

Operational Plan 2012-2015

DFID Yemen

August 2012

This plan will be refreshed annually

Contents:		
	Introduction	1
Section 1:	Context	2
Section 2:	Vision	3
Section 3:	Results	4-5
Section 4:	Delivery and Resources	6-9
Section 5:	Delivering Value for Money	10
Section 6:	Monitoring and Evaluation	11
Section 7:	Transparency	12
Section 8:	Human Rights Assessment	13

Introduction

The UK Government is determined to help reduce the inequalities of opportunity we see around the world today. We believe that promoting global prosperity is both a moral duty and in the UK's national interest. Aid is only ever a means to an end, never an end in itself. It is wealth creation and sustainable growth that will help people to lift themselves out of poverty.

In May 2010, the International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, commissioned the Bilateral Aid Review to take a comprehensive and ambitious look at the countries in which DFID works through our direct country and regional programmes. The review focussed on the best ways for the UK to tackle extreme poverty, ensuring that we make the greatest impact with every pound we spend. In parallel, through the Multilateral Aid Review, DFID assessed how effective the international organisations we fund are at tackling poverty.

On the 1st March 2011, the key outcomes of the reviews were announced, including the results that UK aid will deliver for the world's poorest people over the next four years. The Bilateral Aid Review has refocused the aid programme in fewer countries so that we can target our support where it will make the biggest difference and where the need is greatest. The Multilateral Aid Review findings enable us to put more money behind effective international organisations which are critical to delivering the UK's development priorities. In addition the independent Humanitarian Emergency Response Review looked at how the UK can build on its strengths in responding impartially to humanitarian needs and help ensure future disaster responses can be better prepared and coordinated.

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency. In the current financial climate, we have a particular duty to show that we are achieving value for every pound of UK taxpayers' money that we spend on development. Results, transparency and accountability are our watchwords and guide everything we do. DFID regards transparency as fundamental to improving its accountability to UK citizens and to improving accountability to citizens in the countries in which it works. Transparency will also help us achieve more value for money in the programmes we deliver and will improve the effectiveness of aid in reducing poverty.

The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee commits DFID to making our aid fully transparent to citizens in both the UK and developing countries. As part of this commitment we are publishing Operational Plans for country programmes. The Operational Plans set out the vision, priorities and results that will be delivered in each of our country programmes.

We will concentrate our efforts on supporting achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, creating wealth in poor countries, strengthening their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.

1) Context

Yemen has the highest poverty levels in the Middle East, and faces a range of deep-seated development challenges including a poorly managed and weak economy characterised by: a dependency on declining oil reserves; endemic corruption; and lack of jobs. In addition, Yemen faces food and water insecurity, high population growth, and almost non-existent social service provision. It is unlikely to meet any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). On-going conflict in the north and the south of the country has displaced thousands of civilians and put some areas of the country beyond effective state control. Poverty, inequality and patronage continue to threaten and undermine social cohesion. Many of these problems are rooted in the government's lack of accountability to Yemeni citizens.

These development challenges were compounded by political crisis and an upsurge in conflict sparked by widespread demonstrations against the rule of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011. This resulted in a further deterioration of the economy and a humanitarian crisis, which is marked by high levels of malnutrition, high mortality, outbreaks of infectious diseases and widespread food insecurity.

A political transition deal brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) saw the formation of an interim government and Abdo Rabbuh Mansur Hadi elected as President in February 2012. The transition, though fragile and far from assured, is the best chance in a generation to make progress towards a more secure and prosperous future for Yemen. If the transition is successful, the development challenge will remain enormous. If it fails, Yemen could be facing any or all of state failure, large scale conflict and a humanitarian catastrophe.

The security situation is still serious in many parts of the country, with a number of ongoing conflicts. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has a major presence in the South and East of Yemen, also represents a significant local, regional and international threat. The threat from terrorism and consequent limits on staff and partner access means that implementing and monitoring our programme in Yemen is extremely difficult.

The countries of the GCC play a critical role in supporting Yemen, and the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the United States (US) and some other bilateral donors and humanitarian agencies are also important partners. DFID is one of the leading Western donors to Yemen and plays an important role in coordinating the support of the international community.

