

**FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
OPINIONS**



ARMY

**BOARD OF INQUIRY
INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING UP TO
THE DEATHS OF**

24487779 SGT SA HAMILTON-JEWELL AGC (RMP)

25027534 CPL RA ASTON AGC (RMP)

24934788 CPL PG LONG AGC (RMP)

25111198 CPL S MILLER AGC (RMP)

25133133 LCPL BJ HYDE AGC (RMP)

25084460 LCPL TR KEYS AGC (RMP)

AL MAJARR AL KABIR ON 24 JUNE 2003



[REDACTED]

**Headquarters Land Command
Erskine Barracks
Wilton
Salisbury
Wiltshire SP2 0AG**

Telephone:
Military Network:
Facsimile:
Military Facsimile:
E-mail:
Military E-mail:



See Distribution

Reference: LAND/PERS/7590/2

Date: 19 Oct 04

**BOARD OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
THE DEATHS OF 24487779 SGT S A HAMILTON-JEWELL AGC(RMP), 25027534
CPL R A ASTON AGC(RMP), 24934788 CPL P G LONG AGC(RMP), 25111198 CPL
S MILLER AGC(RMP), 25133133 LCPL B J HYDE AGC(RMP) AND 25084460 LCPL
T R KEYS AGC(RMP)**

Reference:

A. LANDSO 3207 dated Sep 04.

1. During Op TELIC 1 on 24 Jun 03, a section of RMP soldiers consisting of Sgt Hamilton-Jewell, Cpl Aston, Cpl Long, Cpl Miller, LCpl Hyde and LCpl Keys was involved in an incident in which they were all killed. The proceedings of the Board of Inquiry (BOI) into this tragic incident have been scrutinised by COS at this HQ, and a LAND BOI report has been compiled in accordance with the procedures set out at Reference A.

2. Distribution of the report for further staffing is as follows:

- a. MOD PS4(A). The complete case file, together with the full LAND BOI report. The LAND BOI report consists of the 'Comments on the Conduct of the Board' together with a detailed annex covering the 'Record of Recommendations' (12 serials in total).
 - b. HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div. The LAND BOI report for information.
 - c. DGTS. The LAND BOI report, which contains 2 recommendations (serials 1 and 2) which require your further action.
 - d. DITrg (A). The LAND BOI report, which contains 4 recommendations (serials 1, 2, 3 and 7) which require your further action.
 - e. PJHQ. The LAND BOI report, which contains 4 recommendations (serials 5, 8 and 9) which require your further action. PJHQ J1 are requested to staff this report internally and collate a response from the relevant branches within PJHQ.
 - f. PM(A). The LAND BOI report, which contains 1 recommendation (serial 4) which requires your further action.
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3. Responses. Where responses are requested, these are required by 30 Nov 04 for the attention of SO1 Pers/Ops & Plans, Lt Col J S Grinstead RLC, [REDACTED] who is the lead for this Board within Pers Div.

Robertson

V C ROBERTSON
Maj
for COS

Enclosures:

1. BOI case file (consisting of 6 x lever arch files). (2 copies for MOD PS4(A) only)
2. LAND BOI Report: 'Cmts on the Conduct of the Board' & 'Recommendations'.

Distribution:

External:

Action:

MOD PS4(A) – Encs 1 and 2.
PJHQ J1 – Enc 1
DGTS – Enc 1
DITrg (A) – Enc 1
PM(A) – Enc 1

Information:

HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div – G1 – Enc 2
MOD DS&C – Enc 2

Internal:

Action:

ACOS Pers – Enc 1
SO1 Pers/Ops & Plans – Enc 1

Information:

DACOS Legal – Enc 1

[REDACTED]

**COMMENTS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE BOARD OF INQUIRY TO
INVESTIGATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DEATHS OF
24487779 SGT S A HAMILTON-JEWELL AGC(RMP)**

25027534 CPL R A ASTON AGC(RMP)

24934788 CPL P G LONG AGC(RMP)

25111198 CPL S MILLER AGC(RMP)

25133133 LCPL B J HYDE AGC(RMP)

25084460 LCPL T R KEYS AGC(RMP)

BOARD REFERENCE	CONVENING AUTHORITY	HIGHER AUTHORITY	DATE OF INCIDENT
LAND 7590/2	HQ 1 UK (Armd) Div	HQ LAND	24 Jun 03

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE OCCURRENCE

156 Pro Coy RMP deployed on Op TELIC 1 in Mar 03 as part of 16 AA Bde. After the war fighting phase 16 AA Bde and its Pro Coy left theatre. 1 PARA Battle Group (BG) was left to assume responsibility for Maysan Province on 28 May 03. A composite Platoon from 156 Pro Coy RMP was to remain in order to provide provost support to the BG.

The RMP Platoon (1 Pl) comprised 3 Sections. C Section consisted of Sgt Hamilton-Jewell, Cpl Aston, Cpl Long, Cpl Miller, LCpl Hyde and LCpl Keys. C Section was allocated responsibility for the southern area of the province which was in the C Coy, 1 PARA BG Area of Responsibility. On 24 Jun 03, C Section booked out from the 1 PARA BG Operations Room. Their plan was to conduct a routine visit to 3 Police stations in the southern area. Whilst the section were visiting the first of the Police Stations (which was located at Al Majarr Al Kabir), they were involved in an incident that resulted in all 6 members of the Section being killed.

COMMENTS ON THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOARD

The Board of Inquiry Report reveals that a thorough investigation into this tragic event has been conducted in accordance with procedures.

It was noted that it was unusual for the Convening Officer, GOC 1(UK) Armd Div, to have appeared as a witness. However, it is clear that he was able to do so without any conflict of interest and it in no way undermines the integrity of the Board's findings.

COMMENTS ON THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

The Convening Order for this Board was confined to the circumstances up to the point where the RMP Section withdrew into the police station at Al Majarr Al Kabir. The findings are supported by the evidence produced at the Board of Inquiry.

COMMENTS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD

This HQ has reviewed the recommendations made by both the Board and the

[REDACTED]

Convening Authority. Whilst the majority of the Board's recommendations reflect genuine concerns of the Board and are largely supported by their findings, it is felt that not all are germane to the circumstances surrounding the deaths of the soldiers of C Sect, 1 Pl, 156 Pro Coy RMP and, for this reason, not all their recommendations are agreed.

An outline summary of the 12 recommendations is at Annex A. The complete detail of these 12 serials is at Annex B, together with staffing actions (where necessary) to be taken forward.

ADDITIONAL ACTION REQUIRED OF THE BOARD

No additional action is required of this Board of Inquiry.

SIGNED



APPOINTMENT A R D SHIRREFF
Maj Gen
COS

DATE 17 Oct 04

Annexes:

- A. Summary of Recommendations.
- B. Record of Recommendations.

**ANNEX A TO
LAND/PERS/7590/2
DATED 19 OCT 04**

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Ser	Brief Outline Details	Status	Referred To	Review Date
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	The Board recommends that Command Relationships are clearly articulated in OpOs and that the whole chain of command is clearly briefed as to whom they report to and who tasks them.	Open	DGTS and DITrg (A)	30 Nov 04
2.	The Board recommends that any Ops Room operating in this sort of environment adopts a uniform booking out system.	Open	DGTS and DITrg (A)	30 Nov 04
3.	The Board recommends that watchkeepers are trained in maintaining a Log and that it is made clear to them that Logs could potentially become an exhibit in legal proceedings.	Open	DITrg (A)	30 Nov 04
4.	The Board recommends that a review be conducted of RMP Officer training to ensure that their young officers are better trained to command small isolated detachments.	Open	PM(A)	30 Nov 04
5.	The Board strongly recommends that a detailed communications estimate is carried out on entering theatre, which is then regularly updated. Additionally, UOR funds should be made available to purchase additional, off the shelf, communications assets as required.	Open	PJHQ J6	30 Nov 04
6.	The Board recommends an assessment be carried out as to the suitability for the RMP to train and operate GPMG.	Closed	-	30 Nov 04
7.	All personnel issued with grenades must be trained in their operating procedures before issue.	Open	DITrg (A)	30 Nov 04
8.	The scaling of ammunition should be set at BG level and that individual detachment commanders should not be able to dictate ammunition holdings.	Open	PJHQ	30 Nov 04
9.	The Board recommends that morphine is made available to soldiers operating in potentially hostile environments.	Open	PJHQ J1/J4	30 Nov 04
10.	The Board recommends that where practical, consideration be given to providing an officer from Army Legal Services as a BOI member.	Closed	-	-
11.	HQ LAND gives direction on the outstanding disciplinary issues which should be resolved before the findings are exposed to the families.	Open	ACOS Pers	30 Nov 04
12.	Any meeting between the families and MOD representatives are carefully orchestrated, with terms of reference agreed in advance.	Closed	-	-

**ANNEX B TO
LAND/PERS/7590/2
DATED 19 OCT 04**

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	1	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recommends that Command Relationships are clearly articulated in OpOs and that the whole chain of command is clearly briefed as to whom they report to and who tasks them.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

In the context of this incident, this HQ needs to ensure that there are no gaps in our doctrine and teaching of command relationships. To this end, the following staffing action is required:

- a. Director General Training Support (DGTS) is to review how command relationships are articulated and reflected within tactical doctrine¹ together with how their understanding is conveyed to the chain of command. DGTS is to confirm to this HQ whether or not current doctrine covers this area in sufficient detail.
- b. Director Individual Training (Army) (DI Trg (A)) is to review course content for both officers and soldiers in order to confirm to this HQ that an understanding of command relationships is being taught at all levels.

REFERRED TO:	DGTS and DI Trg (A)	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ Command and Staff Procedures appear in Army Field Manual Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 8.

[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	2	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recommends that any Ops Room operating in this sort of environment adopts a uniform booking out system. It further recommends that the system be checked on a regular basis to ensure that all attached units are complying and that an all informed patrol matrix is being maintained.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

The following staffing action is required:

- a. DGTS is to review how operating procedures are articulated, are reflected within tactical doctrine¹ and how their understanding is conveyed to the chain of command. A Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) or Aide Memoire is to be available covering the routine workings of an Operations Room for distribution to the chain of command.
- b. DI Trg (A) is to review course content for both officers and soldiers in order to confirm to this HQ that an understanding of Operations Room procedures is being taught at all levels.

REFERRED TO:	DGTS and DI Trg(A)	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ Command and Staff Procedures appear in Army Field Manual Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 8.

[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	3	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recommends that watchkeepers are trained in maintaining a Log and that it is made clear to them that Logs could potentially become an exhibit in legal proceedings.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

The following staffing action is required:

- a. DI Trg (A) is to review the training currently delivered to watchkeepers to ensure conveyance of an understanding of the importance of the accurate and timely recording of information. Responsibilities of a watchkeeper are also to be included in the SOP/Aide Memoire on Operations Room procedures cf. Record of Recommendations, Serial 2.
- b. The specific requirements for maintenance, accuracy and retention of the log is to appear as a reminder on the cover of AF B 58 (Log Sheet). Pers Div is to undertake staffing to assess the feasibility of this for amendment for future versions of the Log Sheet. It is noted that existing stocks are already distributed across the Army.

REFERRED TO:	DITrg (A) & Pers Div	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	4	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recommends that a review be conducted of RMP Officer training to ensure that their young officers are better trained to command small isolated detachments. Additionally, the Board recommends that thought is given to the RMP carrying out more infantry training, specifically focussing on infantry skills. The competing demands of Police training and Garrison Policing are precluding the RMP from having time available to achieve anything more than a basic level of military training and skills. The Board understands that the RMP is subject to a LAND Management Consultancy Service (LMCS) Review, which will hopefully address these issues.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	See Below	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

The recommendation regarding the review of RMP Officer training is agreed; PM(A) is to carry out a review of RMP Officer training and confirm that training objectives accurately reflect the appropriate type and level of command within an operational environment.

The recommendation – that thought be given to RMP carrying out more infantry training – is, however, not agreed. There is no indication that any shortfall in infantry training had any bearing on the outcome of this incident. The assertion that ‘it was believed that the RMP were being deployed in their traditional policing role and that the extra training they conducted in infantry skills was more than adequate to cover *expected eventualities*¹’ is valid. Training of RMP must reflect the functional requirement and be based upon the policing and associated skills within an All Arms environment.

NB. It should be noted that the recent LMCS Review of RMP roles and structures reported prior to the completion of the BOI. Whilst it considered RMP training for operations, no specific recommendations in this context were made.

REFERRED TO:	PM(A)	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ BOI Findings Page 15, Paragraph 62.

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	5	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board strongly recommends that a detailed communications estimate is carried out on entering theatre, which is then regularly updated. Additionally, UOR funds should be made available to purchase additional, off the shelf, communications assets as required. This is particularly relevant for operations in an urban environment.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	See Below	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

The recommendation for the requirement of detailed communications estimates is agreed. PJHQ (J6) is to confirm the procedures for the execution of a communications estimate on entering a new Theatre of Operations and the regularity with which this is updated.

The recommendation that UOR funds should be made available to purchase additional communication assets as required is neither practical nor is the requirement borne out by the findings of the Board and is, therefore, not agreed. Funding will continue to be available for UORs, including those for communications equipment, the purchase of which will be governed by availability of resources balanced against the operational risk. The recommendation assumes that, on this occasion, insufficient assets were available which is not reflected in the findings which states '(Iridium) phones were always available when requested'¹.

REFERRED TO:	PJHQ J6	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ BOI Findings Page 10, Paragraph 38.

[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	6	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recommends an assessment be carried out as to the suitability for the RMP to train and operate GPMG.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Not Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION: N/A

The requirement for Combat Service Support (CSS) units to be provided with improved self-protection has been recognised as part of the operational Lessons Learned process, staffed¹ and the establishment and fielding of GPMGs to RMP, RLC, RAMC, REME and Log Bde Sig Sqns has been promulgated². The scaling of weapons is to provide for local area protection; it is therefore unlikely that weapon systems would have cascaded down to Sect level. There is no evidence to suggest that a lack of firepower had any bearing on the outcome of this event. Furthermore, the issue of heavy weapons to RMP would detract from their ability to go about their primary function. No further staff action required.

REFERRED TO:	-	Date:
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date:

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:	COS	Date: Oct 04
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¹ LAND/CSS/1581 dated 6 Aug 04 refers.

² LAND/LOG/ES/5011/1 dated 27 Aug 04 refers.

[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING BOARD OF INQUIRY

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	7	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

Grenades were issued widely for this operation and the Board strongly recommends that all personnel issued with grenades must be trained in their operating procedures before issue.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

The recommendation is agreed as a general principle applicable to all weapon systems. DI Trg (A) is to confirm the policy on the training requirement for use of any weapon system and that this is widely distributed to the chain of command.

Whilst the Board is understandably concerned that grenades were issued to the RMP without appropriate training, it should be noted that within the context of this operation, grenades had been withdrawn from the whole BG on the basis that they were no longer appropriate. There is, therefore, no suggestion that the lack of grenades had any direct bearing on the outcome of this incident and the Board considers the withdrawal of grenades was appropriate¹.

REFERRED TO:	DI Trg (A)	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ BOI Findings Page 13, Paragraph 51.

[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	8	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recognises that this operation was transitioning from warfighting to PSO. The drawdown of ammunition was correct however the Board recommends that the scaling of ammunition should be set at BG level and that individual detachment commanders should not be able to dictate ammunition holdings. The scalings then need to be confirmed across the BG.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	See Below	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

This recommendation does not naturally fall out of the findings of the Board. Ammunition scalings for the BG would appear to have been set at the appropriate level¹ and there is no evidence to suggest holdings by the RMP PI were being set at a different scale in conscious contravention of this. There is, however, a requirement to achieve consistency within units working within an AOR and it is therefore agreed that ammunition scalings should be set at BG level.

HQ LAND further recommends that a minimum ammunition scaling be set for each Theatre of Operations, based upon the threat assessment and advice of the National Contingent Commander (NCC), in order that consistency can be achieved for troops operating outside of BG AORs, such as Divisional or Theatre Troops.

PJHQ is invited to review the current policy on ammunition scalings with particular emphasis on the setting of minimum recommended holdings and to report their recommendations.

REFERRED TO:	PJHQ	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ 1 PARA/3/504 dated 11 Jun 04.

[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	9	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

The Board recommends that Morphine is made available to soldiers operating in potentially hostile environments. If there is concern about misuse then it may be appropriate to centralise Morphine. However, all Sects deploying on the ground should have immediate access to Morphine.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	See Below	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

The central recommendation – that morphine is made available to soldiers operating in potentially hostile environments – is agreed albeit that the recommendation does not appear to derive directly from the findings of the Board, which concluded that morphine was available if it had been asked for¹.

Concern over misuse, which is not supported by any evidence, or the risk of disciplinary action if lost is not considered germane to the proceedings. The policy for accounting for controlled drugs is set out in JSP 340. Whilst AMD set the policy for the clinical use of morphine, it is PJHQ that set the policy on the issue and control of morphine in operational theatres.

PJHQ J1/J4 is requested to confirm their policy regarding the issue of morphine in order to clarify current procedures in light of this recommendation.

REFERRED TO:	PJHQ J1/J4	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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¹ BOI Findings Page 13, Paragraph 56.

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	10	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION AND ACTION REQUIRED

The Board recommends that where practical, consideration be given to providing an officer from ALS as a member.

The recommendation is agreed. The advantage of having an ALS officer sitting as either President or as a Member of a Board of Inquiry is recognised and is reflected in Land Command Standing Order (LANDSO) No 3207: 'Conduct of Boards of Inquiry Into Deaths or Serious Injury' (1st Revise dated Sep 04). No further action is required and this recommendation is closed.

MADE BY	Board	Date: 18 Jun 04
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Endorsement	Agreed	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION: None.

REFERRED TO:	-	Date:
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date:

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:	COS	Date: Oct 04
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RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	11	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

HQ LAND gives direction on the outstanding disciplinary issues. The disciplinary issues should be resolved before the findings are exposed to the families.

MADE BY	GOC 1(UK) Armd Div	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

This HQ has carefully considered the issue of possible disciplinary action against certain individuals. Following legal scrutiny of all aspects of the issue, it is the view of this HQ that no disciplinary action should be taken.

It should be noted, however, that administrative action against certain individuals might yet be appropriate. A single CO of 1* rank will be appointed to consider these cases and HQ LAND will brief the appointed officer in due course.

The convening Officer's concerns regarding the withholding of the Board's findings from promulgation pending disciplinary action are not applicable to administrative action, and the findings can be disclosed without prejudice to administrative action being taken.

REFERRED TO:	ACOS Pers	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: 30 Nov 04

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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[REDACTED]

RECORD OF RECOMMENDATIONS

BOARD REFERENCE	SERIAL	TOTAL SERIALS	DIV LEAD
LAND 7590/2	12	12	HQ LAND

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

During Op TELIC 1, on 24 Jun 03 an RMP section comprising 6 RMP NCOs booked out from the 1 PARA BG Ops room. Their plan was to make a routine visit to 3 Police Stations. At the first Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir, they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the section being killed.

RECOMMENDATION

Any meeting between the families and the MOD representatives are carefully orchestrated, with terms of reference agreed in advance.

MADE BY	GOC 1(UK) Armd Div	Date: 2 Sep 04
LAND Endorsement	Agreed	Date: Oct 04

ADDITIONAL STAFFING ACTION:

MOD PS4(A) are the lead on the disclosure of this Board of Inquiry to the bereaved families in conjunction with AG Sec. It is routine procedure to handle with great sensitivity all such meetings and this recommendation is not advising any change to normal protocol in these matters. MOD PS4(A) are to note the Convening Authority's concerns.

REFERRED TO:	MOD PS4(A)	Date: Oct 04
RESPONSE REQUIRED BY:		Date: -

CLOSING ACTION

CLOSED BY:		Date:
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[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE 1 TO
HQ 1 (UK) ARMD DIV
1675/23/03 G1 DISC
DATED 2 SEP 04

SUMMARY SHEET

Formation: HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div

Commander: Major General P A Wall CBE

Type of Inquiry: Board of Inquiry

Convened by: GOC 1 (UK) Armd Div

Terms of Reference of the Inquiry: To investigate the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 24487779 Sgt Hamilton-Jewell, 25027534 Cpl Aston, 24934788 Cpl Long, 25111198 Cpl Miller, 25133133 LCpl Hyde and 25084460 LCpl Keys.

Date of occurrence: 24 June 2003

Date of assembly of Inquiry: 15 March 2004

Date Inquiry completed: 18 June 2004

Opinion of Inquiry: The following summarises the key opinions and findings of the Board:

a. The drawdown in forces in Maysan Province from 16 Air Asslt Bde to a reinforced BG (1PARA) was entirely reasonable in light of the progress towards stability in SE Iraq at the time. It did lead to a reduction in the military footprint in Maysan province, and by implication the ability to gather intelligence. The ability to detect any warning signs there might have been in Al Majar Al Kabir was reduced, but there was no indication that an attack could be expected on 24 Jun 03.

b. OP CLAYMORE, the attempt to round-up heavy weapons in tribal hands, did cause unrest, including a demonstration in Al Majar Al Kabir on 22 Jun 03. This was justifiably treated as an isolated incident and RMP were aware of it.

c. By agreement with the Town Council patrols were to continue. When they deployed on 24 Jun 03

[REDACTED]

the RMP patrols were aware of the presence of the infantry patrols in the town.

d. Once the uprising became apparent, with no confirmation that the RMP were still in the town, the BG Ops staff rightly focussed on the extraction of the infantry patrols. No orders were given to ascertain if the RMP were still in the town, or to arrange for their extraction.

e. The 1 PARA callsigns 20A and 20 B were not aware of the presence of the RMP patrols at the Police Station. They are to be strongly commended for their bravery and skill in extricating themselves intact in the face of an overwhelming threat.

f. The QRF2 deployment was expeditiously executed and, given the scale of the ongoing firefight, the commander was correct to use the assistance of the Iraqi doctor to recover the bodies of the RMP. The decision not to re-enter the town immediately to secure the Police Station for forensic evidence was also correct.

g. RMP command relationships were not clear. Control of RMP patrols from Abu Naji Camp, and their coordination with other BG patrols was poor. There was no attempt to track individual RMP patrols in detail.

h. At this stage in the campaign the RMP were being employed in an unfamiliar role in small isolated detachments. The Board has identified weaknesses in their infantry skills, ammunition holding, ability to use grenades, and lack of morphine. It recommends that individual and collective training are improved to better prepare and equip RMP for this emerging role.

i. Clansman VHF and HF radios did not provide sufficient coverage to ensure an all informed net, and there were insufficient Iridium telephones held by the BG. A culture of operating without proven communications had developed. The Board recommends that a detailed communications plan should be maintained and updated regularly, and that UOR equipment should be provided in sufficient quantity to compensate for the shortcomings of in-service equipment.

