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Independent review of police officers' & staff remuneration & conditions

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Tackling crime effectively requires effective deployment of police officers and staff with the right external support, stronger performance-management and pay and remuneration based on contribution made not years served or hours worked.

The CBI welcomes the opportunity to respond to this review and we are eager to work constructively with all parts of the police service to improve the efficiency and effectiveness so that together we can cut crime and protect and serve the public.

Crime costs UK households, business and Government more than £60 billion each year - roughly 4 per cent of GDP. Recent years have seen massive new investment in the police. Total central government spending on public order and safety – of which over half is spending on the police – accounts for 2.6 per cent of GDP, the highest in the OECD.¹ Central spending on the police has increased by around 19 per cent in real terms since 1997.²

Businesses are a funder and user of the police service. Employers and employees rely on the police to protect people and property. In addition businesses are the single largest payer of taxes so want to see value for that money.

However, business is also a provider of police services. Many members that the CBI represents are involved in the design and delivery of police and criminal justice services. This includes designing, building and operating police buildings, the operation of custody suites, the delivery of forensic science services, prisoner transport and escort services, investigation and major event support, back-office IT products and services and facilities management support – such as catering, cleaning and security. We believe with this perspective we can provide valuable lessons about how these can be improved.

Tackling crime and disorder effectively requires the right workforce that is flexible, equipped with the right skills, deployed appropriately, well-managed and incentivised to deliver for the public. The police service workforce must also contribute to returning the public balance sheets to health by working in the most efficient way and maximising their capability with the resources available.

This will be tough challenge given the wider economic situation and against a backdrop of increasing expectation. The public demand a

¹ Government at a Glance 2009, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2009

² Protecting the public: supporting the police to succeed, Home Office, 2009

visible police presence and involvement in community issues previously seen as the responsibility of other local community actors, while in changing world counter-terrorism and the fight against e-crime represent new challenges to tackle.

Police service working practices and pay and conditions should seek to prioritise those activities that most meet these public demands and should incentivise and reward staff and officers who show strong performance against these measures.

Traditional ways of working, even those that are popular with staff, but that have not stood the test of time need to be replaced. Mixed workforces and new performance-management systems and career progression structures should be embraced where they enable the police service to shift its focus from activities that satisfy process measures to those that deliver a good service to the public and the right outcome for wider society.

Consultation question responses

Relevant consultation questions are answered below:

How could we improve the deployment of officers and PCSOs?

We agree that remuneration and conditions should be used to maximise officer and staff deployment to frontline roles where their powers and skills are required. Sworn officers should be used to fulfil the functions they are trained to do and which the public expects and wants them to do.

Currently too many officers are not used in this way. Many are deployed to staff human resource, training and IT departments, data collection, audit and performance offices, intelligence and offender profiling units, call and case-management centres, storage sites and garages, police station offices and custody suites.

All of these roles are out of the public view and mean that many of the expensive skills that we equip/train police officers with – such as officer safety and police driving are not utilised. The kind of role they perform also seldom draw on the powers of warranted officers. They act as gaolers – feeding detained persons, taking fingerprints, photos and DNA – as staff officers providing secretarial support to senior officers, perform prisoner transfer or court escort driver duties, input and analyse data on crime trends or prolific offenders, train other officers in law and procedure, handle calls from the public or manage cases after arrest.

Police officers can usually be relied upon to do these jobs effectively, but rarely efficiently. It wastes talent and experience and pays a premium for them even though they are not used. Many of these jobs could be undertaken more effectively by a specialist and for considerably less money. Most of all it would free the officers to spend more time on frontline policing where their powers, training and skills are in constant demand.

We should not regard these roles as simply 'back-office'. Even on the streets there are police duties where sworn officers are not best placed to perform them. A police constable working as part of a safer neighbourhood team, for instance, may

have responsibilities around drug education or schools liaison, which do not require warranted powers. They are also unlikely to have expertise in these areas.

Maximising the value of skilled warranted officers will require the police service to redesign some of its operational processes so that tasks requiring the powers and skills of a police officer are concentrated on a smaller number of roles. Other tasks that do not require warranted powers can be bundled together in ways that enable specialist staff to perform them.