Some key statistics:

- Yemen's Gross National Income (GNI) per capita is \$1,070 (2011) [World Development Indicators](#);
- 47% of people lived below the \$2 a day poverty line in 2005 (the last year for which data is available), [World Development Indicators](#)
- Nearly half of all children under five years old in Yemen are chronically malnourished (47%) and 13% suffer from acute malnutrition, [World Food Programme](#)
- 44.5% of the population have limited or no access to sufficient, nutritious food, and have a poor or borderline diet according to agreed international standards. 2012 Comprehensive Food Security Survey, June 2012, [World Food Programme](#)
- Population growth in Yemen is 3% per annum (2010), [World Bank Development Indicators](#)
- Repeated cycles of internal conflict, protracted political unrest and insecurity have caused the displacement of over 460,000 civilians by February 2012 (UN OCHA, [Humanitarian Bulletin Yemen, Issue 2 – 5 April 2012](#).)

2) Vision

Overview

Our vision is a more stable, secure and prosperous Yemen. The current political transition process, though fragile and far from assured, is the best chance in a generation of making progress towards this. **The goal of our programme is to support the success of the transition directly and indirectly,** deliver jobs and basic services which increase citizens' confidence in government, and address immediate humanitarian needs. Inevitably, much of our work to support the transition will focus on the short term, but wherever possible, we will work in ways which deliver results whilst tackling Yemen's underlying development challenges, weaving the golden thread of an open economy and society through the fabric of our programme. We will work within four programme pillars:

Humanitarian

- The focus will be on a short-term response to humanitarian crises, providing indirect support to the transition by delivering assistance to people in urgent need, building the resilience of affected communities and improving the capacity of agencies in Yemen to respond to emergencies.

Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability

- The bulk of our assistance will be used to provide basic services in the short term to help meet the needs of Yemen's most vulnerable people and provide indirect support to the transition by reducing people's sense of grievance around the lack of service delivery. We will work toward laying a foundation for a national social protection system that protects individuals from shocks, equips them to build a better life, and increases resilience to future humanitarian crises
- We will design a programme to improve nutrition in the long term, while also tackling urgent food insecurity.

Economic Growth and Wealth Creation

- We will support the transitional Government directly by providing support to the Ministry of Finance and provide indirect support to the transition process by supporting the private sector to create jobs, and increasing investment in the economy
- We will finance economic analysis and data collection to support better economic policy making in the long term

Governance

- We will support the transition directly, and lay the groundwork for better governance in the long term, by funding elections, providing technical assistance to key arms of Government, supporting the National Dialogue, and by promoting citizen engagement and responsible media.

We will pay particular attention to addressing the needs of girls and women across all four programme pillars. We also recognise the **crucial role that Yemen's regional neighbours and the broader international community** have to play in supporting Yemen to address its political and development challenges, particularly through the Friends of Yemen process, co-chaired by the UK and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We will seek to influence our partners in the region and the broader international community to coordinate and focus their assistance to Yemen.

Alignment to DFID and wider UK Government priorities

Our programme in contributes directly to the UK Government's strategic objective of a more stable and secure Yemen that is a reduced risk to UK interests at home and in the region. We will focus on supporting a successful transition through direct and indirect means as the best way of building a more stable, secure and prosperous Yemen by supporting the transitional government and providing jobs and basic services which reduce citizens' sense of grievance and therefore the recruiting power of terrorist organisations. Our programme contributes to the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) and the UK Humanitarian Policy

What we will stop doing

The operational constraints of working in Yemen, and the urgency of supporting the transition mean that we have had to narrow our focus to programmes which are most critical to the achievement of our objectives. We have therefore decided to pull out of the health, education and justice and policing sectors, though we will continue to provide basic social services through our humanitarian and poverty, hunger and vulnerability work.