[REDACTED]


j. The guidance provided by the ALS member to this complex inquiry was invaluable.

Disciplinary Action taken: None.

Opinion of HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div: I support the findings of the Board and further recommend that:

- a. They are made available to the LMCS review into RMP manning and structures.
- b. HQ LAND gives direction on the outstanding disciplinary issues.
- c. The disciplinary issues should be resolved before the findings are exposed to the families.
- d. Any meeting between the families and MOD representatives are carefully orchestrated, with terms of reference accepted by both parties in advance.

Signed:



P A Wall
Major General
Comd 1 (UK) Armd Div

Date: 2 September 2004

Opinion and Instructions of the Superior Commander-ACOS Pers HQ LAND:

See attached sheet.

Proceedings forwarded to Headquarters:

1 (UK) Armd Div

12 July 2004

HQ LAND

September 2004

RECORD

OF

THE BOARD OF INQUIRY

INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING

THE DEATHS OF

24487779 SGT S A HAMILTON-JEWELL

25027534 CPL R A ASTON

24934788 CPL P G LONG

25111198 CPL S MILLER

25133133 LCPL B J HYDE

AND

25084460 LCPL T R KEYS

ALL OF 156 PRO COY RMP

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

INDEX

Flag

Containing

PROCEEDINGS

- A. Record of Proceedings.
- B. Convening Order.
- C. Findings of the Board.
- D. Witness statements and transcripts taken under oath.
- E. Witness Exhibits.
- F. Witness Statements taken by RMP.
- G. Witness Exhibits taken by RMP.

FLAG A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

of a Board of Inquiry

assembled at HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division, Wentworth Barracks, BFPO 15

on 15th day of March 2004

by order of Major General PA Wall CBE, GOC 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division

for the purpose of investigating the circumstances surrounding the deaths of
24487779 Sgt S A Hamilton-Jewell, 25027534 Cpl R A Aston, 24934788 Cpl P G Long,
25111198 Cpl S Miller, 25133133 LCpl B J Hyde, and 25084460 LCpl T R Keys all of 156
Pro Coy RMP in Al Majarr Al Kabir on Tue 24 Jun 03.

PRESIDENT Colonel MG Hickson OBE Late RLC

MEMBERS Lieutenant Colonel WA Common RHF
Major P Davies (AGC) ALS
Maj J Fletcher RAMC

The board, having assembled pursuant to the convening order attached at Flag B proceeded to hear evidence on oath in accordance with the transcript attached hereto at Flag D.

The evidence presented to the board, which is shown at Flags E-G, was done so under oath as follows:

Flag	Containing	Presented by	Marked as exhibit	Supporting Statement
A	Record of Proceedings	The Board	N/A	N/A
B	Convening Order	The President	N/A	N/A
C	Findings of the Board	The Board	N/A	N/A
D	Evidence given	Individual Witnesses	N/A	N/A
E	Witness Exhibits	Individual Witnesses		
F	Witness Statements taken by RMP		BOI/RMP/6	
G	Witness Exhibits taken by RMP		BOI/RMP/7	

[REDACTED]

The findings and opinion of the board are attached at FLAG C.

Dated the 18th day of June, 2004

President

Michael Bell

Members

Wahmon

PJ Dawis

[Signature]

[REDACTED]

FLAG B

CONVENING ORDER

CONVENING ORDER FOR A BOARD OF INQUIRY
BY ORDER OF
MAJOR GENERAL P A WALL CBE
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING
1ST (UNITED KINGDOM) ARMoured DIVISION

1. A Board of Inquiry composed as under is to assemble at HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division at 1330 hours on the 15th March 2004 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 24487779 Sgt S A Hamilton-Jewell, 25027534 Cpl R A Aston, 24934788 Cpl P G Long, 25111198 Cpl S Miller, 25133133 LCpl B J Hyde, and 25084460 LCpl T R Keys all of 156 Provost Company, Royal Military Police in Al Majarr Al Kabir on Tuesday 24th June 2003.

President:- ██████████ Colonel M G Hickson OBE Late RLC
Member:- ██████████ Lieutenant Colonel W A Common RHF
Member:- ██████████ Major P Davies AGC (ALS)
Member:- ██████████ Major J Fletcher RAMC

2. As the deaths are subject to an ongoing criminal investigation, the Inquiry will only investigate the circumstances up until the withdrawal of members of the Royal Military Police (RMP) into the police station in Al Majarr Al Kabir on the 24th June 2003.

3. Any person to whom Rule 11 of the Board of Inquiry (Army) Rules 1956 applies and who, in the opinion of the President, may be affected by the finding of Inquiry is to be given the opportunity of being present and represented in accordance with Section 135(4) of the Army Act 1955.

4. If it appears to the Board at any time during the Inquiry that any person may have committed an offence against Military Law, including a civil offence contrary to Section 70 of the Army Act 1955, the President is to adjourn the Inquiry and seek legal advice.

5. The Board is to investigate all the circumstances and record all evidence relevant to the Inquiry, save that the Board is not to attribute blame, negligence or recommend disciplinary action. In addition, the Inquiry is to express its opinion with regard to any material conflict in the evidence which may arise and give reasons for reaching that opinion.

6. The Inquiry is to report on the following matters;

a. **The missions and tasks of the following:**

(1) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).

- (2) The Coalition Land Component.
- (3) HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division (1 Div).
- (4) 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (1 PARA BG).
- (5) 1 Regiment RMP (1 RMP).
- (6) 156 Provost Company (156 Pro Coy RMP).

b. The post active hostilities situation in Maysan Province (and specifically Al Majarr Al Kabir) after 28th April 2003 covering:

- (1) 1 Div TASKORG and Deployment (including force levels and dispositions in Maysan Province)
- (2) Geography.
- (3) The local culture.
- (4) The security situation.
- (5) The militia(s) and co-operation (if any) with Coalition forces.
- (6) The police and co-operation with Coalition forces.
- (7) The public and relations with Coalition forces.
- (8) Initiatives for restoration of Law and Order.
- (9) The threat (up until 6e below).
- (10) Strategic estimate and Organisation and Development (O&D) issues.

c. 1 PARA BG operating methods/procedures including:

- (1) Booking Out.
- (2) Patrolling (including co-ordination with other patrols, tracking of patrols and communications including communications checks).
- (3) Searches.
- (4) Interface with the local community and authorities (including co-ordination with other units).
- (5) Intelligence gathering and dissemination.

- (6) Force Protection Measures.
- (7) Quick Reaction Force (QRF).
- (8) Air Reaction Force (ARF).
- (9) Changes to Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs).
- (10) Orders and Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs).

d. 156 Pro Coy RMP operating methods/procedures methods including:

- (1) Booking Out.
- (2) Patrolling (including co-ordination with 1 PARA BG, tracking of patrols, communications including communications checks).
- (3) Interface with the local community and authorities (including co-ordination with 1 PARA BG).
- (4) Orders and FRAGOs.
- (5) What orders and FRAGOs were generated between 28th April 2003 - 24th June 2003? (Orders and FRAGOs to be obtained and attached to the record).

e. Events leading up to 24th June 2003 and, in particular:

- (1) Any changes to the situation in Maysan Province (different from those disclosed at 6b above).
- (2) Tempo of operations. Was there any change and, if so, why?
- (3) 156 Pro Coy RMP meetings with the police in Al Majarr Al Kabir. How many previous meetings had taken place and were any difficulties encountered?
- (4) Other activities in Al Majarr Al Kabir.
- (5) Untoward incidents in Al Majarr Al Kabir prior to 22nd June 2003 (if any).
- (6) Searches and, in particular;
 - (i) How many searches were conducted and what were the results?
 - (ii) What procedures were adopted particularly in relation to women and children?

- (iii) What was the policy for and use of dogs?
 - (iv) What was the effect of OP JASMINE (OP CLAYMORE)?
 - (v) Were there any indications that searches were causing dissent?
- (7) Incident on the 22nd June 2003. What happened and why?
- (8) Meeting on the 23rd June 2003. What was agreed and why?
- (9) Intelligence, including;
- (i) What was the intelligence assessment immediately prior to the 22nd June 2003?
 - (ii) Did the threat assessment change after the 22nd June 2003?
 - (iii) What intelligence information was disseminated to 1 PARA BG and, in particular, 156 Pro Coy RMP and how?
 - (iv) What intelligence information was disseminated to 1 PARA BG and 156 Pro Coy RMP after the 22nd June 2003?
 - (v) Were any additional security measures adopted after 22nd June 2003? If yes, were these sufficient? If not, why not?
 - (vi) Were any additional security measures (if any) adopted by 156 Pro Coy RMP after 22nd June 2003? If not, why not?
- (10) Co-ordination of activity between 1 PARA BG, 156 Pro Coy RMP and other units.

f. Events on the 24th June 2003 and, in particular:

- (1) Actions of C/S 20A and C/S 20B from 1 PARA BG and, in particular;
- (i) What intelligence was provided prior to the patrol going out?
 - (ii) Was there any intelligence of a possible ambush?
 - (iii) Were any additional security measures taken as a result of the intelligence provided? If not, why not?
 - (iv) Were C/S 20A and C/S 20B informed of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir? If not, why not?
 - (v) What action was taken when C/S 20A were informed that they would be engaged if they entered Al Majarr Al Kabir?

- (vi) Was this information passed on to the Ops Room? If not, why not? If yes, was this information passed on to the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol? If not, why not?
 - (vii) When did C/S 20A and C/S 20 B first become aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol? (to include the point where C/S 20A took up all round defence at the crossroads in Al Majarr Al Kabbir)
 - (viii) Could any action have been taken to assist when they became aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol?
 - (ix) Record of all radio logs to be examined and attached to the record.
- (2) Actions of C/S 33J and 33K from 156 Pro Coy RMP and, in particular;
- (i) What intelligence was provided to the patrol prior to departure? If no brief was provided, why not?
 - (ii) Did the intelligence brief (if any) refer to the events of the 22/23rd June 2003?
 - (iii) Were any additional security measures taken as a result of the intelligence provided (if any)? If not, why not?
 - (iv) Was the patrol pattern for 156 Pro Coy RMP known and to whom was this information provided?
 - (v) Was the patrol pattern for 156 Pro Coy RMP provided to the 1 PARA BG Ops Room and, if not, why not?
 - (vi) What co-ordination took place between the 156 Pro Coy RMP Ops desk and the 1 PARA BG Ops room. What co-ordination should have occurred (if any)?
 - (vii) What communication equipment was carried by the patrol? Was this sufficient?
 - (viii) Was the patrol carrying all the required equipment and was this sufficient?
 - (ix) Did the patrol book out?
 - (x) Was a communications check made by the patrol prior to departure or at any other time?
 - (xi) Was a communications check made with the patrol? If not, why not?

- (xii) When was the last communication received from 156 Pro Coy RMP (if any)?
 - (xiii) Record of radio logs to be examined and attached to the record.
- (3) Activity at the police station in Al Majarr Al Kabir and, in particular;
- (i) Was any attempt made at the police station to seek assistance and what was the result?
- (4) Actions of Command Post 1 PARA BG and, in particular;
- (i) At what stage were they aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?
 - (ii) Could any action to assist have been taken when they became aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol?
- (5) Events in the 1 PARA BG Ops Room and, in particular;
- (i) Was the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol briefed to the 1 PARA BG Ops room prior to the departure of the patrol? If not, why not?
 - (ii) Was the 1 PARA BG Ops Room informed of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol by the 156 Pro Coy RMP Ops desk? If not, why not?
 - (iii) Was a patrol pattern produced by 156 Pro Coy RMP and was the patrol pattern provided to the 1 PARA BG Ops Room? If not, why not?
 - (iv) If the patrol pattern was known to the 1 PARA BG Ops Room why was this information not passed to C/S 20A and C/S 20B.
 - (v) Did the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol book out and, if so, through whom?
 - (vi) Was a communications check made with the patrol and, if not, why not?
 - (vii) At what stage was the Ops Room 1 PARA BG aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?
 - (viii) When did [REDACTED] inform the Ops Room (Officer) 1 PARA BG of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?

- (ix) What action was taken when [REDACTED] informed the Ops Room (Officer) 1 PARA BG of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?
 - (x) Could any action to assist have been taken when the Ops Room became aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol?
 - (xi) Record of all Ops Room logs (including 156 Pro Coy RMP Ops desk) to be examined and attached to the record.
- (6) Actions of the QRF (1 PARA BG) and, in particular;
- (i) What was the specific tasking of the QRF?
 - (ii) At what stage were they aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?
 - (iii) Could any action to assist have been taken when they became aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol?
 - (iv) Record of all radio communications to be examined and attached to the record
- (7) Actions of the ARF (1 PARA BG)
- (i) What was the specific tasking of the ARF?
 - (ii) At what stage were they aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?
 - (iii) Was any decision to abandon the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol made?
 - (iv) Could any action to assist have been taken when they became aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol?
 - (v) Record of all radio communications to be examined and attached to the record.
- (8) Actions of the Gazelle Helicopters
- (i) At what stage were they aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol in Al Majarr Al Kabir?
 - (ii) Could any action to assist have been made when they became aware of the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol?
 - (iii) Record of all radio communications to be examined and attached to the record.

- (9) Actions of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).
- (10) Co-ordination of activity.
 - (i) How were the patrols co-ordinated?
 - (ii) Why was the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol not known (if this was the case) to the 1 PARA BG Ops Room, QRF, ARF, and any other relevant parties.

g. Training including the following issues:

- (1) 1 PARA BG Pre Op Tour training - What was the training and was it adequate?
- (2) RMP Pre-Op Tour training - What was the training and was it adequate?
- (3) RMP individual, platoon, company and specialist training - What was the training and was it adequate?
- (4) Differences in approach to training. Was the correct balance struck between military and police training in the case of the RMP?

h. Rules of Engagement (ROE).

- (1) What were the ROE and were they sufficient?

i. Equipment issued to 1 PARA BG including the RMP detachment and CIMIC teams including the following issues:

- (1) What were the initial weapons scalings?
- (2) What were the Personal Protective Equipment scalings?
- (3) Were the scalings reduced on or about the 28th May 2003 and what was the effect (if any) of the reduction in scalings?
- (4) What was the difference (if any) between the scalings for 1 PARA BG and 156 Pro Coy RMP?
- (5) Were the ammunition levels appropriate for the operational tempo both before and after 28th May 2003?
- (6) Were the RMP weapon scalings appropriate?
- (7) Were the RMP Personal Protective Equipment scalings appropriate?

- (8) Would any increases in ammunition and weapon scalings have made any difference to the outcome of this incident?
- (9) Were the vehicle types and scalings appropriate?
- (10) Should any additional equipment have been issued?
- (11) How was the issue of morphine controlled and was morphine issued to 1 PARA BG and 156 Pro Coy RMP? If not, why not?

j. Communications.

- (1) What was the Divisional and Battlegroup communications plan?
- (2) What were the methods of communication?
- (3) Were the available communication systems adequate and appropriate?
- (4) Were the standard Clansman HF and VHF radio systems reliable?
- (5) What were the problems (if applicable)?
- (6) What was the loss of communications procedure?
- (7) What was the procedure for dismounted Ops?
- (8) How was CEI issued and controlled?
- (9) What communications were available for 156 Pro Coy RMP? Were they disadvantaged in the allocation of communications?
- (10) How many modes of communication were required for a patrol (mounted and dismounted)?
- (11) Did the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol have the required communications on the 24th June 2003?
- (12) Why did 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol not have Thuraiya, Iridium, TACSAT or Personal Role radios?
- (13) Would Thuraiya, Iridium, TACSAT or Personal Role radios have made a difference to what happened?
- (14) Would a working, all informed communications net have made any difference to what happened?
- (15) Suggestions for future deployments.

k. Command and control.

- (1) What were the procedures in the 1 PARA BG Ops room?
- (2) What were the Booking Out procedures and were they complied with?
- (3) What were the co-ordination requirements between the 1 PARA BG Ops room and the 156 Pro Coy RMP Ops desk and were they complied with?
- (4) How were radio checks controlled; did the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol and 1 PARA BG Ops room, make any radio checks?
- (5) How was the AWACS Ac controlled and tasked?
- (6) What was the patrol matrix?
- (7) Did the 156 Pro Coy RMP patrol produce a patrol pattern and, if so, was the patrol pattern plotted?
- (8) What were the procedures for contact reports?

l. Why did the incident happen and, in particular?

- (1) Were there any indicators?
- (2) Was it a surprise attack?
- (3) Could the incident have been avoided?

m. Could riot control agents have made a difference?

n. Could this incident have been prevented (either in whole or part) and how?

o. Any other issues which the President considers relevant.

7. The Board is to include in the findings a clear and concise précis of the case in an easily readable form and in particular are to:

- a. Set out the facts which, in the opinion of the Board, have been established by the evidence.
- b. Set out any additional facts relevant to the matter under Inquiry disclosed by the evidence which are not specifically referred to in the Terms of Reference.
- c. Ensure that all documentary exhibits referred to by each witness in the statements attached to the RMP (SIB) Report are annexed to the Record of Proceedings.

d. Ensure that the statements attached to the RMP (SIB) Report together with any additional evidence (including the LAIT Report) is annexed to the Record of Proceedings. The RMP (SIB) Report itself however is not to form part of the Record of Proceedings.

8. The Inquiry is to make any recommendation which it considers appropriate in respect of all matters list in 6 a-o above and any other matters it deems relevant.

9. The Inquiry is to report to the Convening Authority accordingly.

10. The following military witnesses are to be ordered to attend (note - this is a provisional list and will be amended according to the requirements of the Board of Inquiry).

Medical Personnel:

- a. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- b. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- c. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- d. [REDACTED] RAF.
- e. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- f. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- g. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- h. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- i. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- j. [REDACTED] RAMC.
- k. [REDACTED] RAF.

Present in Ops Room

- a. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- b. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- c. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- d. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- e. [REDACTED] 1 IG.

- f. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- g. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- h. [REDACTED] RMP.
- i. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- j. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- k. [REDACTED] RMP.
- l. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- m. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- n. [REDACTED] MC, R Signals.
- o. [REDACTED] R Signals.
- p. [REDACTED] R Signals.

Air Crew

- a. [REDACTED] AAC.
- b. [REDACTED] AAC.
- c. [REDACTED] AAC.
- d. [REDACTED] AAC.
- e. [REDACTED] RAF.
- f. [REDACTED] RAF.
- g. [REDACTED] RAF.
- h. [REDACTED] RAF.
- i. [REDACTED] RAF.

ARF/IRT

- a. [REDACTED] RAF.
- b. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

- c. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- c. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- d. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- e. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- f. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

ORF

- a. [REDACTED] HCR.
- b. [REDACTED] HCR.
- c. [REDACTED] HCR.
- d. [REDACTED] HCR.
- e. [REDACTED] HCR.
- f. [REDACTED] HCR.
- g. [REDACTED] HCR.
- h. [REDACTED] HCR.
- i. [REDACTED] HCR.
- j. [REDACTED] HCR.
- k. [REDACTED] HCR.
- l. [REDACTED] HCR.
- m. [REDACTED] HCR.
- n. [REDACTED] HCR.
- o. [REDACTED] HCR.
- p. [REDACTED] HCR.
- q. [REDACTED] HCR.
- r. [REDACTED] HCR.

- s. [REDACTED] HCR.
- t. [REDACTED] HCR.
- u. [REDACTED] HCR.
- v. [REDACTED] HCR.
- w. [REDACTED] HCR.
- x. [REDACTED] HCR.
- y. [REDACTED] HCR.
- z. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- aa. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- bb. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- cc. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- dd. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- ee. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- ff. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- gg. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- hh. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

20A

- a. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- b. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- c. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- d. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- e. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- f. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- g. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

- h. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- i. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- j. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- k. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

20B

- a. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- b. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- c. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- d. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- e. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- f. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- g. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- h. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- i. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- j. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- k. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

156 Pro Coy RMP

- a. [REDACTED] RMP.
- b. [REDACTED] RMP.
- c. [REDACTED] RMP.
- d. [REDACTED] RMP.
- e. [REDACTED] RMP.
- f. [REDACTED] RMP.
- g. [REDACTED] RMP.

- h. [REDACTED] RMP.
- i. [REDACTED] RMP.
- j. [REDACTED] RMP.
- k. [REDACTED] RMP.
- l. [REDACTED] RMP.
- m. [REDACTED] RMP.
- n. [REDACTED] RMP.
- o. [REDACTED] RMP.
- p. [REDACTED] RMP.
- q. [REDACTED] RMP.
- r. [REDACTED] RMP.
- s. [REDACTED] RMP.
- t. [REDACTED] RMP.
- u. [REDACTED] RMP.
- v. [REDACTED] RMP.

1 PARA

- a. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.
- b. [REDACTED] 1 PARA.

11. No members of the press or public will be permitted to attend any part of the Inquiry unless otherwise directed by the President having first consulted the Convening Officer and MOD PS(4).


12. 1 (UK) Armoured Division, Headquarters and Signal Regiment is requested to provide:
- a. A room suitable for the Inquiry.
 - b. Typing facilities
 - c. A Bible.

d. Copies of the following manuals, fully amended;

- (1) Manual of Military Law Part 1.
- (2) Queen's Regulations 1975.
- (3) Food/accommodation/transport for all persons attending the Inquiry.
- (4) A SNCO to act as orderly to the Inquiry.

13. The president is to forward the original and seven copies of the record of proceedings to me on completion of the Inquiry.

Signed:-



General Officer Commanding
1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division

Date:- 15 March 2004

FLAG C

FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

GENERAL OUTLINE

1. 156 Provost Company (Pro Coy) deployed, on Operation (Op) TELIC 1 in Mar 03 as part of 16 Air Assault (AA) Brigade (Bde). At the end of the war fighting phase 16 AA Bde, and its Pro Coy, left theatre, leaving 1 PARA Battle Group (BG) to assume responsibility for Maysan Province on 28 May 03. A composite platoon (Pl) from 156 Pro Coy remained in Maysan Province to provide Pro support to the BG.

ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

2. The Royal Military Police (RMP) Pl, 1 Pl, was split into 3 Sections (Sects) and a Headquarters (HQ) element. C Sect, consisting of 24487779 Sgt S A Hamilton – Jewell, 25027534 Cpl R A Aston, 24934788 Cpl P G Long, 25111198 Cpl S Miller, 25133133 LCpl B J Hyde and 25084460 LCpl T R Keys, was allocated the Southern area of the province (C Coy 1 PARA BG Area of Responsibility (AOR)) and was responsible for the regeneration of Policing capability within the area. B Sect was allocated the Northern area of the province and A Sect was allocated the town of Al Amarah. On 24 Jun 03, C Sect booked out from the 1 PARA BG Operations (Ops) Room. Their plan was to conduct a routine visit to 3 Police Stations in the Southern area, ultimately meeting up with the visiting 16 AA Bde Commander (Comd) at the Southern most Police Station.

Annex C to ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

3. Whilst the Sect were visiting the first of the Police Stations at Al Majarr Al Kabir they were involved in an incident which resulted in all 6 members of the Sect being killed.

4. On 15 Mar 04 this Board of Inquiry (BOI) was convened to examine the circumstances surrounding the deaths of 24487779 Sgt S A Hamilton – Jewell, 25027534 Cpl R A Aston, 24934788 Cpl P G Long, 25111198 Cpl S Miller, 25133133 LCpl B J Hyde and 25084460 LCpl T R Keys. In order not to prejudice the ongoing criminal investigation the Board was directed not to investigate the events that took place in the Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 Jun 03. Additionally the Board was directed not to interview any Iraqi witnesses.

Q2.

BACKGROUND

5. *Strategic Estimate and O&D issues.* 1 (UK) Armoured Division (Armd Div) deployed on Op TELIC 1 in Feb 03, task organized as per the ORBAT at BOI/RMP/071. In May 03, post warfighting, the Div began to drawdown its forces in line with a reduced threat analysis and a desire to release forces out of theatre in order to allow for future roulement. This drawdown, led by PJHQ, resulted in 16 AA Bde handing over the Maysan Province to an enhanced 1 PARA BG, numbering some 1200 soldiers. 1 PARA, under Command of 16 AA Bde, had previously been responsible for the town of Al Amarah. The revised ORBAT is at ARB/3. On assumption of the Province 1 PARA BG came under the Operational Command (OPCOM) of 1 (UK) Armd Div as opposed to the original plan which had them OPCOM HQ 7 Armd Bde.

Q6b, (1), (10).
BOI/RMP/071, Annex A1 of 1.
p139, C, D, E.

p3, E.
ARB/3, part of BOI/RMP/07.
p19, C.
p138, F, G.
p34, C-F.

6. Various options were examined to establish the best way of employing the revised ORBAT and as a result a laydown of forces was established. HQ 1 PARA BG based itself on the old 16 AA Bde HQ in Abu Naji Camp just South of the largest town in the Province, Al Amarah. Support (Sp) Company (Coy) and B Coy, both based in Abu Naji Camp, rotated responsibility for the Northern part of the AOR as well as providing the BG Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and guarding of the camp. A Coy had responsibility for Al Amarah itself and was based in the Stadium in the town, and C Coy, also based in Abu Naji camp, had responsibility

p6, C, D, E.

p39.
p72, E, F, G.

for the Southern part of the AOR. The basing policy was decided upon due to limited resources being available to cover such a large area and a better economy of force could be achieved by concentrating assets in a limited number of locations. Al Uzayr, the Southern most town in the AOR, some distance from Al Amarah, had a detachment from C Coy and a Troop (Tp) of the Household Cavalry Regiment (HCR) permanently based in the town. The remainder of the HCR, based in Abu Naji camp, were responsible for patrolling of the Iraq/Iran border and QRF tasks.

7. The RMP PI was based in Abu Naji Camp and was split into 3 Sects, each responsible for the regeneration of Police capability within one of the PARA BG Coy AORs. The initial plan to semi-permanently base RMP assets in Police Stations, including the Police Station at Al Majarr Al Kabir, was discounted when it was decided that only one RMP PI was to remain and a centralisation of limited RMP assets was required. A flight of Gazelles, 2 Chinook CH 47 aircraft, Pathfinders, an Engineer Troop (Engr Tp), a Field Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Team, a Dressing Station (DS), a Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) team, Psychological Operations teams (PSYOPS), and Army Legal Service (ALS) support were also attached to the BG and were all based in Abu Naji camp.

UNIT	RESPONSIBILITY	LOCATION
HQ 1 PARA BG		Abu Naji Camp
A Coy 1 PARA	Al Amarah	Stadium, Al Amarah
B Coy 1 PARA	Northern area & QRF on rotation	Abu Naji Camp
Sp Coy 1 PARA	Northern area & QRF on rotation	Abu Naji Camp.
C Coy 1 PARA	Southern area	Abu Naji Camp & Detachment at Al Uzayr
HCR	Iran/Iraq border & QRF	Abu Naji Camp & Detachment at Al Uzayr
A Sect RMP	Al Amarah	Stadium, Al Amarah
B Sect RMP	Northern area	Abu Naji Camp
C Sect RMP	Southern area	Abu Naji Camp

8. *Geography.* A map of Iraq depicting the UK AOR as at 12 May 03, is at RMP/BOI/065. A map of Maysan Province, an area roughly the size of Wales, showing main towns and locations of the Police Stations is at RMP/BOI/066. A satellite photograph of Al Majarr Al Kabir, showing key areas of interest is at RMP/BOI/079.

9. *Local Culture and Regeneration of Maysan Province.* Predominately Shi'ite, the Province was mainly agricultural, and relied heavily on other Provinces for the supply of electricity, oil and basic commodities. The Province however was tribal and certain areas were known to be potentially volatile. Inter tribal fighting, linked to a culture whereby everybody had access to weapons and indeed saw it as a right to hold them, resulted in the threat of public order incidents and the potential for substantial aggression against the Coalition always being present. There was a high expectation for regeneration of the Province. This was twofold, firstly due to the Regime's lack of investment and secondly due to war damage and the extensive looting that had taken place both during and post the hostilities period. The heavy emphasis, in the Coalition pre war information campaign, on how life for the ordinary Iraqi would improve after the demise of the Regime, further enhanced expectations. The population of Maysan Province had been treated very badly by the Regime, especially in reprisals following the 1991 uprising, and they were justifiably very proud of the fact that they had liberated themselves. As a result

██████████ p6,E.
██████████ p39.

██████████ p6,C.

██████████ p236,F.

██████████ p4, D,E.

██████████ p139, D,F.

ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

Q6b(2).
RMP/BOI/065.
██████████ p 36.
RMP/BOI/066.
RMP/BOI/079.

Q6b(3).
██████████ p 36, p 37.

██████████ p3, A, B.
██████████ p5,C,D,E.

██████████ p137, E.
██████████ p 36.

██████████ p27, D.

██████████ p3, A.

they were generally welcoming and receptive to the Coalition presence, and the CO 1 PARA BG accurately assessed the situation as "benign but fragile".

10. *Militia and cooperation with Coalition Forces.* In Maysan Province the militia played a key role, and led the self-liberation of the Province. Two discrete Militia organisations evolved, an independent organisation under Abu Hatim and a Bader Corps sponsored organisation under Abu Mirian. From these militias came the creation of the Fawj Ad Dwaara (Fawj), and it quickly became clear that the coalition needed to work with them to ensure a secure environment in the Province. The Fawj commanded the respect of the civilian population, something the Police failed to achieve, and therefore it was agreed, by 1 PARA BG, that the Fawj would be registered and established in each urban area. They were to conduct patrols, often jointly with UK forces, and carry out other security duties.

11. *Police and cooperation with Coalition Forces.* The Police Force evolved out of 2 discrete organisations. The previous Police Force, hugely discredited and seen very much as a legacy of the old Regime, and those individuals who signed up, post hostilities, to the new Police Force, mainly just to gain employment. The whole Police Force was untrained, lacked cohesion and did not have the support of the local population. There was no recognisable structure and it became clear that the Coalition needed to bring together, train and develop the disparate pieces that had evolved post war fighting. OC 156 Pro Coy started meetings with the Police elements in the Province; this was later expanded by CO 1 PARA BG into a Security Committee, in an attempt to get the Police and the Fawj to work together. The relationship between the Police and the Fawj however remained strained. 156 Pro Coy took on the development of the Police in an attempt to create a trained, accountable, and efficient indigenous Police Force operating within an integrated Maysan Province structure, resourced to enforce law and order within boundaries enjoying the confidence of the local population. Details on the embryonic Police Force can be found at Annex C to ARB/3 and the lines of development, as described by [REDACTED], the RMP PI Comd, is at RMP/BOI/040.

12. *Public and relations with Coalition Forces.* Relationships between the Coalition and the public in Maysan Province were good. Generally the Coalition was welcomed and although expectations were high, sometimes unrealistically, the two groups worked well together. A limited CIMIC capability in the Province worked well and the introduction of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) ensured that some visible progress was evident. There was however dissent, particularly over searches, and it was not uncommon for patrols to be stoned and spat at, almost always by children. Also, whenever patrols did appear, they generated large crowds. The majority of the population had access to weapons and whilst not generally carried openly it was not unusual to see members of the crowd carrying weapons and taking part in celebratory gunfire. There was always scope for large scale public unrest at very short notice. In Al Majarr Al Kabir, however, up until 24 Jun 03, this public unrest had never gone beyond stone throwing.

13. *Initiatives for restoration of Law and Order.* The judicial system in Iraq, post warfighting, was non-existent. There were no Courthouses or prisons and, on the rare occasion when the Police arrested an individual, there was no Court, or Judge, to place them before. In Maysan Province the ALS set up a programme, using QIP money, to refurbish the 6 Courthouses, and also traced the Iraqi Judges, reinstating them where appropriate. The regeneration of a credible Police Force and joint patrolling with the Fawj plus a weapons amnesty, an attempt to remove weapons from society, were all ongoing projects to restore Law and Order. On top of this a 6 pillar approach was adopted which looked at the Law, the Police, the Court

Q6,b(5).

CPK/1 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p6, G,H.

[REDACTED] p 36.

Q6,b(6).

[REDACTED] p7, G.

[REDACTED] p5.

[REDACTED] p6,C, p7,C.

[REDACTED] p236,A-F.

[REDACTED] p20, G- p21, B.

[REDACTED] p7,G.

[REDACTED] p26, D.

ARB/3 part of RMP/BOI/07.

RMP/BOI/040.

Q6b(7).

[REDACTED] p 36, p 37.

[REDACTED] p5,C-E.

[REDACTED] p 303,D.

[REDACTED] p315, G.

Q6b(8).

[REDACTED] p302,E.

[REDACTED] p5, E -P6, B.

BOI/RMP/070.

System, the Prisons and a Judicial Evaluation and Training Team all under an independent Review Board chaired by Commander British Forces (COMBRITFOR).

14. *Threat and Security Situation up to 22 Jun 03.* The threat to Coalition Forces (CF) operating in Maysan Province was dictated by a combination of Capability and Intent. There was wide spread availability of weapons and clearly the Capability was extensive, however all indications gleaned, initially by 16 AA Bde and after their departure by 1 PARA BG, indicated that the Intent to carry out a major attack on the CF operating in Maysan Province was not there. Comd 16 AA Bde was concerned by banditry and general lawlessness, particularly on Highway 6, rather than anything else, and his main concern revolved around a CF Callsign (C/S) running into an incident involving lawless elements fighting each other, rather than any planned attack on CF per se. CO 1 PARA was well aware that the Capability was there but again all indications that he received dictated that, bar stone throwing incidents, the area was benign. Sensible precautions were taken, 2 vehicle moves, a minimum of 2 forms of communications and the carrying of helmets and Enhanced Combat Body Armour (ECBA), but beyond that there were no additional security arrangements in place. The business of patrolling the AOR, carrying out regeneration tasks in the Police Stations and Courts, and the work of CIMIC teams carried on, cognisant of the Capability however unrestrained by any direct threat.

AL MAJARR AL KABIR

15. A map of the town is at BOI/RMP/02. Al Majarr al Kabir is the second largest town in Maysan Province with a population estimated at anywhere between 50,000 – 90,000. There is one approach route into the town from the North, off Highway 6, Route TOBRUCK. In Jun 03, conditions in the town were basic, with regular power cuts and a short supply of drinking water. There was little paid employment in the town and the surrounding area was very tribal. There was always a somewhat hostile atmosphere in the town, mainly due to the high regeneration expectations of the population that were not being met. Stoning of patrols by children continued and there was strong evidence to suggest that it was being instigated by anti-coalition elements. 8 Pl Comd felt that the townsfolk did not like their way of life being interfered with. Against this background PARA patrols regularly visited the town and often based themselves at the Police Station. The RMP often visited the town and had a good relationship with the local Police. Regular meetings took place between Sgt Hamilton - Jewell and the Police leaders and whilst the Police were still pretty ineffective they were progressing and regeneration of a limited Police capability was beginning.

16. *Town Council:* CO 1 PARA, OC C Coy and OC CIMIC had a number of meetings with the local Town Council, including regular regeneration meetings. The 1 PARA BG had a good relationship with the town hierarchy and on 22 and 24 Jun 03 used the Town Council members to go to the town and mediate on behalf of the Coalition. OC C Coy regularly met the Town Council and did so on 23 Jun 03. OC CIMIC liaised closely with the Town Council over local employment issues and was in contact with them over the manning of the Sugar Cane factory in the days leading up to 24 Jun 03. The BG understood the intricacies and tribal issues in the town and was very conscious of ensuring that the right messages were passed to members of the town through the Town Council.

17. *Police Station location and structure.* The photographs forming RMP/BOI/078 show the Police Station at Al Majarr Al Kabir a few days after the

Q6b (4),(9).

p18, C.

p139, B-E.

p37, p38.

p137, E-H, p 138, A,B.

p8.

ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

p22, A.

p38.

Q6c(6).

Q6e(5), Q6d(3).

BOI/RMP/02.

CPK/1 part of BOI/RMP/07.

p322 – 323.

p116,C.

p33, G .p40, A-B.

p71, B,C,E.

Q6e(3).

Q6e(4), 6c(4).

BOI/RMP/06 p4).

p 44, C,D.

p321,C.

p41,

C-p42, A.

p322, E.

Q6e(5).

[REDACTED]

incident. The Police Station resides in a compound with a wall approximately 5ft high along its front and a prominent tree in front of the entrance. Since these photographs were taken the Police Station has been heavily fortified and now bears little resemblance to how the Police Station looked on 24 Jun 03.

RMP/BOI/078.

MISSIONS AND TASKS

18. *Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)*. The Mission of the CPA is, 'in partnership with the Iraqi people and the International community, to establish the conditions for the creation of a sovereign, accountable and representative government in an Iraq that is stable, united, prosperous, and able to take its rightful place as a responsible member of the region and the International community'. The stated endstate for the CPA was expressed in terms of an ultimate goal of 'a durable peace for a unified and stable Iraq that: provides effective and representative government for and by the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a properly functioning market economy; and no longer poses a threat to its neighbours or International security'.

Q6a(1).

RE/2 part of RMP/BOI/046.

19. *The Coalition LAND Component*. The Board has not sourced the missions and tasks of the Coalition LAND Component as it does not deem these to be relevant to the Inquiry.

Q6a(2).

20. *1(UK) Armd Div*. The HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div mission was to 'conduct security and stabilisation operations within boundaries, in order to set conditions for Iraq becoming a stable, self-governing state'. Subordinate formations and Div units were allocated missions and tasks in sp of the Div intent 'to continue to further post war normalisation of SE Iraq, ensuring vital security, enforcing law and order, and enabling further improvements to public services in order to build public confidence...' These missions and tasks were derived from a number of Div Lines of Operation covering the areas of security, rule of law, governance, infrastructure, humanitarian relief and public perception.

Q6a(3).

RE/1 part of RMP/BOI/046, p3.

21. *1 PARA BG*. On 24 May 03 1 PARA BG mission was to regroup to 7 Armd Bde on orders, assume responsibilities of Maysan Province AO, in order to set conditions for coalition security and the transition to a free and stable Iraq. BG sub units were allocated missions and tasks in sp of the BG intent to assume responsibility for the whole of Maysan Province from 16 AA Bde through the employment of a BG configured and capable of operating on a Province wide basis across a number of key lines of development. These lines of development covered the areas of security, regeneration and information operations and from these specific missions and tasks were generated for each sub unit of the BG. The command relationship between the 1 PARA BG and HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div was changed as a result of discussions between Comd 16 AA Bde and GOC HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div. As a result 1 PARA BG was placed OPCOM HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div.

Q6a(4).

ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

22. *1 RMP*. The 1 RMP mission was to provide specialist Pro input throughout the 1 (UK) Armd Div AOR in order to help restore and maintain law and order among the Iraqi community. Sub units were allocated missions and tasks to sp the 1 RMP intent to provide a common Pro *modus operandi* across the Div AOR. The initial onus was on providing specialist sp to Formation Troops in an Internal Security (IS) role through MP Liaison Officers (LOs)/Continuation Non Commissioned Officers (CONCOs) and pointer teams (arrests and finds). In addition they were to concurrently conduct an evaluation of the Iraqi Police in order to identify the work required to restore Police primacy.

[REDACTED] p138, F.G.

[REDACTED] p19, C.

RE/1 part of RMP/BOI/046.

Q6a(5).

RE/7 part of RMP/BOI/046.

[REDACTED]

23. *1 Pl, 156 Pro Coy - Jun 03.* The Pl mission was 'to provide Close Support (CS) to 1 PARA BG and continue to support and monitor the development of the Iraqi Police Service within Maysan Province where possible in order to facilitate a smooth transition between 1 (UK) Armd Div and 3 (UK) Div'. RMP Sects were allocated tasks to sp the Pl intent 'to continue to provide specialist functional sp to 1 PARA BG across the Maysan Province AOR, and in addition to sp the Maysan Province Police service whilst managing a gradual draw down to reflect 3 (UK) Div RMP Force level capabilities'. The intent was that the RMP Pl become part of a number of composite Sects, based at selected Police Stations, which act as CF patrol bases, and to simultaneously allow monitoring and tutoring of the local Police in situ. RMP at those locations were to ensure that effective Police shift systems were adopted, that adequate manning levels were maintained and that the Iraqi Police were diplomatically introduced to effective Police working practices. Every effort was to be made to ensure that the interim Police became a proactive rather than reactive service, providing regular reassurance patrols (preferably by foot) throughout each AOR, establishing and maintaining liaison with the community and building up public confidence in their abilities. Refurbishment of Police Stations was to be carried out in a controlled manner to reflect value for money.

1 PARA BG OPERATING METHODS AND PROCEDURES

24. *Plan of the Operations (Ops) Room.* 1 PARA BG took over the 16 AA Bde Ops Room at Abu Naji camp in late May 03. They laid out the BG Ops Room as per RT/4.

25. *Communications in the Ops Room.* 1 PARA BG operated BG Very High Frequency (VHF) and High Frequency (HF) communications nets, with each Coy retaining a Coy VHF and HF net. Additionally the HCR retained their own VHF and HF nets. The RMP did not maintain their own net and relied on using Coy and BG radio nets to communicate. Furthermore the BG Ops desk had 2 Iridium phones, however these were often difficult to get communications with and on occasions the operator had to lean out of the Ops Room window to get a satellite link. Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) was not available in the Ops Room but a field phone line ran from the Ops Room to the TACSAT operator in a separate building. PTARMIGAN communications were available to allow the BG to speak, secure, to 1 (UK) Armd Div.

26. *Battle Rhythm.* The BG operated a daily Battle Rhythm. At 0800hrs the Ops Offr would give a verbal update around the BG Birdtable (Map Board) and each element of the BG would also brief relevant information. The 0800hrs brief was designed to provide an all informed update on patrol activity and current intelligence, but was also designed to prepare the Ops Offr prior to the COs 0900hrs update. At 0900hrs the CO held a daily briefing in the conference room and all elements of the BG were represented. This was a wider brief than that held at 0800hrs and would not normally cover the detail of patrol programmes. At 1800hrs an Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) was despatched to HQ 1(UK) Armd Div and this was available to key personalities. 1 Pl did not have a formalised briefing process. Meetings took place as and when Sect Comds were available and tended to focus on administrative details.

27. *Patrolling.* To provide a presence on the ground the 1 PARA BG assumed a system of patrols. These patrols were made up of 1 PARA C/Ss, sometimes with HCR, CIMIC, Engr or RMP assets in support, sometimes on their own. Patrols were coordinated at a 1700hrs weekly meeting chaired by the BG Ops Offr. Sub

Q6a(6).
ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

RT/4 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p116, F,H.

[REDACTED] p117, B-D.

[REDACTED] p119, C-D.

[REDACTED] p116,D.

[REDACTED] p117, G-H.

Q6k(1).

[REDACTED] p76, D-E.

[REDACTED] p11.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p2).

RMP/BOI/080.

[REDACTED] p22, G - p23, A.

Q6c(2).

[REDACTED] p76, F.

units were given themes to plan their patrols, for instance, focus on recovery of stolen vehicles. From this meeting a written patrol programme was produced, these were initially done for a week in advance, however this proved to be impractical and therefore by mid Jun 03, patrols were actually being planned a minimum of 24 hrs in advance. The BG produced a synchronisation matrix to allow all subunits to have visibility of what each C/S was planning to do. This was held on the BG Birdtable and from this Coys informed Comms Ops of potential Iridium phone requirements. It was impossible for the BG to maintain an accurate LOCSTAT for patrols due to the difficulties with communications and they therefore relied on patrols reporting in when they could get communications back to the BG Ops Room. This was the procedure for contact reports. When the RMP patrolled with a 1 PARA C/S they were incorporated into the synchronisation matrix. However, the Board found that when the RMP deployed on routine visits/patrols on their own, they were often not included on the synchronisation matrix. On a number of occasions witnesses, both PARA and RMP, state that they came across patrols which they were not aware of.

28. *Gazelles*. The BG had at least 2 Gazelle aircraft and at least 4 crew resident at Abu Naji Camp. This provided Gazelle cover for incidents or as a means of transporting small numbers of personnel across the AOR. The Gazelle were fitted with a Ultra High Frequency (UHF) radio for air traffic control, a Tactical (TAC) VHF radio for ground to air communications and a VHF radio for talking to the Air Ops desk at Abu Naji camp. As such they were ideal for air communications relay tasks. Pilots and co-pilots could switch between radio nets at will, however all three could be monitored concurrently. The Gazelles were equipped with GOA gyro stabilised 2.5x and 10x magnification sight and whilst these were an aid to vision they were designed to allow magnified observation when a Gazelle is hovering and at a height of approximately 100ft. The sights were not designed to provide air to ground observation from 5000 ft and had the additional limitation of only being able to be used from the left hand side of the aircraft. [REDACTED] presented to the Board some video footage taken after this incident from a height of 5000 ft and this highlights the difficulties that the Gazelle crews had when tasked to provide observation. This footage is from a handheld camcorder and is only representative.

