to the MID cell.

**1.3 Action by The Explosives Technical Support**

1.3.1 When the Explosives Technical Support receives a report of NDs it should be processed and forwarded to the MID Cell. For the Land Environment reports must be forwarded to the MID cell.

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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX E****FAULTS AND PERFORMANCE FAILURES****CONTENTS**

## Para

- 1 FAULTS AND PERFORMANCE FAILURES
- 1.1 Terminology
- 1.2 Reasons and Benefits of Reporting Faults / Performance Failures
- 1.3 Use of this Annex

## Appendix

- 1 Maritime Environment
- 2 Land Environment
- 3 Air Environment
- 4 DM

**1 FAULTS AND PERFORMANCE FAILURES****1.1 Terminology**

1.1.1 The following terms are to be used for classifying explosives incidents covered by this Annex:

- (1) *Fault*. An Explosives fault is defined as follows:
  - (a) An error in the make-up of the Munition or Package.
  - (b) An alteration or deterioration found during the design service life of the physical condition of the munition.
  - (c) Deterioration of ammunition packages (including internal fitments), Unit Load Containers (ULC) or Unit Load Specifications (ULS).
  - (d) Marking errors or omissions.
  
- (2) *Performance Failure*. A Performance Failure is the failure of the ammunition or any of its constituent parts, including the explosives, to function as designed. Examples are:
  - (a) After throwing a Grenade Hand Smoke it bursts into flames.
  - (b) A Mortar Bomb drops short.
  - (c) An Artillery Shell/ Naval Gun Shell suffers Misfire or Early Burst.
  - (d) An A/C Bomb fails to detonate after normal release.

**1.2 Reasons and Benefits of Reporting Faults / Performance Failures**

1.2.1 It is essential to report all explosives faults and performance failures in order to prevent a reoccurrence with possibly fatal consequences. DE&S controls all stocks of MoD explosives world-wide and can rapidly impose a ban or constraint on their use. Failure to report incidents could result in disciplinary action being taken against the individual whose responsibility it was to provide the report.

1.2.2 Exhaustive trials are carried out on all munitions prior to service, however it is possible for the explosives to degrade at a faster rate than expected.

If users ignore this degradation, it is possible for it to go unnoticed by the Technical Authorities. The reporting of the Performance Failures of explosives during operations and training provides essential information feedback. Combined with information from In-Service Surveillance (ISS) quality trends can be assessed. These trends are of significant value in calculating the efficiency and reliability of operational and war stocks. In addition, the life of the explosives can be calculated and future buys influenced. The information gathered may also be used to improve the design or make up of the Muniton.

### **1.3 Use of this Annex**

1.3.1 The Fault and Performance failure Reporting regimes for the 3 Services and DM are unique and have different reporting criteria. Therefore for ease of use each Fault and Performance Failure instruction is produced uniquely for each Service and DM. For the Land Environment please note these instructions apply to common user natures used by the Army, RAF and Maritime Shore Establishments.



**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX E APPENDIX 1****NON EMBARKED MARITIME ENVIRONMENT FAULT / PERFORMANCE FAILURE  
REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS****CONTENTS**

## Para

- 1 RN REPORTING/DEFECT REPORT FORMS
  - 1.1 Introduction
  - 1.2 Non-Availability of Appropriate Forms
- 2 FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF ARMAMENT STORES
  - 2.1 Method of Reporting
- 3 FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF GUIDED WEAPONS
  - 3.1 Method of Reporting
- 4 FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF TORPEDOES AND ASSOCIATED STORES
  - 4.1 Method of Reporting

**1 RN REPORTING/DEFECT REPORT FORMS****1.1 Introduction**

1.1.1 Failures of munitions to function correctly may be attributable to any of a number of contributing factors. To ensure the reason for the failure is correctly recorded and the correct actions are taken, MF1668, MF1669, S2022 (GW) and MF 760 (dependant on munition type), are to be rendered on the occasion of any failures<sup>1</sup>.

**1.2 Non-Availability of Appropriate Forms**

1.2.1 In the event of an appropriate form being unavailable, defects and failures are to be reported in manuscript giving as much detail as possible to the authorities appropriate to the store.

**2 FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF ARMAMENT STORES****2.1 Method of Reporting**

2.1.1 MF 1668 and MF 1669 are to be used to report all defects and failures of Armament Stores except Guided Weapons, Torpedoes, Mine Countermeasure Stores, Depth Charges and the Explosive Cutter Mk9.

2.1.2 MF 1668 and MF 1669 are to be rendered as follows:

- (1) The original to the Administrative Authority, or DG Weapons for air explosive stores.
- (2) One copy to MID Cell, Fir 3B, #4304, MOD Abbey Wood South, Bristol, BS34 8JH.
- (3) One copy to the relevant OME PT.
- (4) One copy to the DM Depot at which the defective store has been/will be returned.
- (5) One copy retained by originator.

<sup>1</sup> All RN non-embarked Military Aircraft Environment (MAE) units are to report iaw JAP 100A-01 Chapter 7.5, JAP 100A-01, Chapter 14.8.  
Jan 2013

2.1.3 The defective store (or empty box) is to be clearly labelled using S3086 (Defective Armament Stores Label) with the name of the establishment or Unit with a reference to the defect report and marked "For special examination". The same marking is to appear on the outside of the package.

2.1.4 Any returns must be certified as safe for transportation and handling.

### **3 FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF GUIDED WEAPONS**

#### **3.1 Method of Reporting**

3.1.1 Failures and defects occurring in all Guided Weapons are to be rendered on Form S2022 (GW). Air Weapon defects are to be reported on MoD Form 760. Distribution is to be as for MF 1667 and MF 1668.

### **4 FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF STING RAY TORPEDOES AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT**

#### **4.1 Method of Reporting**

4.1.1 Reports of failures and defects occurring on the Sting Ray and Spearfish Torpedos and associated equipment are to be rendered on either the MF 760 or Form S2022 in accordance with JAP100A01 Chapter 7.5

**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX E APPENDIX 2****LAND ENVIRONMENT FAULT AND PERFORMANCE FAILURE REPORTING  
ARRANGEMENTS****CONTENTS**

## Para

- 1 FAULTS
  - 1.1 Introduction
  - 1.2 Action by the Unit
  - 1.3 Action by Units on Operations
  - 1.4 Information Required
- 2 PERFORMANCE FAILURES
  - 2.1 Introduction
  - 2.2 Ammunition Performance Failures – Immediate Action Drill
  - 2.3 Continue Firing Drill
- 3 SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES BLINDS AND MISFIRES DETAILS
  - 3.1 Introduction
  - 3.2 Action by the Unit
  - 3.3 Action by the AT/ATO

**1 FAULTS****1.1 Introduction**

1.1.1 A fault is deemed to have occurred when an error is found with the actual explosives or their containers and they were sealed by the manufacturer or authorised technical personnel when received by the unit.