3) Results

Headline results

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Humanitarian	Number of people receiving emergency food assistance (including emergency food aid and emergency livelihoods assistance, but not nutrition support)	300,000 (2011/12)	300,000 in 2012/13
Humanitarian	Number of people provided with essential health services	111,000 (2011/12)	170,000 (2012/13)
Poverty Hunger and Vulnerability	Number of people receiving DFID-supported cash transfers (including public works employment)	87,000 (2011/12)	42,000 people directly benefitting from public works income each year, for four years, to 2015 (includes all members of the households that participate in the programme)
Poverty Hunger and Vulnerability	Number of women and children reached with an integrated package of malnutrition prevention and screening interventions	0 (2011)	1.65 million (2012-2015)
Governance and Security	Number of people who vote in elections supported by DFID	Estimated 6.6 million voted in the 2012 presidential elections	These high levels of voter turnout are maintained for planned constitutional referendum in 2013 and the next round of presidential elections in 2014
Wealth Creation	Number of people provided with new access to finance (deposit accounts) (and the % of these who are female) through DFID support	11,700 (54% female) (2011)	44,700 (60% female) (2012-2015)
Wealth Creation	Number of jobs indirectly created through DFID support (based on the International Finance Corporation (IFC) model of jobs indirectly produced through workstreams on access to finance and business training)	1,500 (2011)	2,700 (2012-2015)

3) Results (continued)

Evidence supporting results

There is a critical lack of timely, comprehensive data in Yemen. No national household survey data has been collected since 2006 due to serious security, capacity and funding issues, exacerbated by the recent crisis. Despite the lack of up to date data at a national level, Yemen's short term and underlying development challenges are well known, and the political imperative is to support the success of the transition through direct and indirect means as the best way of tackling these challenges.

There is overwhelming evidence from experts on the ground, from humanitarian reporting, and a range of data collection and analytical work such as the Joint Social and Economic Assessment of a serious deterioration of the situation throughout 2011 and acute need for assistance to the Yemeni population. High quality, timely data at a national level is needed to better prioritise, plan and monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of development interventions, including those supported by DFID; and to report on progress.

Projecting the level of results to be delivered in a fragile and changing context is difficult. The results we can deliver are highly dependent on the performance of the small range of partners with whom we can work in country. DFID and our partners need to be able to adapt to changing priorities on the ground. For example, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) shifted its priorities during 2011 from investment in infrastructure to schemes which bring immediate income to the villagers, as this is what communities required to get them through the crisis. The results targets published on slide four are therefore indicative and will be monitored closely and revised annually if necessary.

DFID response:

- We will develop a programme to build up statistical data in Yemen in 2012 in order to underpin our other interventions, and build the capacity of the Government of Yemen and donors in this area.
- We will monitor results frameworks closely, amending as necessary as the context changes.

Value for Money (VfM) rationale

There is a compelling value for money rationale for focussing our programme on achieving a successful transition as the best opportunity for making progress towards a more secure and prosperous Yemen, and prevent state failure. Studies suggest that conflict and social unrest can have devastating impacts on the economy¹. Failure of the transition in Yemen could result in state failure, major conflict, a deeper and more widespread humanitarian crisis and a further deterioration of the economy and poverty levels. All of these would require a significantly higher investment to address. Making upstream development investments to prevent further conflict is consistent with DFID's Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), 2011.

¹For example see Collier, *The Bottom Billion*, 2007, Oxford University Press

4) Delivery and Resources

Interventions and partnerships

Our choice of implementing partners is severely constrained. The security risks in Yemen mean that there are a limited number of partners for us to work with, which presents a potential risk to the delivery of our programme. The Government of Yemen (GoY) has weak institutional and public financial management capacity, and national and international civil society organisations have weak capacity and poor national reach.

For this reason, we will channel the majority of our support through trusted multilaterals such as the World Bank and United Nations, and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). We will seek to spread the risk as much as possible, whilst ensuring that we use partners who have the institutional capacity to deliver results. Our choice of partners is also informed by the organisational assessments identified in the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) and where organisational weaknesses are identified, we will seek to mitigate these through programme design, and influence our partners to address these weaknesses. We also provide significant support to the Social Fund for Development (SFD), a Yemeni organisation with a good track record of delivering basic services across Yemen. We have confirmed that the SFD has strong monitoring and financial management systems in place, and will continue to monitor its delivery of UK funds. We are working with others to develop new funding channels, such as a Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to increase the volume and effectiveness of aid.