29. *QRFs/ARFs*. The QRF/ARF in Abu Naji Camp was larger than that normally used by a BG. It was enhanced by the CO due to his concerns over the potential for small patrols to come into contact and the need, especially due to the size of the AOR, for a rapidly deployable, substantial and robust QRF. A Medical Immediate Resuscitation Team (IRT) was available to deploy with the QRFs as required. The QRFs consisted of:

- a. QRF 1 - A multiple of 12 men at 5 minutes Notice to Move (NTM), mounted in Pinzgauers. It was expected that QRF 1 would deploy by road.
- b. QRF 2 /ARF - A multiple of 12 men at 30 minutes NTM. It was expected that QRF 2 would deploy by air, it took approximately 20 minutes to get the Chinook ready to fly.
- c. HCR QRF - A Tp of Scimitar at 15 minutes NTM.
- d. Manoeuvre Support Group (MSG) QRF - In addition there were 6 Weapons Mounted Installation Kit (WMIK)s, with .50 machine guns, double hatted as QRF and escort, with 2 WMIKs available to deploy with QRF 1 at 5 minutes NTM.

Q6k(6).
[REDACTED] p77, B-H.
Q6e(10,(i)).
Q6f(10(i)).

[REDACTED] p120,F.

Q6e(10).Q6k(4).
Q6k(8).

[REDACTED] p28, G- p29,B.
BOI/RMP/6 [REDACTED] p4).
[REDACTED] p72,F.

[REDACTED] p4, B.

[REDACTED] p17,F - p18,C.

RMP/BOI/048.

Q6c(7), Q6c(8).

[REDACTED] p9, D-E.
[REDACTED] p13, E-G.
[REDACTED] p34,D-G.

[REDACTED] p78, C - p79,F.

30. *Chinooks.* There were normally 2 Chinooks available at Abu Naji camp, one for IRT taskings and one in support of the QRF. The Chinooks flew from the HLS just outside the front gates of Abu Naji Camp. The cockpit and pilot and co-pilot seats were armoured, however the remainder of the aircraft had no armour protection. The aircraft were armed with 2, sometimes 3, 7.62 M60 air-cooled gas operated machine guns. Normal flight procedures were to avoid transiting over towns and to fly at 3 – 4000 ft to avoid any Small Arms (SA) fire. When Chinooks flew over towns they always flew fast and low to minimise acquisition time. However experience, prior to 24 Jun 03, was that Chinooks had had the effect of dispersing and calming crowds as they were noisy and their downdraft was significant.

31. *1 PARA Booking Out Procedures.* A Coy 1 PARA BG was operating from the Stadium in Al Amarah, where they employed their own booking out system. This was unique to A Coy and the Board considers A Coy procedures no further. The other Coys operated out of Abu Naji Camp and fell under the BG booking out procedures. The Patrol Comd would report to the Coy watchkeeper to receive an update on matters that may affect the conduct of his patrol. The Patrol Comd would then submit a flap-sheet, which would contain the patrol itinerary, names of the patrol members, approximate timelines and Iridium telephone number. From the information on the flap sheet the Coy watchkeeper would book the patrol out in the Coy Log, update the Coy patrol location whiteboard and put a map pin in the main BG Birdtable map showing the patrol callsign and patrol location. The movement of the map pin in-line with the patrol programme was the responsibility of the respective Coy watchkeeper, based on location updates from the patrol. The Coy watchkeeper would then brief the BG watchkeeper, pass on the flap sheet, which was then placed on a centralised board on the BG Birdtable, and he would also ensure that the patrol details were recorded on the BG whiteboard. Finally, prior to leaving the Ops Room, the Patrol Comd could pick up an Intelligence update from the G2 desk and on leaving Abu Naji Camp he should carry out a communications check with the Coy Ops desk. The Board is satisfied that this booking out procedure was followed by 1 PARA C/S.

32. *RMP Booking Out Procedures.* The RMP should have adhered to the BG booking out procedures. In respect of B and C Sects who were based at Abu Naji Camp, the Sect Comd should report to the RMP Ops desk and should brief the duty RMP watchkeeper on his days tasking. The Sect Comd should complete the RMP booking out sheet, moved from its original location in the accommodation to the Ops Room, stating the patrol itinerary, names of the patrol members, vehicle registration numbers and approximate timelines. After booking out through the RMP Ops desk, the Sect Comd should then report to the Coy Ops desk for a further briefing on the Coy AOR, and to brief the Coy watchkeeper on the patrol details. These details would be then put onto the Coy patrol whiteboard. The RMP watchkeeper then places a map pin, with MP written on it, in the BG Birdtable map board. Finally, prior to leaving the Ops Room, the Sect Comd could pick up an Intelligence update from the G2 desk and on leaving Abu Naji Camp he should carry out a comms check with the Coy Ops desk. In practice this routine was not followed. 2IC C Coy states that he often had to remind his RMP Sect to book out through the Coy Ops desk and B Sect Comd states that he never booked out through his Coy Ops desk. In addition only cursory information was ever passed to the Coy. The pin was not always placed on the BG Birdtable mapboard and RMP Sect Comds rarely went to the G2 desk. The Board believes that the RMP Sects regularly failed to give a communications check prior to leaving the camp and also that they failed to update the Ops Room on the progress of their visits/patrols. The

[REDACTED] p23 A-F.

[REDACTED] p45, E-F.

[REDACTED] p3, G-H, p4 B.

[REDACTED] p45, H- p46, A.

Q6c(1), Q6k(1), Q6k(2).

[REDACTED] p40, D-E.

[REDACTED] p72, G – p73, B.

[REDACTED] p137, G – p138, C.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p4).

[REDACTED] p149, E – p151, E.

BOI/RMP/016.

Q6d(1), Q6d(2), Q6k(2), Q6k(3)

[REDACTED] p204, E – p205, C.

[REDACTED] p28, C.

MJM/1 part of BOI/RMP/07.

Q6k(3).

[REDACTED] p149, A.

[REDACTED] p28, E-F.

[REDACTED] p 238, F- p241, C.

[REDACTED] p29, G – p30, B.

[REDACTED]

fact that there was an RMP desk in the BG Ops Room led to a misperception on where responsibilities lay for the coordination of routine RMP visits/patrols. 2IC C Coy states that he thought the RMP desk was keeping track on the progress of RMP visits/patrols, indeed the RMP desk did place the map pin in the BG Birdtable; he further states that he thought the RMP C/Ss were reporting in to the RMP desk by radio. The RMP BG LO states that he thought the RMP C/Ss were being coordinated and controlled by the Coy desks. In practice, nobody kept track of the RMP C/Ss when they were on visits/patrols and the RMP C/Ss did not report in their progress. The RMP Ops desk had no communications assets, so the RMP C/Ss could not report to them.

33. *ALS and CIMIC C/Ss.* The ALS representative always travelled with the 1 PARA BG MT or the RMP. They did not book out and relied on their host C/S to carry this out for them. The CIMIC team booked out through the relevant Coy Ops desk as per a PARA C/S.

COMMUNICATIONS

34. *Background.* 16 AA Bde maintained robust communications architecture with VHF, HF and PTARMIGAN coverage. This was enabled by rebroadcast facilities and was enhanced by TACSAT and Iridium phones. On the drawdown of the Bde to a single BG a number of assets were withdrawn, whilst others were passed onto the 1 PARA BG. Communications however were poor across the whole AOR and CO 1 PARA BG recognised this as a major concern and retained additional TACSAT Channels and all of 16 AA Bdes Iridium phones when the Bde left theatre. Though not ideal CO 1 PARA BG had all the available communications assets that a BG would normally expect to have, plus some significant additional assets. The size of the AOR however meant that he had to accept limited communications coverage and he made his plans accordingly.

35. *1 PARA BG.* The 1 PARA BG communications concept was to maintain normal Combat Net Radio (CNR) communications across the Province using VHF and HF. The BG however recognised that outside of Al Amarah, where communications were enabled by a rebroadcast station on the top of the hospital, a combination of TACSAT and Iridium phones were going to be required. Coys were to attempt to use their own VHF command nets where distance allowed when communicating with their sub units, with Iridium phones as the alternative means. HF communications were to be established from static locations wherever possible.

36. *CNR.* 1 PARA BG was equipped with CNR in accordance with Army Material Liability Committee (AMLC) Clansman Radio Scale 4100 – Infantry Battalion Light - Air Assault. This provided the BG with a mixture of portable and vehicle borne VHF and HF radios as the principal means of communication. The distribution of radios and equipment types were based upon the establishment of a hierarchy of radio nets from Sect to BG, operating over tactical distances. Clansman is an old system and the British Army is in the process of being issued with the new BOWMAN communications system. At the time however Clansman was the only system available to the BG. Basically it was reliable, however the VRC 353 did struggle due to the temperature in Iraq, but operators were well versed in how to get the best from all the Clansman radios and with careful management they worked adequately. However there were limitations. The Communications Engineering Instruction (CEI) was issued widely and all witnesses spoken to by the Board who operated a radio were clear as to its content. To ease operations and in line with the threat there was no requirement to have daily frequency changes. As a result radios were set on the correct frequency

[REDACTED] p141, E-F.

[REDACTED] p205, F.

[REDACTED] p304, B – p305, A.

[REDACTED] p318, D-E.

Q6j(1), Q6j(2).

[REDACTED] p 9, B-G.

[REDACTED] p79, F – p80, F.

[REDACTED] p81, F-G.

Q6j(3).

Q6j(1).

ARB/3 part of RMP/BOI/07.

[REDACTED] p9, B.

[REDACTED] p291, H.

Q6j(10).

[REDACTED]

BOI/RMP/061.

Q6j(4), Q6j(5).

[REDACTED] p119, H – p120, B.

[REDACTED] p66, B.

[REDACTED] p103, E-F.

Q6j(8).

[REDACTED] p122, A,B.

[REDACTED] p68, E - p69, B.

BOI/RMP/068.

[REDACTED] p9, B, p13, F-G, p32, C.

throughout. In addition to the BG nets there was a theatre run HF Guard net. This covered the main Highway 6 and C/Ss could register for a C/S with HQ 1(UK) Armd Div if they were travelling along the route.

BOI/RMP/067.

37. *RMP PI CNR*. The composite RMP PI was equipped with vehicle borne VHF and HF radio in the form of VRC 353 and VRC 321. The PI personnel were particularly skilled in operating the latter HF radio, which is their primary means of communication during war fighting operations.

ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07, pC

38. *Alternative Means of Communication*. The principal alternative means of providing communication within 1 PARA BG was the Iridium phone. The BG held 29 of these phones, a number of which had been purchased by 16 AA Bde on an Op FINGAL Urgent Operational Requirement (UOR). Phones were held centrally to enable them to be charged on the limited powerpoints available and to ensure that they were available to patrols as required. A phone booking out system was used within the BG Ops Room and Comms Ops to control the issue of the phones. Phones were signed out prior to deploying on patrol and returned on completion. Less the RMP, all commanders interviewed by the Board stated that they always deployed with an Iridium phone and that phones were always available when requested. In addition there were a number of military TACSAT systems and these were used to allow C/Ss who operated from static locations a considerable distance from Al Amarah, to communicate back to the BG HQ. They were also used by the HCR. A further 3 Thurayia mobile phones were also held by the BG Commander and the CIMIC teams to enable them to communicate with local Iraqis.

Q6j(2).

RMP/BOI/55.

RMP/BOI/56.

[REDACTED] p80, B.

[REDACTED] p 120, G - 121, F.

[REDACTED] p9, E.

[REDACTED] p10, G.

[REDACTED] p163, D - H.

[REDACTED] p113, E.

[REDACTED] p98, E.

[REDACTED] p104, C-E

[REDACTED] p4, H - p5, B. [REDACTED]

p332, A - E.

[REDACTED] p80, B, C.

RE/9, Staffing Issues 23 Jun 03, part of BOI/RMP/046.

COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

39. *VHF Screening*. The most significant communications problem encountered by C/Ss operating in Maysan Province was the screening effect in urban areas caused by buildings. VHF radio signals were blocked (due to reflection) and operating ranges were reduced dramatically when operating in towns, this situation was further exacerbated as the majority of 1 PARA BG C/Ss were using the less powerful manpacks. Screening had a particularly adverse effect on PI level mounted and dismounted operations where Clansman PRC 349s and 350s were rendered virtually useless. Radio rebroadcast stations could be deployed onto high features to improve VHF communications, an example of this was the use of a VHF rebroadcast station on top of the hospital in Al Amarah.

Q6j(5).

[REDACTED] p82, D. p86, A.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p3).

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p3).

[REDACTED] p74, F, p75, F.

40. *HF Degradation*. The peculiar physical conditions prevailing in Iraq, and particularly in Maysan Province, appeared to reduce significantly the effectiveness of the HF systems, particularly groundwave propagation. Successful HF communication required complex antennae skill, luck and considerable set up time. HF radio could not guarantee communication during mobile patrol operations and often took considerable time to establish once static. A number of witnesses state that they never managed to achieve HF communications.

[REDACTED] p78, H - p79, C.

[REDACTED] p98, E.

[REDACTED] p29, G - p30, E.

[REDACTED] p52, E, F.

41. *Operating Ranges*. Operating ranges varied, it was sometimes possible to speak to a C/S a significant distance away, but not to be able to speak to a C/S in close proximity. Standard planning ranges were redundant.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p

[REDACTED] p86, A.

42. *Iridium Satellite Telephone Limitations*. Iridium phones could not be operated whilst mobile, and had a limited battery life. They required direct access to the satellite and therefore would not operate indoors. The standard procedure was for patrols to keep them switched off unless a call was being made back to Abu Naji

[REDACTED] p74, F.

[REDACTED] 163, G - p164, D.

[REDACTED] p279, E - G.

camp. The phone was not an all informed net and if the receiving phone was busy or out of satellite coverage, then the caller is transferred to an answer machine.

43. *Lost Communications Procedures – Al Amarah.* A Coy's AOR in Al Amarah was relatively compact with command and control exercised through a Coy Ops Room at the Stadium. Communication was achieved by using VHF through the rebroadcast station on top of the hospital. HF was a back-up to VHF. The lost communication procedure within A Coy's AOR was to return to base.

44. *Lost Communications Procedures – Outside Al Amarah.* CNR was not effective in large parts of the AOR outside Al Amarah and therefore the only really effective method with which a patrol could communicate back to Abu Naji camp was through the use of the Iridium phones. If the Iridium failed then the patrol's inability to guarantee communications on CNR should have resulted in them having to return to base. The reality however was that communications were notoriously bad and patrols tended to press on, in the hope that communications would improve. Patrols were never in constant communication with the BG Ops Room, so Comds had to make command decisions on the ground. It is clear that B Sect of the RMP never established effective VHF or HF communications and yet they continued to patrol, even though they did not have an Iridium phone. The Board believes that C Sect of the RMP operated under similar conditions.

45. *Dismounted Communications.* For inter patrol communications the principal method employed by C/Ss deployed on foot, was through the use of CNR supplemented by the Bowman Personal Role Radio (PRR). For the rear link to the BG Ops Room it was through, ideally CNR, although almost always by the Iridium phones. 1 PARA is configured to operate predominately dismounted and their radio sets are established to allow this type of operation. The RMP however operated from their Fitted For Radio (FFR) vehicles and when they dismounted from those vehicles they were effectively without Clansman capability. To overcome this they adopted the practice of leaving a radio operator with the vehicle when they dismounted.

46. *RMP PI Communications Limitations.* The composite RMP PI was equipped with a mixture of vehicle borne VHF and HF Clansman radios and PRR. The RMP PI did not have the ability to improve radio communication from static sites using mast equipment as these had been returned to the UK during the draw down of 156 Pro Coy, although they could have drawn additional equipment from the 1 PARA BG if they desired. They had no Iridium phones issued to them and although C Sect are reported to have occasionally had access to an Iridium phone, the Board believes that the normal practice was for RMP patrols to deploy without one.

EQUIPMENT

47. *General.* At the end of the war fighting phase, and in line with the extraction from theatre of 16 AA Bde and a move into Phase 4, a decision was made to reduce ammunition and other weapons scalings. It was no longer appropriate, or necessary, to carry excessive amounts of ammunition, grenades or smoke and in addition concerns over deterioration of stock, due to its exposure to the elements, resulted in a 1 (UK) Armd Div policy decision to draw down.

48. *Weapon Scalings.* Individuals on OP TELIC 1 deployed with their personnel weapon, either SA 80A2, Light Support Weapon (LSW), General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), Pistol, or for some of the infantry units, UOR procured Minimi or Underslung Grenade Launcher (UGL). Generally weapons type and scaling were

[REDACTED] p227, G – p278, A.

Q6j(6).

[REDACTED] p40, F.

Q6j(6).

[REDACTED] p130, F.

[REDACTED] p67.

[REDACTED] p105, B – H.

[REDACTED] p29, G – p30, G.

Q6j(7).

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p2).

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p4).

[REDACTED] p4, C.

[REDACTED] p30, E.

[REDACTED] p42, A – E.

[REDACTED] p51, F –

p52, A.

Q6j(12).

[REDACTED] p26, C – p27, E.

[REDACTED] p47,

E – p48, H.

Q6i.

[REDACTED] p21, D.

[REDACTED] p11, B – H, p 12 A, B.

RMP/BOI/022.

RMP/BOI/053.

Q 6i(1), Q6i(6).

[REDACTED] p267, F.

[REDACTED] p61, p62.

[REDACTED]

appropriate, however a number of witnesses interviewed stated the difficulties of operating long barrelled weapons in a vehicle, either as a driver or comd. A review of weapons carried by those operating in the confines of a vehicle cab is required to determine whether they should carry a short barrelled weapon as well as their own personnel weapon or whether a new weapon system should be procured for this purpose. Equally a few of the RMP interviewed stated that they would have wished to have a more substantial machine gun than the LSW available to them at stages of the operation; indeed they carried out training on the GPMG prior to deployment.

49. *Personnel Protective Scalings.* All members of 1 PARA BG, including, HCR, RMP, CIMIC and ALS, interviewed by the BOI have stated that they had ECBA and issued helmet. The Board is in agreement with those interviewed that the type and availability of Personnel Protective Scalings were appropriate for both the warfighting and Phase 4 of the operation.

50. *Ammo Scaling.* War Fighting ammo scalings for all elements of the Force were generous and although there were initial restrictions on in theatre training all those interviewed state that they had more than sufficient for the war fighting phase. This included SA ammunition, grenades, smoke and mini flares. Post warfighting and on the withdrawal of 16 AA Bde from theatre, ammunition scalings were reduced. On 28 May 03 all of 156 Pro Coy handed in their war scalings of ammunition, RMP/BOI/025, this was an administrative action to allow 156 Pro Coy to reconcile their accounts. 1 PARA BG reissued 1 PI a total of 1050 rounds of 5.56mm 4B/1T and 750 rounds of 5.56mm Ball. This roughly equates to 65 rounds per person, although it would vary depending on LSW allocation and how each individual Sect allocated out the ammunition. On 11 Jun 03 [REDACTED] (COS 1 PARA BG) wrote a letter stating that members of the BG were to carry 150 rounds of 5.56 ball per SA 80 /LSW. Members of the RMP PI did not apparently see this letter but it was discussed on a number of the Quartermasters (QM)s daily conferences. At the same time there were a number of discussions within the RMP C/Ss over the scaling of "50" rounds per person and the fact that grenades had been withdrawn. At no stage did any member of the RMP PI hierarchy approach 1 PARA and ask for additional ammunition or for clarification as to what the PARA BG were carrying. If the RMP hierarchy had requested an increase in ammunition there is no reason to believe that it would not have been granted. QM 1 PARA BG has stated that there was plenty of ammunition available and it would have been issued if it had been requested. The withdrawal of grenades was across the whole of the BG. It reflected an assessment made by G3 and G4, that grenades were no longer appropriate and that they had been held by individuals for some time in a harsh environment and there were concerns over degradation. The BOI has concerns over the issuing of grenades to the RMP in the first place. A number of members of 156 Pro Coy have stated that they had grenades issued to them for the warfighting phase, yet they had received no training in their use and it is not a serial in the RMP training programme. On 28 May 03 the RMP also handed in Signals kit pyrotechnic pistol (red) and smoke grenades of various colours. They did not ask for these to be reissued from 1 PARA BG. Again QM 1 PARA BG states that they had reserves available and they would have been issued if requested.

51. It is difficult to state what is an appropriate scaling of ammunition for this operation. Certainly during the warfighting phase all members of the BG interviewed felt that they had sufficient ammunition. Concerns began to arise when the ammunition scalings were drawn down. The threat and the "benign" environment suggests that the scaling of 150 rounds per SA 80/LSW was appropriate, and the fact that on 24 Jun 03 the PARA C/Ss 20A and 20B were able to carry out a sustained firefight against a significant number of enemy over a

[REDACTED] p12, D-E.

[REDACTED] p198, E-H.

[REDACTED] p121-122.

[REDACTED] p80, G.

[REDACTED] p143, A.

Q6i(2), Q6i(7).

[REDACTED] p12, E-G.

[REDACTED] p227, D, p228, D,E.

Q6i(3).

RMP/BOI/025.

[REDACTED] p 265, A.

[REDACTED] p144, A.

RMP/BOI/054.

Q6i(4).

[REDACTED] p12, D.

RMP/BOI/012.

[REDACTED] p16, E.

[REDACTED] p41, C.

[REDACTED] p53, A-G.

[REDACTED] p15, A.

[REDACTED] p56, E.

[REDACTED] p98, A-H.

[REDACTED] p65, F.

[REDACTED] p13, F.

[REDACTED] p21, C.

[REDACTED] p102, F.

[REDACTED] p13, A.

CJF/1 part of RMP/BOI/07.

[REDACTED] p199, C.

[REDACTED] p16, C.

[REDACTED] p120, D.

RMP/BOI/025.

[REDACTED] p13, F.

[REDACTED] p20, F.

Q 6i(5).

[REDACTED]

protracted period, supports this. The scaling of "50" rounds per person, in a "benign" environment could be deemed adequate and certainly up until 22 Jun 03 there had been no contacts or situations which resulted in more than one or two rounds being fired. However on interviewing members of 1 PI it is clear that they felt that "50" rounds was inadequate and inappropriate. They discussed this issue with their PI hierarchy who did not see it as a significant issue. The Board is of the belief that the withdrawal of grenades was appropriate.