1.1.2 Explosives faults are nearly always detected by Technicians at storage depots and corrected before issue to units. Units will probably only detect a fault while receipting or issuing explosives from unit explosives stores or while distributing explosives on a range or training area. Units are to ensure that all personnel involved in the distribution of explosives are fully conversant with the procedures contained within this Section

**1.2 Action by The Unit at Training**

1.2.1 When an explosives fault is noticed units are to inform the local ATO. This is in accordance with:

- (1) Infantry Training Volume IV, Ranges, Pamphlet No.21, Regulations for Training with Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), Infantry Weapon Systems and Pyrotechnics Section 6.
- (2) Infantry Training Volume IV, Ranges, Pamphlet No.21c - Regulations for the Planning, Conduct and Supervision of Firing and Training for Cadets.

**1.3 Action by Units on Operations**

1.3.1 When an explosives faults is noticed units are to inform the local Ammunition Technical Support who will then instigate an investigation and corrective action or advice as necessary.

## 1.4 Information Required

1.4.1 The initial information required by the ATO/AT is as detailed on MoD Form 1668.

1.4.2 The investigating ATO/AT will then make a more detailed assessment of the fault with advice from other technical agencies as required. Once the ATO/AT has concluded his investigation, an Explosives Fault Report, MoD Form 1669 should be sent to the MID Cell in accordance with Paragraph 1.8 to this Chapter

## 2 PERFORMANCE FAILURES

### 2.1 Introduction

2.1.1 Ammunition performance failures most frequently occur while units are out on a range, training area or on Operations. In these instances attending safety staffs are unlikely to be carrying a full set of relevant publications. Hence, safety and supervisory staff are to ensure they are fully conversant with the procedures required for dealing with performance failures involving ammunition.

### 2.2 Ammunition Performance Failures – Immediate Action Drill

2.2.1 The immediate action drill should be undertaken in accordance with Infantry Training Volume IV, Ranges, Pamphlet No.21, Regulations for Training with Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFV), Infantry Weapon Systems and Pyrotechnics Section 6 and Pamphlet 21C, Regulations for the Planning, Conduct and Supervision of Firing and Training for Cadets Section 6.

### 2.3 Continue Firing Drill

2.3.1 Firing may continue with the batch of ammunition involved if:

- (1) It is a single occurrence or the total quantity involved did not exceed 1% of the total fired.
- (2) It is a blind or misfire which may be destroyed by the unit in accordance with:
  - (a) Inf Trg Vol 4 Pam 21 Chapter 14.
  - (b) Mil Eng Vol 2 Pam 4 Chapter 7 Section 7.7
  - (c) Arty Trg Vol 3 Pam 19 Chapter 10.

2.3.2 If the same type of failure were it to recur would not put personnel at risk.

2.3.3 If the scene of the incident or any evidence remains undisturbed for the arrival of the ATO/AT.

2.3.4 If the failure(s) will not affect the training being carried out.

2.3.5 The format and detail for the information required by the ATO is laid down on MoD Form 1668.

2.3.6 The investigating ATO/AT will then make a more detailed assessment of the performance failure with advice from other technical agencies. Once the ATO/AT has concluded his investigation, an Explosives Performance Failure Report, MoD Form 1665 should be sent to MID Cell in accordance with Paragraph 1.8 to this Chapter.

## 3 SIMPLIFIED PROCEDURES FOR REPORTING BLINDS AND MISFIRES DETAILS

### 3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 This simplified method of reporting a Blind or Misfire is to be used by the unit when:

- (1) An AT is not available to investigate the Blind or Misfire and explosives are destroyed in situ by appropriately trained and qualified unit personnel in accordance with:
  - (a) Inf Trg Vol 4 Pam 21 Chapter 14.
  - (b) Mil Eng Vol 2 Pam 4 Chapter 7 Section 7.7
  - (c) Arty Trg Vol 3 Pam 19 Chapter 10.
- (2) Blinds occur on a range that will be cleared at a later date by range staff.
- (3) Misfired SAA is recovered after a range practice.

3.1.2 If any injury or damage has occurred, no matter how minor, the incident is to be reported as an Explosives Accident in accordance with Annex B.

3.1.3 Where a weapon is involved it must be inspected by a Technical Authority and a Weapon Report is to be completed.

3.1.4 Although the cause of a blind or misfire may be explosives production, it is still important to report all such occurrences. What may be an isolated incident to an individual unit may be one of many occurrences world-wide. If a large number of incidents occur in a similar fashion it may have an implication on Operational stock holdings or indicate a design fault with the explosives or an error in the drills.

### 3.2 Action By The Unit

3.2.1 When a blind or misfire occurs units are to report the occurrence to their local ATO/AT on MoD Form 1665(S). Units are to reproduce this form locally. Where applicable a copy of the Technical Authority Weapon Report is to be forwarded along with the simplified report.

### 3.3 Action By The AT/ATO

3.3.1 The ATO/AT is to analyse the report and ensure that the details are technically correct and that it contains sufficient detail for the PT Capability Manager to assign a Closure Code. If it is the opinion of the ATO/AT that the report should be investigated further then every effort should be made to complete a full technical report of the incident. The simplified Blinds/Misfire procedure is not intended to circumvent ATO/AT responsibilities in ensuring correct and full Unit reporting of Blinds and Misfires. **ATO/AT's should under no circumstances use the Simplified Blinds and Misfire Procedure, if they attend the range.**

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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX E APPENDIX 3****AIR ENVIRONMENT – FAULT / PERFORMANCE FAILURE REPORTING  
ARRANGEMENTS****CONTENTS**

## Para

- 1 AIR ENVIRONMENT
  - 1.1 PT Responsibilities
- 2 FAULT REPORTING
  - 2.1 General
  - 2.2 Unit Responsibilities
  - 2.3 OME Faults Requiring Inspections
- 3 AIRCRAFT OME PERFORMANCE FAILURES
  - 3.1 General
  - 3.2 Exclusions to Reporting
  - 3.3 Failure to Release/Launch
  - 3.4 Irregular Release
  - 3.5 Failure to Function or Irregular Functioning

## Request/Report Forms

- 1 Request for PT Tasked Inspection of Explosives and Associated Non Explosive Components
- 2 Aircraft OME and Associated Equipment Performance Failures – Format of Initial Report
- 3 Aircraft OME and Associated Equipment Performance Failures– Format of Follow up Report

**1 AIR ENVIRONMENT****1.1 PT Responsibilities**

1.1.1 The PT for the OME concerned is normally responsible for investigating faults/performance failures in explosives and associated components. Where an investigation is to be carried out within industry or at a DSTL/QinetiQ establishment, the PT will act as the tasking agency.

**2 FAULT REPORTING****2.1 General**

2.1.1 Fault reporting is to be in accordance with JAP100A-01, Chapter 7.5, or as otherwise directed by the PT for the OME concerned.

**2.2 Unit Responsibilities**

2.2.1 Units/Establishments are to report any failure in operation, functioning, construction or assembly of OME which indicates a possible fault in design, manufacture, material or packaging. A copy of the report is always to be sent to the MID Cell in addition to any other agency involved.

## 2.3 OME Faults Requiring Inspections

2.3.1 The PT Tasked Inspection Procedures for OME is to be used for the reporting of faults that are not generally significant and do not warrant, at least initially, MoD F760 action, but are beyond the capability of the unit to assess and / or rectify. For example:

- (1) During HE bomb maintenance the exploders are found to be stuck in the exploder tube.
- (2) An item has been found to be corroded or wet due to poor storage conditions.
- (3) An inspection, beyond unit capability, which is required to assess a fault for continued storage and transport, or to assess the fault prior to possible MoD F760 action.