Opportunities to outsource elements of front-line policing are more limited, due to the highly sophisticated nature of these functions and the levels of risk involved. But with front office functions (including neighbourhood policing, financial investigation, and response) accounting for the majority of spending on the police service (£7.2bn a year out of total annual spending of £12.7bn³) forces should be looking to this area for savings.

Making the best use of the police workforce will increase productivity and reduce costs. Debate about the police workforce at a national and local level has tended to focus on overall police officer numbers and has avoided questions about how these officers are deployed and their overall effectiveness. The result has been a debate about policing in which success is measured by inputs - the overall number of officers - rather than outcomes - reducing crime for the public. Moving police officers out of support roles may mean that overall officer numbers are reduced but - significantly - frontline officer strength would be maintained or even increased.

Increased specialisation is not a threat to the role of police constable. But it would be surprising if any officer were able to maintain expertise in the wide range of responsibilities they currently have. By increasing specialisation the police service is more likely to benefit from officer expertise and by

offering opportunities for constables to develop expertise, there is the opportunity for career development without relying on promotion to senior ranks.

Are there any elements of police regulations and delegations that inhibit the more efficient deployment of officers?

Reform of shift patterns and use of assistive technology have been two key ingredients for success but ones that not all forces are using for maximum effect.

Norfolk Constabulary has significantly changed the way it delivers response policing, which has enabled the force to reduce the number of officers in response functions by 20% and move more than 150 officers from response to neighbourhood policing roles.⁴ Norfolk has reduced the number of response bases it operates from 35 to 6, by amending officers' shift patterns from a four-week rotating pattern to a six-week one which more closely matches resources to demand, and readjusting slightly the types of incidents that response officers would be sent to

It has upgraded the Automatic Vehicle Location System in response vehicles. Response times have fallen as the control room can see exactly where the units are and can deploy the closest unit to incidents. Satellite navigation systems in response vehicles are automatically sent directions without any officer input. It has changed the control room culture from one of dispatch to command and control, with an emphasis on managing resources efficiently.

There is also existing good practice where forces have used mixed workforces and role specialisation of civilian staff to change this, though again the examples represent the minority.

Designated detention officers (also known as civilian custody assistants) are now employed in some custody suites in England and Wales.

³ Analysis by Serco. Does not include spending by central agencies such as NPIA and SOCA

⁴ CBI report: A front line force, 2010

South Wales Police have gone further and have chosen private company G4S to deliver a five-year contract to manage custody services for the force. The contract employs 97 trained custody and detention officers at significantly lower cost than employing warranted police officers to fill the same roles. The average cost of a fully-trained police officer to staff the custody suites would be £33,000 a year, a total cost of over £3.2 million. The cost of G4S providing 97 custody and detention officers meanwhile is less than £2 million. The use of G4S therefore offers South Wales Police a net saving of £1.2 million a year on staffing costs alone and has enabled 53 police officers to be released from full-time custody duties and return to frontline operational duties.⁵

Surrey Police are using a new team structure in their Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Investigations are still led by detective police officers but Investigation Support Officers perform a number of tasks previously completed by warranted officers, enabling the role of detective constable to become more specialised. The investigation team has achieved a slight rise in their detection rate – a success given the intention to deliver the same for less.⁶

The Ministry of Defence Police are using security staff employed by the outsourcing provider MITIE to work alongside the force's officers to control access to sites run by the Atomic Weapons Establishment. The MITIE security team also engages with local communities in support of the Atomic Weapons Establishment's commitment to build a strong and positive relationship with its neighbours.

Nottinghamshire Police has devolved enforcement powers to Nottingham City Council, in partnership with Nottinghamshire Fire Service and Nottingham City Homes who have funded 100 community protection officers (CPOs). CPOs provide highly

visible patrols throughout the city to deter criminal and anti-social activity.⁷

Alongside British Transport Police, private company Serco, which operates the Docklands Light Railway under contract to Transport for London, has employed 17 travel safe officers to patrol trains and stations to enforce bylaws and tackle anti-social behaviour. They have powers to eject people from stations and impose penalty fares.⁸

But there are barriers – often the speed of take up when good ideas are developed is very slow. Despite the obvious benefits, only seven forces have delivered their custody facilities in the way South Wales Police have. Although the remaining 36 forces would not all be expected to achieve the same level of saving as South Wales Police, an estimated £45 million could be saved annually across England and Wales if outsourcing were extended. It makes clear sense for more forces to replicate this success and they should do so.