DFID Yemen will publish an anti-corruption strategy by setting out what we will do to minimise the risk of corruption on our programmes, and to tackle corruption within the Yemeni economy and society.

The interventions we support will be driven by the rationale outlined in our Vision, which is to support the transition through direct and indirect means as the best opportunity for progress towards a more stable, secure and prosperous Yemen. This rationale, and an assessment of our comparative advantage in different sectors, will inform our choice of interventions in 2012-15 under the four pillars outlined on slide three. We will retain flexibility in our programme to respond to unforeseen challenges such as humanitarian emergencies and changes in the operating environment.

DFID Yemen is located in the British Embassy in Sana'a and in DFID's London office. We work closely with colleagues across the UK Government including the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to deliver the UK strategy in Yemen, which has development and diplomacy at its heart.

The UK will work to intensify the international community's efforts to galvanise support for Yemen through the Friends of Yemen process and donor conference in September 2012. We are engaging closely with the transitional Government of Yemen to support them in delivering a successful transition and to ensure that our programme is consistent with Yemen's priorities. We will continue to work with our partners in the region, and in particular Gulf donors, to influence them to coordinate their support to Yemen with the international community and to focus on Yemen's short and long term development challenges.

4) Delivery and Resources – Planned Programme Spend

Pillar/Strategic priority	2010/11		2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15		TOTAL 2011-15	
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000
Wealth Creation	3,778				2,025		13,150		14,250		29,425	0
Climate Change												0
Governance and Security	1,952		652		3,205		5,511		4,740		14,108	0
Education	3,375										0	0
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health												0
Malaria												0
HIV/Aids												0
Other Health												0
Water and Sanitation												0
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability	30,732		9,500		22,600		26,000		32,500		90,600	0
Humanitarian	7,429		21,562		28,000		24,000		20,000		93,562	0
Other MDGs											0	0
Global Partnerships											0	0
TOTAL	47,266	0	31,714	0	55,830	0	68,661	0	71,490	0	227,695	0

4) Delivery and Resources – Planned Operational Costs

	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	TOTAL 2011-15
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Frontline staff costs - Pay	181	438	610	610	610	2268
Frontline staff costs - Non Pay	66	194	233	222	222	871
Administrative Costs - Pay	544	457	324	324	324	1429
Administrative Costs - Non Pay	454	140	184	184	184	692
Total	1245	1229	1351	1340	1340	5260

4) Delivery and Resources – Planned Efficiency Savings

Efficiency savings

Category	Details	Residual cost in the SR period £'000
Strategic Reprioritisation	We have decided to discontinue direct support to the health and education sectors. Having already exited the maternal and neonatal health programme, we will also withdraw our support from two education programmes: Basic Education Development Programme - £15 million; and Secondary Education Development and Girls Access Programme - £20 million.	17,331
Further examples of Programme efficiency		

Administrative Cost Savings Initiative	2011-12		2012-13		2013-14		2014-15	
	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000
Reduction in Consultancy Payments								
Reduction in Travel								
Reduction in Training								
Reduction in Estates and Property Costs			0	25	0	62	0	62
Reduction in costs as a result of Office Restructuring	6	0	94	0	94	0	94	0
Other Reductions								
Total	6	0	94	25	94	62	94	62

5) Delivering Value for Money (VfM)

The Yemen team is dedicated to delivering Value for Money (VfM) in all aspects of its work. We will maximise the impact of our programming while minimising the financial cost to the UK taxpayer. By the end of the CSR period we aim to be a model DFID programme in demonstrating and delivering VfM in a fragile state context.

To date, DFID Yemen has demonstrated its ability to deliver good VfM. This has been achieved through careful selection of partners and by considering VfM in all decisions. The security situation and the limited presence of DFID staff in Yemen means that monitoring and evaluation of our programme is challenging. To ensure VfM is maintained, we have focussed on projects which can be most effectively monitored remotely or by using partners with robust monitoring systems with a record of strong delivery in Yemen. Our decision to withdraw from the health and education sectors was based in part on VfM considerations.