2.3.2 Units are to request an PT Tasked Inspection using format 1. On receipt of the request the PT is to consider the request and, as appropriate, is to task the appropriate inspection organisation.

## 3 AIRCRAFT OME PERFORMANCE FAILURES

### 3.1 General

3.1.1 The policy for aircraft OME and associated equipment performance failures is given in JAP 100A-01, Chapter 14.8. A performance failure that **does not** constitute an Accident is to be reported as detailed in this order. This reporting action is additional to any reporting action required by other orders and instructions.

3.1.2 Throughout this annex, the following terms apply:

- (1) Failure to Release or Launch. A failure to release (i.e. hang up) or launch (i.e. misfire) occurs when any ac weapon or equipment is retained by an aircraft after the normal or emergency release sequence has been completed.
- (2) Irregular Release. An irregular release occurs when any aircraft weapon or equipment is released, launched or fired in a manner different from that selected by the aircrew. This includes premature or delayed releases/ launches.
- (3) Failure to Function. A failure to function occurs when any weapon or equipment, after successful release/ launch from an aircraft, fails to operate in accordance with the aircrew pre-release selections.
- (4) Irregular Functioning. Irregular functioning occurs when any aircraft weapon is released, launched or fired correctly, but operates in a manner different to that selected or programmed during preparation or loading. Such occurrences would include premature detonation of a bomb or missile warhead.
- (5) Inadvertent Release. An inadvertent release occurs when the aircraft stores management system operates as selected, but not as intended, and does not constitute an accident as defined in Chapter 25. For example, stores released by mistake, at the wrong instant, or as a result of incorrect switch selection, are inadvertent releases and do not require reporting in accordance with this Annex. Inadvertent releases should be reported in accordance with JSP 551 unless an accident results, when reporting action should be made in accordance with Annex B.
- (6) Unit Senior Armament Officer. The unit Senior Armament Officer (SAO) is the Commissioned Officer or Warrant Officer responsible for armament matters at a unit or detachment. The unit SAO may delegate reporting action required by this Order, but only to engineering personnel of the rank of WO or above.



### 3.2 Exclusions to Reporting

3.2.1 The following exclusions apply:

- (1) 3kg and 14kg Practice Bombs. Failure to release of practice bombs from CBLs need only be reported in accordance with Command Instructions for the quarterly return of ac conventional weapon expenditure and failures. However, unit SAOs may, if they wish, highlight specific occurrences using the reporting procedure in this Order.
- (2) Aircraft Gun Ammunition. Action following failures involving any aircraft gun ammunition is detailed in the appropriate Topic 2(N/A/R) 1. However, unit SAOs may, if they wish, highlight specific occurrences using the reporting procedure in this Order.
- (3) Countermeasures. Misfires or multiple releases of Countermeasures Chaff or IR Flares which, on investigation, are attributable to a dispenser failure, need only be reported in accordance with Command Instructions for the quarterly unit return of aircraft conventional weapon expenditure and failures.
- (4) Aircraft Missiles. Aircraft missile performance failures are to be reported in accordance with the appropriate Topic 2(N/A/R) 1.

### 3.3 Failure to Release/Launch

3.3.1 The following procedure applies:

- (1) 70mm CRV 7 Rockets. If second line investigation, by examination of the launcher, aircraft and launcher connectors, etc., indicates that the CRV 7 rocket motor is unserviceable following a misfire, a Failure to Release Report in the format of Part 2 is to be raised for the rocket(s) concerned. A follow-up report is not required, but full details of the investigation carried out are to be included in the Part 2 report (at para M).

### 3.4 Irregular Release

3.4.1 The following reports are to be used:

- (1) Captain's Report. Irregular and inadvertent releases are to be reported by aircraft captains in accordance with the instructions in JSP 551 – Military Flight Safety Regulations
- (2) SAO's Report. The unit / establishment is to send an initial reporting signal within 24 hours, as detailed in Part 2 2, in all circumstances (including irregular release of practice bombs from CBLs) except where the occurrence is covered by paras 10 to 12 above.
- (3) Follow-Up Report. A follow-up report, as detailed at Part 3, is to be submitted within 10 working days of the occurrence. Subsequent follow-up reports, cross-referenced to the original report, should be sent when further information becomes available.

### 3.5 Failure to Function or Irregular Functioning

3.5.1 In the event of a failure to function, or irregular function, reports are required as follows:

- (1) Bombs A/C 540lb, 1000lb – All Marks, including occurrences where the tail or fuze fails to operate.
- (2) Paveway all variants
- (3) Enhanced Paveway all variants

**REQUEST FOR PT TASKED INSPECTION OF EXPLOSIVES AND ASSOCIATED NON-EXPLOSIVE COMPONENTS**

Station: \_\_\_\_\_ Unit Form Serial No: \_\_\_\_\_ (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Target Date: \_\_\_\_\_ (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Section / Reference / NATO  
No / ADAC: \_\_\_\_\_

Nomenclature:  
\_\_\_\_\_

Package Type: \_\_\_\_\_

Maker (Filler): \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_ Lot Number/BKI: \_\_\_\_\_ (4) \_\_\_\_\_

Weapon Serial Number: \_\_\_\_\_

Reason for request for inspection:

Inspection requested by:

Rank: \_\_\_\_\_ Name \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Notes:

1. Enter the PT Authority for the item/s.
2. Enter Unique Serial Number.
3. Enter target date. This may be dependent on stock levels, safety etc.
4. Enter lot number/BKI. Use a separate application for each lot number.
5. Give full details of fault and how it was found.

Reverse of Form

Inspection Results:

Inspectors Recommendations:

PT Actions:

Name

Signature

Post

Date

**Aircraft OME and Associated Equipment Failures – Format of Initial Report**

		<b>Special Handling Caveat</b>	
<b>Message Form</b>		Serial No	F/Sigs 266 (Rev 3/90)
Line 1			File store ref:
2			Routed by
3			Time
4			Prepared by
			Time
<b>Precedence : Action / ROUTINE / Info ROUTINE</b>			For single transmission
<b>DTG:</b>			
<b>Routeing Indicators</b>	<b>From: STATION</b>		Transmitted to
	To:		Channel No / System
	HQ AIR FOR SO2 A4 ARM AND SO2 A3 OPS		Time
	DE&S MOD ABBEY WOOD – FOR MID CELL		Operator
	DE&S MOD ABBEY WOOD PT (AS APPLICABLE)		Message instructions
	DE&S BATH FOR PYRO MAN		
	HQ 1 Gp SO2 a3 Ops		<b>TABULATE</b>
	<b>Info:</b>		Security classification
	HQ PARENT GROUP		RESTRICTED
	OC ESW (IF DETACHED)		SIC
			HNH/B2B/KJA