Many chief officers would apparently prefer to use warranted police officers in all roles because they regard it as a 'gold standard', but without regard for the cost implications of paying for over-qualified staff and the public dissatisfaction with access to the police, officer visibility and service quality. This is partly a culture issue as most of today's senior officers began in the service when the workforce was less diverse in its terms of roles and this probably meant their own careers saw them perform a very wide range of functions.

Funding for PCSOs is also currently ring-fenced, meaning chief officers are unable to make savings in this part of the police budget to invest elsewhere which reduces the incentive to make these sorts of shift in spending.

In many areas of the UK criminal justice sector (especially in prisons provision and site security), competition has proven to be the best way of

⁵ CBI submission to Comprehensive Spending Review 2010

⁶ Evaluation of demonstration sites: Second Interim Report, Deloitte, 2009

⁷ Nottingham Community Protection website

⁸ Making time: freeing up front-line policing, Alexis Sotiropoulos, The Serco Institute, 2008

ensuring the best provider provides. But ideology within the police is proving to be a barrier. One police authority the CBI is aware of was running a tender for custody health services and conceded that it had awarded a contract to the local NHS Primary Care Trust "...to keep it in the public sector family", even though it was 60% more expensive than a competing private sector bid.

National pay bargaining for police officers and for staff has often also impeded the ability of forces to create the kind of new roles we describe here. One go-ahead force in this area is Surrey Police whose workforce is unique because 54% of it is civilian where the national average is more like 35%. Crucially, Surrey Police has opted out of the national pay bargaining for police staff but is forbidden from doing so for police officers.

How could mutual aid use and remuneration for both Officers and Staff be changed to enable more efficient use of resources?

If the police service is to match its resources to demand in a more sophisticated way it must adopt an approach to risk that seeks to manage, not eliminate risk.

At present the approach to risk in parts of the police service can often be summarised as one of 'just in case'. Staffing levels and shift patterns are often designed to meet every eventuality, with warranted officers kept in support roles in case the worst should happen and they are called on to take a frontline role. Meanwhile, neighbouring forces may be taking the same approach, when forces could work together to share resources in the event of a major incident.

This 'Rolls Royce' mentality,⁹ whereby every process is designed for the worst-case scenario, without regard for the daily implications and cost, is the direct opposite of value for money. Squeezing the price forces pay for receiving mutual aid from neighbouring forces would bring some relief in the costs of this system but a more

profound culture shift and attitude to risk is required by the service.

How could regulations be amended to enable greater use of collaboration between forces?

There are over 700 examples of collaboration nationally, including partnerships to share frontline and operational support services, such as the Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Major Crime Unit, which brings together officers and budgets from both forces to investigate major crime across the two counties, and shared support services, as in the Metropolitan Police Service, which is sharing human resource management services across the 32 borough command units.

Some forces already have cooperative agreements to share resources for a specific peak in demand. For example, the four forces in Yorkshire and Humberside - North Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire and Humberside - collaborate on contingency planning. This includes a shared skills and resources register and a formalised agreement for guaranteed support from all four forces during a major incident. Initiatives such as this should be learned from and applied by other forces.

However mutual aid arrangements can be cumbersome, expensive and disruptive for all involved. As an alternative, external providers can also help forces plan for and cope with peak increases in demand, avoiding the need for them to put last-minute pressure on neighbouring forces through mutual aid arrangements.

G4S Secure Solutions was asked to play a key role in providing support for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to assist the Metropolitan Police in the build-up to and throughout the G20 Summit held in London in April 2009. Over 500 G4S personnel worked in partnership with the FCO, the police and the management of the ExCel conference centre to provide a range of services including access control, manned security, escorting searched vehicles and maintaining a security cordon inside the summit venue.

⁹ The Independent Review of Policing, Final Report, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, 2008

Collaboration between forces may not always be the right solution and regulations should empower forces with the freedom and flexibility to find the approach that works for them rather than putting them in a straitjacket through prescription.

How could officers' remuneration be determined in the future?

Control of costs must be the key feature of any reformed pay system for officers and staff. The police workforce accounts for around 80% of spending on the police service and the size of that workforce has grown considerably. In 1996 UK police forces employed 230,000. By 2006 that figure had grown to 274,000 – an increase of 19.1 per cent.

