

**CONTACTPOINT PROJECT BOARD MEETING MINUTES****Members present:**

**Tom Jeffery (Chair)** Director General, Children & Families & SRO  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Non-Executive Board Member  
**[NAME REDACTED]** SRIE, Capgemini  
**[NAME REDACTED]** GRO Data Delivery Manager  
**[NAME REDACTED]** CP Implementation Manager (for **[NAME REDACTED]**)  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Programme & Project Management Unit, DCSF

**Apologies:**

**[NAME REDACTED]** DCSF Internal Audit  
**Malcolm Britton** Data Services, DCSF  
**Anne Frost** Workforce Development, DCSF  
**Sharon Jones** Head of DWP Data Sharing Strategy  
**Peter Mucklow** CFD Finance, DCSF  
**Jason Skill** Central Procurement, DCSF  
**Martyn Smith** CfH Spine Programme Director  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Director Children's Services,  
**Tim Wright** CIO, DCSF

**Also in attendance:**

**Christine Goodfellow** Programme Director  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Partner, Deloitte (for item 1)  
**[NAME REDACTED]** PMO Manager  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Supplier Delivery Manager  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Account Manager, Capgemini  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Programme Delivery Director, Capgemini  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Director, Security & Privacy, Deloitte (for item 1)  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Project Manager, Capgemini  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Deputy Programme Director  
**[NAME REDACTED]** PMO  
**[NAME REDACTED]** Implementation & Benefits Management Lead

**Agenda – 19 December 2007:**

1. Welcome and Introductions
2. Security Review

**[OTHER AGENDA ITEMS REDACTED AS OUT OF SCOPE]**

**Item 1: Welcome and Introductions**

1. Apologies were presented. Tom Jeffery (TJ) led the introductions.

**Item 2: Security Review**

2. **[NAME REDACTED]** and **[NAME REDACTED]** presented the interim findings of the ContactPoint Security Review. They reported a very open and positive engagement with the project team. No major issues had been found. A number of likely recommendations are emerging however, in the context of a changing "security environment" across Government over recent weeks and months. In particular it was noted that the sensitivity around a large collection of records was increasingly being recognised in security guidance as potentially greater than that associated with the content of an individual or small number records (i.e. the number that might be retrieved by a user). It may be necessary to review aspects such as the overall classification of the database (though it was noted that the protective measures already included within the design would probably be sufficient even if the overall classification of the data was raised) or the use of encryption in the database.
3. **[NAME REDACTED]** recalled that, some months earlier the project had established that Level 3 User Authentication would have significant time and cost implications and that, through **[NAME REDACTED]** (Govt CIO) we had previously agreed that the risk assessment and security measures taken for ContactPoint user authentication was appropriate. Christine Goodfellow (CG) stressed that the approach to a full (best practise) risk assessment had been confirmed as the most appropriate approach, rather than simply following a "Level 2 or Level 3" regime.
4. **[NAME REDACTED]** also highlighted some procedural issues identified in a Local Authority in relation to the use of LDQT.
5. **[NAME REDACTED]** explained that they have a number of outstanding queries and documents to review but expect to conclude in January 2008.
6. **[NAME REDACTED]** asked who commissioned this review and how it might be related to any wider reviews. **[NAME REDACTED]** on behalf of Tim Wright (TW) explained that TW had commissioned at the request of David Bell. He explained that there is a wider DCSF Review of Information Assurance underway. TJ explained that a wider cross-Government review, for Sir Gus O'Donnell, delivered an interim report yesterday (18 Dec) and was due to report fully in February 2008. **[NAME REDACTED]** noted that a WMS from Kevin Brennan had put this Review in the public domain.
7. **[NAME REDACTED]** asked the review team to consider, in their final report, lessons learned from reviews in OGDs, governance (clear accountabilities from top to bottom), what can be deduced about the top 5 risk areas and what the implications are for the project plan. **[NAME REDACTED]** agreed.

8. **[NAME REDACTED]** asked for the earliest possible indication that encryption might be needed so as to initiate initial impact assessment immediately.
9. Noting the cross-government implications of any changes to recommended security levels, **[NAME REDACTED]** asked if there was a forum in which to raise these issues. **[NAME REDACTED]** agreed to look into this.
10. **[NAME REDACTED]** explained that additional draft documents would show the review team the local guidance that is soon to be issued and that the project team would be monitoring LA application of local procedures in accordance with central guidance in future.
11. **[NAME REDACTED]** again stressed that any change in cross-Government thinking on security levels would have a major impact on ContactPoint and that we need to know as soon as possible if requirements have changed.
12. **[NAME REDACTED]** noted that it may be a case of requiring different security levels for different components of the system and that this would be addressed by the review. For example, it may be that encryption would be recommended for certain data only (e.g. shielded records, audit logs, authentication data). **[NAME REDACTED]** agreed to undertake an immediate initial impact assessment of this potential change.
13. **[MATERIAL WITHHELD]**
14. **[NAME REDACTED]** asked where the Information Commissioner is on this subject. CG replied that ContactPoint is in regular dialogue with the ICO and they are consulted in every aspect of ContactPoint design. In recent correspondence, whilst the IC had confirmed that he did not advise on security per se, he was very supportive of ContactPoint engaging with the Government CIO and acknowledged this as the correct approach on security matters.
15. **[NAME REDACTED]** asked if OGC had any involvement. **[NAME REDACTED]** was asked to look into this in the context of the earlier action on broader cross-Government review.
16. TJ thanked Deloitte for their professional and helpful approach and requested a further presentation at the January 2008 Board meeting.

**AP103** – Tim Wright to follow up the offer from Deloitte to consider, in their final report, lessons learned from reviews in OGDs, governance (clear accountabilities from top to bottom), what can be deduced about the top 5 risk areas and what the implications are for the project plan.

**AP104** – **[NAME REDACTED]** to investigate for a for cross-Government security issues arising from the current reviews, including any OGC

involvement.

**AP105 – [NAME REDACTED]** to provide results of initial impact of the use of encryption as of data items discussed (shielded records, audit logs, authentication data) for the Jan 2008 Board meeting.