**SUBJECT – TYPE OF OCCURRENCE – REPORT IAW WITH JSP 482 CHAPTER 25**

A. AIRCRAFT HOME BASE:  
 B. AIRCRAFT TYPE AND TAIL NO:  
 C. DATE OF INCIDENT:  
 D. RANGE/EXERCISE/OPERATION DETAILS:  
 E. TYPE OF ATTACK:  
 F. NO OF WEAPONS RELEASED:  
 G. WEAPON SYSTEM INVOLVED:  
 H. (1) WEAPON : TYPE/MARK / MKR/DATE LOT/ MANUFACTURERS SERIAL NO/ AIR CARRIAGE HOURS  
 (2) FUZE: TYPE/MARK / MKR/DATE LOT/ MANUFACTURERS SERIAL NO/ AIR CARRIAGE HOURS  
 (3) TAIL: TYPE/MARK / MKR/DATE LOT/ MANUFACTURERS SERIAL NO/ AIR CARRIAGE HOURS  
 (4) PROXIMITY SENSOR FITTED: YES/NO INCLUDE SERIAL NUMBER IF APPLICABLE  
 (5) CCG/ECCG: TYPE/SERIAL NO. GCU/EGCU: SERIAL NO.  
 I. AIRCRAFT HEIGHT AND SPEED AT RELEASE OR ATTEMPTED RELEASE:  
 J. BRIEF ACCOUNT OF INCIDENT, INCLUDING ANY CONTROL SYSTEM INDICATORS:  
 K. DAMAGE OF INJURY:  
 L. INITIAL INVESTIGATION:  
 (1) STATUS OF AIRCRAFT FUZING UNITS:  
 (2) STATUS OF SHEARWIRES/LANYARDS/LEFAs REMAINING WITH AIRCRAFT:  
 M. FOLLOW UP ACTION:  
 (1) AIRCREW REPORT:  
 (2) AIRCRAFT SMS TEST RESULTS:  
 (3) GPS OR TELEMETRY FAILURES, DESIGNATOR TESTS (if applicable):  
 (4) WEAPON PREP/DE-PREP FINDINGS:  
 N. ANY OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION

<b>Internal distribution: Action:</b>		<b>Info:</b>			
Page	1	Pages	File No or reference	Releasing Officers	Signature
Of	1				
Have you referred to a classified Message?		Drafters name and Rank (in BLOCK letters)		Name (BLOCK letters)	
State yes or NO		Branch and telephone No		Branch and telephone No.	
for OPR's R use	filing time/TOR	System	Operator/Final check operator		
<b>Security Classification</b>			RESTRICTED		

\* Delete as necessary.

**Aircraft OME and Associated Equipment Failures – Format of Follow up Report**

		<b>Special Handling Caveat</b>		
<b>Message Form</b>		Serial No	F/Sigs 266 (Rev 3/90)	
Line 1				File store ref:
2				Routed by
3				Time
4				Prepared by
				Time
<b>Precedence : Action / ROUTINE</b>		<b>/ Info ROUTINE</b>		For single transmission
<b>DTG:</b>				
<b>Routeing Indicators</b>	<b>From: STATION</b>			Transmitted to
	To:			Channel No / System
	HQ AIR FOR SO2 A4 ARM AND SO2 A3 OPS			
	DE&S MOD ABBEY WOOD – FOR MID CELL			Time
	DE&S MOD ABBEY WOOD PT (AS APPLICABLE)			Operator
	DE&S BATH FOR PYRO MAN			
	HQ 1 Gp SO2 a3 Ops			Message instructions
				<b>TABULATE</b>
	<b>Info:</b>			Security classification
	HQ PARENT GROUP			RESTRICTED
	OC ESW (IF DETACHED)			SIC
				HNH/B2B/KJA
<p><b>SUBJECT – TYPE OF OCCURRENCE – REPORT IAW WITH JSP 482 CHAPTER 25</b></p> <p><b>ORIGINAL REPORTING SIGNAL REFERENCE:</b></p> <p><b>FAULTS FOUND DURING INVESTIGATION:</b></p> <p><b>CAUSES OF THE OCCURRENCE:</b></p> <p><b>UNIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT FURTHER OCCURRENCE:</b></p> <p><b>DETAILS OF ANY UNIT ACTION TAKEN OR ABOUT TO BE INITIATED:</b></p>				

<b>Internal distribution: Action:</b>		<b>Info:</b>			
Page	1	Pages	File No or reference		Releasing Officers Signature
Of	1				
Have you referred to a classified Message?		Drafters name and Rank (in BLOCK letters)			Name (BLOCK letters)
State yes or NO		Branch and telephone No			
for OPR's R use	filing time/TOR	System	Operator/Final check operator		Branch and telephone No.
Security Classification		RESTRICTED			

\* Delete as necessary.

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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX E APPENDIX 4****DEFENCE MUNITIONS (DM) – FAULT REPORTING SYSTEM****CONTENTS**

Para

**1 FAULT REPORTING – DEFENCE MUNITIONS**

- 1.1 Introduction
- 1.2 Fault Reporting
- 1.3 Other information
- 1.4 Completion of MoD Forms
- 1.5 Distribution of MoD Forms

**1 FAULT REPORTING – DEFENCE MUNITIONS (DM)****1.1 Introduction**

1.1.1 The DM Fault Reporting System is designed to meet the needs of General Conventional Munition Fault Reporting; this does not apply to complex weapon processing faults. This Appendix describes the system and procedures which are adopted by DM and Royal Fleet Auxiliary Vessels (RFA).

1.1.2 A comprehensive Fault reporting system is essential to assess/monitor the quality of new munitions and also the processing, performance, reliability and maintainability of the munitions throughout its service life.

**1.2 Fault Reporting**

1.2.1 MoD Form 1669A should be used on all the following occasions:

- (1) All Initial Acceptance Inspection faults of any kind found direct from the Manufacturer.
- (2) All Faults which could affect Operational Capability.
- (3) All Faults which could affect munition performance or safety.
- (4) Returned Ammunition Group (RAG) faults.
- (5) All packaging or marking faults not affecting safety.
- (6) All packaging and wood fitments not ISPM 15 compliant.

1.2.4 All Faults are to be reported.

1.2.5 All Forms should be sent to the MID Cell who will distribute to the appropriate PT for action and Closure. Electronic versions are acceptable.

**1.3 Other Information**

1.3.1 Service User reported faulty munitions must have the Unit/Ship/ Station investigation results reported on the relevant form referencing the Unit/Ship/ Station Fault report number. A copy of the Unit/Ship/Station Fault report must be attached to the relevant form. This will be used for cross referral and trend analysis purposes.

1.3.2 Serious faults must be reported by the Senior Officer involved in the incident immediately by E Mail or by telephone. A format is attached at Part 1 to this appendix. A MoD Form 1669A must be raised but may be issued later. The E Mail should be sent to the MID Cell.

1.3.3 Advice and assistance from the relevant PT in dealing with significant faults may also be undertaken. The DM Proc Tech team and the respective site Explosive Safety Rep (ESR) should also be informed if this type of incident.

#### 1.4 **Completion of MoD Forms**

1.4.1 Forms must be typed.

1.4.2 The security classification should be the lowest possible.

1.4.3 Instructions for completion are detailed on the MoD Forms.

#### 1.5 **Distribution of Forms**

1.5.1 The distribution of the Forms is:

- (1) Original – MID Cell.
- (2) DM EBS - E Mail to DM Prog Tech Team
- (3) One copy to be retained by the issuing depot.



