

### **Operational Plan 2012-2015**

### **DFID MENAD Regional Team**

July 2012 *This plan will be refreshed annually* 

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#### DFID Department for International Development

### Introduction

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- The UK Government is determined to help reduce the inequalities of opportunity we see around the world today. We believe that promoting global prosperity is both a moral duty and in the UK's national interest. Aid is only ever a means to an end, never an end in itself. It is wealth creation and sustainable growth that will help people to lift themselves out of poverty.
- In May 2010, the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, commissioned the Bilateral Aid Review to take a comprehensive and ambitious look at the countries in which DFID works through our direct country and regional programmes. The review focussed on the best ways for the UK to tackle extreme poverty, ensuring that we make the greatest impact with every pound we spend. In parallel, through the Multilateral Aid Review, DFID assessed how effective the international organisations we fund are at tackling poverty.
- On the 1st March 2011, the key outcomes of the reviews were announced, including the results that UK aid will deliver for the world's poorest people over the next four years. The Bilateral Aid Review has refocused the aid programme in fewer countries so that we can target our support where it will make the biggest difference and where the need is greatest. The Multilateral Aid Review findings enable us to put more money behind effective international organisations which are critical to delivering the UK's development priorities. In addition the independent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review looked at how the UK can build on its strengths in responding impartially to humanitarian needs and help ensure future disaster responses can be better prepared and coordinated.
- DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency. In the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we are achieving value for every pound of UK taxpayers' money that we spend on development. Results, transparency and accountability are our watchwords and guide everything we do. DFID regards transparency as fundamental to improving its accountability to UK citizens and to improving accountability to citizens in the countries in which it works. Transparency will also help us achieve more value for money in the programmes we deliver and will improve the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty.
- The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee commits DFID to making our aid fully transparent to citizens in both the UK and developing countries. As part of this commitment we are publishing Operational Plans for country programmes. The Operational Plans set out the vision, priorities and results that will be delivered in each of our country programmes.
- We will concentrate our efforts on supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, creating wealth in poor countries, strengthening their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.



### 1) Context

With a large and growing population of 385 million (WDI 2010), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a diverse region of 19 countries Although most states are middle or upper income, Gulf countries with huge oil and gas reserves, sit next to poorer countries like Yemen.

The Arab Spring, starting in December 2010, marked a historic turning point for the region. Whilst the context and impact was distinct in each country, the drivers were common. The Arab Spring was driven by people power, fuelled by calls for economic and social justice, alongside civil and political liberties. People were frustrated by entrenched corruption, elite capture, restricted economic and political participation, and failing public services. Twelve months later the governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya had fallen, Syria was in violent turnoil, and in Yemen, President Saleh had ceded power after 33 years in office. The monarchies of Jordan and Morocco have started to introduce measures of democratic reform, Egypt and Tunisia have held elections to newly reformed Parliaments, and Gulf countries have begun to provide some economic and political concessions.

**Despite strong economic growth of almost 5% GDP a year** over the last decade, (IFC 2011), this did not generate the quantity and quality of jobs needed to respond to a growing population, and many of the benefits of this growth were captured by a privileged few. This led to rising unemployment, particularly amongst women (over 30% across the region) and young people (averaging 25%) and a high dependence on informal employment (IFC 2011). Added to this, poor and middle class households remained vulnerable to economic shocks such as rising food and commodity prices. The 2009 Arab Human Development Report emphasised the challenges of weak constitutions, legal restrictions on political party formation, state-sponsored repression and limitations on civil society's operations.

**Concerns are now growing as to whether the momentum for change can be sustained.** The Arab Spring has hit economic growth hard, investment has weakened, foreign direct investment inflows and tourism receipts have plummeted and hopes of rapid job creation have been dashed while insecurity rises. The World Development Report 2011 emphasised that transitions take 15-30 years, but in the meantime, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia need immediate confidence building measures including economic stabilisation and early political reform. Countries will need longer term policy changes to deliver growth and positive social outcomes. When the violence is over, Syria will need support to build legitimate and workable institutions, in a similar way to current programmes in Libya.