Given the scale of current spending on staff, police forces and the Home Office need to look at the total paybill, rather than focusing on any 'new money', to see how the spend can best be used, including the potential for changing workforce structure to improve performance.

There needs to be tight pay discipline in the coming spending round. The evidence of police officer and staff salaries and remuneration packages does not bear out the picture often painted of police service workforces being more poorly paid than their private sector counterparts. This is even more the case when other elements of the employment package are taken into account – especially police service pensions and early retirement and other employment opportunities after that. Market comparisons should be used made on the basis of total remuneration.

Police officers in England and Wales are covered by a three-year pay agreement, signed in 2008, which guarantees officers an average basic pay increase of 2.6% a year until 2011. A freeze on the police pay bill, covering the entire police workforce, would help contain costs and create a climate for change.

A reformed pay and remuneration system should prioritise contribution made, not the number of hours or years worked. At the moment, the latter is the key feature of the system with opportunities to emphasise and reward the former possible only tangentially.

There are some clear examples of where the police service is paying staff regardless of the time they actually work. Some of the arcane rules and regulations mean that where an officer works overtime into a rest day or is recalled to duty, they are paid a minimum of five hours at double time regardless of how long they work.

What do you think would be the features of an effective performance related pay system for officers and staff?

This pay bill freeze should not be the same as a freeze of the pay of individual officers or police staff.

The CBI proposes that the police service use a pay bill freeze to move to a system of performance related pay (PRP) for employees, paid to those who make the biggest contribution or those with desirable specialist skills. Where officers and staff are to be awarded a pay rise, the costs could be offset elsewhere so the overall pay bill does not increase. This would concentrate everyone in the service's mind on increasing efficiency and effectiveness.

Existing attempts to reorientate payment around the performance of officers and the successful outcomes they achieve for the public have failed to have the impact that was desired. Some chief officers feel frustrated that the regulations for using the special priorities payments scheme, as drawn up by staff groups, undermined the purpose of it.

The CBI wants the police service to move towards and adopt the same kinds of modern management practices used elsewhere in the public sector and the wider economy.

We think introduction of PRP makes performance management *matter* to staff and line managers. Where clear organisational goals are set out, communicated in objectives, assessed on clear criteria and rewarded, performance has been shown to improve in organisations where it is used, even where staff and managers were initially sceptical.

This increase in performance may come not from the prospect of increased pay but from the introduction of a clear performance management system. The basic targeting approach to PRP, this 'contractual approach'— whereby performance is assessed against individual objectives agreed between the employee and line manager – can survive well in a public sector environment such as the police service.

How could performance by officers and staff be identified and managed?

In policing, such an approach would mean that pay would become a reward for personal development and performance as adjudged against clear criteria, rather than a function of service. This criteria would need to be set out in advance, be designed to be intelligent in encouraging the types of behaviour that we would want to reward (not simply numbers of arrests etc), and be followed through by managers.

Police officers are required to complete performance and development records (PDRs) or equivalents. They matter to officers in their first two years service as completion of them and strong evidence against each of the competencies is required for passing their probation period. However, beyond that they can frequently become a neglected and pointless exercise as the outcomes of them are not linked to how an officer's performance is managed, or to their pay and career progression.

This kind of approach – setting clear objectives between staff and managers and collecting evidence against them and regular appraisals against them (between one and four times a year) – is now common in many areas, and widely accepted as a success.

The CBI would like to see such appraisals take place for officers throughout their career not just in the probationary period. Managers, staff and officers should view their appraisals and their PDRs (or equivalent) as important. We would like to see officers and staff over their whole police career demonstrate the same enthusiasm and

diligence that most probationary officers have towards their evidence records in their first two years. This is a positive culture where high performance and learning is fostered, encouraged and incentivised. All staff should share it.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the current progression scales for officers and staff?

Should progression be linked to length of service, performance, skills or any other factors?

The police service's progression scales suffer from many of the undesirable features that the CBI has identified across the public sector. Police job grading structures tend to put an emphasis on control and predictability while private sector organisations tend to emphasise flexibility. Police pay progression systems take much greater account of length of service than those in the private sector which attach most weight to individual performance. Finally police pay scales and ranges generally give less scope for recognising outstanding contribution.