**PART 1 TO APPENDIX 4****E MAIL FORMAT FOR REPORTING SERIOUS FAULTS****HEADING: NOTIFICATION OF A SERIOUS FAULT FOUND AT DM.**

<b>DM REFERENCE:</b>	
<b>DATE OF FINDING FAULT:</b>	DTG
<b>ITEM FULL DESIGNATION:</b>	
<b>ADAC:</b>	
<b>NSN:</b>	
<b>ITEM (FULL DESIGNATION) :</b>	
<b>BKI OR SERIAL NO :</b>	
<b>BRIEF DETAILS OF THE NATURE OF THE FAULT INCLUDING DETAILS OF THE SAFETY CONCERNS:</b>	
<b>ANY FURTHER ACTION OR RELEVANT INFORMATION:</b>	This is to include details of any subsidiary hazards e.g. Radioactive sources, self –oxidizing etc.

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## CHAPTER 25

## ANNEX F

## GENERIC INITIAL INCIDENT REACTION AND INVESTIGATION GUIDANCE

## CONTENTS

Para

- 1 INVESTIGATION GUIDANCE
  - 1.1 Introduction
- 2 INVESTIGATIONS
  - 2.1 Responsibilities of the Investigating Officer
  - 2.2 Competency
  - 2.3 General Information
  - 2.4 Use of Supporting Agencies
  - 2.5 Jurisdiction and Primacy at the Scene of an Accident
  - 2.6 Actual Investigation
  - 2.7 Witnesses
  - 2.8 Evidence
  - 2.9 Sequence of Events
  - 2.10 Follow-up Investigative Actions

## 1 INVESTIGATION GUIDANCE

## 1.1 Introduction

1.1.1 Where an explosives related incident has occurred and explosives have been initiated, personnel injured (reportable under RIDDOR or the Merchant Shipping [Reporting Accidents and Investigation] Regulations) or the situation is considered High Risk (e.g. fire in the vicinity of explosives) the following action is to be taken:

- (1) The local Major Accident Control plan is to be activated, if appropriate, (see JSP 498).
- (2) The relevant PT and IE are to be informed immediately.

1.1.2 In the event of an incident involving explosives where initiation of an explosive has **not** taken place and the safety of explosives or personnel is not considered to be immediately at risk (i.e. by Fire, personnel trapped etc.), the following key actions must be taken:

- (1) The explosives are not to be disturbed, unless to minimise risk of a further accident.
- (2) An immediate Risk Assessment is to be conducted to ascertain subsequent recovery action. The level of detail required is dependent on the potential consequences and may range from a dynamic Risk Assessment to a full written assessment. This is to be undertaken by the person in charge at the scene.
- (3) Where it is considered appropriate, the local emergency control plan is to be activated.
- (4) The relevant PT and IE are to be informed as soon as practically possible.

1.1.3 Emergency actions to be taken for explosives accidents on public highways or on the rail outside MoD property are contained in JSP 800. Emergency action to be taken for explosives accidents occurring on board ships/vessels outside of the MoD Port Authority (Queens Harbour Master) are contained in JSP 862 Volume 1 or 2 as appropriate and JSP 800 Vol 4b.

## 2 INVESTIGATIONS

### 2.1 Responsibilities of the Investigating Officer

2.1.1 The Investigating Officer is appointed by the HoE or his representative. It is possible that the Investigating Officer may be provided by JSEODOC. The Investigating Officer is responsible for undertaking a preliminary examination of the circumstances and if appropriate make an examination of the site of the accident and take statements from witnesses. This is to provide the Head of Establishment with an early view of the circumstances so that a decision can be made on what actions are appropriate. Annex G provides guidance on Incident categorisation.

### 2.2 Competency

2.2.1 The Investigating Officer must have a sound understanding of MoD Explosive and other Safety Regulations and of local procedures applicable to the area in which the accident has occurred. They must also have appropriate technical expertise. If necessary an Officer with the appropriate technical knowledge must be seconded to the investigation. The appropriate IE can advise on suitability and authorise an independent advisor if necessary. Any contention or doubt as to the suitability of an individual to act as an Investigating Officer is to be referred to the appropriate IE for resolution. The Investigating Officer must not have been involved with the accident in any way.

### 2.3 General Information

2.3.1 The information in this Annex is produced as a guide to investigation for the member of OME competent staff attending the scene of an Accident/Incident. It is produced in a logical order and aims to cover as many incident eventualities as possible. However it should be noted that this information cannot cater for every eventuality and therefore cannot be considered exhaustive. It is advised that each situation should be assessed and investigated on its own merits.

2.3.2 The investigator is reminded of the necessity to record all available information at the time of the investigation. In some circumstances it is possible that the investigator is not notified of an incident until a few days later, on such occasions it is still essential that as much detailed information and evidence as is gathered.

2.3.4 In the investigation of any incident involving munitions, all possible causes are to be carefully considered, particularly if the cause is not immediately apparent. The most probable causes must first be fully eliminated using positive factual evidence before speculation into any other possibilities. All conclusions or theories must be supported by a fully reasoned case with firm available and reliable evidence.

2.3.5 Factual evidence, supported by witness statements, preferably corroborated and carefully examined, should be the basis of all investigation.

### 2.4 Use of Supporting Agencies

2.4.1 By definition, the Investigating Officer is qualified to make a technical judgement on whether the explosives may have caused the accident, contributed to the accident occurring or contributed to the consequences of the accident. However, in a complex situation where other factors may have contributed to the accident, expert assistance is essential in determining the true events.

2.4.2 Various agencies may be called upon to assist in the investigation of an explosives accident. These include:

- (1) Service Armourer
- (2) More experienced Investigating Officers
- (3) Relevant Integrated Project Team (for design defects)
- (4) Inspector of Explosives (relevant service)

- (5) Defence Ordnance Safety Group (DOSG)
- (6) Land Accident Prevention and Investigation Team (LAIT)
- (7) Range Safety Inspection Team (Army) (RSIT[A])
- (8) Military Police
- (9) Small Arms School Corps (SASC)
- (10) Gunnery Instructors.

2.4.3 Such agencies may also be called upon to present reports and evidence at a SI, therefore it is important that the Investigating Officer works with them to produce a co-ordinated and factual report.

## 2.5 Jurisdiction and Primacy at the Scene of an Accident

2.5.1 The subject of primacy at the scene of an incident is determined by the actual nature of the incident. However if ammunition is initially suspected to be the cause of the incident and there are any safety concerns at all, then the senior OME competent person at the scene should have initial primacy until the scene has been made safe. Where death or serious injury has occurred or if negligence is suspected then the SIB or Civil Police, dependent upon location, will take charge of the investigation.

2.5.2 In most cases, primacy is apparent and the OME investigator should work with the other agencies involved to ensure that the scene is dealt with effectively.

## 2.6 Actual Investigation

2.6.1 The following avenues and sequence of investigation should be followed if it is possible to do so.

2.6.2 Following arrival at the scene the following immediate actions should be considered:

- (1) Survey the scene. First priority is **SAFETY**.
- (2) Weapons and munitions remaining at the scene must be made safe. This can form part of the investigation.
- (3) Immediately consider if it is safe to continue use of the munition.

## 2.7 Witnesses

2.7.1 The investigator should emphasise to witnesses that they are in attendance to primarily ascertain the cause of the incident and to prevent re-occurrence by positive action.