The security situation in Yemen has inevitably led to an increase in some operating costs, for example staff allowances, travel costs, security costs (e.g. additional cars and drivers) are higher than they would otherwise be. However, the cost of operating in Yemen compares favourably with other fragile environments, for example Afghanistan, where the large security footprint entails significantly higher operating costs.

For each new project business case we undertake rigorous VfM analysis to examine the VfM offered by the proposed intervention compared to alternative options. Through this process, VfM is placed at the heart of any funding decision. All business cases are available on the DFID website.

As the amount of resources dedicated to Yemen grows, we will continue to work to ensure value for money is maximised. We will achieve this by:

- Developing a VfM strategy to be implemented over 2012-15. This will include actions to enhance VfM on operating costs and ensure VfM is actively considered throughout the programme management cycle
- Ensuring all new business cases for DFID Yemen programmes have undergone a VfM appraisal in line with corporate guidance
- Establishing a virtual VfM team of the Economic and Evaluation Advisers to peer review all new business cases, and provide guidance and advice where required on VfM analysis and assessment
- Ensuring all DFID Yemen staff understand the latest corporate guidance on VfM, including through conducting in-house VfM training
- Improving risk management of financial performance and increased quality of forecasting and variance analysis through improved usage of systems; increasing analysis and challenge of financial performance
- Investing in statistical capacity building in Yemen to provide better baseline data for assessing the VfM of new and existing projects
- Continuing to work with partners to maximise VfM, especially where this has been identified as an organisational priority by the MAR.

6) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Monitoring

The security threat in Yemen means it is virtually impossible for DFID to monitor directly any programme delivery outside Sana'a. However, we are committed to putting in place alternative approaches to ensure the most rigorous possible monitoring despite this serious constraint.

How: each programme will have an M&E framework with robust quantifiable indicators and targets which are sex-disaggregated where appropriate and monitored annually. Due to the high risk context there will also be quarterly monitoring of both country and specific programme level risks. In addition, all programmes scoring a C in their annual review, or which cause concern for other reasons, will have a detailed Performance Improvement Plan.

Who: primary monitoring responsibility will fall to programme partners. Where possible, we will undertake joint monitoring with government and other donors to ensure harmonisation and to reduce workloads. The evaluation adviser will quality assure M&E arrangements and logical frameworks for all new projects, and spot check annual reviews to ensure accuracy and consistency.

When: programme level monitoring will be continuous with formal reporting through Annual Reviews. Risks, results and performance across the programme will be monitored quarterly.

What: we will use a range of methodologies to monitor results depending on the programme. The detailed results framework has been compiled from individual logical frameworks and provides an overarching framework for the programme. The information will be used to both measure the impact of programmes and also to determine the future direction of work.

Evaluation

We will evaluate programmes which are high spending, innovative or where there is limited robust evidence that a particular intervention works. In 2012 projects independently evaluated will include: support to the interim presidential elections and the humanitarian assistance delivered through an International NGO consortium. Yemen may also be chosen as a case study in a DFID-wide study on cash transfer programme beneficiary perceptions. Plans for a large scale impact evaluation for the Social Fund for Development (SFD) Phase IV will also be developed further in 2012.

Building capacity of partners

There is limited reliable data for Yemen with the country scoring just 43/100 in the World Bank Statistics Capacity Building Indicator survey compared with an average score of 58/100 for the Middle East and North Africa. This reflects both the poor availability of data, and the limited use of internationally-agreed methodologies. Poor availability of data affects DFID's ability to plan, monitor and evaluate our projects and programmes.

DFID is supporting the Yemeni Central Statistical Office (CSO) to improve its capacity through a regional programme with the Islamic Development Bank. We will also work up a further programme in 2012 to improve the availability of statistical data. DFID will use its evaluation work in Yemen to share learning with partners with an interest in understanding DFID's approach to evaluation, for example the United Arab Emirates, who have signed an agreement with DFID committing us to work together on evaluation, in order to jointly build up the evidence base in the countries in which we both work.