Currently, it is only usually very senior officers that can receive performance-related bonuses (of typically 15% of salary). The effectiveness of these bonus structures should be forensically examined because they can cost hundreds of thousands of pounds. Often it seems that there is an unclear link between individual effort and the outcome achieved (positive or negative).

Police pay and conditions should reflect individual contribution as well as the skills and experience brought to the job, and not simply length of service. It should also ensure officers do not depend exclusively on promotion, time in service or overtime to secure pay rises.

In particular, police constable progression is based heavily on satisfactory performance over a very long period with little progression beyond that. In many private sector firms the target point for reaching satisfactory performance is typically at or close to the midpoint of the salary range or band. This leaves plenty of headroom for progression beyond the level for those assessed as achieving above and beyond satisfactory performance. In contrast, in the police service the target point is almost right at the top of the range

for constables, meaning there is no scope for salary progression within the pay band for those held to be contributing above the satisfactory level (especially when newer in service).

The current system of national pay agreements provides little incentive for individual officers to improve their performance. While private sector services firms expect a satisfactory performer would typically reach their target rate within one or two years for less complex jobs, or three to four years for more complex ones, police constables complete a two-year probationary period and then receive incremental pay increases based on 14 annual incremental points on the pay scale. This does not take into account individual skills and contribution.

Is it fair to the taxpayer that officers who retire should be able to be re-employed as a) staff or b) in non-territorial forces, while drawing their pension?

How important is the use of retired officers in staff posts or non-territorial forces?

Flexibility in workforce is a key missing ingredient in the police service and it is severely handicapping their capability to be effective and reduce cost.

It should seem obvious that many front-line policing roles (especially involving shift work over several decades) will take their toll on staff and that early retirement will be a natural consequence. But just as obvious is the fact that this need not be the end of person's working life. In fact for most police officers who serve 30-35 years and retire it is not – many do continue to work as police staff or leave the service but stay within the criminal justice world. Many former police officers with the skills and abilities to help police are, for instance employed by specialist security providers who can add temporary capacity to help meet the demand posed by such one-off events.

This kind of movement within a workforce is to be encouraged if we are to retain their many years of experience and skill base. However, the current arrangement of pension schemes (particularly given the single entry and exit point for police

officers) at best acts as a hindrance to it and at worst saddles police forces (and therefore the taxpayer) with significantly higher costs, poor deployment of staff and wasted staff talent.

It means that police officers sometimes stay in the frontline longer than they want to be or should be (because they need to reach the qualification point for their pension); are posted to roles where they are not best utilising their skills (as forces have to find a use for them and use office jobs as an alternative even though civilian staff would be more appropriate and cost effective); or that officers retire as early as 48, claim a lump sum from the exchequer and return to work the following week in a civilian and receive pension payments for up to 17 years whilst still be work.

There needs to be some mechanism which makes it possible (and desirable for officers and police staff) to move roles (and therefore their pension) as opportunities develop and arise.

This must also include the potential for staff to move employment (on a temporary or permanent basis) to a private provider. This is increasingly occurring as custody, forensic, healthcare, logistical, transport, call centre and major event staff are outsourced to non-public employers as their activities are competitively tendered and contracts are awarded outside the public sector.

It is paramount that these decisions are taken on the basis of service quality and value for money. At the moment non-public sector providers of services to police forces are often treated differently to public sector ones with the pitch slanted in favour of the latter. The transfer of public sector staff to an independent sector provider under the TUPE requirements in particular creates extra cost for private providers. This is because they are compelled to offer exact replicas of expensive 'final salary' pension schemes to transferees and accept unlimited liability for their past service accruals. Public sector providers (police forces mainly, but also NHS and local authorities in some cases) meanwhile contribute far below the real cost of the pension benefits and do not have to accept past service risk. Private employers are typically forced to contribute between 20-25% of salary into each transferred

public sector staff member – far more than police forces or other public sector bodies do.

The CBI is aware of at least one police authority which refused to accept any 'cap and collar' on pension risks in a TUPE transfer. As a result, the authority is paying a 30% risk mark-up on costs over the full life of the contract, even though the numbers of staff with protected pension rights are a diminishing risk as they leave or retire.