2.7.2 Witnesses should be interviewed as soon as possible, taking into account due regard to the nature and type of incident. It is possible that the witness may be suffering from shock and this should be considered during the interview process. In any investigation there will be human factors and an examination of the factual evidence available will often enable the investigator to check if there are any inaccuracies in the witness statements.

2.7.3 If the credibility of any witness statements are the subject of conjecture then this fact must be reflected in the report.

2.7.4 Close liaison with Service and Civil Police may be required if access to the witnesses cannot be granted for legal reasons. Any information obtained under these circumstances must also be clearly caveated in the report.

## 2.8 Evidence

2.8.1 Evidence recovered at the scene can be critical to the investigation if it is available. Collection of evidence is subject to primacy at the scene and items should not be removed unless permission has been granted to do so. The investigator, to ensure that evidence is obtained, is to undertake the following actions:

- (1) Cordon and restrict access to the scene.
- (2) Determine whether evidence has been disturbed or removed.

- (3) Search the scene fully for evidence. Include all possible detail.
- (4) Note position of evidence on a sketch drawing.
- (5) Photograph the scene and any munitions, weapons, equipment involved as fully as possible. Consider all angles of the scene. If possible use some form of gauge (e.g. ruler/measure/familiar object such as a pen) to indicate size/distance in photographs.
- (6) Bag and mark clearly any evidence collected and mark location of find on sketch drawing.
- (7) Conduct an FFE certification process on any item removed and produce appropriate certification.
- (8) Secure evidence that cannot be FFE'd and remove to a suitably licenced explosive facility.

## 2.9 Sequence of Events

2.9.1 Evidence available at the scene is critical but may not be conclusive. The investigator should also consider external influences and any events which could have been significant prior to the actual incident occurring. Many accidents are preceded by a linked event, such as poor drill or adverse weather, climatic or ground conditions. Other investigative Avenues to Consider

2.9.2 The following avenues of investigation should be pursued. This list is not exhaustive but is intended to provide some investigative guidelines:

- (1) Has the munition of this type or Batch Key Indicator (BKI) been subject to any ban, constraint or limitation in its service life?
- (2) Are there any known faults with the munition involved?
- (3) Where applicable was the munition assembled correctly?
- (4) Was there any evidence of Modification? If so was the Modification authorised and conducted in accordance with instructions?
- (5) Was there any evidence of tampering or unauthorised actions?
- (6) Were there any problems loading the munition? Had any other munitions been loaded prior to the incident?
- (7) How long had the munition been loaded into the weapon or equipment prior to the incident?
- (8) How many of the same munition had been fired prior to the incident, both overall and with the weapon involved? Had there been any irregularities during these firings?
- (9) Were there any RF hazards in the area (if EED involved)?
- (10) How was the item packed? Was it damaged in any way?
- (11) How had the munitions been stored? Had they been exposed to extreme conditions?
- (12) How had the munitions been transported? Had they been subjected to excessive rough handling?

2.9.3 Small Arms and Gun Ammunition only:

- (1) How many rounds had been fired before the incident?
- (2) Had there been any stoppages prior to the incident?
- (3) Had the primer or cap been struck? Did it misfire?
- (4) Had there been an error in or of drill?
- (5) Did the propulsion seem normal when compared to other firings? Is there any evidence of incomplete burning of propellant?

(6) Was the muzzle flash different when compared to other firings?

2.9.4 Grenades and pyrotechnics:

(1) Was the safety pin removed correctly? Was it easy to do so?

(2) Did the initiation system function easily?

2.10 **Follow-up Investigative Actions**

2.10.1 Evidence gathered at the scene of an accident is critical, however to complete the investigation a number of follow up actions are available. Examples of these are:

(1) Test firing – actually try to replicate, if safe to do so, the incident. Consultation with the PT concerned should be undertaken if any safety concerns exist.

(2) Comparison firing – comparison firing of a different BKL of a nature under the same conditions may assist the investigation.

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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX G****POINTS OF CONTACT FOR INCIDENT INVESTIGATION AND PREVENTION****CONTENTS**

## Para

- 1 INCIDENTS IN THE UK
- 2 INCIDENTS IN GERMANY
- 3 INCIDENTS ON EXERCISES OR AT PERMANENT JOINT OPERATING BASES
- 4 INCIDENTS WHILST ON OPERATIONS

**1 INCIDENTS IN THE UK**

1.1 In the UK all Incidents and Near Misses should be reported to the JSEODC as detailed below:

JSEODOC  
11 EOD Regiment RLC  
Vauxhall Barracks  
DIDCOT Oxon OX11 7ES  
Telephone: Didcot Military: (94 234) Ext: 3360, 3361 or 3362  
Didcot Civil: (01235) Ext: 513360, 513361 or 513362  
Facsimile number: Didcot Military: (94 234) Ext: 3354  
Didcot Civil: (01235) 513354  
Signal Address: JSEODOPSCEN DIDCOT

**2 INCIDENTS IN GERMANY**

2.1 Within Germany all explosives incidents are to be reported to 921 Squadron, 11 EOD Regiment RLC. Contact address and telephone numbers are (all dialling codes are for dialling within Germany):

Normal Working Hours:  
Golf Troop  
921 Squadron  
11 EOD Regiment RLC  
BFPO 39  
Telephone: Bielefeld Military: (81) Ext: 3474, 3475  
Bielefeld Civil: (0521 9254) Ext: 3474, 3475 or 3476  
Facsimile: Bielefeld Military: (81) Ext: 3460

**3 INCIDENTS ON EXERCISES OR AT PERMANENT JOINT OPERATING BASES**

3.1 Units in Belize, Brunei, Canada, Cyprus, Falkland Islands and Northern Ireland are to report all incidents direct to their local Ammunition Technical Support or nearest Service Police Unit who will assist in contacting the AT/ ATO.

3.2 For Exercise where Technical Support is deployed with exercising Service Personnel, units are to report all explosives incidents direct to this support. Where this support is not available, units are to report all explosives incidents to JSEODOC who will arrange technical assistance.

#### **4 INCIDENTS WHILST ON OPERATIONS**

4.1 Units are to report all incidents to the local explosives technical support. Where no such support is available, units are to report all explosives incidents to JSEODOC who will arrange for the correct technical assistance.

**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX H****CLASSIFICATION OF ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS****CONTENTS**

## Para

## 1 INTRODUCTION

## Tables

- 1 Accidents/Incidents Involving Death, Injury or Damage
- 2 Accidents/Incidents Not Involving Death, Injury or Damage

1 **INTRODUCTION**

1.1 The severity of an incident is defined for the Ministry of Defence in JSP 375. Tables 1 and 2 below provides guidelines to these regulations as applied to the OME Environment plus further guidance on how these categories relate to incidents specifically involving explosives. Note that JSP 375 does not specifically cater for incidents involving explosives but provides generic MoD wide guidance only. The Investigating Officer will categorise the incident on all occasions with the assistance of the appropriate IE. In all cases the IE will make the final decision on the classification assigned to an incident. Where a Near Miss had the potential to cause damage, death or injury the IE may call for a full Inquiry in order to prevent re-occurrence as well as ensuring that a corrective action plan is undertaken and implemented.