**Power structures in the region are shifting.** The Arab League has asserted itself under Saudi and Qatari leadership, and Iran and Turkey are playing increasingly prominent roles in the political arena. Gulf donors are emerging as major international aid players. For example, in 2011 and 2012 Saudi Arabia and Qatar both made significant financial contributions to stabilising the Egyptian economy. New opportunities are emerging for closer working between traditional and Gulf donors.

But long running Middle East issues have not gone away. The Middle East Peace Plan remains a critical point of tension; sectarian struggles have escalated; minority groups remain marginalised; and peace is still a long way off. The region remains vulnerable to natural disasters including earthquakes and suffers from environmental challenges of water scarcity, land degradation and desertification. These could all affect growth prospects and potentially exacerbate local conflicts.

The fundamental challenge for the international community will be to support transition countries to create the building blocks of democratic and prosperous societies and to help countries, such as Syria, to avoid deterioration into further conflict and collapse.

The DFID programme will be a major component of a broader-based effort by the UK Government to mobilise developmental, diplomatic, and security efforts. There are separate plans covering DFID's bilateral programmes in Occupied Palestinian Territories and in Yemen.



# 2) Vision

#### Overview

The UK Government's long-term vision for MENA is a region based on open, democratic societies, with greater social, economic and political participation of its people. This will require a major rethink of the role of the state and of citizens, changes to policies and institutions, so that expectations for security, jobs and services are met, and integration achieved with the regional and global economy. These changes will take time and may be accompanied by rising tensions and insecurity.

DFID will work through our membership of the G8 (particularly in the UK's Presidency year of 2013), the European Union, and other international financial institutions, to help them to make an effective response to the Arab Spring, strengthening their focus on delivering results, and building on deeper analysis of what interventions will secure long term political, economic and social change in the region. To achieve this the UK committed £110 million to the DFID/Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Arab Partnership (AP), launched in 2011. This comprises a £70 million DFID-led Arab Partnership Economic Facility (APEF), primarily leveraging funding and technical assistance through multilaterals, and a £40 million FCO-led Arab Partnership Participation Fund (APPF).

The APEF is initially focussing on Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan and Morocco and will support wealth creation, ensuring it is both inclusive and sustainable. APEF will partner with international and regional institutions, largely using multi-donor trust funds, and national governments, the private sector, and civil society organisations to support trade and investment, enterprise growth, job creation, economic governance and vocational skills development. Currently the DFID programme in Syria is focussed on humanitarian issues, but if the situation evolves towards stabilisation, economic transition support may be needed as part of our broader support in the region.

MENAD Regional team will use the FCO/DFID/Ministry Of Defence (MoD) Conflict Pool (CP) to help deliver this vision through supporting conflict prevention, reconciliation and building effective and accountable security and justice institutions.

MENAD will strengthen the partnership with the Gulf States and regional institutions, recognising their key role in providing development and humanitarian support across the world. In particular MENAD will work with them to improve development effectiveness and to help countries in the region build resilience to chronic and rapid-onset conflict, economic shocks and natural disasters.

Through our broader humanitarian response work, we will also assign financial and personnel resources to respond to crises.

### Alignment to DFID and wider UK Government priorities

The UK aid progarmme in MENA will help deliver the UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), the UK Humanitarian Policy and the Whitehall Gulf Initiative<sup>6</sup> and will contribute to the UK Government's "Emerging Powers Initiative". The programme will contribute to ensuring that tri-departmental Conflict Pool<sup>3</sup> resources are fully aligned with Strategic Defence and Security Review priorities and provide value for money. DFID will contribute £20 million to the FCO-led Arab Partnership Participation Fund, and will work closely with the FCO to ensure this Fund delivers results and value for money. DFID's MENA programme will also support the UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security, which includes specific MENA actions. We will continue to ensure our approach is guided by conflict and political analysis including through close working with FCO in London and in the region, and through drawing on analysis from national and international researchers.