We call on the Home Office to communicate the importance of resolving this issue to colleagues in Treasury and Cabinet Office. We urgently need to take this issue off the table and focus contract-awarding decisions fairly on service quality and value for money.

Looking longer term, the CBI takes the view that very different patterns of reward - as between the public and private sectors in the criminal justice market - are not conducive to a healthy labour market with reasonable mobility. Certainly among older employees, defined benefit pension arrangements can constitute a hindrance to the mobility a dynamic economy needs – and can have the effect of limiting the horizons of individuals. As new patterns of pension provision in the private sector get bedded in, the police service should be looking to reshape their arrangements in order to achieve broad comparability of provision.

The CBI welcomes the plan to cap the employer contribution to the NHS and school teachers' pension schemes at 14% of earnings on a long-term basis (from 2016 for the NHS scheme and from 2011 for the teachers' scheme). Contributions at this level imply broad stability in employer contributions. The police service has significantly higher employee contributions but earlier retirements necessitate this.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of local, regional, and national pay determination?

What evidence is there of different local pay ranges for police staff in similar posts?

The CBI believes there is a case for a greater diversity of approaches to pay in the police service. More account needs to be taken of the relevant market or markets to decide what form of pay determination should apply. For professionals

who operate in a national market, national multi-employer machinery may well be appropriate. For many less skilled roles, the recruitment market is likely to be much more local. In these cases, pay determination too should operate locally. This can take many forms. It does not have to mean every unit or organisation operating entirely on its own but it could operate across a regional or even force-wide area.

This is because it is easy to see that living costs differ enormously between places such as Oxford, Bath and Brighton compared to Middlesbrough, Stoke-on-Trent and Preston. The labour markets in those areas differ to reflect this and so it does not make sense for the police forces serving those areas to all pay the same for police officers or staff.

Public sector employers should critically review the levels at which they set pay. The presumption should be that pay should be set closer to the level of operating organisations or units unless there are strong reasons to operate multi-employer national arrangements

If there are to be increases in pay for hard to fill roles in expensive areas, they should be offset elsewhere in the police service paybill. Now is not the time to grow the size of workforce expenditure in the police service.

What issues are preventing more officers returning to full time duties?

The practical and hands-on nature of police work together with frequent long hours and shift work does take its toll on police officers and staff and can be shown in the absence rate amongst police workforces, and also in the number of employees unavailable for front-line operational duties.

In many respects however, the police service has much in common with the rest of the public sector which has significantly higher rates of absence and reduced working than the private sector and particularly suffers from long-term absence from work. Not all of this should be accepted as an inevitable part of the territory.

The private sector has reduced absence over a long-term period and the CBI has surveyed its

member companies to try and discover the causes of this.¹⁰ The top three factors relate to the proactivity of line-managers in monitoring absence and engaging in discussion with the staff affected to find the root of the problem and possible remedies.

Employers cited: Closer monitoring and management of absence by companies/managers, greater investment in occupational health and changing workforce culture as chiefly responsible for the improvement. Flexible working may also prove to be part of the solution but attendance bonuses have not been scored highly in the experience of private employers.

The police service has made some positive steps in the same direction such as the using back to work interviews between constables and their sergeants when an officer has been off ill and also through withdrawing the right to self-certify sickness for police staff such as PCSOs who have short-term absence rates well above average. Sometimes the paramilitary nature of the police rank structure can hinder effective absence management as officers of rank see their role as primarily leading operational teams on the front-line and directing large events and perhaps view occupational health responsibilities to staff as second-tier or non-core. It is clear though that if more officers and staff are to return to full-time, front-line duties active and engaged line managers are required.

□

The CBI recommends that the police service seek to apply some of the lessons of what has worked in the private sector to its own workforce to reduce absence – particularly more active performance management and a change in the culture between staff and line-managers.

The top five steps that private employers have suggested line managers can take to reduce absence are: Making the line manager primarily responsibility for managing absence, using return

to work interviews, discipline procedures, rehabilitation plans (e.g. staged return to work) and waiting days before occupational sick pay is payable. Remaining in contact during absence, building understanding of the nature of the problem and discussing possible adjustments were also regarded as successful.

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¹⁰ On the path to recovery: Absence and workplace health survey 2010, page 25



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