52. *Vehicle Scalings.* 1 PARA had a mixture of vehicles consisting of Pinzgauers, L/Rs, WMIKs, DAFs and a Bedford 4 Tonne. Generally this was appropriate and they task managed their vehicles to each operation or patrol. When a C/S was transiting to an area to carry out a foot patrol they would deploy in a troop-carrying vehicle, usually a DAF. If a C/S was carrying out a vehicle patrol they would task manage the Pinzgauers and take out a number appropriate to the scale of the task. The WMIKs and L/Rs were used for the QRF and MSG and for admin tasks as appropriate. Careful Military Transport (MT) management therefore meant that the appropriate vehicle for the task was made available. The vehicles were reasonably reliable and even though spares were not plentiful and the vehicles had been operating in a harsh environment, after a war-fighting period, they were generally available for tasking. One issue that did arise though was as a result of a decision, at Divisional level, that the whole force would adopt a single fuel policy using the American fuel JP8. This fuel was fine for the majority of the UK's vehicles however it had an impact on the DAFs, which often struggled to start on JP8.

53. The RMP detachment was issued with a fleet of Wolf L/Rs for patrolling, and a Pinzgauer for admin tasks. This was entirely appropriate and the Wolf L/Rs had the added advantage of being FFR. A few members of the RMP stated that a vehicle providing greater firepower and protection would have been more appropriate. The Board is of the opinion that in the environment within which they were operating, and particularly the fact that their role required them to closely liaise with the local population, that the Wolf L/R was indeed the most appropriate vehicle. The environment has however significantly deteriorated and when the Board visited Iraq in May 04 the RMP C/Ss were operating, in Basra, from the Snatch L/R. Under the current threat this is now the appropriate vehicle, however a study into what future vehicles may be appropriate for RMP use should be taken forward.

54. CIMIC patrols operated with white fleet civilian vehicles, or civilian style military vehicles. Again, considering their tasks and the environment at the time, this was an appropriate form of transport.

55. ALS relied on military transport from the MT Section. In either instance the vehicle was appropriate for their missions and tasks in the environment at the time.

56. *Morphine Scaling.* During the warfighting phase every member of 16 AA Bde was issued with Morphine (2 capsules of 10mg/capsule). By mid May 03 Morphine had been withdrawn from all members of 156 Pro Coy by the Company Quarter Master Sergeant (CQMS). Post warfighting, as part of the administrative drawdown, Morphine was also drawn down within 1 PARA but very much dependant on personal choice. In some cases individuals retained their Morphine, in others it was held by Sect Comd, Sect 2ICs and selected soldiers. Members of 1 PI state that they asked for Morphine to be reissued however the RMP PI hierarchy did not forward that request to the 1 PARA QM staff. Morphine was available if it had been asked for.

Q6i(9).

[REDACTED] p3, B.
[REDACTED] p63, p64.

[REDACTED] p3, p4.

[REDACTED] p3, D-F.

Q6i(9)

[REDACTED] 156 Pro Coy.

[REDACTED] p13, D - p14, B.

Q6i(10).

[REDACTED] p238, G.

[REDACTED] p304, A.

Q6i(3). Q6i(11).

[REDACTED] p18, D - p19, E.

[REDACTED] p84, F.

RMP/BOI/24.

[REDACTED] p64.

[REDACTED] p14, A.

[REDACTED] p72, D.

[REDACTED] p23, A.

57. The Board understands the concern over the issuing of a controlled drug to soldiers. However in a potentially hostile environment, and also in a country where roads and driving standards are poor, and RTAs could take place in isolated areas, it is imperative that Morphine is issued to all members of the Force. The Board believes that Morphine should be readily available to all soldiers, irrespective of rank, operating in these types of environment, a view shared by [REDACTED] a consultant anaesthetist, interviewed by the Board. The Board has a concern over the culture of disciplinary proceedings for loss of Morphine, and believes that it may have resulted in a desire to hand in Morphine rather than risk the disciplinary action that would take place if it was lost.

[REDACTED] p41, D-G.

58. *Riot Control Scalings.* The public order equipment available to the 1 PARA BG was a single Internal Security (IS) Pack, RMP/BOI/057. This was held centrally in the Stadium in Al Amarah, the area deemed to be most likely to require IS support. Thirty six Federal Riot Guns (FRG)s were issued to the 1 PARA BG, RMP/BOI/58, and then issued to each Coy, C Coy being issued with 8. The threat pertaining to the BG and the number of instances where public order had broken down were very low. The scaling of one IS Pack and 36 FRGs was appropriate against the perceived threat and the number of instances of public unrest. In accordance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, no other riot control agents were issued to the BG. Having spoken to a number of members of the BG there is a general view that having CS gas available would not have been significantly advantageous. Its inability to differentiate between friendly and hostile C/Ss, the difficulties of wearing respirators, especially in the heat of Iraq, and the understanding by the locals that it was a non lethal gas all dictate against its use. Even if the 1925 Geneva Protocol had not been in place the Board concludes that CS gas should not have been deployed in response to the incidents in Maysan Province.

Q6m.

[REDACTED] p16, B.

[REDACTED] p27, A.

RMP/BOI/057.

RMP/BOI/058.

[REDACTED] p27, E.

[REDACTED] p60.

59. It is impossible to state that a difference in scalings of weapons would have made a difference to the fate of the 6 RMP. They had their allocation of personnel weapons and they were adequately trained in their use. It is very easy for the Board, in hindsight, to suggest that they should have been issued with GPMG. However the perceived threat at the time simply did not warrant it. The RMP were carrying out hearts and minds operations, they were liaising with locals and they were building up a Police Force. There was no reason for them to have additional firepower allocated to them. They had the ability to increase their firepower by taking PARA escorts with them whilst on patrol. They chose not to because the more robust stance of the PARA Regt personnel did not suit the RMP aims.

60. Equally it is impossible to categorically state that the RMP should have carried more ammunition, and that if they had been, that the outcome would have been different. However having spoken to all members of the RMP P1 it is apparent that they felt uncomfortable with the amount of ammunition that they had been allocated and that they did ask for more. The issue is not a stand alone one and relates to communications, training and ethos. If an individual knows that he has back up close by, he is confident in his military skills and he has sufficient ammunition to sustain a firefight until that back up arrives, then he may well initiate that firefight. If however he has no means of knowing when his back up will arrive, if at all, has limited ammunition and a training regime that recommends negotiation rather than conflict, then he may not. On 24 Jun 03 the 6 RMP had approximately 50 rounds of ammunition each, and may well have felt that this was insufficient to initiate a firefight. However, if they did make that decision then factors other than just the amount of ammunition they had might have influenced it. Equally if they had more ammunition the Board cannot say that they would have

Q6i(8).

made a different decision.

TRAINING

61. *1 PARA*. 1 PARA were at Collective Performance Level 5 (CP 5). They had attended a number of exercises in the months leading up to deployment, including Ex GRAND PRIX and Ex EAGLE STRIKE and in addition they had completed considerable pre and post deployment training, including an Operational Training and Advisory Group (OPTAG) package and some limited live fire and manoeuvre training in theatre. Their CO, and Comd 16 AA Bde, both state that they were content that 1 PARA were trained and prepared to conduct combat operations including warfighting. They also state that the Battalion were capable of conducting Peace Support Operations (PSO). Comd 16 AA Bde states that the 1 PARA BG was the most appropriate BG within his Comd to leave behind when the Bde departed theatre.

62. *RMP*. Between 7 – 30 Jan 03 all members of 156 Pro Coy conducted a Coy level training programme, CJF/1, part of BOI/RMP/07. This included all Individual Training Directives (ITDs), a detailed communications package and limited range work and field craft training. Comd 16 AA Bde, OC 156 Pro Coy and the Trg WO 156 Pro Coy all state that the members of 156 Pro Coy were adequately trained for the warfighting operation. There is a feeling amongst some RMP interviewed that RMP training does not focus sufficiently on infantry skills, and particularly on live fire and manoeuvre. However, pre deployment, it was believed that the RMP were being deployed in their traditional policing role and that the extra training they conducted in infantry skills was more than adequate to cover expected eventualities. The members of C Sect were generally experienced soldiers, certainly Sgt Hamilton-Jewell had infantry experience and Cpl Aston and LCpl Keys had both served with the infantry and they had a good level of infantry skills.

63. *Differences in Trg*. There were clear differences between the training of 1 PARA and the training of 156 Pro Coy. This is totally appropriate as each unit fulfils a different role and each was trained to fulfil its specific tasks within that role. Generic ITDs were carried out by both organizations, however the PARAs subsequently focused on infantry skills, the RMP subsequently focused on policing skills.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

64. Command relationships for the RMP PI left to work with the 1 PARA BG were not clear. Normally 156 Pro Coy are under the OPCOM of 16 AA Bde and whilst 16 AA Bde and 156 Pro Coy were in theatre this is the command relationship that was in place. With the withdrawal of the Bde and with the RMP PI being left as part of the 1 PARA BG the command relationships became muddled. The HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div Op O 005/03 dated 8 Jun 03 states that the RMP PI is OPCOM to 1 PARA BG. The 1 PARA BG Op O however has a number of anomalies. In the TASKORG the PI is under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the BG, in Annex C the RMP are under OPCON of 115 Pro Coy and Tactical Command (TACOM) 1 PARA BG. [REDACTED] however states that he was Tactical Control (TACON) to 115 Pro Coy and this is supported by the RMP 115 Pro Coy Fragmentation Order (FRAGO) 002 dated 16 May 03, however this was never confirmed. During interview, witnesses, not surprisingly, were unclear as to what command relationship they thought they were operating under. The Board believes that there was no uniformity of knowledge and consequently no clarity as to who was providing supervision and direction to whom.

Q6g(1).

[REDACTED] p18, G.

[REDACTED] p100, G – p101, A.

[REDACTED] p19, A.

[REDACTED] p59.

[REDACTED] p140, B.

Q6g(2).

[REDACTED] 21, G – p23, B.

CJF/1 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p30, E – p31, C.

[REDACTED] p143, F – p144, C.

[REDACTED] p29, F – p30, F.

RMP/BOI/042.

[REDACTED] p44, H.

Q6g(4).

Q6g(3).

[REDACTED] p4, F – p6, G.

RE/11 part of RMP/BOI/046.

ARB/3 part of BOI/RMP/07.

BOI/RMP/075.

[REDACTED] p29, D.

[REDACTED] p38, D – p40, C.

[REDACTED] p21, G – p22, B.

65. The Board believes that this ambiguity of command left the RMP PI Comd in a difficult position. The PI was clearly part of the BG and the RMP Sects worked with the PARA Coys. The Coys however were not directing Police tasks and the RMP Sects very much worked to the RMP PI Comd. The PI Comd received direction, but not command, from CO 1 RMP, in his capacity as the Divisional Provost Marshall (PM), through OC 115 Pro Coy. OC 115 Pro Coy regularly visited the RMP PI but he saw his role very much as a mentor rather than as a commander. This meant that the RMP Sects were in support of the PARA Coys operating in their AORs, however the PARA Coys had no, and indeed saw no need, to have visibility of the RMP tasks and daily activity. The RMP however worked to a programme of Police regeneration directed by the PM.

INTELLIGENCE

66. Post Warfighting operations in Maysan Province did not conform to the traditional counter insurgency type intelligence gathering format and indeed there was no intention to try and adopt a system of detailed intelligence gathering. Limited HUMINT capability and the existing Force levels meant that patrols would only be visiting towns outside Al Amarah on an occasional basis. They would not be able to gather any significant intelligence and consequently the Town Councils, the Police, the Fawj and local interpreters provided the only real form of ground intelligence. The belief that the area was "benign" was supported by all these agencies, and by the 1 (UK) Armd Div G2 staff, however particular concerns or unrest could develop without the Coalition knowing. Leading up to 24 Jun 03 there were no indications that the situation in Maysan Province had changed.

67. Intelligence was disseminated from HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div to the 1 PARA BG through daily INTSUMS. The Intelligence Officer (IO), at the 0800 hrs BG Birdtable brief and at the 0900hrs COs update, gave a daily Intelligence brief. Information was then passed to patrols at unit level briefs. On booking out C/Ss could receive the latest intelligence update from the G2 desk in the Ops Room. At 1800 a written INTSUM for HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div would be produced by the Intelligence Cell and displayed within the Cell for all Patrol Comds to read.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

68. ROE on 24 Jun 03 remained the Warfighting ROE. Individuals were authorised to fire warning shots, could fire BATON rounds and were authorised to use lethal force if required. These were well understood throughout the BG. The ROE were wide ranging and more than sufficient for the environment at the time.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO 21 JUNE 2003

69. *Searches in Maysan Province.* Post the war-fighting phase there was a significant amount of weapons in the Province, these were readily available and most people had at least 2 or 3 Small Arms (SAs) and also a significant number of heavier calibre weapons. Equally the Iraqi culture dictated that owning a weapon was very much a way of life and the average Iraqi expected to have a personal weapon at his disposal. There was also a fear that the Coalition would leave and civilians would not, without their weapons, be in a position to defend themselves. To try and reduce the weapons in circulation the Coalition instigated Op JASMINE, a weapons amnesty, the aim of which was to encourage Iraqis to hand in "surplus" weapons. The Op was hugely unsuccessful and virtually no weapons were handed in. At the end of the amnesty period the Coalition instigated Op

[REDACTED] p31, F-H.

[REDACTED] p6 D-G.

[REDACTED] p26, C-E.

BOI/RMP/074.

Q6c(5).

[REDACTED] p9-p10.

[REDACTED] p5, F.

[REDACTED] p5, C-E.

[REDACTED] p18, B-p19, B.

RE/3 part of RMP/BOI/046.

Q6e(9(i)), Q6e(9(ii)).

Q6e(9(iii)).

Q6e(1).

[REDACTED] p14.

Q6h.

RMP/BOI/069.

[REDACTED] p310, G.

[REDACTED] p20, H.

Q 6e(6)(i)-(v), Q6c(3).

[REDACTED] p8.

[REDACTED] p11, D-G.

[REDACTED] p44.

[REDACTED] p79.

CLAYMORE, an operation designed to remove heavy calibre weapons from society.

70. Op CLAYMORE was very carefully instigated. Detailed briefs were produced to ensure that Iraqi sensitivities were respected and every soldier spoken to by the Board, of many capbadges, clearly understood the sensitivities that needed to be adopted when carrying out these searches. Op CLAYMORE ran for the period 15 - 25 Jun 03. During that period 1 PARA BG carried out a total of 7 planned searches, all authorised by warrants signed by the CO or 2IC, although they did also carry out a number of random rummages in outhouses. No searches took place in Al Majarr Al Kabir. The BG did use dogs on a number of searches however once again they were very sensitive to the Iraqi feelings.

71. All searches were carried out in accordance with the Op CLAYMORE guidelines and great care was taken to ensure that property and personnel were respected. Heavy calibre weapons and excessive numbers of SAs were to be removed. The PARA hierarchy admit that they did make mistakes however these were minor and they genuinely believed that all possible cultural sensitivities had been taken into account. The locals however still had an issue over searches. Rumours began to circulate through the area that the Coalition was being insensitive and not respecting local customs and culture. Many locals did not understand why they could not retain weapons. 1 PARA BG was aware of this and through the Town Councils tried to ensure that the correct message was passed to the locals.

72. The BG perceived there to be no changes in the threat assessment or in the security environment in Maysan Province in the period leading up to 21 Jun 03.

EVENTS ON 21 JUNE 2003

73. Patrols had been operating in and around the area of Al Majarr Al Kabir for a number of weeks and stoning had become more intense. The CIMIC team operated in the town on a regular basis and Sgt Hamilton-Jewell and his Sect were regular visitors at the Police Station. OC C Coy however, wanted to gain a better idea of what was happening in the town and to better integrate the Coalition into the local community. He therefore decided to place a C/S, from the PARAs, in the Police Station for a period of a few days. The Police Station was the logical building to use and it would have also provided support to the Police Force who were still pretty ineffective. OC C Coy visited the Town Council on 21 Jun 03 to inform them of this decision. The Town Council were not in the Town Council building so a message was left informing them of the Coy's plan.

EVENTS ON 22 JUNE 2003

74. On 22 Jun 03 two incidents occurred.

75. In Al Amarah a C/S from A Coy carried out a planned search operation under Op CLAYMORE. During that operation the C/S was contacted and returned fire, no CF were injured and there was no confirmation of any enemy casualties. The Board believes that this has no bearing on the incident in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 23 or 24 Jun 03 and considers it no further.

76. On the morning of 22 Jun 03 C/S 20A from C Coy travelled to the town of Al Majarr Al Kabir to take up residence at the Police Station in line with the plan outlined the day before. There was no intelligence to suggest that this was going to

██████████ p19, F-p19, G.
BOI/RMP/030.

BOI/RMP/009.
██████████ p45.

Part of RMP/BOI/026.
██████████ p42, G.

Q6e(6(iii)).
██████████ p14.
██████████ p71, G- p72, A.

██████████ p15-16.
██████████ p9, F-G.

Q6e(1).
██████████ p10, G.

Q6e(1), (2), (5).

██████████ p40, E.

Q6e(1),(2), (5), (7).

██████████ p55, D-G.
BOI/RMP/033.

[REDACTED]

cause unrest and indeed the C/S was given the instruction to "go into the town and smile at people". The C/S established itself at the Police Station and had been there for approximately 3 hours when a crowd began to appear. This was not unusual as CF always attracted large crowds whenever they appeared, however it may be that this crowd was organised to respond to the pre notified presence of the C/S. The crowd was hostile and although they were not overtly carrying any weapons, they were carrying banners and appeared to be protesting about searches. Using the local Police, [REDACTED] attempted to negotiate with the crowd however the Police were ineffectual and the crowd quickly enveloped the Police Station. The crowd, now assessed to be in the region of 300 personnel, started to heavily stone and plunder the C/Ss vehicles and smash the windows of the Police Station. By this stage the C/S had sealed the Police Station with all members inside with the exception of [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] who were on the roof. [REDACTED] made the decision to fire warning shots over the heads of the crowd, however this had little effect. [REDACTED] used his Iridium phone to contact the BG Ops Room and requested QRF assistance. When [REDACTED] discovered that [REDACTED] had fired warning shots he rebuked him, as he did not believe that the crowd would know the difference between non-lethal and lethal force. Whilst waiting for the QRF to arrive he continued to use the Police to negotiate with the crowd, but again too little effect. Eventually [REDACTED] managed to speak to Abu Hatim and he agreed to move the crowd away from the Police Station and ultimately was instrumental in dispersing the crowd. [REDACTED] asked Abu Hatim to visit the CO to discuss the incident and he did so immediately after the event.

77. The QRF, made up of WMIKs, and a Tp of the HCR in light armoured vehicles arrived in the town and as they did so the crowd was already dispersing under the guidance of Abu Hatim. Indeed the QRF, on arriving at the Police Station, questioned C/S 20A as to why they had been called out, as there was no disturbance by the time they got there. In the Ops Offr's War Diary it states that BATON rounds were fired at this stage. The Board has not found concrete evidence to support this.

78. C/S 20A and the QRF then returned to Abu Naji Camp and the incident was recorded in the Ops Offr's War Diary, reported up to Div and was briefed at the Ops updates that night. The incident was however not deemed to be a significant event and whilst the stoning had been more intense than usual the BG believed that it was an issue that required a meeting with the Town Council rather than anything else.

EVENTS ON 23 JUNE 2003

79. CO 1 PARA directed that OC C Coy go into Al Majarr Al Kabir on 23 Jun 03 to meet with the Town Council to establish why the unrest had occurred. [REDACTED] accompanied by [REDACTED] the OC of the 1 KOSB Coy who was due to take over the AOR when the PARA Coy departed theatre, went to the Town Council building and a meeting took place with the locals. The meeting followed the typical Arab practice with individuals coming in and going out at will. There is evidence to suggest that the normal Town Council members attended the meeting, however the Town Council leader was away in Baghdad. There also appears to be another element present who were particularly hostile and aggrieved. The meeting was not progressing well and [REDACTED] felt that he needed to make some compromises to progress matters. He offered to abandon searches in the town, Op CLAYMORE was due to end on 25 Jun 03 anyway, and searches were clearly the issue worrying the locals most. An agreement was drawn up and [REDACTED] and a local leader signed it. The agreement is in relation to searches and [REDACTED] and

[REDACTED] p76, G.

[REDACTED] p77, C-p78, G.
[REDACTED] p50, D-p52, D.

[REDACTED] p38, A-D.

[REDACTED] p55, E.

[REDACTED] p89, G-p90, A.

[REDACTED] p89, G-p90, A.

[REDACTED] p78, F-79, E.

[REDACTED] p5, G-6, D.

RT/3 part of BOI/RMP/7.

Q6e(1), Q6e(2).

Q6e(9(iv)), Q6e(9(v)), Q6e(9(vi).

Q6e(8).

[REDACTED] p13, B.

[REDACTED] p41, G-p42, C.

[REDACTED] p45, A.

[REDACTED] p4, D.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are absolutely clear that it was only searches that the agreement relates to. [REDACTED] is equally clear that the Town Council understood this and that it was stated that patrols would continue. [REDACTED], Company Sergeant Major (CSM) C Coy, was also at the meeting and he confirms that the agreement was in relation to searches only and that patrols were to continue. [REDACTED] would not have had the authority to abandon patrols and GOC 1 (UK) Armd Div states that he was not prepared to have "no go areas" within the Div AOR. On return to Abu Naji camp [REDACTED] backbriefed the CO and at this meeting he also confirmed that it was searches that would cease, but that patrols would continue.

80. The Board cannot confirm what the Town Council's interpretation of the agreement was, however the document only refers to searches and at no point does it state that patrols would cease. Equally though there is the possibility for some ambiguity. In the document it states "... and there is no necessity that the Coalition and its different people be there and" This could be interpreted as relating to any coalition presence, not just searches. When questioned on this point [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are adamant that the Town Council knew exactly what was meant in the document and they are clear that the Town Council members knew that patrols would continue. What the Town Council passed down to the population is not known. Concurrent to the meeting, members of C/S 20B, led by [REDACTED], patrolled the town and reported no unrest.

81. There were no specific updates or increased threat assessments given to the C/Ss patrolling in Al Majarr Al Kabir the next day. No additional security measures were adopted and there were no indicators that anybody entering Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 Jun 03 was likely to be attacked or ambushed. All PARA C/Ss were aware of the incident at the Police Station on 22 Jun 03 as were the RMP C/Ss. Sgt Hamilton-Jewell decided to take his C/Ss through Al Majarr Al Kabir the next day to enable him to discuss with the local Police why they had been so ineffective when dealing with the crowd at the Police Station on 22 Jun 03.