### What we will stop doing

DFID closed its Iraq bilateral programme in March 2012. The MENAD Regional Team in London will manage and monitor remaining projects. All MENA countries, except Yemen, are middle or high income and do not need substantial grant resources. We will, therefore, not establish any new bilateral programmes but will fund specific technical advice and knowledge sharing to help countries maintain a positive growth trajectory and to prevent economic collapse.



# 3) Results

### Headline results

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)		
Wealth Creation	Estimated number of jobs directly or indirectly created as a result of DFID support (cumulative)	2011 5,819 jobs	By 2014/15 39,000 jobs		
Wealth Creation	Number of loans disbursed as a result of DFID support (cumulative): - SME loans - Micro loans - Micro loans to women	2011 SME loans – 0 Micro loans – 0 Micro loans to women – 0	By 2014/15 SME – 2,800 Micro loans – 50,000 Of which to women – 18,000		
Wealth Creation	Number of enterprises receiving business advice under DFID funded programmes (cumulative)	2011 125 enterprises	By 2014/15 1,200 enterprises		
Global Partnerships	Percentage of new projects by World Bank and African Development Bank, to Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco and Libya, which are focused on promoting economic and social inclusion	2010 WB – 48% AfDB – 25%	By 2014/15 WB - 60% AfDB - 35%		
Global Partnerships Average annual disbursal rate of funding allocated to Deauville Transition Fund Country Programmes (average across the five Deauville Transition countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco and Libya)		2012 n/a Fund is being established	By 2014/15 65%		

**NOTE:** The MENAD team works closely with Whitehall partners on the Conflict Pool and the Arab Partnership Participation Fund. The results of this activity are not included as funding is not part of the core MENAD Regional Programme. These programmes provide essential support on governance and political participation which will complement the APEF and support economic transition across the region. The results of humanitarian programmes, including Syria, are not included in the expected results, rather the results will be reported retrospectively.

All results are disaggregated by sex where appropriate.



# 3) Results (continued)

### **Evidence supporting results**

There is a mixed range of supporting evidence for this operational plan on which our core assumptions and theory of change are based. We have drawn upon a range of official economic and social data sources (surveys, administrative data, economic data etc) in examining past progress and establishing baselines. The AP/CP Programmes are based on country strategies which draw on a range of data sources and use basic political economy analysis to inform the strategy setting for each country. Overall we consider the quality of national data is mixed. There is a range, from countries with high quality data such as Egypt and Palestine having high statistical capacity indicator scores, 89 and 84 respectively, and Libya and Yemen with scores of 36 and 43 respectively (World Bank Statistics Capacity Indicator 2011, score out of 100). There appears to be a lack of sub-national data in many countries, which hampers policy making at this level.

There is a considerable evidence base for the importance of private sector development for growth and poverty reduction. For example, the OECD/World Economic Forum 2011 Arab Competitiveness Report provides a wide range of data to support this pillar. It outlines the key socio-economic challenges, in particular the need to create more and better employment opportunities for the 2.8 million young people entering the labour markets every year. It notes " particularly needed are measures to support a vibrant, competitive and entrepreneurial private sector. Corruption, lack of transparency in government decision making, market distortion, and weak global and regional integration hinder competition and reduce efficiency."

DFID has supported a regional research institute, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Beirut Centre to provide analysis of development and security challenges and realistic policy alternatives. In addition this Plan includes specific programmes to "improve policy making and debate" and within this area we will be supporting regional and country research including, the Egyptian Network for Integrated Development. The design of new programmes will include a strong focus on evaluation to ensure the evidence base is built up on what works and what does not work.

In order to determine our expected levels of results we have worked closely with programme partners. In the Wealth Creation pillar the quality of the evidence used is good.

#### Value for Money Rationale

There is a compelling argument for making targeted interventions now, with the objective of preventing state failure. A key element of DFID's contribution to the 2010 UK Strategic Defence and Security Review is to emphasise the importance of integrating the risks of further instability and upstream conflict prevention as opposed to focussing solely on response. The costs of intervention after a state fails are likely to be higher than the costs of preventing that failure. This principal has guided the development of the programme which is focusing on inclusive and sustainable wealth creation.