## Tables

- 1 Accidents/Incidents Involving Death, Injury or Damage
- 2 Accidents/Incidents Not Involving Death, Injury or Damage

**TABLE 1 - Accidents/Incidents Involving Death, Injury or Damage**

<b>Nature of Accident/Incident</b>	<b>Required Actions</b>	<b>Level of Inquiry</b>	<b>Report to</b>
<p><b>Critical</b></p> <p>A fatality or severe injuries resulting in long term illness or disability.</p> <p>Total loss of platform, system/munition or facility.</p> <p>A MACR incident as defined in JSP 498 Major Accident Control Regulations.</p>	<p><b>Service Inquiry</b></p> <p>MOD Formal Service Inquiry/Board of Inquiry supported MoD Form 510 in addition external agencies, e.g. Police Investigation, Coroners Report, HSE Investigation.</p> <p>MoD Form 1670.</p>	<p>Officers appointed in accordance with Service Regulations or Senior Office appointed by Establishment/ Department/Unit or Police.</p> <p>AT/ATO, RN, RAF or Civilian equivalent full investigation which provides the Service Inquiry with specialist OME information and knowledge.</p>	<p>Commanding Officer/Head of Establishment/Unit. DS&amp;C Findings for follow up action to Service Principal Focal Points, BLB, HLB and TLB H&amp;S focal points.</p> <p>IRIS Mainframe records via Incident Notification Cell</p> <p>MID Cell</p>
<p><b>Major</b></p> <p>Victim requiring hospital treatment or several serious injuries.</p> <p>Damage to platform, system/munition, facility, such that it is beyond economic repair or failure of an extant safety measure or procedure.</p>	<p><b>Service Inquiry</b></p> <p>Fully documented, Service Inquiry/ Board of Inquiry supported by MoD Form 510.</p> <p>HSE may investigate.</p> <p>MoD Form 1670.</p>	<p>OF5 level or above and H&amp;S Adviser or Police.</p> <p>AT/ATO, RN, RAF or Civilian equivalent full investigation which provides the Service Inquiry with specialist OME information and knowledge.</p>	<p>Commanding Officer/ Head of Establishment/Unit.</p> <p>IRIS Mainframe records via Incident Notification Cell</p> <p>MID Cell</p>
<p><b>Serious</b></p> <p>A Broad category between</p>	<p><b>Informal</b></p> <p>Informal with a written record</p>	<p>AT/ATO, RN, RAF or Civilian</p>	<p>Commanding Officer/ Head of</p>

Nature of Accident/Incident	Required Actions	Level of Inquiry	Report to
<p>Slight and Major</p> <p>Examples are:</p> <p>More than 3 days lost time, requiring medical treatment but not admission to hospital.</p> <p>A formal report to the HSE under RIDDOR</p> <p>Failure or corruption of extant safety measure or procedure resulting in broken or damaged munition/ platform/ equipment but which can be repaired.</p>	<p>Supported by MOD Form 510.</p> <p>HSE may choose to investigate dependent upon circumstances.</p> <p>MoD Form 1670</p>	<p>equivalent to investigate. OF3 level or above and/or H&amp;S Adviser, Police or Specialist Investigation team to assist if required.</p>	<p>Establishment/Unit.</p> <p>IRIS Mainframe records via Incident Notification Cell</p> <p>MID Cell</p>
<p><b>Slight</b></p> <p>Examples are:</p> <p>Injuries resulting in more than one hour but less than 3 days lost time.</p> <p>Failure or corruption of an extant safety measure resulting in an accident</p>	<p><b>Local</b></p> <p>MoD Form 510.</p> <p>MoD Form 1670</p>	<p>AT/ATO, RN, RAF or Civilian equivalent to investigate. Line Management and the injured party must assist with the investigation.</p>	<p>Local H&amp;S Adviser.</p> <p>IRIS Mainframe records via Incident Notification Cell</p> <p>MID Cell</p>

Nature of Accident/Incident	Required Actions	Level of Inquiry	Report to
causing minor damage to Munition, platform/ equipment which is considered cosmetic and can be repaired.			
<p><b>Trivial</b></p> <p><b>No incidents involving OME items are classed as trivial.</b></p>			

**TABLE 2 - Accidents/Incidents not involving Death, Injury or Damage**

<b>Nature of Accident/Incident</b>	<b>Investigation required</b>	<b>Type of Inquiry</b>	<b>Report to</b>
<p><b>Near Miss</b></p> <p>An occurrence, or potential occurrence, involving an explosive which could have caused:</p> <p>Damage to the explosives. Damage to, or contamination of, military or civilian equipment, property or the environment.</p> <p>Death, injury to, or illness of, military personnel, MoD civilian personnel or members of the public.</p> <p>Threat to the structural integrity of, or to cause damage to, military or civilian equipment, property or the environment.</p>	<p><b>DEPENDENT ON SEVERITY OF NEAR MISS</b></p> <p>Each Near Miss should be considered on the relative merits or nature of the incident. Where a near Miss could have resulted in a death or injury e.g. An event such as a bullet closely missing a soldier in training would be classed as a Near Miss, however if the bullet had struck and killed or injured the soldier then the incident would have been classed as a Critical or Major Accident.</p> <p>In the case of any doubt contact should be made in all instances to the appropriate IE.</p>	<p><b>DEPENDENT ON SEVERITY OF NEAR MISS</b></p>	<p><b>DEPENDENT ON SEVERITY OF NEAR MISS</b></p>

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**CHAPTER 25****ANNEX I****CLOSURE OF INCIDENTS****CONTENTS**

## Para

1 CLOSURE

## Appendix

1 Example Closure Format

2 Closure Codes for PTS

**1 CLOSURE**

1.1 The MID Cell on receipt of the complete report will pass a copy to the respective PT or relevant suitable authority for their consideration and closure. The Authority will consider the report on its merits and decide on a closure code following a technical investigation. Any required actions will be issued by the Authority with their closure documentation. A generic blank Closure Report format is attached at Appendix 1 as well as a list of closure codes to be used at Appendix 2.

1.2 In an instance where further actions are required by the Unit/Establishment involved in the incident, but which does not involve any corrective actions concerning the munitions (e.g. Error in drill, safety work on a range etc.) then confirmation is required that this work has been completed and is to be provided by the Unit involved directly to the MID cell.

1.3 The MID cell is not authorised to close incidents which are the subject to a SI until all actions arising from such an inquiry have been fully completed. In order to achieve this confirmation of completion of required actions is required to be issued in writing directly to the MID cell. This can be in any written format, including E mail but must detail all actions taken to prevent re-occurrence.

1.4 Following satisfactory closure of the incident the MID Cell will close this incident on the central database record.

1.5 The MID Cell produces monthly Closure information on the Defence Intranet as well as ensuring that all reports are satisfactorily investigated and closed accordingly.