EVENTS ON 24 JUNE 2003

82. C/Ss 20A and 20B. On 24 Jun 03 C/S 20A and 20B were the assigned C/Ss for 8 Pl, C Coy, 1 PARA. The C/Ss were manned as follows:

C/S 20A	C/S 20B

83. The C/Ss operated in support of one another and had Clansman PRC 351/2 VHF radios, with a few patrol members carrying PRC 349 VHF radios. Both C/Ss carried an Iridium phone and had a number of PRRs. All personnel deployed with

BOI/RMP/077.

[REDACTED] p43,
D-p44, B, p45, F-p46, A.
[REDACTED] p12, G-p13, D.
[REDACTED] p22, H-p23, B.

[REDACTED] p13, G.

[REDACTED] p5, B-D.

[REDACTED] p43, G-H
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p1, [REDACTED]

Q6e(9(ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi)).

Q6f(1(i), (ii)(iii)). Q6f(2(ii)(iii)).
[REDACTED] p250, D-E.

[REDACTED] p9, E-F.

[REDACTED]

ECBA and issued helmet. Each soldier carried his personal weapon, which was an SA 80 A2 with approximately 150 rounds, a Minimi with 400 rounds or a GPMG with 400 rounds of 7.62mm. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] carried FRGs with 6 or 7 rounds between them. Grenades were not carried but both Multiple Comds carried red mini flares. The PI travelled in 3 vehicles, C/S 20A in a DAF 4 Tonne and C/S 20B in 2 Pinzgauers. Morphine was held in each C/S.

84. *C/Ss 33J and 33K.* On 24 Jun 03 C/Ss 33J and 33K were the assigned C/S of C Sect 1 PI 156 Pro Coy. The Sect deployed in 3 TUM FFR L/Rs equipped with a combination of VRC 321 and PRC 320 HF radios and VRC 353 VHF radios. The Board is of the opinion that all personnel deployed with ECBA and issued helmet and in addition each soldier carried his personal weapon, which was either an SA 80 A2 or an LSW with approximately 50 rounds each. Morphine and grenades were not carried.

85. *Booking Out from 1 PARA Ops Room – C/S 20A and 20B.* On 24 Jun 03 C/Ss 20A and 20B were to visit Al Majarr Al Kabir to carry out a joint patrol with the Fawj, starting at the Fawj building in the town. The patrol route and tasks had been discussed with OC C Coy the previous evening. The Board believes that [REDACTED] booked out through the C Coy Ops desk stating time of departure as approximately 0840hrs. A patrol trace was submitted and details of the C/S including their Iridium phone numbers, were recorded on the C Coy whiteboard. A pin was placed in the BG Birdtable map by [REDACTED] placing the C/Ss at Al Majarr Al Kabir. C/Ss 33J and 33K had not yet booked out through the C Coy desk and therefore the C/Ss could not have been informed of their proposed patrol and they were not on the patrol synchronisation matrix.

86. *Booking Out from 1 PARA Ops Room – C/Ss 33J and 33K.* On 24 Jun 03 C/Ss 33J and 33K were to visit the Police Stations at Al Majarr Al Kabir, Qal'at Salih and Al Uzayr ultimately meeting up with the visiting 16 AA Bde Comd at Al Uzayr at 1400hrs. The patrol route and tasks had been the subject of a discussion between [REDACTED] and Sgt Hamilton-Jewell the previous evening. Sgt Hamilton-Jewell booked out through the RMP desk stating time of departure as 0910hrs and an estimated time of return as 1700hrs. There are no details, in the booking out sheet, of estimated timings at each Police Station, nor any reference to the planned meeting with Comd 16 AA Bde. A map pin with MP written on it was then placed, by [REDACTED], in the BG Birdtable map placing the C/Ss at Al Majarr Al Kabir. Sgt Hamilton-Jewell then reported to the C Coy Ops desk, as he was operating in the C Coy AOR, and had his outline patrol details marked up on the C Coy whiteboard.

87. *Ops Room Communication with C/Ss 33J and 33K.* There is no record of C/Ss 33J or 33K making any radio checks on any VHF or HF radio net on 24 Jun 03. Evidence presented to the Board suggests that the CNR held by C/Ss 33J and 33K would not have enabled them to communicate with the BG Ops Room at Abu Naji Camp due to the effects of VHF screening and HF degradation in the area of Al Majarr Al Kabir. The only means of semi guaranteed communication from Al Majarr Al Kabir to Abu Naji Camp was via Iridium phone. The Board accepts that C/Ss 33J and 33K had no Iridium phone with them on 24 Jun 03. In addition there was no landline communication into Abu Naji camp.

88. *Foot Patrol – C/S 20A.* Timings are unclear with various witnesses stating different times for activities. However, shortly after arriving at the Fawj building, at approximately 0930hrs, C/S 20A set out on a joint foot patrol with the Fawj. C/S 20B remained at the Fawj building to act as a QRF. [REDACTED] set off with

[REDACTED] p174, F-H.

[REDACTED] p169, G.
[REDACTED] p97, E-F.

Q6f(2(vii),(viii))-Q6j(11).

Q6j(11).

Q6f(1(i)), Q6f(1(iv)).
[REDACTED] p81, A-E.

[REDACTED] p46, H.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p3).

[REDACTED] p151, E.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p6).
Q6f(2(vi)). Q6f(5(iv)).

Q6f(5(ii)(iii),(iv),(v)).

[REDACTED] p250, D-E.
Q6f(2(ix)).

Q6f(5(v)).
MJM/1 part of BOI/RMP/07.
Q6f(2(v)).
Q6f(5(i)), Q6f(5(ii)).
[REDACTED] p208, C-D.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED]
p2). Q6f(5(iii)).

Q6f(2(x)), Q6f(2(xi)) Q6f(5(vi)).
ARB/1 part of RMP/BOI/07.
BOI/RMP/046.

[REDACTED] p98, E.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p2.
Q6f(2(xii)).

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p3).
[REDACTED] p81, D-G.

his multiple, an interpreter, and about 10 members of the Fawj, aiming to cross the Northern bridge, before heading down the East side of the river and into the market area. Approximately 100m along the road on the East bank of the river, the Fawj leader, in a 4x4 vehicle, drew up alongside [REDACTED] and warned him that if he continued with the foot patrol then he would be shot at. [REDACTED] then discussed with the Fawj leader how best to progress with the joint patrol and was advised to return to the Fawj building and conduct a joint vehicle patrol. [REDACTED] using his PRR, passed this message to C/S 20B still at the Fawj building. He then returned to the Fawj building and as C/S 20B were already mounted in their vehicles, 2 Pinzgauers, it was decided that C/S 20B would conduct the joint vehicle patrol. The Board are satisfied that there was no requirement for [REDACTED] to inform the BG Ops Room that he was carrying out a vehicle rather than a foot patrol or that he had been spoken to by the Fawj leader. He thought that the Fawj leader was "being jittery" and therefore the threat of being contacted was being exaggerated. He did not see it as an issue that required raising to the BG Ops Room.

89. *Vehicle Patrol - C/S 20B.* The joint vehicle patrol of C/S 20B and a Fawj contingent, in their own pick up, left the Fawj building at approximately 1010hrs. They moved South along the West bank of the river before crossing over the Southern bridge into the centre of the town. On entering the market area a crowd began to develop. Progress was slow and the crowd closed in on the patrol and stones were thrown at the C/S. The stoning became more intense, and one of the Pinzgauer's windscreens was broken. It was decided to dismount and walk the vehicles through the crowded streets. One of the crowd attacked a member of the Fawj, attempting unsuccessfully to remove his weapon. At some point soon after this the Fawj element of the patrol, extracted from the area. The stoning got significantly heavier with the Pinzgauers and members of the C/S being hit. In an attempt to control the situation [REDACTED], who was covering the rear of the patrol opted to fire a BATON round from his FRG at one of the ringleaders in the crowd. This had a very limited effect and the crowd was soon closing in on the patrol again. [REDACTED] then joined [REDACTED] at the rear of the patrol where both he and [REDACTED] fired a total of 6 or 7 baton rounds at members of the crowd. This had some limited effect, however the crowd still closed in on the patrol.

90. *Exchanges of Fire Involving C/S 20B.* [REDACTED] and a few other members of the C/S then fired a number of warning shots over the heads of the crowd to aid the extraction of the patrol. There is some confusion as to who exactly fired warning shots, however [REDACTED] states that warning shots were fired from SA 80 A2, GPMG and Minimi, he does however state that shots were all fired well over the heads of the crowd at an angle of 11 or 12 o'clock. Just after the warning shots had been fired a gunman engaged the C/S from a first floor window. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] took cover and returned fire and the remaining members of the C/S took cover and attempted to identify the firing point. The contact began to escalate with several more gunmen engaging the patrol from the buildings and from amongst the crowd. A number of the C/S returned fire, hitting identified gunmen, and the whole C/S began to extract. Under fire they mounted the Pinzgauers and by aggressive driving and returning fire they managed to withdraw from the market area.

91. *The Withdrawal of C/S 20B.* The patrol drove North, out of the main town, and took up a position on the East bank of the river. Their aim was to provide support to C/S 20A, as [REDACTED] thought that C/S 20A may be under attack at the Fawj building. There had been no communication between C/S 20A and C/S

[REDACTED] p83, A-G.

Q6f(1(v)).

[REDACTED] p84, B.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p6).
[REDACTED] p59, H-p60, A.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p3).
Q6f(1(vi)).

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p2).
JED/1 part of RMP/BOI/07.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p7).
[REDACTED] p19, A-C.
[REDACTED] p19, E.
[REDACTED] p175, B-D.
[REDACTED] p60, E-H.
[REDACTED] p61, G.
[REDACTED] p174, B-D.
[REDACTED] p175, E-p176, E.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p7).

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p7).
[REDACTED] p177, A-G.
[REDACTED] p8, G-p9, C.
[REDACTED] p62, A.
[REDACTED] p21, B-F.
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p8).
[REDACTED] p62, B-E.
[REDACTED] p177, G-p178, G.
[REDACTED] p21, G-p22, C.
[REDACTED] p62, F-p64, C.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p8, p9).
[REDACTED] p64, D-F.
[REDACTED] p85, B-D.

20B since C/S 20B had started their patrol. It was from this position, by the river, that [REDACTED] sent a contact report to BG HQ at 1037hrs. The C/S could not extract at this stage and remained in the area coming under fire from SAs and RPGs. At the same time their Pinzgauers were destroyed.

92. *Vehicle Move of C/S 20A.* At around 1025hrs, gunfire from the area of the market was heard by C/S 20A. Although hearing gunfire was not unusual, members of C/S 20A identified both 7.62mm and 5.56mm calibre rounds being fired, which led them to believe that C/S 20B were under contact. [REDACTED] decided to enter the town to support C/S 20B and therefore mounted his C/S onto their DAF 4 Tonne, and moved out of the Fawj building heading West to East across the Northern bridge. At this point some members of C/S 20A saw the Pinzgauers from C/S 20B speeding across the staggered crossroads approximately 200 meters in front of them, heading North. [REDACTED] decided to follow C/S 20B and moved towards the crossroads.

93. *Exchange of Fire Involving C/S 20A.* As C/S 20A arrived at the crossroads they turned North to follow C/S 20B. At this point they came under SAs fire from the South. The patrol debussed and took up a position of all round defence initially facing Southwards in the direction of the incoming fire. At this stage it was difficult to confirm firing points and the intensity of incoming fire increased and also started to come from the area to the East. It would appear that the enemy had been drawn from the market area and were attempting to outflank the C/S by using the alleyways between the market area and the Police Station. [REDACTED] began to withdraw his troops to form a firebase around the 4 Tonne and at the North East side of the crossroads, at the hospital corner. Incoming fire intensified and the C/S was fired at by an RPG. [REDACTED] spoke to [REDACTED] but communications were bad and [REDACTED] spoke to the BG Ops Room. It was from here that members of C/S 20A had direct sight of the Police Station perimeter wall approximately 200 metres away. The Board specifically asked all members of C/S 20A if they saw any RMP vehicles parked in the road outside the Police Station, or in the area of the Police Station. All members of the C/S are clear that there were no RMP vehicles visible at, or in the area of the Police Station. However a number of witnesses state that if the vehicles had been behind the wall and obscured by the tree then they would not have been able to see them anyway. No member of C/S 20A report seeing any smoke coming from the area of the Police Station.

94. *The Extraction of C/S 20A from the Crossroads.* The members of the C/S not forming the firebase push started the 4 Tonne which, due to using JP8, had stalled when stopped and would not start with the key. Once the vehicle had started the C/S mounted up and extracted themselves Northwards out of the town. As the C/S extracted past the Town Hall they came under fire from 2 gunmen in an alley to the East of the main road. These gunmen were engaged. At approximately 1050hrs C/S 20A, had safely extracted themselves to the Northern outskirts of the town and spoke on the Iridium to both C/S 20B and BG HQ.

95. *Subsequent Actions Involving C/S 20A.* [REDACTED] was briefed, by the BG Ops Room, on the Iridium, that the QRF were inbound and was tasked to re-enter the town to assist the extraction of C/S 20B. C/S 20A and C/S 20B spoke on the PRC 349, however communications were still poor. C/S 20A re-entered the town along Route TOBRUCK but were only able to progress as far as the area of the School, Grid Ref 064967, before coming under heavy and accurate fire. At about 1138 hrs the QRF, commanded by [REDACTED] OC C Coy, arrived in the area of the roundabout at the North of the town and set up an Incident Control Point (ICP).

BOI/RMP/046.

[REDACTED] p20, G - p22, G.

[REDACTED] p85, E.

[REDACTED] p40, G.

[REDACTED] p85, E.

[REDACTED] p65, F-G.

[REDACTED] p 85, G - p86, B.

BOI/RMP/034.

BOI/RMP/035.

BOI/RMP/036.

RMP/BOI/052.

[REDACTED] p105, G - p107, E.

[REDACTED] p62, G - p65, E.

[REDACTED] p90, B.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p4).

[REDACTED] p88, C - G p91, B-E.

[REDACTED] p42, C-E.

[REDACTED] p69, E - p70, B.

[REDACTED] p10, A - G p11, G - p1.

C.

[REDACTED] p67, D-E.

[REDACTED] p107, F - p108,

[REDACTED] p41, H - p42, B.

[REDACTED] p106, A.

[REDACTED] p33, C-F.

[REDACTED] p51, C.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p2).

[REDACTED] p49, F.

[REDACTED] p65, H - p66, C.

[REDACTED] p14, C.

[REDACTED] p90 G - p91, C.

[REDACTED] p15, E - G.

RMP/BOI/046.

[REDACTED] p153, D.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p5).

[REDACTED] p65, A.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p5).

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

C/S 20A was at that stage running low on ammunition and withdrew back to the ICP to meet the QRF. Once resupplied C/S 20A acted in support of the HCR and the MSG engaging targets until ordered to withdraw back to Abu Najj Camp.

96. *Mutual Awareness C/Ss 20A and 20B and C/Ss 33J and 33K* C/S 20A first became aware that an RMP patrol had been in Al Majarr Al Kabir at about 1250hrs, after an Iraqi ambulance, containing 3 bodies of the RMP Sect, had returned to the ICP from the town. C/S 20B became aware shortly afterwards. The Board is unable to state what awareness C/Ss 33J and 33K had of the PARA C/Ss in the town that day, however when C/Ss 33J and 33K booked through C Coy Ops desk the Board believes that it is reasonable to assume that they may have seen C/Ss 20A and 20B patrol programme plotted on the C Coy whiteboard.

97. *Actions in the BG Ops Room from initial contact report to tasking of ARF and Gazelle 1.* The contact report sent in by Iridium phone by C/S 20B was received by the 1 PARA BG Ops Room at 1037hrs. The call was answered by [REDACTED] the C Coy Ops Desk signaller. He took the call and then handed the Iridium over to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] informed the Ops Room that one of his C/Ss was in contact however communications, even on the Iridium, were bad and the details were sketchy. This was the first indication that the BG Ops Room had that there was an incident occurring. Shortly afterwards the BG Ops Offr called for key personalities from the Ops desks to gather around the BG Birdtable for a briefing. Post the briefing the QRF and IRT were deployed to travel by Chinook to the town, and a Gazelle was tasked to over fly the town. The second QRF was tasked to be prepared to move into the town.

98. *Ops Room awareness of C/Ss 33J and 33K.* During the initial BG Birdtable briefing [REDACTED] reported that there could be an RMP patrol at the Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir. He could not however confirm this as he felt that the C/S may have departed to their second location at Qal'at Salih. Having reported that the RMP patrol could still be in Al Majarr Al Kabir [REDACTED] attempted to get in contact with C/Ss 33J and 33K and confirm their location. Due to the difficulty in communications the BG Ops Room and therefore [REDACTED] did not, at this stage, have a detailed understanding of the seriousness of the incident. [REDACTED] states that he did attempt to contact the C/Ss using one of the radio operators, although he cannot remember whom. The Board has determined that C/Ss 33J and 33K did not have an Iridium phone with them and therefore the only means of contacting them was either through the BG or Coy HF and VHF nets, although there was only a very remote chance of achieving a successful link. Neither the C Coy or BG HF and VHF net operators recall [REDACTED] tasking them to try and contact C/Ss 33J and 33K, nor are there any entries in the BG or Coy radio logs to that effect. However [REDACTED] the BG Iridium operator, does state that he was approached by a member of the RMP and asked if he could get in contact with the RMP C/Ss, clearly he could not do this as the RMP had no Iridium phone. [REDACTED] then briefly left the Ops Room to inform [REDACTED] that there was an incident developing in Al Majarr Al Kabir that may potentially require RMP assistance. On returning to the Ops Room [REDACTED] approached [REDACTED] and again expressed his concern that C/Ss 33J and 33K may still be in Al Majarr Al Kabir. [REDACTED] tasked [REDACTED] to try and contact the RMP C/Ss.

99. At 1230hrs, after the BG Ops Room became aware that there were CF casualties, [REDACTED] tasked [REDACTED] to pass a TACSAT message to the Police Station/PARA Patrol House at Al Uzayr. This was to have been the last Police Station to be visited by C/Ss 33J and 33K that day and is the only Police

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p5).

Q6f(1(vii)).

[REDACTED] p92, A-D.

[REDACTED] p66, B-D.

BOI/RMP/046.

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p148, E-G.

[REDACTED] p94, D.

Q6f(2(iv)). Q6f(5(viii)).

[REDACTED] p94, F.

[REDACTED] p220, F - p221,

E. Q6f(10(ii)).

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

Q6f(5(ix)).

[REDACTED] p220, A-D. p221, C - p221, D.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p7).

[REDACTED] p289, E-G.

[REDACTED] p56, D.

BOI/RMP/046.

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p275, H.

[REDACTED] p220, E-F.

[REDACTED] p56, p57.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p7).

[REDACTED] p54, E-G.

BOI/RMP/46.

Station with TACSAT communications. The message was that if the RMP patrol had arrived they were to report in and to remain there.

100. *Gazelle Tasking.* At approximately 1050hrs [REDACTED], the Comd of the "First to Fly" Gazelle helicopter was briefed, in the Ops Room, by [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was tasked to fly to Al Majarr Al Kabir, establish communications with C/S 20B and act as a relay back to the BG HQ. [REDACTED] states that he further tasked the Gazelle, once it was in the air, for the crew to "have a look at the Police Station", or words to that effect. The Gazelle pilots knew Al Majarr Al Kabir well and when flying over the town traditionally used the Police Station as a point of reference. On 24 Jun 03 they flew top cover at 5,000 ft and used the Police Station as their normal reference point. They used their GOA gyro stabilised 10x magnification sights but at no stage did they see anything untoward occurring at the Police Station. However, they all state that they were not specifically tasked, and therefore they were not specifically looking for RMP vehicles. Equally even with the 10x magnification sight it would not have been easy for them to identify specific vehicles. The "First to Fly" Gazelle, to allow it to refuel, was replaced at approximately 1240 hrs by a second Gazelle. The Board has spoken to all the Gazelle crews and at no point did they hear the RMP mentioned, up until the point where the bodies had been recovered, on any radio nets, nor did they report back to the BG Ops Room that the Police Station was clear of RMP. Neither the Air Ops Offr, nor any of his staff who were manning the Air Ops UHF, VHF and HF nets, or the soldiers manning the BG VHF and HF nets recall any messages regarding the RMP C/Ss from the Gazelle crew. There is no entry of any such conversation in the BG Radio Log.

101. *Deployment of the Air Reaction Force (ARF).* Immediately after the contact report was received in the BG Ops Room the QRF runner was sent to warn off QRF1. [REDACTED], QRF1 Comd, reported to the BG Ops Room shortly afterwards. He was joined by [REDACTED], the Chinook pilot. Both were briefed by [REDACTED] to the effect that C/S 20B was in-contact in Al Majarr Al Kabir and was running low on ammunition and that C/S 20A was also in the vicinity. The QRF task was to deploy to Al Majarr Al Kabir, by air, to provide support and deliver additional ammunition. The Ops Room, at this stage, was aware that the RMP patrol may be in the town. [REDACTED] recalls this being mentioned, [REDACTED] does not. At about the same time a Chinook aircraft on a routine tasking from Basra arrived at Abu Naji Camp. This aircraft kept its engines running whilst it refuelled and [REDACTED] went to the HLS to request that the aircraft be handed over to her in order to save the time it would take to start up the ARF Chinook. Additionally the Chinook that had just arrived had a facility to enable air to ground communications, something not working on the ARF Chinook. In order to save additional time it was decided that the pilots of the Chinook from Basra should stay onboard and fly the mission and [REDACTED] gave them a brief. The Board believes that this brief did not mention the possibility of an RMP C/S being in the town. The QRF, plus an IRT, mounted the Chinook and were flown down to Al Majarr Al Kabir. There is some dispute as to whether additional ammunition was placed onboard, however as the Board believes this is not relevant to the incident, it has not been examined further. The Chinook crew followed standard practice and flew low and fast over the town. Somewhere in the passage of information the grid reference given to the Chinook crew did not match that recorded in the BG Log and the Chinook flew past C/S 20B and circled to the South of the town. On hearing C/S 20B on the net, the Chinook flew back over the town towards the C/S. As they flew over the centre of the town, near the crossroads, the Chinook was shot at by RPG and SAs fire. The RPG narrowly missed however 7 casualties were sustained from the SAs fire,

Q6f(8(i)).

[REDACTED] p31, F-p32, H.

[REDACTED] p98, F-p100, B.

[REDACTED] p37, G-p38, B.

[REDACTED] p18, F. p19, G.

[REDACTED] p20, B.