Due to travel restrictions, DFID and other donors rely heavily on local partners for monitoring and evaluating programmes and projects. This includes local M&E consultancy firms and NGOs. By commissioning local partners to undertake this work, and by pairing them with international organisations to train and mentor the local implementers, we will build up national capacity in M&E.

7) Transparency

Publication of information

We will meet the commitments made by DFID in the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee by publishing detailed information of all new programmes on the DFID website, as well as all procurement over £500. In addition:

- We will ensure that all project performance reviews and evaluations are published on the DFID website
- We will ensure that all information in the public domain is comprehensive, accessible, accurate, timely and written in plain English
- We will publish a summary of this Operational Plan in English and Arabic on the DFID website
- We will publish summaries of all new projects in Arabic

Supporting transparency in our work

We will explore options to increase opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback on project performance.

Supporting transparency in others

We will work to meet the standards set out in the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), and encourage our partners in civil society, multilateral organisations and other donors to do the same (some of our implementing partners are signatories to IATI e.g. UNICEF). For example, we will encourage SFD to use innovative methods for communicating their work.

We will use our influence to encourage the transitional Government of Yemen to become more transparent to its own citizens about its budgets and the aid which it receives, for example through improved and more transparent public financial management. The Government of Yemen has demonstrated good progress in the past, with their bi-annual Open Budget Initiative score increasing from 10 out of 100 in 2008, to 26 out of 100 in 2010¹. However, given the large scale disruption to government in 2011, it is likely that this progress has reversed. This survey evaluates whether governments give the public access to budget information and opportunities to participate in the budget process at the national level.

¹ International Budget Partnership , Open Budget Survey 2010

8) UK Human Rights Assessment

Human rights context

Up to 2011, despite some improvements, Yemen had a poor human rights record, which reached a new low in 2011 with the deaths of over 200 civilians (estimated), largely at the hands of security forces and armed supporters of President Saleh¹. Despite Yemen being party to eight of the nine core international human rights treaties, implementation of its commitments is still seriously lacking. New Ministers for Interior and Human Rights (MoHR) are in place following the signature of the GCC agreement in November 2011, and there are renewed commitments to implementing human rights laws and treaties, establishing press freedom and releasing detainees². Whilst MoHR has made efforts to promote and monitor the human rights situation, it lacks the power to influence governmental bodies to abide its commitments and laws or to be transparent about human rights violations. Overall, it is too early to tell whether the long term direction of travel on human rights has substantively changed.

UK Approach

- The UK regularly raises human rights issues at senior levels with the Yemeni government, with some notable success (preventing executions of some minors) and works closely with bilateral as well as multilateral partners to monitor progress on implementation of human rights commitments, including the release of political detainees, protection of civilians from armed conflict, gender equality and justice and national reconciliation. The UK actively participates in discussions on Yemen at the Human Rights Council and looks forward to supporting the work of the UN Office for the Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Yemen, including transitional justice and a future independent human rights institute
- UNDP and other donors take the lead on Human Rights programming. DFID Yemen has preferred to mainstream human rights across our entire programme. Our security and justice programming has included sensitivity training to police on gender rights issues (2010) and Conflict Pool programming has supported groups, including youth, to raise awareness of human rights and to effectively articulate and voice their grievances. Forthcoming programming on political transition will seek to boost the voice and inclusion of marginalised groups, particularly women and youth, which should also leverage the profile of their grievances. Interventions under wealth creation, humanitarian, and poverty and vulnerability pillars will address social and economic rights.

Indicators

- The Universal Periodic Reviews in 2009 noted that Yemen had ratified more than 56 international conventions and instruments, and appeared to be on track with a significant number of these. However other reports paint a less rosy picture, and the extent to which such progress has been unpicked by recent political turmoil remains to be fully assessed
- The FCO's Annual Human Rights Report (April, 2012) states that in Yemen "there were many examples of media restrictions, intimidation, incommunicado detention, exposure of civilians to armed conflict, large-scale displacement of people, humanitarian crises, torture, an absence of accountability and justice, and the recruitment of children into the ranks of government security forces and the armed opposition."

¹ Amnesty International, 24/11/2011

² The Yemeni Minister for Human Rights has drawn up a list of citizens illegally detained during 2011 and is seeking their release