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**CHAPTER 25**

**ANNEX I APPENDIX 1**

**EXAMPLE CLOSURE REPORT FORMAT (EXAMPLE)**

**MID RECORD CLOSURE**

<b>1. MID RECORD NUMBER:</b>
<b>2. ESTABLISHMENT/UNIT REF NO.</b>
<b>3. Details of Investigation</b>
<b>4. Any Additional Comments/Observations:</b>
<b>5. FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED:</b>

<b>6. ACTION REQUIRED BY:</b>	
<b>7. DETAILS OF COMPLETED ACTIONS:</b>	
<b>8. ASSIGNED CLOSURE CODE</b>	
<b>SIGNATURE</b>	
<b>DATE</b>	

**DISTRIBUTION:****1 COPY MID CELL****1 COPY REPORTING UNIT/ESTABLISHMENT****APPROPRIATE IE (if applicable)****Other: as appropriate**

## CHAPTER 25

## ANNEX I APPENDIX 2

## CLOSURE CODES

## INCIDENT CLOSURE CODES

Closure Code	Description
0	Open – MID Under Investigation
0A	NK/NA - OME item not available for examination
0B	NK/NA - Cause cannot be determined with evidence available
0C	NK/NA - Cause cannot be determined with evidence available - OME item Suspected
0D	NK/NA – Not applicable.
0E	NK/NA - Not Investigated – Incident/Accident/Performance Failure within Acceptable Limits
0F	NK/NA – Cancelled-Re-categorised
0G	NK/NA Cancelled
0H	NK/NA - An Accident/Incident/Performance Failure Not Related to OME Item, Weapon Or Drill (eg Platform Fault)
0J	NK - Unexplained Late/delayed Functioning
0K	Near Miss – potential to have caused Incident/Accident
0L	NK/NA – MID Cancelled – to be used by MID Cell only.
0M	NK – An Accident/Incident/performance Failure not related to the Munition.
1A	Storage – Army/ Depot
1B	Storage - Unit Store Army
1C	Storage - Field/Emergency
1D	Storage - On Range
1E	Storage - RN Ships
1F	Storage - Transit Storage - Road / Rail / Sea / Air Stationary/parked
1G	Storage - Temporary Licensed Location
1H	Storage - NK
1J	Storage – DSDA Explosive Site
1K	Storage - RAF Explosives Storage Area/Storehouse
1L	Storage – RFA/STUFT
1M	Storage other (specify on report)
2A	Handling – Due to MHE – general
2B	Handling – Manual Handling – Accident
2C	Handling – Manual Handling – Negligent
2D	Transportation – Road
2E	Transportation – Rail
2F	Transportation - Sea
2G	Transportation – Air
2H	Handling - Air Drop all methods
2J	Transportation - Cross Country
2K	Handling - Cause Not Known
2L	Handling - User – Negligent
2M	*Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes*
2N	Handling - When using crane (including overhead gantry)

2O	Handling VERTREP or RAS
2P	Handling other (specify on report)
2Q	Handling – Loading to/downloading from operating aircraft
2R	Handling - Due To MHE/GSE – Accident
2S	Handling – Due to MHE/GSE – Negligent use
3A	Design –OME item design fault
3B	Design – OME Packaging fault
3C	Design – Equipment. OME item not at fault.
3D	Design - Range Construction Or Maintenance
3E	Design - Range Construction Or Maintenance Suspected
3F	Design - Inert Component
3G	Design other (specify on report)
4A	Tampering - Malicious (Military)
4B	Tampering - Malicious (Civilian)
4C	Tampering - Prank (Military)
4D	Tampering - Prank (Civilian)
4E	Tampering - Experimental / Curiosity (Military)
4F	Tampering - Experimental / Curiosity (Civilian)
4G	Tampering – No evidence to assign other closure code
4H	Tampering – other (specify on report)
5	*Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes*
5A	Error Of Drill - OME Loading/ Unloading / Firing/Use
5B	Error Of Drill - OME Handling
5C	Error Of Drill – Equipment
5D	Error Of Drill - Negligent Discharge
5E	Error Of Drill - Incorrect Instruction(s)
5F	Error Of Drill – Malicious
5G	Error Of Drill – Prank
5H	Error In Drill (specify on report)
5I	*Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes*
5J	Error Of Drill - Miscellaneous
5K	Error Of Drill – Negligent supervision
6A	Equipment / platform only Failure - Broken / Damaged / Unserviceable
6B	Equipment / platform only Failure - Poor Maintenance
6C	Equipment / platform only Failure - Ingress Of Water / Moisture
6D	Equipment / platform only Failure - Ingress Of Dirt / Grit Etc
6E	Equipment / platform Failure - Design
6F	Equipment / platform only Failure - Production By Manufacturer
6G	Equipment /platform only Failure – Cause not known
6H	Equipment / platform Failure- Small Calibre Trapped Link
6I	Equipment / platform Failure –Firing Circuit
<b>6J</b>	<b>Equipment – Counterfeit Material</b>
7A	Production –OME item fault (not design)
7B	Production – OME Packaging fault (not design)
7C	Production - Incorrect or Temporary OME Packaging
7D	Production - Inert Component fault
7E	Certified Free From Explosives violation.
7F	Production – OME Package Marking Fault
8A	Defect Points
8B	Packaging
8C	Track Spread – Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes
8D	Split points - Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes

8E	Spread points - Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes
8F	Missile / Torpedo / Guided Weapon — Guidance Failure
8G	Missile / Torpedo / Guided Weapon — Hardware / Software Failure
8H	Missile / Torpedo / Guided Weapon – In Flight / Run failure
8I	Missile / Torpedo / Guided Weapon – Explosive component failure
8J	Missile / Torpedo / Guided Weapon – Test Failure
8K	Missile / Torpedo / Guided Weapon failure other (specify on report)
9A	In-Service Deterioration - Beyond Design Shelf / service Life
9B	In-Service Deterioration - Approaching Design Shelf / service Life
9C	In-Service Deterioration - Packaging Open and OME Returned / Held By Unit
9D	In-Service Deterioration – Prolonged in service Use / Handling By Unit
9E	In-Service Deterioration – No cause known
9F	In-Service Deterioration – Prolonged exposure to unprescribed climatic conditions.
9G	*Dummy for Referential Integrity Purposes*
10A	Unauthorised – Incident/accident/Performance Failure caused by unauthorised planning activities
10B	Unauthorised - Incident/accident/performance Failure caused by unauthorised supervision
10C	Unauthorised - Incident/accident/Performance Failure caused by unauthorised firing
10D	Unauthorised other (specify on report)
11A	<b>Unforeseen Environmental Factors e.g. Aircraft Bird Strike/ Severe Weather or ground conditions.</b>
11B	<b>Unforeseen Human factors resulting in an Accident, Incident, Performance Failure or Near Miss. Human factors to be detailed on report.</b>
Z1	Provisionally closed - awaiting BOI / COI
Z2	Provisionally closed – awaiting full Report. Signal only received
Z3	MID use only (where no closure code has been provided)

**New Closure Codes are:**

6J	<b>Equipment – Counterfeit Material</b>
11A	<b>Unforeseen Environmental Factors e.g. Aircraft Bird Strike/ Severe Weather or ground conditions.</b>
11B	<b>Unforeseen Human factors resulting in an Accident, Incident, Performance Failure or Near Miss. Human factors to be detailed on report.</b>

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**CHAPTER 25**

**ANNEX J**

**MID CELL POINTS OF CONTACT**

Mail Address:

MID CELL  
FIR 3A  
#4304  
MOD ABBEY WOOD SOUTH  
BRISTOL  
BS 34 8JH

SECTION C2: MIL: 96 79 80468 CIV: 0306 79 80468

Fax: MIL: 93 52 31920 CIV: 0306 79 31920

**E- Mail**

**DES WpnsEng-MID Mailbox (MULTIUSER)**

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