To ensure Value for Money we will look to work primarily though the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which offer an opportunity to work strategically across the region, particularly in countries where DFID has no country office.



## 4) Delivery and Resources

#### Context

The MENAD Regional Team has staff in London and overseas. The team includes Governance, Conflict, Humanitarian, Economics, Private Sector, Social Development, Anti-Corruption, Evaluation and Statistics Advisers as well as policy and programme management staff. We have seconded a staff member to the Islamic Development Bank to work on aid effectiveness and we are funding an AP Adviser in each of the UK Embassies in Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan. DFID has also seconded a National Expert to the EC's European Neighbourhood Policy and Programmes team. During the Operational Plan period we will scale up our policy, programme management and advisory capacity so we can play a greater leadership role, both across DFID, across Whitehall and within international systems.

#### We will work with the following partners and mechanisms:

• **UK Government Departments**: we will work closely with other parts of the UK government in response to the Arab Spring and wider regional issues. This includes work with the FCO and HM Treasury to set the strategic direction and priorities for our programming, and to ensure DFID's views are represented in high-level international fora such as the G8 Deauville Partnership, EU Neighbourhood Instrument and our engagement with Gulf States. We will also work closely with the FCO, MOD and Cabinet Office on conflict and stability issues including through the Conflict Pool and BSOS board.

• Aid Coordination fora: we will continue to influence, promote coordination and galvanise wider donor support for the region particularly through international processes. We will continue to work with Arab Donors as part of the UK Government's Gulf Initiative to increase UK co-operation with Gulf States. In this regard, we will focus on aid effectiveness, monitoring and evaluation and improving the response to humanitarian and fragile/conflict affected situations.

• International Financial Institutions – we have prioritised support to the IFIs as they have a critical role to play in supporting economic transition in the MENA region in terms of knowledge, expertise and financial resources. We will encourage the IFIs to take on board lessons of the past adjusting and designing programmes to respond to the region's current and emerging challenges. We will take full account of the Multilateral Aid Review findings and will work with the IFIs to ensure a strong grip on results and cost-effectiveness.

• United Nations -we will work with UN agencies as coordinators of international assistance, policy makers and programme implementers including for delivering and coordinating humanitarian assistance, and achieving our political, security and development objectives. We will take full account of the Multilateral Aid Review when deciding which UN agencies to work with.

• **Private Sector** – where appropriate, we will work directly with international and domestic businesses to support innovation, job creation, vocational training, and supply chain linkages between domestic and international business.

• **Civil Society** – we will support civil society organisations, including emerging organisations to pilot innovative approaches to social and economic problems and to assist them to engage in policy debate with politicians, government ministries, the media and donors.

• Researchers and Think-Tanks – we will support academia and think tanks to undertake regional analysis and research on political and economic transformation in order to build a stronger evidence base that supports decision making by donors, regional governments and other decision makers.

#### **Intervention Choice**

• Under the joint DFID/FCO AP we will fund and manage the Arab Partnership Economic Facility (APEF) to provide £70 million of assistance to support economic transition in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Libya. We will prioritise support to IFIs but we will also set up a mechanism to provide small-scale, flexible funding to a broader range of partners. These programmes will support inclusive and sustainable wealth creation , in support of transition countries in the region.

• We are implementing a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Arab Emirates and developing another with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation which will specify areas for joint working.

• We will take forward MENA's contribution to the UK Government's response to the Humanitarian and Emergency Response Review, the UK Humanitarian Policy, the UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy<sup>4</sup> and the UK Government 's Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Strategy.