[REDACTED] p41, G-H.

[REDACTED] p23, G-H.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p3).

Q6f(8(i)).

Todd p94, D.

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p95, B.

Q6f(7(i)).

[REDACTED] p5, D.

[REDACTED] p5, G.

[REDACTED] p7, E.

[REDACTED] p41, H-p42, C.

[REDACTED] p48, C-E.

[REDACTED] p47, F-H.

[REDACTED] p53, F-G.

EVDB/1 part of BOI/RMP/07.

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p49, F-p50, D.

[REDACTED] p183, B-F.

[REDACTED] p26, A-B.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p9).

[REDACTED] p53, E.

[REDACTED] p20, E-p21, A.

BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p2).

including 2 serious head injuries. The pilot made a decision to abort the mission and return to the DS at Abu Naji Camp without landing in the town. The Board has interviewed all the Chinook crew, [REDACTED] who was on a headset, and a number of the ARF and IRT. Nobody on board was aware of the RMP C/S in the town and the only reason the mission was aborted was to get the critical casualties back to the DS. The Board has not been able to recover the Air Log.

102. *Deployment of the QRF.* OC C Coy deployed from Abu Naji Camp at approximately 1058hrs with a QRF consisting of his own Coy HQ, 2 Tps of HCR, an MSG, commanded by [REDACTED], and RMP support led by [REDACTED]. His task was to assist C/Ss 20A and 20B. On deployment from the Ops Room OC C Coy had an awareness of a missing RMP patrol. The scale of the gun battle in Al Majarr Al Kabir was not understood in the Ops Room at the time the QRF deployed and when the QRF arrived, at approximately 1138 hrs, and set up an ICP to the North of the town they were surprised at the scale of the engagement and the intensity of the firefight. As a result the QRF was very quickly fully committed and took some time to enable the extraction, under fire, of C/S 20A. It was during the extraction of C/S 20A that an Iraqi doctor, in an Iraqi ambulance, approached the ICP and stated that there were CF hostages at the Police Station. He offered to effect their release and [REDACTED] accepted this offer, coordinating the Friendly Forces fire to enable the doctor, who was not being fired at by the Iraqis, to re-enter the town. The doctor left to return some minutes later stating that the CF at the Police Station were dead. This was reported to the BG Ops Room at 1240 hrs. At this stage the intensity of the ongoing firefight was such that it was deemed not operationally essential to risk life by attempting to deploy the QRF to the Police Station to recover the bodies. The ICP at this stage had not confirmed that all of C/S 20B were alive and they thought that the bodies must be from C/S 20B. The Iraqi doctor offered to use his ambulance to go back into the town and bring out the bodies. The doctor left and returned to the town. He reappeared at the ICP at approximately 1255hrs with 3 bodies. C/S 20B had just been extracted and it was at this point that the members of the ICP realised that the dead soldiers must come from the RMP. This was the first confirmation of the presence of the RMP C/Ss in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 Jun 03. The doctor returned into the town and at approximately 1308hrs he brought out the remaining 3 RMP bodies. Up until this point there had been no mention of the RMP C/Ss on any radio net. The firefight was still continuing and CO 1 PARA BG, who was now at the ICP, made the decision to extract all elements of the BG from the town. He saw no advantage in attempting to go into the town to secure the Police Station. Any move into the town would have resulted in a major battle and, in his view, additional CF casualties. He ordered the BG personnel to return to Abu Naji Camp.

103. *Possible Options to Assist C/Ss 33J and 33K.* It was not until the RMP bodies had been brought out of the town that the BG Ops Room or any member of the BG on the ground knew for definite that there were RMP in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 Jun 03. There was always a possibility that the RMP had moved on and until the BG Ops Room knew for definite, they concentrated on the contact involving C/Ss 20A and 20B. If the RMP C/Ss at the Police Station had been equipped with an Iridium phone, as per the 1 PARA BG Op O, then they may have phoned the BG Ops Room when the initial contact in the town took place. This would have given them some situational awareness and it may have enabled them to make a decision to extract or to call for assistance. There was never an intention to issue the RMP, or any PARA patrols, with Thuriaya or TACSAT, however again, if they had those communications assets available to them then again they may have become more situationally aware and they may have taken different actions. Had the Gazelle crew been tasked to positively confirm that the RMP

Q6f(7(ii)).Q6f(7(iii)).

Q6f(6(i)).
BOI/RMP/06 [REDACTED] p5).

[REDACTED] p48, G.
Q6f(6(i)).

[REDACTED] p16, D-F.
[REDACTED] p52, B.

[REDACTED] p52, G-p55, G.

ARB/2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p92, B.

Q6f(1(vii)), Q6f(6(ii)).

Q6f(4(i)).Q6f(4(ii)).Q6f(5(vii))A
2 part of BOI/RMP/07.

[REDACTED] p18, B-F.

Q6f(1(viii)).
Q6f(5(x)).
Q6f(6(iii)).
Q6f(7(iv)).
Q6f(8(ii)).
Q6j(13).

vehicles were at the Police Station, and they had been able to see them, then the BG Ops Room would have been in a position to take a different course of action. They may have chosen to deploy the ARF to the area of the Police Station; they may have tried to get C/S 20A or C/S 20B to try and reach the Police Station; however, the confirmation that the RMP were definitely at the Police Station was never received and therefore these options were not considered by the BG Ops Room staff. If C/S 20A or 20B had known that there were RMP in the town they may have changed how they extracted from their contacts, however they were not aware and therefore again these options were not considered. The Board has no record of any communications emanating from the RMP at the Police Station requesting assistance.

104. *AWACs.* The Board has determined that an AWACs aircraft was not deployed during this incident. There was though, a static installation called MOJACK, which acted like an AWACs and co-ordinated fast jet movement in the area. The Board deems neither AWACs nor MOJACK or the US fast jets that flew over the town relevant to this inquiry.

105. *Orders and FRAGOs.* The Board has scrutinised the relevant parts of the War Diaries from PJHQ and has also received a number of exhibits from various witnesses. Those Orders and FRAGOs that the President deems relevant to the Board are attached as exhibits. The Convening Order tasks the Board to attach all Orders and FRAGOs from 28 Apr 03 – 24 Jun 03 to the Record. This has not been complied with as a large number are irrelevant.

106. *Logs.* The Board has not been able to find all the relevant Log Books relating to the 24 Jun 03. Specifically the Air Log has not been located. Having interviewed all air crew and all Air Desk signallers/watchkeepers the Board is content that they have an accurate picture of events. The SIB stated that they did not collect all the relevant Logs at the time of their investigation as they were dealing with the events in the Police Station, and not the circumstances surrounding the deaths.

107. *Chronology of events* – A chronology of events of 24 Jun 03 is at Annex A.

THE FACTS WHICH IN THE OPINION OF THE BOARD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE.

108. It is the opinion of the Board that the relevant facts established by the evidence are as follows:

- a. 156 Pro Coy and 16 AA Bde departed theatre at the end of May 03. 1 PARA BG assumed responsibility for Maysan Province with a composite Pl from 156 Pro Coy on 28 May 03.
- b. It was generally accepted that intelligence gathering capability was going to be limited.
- c. It was generally accepted that the BGs communications ability, particularly outside Al Amarah, was very limited. Mindful of this 16 AA Bde left behind all their Iridium phones and the BG stated in their OpO that outside of Al Amarah, a combination of TACSAT and Iridium phones were to be used.
- d. On 10 May 03 156 Pro Coy handed in its Morphine.

Q6k(5).

██████████ p13, A-D.

Q6f(9).

Q6c(10). Q6d(4). Q6d(5).

Q6f(2(xiii)). Q6f(5(xi)).

██████████ p8, D-E.

Q6f(6(iv)). Q6f(7(v)). Q6f(8(iii)).

[REDACTED]

e. On 28 May 03 all ammunition was withdrawn from 156 Pro Coy. On the same day, ammunition was reissued to the RMP stay behind composite Pl by 1 PARA BG at a scaling of approximately 50 rds per person. Morphine was not requested and therefore not reissued. On 11 Jun 03 1 PARA issued a letter stating that all members of the BG were to carry 150 rds per SA 80/LSW. This scaling was adopted by 1 PARA but was not followed by the RMP who remained holding 50 rounds per person.

f. Under the direction of the CPA the Coalition initiated a weapons amnesty (Op JASMINE) to run from 1 - 14 Jun 03.

g. The amnesty was unsuccessful and a series of search operations, (Op CLAYMORE) designed to collect in heavy weapons, started on 15 Jun 03 to run to 25 Jun 03. Seven planned searches were carried out in Maysan Province, all were carried out with local sensitivities well understood and respected. However, unsubstantiated rumours that the Coalition were being heavy handed and insensitive began to spread around the Province.

h. No planned searches were carried out in Al Majarr Al Kabir itself, however a number of rummages took place in the surrounding District.

i. Al Majarr Al Kabir was regularly visited by 8 Pl 1 PARA, C Sect 1 Pl RMP, a CIMIC team and the BG ALS.

j. On 21 Jun 03 [REDACTED] OC C Coy, visited the Town Council buildings in Al Majarr Al Kabir and informed the Town Council that an 8 Pl C/S would be basing itself at the Police Station for a period of a few days.

k. On 22 Jun 03 C/S 20A began to establish itself at the Police Station. A large crowd appeared protesting about searches and lack of progress on regeneration. After sustained stoning, C/S 20A, with the help of the QRF, extracted from the Police Station.

l. On 23 Jun 03 OC C Coy 1 PARA met with the Town Council to discuss local concerns. An agreement was drawn up stating that searches would cease. Patrols were also discussed and OC C Coy stated that patrols would continue.

m. On 24 Jun 03, C/Ss 20A and 20B from C Coy 1 PARA BG booked out of the C Coy desk in the Ops Room stating that they would depart Abu Naji camp at 0850 hrs. They submitted a patrol trace and planned to visit Al Majarr Al Kabir to carry out a joint patrol with the Fawj. They had VHF and HF comms and an Iridium phone with each C/S. They had approximately 150 rounds of SA ammunition each and Sect Comds, 2ICs and senior soldiers held Morphine.

n. C/Ss 33J and 33K from 1 Pl, 156 Pro Coy, booked out of the Ops Room through the RMP desk stating that they would depart Abu Naji Camp at 0910 hrs. Sgt Hamilton-Jewell, representing C/Ss 33J and 33K wrote, in the RMP Booking Out sheet, the locations that they would visit and an estimated time for their return to Abu Naji Camp. [REDACTED], the RMP Pl Comd, and [REDACTED], the RMP Ops WO, were present at the time. Sgt Hamilton-Jewell then, verbally, gave [REDACTED], C Coy 2IC the same information. C/Ss 33J and 33K had VHF and HF communications assets with them, however they had no Iridium phone. They had approximately 50 rounds of SA ammunition each and no Morphine.

[REDACTED]

o. C/Ss 20A and 20B did not make a radio check prior to departing Abu Naji Camp. They arrived at the Fawj building in Al Majarr Al Kabir at approximately 0930 hrs. They did not report their arrival at the Fawj building to the BG HQ.

p. C/Ss 33J and 33K did not make a radio check prior to departing Abu Naji Camp. They arrived at the Police Station in Al Majarr Al Kabir at approximately 0940 hrs. They did not report their arrival at the Police Station to the BG HQ.

q. At approximately 0955 hrs C/S 20A departed the Fawj building on a joint foot patrol with the Fawj.

r. At approximately 1005 hrs C/S 20A was approached by the Fawj leader and told that if they continued on a foot patrol they would be contacted, however they were advised that they could carry on in a vehicle patrol. C/S 20A returned to the Fawj building. They did not report this event to the BG HQ.

s. At approximately 1010 hrs C/S 20B set out from the Fawj building on a joint vehicle patrol.

t. At approximately 1020 hrs C/S 20B entered the market place and came under significant stoning. The situation escalated, [REDACTED] then [REDACTED] fired BATON rounds. Warning shots were then fired over the heads of the crowd. Almost immediately after the warning shots C/S 20B were contacted by SAs fire. They returned fire and extracted to an area East of the river and North of the town overlooking the Fawj building. They remained however in contact. C/S 20B made the first contact report to the BG HQ at 1037 hrs.

u. The BG Ops Room was cleared of all non essential staff and the Ops Offr held a briefing. [REDACTED], the RMP Ops WO informed the BG Ops Room that an RMP C/S may be in the town. He was tasked to locate the RMP C/S, however could not do so as they had no Iridium phone and VHF and HF communications were unworkable. The BG Ops Room informed Div HQ of the contact at 1105 hrs.

v. C/S 20A heard the shots from C/S 20B being fired, mounted their DAF and drove out of the Fawj building. As they entered the town they saw C/S 20B vehicles extracting. Whilst following C/S 20B vehicles out of the town C/S 20A came under fire at the crossroads in the centre of the town. They debussed and return fire.

w. During the firefight members of C/S 20A took up positions facing the South and looking directly down the road in front of the Police Station to the East. Members of C/S 20A identified that they were being contacted from an alleyway beyond the Police Station and from the area of the market place in the South. They returned fire. No RMP vehicles were seen by members of C/S 20A.

x. C/S 20A push started their stalled vehicle, remounted and extracted to the North of the town.

y. The Gazelles were ordered to fly top cover and to act as a relay to facilitate communications. Gazelle 1 deployed to the town and later was replaced by Gazelle 2.

z. C/S 20A having extracted completely from the town, realised that C/S 20B were still in contact and were ordered, by the BG Ops Room, to attempt to re-enter the town and assist in the extraction of C/S 20B.

aa. The BG Ops Room deployed an ARF and an IRT to the town to support the PARA C/Ss using the Chinook that had just arrived from Basra to carry out the mission. The Chinook overflew the town and came under fire. Seven casualties were sustained and the Chinook returned to Abu Naji Camp DS HLS.

bb. C/Ss 20A and 20B remained in contact whilst a road QRF, Commanded by [REDACTED], was deployed to the town. The QRF formed an ICP just to the North of the town.

cc. On arrival at the town the ICP and the QRF came under fire. Eventually C/S 20A was extracted to the ICP location and C/S 20B subsequently followed.

dd. During the extraction of C/S 20B [REDACTED] was approached by an Iraqi doctor who claimed that there were Coalition hostages at the Police Station. He offered to affect their release. The doctor went back into the town and returned stating that the hostages were dead. He then returned to the town and brought out 3 bodies. By this stage all members of C/Ss 20A and 20B were accounted for. The bodies were identified as being members of the RMP.

ee. The town was still hostile and the doctor offered to go back into the town to collect the remaining 3 bodies. CO 1 PARA made the decision not to enter the town in force and once the remaining 3 RMP have been brought to the ICP the 1 PARA BG withdrew to Abu Naji camp.

ff. Due to the hostile nature of the area no examination of the scene was carried out until 28 Jun 03 when Op SWORDFISH was initiated to allow forensic teams a short examination of the site.

gg. 1 PARA BG returned to UK prior to being interviewed by RMP (SIB).

hh. Remaining elements of 156 Pro Coy returned to UK prior to being interviewed by RMP (SIB).

FINDINGS OF THE BOARD

109. It is the opinion of the Board that there were a number of events that took place prior to, and on 24 Jun 03, that may potentially have had a bearing on the eventual deaths of the 6 RMP in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 Jun 03:

a. The drawdown from a Bde to a BG resulted in a reduction in the number of troops on the ground in Maysan Province and a recognition of a reduced intelligence capability. On handover, the Province was deemed to be sufficiently benign that a single enhanced BG could assume responsibility for it. There was though an understanding that the capability for significant unrest was present, however the Board is content that there was no evidence to suggest that an incident of this magnitude was likely to occur, indeed the

[REDACTED]

majority of the population were assessed as being pro Coalition. Following the handover, intelligence gathering capability was limited and consequently there were no indicators of this incident. Having additional intelligence gathering assets on the ground may have given warning that the incident was going to occur. However, even with the benefit of hindsight, it is impossible to state that intelligence assets would have forewarned of the incident.

b. The Board believes that an enhanced BG with the additional assets assigned to it was appropriate and adequately resourced to assume responsibility for Maysan Province. The BG operated with a substantial QRF capability, but with only light armour, supported by Support Helicopters.

c. The Board believes that the emphasis placed on the restoration of Law and Order by the BG was entirely appropriate in trying to achieve the end state of a durable peace for a unified and stable Iraq. This resulted in the BG having to deal with the militia and the Police, the latter, being very ineffective at this early stage of the occupation. As a consequence it was essential that the RMP mentored and trained the Police in order to raise their standing and value within the local community. The Board believes that having RMP Sects regularly visiting Police Stations was an effective way of improving the Police Force.

d. The Board is content that the BG was aware that Al Majarr Al Kabir was potentially more hostile than the rest of the AOR. However, up until the 22 Jun 03, there had been no significant incidents in the town. Patrolling and visits carried on as per any other town in the AOR.

e. The Board has a serious concern over the Command Relationships operating in the BG at the time and believes that this led to a degree of confusion and resulted in the RMP element of the BG "falling through the cracks" when it came to Command and Control. For example the PARA Coys believed that the RMP were booking out their own patrols, ensuring their coordination and communications. The RMP PI hierarchy believed that the PARA Coys were doing this.

f. The Board believes that the BG had a robust and effective briefing system and all disparate elements of the BG were included in daily briefings. Information was readily available, and, as normal, the system relied on unit's briefings down to ensure messages were passed across the chain of command.

g. The Board believes that there were sound procedures in place for the briefing, booking out and coordination and control of 1 PARA C/Ss. The environment and the communications assets available resulted in the BG adopting a less than ideal system, however it was appropriate for the conditions prevailing at the time. There was no attempt to track individual patrols in detail, the system in place relied on patrols, using an Iridium phone, reporting in on a regular basis as they transited the AOR.

h. The Board has concerns over the briefing, booking out and coordination and control of all RMP C/Ss, less A Sect, which was based at the Stadium. Briefings were ad hoc, booking out was poorly controlled and uncoordinated and once on the ground the patrols rarely updated the Ops Room on progress. The relative inexperience of the RMP PI Comd resulted in the RMP Sects being able to operate independent of the BG controls. The Sects often failed to book out with the PARA Coy desk in whose AOR they were operating in and

they rarely, if ever, had an Iridium phone. They had limited intelligence updates. They believed, in the Boards view, rightly, that they were not being supported by their RMP Pl hierarchy and when they raised issues these were not taken seriously or actioned. The Board however notes that the Military Police Officers Course has very little emphasis on Pl Comds skills, infantry operations and particularly command of an independent detachment.

i. The Board is satisfied that the training and pre deployment training of 1 PARA and 156 Pro Coy was appropriate to the warfighting and subsequent PSO that they were engaged in. The Board however accepts the comments made by a number of senior RMP Offrs that a greater emphasis needs to be placed on infantry skills training for RMP Offrs and soldiers.

BOI/RMP/076

j. The Board is of the opinion that the difficulties of communicating using the issued Clansman VHF and HF radios were significant. The AOR was substantial, the assets were old, and atmospheric conditions and urban clutter in the towns, dictated that an alternative means of communication had to be adopted outside Al Amarah. The BG were well aware of the communications limitations. The Board believes that the use of Iridium phones achieved the aim of allowing patrols to report progress. They were however not ideal. They did not provide an all informed net, an essential requirement for urban operations, they needed to be recharged regularly, occasionally they did not have access to the satellite and if engaged they placed the caller onto an answer machine. They were however, at that time in Iraq, the only realistic form of communication available between patrols and the BG Ops Room.

k. Due to the difficulties of CNR communications the Board is of the opinion that it became accepted practice, within some C/Ss, to depart on patrol without carrying out a radio check. This certainly appeared to be the practice for the RMP C/Ss.

l. The Board is of the opinion that the weapon scales for 1 PARA were appropriate; certainly once the UORs had been received. Equally the Board believes that the weapon scales for the RMP were appropriate considering the role that they carried out in Iraq at the time.

m. The Board is content that all members of the BG were issued with ECBA.

n. The Board believes that it was appropriate for 156 Pro Coy to withdraw its ammunition on its withdrawal from theatre as the 1 PARA BG immediately reissued ammunition to the remaining 1 Pl. Grenades were withdrawn and not reissued and the Board feels this was appropriate due to the prevailing threat, the degradation of the grenades and the potential for accidents.

o. 1 Pl were only reissued with approximately 50 rounds per person. The Board is of the opinion that even though Maysan Province was deemed to be benign, the issuing of only 50 rounds was insufficient, due to the size of the AOR and the time it would take to deploy a QRF. Certainly the RMP Sect members felt that they were under resourced. Ammunition was available in 1 PARA BG, however, the RMP Pl hierarchy never asked for more. The 1 PARA personnel carried approximately 150 rounds per person. The Board feels this was a much more appropriate scaling.

p. The Board is of the opinion that the Wolf L/R was the most appropriate vehicle for the RMP at the time.