### 4) Delivery and Resources (cont)

Planned Programme Spend (from Regional Team budget)

Pillar/Strategic priority	2010/11 (outturn)		010/11 (outturn) 2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15		TOTAL 2011-15	
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000
Wealth Creation	2,700		6,445		19,390		22,890		19,520		70,945	0
Climate Change											0	0
Governance and Security	1,119		209								1,328	0
Education											0	0
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health											0	0
Malaria											0	0
HIV/Aids											0	0
Other Health											0	0
Water and Sanitation											0	0
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability											0	0
Humanitarian	9,579		8,057		1,540						19,176	0
Other MDG's											0	0
Global Partnerships			600		2,910		4,110		480		8,100	0
TOTAL	13,398	0	15,311	0	23,840	0	27,000	0	20,000	0	99,549	0
Additional Expenditure	2010	1 <mark>0/11</mark> 2011/12		I/12	2012/	2012/13		/14	2014/15		TOTAL	
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000

01000											
£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
				8,000		6,000		6,000			20,000
				480		480		480			1,440
	2000				8,000		8,000 6,000	8,000 6,000	8,000 6,000 6,000	8,000 6,000 6,000	8,000         6,000         6,000



### 4) Delivery and Resources (cont)

### **Planned Operational Spend**

	2010/11 (outturn)	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	Total 2011-15
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Frontline staff costs - Pay	n/a	286	947	100	967	3200
Frontline staff costs - Non Pay	n/a	907	371	228	88	1594
Administrative Costs - Pay	662	1176	857	450	442	3587
Administrative Costs - Non Pay	101	286	117	56	56	616
Total	763	2655	2292	1734	1553	8997



## 4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

### **Planned Efficiency savings**

<b>Delivering Programme Efficiencies</b> *	*													
												ual cost		
									in the SR					
Category		Details										period £'000		
Strategic Reprioritisation	Ν	N/A*												
Further examples of Programme efficient	ency N	¶⁄A*												
Reduction in costs as a result of Office Restructuring					0							0		
Other Reductions			0			0								
Total		0 (	0 0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		

\* FOOTNOTE: The Arab Spring has led to dramatic changes across the region with a significant increase in workload for the MENAD Regional Team. The overall budget and size of the team has increased to deal with these new demands and will make efficiency savings by:

- · Merging the Libya team with the wider MENAD regional team to save overhead costs;
- Closing or redesigning poor performing programmes;
- Paying close attention to administrative overheads and the ratio of administration costs to programme spend for all programmes;
- · Continuing to drive down costs of travel, training and consultancies.



### 5) Delivering Value for Money

The MENAD Regional team is dedicated to delivering Value for Money (VfM) in all aspects of its work. We will maximise the impact of our programming while minimising the financial cost to the UK taxpayer. Key to this will be ensuring that our implementing partners, primarily the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), provide VfM in their operations. The Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) identifies areas where each IFI needs to improve its VfM. These areas will provide the basis for our institutional engagement with each IFI.

#### **Key Action Points**

- Completed VfM strategy by end of August 2012.
- Ensure financial allocations are based on MAR recommendations and performance leads to better VfM in IFI operations.
- Ensure VfM is embedded in our work with the FCO on the Arab Partnership.
- Embed early analysis of VfM in the formal programme approval and appraisal processes.
- Ensure every project has at least one unit cost identified during design to measure the cost of buying inputs ('Economy') and one unit cost for producing
  outputs ('Efficiency'), and to ensure these are measured throughout the project lifecycle to assess VfM.
- Ensure all travel and job-related training are assessed based on their contribution to achieving DFID's business objectives.
- Ensure every team member has at least one VfM objective in their performance framework.

### **Key Challenges**

- Embedding VfM at key steps in our project cycle management processes and that appropriate tools are used.
- Ensuring all MENAD staff make VFM considerations a priority in programme management.
- Ensuring staff have time to manage a large number of small projects provides VfM.
- Monitoring and ensuring VfM through our implementing partners' systems, particularly making sure that the benefits are captured and estimated in monetary terms in a cost effective way.
- Comparing the administrative costs of our partners order to identify best practice and to demonstrate how to gain greater VfM.
- Overcoming the scarcity of good quality data and evidence to assess VfM .
- · Generating evidence on best practice in VfM work in fragile and conflict affected states .



### 6) Monitoring and Evaluation

### Monitoring

MENAD Regional Team will carry out on-going monitoring to assess progress against this Operational Plan and the Results Framework. Due to the nature of the environment in which we work, it is also important that we focus on monitoring and managing risks, as well as results, and we take appropriate action to review results anticipated as the context evolves.

How: We will make sure all of our programmes have a monitoring framework, which will track progress in delivering outputs. At Operational Plan level we will maintain risk frameworks as well as results frameworks, and monitor both together.

Who: DFID staff will assess performance in relation to the overall Operational Plan and make sure that all programmes deliver the information required for monitoring the indicators in the results framework. We will work closely with partners, who will be responsible for the actual monitoring of progress in programmes.

When: Each programme will develop its own reporting timetable but at a minimum each programme will be monitored annually. Risks will be monitored quarterly and progress towards Operational Plan objectives will be reviewed every six months and recommendations will be made to the team leader where performance needs to improve.

What: Monitoring information will be used to influence the future direction of the programme and to reconsider approaches where necessary. At an Operational Plan level, the information will be used to determine areas of strong and weaker progress, so that remedial action can be taken where progress is slow.

#### **Evaluation**

The MENAD Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy is the framework for our approach to evaluation during implementation of this Operational Plan. It sets out guidance for which programmes to evaluate, and how to plan, manage and communicate findings from evaluations.

As the Arab Partnership Economic Fund is a new modality operating in a high risk context, a high level of evaluation will be desirable. For all programmes with budget £5 million and over, an independent evaluation will be considered at the programme design stage. Where possible DFID will look to conduct these jointly with partners. In addition an independent strategic review of the whole APEF portfolio will be commissioned in 2014. We will strive to ensure that lessons from these evaluation studies feed into DFID's broader knowledge base. We will also work with the FCO on the evaluation of the Arab Partnership Participation Facility to ensure we can learn lessons across both funds.

In 2013 MENAD will undertake a Strategic Climate Programme Review of the whole regional programme to ensure climate issues are being addressed.

### **Building capacity of partners**

DFID works with a range of partners in the MENA region, some of which are non-traditional partners for DFID and it is an important part of the work of MENAD to engage them on the importance of solid monitoring and evaluation in joint programmes, and the importance of building a solid evidence base for working in the region. A good start has already been made on this, as DFID has been supporting the Islamic Development Bank (through our Secondee) and several Gulf Donors (especially UAE) to improve their understanding of the importance of independent evaluation. Under this Operational Plan we will seek opportunities to work together on joint evaluations.



### 7) Transparency

### **Publication of information**

Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK Government. We will ensure that we continue to meet our commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee including publishing detailed information about DFID projects, including programme documents and all spend above £500. We will continue to ensure that information is accessible, comparable, accurate, timely and in a common standard with other donors and that we provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback.

DFID MENAD aims to set an example in transparency and donor predictability within the region, whilst retaining the flexibility to respond to the dynamic environment in which we find ourselves.

•We will ensure that all information in the public domain is of high quality (comprehensive, accurate and timely) and accessible through the use of Plain English.

- We will publish all project performance reviews and evaluations on the DFID website.
- We will publish a summary of the Operational Plan in English and Arabic on the DFID website.
- We will seek to publish summaries of all large scale new interventions in Arabic.

### Supporting transparency in our work

Uprisings across the Arab region have sought to put a stop to the abuse of power for the private gain of privileged minorities. There has been demand for greater accountability and transparency across the region. We will put this fundamental demand at the heart of our work. We will also seek to provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback on them and we will respond to the findings, as appropriate.

### Supporting transparency in others

•We will work with the multilateral and regional financial institutions in MENA to ensure they adhere to the standards of the International Aid Transparency Initiative.

- We will encourage the multilateral and regional financial institutions to:
  - o Support country efforts to improve public financial management and make it more transparent , for example in Egypt.
  - Support demand-led, beneficiary monitoring by indigenous civil society groups to enable them to hold governments to account.
  - $\circ$   $\,$  Incentivise countries to publish their budgets and improve access to information for the public.
- We will work closely with the FCO Arab Partnership Team to jointly address transparency and corruption issues through:
  - o Support to regional work with organisations such as Transparency International, Open Budget Index and Revenue Watch Institute.
  - Support to country governments and private sector to improve transparency measures though programmes such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and to introduce measures to reduce the opportunity and incentives for corruption.