[REDACTED]

q. Morphine was withdrawn from 156 Pro Coy on 10 May 03, soon after the warfighting finished. The Board is concerned that Morphine was not issued to members of the RMP in a potentially hostile environment, in a country where roads and driving standards were poor and RTAs could take place in isolated areas. The Board believes that Morphine should be issued, as a minimum, to all Sect Comds, in line with the approach taken by 1 PARA.

r. The Board appreciates that Op JASMINE was a directed operation and was always going to be ambitious. Op CLAYMORE however took account of Iraqi sensitivities and the prevailing gun culture. The Board is of the opinion that the operation was conducted with due diligence and was carried out appropriately. The operation did however cause unrest and probably resulted in the demonstration in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 22 Jun 03.

s. The incident on 22 Jun 03 was more hostile than anything previously experienced in Al Majarr Al Kabir. Even though no weapons were fired at C/S 20A, they felt under considerable threat and their vehicles were severely damaged resulting in QRF assistance being requested. In hindsight this could be viewed as a precursor to greater unrest in the town, however the BG, with limited intelligence gathering capability, treated it as an isolated incident that required negotiation rather than a military response. Taking into account the conditions prevailing at the time the Board concurs with the BG's view.

t. Whilst at the Police Station on the 22 Jun 03 [REDACTED], a member of C/S 20A, fired warning shots over the heads of the crowd; this was against the expressed order of [REDACTED] the C/S Comd. [REDACTED] rebuked [REDACTED] and stated that that was the end of the matter. When interviewed by the Board [REDACTED] was questioned over the possibility of warning shots being fired. He denied that any warning shots had been fired. When [REDACTED] gave evidence he accepted that he had fired warning shots and stated that [REDACTED] was aware of this. [REDACTED] was recalled by the Board and admitted that he was aware that warning shots had been fired. The Board felt that this failure to give a true account of the events could potentially taint the evidence of the whole of C/S 20A. As a result the Board recalled a number of C/S 20A to ascertain whether their initial evidence was indeed correct. The Board is now satisfied that the evidence presented by members of C/S 20A is truthful. The Board believes that this was an isolated incident of misplaced loyalty and the matter has been reported to [REDACTED] CO. The issue of warning shots being fired on 22 Jun 03, in the view of the Board, is not material to the events at the Police Station on 24 Jun 03 and was in accordance with the ROE at the time. The shots were fired well over the heads of the crowd and had little effect.

u. The Board has had the agreement signed by [REDACTED] at the Town Council meeting on the 23 Jun 03 translated by an independent linguistic expert. The Board is satisfied that the agreement only relates to searches. [REDACTED] is absolutely clear that the Town Council knew that patrols were to continue. [REDACTED] supports him in this view. The Board is content that it was agreed, at the meeting, that patrols would continue.

v. The Board is satisfied that C/Ss 33J and 33K were aware of the incident in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 22 Jun 03.

w. The Board is of the opinion that on 24 Jun 03, the RMP patrol was not on

[REDACTED]

the C Coy patrol programme and therefore C/Ss 20A and 20B were probably not informed of the RMP presence in Al Majarr Al Kabir when they departed on their patrol.

x. The Board believes that it is reasonable to assume that C/Ss 33J and 33K were aware of the presence of C/Ss 20A and 20B when they departed on patrol as the PARA C/Ss had already booked out and their details had been placed on the C Coy whiteboard.

y. On receipt of the contact report the BG Ops Offr called the Ops staff to the BG Birdtable for a brief. At that brief [REDACTED] was not able to positively confirm that the RMP C/Ss were in the town as he felt that they might have already left. Without that confirmation the BG Ops Room staff focused on the incident at hand and did not factor in the RMP. The Board believes this was correct. [REDACTED] attempted to contact the RMP C/Ss by radio, a course of action that was extremely unlikely to succeed. Whilst he was doing this the BG Ops Room staff continued to deal with the evolving incident, which was escalating. Until [REDACTED] or the C Coy Ops desk confirmed that the RMP were in the town the Board believes that the BG Ops Room staff could not have deployed assets to assist their extraction.

z. The difficulty in communications and the speed that the incident evolved resulted in some information being misinterpreted within the BG Ops Room. The BG Ops Offr thought he had tasked the Gazelles to look for the RMP, the Gazelle pilots are adamant that they were only asked to "have a look at the Police Station". The location of C/S 20B was correctly recorded in the BG Log, however the Chinook crew and the QRF1 Comd had a different grid. The Board is of the view that the incident was handled well by the Ops Room staff, however there was some confusion and part of that confusion resulted in the BG Ops Room never having a clear tasking to ascertain if the RMP were still in the town and if they were, to assist in their extraction.

aa. The Board believes that for expedience it was correct for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] to fly the Chinook sortie.

bb. The Chinook flight followed the recognised practice of flying low and fast over built up areas, however flying directly over a contact area was always likely to attract SAs fire. The crew attempted to avoid the built up areas and the Board believes that their flight path was logical. In hindsight it is easy to state that they should have avoided the area and landed some way off. However C/S 20B were calling the Chinook into their location and the decision to go to the C/S was made on the basis of the information available to the Chinook crew at the time. The Board believes that they made the right decision.

cc. The Board considers that the damage sustained by the Chinook and the critical condition of the 7 casualties onboard provides ample evidence of the severity of the fire fight in Al Majarr Al Kabir on 24 Jun 03. The Board agrees that due to the casualties on board it was imperative that the Chinook return to the DS as soon as possible and that this was the correct decision.

dd. The Board is of the opinion that [REDACTED] had no requirement to update the BG Ops Room that he was changing from a foot patrol to a vehicle borne patrol. [REDACTED] did not view the threat of a potential contact as being overly serious and therefore did not report this to the BG Ops Room. The Board

[REDACTED]

believes that in hindsight it would be easy to state that he should have reported the incident, however, Mission Command dictates that as he was the Commander on the ground, he should make a decision based on the facts and the atmosphere pertaining at the time. This is what he did. In light of this the Board believes that [REDACTED] took the correct course of action. At this stage there were no signs that this incident was going to escalate to the level that it did.

cc. With hindsight the Board is of the opinion that once C/S 20B entered the market place they were likely to be involved in a major incident. The threatening nature of the crowd and the severe stoning gave the C/S little alternative but to attempt to extract, using force. The use of BATON rounds was appropriate, and as the situation escalated the Board believes that the firing of warning shots was also appropriate. However the use of GPMG and Minimi for warning shots appears excessive to the Board. The initial return of fire was a surprise and the way the incident escalated was totally unexpected. The Board believes that the C/S acted professionally and that the only option was to extract under fire. The Board is of the opinion that the incident in the market place was the catalyst for what followed.

ff. Once C/S 20A had reached the crossroads and had formed a firebase a number of them had direct sight of the Police Station perimeter wall, some 200 meters away. The Board is satisfied that no RMP vehicles were seen by any member of C/S 20A. The Board is of the opinion that the RMP vehicles had already been moved inside the compound.

gg. The Board is of the opinion that armed members of the crowd had moved from the market place and had right flanked, through the alleyways, towards the Police Station. Once C/S 20A extracted, gunmen were in the vicinity of the Police Station.

hh. The Board recognises the leadership and the professional skills of C/Ss 20A and 20B which resulted in their ability to maintain a sustained firefight and ultimately extract themselves without injury.

ii. The Board is satisfied that the QRF2 deployment was expeditiously executed and that the actions of the QRF allowed C/Ss 20A and 20B to extract themselves. The scale of the contact should not be underestimated and when the Iraqi doctor approached the ICP and offered to go into the town to recover the hostages it was totally appropriate for [REDACTED] to take up that offer. He did not have sufficient combat power available to enter the town and the Board believes that his actions were correct. Once the Iraqi doctor stated that the CFs at the Police Station were dead it was again totally appropriate for the doctor to recover the bodies rather than 1 PARA BG mounting a major offensive to do so. Equally the decision not to re-enter the town immediately to secure the Police Station for forensic evidence was correct.

jj. *Were there any indicators?* The BG only had limited intelligence available and there were no indicators that an attack of this magnitude would take place. It is impossible, in the view of the Board, to say whether having additional intelligence gathering assets would have indicated that this incident was going to occur. The Board believes that the incident on the 22 Jun 03, in the absence of intelligence to the contrary, was not an indicator that the unrest in the town was going to escalate to such a scale and the meeting on the 23 Jun 03 was thought to have appeased the situation.

Q61(1).

kk. *Was this a surprise attack?* The Board concurs with the opinion of all witnesses that this was a surprise attack and marked the end of the honeymoon period that the Coalition was enjoying.

Q61(2).

ll. *Could it have been prevented/avoided?* With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to state that this incident could have been prevented/avoided:

Q61(3), Q6n.

(1) There was a requirement for the RMP to visit the Police Station, they could however have been accompanied by PARA C/Ss had the threat indicated that this was required. It did not.

(2) There was no all informed communications network available. The RMP should therefore have had an Iridium phone. This would have allowed the BG Ops Room to know that they were in the town and would have resulted in different actions being taken by the BG Ops Room, which may have allowed the RMP to extract. The BG Ops Room could have tasked the ARF differently, and even though it would have been difficult, they could have tasked C/S 20A or C/S 20B to try and reach the Police Station.

(3) The RMP C/Ss should have had more ammunition and this may have resulted in them deciding a different course of action at the Police Station, particularly if they knew that reinforcements were imminent.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BOARD

110. The recommendations of the Board are as follows:

a. The Command Relationships were unclear and this resulted in confusion. The Board recommends that Command Relationships are clearly articulated in OpOs and that the whole chain of command is clearly briefed as to whom they report to and who tasks them.

b. The booking out process was ambiguous. The Board recommends that any Ops Room operating in this sort of environment adopts a uniform booking out system. It further recommends that the system be checked on a regular basis to ensure that all attached units are complying and that an all informed patrol matrix is being maintained.

c. The watchkeepers Logs from this incident are poor. The Board recommends that watchkeepers are trained in maintaining a Log and that it is made clear to them that Logs could potentially become an exhibit in legal proceedings.

d. The Board recommends that a review be conducted of RMP Officer training to ensure that their young officers are better trained to command small isolated detachments. Additionally the Board recommends that thought is given to the RMP carrying out more infantry training, specifically focusing on infantry skills. The competing demands of Police training and Garrison Policing are precluding the RMP from having the time available to achieve anything more than a basic level of military training and skills. The Board understands that the RMP is subject to a LAND Management

[REDACTED]

Consultancy Service Review, which will hopefully address these issues.

e. The Board recognises that Clansman is an old radio system and that is in the process of being replaced with BOWMAN. Even when BOWMAN is in service there will still be occasions when theatres will have communications shortfalls. The Board strongly recommends that a detailed communications estimate is carried out on entering theatre, which is then regularly updated. Additionally UOR funds should be made available to purchase additional, off the shelf, communications assets as required. This is particularly relevant for units operating in the urban environment.

f. The Board recommends an assessment be carried out as to the suitability for the RMP to train and operate GPMG.

g. Grenades were issued widely for this operation and the Board strongly recommends that all personnel issued with grenades must be trained in their operating procedure before issue.

h. The Board recognises that this operation was transitioning from warfighting to PSO. The drawdown of ammunition was correct however the Board recommends that the scaling of ammunition should be set at BG level and that individual detachment commanders should not be able to dictate ammunition holdings. The scalings then need to be confirmed across the BG.

i. The Board recommends that Morphine is made available to soldiers operating in potentially hostile environments. If there is a concern about misuse then it may be appropriate to centralise Morphine. However, all Sects deploying on the ground should have immediate access to Morphine.


j. This BOI had an Officer from the ALS as a member. The guidance provided, especially over some of the more complex legal issues was invaluable. The Board recommends that where practical, consideration is given to providing an Officer from the ALS as a member.





MG HICKSON OBE
Colonel
President



WA COMMON
Lieutenant Colonel
Member



PJ DAVIES
Major
Member



J FLETCHER
Major
Member

18 Jun 04

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS ON 24 JUNE 2003

(All timings are estimated based on evidence presented)

Ser	DTG	Event
1	240800Jun03	Morning BG Birdtable update.
2	240840Jun03	[REDACTED] C/S 20A and [REDACTED] C/S 20B book out from C Coy Ops desk.
3	240850Jun03	Sgt Hamilton-Jewell approaches the Pro Ops desk to book out.
4	240900Jun03	C/S 20A and C/S 20B depart Abu Naji Camp for the Fawj building Al Majarr al Kabir.
5	240910Jun03	C/S 33J and C/S 33K depart Abu Naji Camp for the Police Station at Al Majarr al Kabir.
6	240930Jun03	C/S 20A and C/S 20B arrive at the Fawj building.
7	240940Jun03	C/S 33J and C/S 33K arrive at the Police Station.
8	240955Jun03	C/S 20A begins foot patrol heading into the market area, accompanied by the local Fawj militia.
9	241005Jun03	[REDACTED] (C/S 20A) is approached by local militia leader and advised that if he continues on foot, his patrol would be fired at. He is advised that if he wants to continue with the patrol, it should be a vehicle patrol. C/S 20A returns to Fawj building.
10	241010Jun03	C/S 20B depart Fawj building on a vehicle patrol.
11	241020Jun03	C/S 20B enter the market area and come under sustained stoning. Situation escalates and C/S 20B fire BATON rounds and warning shots and then come under SAs fire.
12	241025Jun 03	C/S 20B extract from the contact and head North out of the town.
13	241025Jun03	C/S 20A hears 7.62mm and 5.56mm gunfire from the direction of the market. They mount their vehicle and depart the Fawj building to offer assistance to C/S 20B.
14	241030Jun03	C/S 20A sees C/S 20B extracting North and follows. On approaching the crossroads C/S 20A comes under contact. C/S 20A debuses and returns fire.
15	241037Jun03	C/S 20B send initial contact report to BG Ops Rm on the Iridium phone.
16	241037Jun03	On receipt of the contact report [REDACTED] sends for the Ops Offr, QRF Comd.
17	241040Jun03	[REDACTED] Ops Offr arrives and takes control of the incident. Ops room is cleared, key personalities called to the BG Birdtable.
18	241040Jun 03	C/S 20A extracts from contact at crossroads and moves North.
19	241045Jun03	BG Birdtable briefing takes place. The possibility that RMP C/Ss 33J/33K could be at the Police Station in Al Majarr al Kabir is announced [REDACTED]
20	241050Jun03	C/S 20A contact report received in BG Ops Room.
21	241050Jun03	[REDACTED] the Comd of the "First to Fly" Gazelle helicopter and [REDACTED] Chinook pilot, [REDACTED] QRF 1 Comd, briefed [REDACTED]
22	241050Jun 03	C/S 20A ordered to re enter town to assist C/S 20B.
23	241058Jun03	QRF 2 deploys by road to Al Majarr Al Kabir.
24	241100Jun03	Chinook from Basrah arrives at HLS. [REDACTED] goes to take over aircraft. QRF 1 and IRT are loaded onto the Chinook. [REDACTED] retains comd of the aircraft.
25	241100Jun03	[REDACTED] BG COS enters Ops Room.
26	241100Jun03	Gazelle 1 takes off.
27	241105Jun03	Chinook with ARF and IRT takes off.
28	241110Jun03	Gazelle 1 arrives over Al Majarr al Kabir and begins mission.
29	241111Jun03	C/S 20B vehicles attacked with RPGs and destroyed.

30	241115Jun03	Chinook arrives over Al Majarr Al Kabir. On second orbit receives heavy incoming SAs fire and sustains seven casualties. Aborts mission and returns to Abu Naji camp.
31	241138Jun03	QRF arrives at Al Majarr Al Kabir and links up C/S 20A. Establishes ICP at Grid Ref 066980.
32	241145Jun03	QRF assets advance South into town and assist in extraction of C/S 20B.
33	241200Jun03	An Iraqi doctor arrives at ICP, in an Iraqi ambulance, and reports that there are four CF hostages being held in the Police Station. [REDACTED] asks the doctor to return and extract the hostages.
34	241230Jun03	The Iraqi doctor returns and reports that he has seen the bodies of 3 dead British soldiers at the Police Station. The doctor offers to collect the bodies and this is agreed [REDACTED]
35	241240Jun03	Report of 3 dead CF in Police Station received by BG Ops Room.
36	241240Jun03	Gazelle 1 relieved by Gazelle 2.
37	241250Jun03	All of C/S 20B extracted to ICP.
38	241250Jun03	The Iraqi doctor returns with the bodies of Sgt Hamilton-Jewell, Cpl Long and Cpl Ashton. The ambulance then returns to collect the remaining bodies of Cpl Miller, LCpl Hyde and LCpl Keys.
39	241320Jun03	[REDACTED] CO 1 PARA BG arrives at ICP.
40	241340Jun03	1 PARA BG extracts back to Abu Naji Camp.

A BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE DEATHS OF 2448779 SGT S A HAMILTON-JEWELL, 25027534 CPL R A ASTON, 24934788 CPL P G LONG, 25111198 CPL S MILLER, 25133133 LCPL B J HYDE AND 25084460 LCPL T R KEYS ALL OF 156 PRO COY RMP IN AL MAJARR AL KABIR ON TUE 24 JUN 03

WITNESS LIST - ALPHABETICAL

Serial	Name and Initials	Rank/Title	Role on 24 Jun 03	Interviewed By Board
1.		Lt Col (Retd)	SO2 (A) LAIT (Apr 04)	Yes
2.		Lt	OC 3 TP, HCR	Yes
3.		Pte	ARF	No
4.		Lt	OC 2 TP, HCR	Yes
5.		FO	Chinook Crew	Yes
6.		Lt Col	Former CO 1 RMP	Yes
7.		Tpr	QRF	No
8.		Sgt	Chinook Crew	Yes
9.		Lt Col	CO 1 PARA	Yes
10.		CoH	QRF	Yes
11.		Capt	SO3 Geo Int, HQ 1 (UK) Armnd Div	Yes
12.		LCpl	A Sect RMP PL	Yes
13.		Capt	RSO 1 PARA	Yes
14.		Lt Col	CO 1 ADSR	Yes
15.		Cpl	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
16.		Sgt	Sigs Sgt 1 PARA	Yes
17.		Capt	Battle Captain HCR	Yes
18.		Tpr	QRF	No
19.		Maj	SO2 G3 Plans, HQ1 (UK) Armnd Div	Yes
20.		Pte	ARF/IRT	No
21.		Cpl	A Sect RMP PL	Yes
22.		Capt	T/O QM (T), 1 PARA	Yes
23.		LCpl	ARF/IRT	Yes

24.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	No
25.	Tpr	QRF	No
26.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
27.	Maj	SO2 Legal	Yes
28.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
29.	LCpl	Docs Clk 156 Pro Coy	No
30.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
31.	SSgt	158 Pro Coy CQMS (May 04)	Yes
32.	LCpl	Radio Op, Iridium	Yes
33.	Cpl	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
34.	LCpl	A Sect RMP PL	No
35.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
36.	Mr	Army Historical Branch (May 04)	Yes
37.	Pte	QRF	No
38.	LCpl	Off Duty Wkpr RMP PL	Yes
39.	LCoH	QRF	Yes
40.	Lt Col	CO 1 RMP	Yes
41.	Maj	OC B Coy 1 KOSB	Yes
42.	WO2	Trg WO, 156 Pro Coy	Yes
43.	Maj	SO2 G2, HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div	Yes
44.	LCoH	QRF	Yes
45.	Pte	QRF	No
46.	Cpl	QRF	No
47.	Sgt	MT Sgt 156 Pro Coy	No
48.	Cpl	1 PARA C Coy Radio Op	Yes
49.	Pte	1 PARA, C/S 20A	Yes
50.	Tpr	QRF	No
51.	Cpl	B Sect RMP PL	Yes
52.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
53.	Capt	G3 Ops, HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div (Jun 04)	Yes
54.	Capt	Gazelle 1	Yes

55.	Cpl	HQ SIB (Apr 04)	Yes
56.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
57.	Pte	QRF	No
58.	LCpl	A Sect RMP PL	Yes
59.	Pte	QRF	No
60.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
61.	Tpr	QRF	No
62.	Cpl	IC B Sect RMP PL	Yes
63.	Prof	Expert Linguist, SOAS, Uni of London	Yes
64.	Pte	ARF	No
65.	SSgt	HQ SIB (Jun 04)	Yes
66.	Pte	ARF/IRT	No
67.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
68.	Cpl	Off duty Wkpr	Yes
69.	Maj	OC C Coy, 1 PARA	Yes
70.	Lt	OC 8PL, C Coy 1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
71.	Lt	1 PARA Ops Room Wkpr	Yes
72.	Tpr	QRF	No
73.	Capt	Gazelle 1	Yes
74.	Maj	CIMIC Team	Yes
75.	Tpr	QRF	No
76.	Capt	Gazelle 2 Commander	Yes
77.	Capt	MTO	Yes
78.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
79.	Maj	QM 1 PARA	Yes
80.	CSgt	QRF	Yes
81.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
82.	Maj	SO2 G3 Ops, HQ 1 (UK) Armnd Div	Yes
83.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
84.	WO2	Ops WO RMP	Yes
85.	LCpl	ARF	Yes

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Sgt	1 PARA AGC Det	No
Pte	ARF/IRT	No
Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
Maj	OC 115 Pro Coy RMP	Yes
Sgt	1 PARA Sig PI Stores	Yes
Capt	1 PARA IO	Yes
LCpl	A Sect RMP PI	Yes
Pte	ARF/IRT	No
Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
Sqn Ldr	ARF/IRT	Yes
Sgt	QRF	No
LCpl	QRF	No
Tpr	QRF	No
LCpl	QRF	No
Pte	1 PARA C/S 20A	Yes
SSgt	156 Pro Coy CQMS	Yes
Tpr	QRF	No
Sgt	Chinook Aircrew	Yes
WO2	CSM C Coy, 1 PARA	Yes
Lt	Air Ops Offr	Yes
Capt	RSO 1 PWRR (Ops Offr)	Yes
LCpl	1 PARA C/S 20B	Yes
LCoH	QRF	Yes
Flt Lt	Chinook Pilot	Yes
Cpl	B Sect RMP PL	No
LCpl	B Sect RMP PL	No
Brig	Comd 16 AA Bde	Yes
Capt	1 PARA C Coy Ops Offr	Yes
Maj	OC 156 Pro Coy	Yes
WO2	1 PARA RQMS	Yes
Lt	RMP PL Comd	Yes

117.	Pte	QRF		No
118.	Sgt	8PL Sgt, C Coy 1 PARA C/S 20B		Yes
119.	Pte	QRF		No
120.	Sgt	ARF		Yes
121.	Pte	QRF		No
122.	Tpr	QRF		No
123.	LCoH	QRF		Yes
124.	Sig	Radio Op, Air Cell		Yes
125.	LCpl	QRF		No
126.	CoH	QRF		Yes
127.	Cpl	A Sect RMP PL		Yes
128.	Sig	Radio Op, Air Cell		Yes
129.	LCpl	Sect RMP PL		Yes
130.	LCpl	Ops Room Signaller		Yes
131.	Pte	1 PARA C/S 20B		Yes
132.	Maj	OC 16 AA Bde Sig Sqn		Yes
133.	SSgt	RMP PL Sgt		Yes
134.	Cpl	Radio Op, BG VHF/HF		Yes
135.	Tpr	QRF		No
136.	Pte	QRF		No
137.	Tpr	QRF		No
138.	Cpl	QRF/ARF		Yes
139.	Capt	1 PARA Ops Offr		Yes
140.	Maj	1 PARA 2IC		Yes
141.	Tpr	QRF		No
142.	LCpl	QRF		No
143.	Sgt	RMP Wkpr		Yes
144.	Wg Cdr	Chinook Pilot		Yes
145.	LCpl	B Sect RMP PL		No
146.	Sgt	1 PARA, 9PL		Yes
147.	Maj Gen	GOC HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div		Yes

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Cpl	C Coy Signaller	Yes
Sgt	IC A Sect RMP PL	Yes
LCpl	I PARA C/S 20A	Yes
Cpl	Geo Cell, HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div (Jun 04)	Yes
Capt	RMO, 1 PARA	Yes
LCpl	A Sect RMP PL	Yes
Sqn Ldr	Chinook Comd	Yes
Tpr	QRF	No
Tpr	QRF	No
Capt	Gazelle 2 Pilot	Yes